Bannon's War Room

00:00:00.000 this is the primal scream of a dying regime pray for our enemies because we're going to

00:00:10.520 medieval on these people here's not got a free shot all these networks lying about the people

00:00:17.120 the people have had a belly full of it i know you don't like hearing that i know you try to do

00:00:21.280 everything in the world to stop that but you're not going to stop it it's going to happen and

00:00:24.640 Where do people like that go to share the big line?

00:00:27.920 MAGA Media.

00:00:28.820 I wish in my soul, I wish that any of these people had a conscience.

00:00:34.740 Ask yourself, what is my task and what is my purpose?

00:00:38.440 If that answer is to save my country, this country will be saved.

00:00:44.860 War Room. Here's your host, Stephen K. Band.

00:00:48.040 I want to pivot to the commemoration of what we're doing, the Battle of Midway, and also the 250th.

00:01:00.500 It's right and proper that we remember, when we talk about American exceptionalism,

00:01:06.680 the greatest moments we've had in our military and how that saved the country from absolute total destruction.

00:01:14.140 And I think in this 250th year, it's important for us to not just follow the revolutionary generation, but also to make sure that we know their virtues and how it kind of resonates down through the ages.

00:01:28.420 Captain Fennell joins me.

00:01:29.500 We're going to get to the Battle of Midway and talk about it.

00:01:33.060 But first, Captain Fennell, because the interesting thing on this story, when you really get behind of it, a lot of it revolves around China and approaches to China and trying to control China, as we'll get into the Japanese co-prosperity sphere, right?

00:01:50.180 And FDR and the great leaders we had then, of course, standing on the giants of the 19th century that knew that we're a Pacific nation and that the strategic pivot of the United States is the Central Pacific Ocean, which is so relevant, particularly in today's time.

00:02:08.160 But you tried to warn the nation about this, about this situation, not just with China, but China's intent to really build a global naval force and a global military.

00:02:19.800 But we were heading towards a conflict with China if we did not wake up, in particular, our political leaders in D.C.

00:02:28.660 What is so amazing, it really is very much about what very smart naval officers and naval intelligence officers tried to warn same folks in Washington, D.C. back in the 1930s, and people would not heed their calls, and that led to the destruction of Pearl Harbor.

00:02:47.080 Eventually, it led to our victory at Midway.

00:02:49.100 But talk to me about your warning back in the Obama administration about the rise of China.

00:02:55.500 well steve i was a product of my environment i had uh in a 29 year career i had eight years at

00:03:05.280 the pacific fleet headquarters in pearl harbor working the headquarters building where nimitz

00:03:10.760 had built uh as a as a mid-grade officer lieutenant commander commander then i went

00:03:17.240 out to japan on the kitty hawk uh as the director of intel for the carrier strike group out there

00:03:22.680 back to Washington, focused on China at the Office of Naval Intelligence, back out to the

00:03:29.000 Seventh Fleet, and then to the Pacific Fleet. And so throughout that period, I had known the history

00:03:34.860 of what happened at Pearl Harbor and what happened at Coral Sea and what happened at Midway.

00:03:41.600 And I knew, like I've mentioned before, Admiral Showers and other people from that generation,

00:03:46.900 But Admiral Showers was very big to me, and he told me the firsthand observations of Joe Rochefort and Eddie Layton and what they did to support Admiral Nimitz in that conflict.

00:03:59.140 And so in my career, it was just natural as we saw the rise of the Chinese Navy starting around 99, 2000, that we were doing our job, which is to tell our commanders what the enemy is doing today and where he's going to be tomorrow.

00:04:14.820 That was Joe Rochefort's motto. Tell your commander, it's your duty to tell your commander where the adversary is today and where he will be tomorrow. 0.59

00:04:24.920 In essence, meaning I'm going to predict, I'm going to assess his future movements, not just tactically at the ship level, not just operationally at the strike group level, but maybe even strategically.

00:04:36.420 And that's what I was trying to do in those years that I was on active duty.

00:04:40.200 And I was fortunate enough to be able to get the opportunity to tell those stories in public at a couple of conferences in San Diego, the U.S. Naval Institute and Armed Forces Communication Electronic Association.

00:04:55.440 It's called WEST. It's a big Navy Marine Corps conference that happens each year in the early January, February timeframe in San Diego.

00:05:03.060 and I was invited to speak in 2013 and 2014 about the Chinese growing naval threat. And I just told

00:05:10.940 the truth. I didn't really have any ulterior motives, just to kind of articulate at an

00:05:16.500 unclassified level what I knew I was seeing from all source information. And it got some attention

00:05:22.560 the second year, not just with the Chinese, but with inside the U.S. government,

00:05:29.940 with inside the Obama administration who had a policy of unwritten policy of don't provoke China.

00:05:36.620 And they didn't like that. And there was a consternation over that.

00:05:42.080 Talk to me for a second before I get back into the 1930s and the warnings that were given then

00:05:46.460 that were looked aside that led to Pearl Harbor and then to Midway. What was it like? One of the

00:05:51.800 things as a young naval officer, and I always wanted to go to the Pacific Fleet as a kid and

00:05:56.700 and had my dreams granted by the Navy as I got commissioned,

00:06:01.980 I got assigned to a sports class out of San Diego

00:06:04.180 that would eventually rotate into the 7th Fleet

00:06:07.180 and do those tremendous Westpac deployments

00:06:09.560 and eventually one into the Persian Gulf and North Arabian Sea.

00:06:13.580 But in getting to Pearl Harbor for the first time,

00:06:16.960 and this was 1976, 77,

00:06:20.540 I felt like I had gone back in time.

00:06:24.240 To me, when I got there, I looked around in the Navy Yard because the Schofield barracks and they hadn't changed.

00:06:32.840 They were physically very much the same.

00:06:34.680 You think you're going back in time.

00:06:36.460 I mean, it was very powerful for me.

00:06:37.980 Tell people what it was like to actually work in the building as a junior officer that Admiral Nimitz had built.

00:06:43.220 What was it like to actually be at Pearl Harbor?

00:06:47.200 Yeah, Steve.

00:06:47.940 Even all my years that I was in Hawaii and on Oahu, I would drive by, I lived in Pearl

00:06:53.480 City for a part of that with my wife, and I would go to work at Pearl Harbor and drive

00:06:57.340 by the USS Arizona Memorial, and I'd been on it many times, but you'd see it every day.

00:07:03.320 You'd see it going to work, coming home, on your bicycle, in a car, whatever, and you

00:07:08.040 wouldn't stop necessarily, but you'd think about it, and you'd remember every day what

00:07:15.220 happened and how we were caught with our pants down, so to speak, and how a lot of people died

00:07:21.880 because we weren't prepared. And so there was a visual sense of, on a daily basis, that what we

00:07:28.920 were doing mattered because we didn't want to be snuck up on again. We didn't want to be surprised.

00:07:33.640 So when 9-11 happened, it was a gut blow. It was in a different place in America, but it was still

00:07:39.920 the same kind of, hey, how could this happen again? We shouldn't allow these things to happen.

00:07:44.080 And our job as intelligence professionals is to see into the future and make sure we don't get surprised.

00:07:51.040 And working there at Pearl Harbor and Makalapa, which is the headquarters of the Pacific Fleet,

00:07:57.080 the headquarters building, as I may have mentioned, was built by Admiral Nimitz.

00:08:02.840 Actually, Admiral Nimitz had tours in Hawaii back into the 20s.

00:08:06.560 And the dive tower that's on the submarine base closer into the Pearl Harbor, into the water,

00:08:11.740 the dive tower that Admiral Nimitz was responsible for building that trained divers that tower is

00:08:17.320 still there so that you're right that the buildings the atmosphere you get the sense that

00:08:22.840 you're almost you haven't you haven't left the the linkages to World War II even though it was

00:08:28.280 60 70 80 years later it's still it's still it exudes into your thinking and into your daily

00:08:34.380 work it maybe not every day but it's there and it's an undercurrent it makes you dig a little

00:08:40.880 deeper and go a little bit harder to make sure that we're doing all that we can. And that's the

00:08:45.420 way we approached the China problem was that, hey, something's happening out here, and we need to be

00:08:50.300 aware of it. Well, see, this was in the 1930s, something was happening out there, and people

00:08:55.260 need to be aware of it. That was, I argue, it's kind of like this weird Atlantis's kind of white 0.99

00:09:02.880 perspective on World War II, that World War II started in the invasion of Poland. The European 0.62

00:09:07.720 war started with the invasion of Poland. There's no doubt about that. But we have been, there was

00:09:12.220 a war going on for, I argued, 1935. I guess the incident at the Marco Polo Bridge in Japan was

00:09:19.340 already a force, had already invaded China at that time, I think in 31. These Asian wars went on, 0.62

00:09:26.520 and the whole China situation was at the top of the mind of the strategists in Washington, D.C.

00:09:33.420 about how to deal with Japan, but so many of the warnings of what was to come was not.

00:09:38.900 So give us a perspective.

00:09:40.040 China has always been at the center of this story, right,

00:09:43.100 and including the beginning of the real beginning of World War II,

00:09:46.140 which took place in the Pacific, sir.

00:09:49.460 Yeah, I think, you know, what happened out there in the Pacific,

00:09:54.360 we can say that there was warning and people were aware.

00:09:57.980 You can go to the fact that Senator Carl Vinson passed the Two Ocean Navy Act, right, in 1938, 39, 40.

00:10:08.280 There was several acts from the Congress and the Senate that funded the Navy that helped us win this war in the Pacific.

00:10:14.880 So there were people that were aware, but we were in a different kind of a posture in terms of, you know, kind of living in a little bit in the denial.

00:10:23.880 And also, as you said, we had this view about everything's about Europe.

00:10:29.580 James Schlesinger, in his speech about Midway in 2017, talked about Churchill's grand strategy,

00:10:36.180 which was the whole thing, everything that we want from the Americans is to be fighting

00:10:40.200 against Adolf Hitler in Europe.

00:10:43.040 And that's, for Schlesinger, why he considered Midway was more than a decisive naval victory.

00:10:47.980 He said it was more than a turning to the tide in the Pacific War.

00:10:50.940 He said, in a strategic sense, Midway represents one of the turning points of world history, and in that role, it remains underappreciated.

00:10:59.240 But the role that he's speaking to is to help Roosevelt and Churchill finish and achieve the grand strategy of defeating Hitler.

00:11:08.640 While they took the first blow from the Japanese on 7 December, they weren't really, even then, willing to say, 7 December gave Churchill the excuse to say, now we're in the war. 0.84

00:11:22.260 And you'd think, okay, now we're in the war, America, let's go fight Japan. 0.89

00:11:26.000 But actually, we turned to the Atlantic and going after Hitler in full force. 0.84

00:11:31.020 The United States and Pearl Harbor, when Pearl Harbor occurred, we had two aircraft carriers around Hawaii, the Enterprise and the Lexington, Enterprise about 250 miles west of Hawaii. 0.81

00:11:46.240 Lexington was about 500 miles southeast of the Midway, and the Saratoga had just finished overall and was in San Diego.

00:11:54.280 And New Yorktown wouldn't arrive from the Atlantic fleet until December, late and mid to late December.

00:11:59.020 So we had two aircraft carriers when Pearl Harbor started, and the Japanese had a lot more than that, like six, eight more heavy carriers and light carriers.

00:12:10.140 So we were really not prepared as a nation for what was coming.

00:12:14.680 And at the strategic sense, you have to ask yourself, why were we not prepared for that? 0.98

00:12:20.160 And my concern in my career was, if we got surprised by the Japanese in their 30s, in the late 30s, 1941, how can we prevent that happening again from China? 0.91

00:12:32.420 Because China has the same or greater ambitions than Japan had. 0.87

00:12:37.540 Japan had a regional greater co-prosperity sphere of influence in that region of Asia.

00:12:44.460 China has a global agenda.

00:12:46.400 The Chinese Communist Party, as Xi has said, has a global governance initiative, a global security initiative, a global civilization initiative.

00:12:54.820 They are seeking to control the globe, and they're building a military force and an economic force and everything else to achieve that goal.

00:13:03.180 What are we doing to deter it, one?

00:13:05.940 And two, if we can't deter it, are we going to allow people to be killed like we were in Pearl Harbor and even some of the people that were killed at Midway? 0.97

00:13:14.340 it um you talk about the co-prosperity sphere and the chinese have it now the japanese the 0.77

00:13:22.900 japanese philosophy of going to east asia of of indo of indo french indochina the british out of

00:13:29.700 singapore the americans out of the philippines the dutch out of the east indians of what's

00:13:33.920 indonesia today was essentially to drive the whites out they felt that they asians should 0.82

00:13:39.780 control asian they they should be the dominant power in asia and drive the whites out they'd 0.91

00:13:44.480 look to do this with shattering blows right military blows uh at pearl harbor and then later 0.99

00:13:50.580 at midway uh let's take a short commercial break where we get back with uh captain finnell

00:13:54.940 he called it james slushner called it one of the turning points in world history

00:14:01.780 the battle of midway intelligence officers fleet sailors and some incredibly heroic pilots both

00:14:09.360 navy pilots and marine corps pilots the story of midway read that story study that story you'll

00:14:15.840 find out anything you want to know about american exceptionalism about american greatness

00:14:19.760 that is making america that was making america great hopefully we can make her great again

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00:14:43.460 Captain James for now on the other side.

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00:16:32.500 so captain vannell to start this all off at pearl harbor give us just a short summary of what

00:16:42.780 happened how we got caught by surprise the damage done and what was really left when

00:16:49.380 Abram Nimitz came and relieved the command.

00:16:56.340 In 1941, Japanese Mobile Striking Force, a part of the Kido Butai, is what the Japanese

00:17:02.940 called it, came in and struck Pearl Harbor.

00:17:05.700 They had been planning this for years.

00:17:07.620 They had detailed intelligence of the Pearl Harbor.

00:17:11.180 They knew everything about where we were at.

00:17:13.840 And fortunately, as I mentioned, two of our carriers were not in Pearl Harbor, but our

00:17:17.940 eight battleships were in Pearl Harbor. And the battleship at that time in 1941 was considered

00:17:23.240 the centerpiece of the power projection for the U.S. Navy. That was the number one platform,

00:17:28.600 not the carrier at that time. And so our battleships, most of them were destroyed.

00:17:34.100 Most famously, the Arizona is still there and you can go and visit it. I would recommend

00:17:38.240 War Room Posse members go when they go to Hawaii, visit it and see it. It's a graveyard and it's an

00:17:44.520 sacred ground, but you should go and see it. The Japanese came in and struck and destroyed 1.00

00:17:49.960 the battleship fleet, essentially took that fleet out, and then they retreated. And they thought,

00:17:56.560 okay, we're going to make this strike. Admiral Yamamoto, the head of the Imperial Japanese Navy,

00:18:02.000 said, when we do this, we're going to awake a sleeping giant. But the army forces that were

00:18:07.640 running and pushing the Japanese Imperial war machine, they wanted this, and they thought they

00:18:13.720 get a decisive blow and take us out in one failed attack, one full swoop. But what happened was, 0.76

00:18:20.920 is that five months later, we had a major naval battle down in the Battle of Coral Sea, which is

00:18:26.520 in that area between Papua New Guinea, Solomon Island, just south of Solomon Islands. That's

00:18:32.020 Coral Sea, Guadalcanal, Tulagi, all of that. So we had a major battle down there for 8 May,

00:18:38.840 and the Japanese lost a light carrier, the Soho, but they also lost, or if not didn't lose,

00:18:45.920 but they had damaged two heavy carriers, the Zukaku and the Shokaku. And those two carriers

00:18:51.920 could not then be available for Midway, which came just a month later. So they took out one

00:18:57.900 third of their heavy carriers in Coral Sea. We lost the Lexington. So we did lose one of our

00:19:06.440 few carriers that we had, which was critically important to Admiral Nimitz. He was desperately

00:19:12.200 afraid of losing his carriers after losing his battleships because we had nothing else.

00:19:17.580 We had to scuttle the Lexington because of the damage, so it sunk. But the Yorktown was shot

00:19:25.160 to pieces. I mean, the Yorktown had to be put emergency yards, and normally you would think

00:19:29.840 that'd be out of commission for a year. They literally had days or weeks to turn this thing

00:19:35.720 around, correct? That's right. The Yorktown was in the battle with Lexington. We lost Lex.

00:19:41.840 Yorktown steams up to Hawaii and Nimitz orders the shipyard in Hawaii. You got to get this fixed

00:19:48.200 as soon as possible. And within three days, they repaired the Yorktown satisfactorily enough so

00:19:54.380 that she could get underway and head up to Midway. And that's where everything culminates here in

00:19:59.440 this battle of Midway, at least operationally. So at Midway, we have the Enterprise, the Hornet,

00:20:05.220 and the Yorktown. Those were our three carriers. The Japanese had four heavy carriers, the Akagi,

00:20:11.700 the Hiryu, the Kaga, and the Soryu. And they also, again, I mentioned this term Kido Butai,

00:20:17.960 which is this mobile striking force. It was essentially the big Imperial Japanese Navy

00:20:24.020 force that would move out into the Pacific. And they had the carriers up forward. These four

00:20:30.920 carriers that i mentioned they also had 12 destroyers two battleships two heavy cruisers

00:20:35.900 and one light cruiser that were forward heading towards midway but about 700 miles behind hang on

00:20:43.020 before we get there just second given the fact they had this they have a construct of this mobile

00:20:48.360 striking force they've got a concept of using carrier base not in defense but in offense

00:20:55.180 and we're still getting off weaning off the battleship strategy to the carrier strategy

00:21:01.100 How did the crushing blow at Pearl Harbor, why did it not totally succeed?

00:21:07.360 What happened, the Japanese did catch us because we didn't pay attention to a lot of the naval intelligence we got.

00:21:14.060 We were totally caught by surprise at, what, 8 o'clock in the morning on Sunday morning. 0.68

00:21:18.840 They actually, the local spies, knew exactly when the best time to hit would be.

00:21:23.780 Why did that crushing blow, what happened that that didn't actually deliver all the punch 0.79

00:21:29.200 that the Japanese anticipate, given that they had gotten the most important thing, 0.79

00:21:34.540 which to catch the Americans totally by surprise. 0.54

00:21:38.440 Right. They thought that they had caught us by surprise and then given us the death blow.

00:21:43.420 But remember, this is 7 December. Nimitz gets selected by Roosevelt to come out and replace

00:21:49.220 Kimmel. And he arrives around Christmas, two weeks later. And when he gets there,

00:21:55.240 he's there's a story about nimitz's because he's taken out into a launch into pearl harbor which

00:22:00.720 i've been on many times in the launches except in this time when he does it there's ships that

00:22:06.200 are sunk turned over there's still flames there's still dead bodies in the in the harbor there's

00:22:12.100 oil it's it's a it's devastation from all the battleships and other ships the cruisers that

00:22:17.580 were destroyed and nimitz is taken around and the petty officer that was running the motor launch

00:22:22.700 said, oh, man, this is pretty bad, isn't it, Admiral Nimitz? And Nimitz is reported to have

00:22:27.280 said, well, you know what? They made tragic mistakes. The biggest mistake that they made

00:22:32.760 is they didn't get our oil. They didn't get Red Hill, the place where we keep and store all our

00:22:38.640 fuel, which was up the hill from Pearl Harbor. It's still there today. There's a whole story we

00:22:43.360 could get into in current events about Red Hill. But back then, Red Hill was critically important

00:22:48.360 to be able to supply fuel to our fleet, and they didn't touch that.

00:22:52.180 The Japanese didn't bomb our fuel.

00:22:54.240 Secondly, they didn't get our carriers, as we've talked about. 0.94

00:22:57.960 And thirdly, they didn't understand the spirit of the American people,

00:23:01.180 and Nimitz mentioned that.

00:23:02.460 So they didn't get the crushing blow, and we started to react to that,

00:23:07.520 and that's why we had the battle at Coral Sea to check them there.

00:23:11.060 That was an offensive operation.

00:23:12.380 Abel Nimitz, I think a submarine officer, did the high command see the value of intelligence?

00:23:22.380 I mean, after Pearl Harbor, we're ever saying, how do we get caught by surprise?

00:23:26.340 And D.C. is trying to shift blame to everybody.

00:23:28.900 Was Rochefort, were these great intelligence officers that actually had broken codes,

00:23:35.700 were they dismissed as, hey, you blew it at Pearl Harbor?

00:23:38.420 are they saying, hey, you guys actually had, you've broken the naval codes, you've broken

00:23:41.980 the diplomatic codes. We now know to pay attention to you. I mean, what was the status

00:23:46.980 of our intelligence services, the naval intelligence to the high operational command?

00:23:54.840 Right. So going back into the 20s, there was this establishment of these radio listening

00:23:59.360 posts across the Pacific. And by the time Pearl Harbor happens, you know, the guys at station

00:24:06.400 hypo there were not allowed to look at the Japanese naval communications, JN-25. So after

00:24:14.140 Pearl Harbor, the folks back in D.C., the Redmond brothers who worked for Admiral Kelly Turner,

00:24:20.900 they put out this kind of whisper campaign against Joe Rochefort to say, hey, he missed it. It was

00:24:28.440 those guys in Hawaii that missed the attack. It's their fault. But it wasn't their fault because 0.97

00:24:33.520 they had been giving tasking to say, you're not going to look at, you guys are in Hawaii,

00:24:37.680 but we're not asking you to look at the naval communications. We want you to look at the

00:24:42.180 fleet admiral communications, which was a very difficult code and was very rare.

00:24:47.960 There was not that much communication, so it made it harder to do traffic analysis to break it.

00:24:53.220 And Rochefort was, you know, he was given an order to look at one element of the Japanese

00:24:58.340 communications, and he did that. And then when the attack happened, they all said, hey,

00:25:03.060 how come you didn't look at the fleet communications? He's like, well, hey, you didn't

00:25:07.040 ask me to do that, but now I'm going to do it. And so from essentially December 8th until Midway,

00:25:13.520 Joe Rochefort and his team started breaking JN-25, this fleet communications code. And by the time

00:25:19.800 that Battle of Midway started, they had gone from 0% understanding to about 30%. So I always like to

00:25:26.560 use the example, if you took a Sunday New York Times and you laid it on your coffee table on a

00:25:31.940 morning and started reading it, but you only had 30% of the words, would you know what was going

00:25:36.960 on in America? Would you be able to tell stories? Well, if you're Joe Roche, you would, because you

00:25:42.100 were not just a cryptanalyst. You also had lived in Japan. You spoke Japanese. You understood

00:25:47.240 Japanese culture. And you used that along with your team to decrypt and understand where the 0.99

00:25:53.680 Japanese were going. While he's doing all that, the folks back in D.C. are picking at him and

00:26:00.500 saying, oh, no, they're not going to Midway. They're going to go to the Aleutians. They're

00:26:05.840 going to go to the Philippines. They're going to go to the West Coast. And so there was this battle 0.59

00:26:10.280 in the intelligence community, but there was no trust in the guys forward. And Rochefort and his

00:26:18.020 team were able to decipher and understand that it really was the Japanese intent to strike again,

00:26:25.160 another striking blow at Midway. And the folks in D.C. did not believe that. So what happened is

00:26:32.560 on the island, his team, Rochefort's team, came up with an idea. And there's a cable between Oahu

00:26:40.520 and Midway. It's 1,500 miles, about 1,400 nautical miles from Oahu, Pearl Harbor to Midway.

00:26:47.620 There's an undersea cable. And Jasper Holmes was a submarine officer that worked for Joe Rochefort.

00:26:53.100 He recommended to Rochefort, why don't we send an underground cable message to the guys in Midway and tell them to come up in clear voice on their HF radio and say, our osmosis machine to purify water is broken and we need water from Oahu.

00:27:12.380 Bring us water. And Rochefort and Holmes knew that if the people in the command on Midway,

00:27:20.000 the few Marines and Navy officers there, came up and said that, that in Wake Island,

00:27:25.360 the Japanese had a listening post, that the Japanese listening post in Wake Island would

00:27:30.120 intercept that and report back to Tokyo, guess what? Midway's out of water. And when they did

00:27:36.100 that rochefort and holmes knew that the japanese would use the two-letter designation alpha foxtrot

00:27:42.820 af and so they did this test they sent an underground cable message the midway came up

00:27:49.140 on hf they made the report it got intercepted by the japanese on wake and they reported it back to

00:27:55.580 tokyo but what rochefort and what i want i want to hold that until the uh next segment and we're

00:28:05.260 going to say, why Midway? Why this small island in the middle of nowhere? Then the battle's

00:28:10.560 actually engaged, and you will be blown away by the heroism and valor of the United States Navy

00:28:16.380 and the ability to react. Short commercial break. I want to thank Birch Gold as our sponsor. Text

00:28:21.800 Bannon, B-A-N-N-O-N, at 989898, the ultimate guide for investing in gold and precious metals.

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00:29:57.760 so in the vast pacific from the illusions all the way down coral sea was right off australia

00:30:05.440 you know pearl harbor in the hawaiian islands are not that big when you actually look at them

00:30:09.780 in the map or the charts of the pacific why midway why this tiny essentially runway

00:30:16.120 literally in the middle of nowhere, 1,400 miles,

00:30:19.880 kind of even deeper into the Central Pacific.

00:30:22.620 Why did they choose?

00:30:23.780 Why was Midway the focus of a battle

00:30:27.360 that's one of the turning points in world history, sir? 1.00

00:30:31.300 Well, Steve, the Japanese, you know, they also,

00:30:35.140 while we were debating where they would go with the Kido Boutai,

00:30:37.520 the Japanese were debating also about where to go

00:30:40.460 and what was the best place.

00:30:42.300 And they finally decided on Midway.

00:30:43.800 I sent your team a picture of Midway so we can see it.

00:30:48.880 It's very small.

00:30:50.200 I've been there.

00:30:50.980 I went there for the 70th anniversary of the Battle of Midway with the fleet commander,

00:30:54.680 Admiral Cecil Haney.

00:30:56.040 And it's very, very small.

00:30:59.120 And it's beautiful.

00:31:00.780 It's gorgeous.

00:31:01.280 But it's very small.

00:31:02.140 But it had a runway, like you said.

00:31:03.980 And in those days, airfields or aircraft had shorter ranges.

00:31:10.080 And so this was a key place for us to get from Hawaii to Midway to Wake to then allow us to go to Japan.

00:31:18.160 Wake was under the control at that time of the Japanese. 0.86

00:31:20.400 So it was a key place for us to be able to operate forward.

00:31:24.800 The Japanese suspected that we were going to defend there. 0.84

00:31:27.280 That was part of it. 0.91

00:31:28.480 And so as they raced or came across the Pacific from west to east, they focused on Midway.

00:31:34.080 midway and you know the folks in the intel center there are stationed hypo and on honolulu at pearl

00:31:40.300 harvard they understood that and and as i mentioned in the last segment when midway came up and gave

00:31:46.460 that message and say we're out of water and the wake island japanese listening post intercepted

00:31:51.480 it and reported it to tokyo re-intercepted that communication and rochefort and the team at hypo

00:31:58.180 intercepted it. And their guys, the people that did the work, the lieutenants and petty officers

00:32:04.440 were like, let's report this out. We got it. It proves we were right. And Rochefort said, no,

00:32:09.060 no, no, no, we're not going to report this out. We're going to let somebody else in our network

00:32:13.440 report this. And so there was a fleet radio unit, Melbourne, Frumel, and the folks at Frumel also

00:32:21.300 intercepted the Wake Island communications to Tokyo and reported out in a report to the

00:32:27.900 U.S. side saying, hey, station hypo or station AF is midway. AF is midway. And they reported that

00:32:38.300 out back to the U.S. side, but it got back to Washington. And so Rochefort was very astute

00:32:44.920 and said, I'm not going to say I was right in a report. I'm going to let somebody else say it for

00:32:49.220 me. And they did. And when that happened, they took that information to Admiral Nimitz. And

00:32:54.080 And Admiral Nimitz had been asking Admiral Ernest King, who was the chief of naval operations in D.C., hey, I want to send my carriers up to Midway because that's where the Japanese were going to attack.

00:33:04.880 And King, advised by Kelly Turner and the Op-20G Redmond brothers who didn't like Rochefort, they said, no, no, no, that's wrong, that's wrong, that's wrong.

00:33:15.240 And when finally there was empirical, undeniable empirical proof, Nimitz went back to King and King said, yep, get him up there.

00:33:22.400 And that's when we sent up Enterprise Hornet in Yorktown. And the Enterprise and the Hornet were formed Task Force 16. And they got up there and were, you know, east of Midway as the Japanese were west of Midway.

00:33:37.200 And Eddie Layton, who was Nimitz's intel officer, was very close with Rochefort, who was the radio intelligence cryptographer, we'd call him today.

00:33:48.100 Rochefort was working very closely with Layton, who was the N2, the director of intelligence for Nimitz.

00:33:55.220 He was a lieutenant commander.

00:33:56.420 And he came in and said, I think the first time we're going to detect them is in this location, on this vector, at this time, and this many miles from Midway.

00:34:04.440 And when the first patrol boat, the PBY, founded on June 4th, found the Japanese strike force, it was literally five miles off, five degrees off in vector and five minutes off in time. 0.88

00:34:20.800 And Nimitz, you know, kind of joked with his Eddie Layton and said, hey, you were five minutes off, five miles off and five degrees off, which was to say you were right on. 0.97

00:34:29.080 You were spot on. You predicted where we would find them.

00:34:31.700 And then the battle ensued over the next couple of days with the Japanese carriers getting closer, never detecting the American carriers at first. It was us that were the fortunate ones that knew where their carriers were. And then the Japanese came out and started bombing Midway to destroy the forces that we had there. 0.78

00:34:48.680 And we had Marine forces there from fighter squadrons and Marine ground forces there, and they were under incredible assault. 0.95

00:34:57.180 And the Marines, as I, you know, there's a piece out today about VMFA 221, and they had these, you know, Buffalo aircraft that were, you know, built in the 20s that were really not appropriate for dealing with the Japanese Zeros and fighters that they encountered.

00:35:14.580 And that Marine squadron suffered 75 percent casualties. And those Marines essentially went into combat knowing that they were going to die. And they did it anyway. And the Japanese launched their strikes and then got back to their carriers. And while they were refueling and rearming, our carriers attacked them. And that's when we had our greatest victory.

00:35:36.640 How did you find, but explain to the audience, and if you haven't been there, the Pacific is so vast.

00:35:43.280 It's, I mean, you've got to sail it to really understand how vast this is.

00:35:49.260 It puts the Eurasian landmass, it's bigger than the Eurasian landmass.

00:35:53.280 It's a needle in the haystack.

00:35:55.380 How did our pilots actually find the targets?

00:35:59.220 they they had estimates from leighton and rochefort that said we because they're intercepting

00:36:06.380 their communications and they think based upon where the communications are between all the

00:36:11.620 ships in this keto butai that they and and where they were going and the orders that they were

00:36:16.980 being given they were you know there was communications that said hey go to this place

00:36:21.400 go to that place and the speed of advance in the locations that's how we identified where they would

00:36:27.280 be. And Rochefort and his team, they're in the basement at Station Hypo that included, for

00:36:32.880 instance, petty officers from the USS California. Our battleships before, you know, in the battleship

00:36:39.060 Navy, each battleship had a band. They had several, you know, I don't know how many people in the band,

00:36:45.000 a dozen or so sailors that were a band. And that night before on Saturday night, there was a,

00:36:51.600 they always had a, in Pearl Harbor, they had a battle of the bands down there in Waikiki and

00:36:56.400 the Navy bands would play against each other, you know, 1940 swing music. And the band from

00:37:01.860 the California that was, their ship was sunk. They were off the ship. Their ship was sunk.

00:37:07.060 There's a, you know, a linkage between musicians and people that can read sheet music and understand

00:37:12.060 music and cryptologic work. And so they went and asked the band from the California to come over

00:37:17.640 and work in Station Hypo because they needed more people because the volume of traffic under this

00:37:22.540 new code that they were looking at, Jan 25, was much greater than the Imperial Admiral's code.

00:37:29.340 And so there was all kind of people, not a lot, there was, you know, probably less than 70 people

00:37:35.520 working in that basement, but they worked 24 hours a day to break that code and to find out where

00:37:40.360 this Kido Butai striking force would be. And they served it up to Nimitz and Fletcher and Spruance 0.82

00:37:46.680 on a tee, and they got it, and they were able to then allow our, you know, great sailors and 0.91

00:37:52.800 aviators to get in the position to be able to conduct the strikes that caught the Japanese 0.73

00:37:57.380 while they were in the middle of rearming and refueling and start sinking all four of their

00:38:01.940 aircraft areas. It was massive. Talk to us about these strikes, the valor and heroism

00:38:07.260 and proficiency of these strikes. Well, a lot of, I mean, some of our torpedo bomber

00:38:14.420 squadrons, you know, they took heavy casualties as well because they had to fly straight down

00:38:20.020 or low and be put in the range of the Japanese self-defense guns. And so we lost a lot of our

00:38:28.700 torpedo aircraft, but they continue to fly in, you know, essentially suicide missions to be able to

00:38:35.960 deliver their ordnance. Oh, by the way, not all of our torpedoes work correctly. We had problems

00:38:41.560 with torpedoes. We had problems with aircraft performance. So we had a fleet that was, you know,

00:38:47.720 not as on the same technological standard as the Japanese. The Japanese had better aircraft. They 0.98

00:38:54.940 had better pilots in a way. Their pilots were very, very well trained. They viewed pilots,

00:39:01.020 the Imperial Japanese Navy viewed pilots as kind of samurai warriors. And so they put everything

00:39:07.980 into them. And this is one of the effects of the battle. Not only did they lose four aircraft

00:39:12.900 carriers, they lost a generation of aviators. And they never really quite recovered from that

00:39:19.660 when they lost so many of these aviators that they'd put so much time and energy and effort

00:39:24.880 and training to make them these great aviators. They lost them. And we, on the other hand,

00:39:31.040 said we're Americans and we're going to train people from all over America, farm boys from

00:39:36.100 Iowa, to people from the cities, whatever, and we're going to get as many people flying

00:39:40.200 and being capable of doing that. That came about later, but that was one of the strategic pivot

00:39:46.720 points, which was we started to be in command of carrier aviation compared to the Japanese,

00:39:54.120 with really a devastating blow to lose four heavy carriers in one battle. And we lost one to

00:40:02.420 Yorktown, which was devastating. But comparatively, it was a massive blow to the Japanese when they 1.00

00:40:09.200 thought they were going to give us the second decisive knockout blow after Pearl Harbor.

00:40:15.160 Tojo in the army, he was now prime minister. It was a military, essentially dictatorship.

00:40:20.980 The army had always been brewing for a fight with the Americans, figuring the Americans

00:40:25.560 would not fight. And they had combat experience and obviously in China for a long time.

00:40:31.000 The Navy was always very hesitant. The highest levels of the Navy were always very hesitant about taking on the Americans because they felt the American, you know, Yamamoto knew the industrial capacity of it.

00:40:43.440 But how did that inform decisions they made strategically, the Navy, on this, understanding that they had a lot more respect for their opponent than the Japanese Army Command did?

00:40:54.500 Well, I think you could say in a sense they were a bit reluctant in their attack, because if they had been really focused, they wouldn't have allowed this great rest of their carrier force under Yamamoto and Admiral Kondo, which had two light carriers, five battleships, four heavy cruisers, and two light cruisers that were 700 miles away.

00:41:17.800 They should have been up at midway.

00:41:19.880 They should have been providing support to those four carriers that were kind of exposed.

00:41:25.240 So in that sense, there was this kind of, I think, I don't want to say that they didn't really, they weren't willing to go die for what they believed in.

00:41:34.120 But there was some kind of, I say, they weren't as, they weren't sure.

00:41:39.520 And so there was a little bit of trepidation.

00:41:41.100 Oh, by the way, the Army, the Imperial Japanese Army, was very aggressive, as you said, and they were wanting to have an attack on American soil.

00:41:52.120 And so they had a plan, and there was attacks that occurred before the Midway battle on the Aleutians.

00:41:57.640 And so that required Imperial Japanese Navy ships go up and cover that invasion up in the Aleutians.

00:42:04.600 The Japanese landed and took parts of Alaska.

00:42:07.820 Now, it wasn't a state at the time, but it was considered Japanese or American interests and territory.

00:42:13.620 And so the Japanese Imperial Army wanted to go there and they wanted to use it for a divert.

00:42:18.220 But they also wanted it for a symbolic, hey, we've taken some territory.

00:42:21.600 They needed some territory to tell the people of Japan that we were successful because they didn't get any territory in Pearl Harbor.

00:42:29.240 They didn't get any territory necessarily. 0.55

00:42:33.440 Well, they did at Coral Sea.

00:42:36.420 That's not really applicable.

00:42:37.820 But Pearl Harbor and the Aleutians and then Midway were all about this tug of war between the Army, Imperial Japanese Army and the Navy.

00:42:46.360 And I think the Navy leadership, and as you said, Yamamoto knew the strength of America.

00:42:52.440 And he had that famous quote, you know, I think we've awakened a sleeping giant.

00:42:56.640 And so there was some subconscious concern about what have they done.

00:43:01.200 And I think that affected the not maybe not the combat operations of the day, but I think strategic thinking to allow that separation between the two forces of those not concentrate forces.

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00:43:49.780 everyone's focus on how the conflict in the middle east is raising oil prices but there's

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00:45:19.320 War Room.

00:45:20.360 Here's your host, Stephen K. Mann.

00:45:24.060 The pilots, the sailors, and the pilots,

00:45:28.020 of course, for a surface warfare officer,

00:45:29.660 having Ray Spruance replace a ill Bull Halsey

00:45:33.200 and be one of the great commanders here

00:45:35.020 has always been fantastic.

00:45:36.160 But the sailors in the fleet,

00:45:37.720 and particularly these pilots,

00:45:38.940 Marine Corps and Navy pilots,

00:45:40.280 It is what our service is all about, and that's why these individuals are revered for the sacrifice, knowingly, understanding they were going to die, went in and took care of their jobs anyway.

00:45:52.660 Just amazing heroism.

00:45:54.780 Rochefort's another hero.

00:45:55.960 Was he treated like a hero, sir?

00:45:58.740 No, he was not, Steve.

00:46:00.280 Joe Rochefort was treated very poorly.

00:46:02.920 After this great battle, and if you can put up that last graphic just so people can see the battle in the numbers, Rochefort was, in all accounts, one of the key architects of finding the Japanese fleet and having this victory that's up on the screen there.

00:46:22.760 After it was over, Admiral King, the CNO, went to Nimitz and said, hey, on the advice of his intel people there, communications people in OP-20G, and said, we need to have Eddie Layton, who was the N2, and Rochefort brought back to D.C. so we can debrief what happened at Midway.

00:46:39.560 And they did, Nimitz said, no, I can't do that because I'm working on my next plan and I can't get, those two guys are too important.

00:46:48.840 So King came back about three weeks later and said, hey, Chester, I really want those guys back here.

00:46:54.800 And Nimitz went to Layton and said, the CNO is really adamant.

00:46:58.280 And I can protect you because you're my end too, but I cannot protect Joe Rochefort because in the chain of command, he worked for the 14th Naval District.

00:47:06.400 And so they brought Joe Rochefort back right after Midway within a couple of months.

00:47:10.880 They brought him back to D.C. and they relieved him of being the officer in charge of Station Hypo and that team of radio intelligence cryptographers, cryptanalysts that did this great victory.

00:47:23.520 And they brought him back and they said, hey, you're not going back there.

00:47:29.340 And so what do you want to do? And he goes, well, I would like to command at sea.

00:47:32.200 And they said, oh, sorry, you know too much information. You have too much intelligence.

00:47:35.780 So you're not going to go there and you're going to have to stay back here.

00:47:39.300 And he ended up going out to San Francisco, the mayor's island, and became the commanding officer of a floating dry dock for the rest of the war.

00:47:48.260 The guy that knew Yamamoto, the guy that broke the coast.

00:47:52.280 But why did King cashier him?

00:47:56.900 King didn't do it.

00:47:58.440 The Redmond brothers and R.K. Turner did it.

00:48:01.700 And essentially King didn't say anything about it.

00:48:04.500 And so Rochefort went away and didn't get any recognition.

00:48:09.300 and he died without recognition. And it wasn't until afterwards in the 50s that they went and

00:48:17.060 tried to recognize him in the 50s while he was alive. And that got shunted by the Secretary of

00:48:22.980 the Navy because it was too late after the war and there was a statute of how long you could

00:48:27.300 give awards for. So he never got recognized, even though Nimitz in 53, 54 wrote a letter to the

00:48:33.220 SECNAB and said, recognize Joe Rochefort for what he did. And it didn't happen. And it wasn't until

00:48:38.700 the 80s when Admiral Showers was, you know, working in the Reagan administration and with

00:48:45.980 Secretary Layman that they recognized Joe Rochefort and President Reagan gave Joe Rochefort's son and

00:48:52.560 daughter his recognition with an award. And it was a travesty. But that's the way DC is. If they

00:49:00.120 don't like you, they will bury you. Bury you and destroy you. Real quickly, if somebody's got to 1.00

00:49:07.700 read a book on on midway which one would you recommend is to start to get a comprehension

00:49:12.720 to comprehend the battle i would recommend eddie leighton's uh and i was there and there's a book

00:49:19.800 by elliot carlson called joe roseford's war uh and there's a couple others craig simington's got

00:49:26.080 a book as well um yeah uh praying that i'm missing out yeah there's a there's four or five but simon

00:49:34.520 Simon's first-person accounts.

00:49:37.440 Go ahead.

00:49:38.880 Closing thoughts on – oh, give me a minute on Admiral Kimmel because this is one that gets me.

00:49:43.900 Admiral Kimmel, he was also cashiered for Nimitz, but he was also humiliated.

00:49:49.800 Should he be – because he was a four-star admiral.

00:49:52.360 They took a star away.

00:49:53.880 Should he be reinstated?

00:49:56.180 Should his rank be reinstated, sir?

00:49:57.820 I think at this point, it would be a service to his family and his history to say, hey, listen, this guy knew something was wrong. He tried within the confines of his authority to make us prepared.

00:50:13.640 And remember, back in those days, there was no Pentagon. There was no chairman of the Joint Chiefs. It was the War Department, the Army, and there was the Navy Department. And trying to get things done under those confines was not easy.

00:50:27.820 And, you know, Kimmel was there when they brought the Pacific Fleet from San Diego to Hawaii, and he had warned about that, or Richardson had, and then Kimmel.

00:50:39.880 And so there was concerns that they had about what was happening.

00:50:44.340 He did as much as he could, and to place the entire blame on him when the rest of the system had this knowledge.

00:50:53.500 Roosevelt had knowledge.

00:50:55.420 Obviously, Benson had knowledge.

00:50:56.860 That's why they passed the two ocean Navy.

00:50:58.660 People knew something bad was coming.

00:51:01.880 General Marshall had knowledge.

00:51:03.800 We've got to bounce.

00:51:04.860 I want to thank you.

00:51:05.780 This is amazing.

00:51:06.800 Last question, and we only got a minute.

00:51:09.300 Given everything you've read, your own conclusion, was Midway a pivot in world history?

00:51:16.100 It was, and it's underappreciated.

00:51:19.020 It was very significant.

00:51:20.540 It changed the course of human history. 0.96

00:51:22.560 If we had lost that battle, Japan would have ruled the Pacific Ocean.

00:51:26.860 captain uh you're amazing thank you your analysis on topics of current of this current war and

00:51:34.940 topics of intelligence and particularly keep the main thing the main thing which is the chinese

00:51:40.020 communist party in china and if you study the history of world war ii you see where it all

00:51:44.120 started about who's going to control china captain uh jim finnell thank you so much for taking time

00:51:50.840 away today to do this for us. Well, thank those who served in the parish at the Battle of Midway.

00:51:57.120 They deserve our honor. The Battle of Midway, the honored dead. I want to thank everybody. I'll be

00:52:03.720 up on Getter all weekend, and I'll see you back at 10 a.m. Eastern Daylight Time, Monday morning.

00:52:20.840 Thank you.

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Episode 5427： Remembering D-Day And The Sacrifices That Built This Country; Death Of America's Beef Industry

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