Trudeau is Fully Aware of Foreign Interference and the Threat to Canada Losing its Sovereignty
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Summary
In this episode of the 2019 Annual Report, we discuss the threat facing Canada from foreign interference and the government's response to that threat. We also discuss the role of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) and the need for greater interdepartmental cooperation on foreign interference.
Transcript
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and i'm aware that you obviously can't get into details can you give any kind of ballpark about
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how many other countries we're talking about here is that a lot of other countries
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that engage in foreign no no we're not allowed i i'm sorry i can't uh can't get into that thank
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you thank you for trying let me now turn to the second review in the 2019 annual report
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the government response to foreign interference this review examined the threat facing canada
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from foreign interference and the government's response to that threat on both fronts the
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committee heard testimony from dozens of officials from the canadian security and intelligence
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community reviewed thousands of pages of documentation both classified and open source and i mean
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thousands of pages and deliberated at great length first the threat our democratic institutions
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on independent media civil society academia and our electoral system and process support
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effective accountable and transparent government however the review demonstrates that those same
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institutions are also vulnerable to foreign actors seeking to covertly and inappropriately
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to repeat the committee sought to present a clear description of the magnitude and nature of the
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challenge of foreign interference in canada the committee's assessment of the threat is best
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described at paragraph 189 on page 77 and i quote the committee believes there is ample evidence that canada
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canada is the target of significant and sustained foreign interference activities the prc the russian federation other states
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the committee believes that these states target canada for a variety of reasons
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but all seek to exploit the openness of our society and penetrate our fundamental institutions
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to meet their objectives they target ethno-cultural communities
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and attempt to curate debate on post-secondary campuses
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each of these activities pose a significant risk to the rights and freedoms of canadians and to the
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country's sovereignty they are a clear threat to the security of canada the committee conducted a
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thorough examination of the primary security and intelligence organizations
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responsible for investigating and countering the threat of foreign interference
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cesis global affairs canada the privy council office public safety canada and the rcmp
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we undertook a deep dive into the extent and sufficiency of interdepartmental coordination
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we examined a series of case studies of canadian responses to instances of foreign interference in canada
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we examined the extent to which the government of canada engaged with other orders of government
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and the canadian public and finally we examined international collaboration and coordination
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the review found that the interdepartmental coordination and collaboration on foreign interference
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was done on a case by case even on an ad hoc basis it found also that there are differences
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in how individual organizations interpret the gravity and prevalence of the threat
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and it found the federal government's engagement with provincial and municipal governments
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and the canadian public on the threat from foreign interference has been limited
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most afternoon thanks for taking our questions um in terms of uh foreign interference and
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recommendations you talk about a whole of government approach but obviously espionage
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is about as old as statecraft itself so what what's missing what are the gaps right now that need to be addressed
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in the government's response to this sustained effort by numerous countries including china and russia to
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spy on canadians the report goes to uh considerable length
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foreign interference foreign interference under two key rubrics one is a clear description of the threat
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and the other is perhaps most importantly the government's response to that threat but let's be clear
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on this there is ample evidence the committee believes that canada is the target of significant
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and sustained foreign interference activities the committee also believes that these activities pose a
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significant risk to the rights and the freedoms of canadians and to our sovereignty they are a clear threat
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one of the things we do point to in the report is the example from australia
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just recently australia launched its new counter interference strategy
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it also then created the post of the national counter foreign interference coordinator
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and then as recently as december 2019 backstopped it with a recently created task force
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to deal specifically with foreign interference in australia and funded it to the level to the tune of
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of ninety million dollars for a single task force um but specifically within the framework here i mean
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is there a lack of communication between it seems that that csis takes the lead on most of these files
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is there a lack of communication when it comes to the rcmp and it seems that the cbsa i know that
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they're covered in a different part section of this report but it does seem like there's a need for
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there's a need for the cbsa to also have uh be more in the loop when it comes to the potential of foreign
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interference and uh within canada's uh governance structures and institutions you're right in pointing
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out that there needs there there needs to be enhanced uh cooperation interdepartmental cooperation integration
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uh sharing of information uh clarity when it comes to defining what foreign interference is or is not
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um better efforts at reaching out and engaging civil society actors academic institutions the canadian
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public all of these things are laid out in considerable detail in the review itself which is why we're saying
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it's time it's time it's time uh for canada to move forward and improve uh its cooperation in at the
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at the governmental level given what we've seen south of the border in the 2016 election i don't think
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many canadians would necessarily be surprised by the fact that there are foreign actors russia and china as
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an example that would be trying to interfere with our democracy so is it fair to say that with this report today
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you're sending a message to the government that they've not been taking this seriously enough
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i think what we're saying to the government is that um it's a reminder from the committee that canada
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is the target of significant and sustained foreign interference activities we're saying that uh there have
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been efforts made uh at the governmental level different institutions departments agencies to respond
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to it but that that response that can be vastly improved we're saying that there there's no evidence
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that that foreign interferences is going to cease and desist uh we're saying that appears to be continuous
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it appears to be in different settings it appears to be uh we've listed a number of examples that in
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university contexts we've talked about this at length when it comes to media and free media foreign
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language media we've talked about the effects of foreign interference on ethnocultural communities and
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the pressure some of those communities may feel so we've pointed this out we've broken it down into as i said
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earlier uh the threat of foreign interference and the government's response to it and we're really
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focusing on saying to the sending the message to the government that things can be improved
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good efforts have been have been made but it's time to up our game
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um so my second question there are two countries that are named here i understand that there are
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also other countries that remain unnamed so what are those other countries and why do you not name them
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could you answer uh rather repeat the question yes so you name two specific countries in your report
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that are involved in foreign interference but you say that there are other countries involved as well but
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you don't say which countries they are so which countries are we talking about first and second
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how would you describe the nature of the threat that they pose
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but when it comes to actually naming the other countries i i can't answer that question directly
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uh mr mcginti you mentioned in the report that you had issues with some departments and agencies in
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terms of the information that they were handing over whether it was a full report or actual documents
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and you've raised this with the prime minister can you name the departments or agencies that you face
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this resistance from sure um i'm going to ask uh our executive director to speak to that directly
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because this is very much a question of of um officials to officials uh negotiation discussion
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and of course sourcing the information perhaps rainy mark who can answer that directly for you
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thank you um so i'll just go back and quote uh our right of access in our legislation because that's
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very important so our act says that the committee is entitled to have access to any information that
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is under the control of a department and that's related to the fulfillment of the committee's mandate
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so in the cancer it would be the department of national defense and uh also in the same national
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defense from in our diversity and inclusion study and then maybe more generic generally from the privy
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council office itself so uh and in follow-up can i just add to that sure um i've raised these uh issues
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this issue directly with the prime minister right uh and i'm now we're now following up with the
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prime minister's national security and intelligence advisor uh to um to make sure that we come to
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ground on a much um clearer understanding between the committee and the government of what the
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committee has access to or does not have access to based on the enabling legislation so we're following
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up on this quite quite directly you you mentioned single out two countries china and russia in terms
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of foreign interference uh why were you able to name those but not the others that you mention are are
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present as well uh china and russia have been named publicly in the media in reports by think tanks in
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academic studies by other foreign actors partners as states that engage in foreign interference
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uh the committee also named china and russia in the opening chapter of its 2018 annual report
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the question of identifying or speaking about any other country is a question of redaction
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and i explained the redaction process at the beginning of my comments so we're really in no position to
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speak further about uh any other uh country in any detail other than china and russia given the details
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around how state actors are using their ethno-cultural communities what do you want canadians to take
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away from that given their obviously sensitivities and some of those communities already face a lot of
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stigma i would say one of the most important messages the committee wants to impart about ethno-cultural
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communities is that they are targets they are targets and that's what concerns the committee
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uh their rights as canadian citizens are are targeted their freedoms are targeted um and we've laid out
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the kinds of activities that take place from different sources um so we are um we're concerned
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we're concerned about our fellow canadians um given the tone in the annual report and in your tone now
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should we take away from that that china and russia have been successful in their objectives but
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these aren't just attempts not in a position to answer that um we focused very much on what the threat
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looks like as fulsomely as possible and we focused even more on the government's ability to respond
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respond to the threat how well it was responding and where it could improve
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a larger community so we want to extend of the foundation and then we will try to compare the