Juno News - Behind the scenes of CSIS with a former Canadian spy

00:00:00.000 Welcome to Canada's most irreverent talk show. This is the Andrew Lawton Show, brought to you by True North.

00:00:10.580 Coming up, a real Canadian spy story. I speak with author and former CSIS officer Andrew Kirsch.

00:00:16.820 The Andrew Lawton Show starts right now.

00:00:19.880 Hello and welcome to you all. This is the Andrew Lawton Show here on True North, Canada's most irreverent talk show.

00:00:26.260 I'm going to do things a little bit different on this program. Every now and then a book comes along that I feel just a little 10-minute interview at the end of the show is not enough to delve into.

00:00:36.560 And I want to take a little bit of time with it, with the author. And I wanted to do that today.

00:00:40.780 I read a couple of weeks ago a book called I Was Never Here, my true Canadian spy story of coffees, code names, and covert operations in the age of terrorism.

00:00:51.340 It's written by Andrew Kirsch, who is not just a former CSIS officer, but also a former fellow political candidate.

00:00:59.460 And he now runs a security consulting firm, so he does lots of great stuff.

00:01:03.800 And interestingly enough, CSIS, I've always had an interest in intelligence and law enforcement and security because I'm a bit of a nerd like this.

00:01:11.920 But CSIS is not an organization or an agency that is all that well-known by Canadians.

00:01:17.660 I think a lot of people would shrug their shoulders and say, you know, see what? See, like Canada doesn't have a spy agency.

00:01:22.980 Or if we do, it's not one that does anything. And it does do a lot.

00:01:26.220 And they have had a very critical role to play in several incidents that have come up.

00:01:31.160 But as always, Canada tends to live in the shadow of the United States and other countries around the world.

00:01:37.740 And the book does, I think, an interesting job of talking about Andrew's own experiences going through this,

00:01:42.440 but also the role that CSIS plays in Canada. And I thought it was an interesting read and thought perhaps you might believe that as well.

00:01:50.780 So it's my great privilege to talk to Andrew Kirsch, former CSIS officer and now author of the book, I Was Never Here,

00:01:57.620 my true Canadian spy story of coffees, codenames and covert operations in the age of terrorism.

00:02:03.780 Andrew, good to talk to you. Thanks for coming on today.

00:02:06.120 Thanks so much for having me. It's great to be here.

00:02:07.740 This is, I think, a fascinating book for a number of reasons that we'll get into.

00:02:12.700 But I think the existence of the book itself is unique because, as I understand it,

00:02:17.580 and you talked about this in the book a little bit, no one else who's gone through what you went through,

00:02:22.460 working for CSIS, has done this, has written about that experience.

00:02:26.260 Whereas I can just name off the top of my head like five books from former CIA officers in the United States.

00:02:32.700 Well, it seems like there's a bunch of books a week from CIA, FBI.

00:02:35.960 And no, we haven't had a CSIS book from somebody who worked at CSIS about the experience of working for CSIS.

00:02:43.560 There have been books that have come out, policy books or people commenting on public policy or threats,

00:02:50.880 but not about the experience itself, like what it's like to work at CSIS and be a Canadian spy.

00:02:56.600 Why was it that you wrote the book? Because I got from you talking about it that there was a little bit of a catharsis

00:03:03.800 in wanting to unpack your experiences of being there and living through this for a number of years.

00:03:08.620 But it also seemed like you wanted to promote, if that's the right word, the organization itself or at least demystify the organization.

00:03:16.680 Well, I said, I hope the book was not intended to talk anybody into or out of working there, but it was to talk about my experience.

00:03:25.020 And when I signed up in 2005 and looked into what it would be like, there's nothing out there.

00:03:32.100 And I get, now that I'm out and I'm public about it, I get asked a lot of questions from people who are applying,

00:03:36.660 interested, have no idea that Canada has spies about what it is and what they do.

00:03:42.080 And I can tell you from my experience when I was knocking on doors every day, and I write about this in the book,

00:03:47.020 and I say, hello, my name is Andrew and I'm here from CSIS and I need your help.

00:03:50.420 Like no one has any idea what CSIS is, what it does, why we're there, what we want.

00:03:57.420 And so I just felt like it's important where people know about it.

00:04:01.240 One, for the folks who are applying and want to know what they're getting themselves into when they run away and join the circus.

00:04:06.240 And also from the Canadians who are being asked for help and, or who might be aware of concerns.

00:04:13.060 This is what we're worried about.

00:04:14.600 This is the people, these are the people who are worried about it.

00:04:17.360 And it's okay to help them like they're real people.

00:04:20.300 So let's actually strip it down to the basics for people.

00:04:22.720 What is CSIS?

00:04:23.840 And to engage in that longstanding Canadian pastime of comparisons with the U.S.,

00:04:28.460 how does it differ from American intelligence and law enforcement agencies that Canadians are probably more familiar with?

00:04:34.700 Well, that's, that's it.

00:04:36.540 We often get compared and it's not a great comparison.

00:04:39.040 So we have the Canadian security intelligence services, Canada's domestic security service,

00:04:43.300 and it is mandated to investigate threats to the security of Canada.

00:04:47.360 And there are four threats and they are espionage and sabotage,

00:04:51.260 foreign influence activities, terrorism, and subversion.

00:04:54.900 And so we're closely compared to the CIA, but it's, it's not a great comparison.

00:04:59.500 CIA operates abroad, whereas Canada, we are a domestic service.

00:05:03.500 And then they say, well, you must be the FBI, but the FBI is law enforcement and will bring charges.

00:05:08.840 And that is more aligned with our RCMP.

00:05:11.420 So we're closer to the British model, which is a foreign intelligence service, the MI6, James Bond running around,

00:05:18.520 and MI5, which operates domestically, Mossad and Shin Bet, and Australia has ASIO and ASIS.

00:05:25.220 So we're in that model, but we don't have a foreign service.

00:05:27.800 So that's the big difference, is that we only have a domestic security service, not a foreign intelligence service.

00:05:33.820 And even then, the domestic service is relatively young in Canada.

00:05:37.860 A lot of this all used to be done under the banner of the RCMP within that law enforcement purview.

00:05:43.480 That's right. That's right.

00:05:44.340 So this all came about kind of shortly after the War Measures Act in the problems in the 70s,

00:05:50.300 where the RCMP was responsible for law enforcement and intelligence.

00:05:54.700 And the decision was made to separate those functions in the 80s, early 80s,

00:05:59.380 to create a domestic security service, which was a separate function from law enforcement.

00:06:04.420 Following the RCMP getting into some trouble and the McDonald's commission was struck.

00:06:09.940 And they said, you know, we want to take away some of those responsibilities from the RCMP.

00:06:14.200 So you mentioned knocking on doors.

00:06:17.300 The earlier part of the book is really about your experience starting out as an intelligence officer.

00:06:22.240 And it was interesting.

00:06:23.560 I never really thought about what that role was, but a lot of it is not clandestine.

00:06:28.400 It's not covert.

00:06:29.200 It's you just going to the door and waving a badge in the air and saying,

00:06:32.260 hey, I'm with CSIS. Let's talk.

00:06:34.080 And the badge didn't have your real name.

00:06:35.660 But still, you were remarkably transparent to people about what you were doing and what you wanted from them.

00:06:40.240 It's a very unique experience being a Canadian spy because you're working.

00:06:44.360 And I'd say I'm working 15 minutes from where I'm from Toronto.

00:06:47.080 I'm working in Toronto, 15 minutes, 20 minutes from where I grew up.

00:06:50.080 I'm knocking on a door and I have a badge and it says CSIS.

00:06:53.020 That's my face.

00:06:54.300 And I called myself Andrew and I said, my name is Andrew.

00:06:56.860 I'm here from CSIS and I need your help to complete stranger.

00:07:00.900 Right.

00:07:01.080 And then at night I go out and I see all my friends and family.

00:07:04.720 I lie to everybody I know about where I work and what I do versus the strangers that I'm completely honest with about where I work,

00:07:11.960 what I'm interested in and what I need their help with.

00:07:14.340 So it is that funny.

00:07:16.220 It's not a clandestine service.

00:07:17.700 You know, we're introducing ourselves as CSIS intelligence officers to Canadians, you know, asking them for assistance.

00:07:25.940 Which is why I say it's important people know about CSIS because we are operating kind of overtly in town, you know, in Canada.

00:07:35.680 That double life aspect you mentioned, I think, is interesting.

00:07:38.880 I don't mean it to be dramatic, but double life in the sense of you weren't entirely forthright with people in your personal life about what you were doing.

00:07:46.940 And it seemed like there wasn't actually a hard and fast policy that CSIS had on that.

00:07:51.760 I mean, you mentioned, you know, people from CSIS being at your wedding and the idea that, you know, oh, that's the intelligence table with all the spies over there seems like something that, you know, wouldn't you wouldn't have in this.

00:08:01.500 And I guess I don't know if it's changed since then, but how hard and fast were the rules versus how much was really just left up to your discretion as an individual?

00:08:10.920 It's, there's a lot of discretion.

00:08:13.340 I think that was a challenge.

00:08:14.420 And I try to talk about it throughout the book about, you know, who I'm telling, what I'm telling them.

00:08:19.620 No, I was dating and going out on dates and trying to, and I met my wife while I was working there.

00:08:24.640 And at some point I had to tell this woman I was dating that I actually worked for CSIS.

00:08:29.700 I wasn't just kind of a government person when it came to our relationship got serious.

00:08:34.480 And so you have to figure out, okay, well, how, how early, you know, is, is appropriate or how late then you said, well, you can lie me for six months.

00:08:43.640 You know, it, there's kind of this, this balancing act about what we can say.

00:08:48.580 And obviously, you know, it's, it's for people's protection.

00:08:51.660 Like the, the idea is that we're out in public talking to folks and we don't want everyone to know that we're CSIS because the people we're talking to are then, you know, associated with CSIS and it's for their protection.

00:09:03.620 That's why we operate might have different names and we don't, I don't face been a Facebook or Twitter because we didn't want people to be connected with me on social media because that would say, oh, why are they, you know, connected with someone?

00:09:16.040 So, um, it was to create a bit of, of, of, of a barrier and protection for those folks who were working with us, you know, to, to give them some, some protection, but it does create challenges in your life.

00:09:27.360 I say, what did I put on my J date profile when I was trying to meet people?

00:09:30.800 And if you put, I work for government in Ottawa, that gets a lot of questions.

00:09:34.640 Uh, so I had, you have to kind of play around with that where you are and what you're writing.

00:09:38.760 Yeah.

00:09:39.120 I mean, I love it because I, I saw, I don't know how I managed to find a woman that was in love with me and wanted to marry me.

00:09:44.720 And I'm very grateful I did, but you had to, when you were dating, take the most interesting thing about you off the table and you had to get women to fall for like a government bureaucrat in some nondescript office.

00:09:55.780 And then once they got past that, then you can drop the interesting stuff on them.

00:09:59.700 Yeah.

00:10:00.200 Although sometimes it went well and sometimes, uh, I didn't tell a lot of people, but it was frustrating sometimes where I'm sitting at a date and I, he's like, I promise you I'm cool or much cooler than I'm letting on.

00:10:11.940 Uh, but just seeing, I worked for the government and, and trying to get their eyes to glaze over so I can change, change the topic.

00:10:19.720 Yeah.

00:10:20.100 There's one part of the book where I found it quite interesting and I don't know how many incidents you had like this, where you met someone at a party and you knew that they were going to be at the same place that you were later on for what was an undercover operation.

00:10:32.480 And you had to like, you had to break your cover to them and say, okay, listen, I'm with CSIS, don't talk to me when you see me later.

00:10:39.180 Well, it happened, uh, you know, a few times, but the, the big one was an airport.

00:10:43.900 I was having brunch with some people, uh, who were in town and then, and I just came up and so I'm, I'm traveling tonight.

00:10:51.740 And I knew I was going to be at the airport working that night.

00:10:54.140 And of course, if you see someone have lunch with them during the day and then see them at the airport, when I, they would say, well, why didn't you mention that you were going to be flying somewhere or what are you doing here?

00:11:02.340 Where are you going?

00:11:03.780 And I, I just couldn't have that interrupt the operation.

00:11:06.460 Uh, so I had to pull them aside and say, look, you, you may see me tonight, uh, you know, at the airport and this is why and some working and, and if you do, just please don't come over and say anything.

00:11:18.000 But of course now I freaked them right out because they're saying, why are you, why are you at the airport?

00:11:23.300 What do you, what's wrong with my, nothing's wrong.

00:11:25.620 Nothing's wrong.

00:11:26.880 But, uh, yeah, just, you know, if you do see me, please, please, please don't, don't, uh, they'll come and talk to me and we can, we can talk about it later.

00:11:35.520 So in your career at Seizes, you did a lot of the community liaising that we were talking about earlier, and you also did special operations, which gets into the airport realm.

00:11:44.640 But I also want to set expectations here.

00:11:47.380 I think like the word overtime appears more in the book than the word gun does.

00:11:51.440 So you're dealing with a lot of bureaucracy in this organization and you're dealing with at times also, uh, dealing with other agencies, someone maybe under a police investigation and also a Seizes investigation.

00:12:03.800 How much was the administration and the bureaucracy of this really front and center in what you were trying to do, which was, you know, stop the bad guys?

00:12:12.800 It's, Seizes is a government organization, uh, part of the public service.

00:12:17.840 It's a big bureaucratic, uh, machine.

00:12:20.280 And I, I don't say that in a, it's bad or that it's good.

00:12:23.200 That's kind of what it is.

00:12:24.540 We, we want our organizations to have some controls and oversight.

00:12:27.720 And I was a part of that.

00:12:28.940 One of the things I wrote about in the book and I wanted to say was for the first two years of my career,

00:12:33.740 I was one of those kind of behind the desk, uh, human source policy, uh, reviewers.

00:12:38.980 Like I was an administrator, essentially part of that machine, uh, making sure that everybody was adhering to policy and following, following the rules.

00:12:48.020 So it's a huge part of your day-to-day existence.

00:12:50.760 There is managing that bureaucracy, getting plans approved, uh, getting invoices signed off on, and, you know, making sure that everything you're doing is kind of within the bounds.

00:13:00.360 And there are people who check up on it.

00:13:01.980 I was, uh, when I, when I watch, sometimes I watch a James Bond movie, um, and I go, I can't imagine the paperwork that he would have to do to blow that.

00:13:12.280 If he blew that thing up or he had that weapon, I just, all my mind goes to is the forms that he would have to, uh, fill out to do the missions that he was doing.

00:13:21.100 So it is, it is ever present, uh, in the mind.

00:13:25.120 Well, you mentioned James Bond.

00:13:26.840 So let, let's ask a question that I was going to ask at some point.

00:13:30.240 Anyway, I was probably going to do it near the end, but you brought it up now.

00:13:32.560 What's one thing that the movies get right?

00:13:35.620 And what's one thing that the movies get spectacularly wrong?

00:13:38.460 One thing, can I go reverse order up the thing that movies get right?

00:13:43.560 The movies get wrong is it's not just one person out there running around.

00:13:47.860 I think when I watch James Bond and he's doing surveillance and he's following somebody from, you know, an airport to their hotel and he does it all by himself without being detected.

00:13:58.600 And I think the number of people that it takes to do things like that, uh, or to coordinate special operations that he would do.

00:14:06.420 It's such a team effort.

00:14:07.940 And the Jason born the same thing, right?

00:14:09.640 There's one guy, the super hyper-competent individual that can go and take out large organizations.

00:14:14.940 It's just not the case.

00:14:16.200 Uh, and I hope that comes across in the book that I relied on people, that we had folks with different talents and skills and special operations, communications analysts, surveillance as a whole separate skill set that I didn't have that we, that we needed.

00:14:29.220 So this, this idea of a team that comes together, um, it's far more mission impossible than, than James Bond and James, uh, and Jason Bourne running around and that, uh, that it gets right.

00:14:42.500 I mean, it's, it's, it's all, uh, it's all for fun.

00:14:45.340 I wish it was more, you know, people sign up and go, I wish it was that swab and debonair and, uh, and cool.

00:14:51.360 But, you know, look, I guess that, that there are people out there that want to do harm.

00:14:56.100 Like he was out there for the, for the plots and maybe those are sensationalized, but we do, it's not a single person running around.

00:15:03.620 We do need people who are out there looking out for us.

00:15:05.900 Uh, we do have threats that people find out there are threats out there and then you get a team together and you go track them down.

00:15:12.560 So as much as the methods, I guess, that they do, um, are sensationalized and the threats may be sensationalized.

00:15:19.580 Um, we have spies for a reason, you know, we have people who are looking out for us in the shadows, uh, doing some dirty work, not that dirty work, um, because there are real threats out there.

00:15:30.440 So maybe that's, uh, maybe that's a stretch, but what it gets right is they exist.

00:15:35.380 Um, maybe not as cool, but.

00:15:38.060 There was a line in the book that jumped out at me that I wanted to get your thoughts on.

00:15:42.260 You, you say, uh, we didn't have threat reduction, mitigation, or disruption powers at that time.

00:15:48.680 And you were talking about how CSIS's mandate is about collecting information, analyzing it, retaining it.

00:15:53.860 It wasn't about intervention.

00:15:55.040 It wasn't about, we've got to get in and stop this guy.

00:15:58.180 And the, at the time, I know this changed slightly with, uh, Stephen Harper's government, but I'm curious if you can speak.

00:16:04.780 I mean, insofar as you're able to speak about it, about how that played out in, in real life.

00:16:09.540 That idea that, you know, you were seeing something and you couldn't necessarily do anything about it.

00:16:14.560 And you didn't have a mandate to do anything about it.

00:16:18.640 Exactly.

00:16:19.200 And there, so the mandate was to investigate, investigate threats, uh, and advise government essentially.

00:16:26.420 And then we would investigate threats to security Canada and advise the appropriate government.

00:16:29.860 Sometimes that's the RCMP, you know, in a very controlled way.

00:16:32.820 And sometimes that is, uh, other parts of government.

00:16:35.380 But, but so every time you go to talk to somebody, every time I knocked on a door, I had to be there to investigate, but you'd see sometimes someone would tweet something or, or you'd hear something and you'd want to just go and tell the person, like, knock it out, like, knock it off.

00:16:51.080 If I, if I can see this, a lot of other intelligence services can probably see this too.

00:16:55.640 And you're going to get yourself in a lot of trouble, but that'd be considered disruption, right?

00:16:59.140 If I was doing it solely for the, to try to stop them from, from doing it.

00:17:03.460 And that was not part of the mandate.

00:17:05.020 So you could, I mean, you can go to the person.

00:17:07.360 And say the person's parents say, Hey, you know, an investigative asking a questions, uh, have you seen what your child is posting online?

00:17:15.580 You know, is this something that you condone?

00:17:18.340 Is this something that you're, as you know, investigating these threats to find out in a, in a roundabout way to say, can you help us, you know, help us knock this off?

00:17:27.160 Um, but you know, the, the threats became very dynamic.

00:17:31.820 If people are back then members, foreign fighters.

00:17:34.200 So if somebody says I'm getting on a plane, uh, in a couple hours, well, you can advise government, but maybe there's things that we need to be able to do a little quicker, uh, in a controlled way.

00:17:45.080 And that's where those, those change.

00:17:47.280 So I think it was challenging to have this information and you're not able to act on it because of the mandate.

00:17:53.780 Um, and sometimes, you know, required some, some, some quick acting, um, from somebody.

00:18:00.380 So that's what they did.

00:18:01.700 And I wasn't around for that to see how it's played out.

00:18:04.000 I'm super curious, I guess, uh, where that's been used.

00:18:07.680 And if it's been used effectively, because, you know, I could see the benefits of it.

00:18:12.160 Right.

00:18:12.500 Which is, well, can we, can we cut out a few layers here and just do something very quickly to, to, to stop something bad from happening?

00:18:19.400 When you were in the service, how well did Canada manage the interagency aspect of it?

00:18:25.660 I mean, it would be mainly with the RCMP, I'm assuming, but perhaps some local police departments.

00:18:29.780 How well did they play, if you will?

00:18:33.460 Yeah, it was, it was a struggle at times.

00:18:37.420 I, I wasn't very involved, but I found it from, from anecdotally, it kind of changed, uh, a lot regionally.

00:18:43.640 You know, if you had a good relationship on the ground, uh, with your local contacts, if you were able to share in a very limited way, you know, we were, CSIS is often considered a black hole of information.

00:18:54.260 No one liked to play with us because we weren't able to share a lot of things.

00:18:57.000 And people assumed rightly or wrongly that we had more information that we were not able to, to give up.

00:19:02.460 And our, our concern was, well, we don't want to get in, get in the way of an RCMP investigation.

00:19:08.000 You know, if we were to hand over information that, that would not help them, that would cause problems.

00:19:13.180 So there's, there's a tension there.

00:19:15.040 Sometimes that's healthy and sometimes it's not, I, I, you know, I wasn't involved in those conversations at a very high level.

00:19:21.180 I think if it's one thing from the book, you know, I was more on the ground day to day and those conversations be somebody else to comment on them.

00:19:27.740 But my impression, it was very much dependent on, on, you know, relationships and how people were able to act and talk often geographically, right?

00:19:37.100 If you're dealing with your local RCMP contacts.

00:19:40.080 You had police called on you though.

00:19:42.120 Yeah.

00:19:43.140 That's the, the irony is that you're there from the government.

00:19:45.380 And so it says, I don't trust this government guy.

00:19:47.120 I want the other government guy to come.

00:19:48.840 Well, that's it.

00:19:49.760 You know, and I'm not the only one happens all the time.

00:19:51.740 If you call, you can imagine the day of CRA scams and window duct cleaners.

00:19:55.260 So I call someone at the phone and I say, hello, my name is Andrew.

00:19:57.360 I'm calling from CSIS and I'd like to meet you for coffee.

00:20:00.380 And I can't tell you why over the phone.

00:20:02.340 I promise you I will explain everything.

00:20:03.880 I'll show you my badge when we, when we meet for coffee, whenever it is like, you know, obviously people are healthily skeptical of that.

00:20:13.120 So you would have police get called on you.

00:20:15.320 If you're knocking at a door and I talked about in the book, I'm knocking at a door late night.

00:20:19.760 I had to, it was very, very important.

00:20:21.200 I had to speak to the person.

00:20:22.100 I knew they were home.

00:20:22.680 They were not answering their door.

00:20:23.880 And I thought that they couldn't hear me because the laundry machine's on.

00:20:27.140 So I'm banging on this door.

00:20:28.380 I'm banging loudly.

00:20:29.340 And they call the police, four police cars come, come down the street.

00:20:32.860 And of course, I had to show my badge to the police.

00:20:35.040 And we have a big powwow in the, in the, in the driveway and the garage door opens up.

00:20:40.660 And this very frightened guy who's had someone bounding on this door for an hour.

00:20:45.720 He looks out and the police turn to him.

00:20:47.880 You got to talk to this guy.

00:20:49.160 He said, it's important.

00:20:50.020 Now he's, what did I do?

00:20:51.680 What did I do?

00:20:52.200 I thought the police were here to help me.

00:20:53.760 So yeah, they were very helpful.

00:20:56.040 We used to, if people didn't believe who we were, we would sometimes ask the police to

00:21:00.060 vouch for us.

00:21:00.980 So at the ground level, you know, you're working as a team, but we're trying to be discreet.

00:21:07.020 So if we can avoid, if we can avoid that kind of attention, we try to do that.

00:21:11.360 I think one of the largest criticisms that I see, and it's a criticism I've made in some

00:21:16.220 ways in the past of Canadian intelligence, is that there seems to be an awful lot of

00:21:20.740 reliance on American intelligence.

00:21:22.580 One notable example is Aaron Driver, the young man from not far from where I live, Strathroy,

00:21:27.460 Ontario, who was intercepted.

00:21:29.420 And this one did sound like a very dramatic movie-like interception at the last minute,

00:21:34.520 but it was a tip from the FBI that came through Canada to the RCMP.

00:21:39.320 And on one hand, you want that cooperation and collaboration.

00:21:42.740 But on the other hand, is this Canada getting lucky time and time again when we get tips

00:21:46.720 from foreign agencies that are picking up stuff that we're not?

00:21:49.260 Well, I'll tell you, Canada, I think we punch above our weight for what we are and what our

00:21:56.180 mandate is and that we're domestic intelligence service.

00:21:58.220 People love working with us.

00:21:59.520 We often get asked from the Americans and others for assistance, you know, with their

00:22:06.360 investigation.

00:22:07.040 So we're working very collaboratively, but we don't have a foreign intelligence service,

00:22:09.760 right?

00:22:09.960 So that is a limitation.

00:22:11.680 We are able to do some things abroad and collect information abroad as it pertains to threats

00:22:16.260 to Canada, but many other countries have a foreign domestic.

00:22:19.800 And I don't even know if we need one, if our mandate allows for us to do it in a sufficient

00:22:26.160 way, but being next door to the Americans with this huge, you know, with what they have, 0.98

00:22:31.960 we're always going to be importers of information.

00:22:35.140 We're just, we're not going to compete in that way.

00:22:37.960 So I don't know if we should actually try, but yeah, we're in the five eyes community.

00:22:44.360 We work very closely with the Americans, the British, Australians, and the New Zealanders.

00:22:48.660 But just by scale and size and our limited footprint abroad, we're just, that's just the

00:22:55.800 way it's kind of going to be.

00:22:57.340 And we benefit greatly from our relationship with the Americans.

00:23:00.460 You know, they, they obviously do have a lot of coverage and are happy to share and work

00:23:06.920 with us.

00:23:08.120 Let's talk about some of the fun stuff here.

00:23:10.000 Your, your special operations chapters, I thought were really, really exciting to read.

00:23:14.780 And one of the notable things that really jumped out is you talked about the training you went

00:23:19.300 through when you were going into the intelligence officer program at first, and then later on

00:23:23.720 in special operations.

00:23:24.840 And I can't remember the exact wording, but the trainer basically said to you, we're not

00:23:28.820 trying to trip you up.

00:23:30.100 The real world has its way of doing that.

00:23:32.740 And you talked about on a training exercise, like a cat escaping a house.

00:23:36.920 And at another point, dog poop was like interfering with it.

00:23:40.800 And this was not like you being put through an obstacle course deliberately.

00:23:44.900 Life just does this.

00:23:46.040 And I was wondering if you could talk about that, how there are certain things that just

00:23:48.500 happen in the field that you couldn't plan, you couldn't script, and you couldn't necessarily

00:23:52.080 have a plan for if you tried.

00:23:54.800 If I could go back and answer the James Bond question, which is one thing to get wrong,

00:23:58.800 or all these shows get wrong, is that the plans go as scripted.

00:24:02.180 The plans never go as scripted.

00:24:05.140 Something always happens.

00:24:07.220 And I say in the book, so our trainer, our grizzled veteran of hundreds of special operations,

00:24:12.140 and special operations for those listening is when a target individual reaches a threshold

00:24:18.520 of investigation, warrants, we were able to apply for warrants to do what we call technical

00:24:23.300 surveillance, which would be maybe implanted.

00:24:25.720 James Bond never needed a warrant.

00:24:27.120 Jack Fowler never needed a warrant.

00:24:27.300 I know, I got paperwork.

00:24:28.240 I mean, I think about that all the time.

00:24:31.540 But we then get approvals to do more, we'd say, technical surveillance or close access.

00:24:39.620 We break into places, try to plant devices, look for information in places where we, individuals

00:24:44.860 would otherwise expect a privacy or that we would not otherwise have the opportunities

00:24:48.720 to go.

00:24:49.580 And so that's what we were doing is we were going to do those things.

00:24:52.040 And of course, as I said, you know, you plan this, this, this operation, okay, it's going

00:24:56.040 to be late at night, and everyone's going to be asleep, we're going to get out of the

00:24:59.280 van.

00:24:59.980 And as we took two steps out of the van and training, and my colleague stepped in a huge

00:25:04.800 pile of dog poo.

00:25:05.820 And you obviously cannot break into a house and leave the smell of dog poo all over the

00:25:10.060 place when you weren't supposed to be there in the first place.

00:25:12.180 So you have to go back in the van and trade shoes.

00:25:14.920 But our trainer said, we, we are not going to mess with you.

00:25:18.880 We're not going to place any arbitrary tricks, traps, anything like that, because we know

00:25:24.360 life finds a way and things happen.

00:25:26.760 You don't expect.

00:25:27.540 And every single time, if it was people falling asleep in the, in their front rooms where you

00:25:35.800 think they're going to be asleep, but they fell asleep, uh, where they can see an operational

00:25:39.980 where you're, where you're supposed to be operating, you know, neighbor, a neighbor still up at

00:25:43.380 three in the morning, watching the Godfather rerun, uh, well into the night or smokers, people

00:25:50.560 out late walking their dogs and smoking constantly garbage day, people coming out, um, where you

00:25:56.020 don't expect it was all the time.

00:25:58.620 And so that is one thing that you don't, you don't see is everyone waiting in a van for

00:26:02.340 an extra hour for the neighbor to fall asleep or the dog to finish going to the bathroom.

00:26:08.680 So you can conduct a national security, um, you talk about overtime and a lot of money

00:26:13.400 racked up waiting for us in vans, uh, while we waited for people to go to sleep.

00:26:19.320 I don't know if there is an answer to this or if it depends on, on the person running

00:26:23.360 the operation, but is there a way to measure whether it's worth the risk in real time when

00:26:30.260 things are changing or is it really like, is there a standardized way of doing that?

00:26:34.560 Or is it basically you have to go with your gut?

00:26:38.060 Yeah, it's, you kind of lay out what your, the, let's say the acceptable level of risk

00:26:43.660 or what your concerns are.

00:26:44.940 And you talk about this in advance and then you're, you're playing around within those

00:26:48.320 parameters, right?

00:26:49.320 Which is, we think we need this much time.

00:26:51.960 We have this much time, so it's going to be okay.

00:26:55.440 We won't get caught in the morning.

00:26:57.060 And then your, your time window narrows where, oh, we had to start late.

00:27:02.620 We're really going to bump up against it.

00:27:04.140 You can, and you're doing a lot of that on, on the fly.

00:27:06.960 And I say, it's all about decision-making.

00:27:08.700 Um, when the plans go wrong, how are you able to adjust, um, accordingly?

00:27:14.240 So we think we would have situations where we, we think that this person parks their car

00:27:20.400 here every night, every night, they park their car here, every night they park.

00:27:25.000 And then, then they, we show up, the car is parked, you know, a few, a few steps over

00:27:31.360 and it's a little closer to a parking attendant or a light that was not where we, you know,

00:27:37.960 it was not there.

00:27:39.280 And so you have to say, well, does this impact our risk assessments impact our, the cost benefit

00:27:44.920 announced, can we come back tomorrow?

00:27:46.480 Is this our one opportunity?

00:27:48.520 You are, you're having those conversations, uh, all the time.

00:27:53.200 And that's the, that's the tricky part of the special operations.

00:27:55.480 It's not, um, you know, you do all your planning and when you throw your plan out the window,

00:28:02.380 would you have enough to fall back on to be confident in your decisions?

00:28:06.580 One thing as well, that the book explains movies get wrong is that it's not one person

00:28:11.440 that has all of the skill sets.

00:28:13.180 It's not one person that's picking the lock, that's hacking the phone, that's planting

00:28:17.200 the bug and doing all of that.

00:28:18.580 And I like the way you described how each of these specialists on your team had their

00:28:22.560 own specialty.

00:28:23.360 You know, this one guy was, uh, great at picking locks and someone else was great at doing

00:28:27.740 this and, and so on.

00:28:28.860 And, and that was also interesting because these people aren't always as suave and debonair

00:28:34.200 as other people are.

00:28:35.520 Like some of them are very rough around the edges, it seems like, and, and you've got to

00:28:38.760 be a babysitter in a way, which I found interesting because you're talking about people that are

00:28:42.820 doing something very risky, very skilled.

00:28:45.540 They're obviously capable, competent people, but, uh, they still need their handheld at

00:28:49.720 times.

00:28:51.440 Yes.

00:28:51.840 First of all, I'll say the extreme competence in their unique, uh, and specific fields.

00:28:55.900 So with locks, we have a guy that's all he did.

00:28:57.700 You pick locks all day, practice picking locks in the evening.

00:29:00.520 If we need to get in the room, we called him locks.

00:29:03.200 That was, it was not creative and he was locks and he did locks and he could pick a lock while

00:29:07.480 he was talking about what he was having for lunch that day.

00:29:09.360 And that was not a skillset that I had, um, but so the, the, the relationship was, he just

00:29:14.740 focuses on picking locks.

00:29:16.040 So we're walking up to a front door, you know, he's, that's all he's doing.

00:29:19.960 And I'm the one as a security person, I'm the one looking around to make sure that he

00:29:23.400 can focus on his job.

00:29:24.680 So a lot of it is this, those specialists who are specialists, they, that is what they

00:29:30.600 do.

00:29:30.980 And generalists like myself are the ones who are responsible security to ensure that they

00:29:35.220 can do their job securely, that they can do their job uninterrupted.

00:29:39.900 And if something goes wrong, they're counting on me to let them know, you know, grab, grab

00:29:44.440 locks or give them a, give them a squeeze and say, we got to go or, or, you know, be quiet

00:29:49.360 for a moment and want to make sure we're okay.

00:29:51.480 And he relies on me for that.

00:29:53.360 So there is that joke.

00:29:54.600 Yeah.

00:29:54.660 We don't let the texts, we call them all kind of bundle up as texts.

00:29:57.660 The texts don't talk to anybody.

00:29:59.160 Uh, we do the, we do the talking and you just, you just do focus on your job.

00:30:03.960 And that there's a, there's a healthy tension there, um, with operations because they know

00:30:09.760 that I can't do what they can do.

00:30:11.320 And I always want them to do it faster and a little bit better.

00:30:14.880 Um, so there's, there's always a special operations tension, uh, when we, when we do

00:30:19.100 these things.

00:30:19.580 And I think that what was one thing when I wrote the book, I was very hopeful that the

00:30:24.060 texts didn't, didn't rebel against me, that I, that I captured that relationship well,

00:30:28.180 without, uh, you know, getting to say, well, come on, man, you couldn't do anything we

00:30:33.560 can do.

00:30:33.900 Don't, don't always tell us our gear doesn't work.

00:30:36.080 Um, you could never, you couldn't do anything.

00:30:38.220 So, yeah.

00:30:38.980 Well, yeah, let's, let's talk a little bit about when you're planning an operation,

00:30:43.120 because there were, I mean, one incident you talk about in the book or not incident,

00:30:45.960 but one event is having to go and buy a particular car.

00:30:49.080 So you buy a used car and stuff like that.

00:30:51.240 And a lot of people would not necessarily have thought about this, that it's not just the two

00:30:56.860 hours you might be on a street, but in many cases, days, weeks, possibly months of, of

00:31:01.720 planning.

00:31:02.120 And I was thinking about this, you would have to have presumably like an entire other identity

00:31:08.460 when you're going out and procuring this stuff, you need to be in a particular mindset.

00:31:11.900 Why are you buying a car?

00:31:13.420 Why are you buying this, you know, construction outfit or something like that?

00:31:18.720 It kind of depends on what you're, what you're getting.

00:31:21.380 If you're going to, to, to Costco or Best Buy and just buying something that's innocuous,

00:31:25.760 but you're going to use it for a special operation.

00:31:28.020 But if you're, and if you're going to procure a vehicle, um, so, so for example, uh, yeah,

00:31:34.180 we're trying to get a car.

00:31:35.140 If you're going to do a job, the techs in their defense, you know, they want to practice.

00:31:39.240 They might have 10 minutes to do their operation.

00:31:41.460 They don't want to walk up to a car without having ever seen what the inside looks like,

00:31:46.760 uh, or, you know, so we try to get them practice vehicles or things that they can test

00:31:51.760 on so they're not walking up a cold to that environment.

00:31:55.440 So we'd have to go.

00:31:56.560 And if it could be buy a car or borrow a car, rent a car, or if one case it was going to

00:32:01.600 go to my brother and borrow his car.

00:32:04.020 So the CSIS budget is going to be very high.

00:32:06.060 If there's a year where they've got to break into a bunch of Mercedes and, uh,

00:32:09.560 I mean, big problems.

00:32:10.660 The, uh, that is it.

00:32:12.300 We, when we try to do it, look, we're, we bureaucratic organization.

00:32:16.120 We have budgets and you can't go, Hey, you know what?

00:32:17.920 I just want to go and take this, take this car and, uh, and take it apart and we'll throw

00:32:22.220 it out.

00:32:22.540 I'm sure our budget's there.

00:32:23.760 One thing the movies don't get is the budget constraints.

00:32:26.780 So if we can borrow something, if we can go and ask somebody, in some cases you're going

00:32:30.560 as CSIS, hi, my name is Andrew.

00:32:32.340 I'm here from CSIS.

00:32:32.920 Can I borrow your car for a week?

00:32:35.300 I promise to give it back to you.

00:32:37.140 I can't tell you what it's for.

00:32:39.440 Uh, I, you know, I, I can't give you a piece of paper that says, uh, you know, Andrew from

00:32:46.420 CSIS has my car.

00:32:47.600 I just need you to need your help.

00:32:49.400 I need you to trust me.

00:32:50.640 And I promise you to get it back in one piece.

00:32:54.060 And people do like the other neat thing.

00:32:56.600 And I, and I hope I came across in the book is that we were constantly asking people for

00:33:00.820 ridiculousness.

00:33:01.720 Like, can I borrow your car for four days? 0.98

00:33:04.400 Can I borrow your house?

00:33:05.180 Can I borrow your house?

00:33:06.640 Um, I need your house.

00:33:07.960 I need you to get out of your house.

00:33:09.840 You cannot be there when I'm there running this operation.

00:33:12.920 I will, I will pay for your dinner and a movie.

00:33:15.620 I don't have much more money than that.

00:33:17.680 And I really appreciate it.

00:33:20.200 And people would do it and people would do it.

00:33:22.140 It's an amazing thing.

00:33:23.000 So that's that, that also is really appreciate it.

00:33:26.720 I wanted people who cannot in any way, um, you know, they're not supposed to say that

00:33:31.820 they let CSIS borrow their house or CSIS borrow their car, um, or that they talk to CSIS

00:33:36.460 anyway, they also don't get acknowledged for their help.

00:33:39.440 And I think, you know, it's okay to say, Hey, thanks.

00:33:42.340 You know, we really, really appreciate that.

00:33:44.680 It's extremely helpful.

00:33:46.380 Um, it's legitimate.

00:33:47.540 Now I hope people on the listening, don't go out and start pretending to CSIS and make

00:33:52.160 a fake badge and run around and go stealing cars.

00:33:54.680 Um, you know, there are ways to verify, but yeah, we were constantly asking the public

00:33:59.920 for assistance in kind of unique and funny ways.

00:34:02.560 And they would come through, um, it's like heartwarming when I think about all the people

00:34:07.460 that asked for help and that they did it.

00:34:09.620 I know you were given an alias, which was what you operated as not just publicly, but

00:34:14.380 even internally at CSIS with your colleagues, as I understood it.

00:34:17.160 And I I'm curious how sort of integrated that was.

00:34:20.700 Like, did you have a driver's license and credit cards under that name as well, or was

00:34:24.780 it just your business card and your badge?

00:34:26.700 I can't get, I can't get too much into that.

00:34:29.160 Um, but what I can say is that occasionally I would use, uh, you know, working name and

00:34:35.340 alias once again, to create some distance from the people who, that I would meet that

00:34:40.320 they, if it should ever get out, that I was, uh, you know, an intelligence officer, that

00:34:44.680 they would have some distance from that, that they couldn't connect with me online and those

00:34:48.180 types of things.

00:34:49.200 Um, you know, how that kind of worked is I'd say I'd probably get a lot of trouble for,

00:34:53.280 for talking about that.

00:34:54.280 And then the, so I can't get too much into it, but I said, I, my name is Andrew.

00:34:58.680 I was mostly known as Andrew, you know, it's a pretty generic, I'd knock on the door and

00:35:01.740 say, my name is Andrew.

00:35:02.340 I'd have a different last name, but it wasn't overly elaborate and where I could operate

00:35:07.180 him under my real name.

00:35:08.880 I did.

00:35:09.440 I don't like lying to people.

00:35:10.860 So I didn't have a real complicated backstory.

00:35:14.100 If someone said, are you married?

00:35:16.380 That's yeah.

00:35:17.100 You know, do you have kids?

00:35:17.720 Yeah.

00:35:18.060 I just found it easier to keep my story straight than this other Andrew was this person.

00:35:23.240 And I was this person.

00:35:24.240 And so, you know, that when I would meet people, they might not know my real name, but

00:35:28.360 you know, they know most things, uh, most other things about me.

00:35:31.260 And, and cause you're, you're trying to build rapport.

00:35:33.400 You're trying to ask people for assistance.

00:35:35.360 Um, you know, I, I felt that was, that was important.

00:35:38.620 The name was kind of the, um, once again, for kind of protecting myself and protecting

00:35:43.700 them as well.

00:35:44.280 Um, why couldn't you include your alias in the book?

00:35:49.460 That was the one thing that jumped out at me because you're no longer working there.

00:35:52.460 You're obviously publicly acknowledging you worked at CSIS.

00:35:55.220 Why was that still not something you were able to or comfortable sharing?

00:35:59.960 I thought a lot about it, uh, actually.

00:36:02.940 And at the end of the day, I just kind of made a decision to take it out.

00:36:06.220 This was the first thesis memoir, um, written by intelligence officer about working there.

00:36:11.880 And, you know, maybe down the road, some will do it and the next person will do it and everyone

00:36:16.440 else will do it.

00:36:17.100 Uh, I was trying to be maybe, maybe cautious in that respect, not knowing, you know, there's

00:36:23.740 no, there's no formal, uh, way to vet a memoir.

00:36:27.560 So in CIA, they have, you can submit it to a review agency.

00:36:30.740 I think most other services do.

00:36:32.580 We don't.

00:36:33.260 So as much as I was trying to get some feedback from next colleagues and, and others, you know,

00:36:40.080 I, I didn't know if I was getting in trouble, I joke at the end of the book.

00:36:43.480 I said, uh, my hope is that I, I don't, uh, uh, go to jail for this.

00:36:47.300 And I didn't want to go to my publisher and say it's a two book deal.

00:36:49.620 And the second, the second book is from prison.

00:36:51.980 Jailhouse memoirs.

00:36:52.880 Yeah.

00:36:53.140 Yeah.

00:36:53.580 So I, I just, maybe there, I aired, I aired in the side of caution.

00:36:56.940 There are absolutely people out there who have met me who I was a candidate in 2018.

00:37:00.680 Right.

00:37:01.280 So I left CSIS and I worked under my alias.

00:37:05.460 And then there were posters of me and my real name and subways around my, uh, neighborhood.

00:37:10.380 So yes, people would know me by my alias.

00:37:13.700 There are people out there who would, um, I just, I said, that was, that was one thing

00:37:18.660 I thought, you know what, I'm not gonna, I'm not gonna test it.

00:37:22.400 Let's talk a little bit about in our, our closing moments here, your, your post CSIS life.

00:37:26.900 Obviously you went into politics, I know you run a security, uh, consulting agency right

00:37:31.280 now.

00:37:32.140 What are the practical, uh, guidelines or what's the practical advice you'd give people

00:37:37.180 about how to protect themselves?

00:37:38.300 Not just, I mean, I don't want to over dramatize here and say that we all have to protect ourself

00:37:42.380 against a terror threat any day, but, but you know what I mean?

00:37:44.560 There are threats out there, cyber threats, even just in general, uh, people that might

00:37:48.420 be up to no good around us.

00:37:49.620 How can people protect themselves?

00:37:52.480 It's a, it's a great question.

00:37:53.800 And obviously, um, there are kind of specific people have unique, specific challenges.

00:37:58.480 I'm happy to, to discuss them.

00:38:00.080 I think on the cyber front, we have to stay vigilant.

00:38:02.920 So let me start with this.

00:38:04.080 There are absolutely threats and risks out there.

00:38:06.280 I think as Canadians, sometimes we get in this mindset that, oh, we live in a safe country.

00:38:10.340 What does anyone want from me?

00:38:12.020 You know, I, I'm, I have nothing of any value.

00:38:14.880 If they hack me, it's okay.

00:38:16.120 Well, no, um, we all have things of value.

00:38:19.080 We have assets of value.

00:38:20.200 We have that either home broken into, they might not take things of value.

00:38:23.440 That's incredibly, uh, it makes you feel violated.

00:38:26.860 Um, and so we, we, we want to maintain our, um, our safety and security.

00:38:31.720 You have things of value cyber wise.

00:38:35.020 If, if you are compromised, think about everybody you're connected to on Facebook, LinkedIn,

00:38:40.020 every, you know, the most, uh, I'd say technically illiterate colleague, friend, family member

00:38:46.640 you have is now vulnerable to any scammer.

00:38:49.280 Who's going to use your accounts to get to them.

00:38:51.080 So first let's all acknowledge that, that we have assets, we have information, we have

00:38:55.480 things of value that are important.

00:38:57.740 So, so identify what those things are.

00:38:59.640 If you're online banking, make sure your passwords, like that we have appropriate security

00:39:03.800 in place around them.

00:39:04.820 So identify your critical assets that you have them, you know, assess the security you

00:39:09.400 have around those assets, and then be vigilant that you are appropriately secured.

00:39:14.440 Right.

00:39:14.980 And so you don't have to go overboard.

00:39:17.140 Um, I'm certainly one that says, we can't, we can't make it overly complicated, but we

00:39:22.940 do have things we should do a base level of protection around those things.

00:39:26.420 Some people have more, some people have, uh, you know, varying degrees companies.

00:39:31.280 Absolutely.

00:39:32.540 Um, so that's, that's kind of the broad strokes.

00:39:35.320 What I do, I, so I joke in my, I used to break into places and now I help companies,

00:39:41.400 uh, identify and secure those vulnerabilities that I used to exploit when I was out there

00:39:46.680 trying to get it into places.

00:39:47.900 And so, uh, if you, anyone wants to chat about that and what those vulnerabilities are, we're

00:39:53.180 happy to, happy to do it.

00:39:55.120 And if people think they don't have threats, look, we do this stuff too, and we're the good

00:39:59.580 guys.

00:40:00.200 So you better believe there are bad guys out there who are targeting us for a number of

00:40:05.620 things that we need to keep ourselves safe.

00:40:08.360 I don't think it came up on the book.

00:40:10.360 Uh, and, and I'm confident this might be one of those.

00:40:13.120 I can't talk about us, but I'll, I'll go wild anyway.

00:40:15.580 Alarm systems.

00:40:16.840 This was something that I'm assuming there was a way to get around, but how useful are

00:40:22.320 they as an individual who has one in their home?

00:40:26.720 Well, they, they're not, uh, they're definitely useful.

00:40:29.640 Um, we talk about security.

00:40:32.020 We're talking, I'm going to get the, the, the five D's.

00:40:34.760 It's, uh, what's it, um, uh, deter, detect, delay, uh, disrupt and defeat.

00:40:44.120 So all these systems that we have are cameras that would, that help deter, they help detect

00:40:49.300 alarm systems, definitely, uh, detect so that you can then disrupt an activity in place.

00:40:54.820 Like these are all very, very helpful.

00:40:56.800 Certainly things, you know, every secrecy, every, even locks, even with the toughest lock

00:41:02.360 can be picked or broken.

00:41:03.940 And it just might take a lot longer.

00:41:06.340 So if you have a more secure lock in there, then one, somebody with more skill and experience

00:41:11.600 is going to be needed to break into it.

00:41:13.640 Then your average person would just kick the door in.

00:41:16.320 Um, and that delay you're trying to, to create by having better, you know, having an alarm

00:41:22.140 system needs to be defeated.

00:41:23.140 Having a tougher lock.

00:41:24.800 It's going to give you more time to respond.

00:41:26.740 So these, these things all work together.

00:41:29.220 Cameras do.

00:41:29.960 You get broken into, maybe the cameras didn't deter the person, but you can go review them

00:41:34.840 afterwards and, and give them police to defeat and get your stuff back.

00:41:39.320 So layering these, these tools around, uh, it's just a way to keep this, to work together

00:41:46.200 to keep safe.

00:41:46.700 So I wouldn't say, uh, useless and on their own, obviously useful, but they need to work

00:41:52.040 for a reason.

00:41:53.720 I don't know how well, or if I would fit into a CSIS special operations unit, but the one

00:41:59.120 skill I do have that I, I wish more people did was just generally a situational awareness.

00:42:04.280 I find a lot of people just when they're walking down a street, just are not paying attention

00:42:08.420 to what's around them.

00:42:09.280 Whereas for me, I'm probably paying attention too much to what's going on around me that

00:42:13.420 I'm like, you know, barely talking to my wife if I'm ever walking down the street.

00:42:16.560 Cause I'm just like, Oh, what's that guy?

00:42:17.740 What's that?

00:42:18.140 I hear a car.

00:42:18.760 I feel the person, but I do think that's missing in a lot of cases, especially in the air

00:42:22.460 pod age, you know, people are walking around just not at all aware that there is a world

00:42:26.640 around them.

00:42:28.420 Absolutely.

00:42:29.200 I mean, that's what we tried to take advantage of that, that people's just not paying attention

00:42:33.540 or, you know, working in plain sight.

00:42:35.900 You really, your cover is that you belong there and people look around, they look like 0.87

00:42:40.320 you belong and they don't take any notice of you going into, going into buildings, right?

00:42:45.060 Just looking like you belong in that building.

00:42:47.380 People take a, oh, that person's wearing a blazer.

00:42:49.640 They must, that must be okay.

00:42:51.700 And I'll hold the door for that person.

00:42:53.780 Or like there is a situation, you know, tailgating, you know, walking with purpose, not signing

00:42:58.940 in places.

00:43:00.240 Absolutely.

00:43:00.840 We took, I'd say take advantage of it, but we use that.

00:43:03.420 Obviously that was a big part of what we were doing.

00:43:06.080 I mentioned the book.

00:43:07.400 It's like car alarms.

00:43:08.740 Speaking of alarms, I set up numerous car alarms in my day.

00:43:13.040 And the first one is terrifying.

00:43:15.680 You walk up.

00:43:16.020 So locks would say, he said to me, you know, Andrew, I can, I can turn it off, but I can't

00:43:21.160 stop it from going off.

00:43:23.280 So it's going to go off.

00:43:26.040 Your instinct is going to be to run away, but you can't because people look out their

00:43:32.000 window and they see alarm go off and someone running.

00:43:35.220 That's going to look bad.

00:43:36.300 If they see two guys standing there, it's going to look like we're fumbling with our keys

00:43:40.060 and it's going to look totally normal, right?

00:43:42.600 So yeah, we would try to play on what looks normal, what doesn't.

00:43:46.040 So the first time, sure enough, like the car alarm goes off, you just, every, every party

00:43:49.640 it wants to bolt the third, fourth, fifth time, a little more, you're a little more

00:43:54.660 comfortable, you know, the locks can turn it off and whatnot, but that's, that's kind

00:43:57.720 of the awareness you're, you're taking advantage of, oh, the guy set off an alarm.

00:44:00.840 It's three in the morning.

00:44:02.400 Should they be there?

00:44:03.740 Should they not?

00:44:05.240 Oh, they look normal.

00:44:06.620 I'll go back to smoking my cigarette or walking my dog, you know?

00:44:10.060 Well, it's a fascinating book.

00:44:12.020 I'm glad you wrote it.

00:44:13.040 I'm glad you're in a position where you're able to talk about it.

00:44:15.300 I was never here.

00:44:16.420 My true Canadian spy story of coffees, code names, and covert operations in the age of

00:44:21.220 terrorism.

00:44:21.840 And we didn't get into it, but I was never here.

00:44:24.160 You literally wore t-shirts that said that on operations and you bought the shirt from

00:44:29.120 winners, as I understand it.

00:44:30.740 That's right.

00:44:31.280 Under my, under my hooded sweatshirt, but that was my, uh, yeah, that was my lucky t-shirt.

00:44:36.740 And my wife knew when I was going out late at night, uh, sometimes you go out just to

00:44:40.900 see a neighborhood.

00:44:41.740 But when I put on my lucky, she's like, oh, you're working tonight.

00:44:43.960 You know, that was a, I might have a giveaway.

00:44:46.280 My, I was never here t-shirt, you know, no one will ever, no, get caught and, you know,

00:44:51.440 get home.

00:44:52.220 Okay.

00:44:52.700 So yes, that's why we named the, named the book.

00:44:54.600 I was never here.

00:44:55.780 I love it.

00:44:56.120 Well, it was a great book.

00:44:56.800 Andrew Kirsch, thank you so much for coming on today.

00:44:59.040 Great to talk to you.

00:44:59.860 Thanks so much for having me.

00:45:00.720 Really appreciate it.

00:45:01.660 That was Andrew Kirsch.

00:45:03.260 The book you can see up on the screen there, I Was Never Here, my true Canadian spy story

00:45:07.260 of coffees, code names, and covert operations in the age of terrorism.

00:45:13.300 So much that we didn't get a chance to get to.

00:45:15.460 So I hope you do buy the book and read the book and enjoy the book as I did.

00:45:19.420 That does it for us.

00:45:20.420 We will be back next week with more of Canada's most irreverent talk show here on True North.

00:45:25.860 This is the Andrew Lawton Show.

00:45:27.020 Thank you, God bless, and good day to you all.

00:45:29.840 Support the program by donating to True North at www.tnc.news.

Juno News - September 02, 2022

Behind the scenes of CSIS with a former Canadian spy

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