Juno News - March 02, 2023


China Hearings | CSIS Director David Vigneault questioned on foreign interference

Topics
Mentioned
Trudeau wants Big Tech to subsidize Big Media LAWTON: The left is never going to like you

Episode Stats


Length

1 hour

Words per minute

136.85

Word count

8,273

Sentence count

234

Harmful content

Misogyny

3

sentences flagged

Hate speech

3

sentences flagged


Summary

Summaries generated with gmurro/bart-large-finetuned-filtered-spotify-podcast-summ .

CSIS Director David Vigneault, Director Michel Tessier, Director of the Communications Security Establishment, Caroline Xavier, Chief of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Michael Duhem, Deputy Commissioner of Federal Policing, and Director-General of the Canadian Joint Intelligence Service (Joint Commissioner of Public Intelligence) all testified before the Joint Committee on Foreign Interference.

Transcript

Transcript generated with Whisper (turbo).
Misogyny classifications generated with MilaNLProc/bert-base-uncased-ear-misogyny .
Hate speech classifications generated with facebook/roberta-hate-speech-dynabench-r4-target .
Topics generated with Qwen2.5-3B-Instruct.
Hosts, guests, and mentioned names generated with spaCy (en_core_web_sm), reconciled against Wikidata.
00:00:00 I want to welcome David Vigneault, Director, Michel Tessier, Deputy Director of the Canadian
00:00:17 Security Intelligence Service, and from the Communications Security Establishment, Caroline
00:00:24 Xavier, Chief, and from the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Michael Duhem, Deputy Commissioner,
00:00:32 Federal Policing.
00:00:33 We have until noon, and I think we will take a little bit of time after that to finish
00:00:40 up.
00:00:41 So I will ask Mr. Vigneault to give his opening remarks.
00:00:47 Welcome.
00:00:48 Thank you very much, members of the committee.
00:00:53 Good morning.
00:00:54 Thank you for inviting CSIS and our colleagues to appear on foreign interference threats to Canada's democratic institutions.
00:01:02 CSIS continues to view hostile activities by foreign state actors as the most significant strategic threat to Canada's national security community.
00:01:12 Foreign interference in our democratic institutions is particular, undermines key in society.
00:01:18 Foreign state actors who engage in these deceptive, covert and hostile activities seek to weaken
00:01:25 trust in our fundamental institutions and processes, threaten communities, sow division
00:01:32 and ultimately influence policy.
00:01:37 As CISA's officials recently told this committee, foreign interference can take multiple forms.
00:01:44 Threat actors may aggressively threaten or coerce their targets into acting in a certain
00:01:50 way.
00:01:51 This is a common activity impacting Canada's diverse communities and can involve threats
00:01:56 to them or their family outside Canada.
00:02:01 Threat actors may also cultivate relationships with targets to manipulate them into providing
00:02:07 favors and valuable information or may conduct corrupt or illicit financing activities.
00:02:15 It is also important to note that threat actors may use others as proxies to conduct these
00:02:21 activities on their behalf.
00:02:22 The techniques that foreign state actors employ to influence public discourse, the behavior
00:02:29 of individual Canadians and even our democratic processes to their advantage.
00:02:35 We have also observed them to deploy cyber attacks, disinformation campaigns and espionage
00:02:41 to these ends.
00:02:43 Foreign interference is therefore a complex and enduring threat to Canada's sovereignty.
00:02:48 I can assure you that CSIS takes all allegations of foreign interference very seriously and
00:02:53 uses its authorities under the CSIS Act to investigate, provide advice to government and,
00:02:59 where appropriate, take measures to reduce the threat.
00:03:03 Having resilience to foreign interference is one way to mitigate its coercive effects.
00:03:08 CSIS has spoken publicly in a variety of forums to warn Canadians about these threats and
00:03:15 these techniques and inform them of ways they can protect themselves.
00:03:19 We have also provided defensive briefings to elected officials from all orders of government
00:03:24 across Canada.
00:03:26 Perhaps most central to these efforts is our engagement with Canadian communities. 0.98
00:03:31 We have been clear that the principal threat to Canada comes from the People's Republic
00:03:35 of China. 0.74
00:03:36 But to be clear, the threat does not come from the Chinese people, but rather from the
00:03:41 Chinese Communist Party and the government of China. 0.72
00:03:44 Indeed, we are keenly aware that Chinese communities are often the primary victims of PRC foreign
00:03:49 interference efforts in Canada.
00:03:52 We therefore continue to invest significant effort in building relationships with
00:04:00 individuals communities and community leaders to establish and sustain trust
00:04:05 and to offer our support and partnership in their protection furthermore furthermore
00:04:13 these efforts are not limited to Chinese Canadian communities CSIS takes
00:04:20 allegation of authorized released of classified information very seriously
00:04:24 compromises of this kind can reveal sensitive sources methodologies and
00:04:29 techniques through Canada's adversaries they are listening this can subsequently
00:04:36 threaten the integrity of our operations and even the physical safety and
00:04:39 security of human sources and employees ultimately such releases can hinder our
00:04:45 ability to protect Canadians therefore I would like to remind the committee that
00:04:49 just as with other recent appearances in front of a proc in other communities
00:04:53 here I am limited in what we can say in an unclassified setting ceases cannot
00:04:59 publicly in fact prohibited from commenting on operational matters and classified information
00:05:04 in order to protect the safety and security of canadians nonetheless i welcome this opportunity
00:05:10 for a frank and transparent discussion to the extent possible on the foreign difference threats
00:05:15 to canada that canada faces and we'll be happy to answer your questions thank you madam chair
00:05:23 thank you so much mr vignon um and so we will start with our six minute rounds it will start
00:05:28 with mr cooper followed by mrs romanado suivi per madame goudreau and then mr julian everyone
00:05:44 that comment should go through the chair and there should be one voice being heard at a time
00:05:50 mr cooper six minutes to you well thank you very much madam chair thank you to the witnesses and i
00:05:55 I would like to just express and associate myself with the remarks of Mr. Binot in saying
00:06:02 that the interference that we see in the threat posed by the Beijing Communist Party has nothing
00:06:07 to do with Chinese Canadians who are victims of the regime and their interference activities.
00:06:13 It's very important we keep that in mind at all times during our deliberations on this matter.
00:06:20 Mr. Vinault, how many times did CSIS brief the Prime Minister regarding Beijing's interference in the 2019 and 2021 elections?
00:06:35 Thank you, Madam Chair. I have been Director of CSIS since 2017.
00:06:41 I have had many opportunities to brief the Prime Minister, Cabinet, and different ministers on the subject of national security,
00:06:48 including specifically on foreign interference i would not have a specific breakdown of the
00:06:53 number of times since 2017 but this has been a topic of ongoing briefings will you undertake
00:07:00 then to provide the committee with the list of all the dates that you briefed the prime minister
00:07:08 but cesus briefed the prime minister in regards to interference activities by
00:07:14 beijing related to the 2019 and 2021 elections so um madam chair i understand that yesterday the
00:07:23 national security intelligence advisor was asked for a similar request and uh my reaction to this
00:07:28 would be to probably work with the privy council office to have a consolidated response uh to the
00:07:34 committee uh through you madam chair and uh will you also uh undertake to do the same with respect
00:07:41 to a list of all the dates that CSIS briefed any minister PMO staff ministers
00:07:48 office staff or security cleared Liberal Party staff related to Beijing's
00:07:53 interference in the 2019 and 2021 elections so madam chair I think you
00:07:59 know as just mentioned we will endeavor to to collide as much of that information
00:08:03 possible and bearing any specific national security considerations we
00:08:08 endeavor to to provide as much as possible to the committee okay and uh and i guess consistent with
00:08:15 that or in addition to that will you undertake to provide a list of all individuals who are present
00:08:20 at these briefings to the degree that this is possible um i will probably have to defer to uh
00:08:28 the extent to which we know we will again you know provide the information in the context of uh of uh
00:08:34 any bearing any other uh national security considerations but we'll probably have to rely
00:08:38 also on the privy council office uh for some of the attendance of these briefings so that
00:08:43 consolidated piece will hopefully be answering many of these questions madam chair thank you
00:08:49 very much on uh february 24th 2023 sam cooper of global news reported that three weeks before the
00:08:55 2019 election cesus officials gave an urgent briefing to senior aides in the prime minister's
00:09:01 office warning them that a liberal candidate who is a sitting liberal mp now had received assistance
00:09:09 from beijing's toronto consulate in his nomination campaign what are the names of the pmo aids who
00:09:16 were briefed madam chair as i have just indicated we'll have to review the the list of the and the
00:09:25 dates of such briefing it will be important to remind uh colleagues that you know i will
00:09:32 or this committee i should say that uh the uh i do not take the premise of that the the question
00:09:39 at face value i need to be able to provide information respecting the the proper uh
00:09:46 classification of the information so uh that the the spirit of that of that question will
00:09:52 be answered through the consolidated response. And to that end, did CISIS brief the Prime Minister?
00:10:04 CISIS, as I mentioned. No, no, no, but specifically in relation to the 2019 circumstances
00:10:10 surrounding a Liberal candidate and Beijing's consulate in Toronto assisting him in his nomination
00:10:16 campaign so maybe madam chair on that question i think it's important to um to put in context
00:10:23 that information that is in in the public domain uh may or may not be coming from uh from the
00:10:29 service or from other agencies uh there's been uh indeed uh information that is now reported by the
00:10:35 media uh and um it is not because the information is in the media that i'm at liberty to confirm or
00:10:42 or deny the specific nature of classified information.
00:10:45 So along these lines, I will not be able to provide a specific answer to that allegation.
00:10:50 I understand that you're not able to provide a specific answer at this time,
00:10:54 but again, would you undertake to go back and provide this committee with any date
00:11:04 or dates that the Prime Minister was briefed on this matter?
00:11:08 I will be able to provide, Madam Chair, a consolidated response to PCO of dates where the subject of foreign interference was discussed.
00:11:17 However, I am not at liberty to disclose information directly and indirectly that would provide classified information in a public setting.
00:11:26 So there will be a limit, Madam Chair, to the specificity of the topic discussed.
00:11:32 But as I said, I think it's important that people understand that foreign interference was indeed briefed regularly.
00:11:38 Okay, and the same would apply with respect to Liberal Party staff or other officials who may have been briefed.
00:11:45 If you could also undertake that, if they were briefed, to come back to this committee,
00:11:52 having regard for what you had previously said, unless it doesn't apply in that case.
00:11:56 We will, I think in the spirit of these hearings, Madam Chair,
00:12:00 we will absolutely endeavor to provide the most consolidated and thorough response possible to the committee.
00:12:06 Thank you.
00:12:08 thank you and now mrs romanado up to six minutes for you
00:12:17 thank you very much madam madam chair um i'd like to thank the witnesses for being with us today
00:12:23 and for providing uh the information that they are able to because i understand full well
00:12:29 given security issues we can't um publicly discuss in public things that we do not have clearance
00:12:36 for. My first question is for Mr. Vigneault. I'd like to know a little bit about the tools that
00:12:42 CSIS has to disrupt foreign interference and in the Rosenberg report that was released this week
00:12:48 it says that one of the options CSIS has is to engage with diplomats who may try to interfere
00:12:54 in our elections. So if a foreign official was trying to interfere in our election
00:13:00 does CSIS have the tools in its mandate to address that so thank you for the question and madam chair
00:13:08 through you I would say that the CSIS Act provides a number of tools for CSIS to investigate foreign
00:13:15 interference activities including when it comes to diplomats posting in Canada we are as an
00:13:24 intelligence service our professional are looking at the best way possible to get at the intelligence
00:13:29 using all the techniques that are available to us.
00:13:32 And when we do face questions or situation where there's a specific threat activity,
00:13:40 we are also using, and we have used and will continue to use,
00:13:44 our threat reduction measures mandate to engage in those activities.
00:13:48 We will often, you know, work with partners.
00:13:52 We will not work in isolation because, you know, these issues are very complex
00:13:57 and you do not want to take an action and have unintended consequences,
00:14:01 so we work in partnership.
00:14:02 So in this case, when it comes time to diplomat,
00:14:05 you would likely be working with the Department of Global Affairs Canada, GAC, to do so.
00:14:11 But I can assure the committee that, as I said in my opening remarks,
00:14:14 that CSIS and our partners at this table,
00:14:17 we do take any allegations of foreign interference extremely seriously.
00:14:22 We investigate these allegations,
00:14:24 And we use all the tools at our disposal to try to better understand, characterize these activities and reduce the threat where possible.
00:14:33 Okay. And thank you very much. CSIS has the ability to share information with the RCMP for them to launch an investigation. Is that correct?
00:14:42 Yes, CSIS is actually over the years, since the inception of CSIS in 1984, we have developed between the CSIS and the RCMP very elaborate processes, processes to be able to share information.
00:15:00 I think the committee has heard some of the challenges that exist in using intelligence and passing it on to law enforcement agencies or investigative bodies, because intelligence is not a question of evidence.
00:15:15 So, you know, the RCMP in this specific case needs to determine how to use the information and further their own investigation.
00:15:23 It is a complex process. The two organizations working with the Department of Justice continue to work on this issue.
00:15:29 The notion of using intelligence to pursue law enforcement matters continues to be a challenge that, you know, a number of organizations are actively working on.
00:15:41 But we do have robust processes with the RCMP and with other law enforcement and investigative bodies to do such an exchange.
00:15:50 so on that um mr vigno i'm i'm sure you're aware that yesterday the uh deputy minister of public
00:15:57 safety confirmed that there are actually no investigations into allegations of foreign
00:16:01 interference uh from the last election underway so based on your your previous response that
00:16:07 information is shared uh what they have in front of them they do not have any impact of investigations
00:16:13 i'd like to just talk a little bit about the briefings next you mentioned that you do
00:16:18 participate in briefings of the panel do you personally do that briefing or is that somebody
00:16:23 else on your team or along with you i normally i'm the one would be doing these briefings
00:16:31 there may have been one or two that my uh my colleague deputy director operations may have
00:16:36 undertook but it's normally it would be myself briefing the panel directly okay and from what
00:16:42 i understand um based on those briefings there has been no um incident or incidents of
00:16:50 interference that have threatened the integrity of the election is that correct
00:16:54 uh madam chair uh the uh it's indeed the conclusion that the the panel has taken uh
00:17:00 they received a lot of information a lot of briefings and the the panel uh can tell you
00:17:06 having been part of the discussions have been challenging us on our information on better
00:17:10 understanding the panel members wanting to better understand what we had and i can tell you that it
00:17:16 has been a very uh robust exchange and the committee uh the panel have come to conclusions
00:17:22 in 2019 and also for the elections in 2021 that indeed that the information did not reach that
00:17:28 threshold and um based on my information and my experience uh for what it's worth madam chair
00:17:35 i would say that i concur with that conclusion perfect and i have only about 30 seconds left
00:17:42 um you mentioned that you could not comment on um media reports that may or may not have come from
00:17:50 uh thesis whether it be leaks and so on and so forth as you probably know my son is an intelligence
00:17:56 officer of the canadian armed forces and i take the the issue of security and national security
00:18:01 extremely seriously could you explain quickly what a leak could mean to the intelligence sharing of
00:18:08 five eyes and what would that happen if we were to have leaks of top secret information so madam
00:18:14 chair uh very quickly i would say that um the bread and butter of of uh intelligence organization
00:18:21 is our ability to collect secrets and and keep secrets and use those secrets you know with the
00:18:26 appropriate people when that ability is threatened it undermines the confidence of our partners
00:18:32 domestically and internationally and this is something we take very seriously but i would say
00:18:36 it's also the ability of our to protect our people and our sources people who put their lives at risk
00:18:41 to uh protect canada so would you say thank you sorry letting information like this out would
00:18:47 actually put our members of the canadian armed forces at risk if you can give it in one answer
00:18:54 i would take it i would say that any any uh information that is disclosed uh uh in a
00:18:59 unauthorized way uh you do not know the consequences you cannot foresee the
00:19:03 consequences down the road so i think it's it's very serious thank you i have to end our time
00:19:09 there and i would just like to keep it tight um i will go medium normandy she's gonna see
00:19:15 ms normanda six minutes thank you very much to all of the witnesses for being here
00:19:20 You just mentioned that it's a hypothetical situation where there are leaks, but in fact
00:19:31 we had a leak apparently to global and this has serious consequences.
00:19:38 But is it perhaps because that the people who had that information were dissatisfied
00:19:48 with how the information was handled by CSIS or the government, and does it say something
00:19:59 about the tensions that might exist, Madam Chair?
00:20:05 I would say that in an intelligence agency like ours, there are always different points
00:20:13 of view and very serious discussions, but I want to assure the committee that issues
00:20:22 dealing directly with interference constitute a very important issue, and we discuss them
00:20:31 very seriously with all of our people, so there's no problem there.
00:20:39 There are measures in CSIS for people who are dissatisfied with how information is being
00:20:49 handled to take a user process to deal with that.
00:20:58 We have in CIRA as well a complaint process to deal with classified information.
00:21:09 So there are processes and forums for people to explore these concerns.
00:21:18 It's not an issue that there is this kind of tension within CSIS.
00:21:24 Thank you.
00:21:25 I want to come back to the issue of donations to the Trudeau Foundation.
00:21:31 We know that when the Chinese government is making donations, it's because it is political
00:21:38 interference, how do you deal with this, and do they come to CSIS directly, these kind
00:21:48 of complaints?
00:21:49 This is an important question, and it's a complex matter with respect to the foundation
00:21:58 in question.
00:21:59 I believe it operates at arm's length from the government, so it is not something that
00:22:05 CSIS would get involved with directly.
00:22:07 said, if we are aware of information involving a foreign actor that is undertaking disruption
00:22:21 activities or interference, then we can take action.
00:22:25 On the specific question, CSIS doesn't necessarily have the last word because depending on the
00:22:32 situation there may be other agencies organizations involved but in my
00:22:38 experience CSIS is involved in the discussions thank you you mentioned in
00:22:44 your opening remarks that when it is appropriate one of the roles of CSIS is
00:22:50 to encounter threats what happens in those situations and what who else has
00:22:58 a role to play in deciding whether those steps are taken.
00:23:02 Madam Chair, the powers that CSIS has for countering threats go back to 1998, I believe,
00:23:16 the changes were made then, and it's always evolving how we use those powers.
00:23:24 As I mentioned earlier, generally we don't work alone.
00:23:28 We work with our partners to understand clearly the context of the situation and the impacts
00:23:38 to ensure that we take the most specific action possible to deal with the threat.
00:23:50 So we would not usually take action without consulting our agency before taking action.
00:24:00 We heard that from our previous witnesses, that is, Elections Canada and the Commissioner's
00:24:09 Office, that they are not able to take specific action.
00:24:15 So I would like to hear from you, since the Prime Minister seemed to brush aside the recommendation
00:24:25 that more needed to be done.
00:24:28 So is there enough power available to deal with these situations for CSIS?
00:24:35 I mentioned in my opening remarks, Madam Chair, that foreign interference is taken seriously
00:24:45 and over the past few years we have noted that the types and sophistication of foreign
00:24:54 interference have evolved, have increased.
00:24:58 They have learned how we work and the types of powers that we have and what we can do.
00:25:06 And that is why we need to protect certain parts of our information.
00:25:15 CSIS, the CSE, the RCMP, and the Commissioner's Office all have complementary powers.
00:25:26 we need more tools in our toolbox that's certainly something that we can look at
00:25:31 we work very well together but there is certainly room for improvement
00:25:42 thank you thank you very much madame chair and thank you very much for our witnesses monsieur
00:25:50 vignon i was attempted to ask the same question asked yesterday which is the articles by
00:25:56 robert fife and stephen chase in the global mail and sam cooper and global news if you could
00:26:02 acknowledge their factual articles i don't believe you're willing to do that however
00:26:07 i i do want to ask whether the concerns around multiple liberal and conservative candidates
00:26:14 being involved potentially being favored by beijing if this is something that you can confirm
00:26:23 whether there are multiple Liberal and Conservative candidates that are of concern.
00:26:28 Madam Chair, I think the member has had the preview of my answers. I will not be able to
00:26:37 speak specifically about who may or may not have been a subject of interference. What I can say,
00:26:45 and we have said that publicly many times over the last number of years, is that for interference
00:26:51 is the actors were engaged in foreign interference against Canadians do so at
00:26:56 all levels of government at the federal provincial and municipal level and
00:27:02 they're doing it across party lines the goal here for the country organizations
00:27:09 want to interfere is to favor their own their own interest and therefore whatever
00:27:15 way they decide to determine that there those interests would be pursued more
00:27:19 fair most effectively they will engage and that's why we have seen uh for interference across uh
00:27:26 party lines and across uh different levels of government now i i want to ask you uh following
00:27:32 up on madame romanado's question around foreign diplomats uh when we have a case of a foreign
00:27:38 diplomat that is involved in um in potentially provoking violations of our laws in this case the
00:27:46 Canada elections act what are the steps that CSIS can take in the case of that diplomat
00:27:52 what what is open to the Canadian government as well so I would say um the the um probably uh
00:28:00 madam chair I would structure my answer in in two ways the first is what CSIS can do which is
00:28:06 uh we would investigate the uh uh the information we would pursue all uh using all techniques to
00:28:12 find as much as possible about the interference of of diplomats based in canada when we have that
00:28:19 information then there's uh the options of the service taking uh the measures directly ourselves
00:28:25 using our threat reduction mandate but in the case of a foreign diplomat it would uh i do not foresee
00:28:31 scenario in which we would not engage a global affairs canada is the authority in canada to
00:28:37 ensure that the enforcement of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations they are
00:28:44 the ones who are interacting on a day-to-day basis with foreign diplomats and at that point
00:28:49 there are different tools the disposal of the government to Global Affairs Canada to be able
00:28:55 to enforce the Vienna Convention up to and including declaring someone personal non grata
00:29:01 from the country um and so uh again thank you yeah okay yeah thank you that that response to
00:29:08 my question uh you did say something that disturbed me um a few minutes ago you said and i and i quote
00:29:14 i've got quotation marks around it intelligence is not a question of evidence making the distinction
00:29:21 between intelligence you receive and the evidence that the rcmp or the commissioner of elections can
00:29:27 act on so my question is how do you validate intelligence then in that case to ensure
00:29:34 that you're moving from intelligence to actual evidence that is actionable
00:29:40 thank you for the question madam chair i'll respond if that's okay we constantly work with
00:29:45 our partners in law enforcement as the director mentioned with the commissioner of canada elections
00:29:50 and we share that information we have those discussions and they are really the ultimate
00:29:55 authority to know what could be of use to them the challenge for us and the
00:29:59 challenge in the system currently is we need to be able to protect our methods
00:30:03 of operation we need to be able to protect our human sources our technical
00:30:07 sources our employees and so that sometimes poses challenges as was
00:30:11 mentioned by the panel yesterday in terms of converting that intelligence
00:30:15 into evidence but the decision in terms of whether to use that information it
00:30:20 could belong to the Public Prosecutor Office it could belong of course the
00:30:23 rcmp colleagues and perhaps i'll turn to my rcmp colleague if he there's anything he wants to add
00:30:28 from his perspective in terms of uh sharing information but i can say that it is a very
00:30:33 close partnership ongoing discussions and we work quite closely with all involved
00:30:38 agencies in trying to action that information
00:30:41 now i will go to my next question that deals with the diaspora you talked about the measures
00:30:56 to decrease the threat of foreign interference what are the measures you are undertaking with
00:31:03 the diaspora namely i'm talking here about the chinese diaspora diaspora but also with the
00:31:09 Russian-Iranian diasporas.
00:31:12 So, Madam Chair, it's a very good question, as mentioned in my opening remarks.
00:31:22 It is a very sensitive issue, and it is a priority for CSIS.
00:31:30 and cultural communities in Canada are being pressured when it comes to foreign interference.
00:31:42 And to answer your question, in the last year, we've published a report on foreign interference.
00:31:51 We've published it in the different Chinese dialects and in Russian.
00:31:57 We've released a guide for communities to better counter foreign interference.
00:32:05 So this is a tool.
00:32:06 It's a public information tool.
00:32:09 We engage people to talk to us to see what more can be done.
00:32:15 Merci beaucoup.
00:32:17 Thank you very much.
00:32:18 We will now go for a five-minute round. 0.76
00:32:25 Madam Dancho, you have the floor.
00:32:28 Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chair.
00:32:29 Thank you to the witnesses for being with us today.
00:32:32 Regarding the specific allegations report in the Globe and Mail
00:32:35 from CSIS documents that Beijing was responsible for illegal cash donations,
00:32:40 tax receipts, and hiring campaign workers using illegal methods,
00:32:43 as well as disinformation campaigns in the 2021 election,
00:32:47 this information from CSIS would have been shared with our Five Eyes intelligence allies.
00:32:51 Is that correct?
00:32:53 Madam Chair, as I mentioned earlier,
00:32:55 I will not be in a position to comment specifically on these allegations, this information.
00:33:03 What I can say, however, is that indeed CSIS and our intelligence partners
00:33:07 do share information extensively with international partners.
00:33:13 Foreign interference, amongst other threats, is one that is shared by many countries.
00:33:19 The PRC specifically and other countries are engaging in foreign interference in other countries.
00:33:23 And one of the advantages we have is having a number of countries, not only among the five, but more broadly in Western Europe, in Asia, in the Middle East, we work very closely with these partners to share information.
00:33:37 And that is one way we have to protect Canadians, is to benefit from the enriched picture here.
00:33:43 It was also reported that a Consul General of Beijing took credit for the defeat of a Conservative MP in the 2021 election. Is that correct?
00:33:51 uh madam chair i would uh unfortunately have to retain my answer i cannot specifically confirm
00:33:59 some of the information that is in the public domain in this current setting this has been
00:34:04 asked i'll ask again was the prime minister briefed of any of this information and when would that
00:34:08 have been what would have been the dates madam chair we will be as i uh answer to the previous
00:34:15 question we endeavor to be able to provide information to the booking with pco uh to this
00:34:21 committee in terms of what has been uh briefed and who has been briefed but i'm not in a position to
00:34:27 specifically answer the question thank you mr venia i appreciate your service to this country
00:34:31 but i am surprised of course you were all aware that you were coming to this committee today and
00:34:35 i know you all take i'm sure very detailed notes in your calendar so i'm a bit surprised that
00:34:39 that information is not readily available to committee members as i'm sure you anticipated
00:34:42 the questions of when the prime minister would or would not have been briefed by you or others in
00:34:47 cesis but i would appreciate if you would provide that in short order uh to the committee thank you
00:34:52 to the rcmp has cesis shared any of this information regarding election interference with you
00:34:59 uh any sharing of information would have been done through the site committee
00:35:02 and then if uh if uh it falls into the criminal space the rcmp would investigate
00:35:07 and you're not investigating we're not investigating any elements from the 2019 or
00:35:14 the 2021 elections we did not receive any actionable intelligence that would warrant
00:35:20 us to initiate a criminal investigation so no charges have been laid to anyone concerning any
00:35:25 election interference is that correct no charges have been laid and no charges have been laid
00:35:29 concerning the beijing police stations illegally operating in canada for the purpose of terrorizing
00:35:34 Chinese Canadians no charges have been laid in that regard either no but the RCMP has taken over
00:35:39 to actions on four specific sites where we were present in uniform marked vehicles to demonstrate
00:35:45 to the community that we're taking this seriously and we've had a positive impact on the actions
00:35:51 that we've taken and that positive impact in particular does that mean that the operations
00:35:55 from those illegally illegal Beijing police stations have ceased we are our understanding
00:36:01 is they've ceased and we're continuing investigation of the ongoing anytime you have a representative
00:36:05 from the embassy who's a law enforcement relation uh liaison officer comes up to us and not pleased
00:36:10 with the actions we take we took i think that's a sign that we did our job i appreciate very much
00:36:15 in that regard uh yesterday i believe it was shared in committee from the deputy of
00:36:20 minister of public safety that legislative changes would need to be made or he implied
00:36:24 that they would need to be made for charges to be laid is that correct
00:36:26 that legislative changes would need to be made for the rcmp to lay charges is that correct when
00:36:32 we talk about legislative changes the rcmp operates in the criminal environment and this is the work
00:36:37 that michelle alluded to earlier my colleague with regards to the work we do with the service
00:36:41 the service is in the intel business but as the intel starts building towards a criminal offense
00:36:47 that's when it's shifted the rcmp so we work with the existing legislation that we have under the
00:36:51 thank you would a criminal would a change to the criminal code be needed to lay charges based on
00:36:57 the evidence that you have concerning the police stations or election interference we always
00:37:01 entertain new new tools uh under the code has the minister of public safety or anybody from
00:37:06 government the prime minister's office been briefed that legislative changes would need to be made for
00:37:10 charges to be laid not to my knowledge uh none of those briefings have happened i'm saying not to
00:37:16 my knowledge okay so the rcmp has not informed the prime minister or any of his cabinets uh that
00:37:22 legislative changes are needed for charges to be late the rcmp will go through public safety uh
00:37:27 to for for any change in legislation will you be pursuing any of those briefs thank you very much
00:37:33 thank you to everyone for your for your feedback um excellent and this brings us to mr fergus
00:37:39 Thank you very much, Madam Chair.
00:37:44 And I first want to thank our witnesses who are here with us today.
00:37:52 I feel very encouraged to see the coordination between the RCMP, our CSIS partners.
00:38:04 It's very important to see this coordination so that you are working together to protect
00:38:10 Canadians and playing our part with our international partners.
00:38:17 Mr. Vignon, I want to come back to an answer you gave to Mr. Cooper when he talked about
00:38:24 allegations that have come out in the media.
00:38:31 If I remember correctly, you confirmed – or rather, you could not confirm the veracity
00:38:46 of those allegations.
00:38:48 These allegations may or may not come from CSIS.
00:38:56 And this leads me to a sensitive question now.
00:38:59 I know you can't comment about the specific case,
00:39:02 but so let me just take this into a hypothetical range.
00:39:06 When you see, you know, with your knowledge of foreign interference
00:39:11 and the different techniques which are used in foreign interference,
00:39:16 is it possible, in your opinion,
00:39:19 that unverified or unconfirmed leaks from secret sources
00:39:28 that may or may not come from official sources could in itself represent a form of foreign interference
00:39:37 um madam chair i will answer in english or rather in french if you don't mind
00:39:49 i think that this is one of the key aspects of this whole situation
00:39:54 foreign interference is very complex there is a whole spectrum of activity
00:40:02 that goes from a diplomat that might speak openly to exercise influence and
00:40:13 that would be acceptable and then there is a whole category of activities that
00:40:19 would be a gray area that would be a little more secretive or would be revealed only later
00:40:28 and that would also be foreign interference in a way so that that's very complex as you
00:40:35 can see so.
00:40:36 United Front Work Department is the organization, UFWD, United Front Work Department is an
00:40:45 organization of the Communist Party.
00:40:47 is as old as the chinese communist party um under xi jinping this organization you know has been
00:40:54 uh provided new budgets and that now they're they're the budget of the organization dedicated
00:41:00 to engage uh the the chinese abroad but also to interfere in in other countries internal affairs
00:41:08 that done by the fwd the budget of that organization now is bigger than their entire
00:41:14 department of foreign affairs so the the budget of an organization dedicated to foreign interference
00:41:20 is now larger than the entire uh over diplomatic work that the the the prc is engaging in it gives
00:41:27 you a sense of how important this is and i would say very quickly madam chair this is why um the
00:41:34 president of china jiji ping calls the ufwd one of its magic weapons so then it's not beyond reasonable
00:41:44 to see that undermining democratic systems, democratic institutions, could be a primary purpose of the UFWD.
00:41:58 Chair, in terms of foreign interference writ large, carried out by the PRC, but also we have seen it by Russia,
00:42:05 this information is one of this very specific tool that is being used.
00:42:08 That is why, as an intelligence service, we have very rigorous processes to be able to ingest information, challenge that information, validate it, assess it, and that's how intelligence is then put together at the end.
00:42:23 and so that I would just invite everybody to be mindful that you know some of the
00:42:29 information that may be public domain could be accurate could also be an
00:42:33 information that is part of that process that it's still part of an evaluation
00:42:37 assessment process so this is why we are very concerned when we see this in the
00:42:41 public domain to because you know you need to have experts also be able to
00:42:46 to assess the specific information.
00:42:49 Thank you.
00:42:51 Madame Normandie, two minutes and demi.
00:42:54 Two and a half minutes for Ms. Normandie.
00:42:57 I understand that you can't say whether or not
00:43:02 the information that was provided to the Globe and Mail
00:43:06 is accurate, but there is information
00:43:09 that indicate that some CSIS officials
00:43:13 may have leaked information about how information was managed with the PMO, and the Prime Minister
00:43:22 has brushed aside the possibility that one of his candidates may have had interference
00:43:31 work in his favor.
00:43:33 So we've got these activities by the Communist Party of China.
00:43:40 But I want to hear about whether there are any tensions between your organization and
00:43:47 the prime minister and the PMO.
00:43:49 Thank you.
00:43:50 Through you, Madam Chair, there are various aspects to that question.
00:43:55 So I would like to quickly say that there is an investigation underway by CSIS and our
00:44:03 partners regarding the sources of the information, the leak.
00:44:08 We are in a democracy.
00:44:11 People do have the right to speak freely, and as I said earlier, in response to a question,
00:44:22 if there are means that exist already for people to express their discontent regarding
00:44:31 relations with the Prime Minister's office.
00:44:36 It is clear that our work is to inform the government, and we have every means available
00:44:43 to us to do that.
00:44:45 And so I can say that communication is open so that CSIS can provide all of the required
00:44:54 information.
00:44:55 Very quickly, I have little time, but on another issue, would it be useful for CSIS to have
00:45:03 a registry of foreign officials and actors for – to be able to track down interference?
00:45:12 Yes, Madam Chair.
00:45:14 I had the opportunity to appear before a different parliamentary committee with Minister Mendicino
00:45:23 a few weeks ago, and I would say in response to that question that, yes, CISAs have been
00:45:30 talking about foreign influence for the last few years, foreign interference, and I think
00:45:40 that tool would be useful. It wouldn't solve all our problems, but it would increase transparency.
00:45:45 Thank you.
00:45:46 Mr. Giulia.
00:45:47 Thank you very much, Madam Chair.
00:45:52 I know that you can't share information about Five Eyes.
00:46:00 That said, there are similar measures that have to be taken by our partners.
00:46:09 If we look, for example, at Chinese interference, there are other examples, and I think they
00:46:17 They are fairly much public knowledge, and there are solutions in place, other places.
00:46:27 When Donald Trump was elected, there was a lot of interference by Russia.
00:46:37 The same occurred with Brexit in the United Kingdom.
00:46:44 And we had the convoy, as it was called, here in Canada, and we know that Russia was involved
00:46:53 in that.
00:46:54 So what lessons can we draw from our partners on that, and how can we apply them in Canada?
00:47:04 We talk about interference where the diaspora of people from other countries is concerned,
00:47:15 but also within Canada, like the convoy.
00:47:19 Thank you.
00:47:21 Madam Chair, if I may, there were a few aspects that were mentioned that don't match the information
00:47:32 that I have, including foreign interference in the convoy activities.
00:47:40 That's not the information I have, but I can address lessons that we can draw from
00:47:47 situations in other countries.
00:47:51 Canada is very fortunate because we have a lot of partners and allies around the world.
00:47:56 We work confidentially with other countries through Five Eyes but also other means.
00:48:06 The lessons concerning the register that was already mentioned, that's one that we can
00:48:17 take from other countries.
00:48:18 There are things done in Canada that can be useful to other countries as well.
00:48:27 Some of them are confidential, and this is how we build our partnerships.
00:48:32 Thank you.
00:48:34 We will now go to Mr. Bertold for four minutes.
00:48:39 Thank you, Madam Chair.
00:48:40 Mr. Vignon, I have a question for you.
00:48:43 I'm a little bit of a novice when it comes to security levels and things.
00:48:49 I asked the same question of Ms. Thomas.
00:48:53 When information is provided to somebody in a political party that is classified, can
00:49:01 that person provide information to others?
00:49:06 Madam Chair, is one thing that we need to keep learning about and drawing lessons about 0.98
00:49:15 because that is one of the examples. 0.61
00:49:18 The process isn't as clear as that.
00:49:24 There are ways for people who have classified information to be able to share it in order
00:49:35 to provide advice to people just like we've got certain committees but the
00:49:43 actual information is classified is that correct yes the specific information is
00:49:50 classified so if a person provides shares that information that is illegal so to
00:49:58 speak if it is classified yes specific information would probably be considered
00:50:12 illegally shared but in my experience this is an information that needs to be
00:50:20 held to see how the information can be used yes I understand your there's the
00:50:26 a distinction between the specific information and advice.
00:50:30 So if CSIS is investigating a specific candidate, then that information can't be shared.
00:50:41 I understand the need for the committee members to have specific answers to their questions,
00:50:50 But I do have to just take a moment to say that it is not just a matter of providing
00:50:57 the information and then washing our hands of it, but rather to provide it along with
00:51:02 means to use it.
00:51:04 Yes, we understand that classified information under the current system remains classified
00:51:11 and it has to be classified and can't be shared, Madam Chair.
00:51:17 specific information can't be shared. That's correct.
00:51:22 Mr. Vigneault, Ms. Thomas said that CSIS was informed a number of time – of a number
00:51:30 of complaints regarding foreign interference in 2019-21. Can you confirm that or rather
00:51:41 to the RCMP?
00:51:42 no it's very rare that information would be sent to us do you have any
00:51:47 information that that any information was provided from ministers offices and
00:52:00 others no any information that we would have would involve the site committee
00:52:08 Can you talk about foreign interference by Beijing in 2019, 2021?
00:52:18 Has anything come to your office?
00:52:19 No.
00:52:20 You haven't provided information either to the minister or cabinet?
00:52:25 No.
00:52:26 If somebody did so without going through the regular channels, I wouldn't know.
00:52:32 Well, just going by memory, that's one thing.
00:52:38 But can you go through the communications with the cabinet and all others to make sure that that is not the case?
00:52:50 Yes, I can commit to doing that.
00:52:52 Thank you.
00:52:53 Thank you, Madam Chair.
00:52:56 Merci, Monsieur Bertolt.
00:52:57 Thank you, Mr. Bertolt.
00:53:00 Hoda, you will have four minutes and 20 seconds.
00:53:05 Thank you.
00:53:05 so many more questions and uh never enough time um i want to thank the witnesses first and foremost
00:53:13 at the beginning of uh the statements it was mentioned that many chinese canadians become
00:53:19 victim of this type of foreign interference that occurs would you also say that candidates could
00:53:25 also become blindsided and victim of this type of foreign interference canada candidates um um
00:53:34 Madam Speaker, Madam Chair, sorry, I would say that the purpose of foreign interference
00:53:42 is to again push an agenda of a foreign country.
00:53:46 And so as we have mentioned, it takes many different forms and absolutely that could
00:53:51 include engaging candidates, engaging staff, engaging people of different part of the Canadian
00:54:01 civil society.
00:54:02 So as we have said, everybody is potentially, depending on their position, could be subject to foreign interference.
00:54:09 And does your agency regularly inform parliamentarians, brief them on foreign interference and how to protect themselves,
00:54:18 especially if a candidate may be a victim of foreign interference?
00:54:22 Would your agency brief them about this and have they done so in these occurrences in the past?
00:54:28 So, Madam Chair, we do have briefed many parliamentarians across party lines, across different levels of government, as I mentioned before.
00:54:40 We also continue to publicly speak about foreign interference.
00:54:44 We have publications that exist in terms of specifically foreign interference
00:54:49 and the guide available in multiple languages to help people to understand very concretely what foreign interference is
00:54:58 and what they could do about that.
00:55:00 And so the service, the CSIS, has been engaged with our partners, and I believe that the chief also has examples.
00:55:09 Yes.
00:55:11 Yes, thank you for the question.
00:55:13 I would just add that since 2017, the CSC has been putting out publications with regards to threats of democratic institutions.
00:55:21 And one of the things that we clearly outline in that booklet or in the guidance we've provided to democratic institutions and around general elections is that foreign interference could happen to those that are voters, as well as candidates, as well as politicians.
00:55:38 So as recently as the 2021 election as well.
00:55:42 because I don't have that much time I also wanted to get into more things how
00:55:46 many countries how many given countries might be involved in these types of
00:55:49 activity in Canada do you have a ballpark figure of how many countries are
00:55:55 involved so madam chair I would say that we have publicly acknowledge the
00:56:01 difference activities of the the PRC of Iran and of Russia and there are other
00:56:07 countries also involved in in that foreign difference in our in our overall country not
00:56:13 just in the democratic electoral processes so there are a few countries that you acknowledge
00:56:19 publicly but how many countries is there a number an idea is it a lot greater than three or is it
00:56:29 you know just a few greater than three um madam chair it's uh i would say that uh it is it is
00:56:38 more than three uh we're not talking about every country engaging in these activities the most
00:56:43 countries do not resort to these types of actions but indeed we are concerned about a few other
00:56:48 countries uh would a public inquiry be and many of former directors of theses have commented on
00:56:56 this recently do you believe a public inquiry might be a good forum for us to continue this
00:57:02 conversation and do you think that thesis and our country would have something to gain uh
00:57:09 instead of having it in in a in a committee hearing like this or at nc cop or you know
00:57:15 briefings to cite and we've seen that the rosenberg report has recently come out and i'm
00:57:20 sure that you were involved in briefings with them in order for them to reach their conclusions
00:57:25 so having done all of these things and being engaged in in these ways do you think a public
00:57:31 inquiry on top of that uh would be beneficial madam chair i'd say that um the goal of uh uh
00:57:39 the the focus of of ccss of the last number of years has been to publicly engage in talking
00:57:45 about foreign interference we're using all platforms available to us including parliamentary
00:57:49 committees um so uh whatever decision is made uh to to continue this discussion cesus would be uh
00:57:57 of course engage actively and continue the discussion the one of course remaining uh
00:58:03 consideration is the classified information how can we find the best possible way of having
00:58:08 classified information you know uh part of of a of a classified discussion but uh inform the
00:58:15 the proper debate without becoming public is that the key conundrum so with that i would like to
00:58:20 thank um all of our guests for coming um it's been really interesting and something that i
00:58:25 often hear is you know when does the public get to know these meetings are taking place in public
00:58:30 you've really demonstrated just the level of detail and just the layers of it so i can speak
00:58:39 for myself to say i appreciate that you are responsible for our security and that you are
00:58:45 doing really important work so I thank you and for being available today I
00:58:48 thank you and I'm going to let witnesses go so we can get to the next just it's
00:58:52 related to the witnesses just very briefly madam chair mr. you know
00:58:58 undertook to provide a consolidated response in consultation with PCO I would
00:59:05 ask that the clerk contact the PCO to request that those that response be
00:59:12 provided within a week these are the briefings were matters that I think were
00:59:21 easily easy to anticipate and would not require a significant amount of time for
00:59:28 calendars to be checked so I think we I appreciate that and I have full
00:59:36 confidence that everyone who is appearing here will get us information
00:59:40 quickly as possible i have not found one person yet who does not take this matter seriously and
00:59:46 who wants to ensure that our elections are protected um open and transparent and fair
00:59:52 so i would ask that you provide us information as quickly as possible to the clerk if there's
00:59:57 other information you would like to provide us to the clerk and we'll make sure it's circulated to
01:00:00 all members with that to on behalf of committee members thank you for your service and to your
01:00:05 teams have a great day and we'll get ready for the next panel for committee members i am going to
01:00:11 pause a suspend for um till 12 20 so that everyone has time to go to the washroom or take a health
01:00:20 break or whatever you need to do and we will resume at 12 20 with the next panel thank you and have a
01:00:26 Have a good day.