Juno News - China Hearings ｜ CSIS Director David Vigneault questioned on foreign interference

00:00:00.000 I want to welcome David Vigneault, Director, Michel Tessier, Deputy Director of the Canadian

00:00:17.080 Security Intelligence Service, and from the Communications Security Establishment, Caroline

00:00:24.640 Xavier, Chief, and from the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Michael Duhem, Deputy Commissioner,

00:00:32.140 Federal Policing.

00:00:33.980 We have until noon, and I think we will take a little bit of time after that to finish

00:00:40.160 up.

00:00:41.760 So I will ask Mr. Vigneault to give his opening remarks.

00:00:47.880 Welcome.

00:00:48.880 Thank you very much, members of the committee.

00:00:53.140 Good morning.

00:00:54.140 Thank you for inviting CSIS and our colleagues to appear on foreign interference threats to Canada's democratic institutions.

00:01:02.680 CSIS continues to view hostile activities by foreign state actors as the most significant strategic threat to Canada's national security community.

00:01:12.900 Foreign interference in our democratic institutions is particular, undermines key in society.

00:01:18.080 Foreign state actors who engage in these deceptive, covert and hostile activities seek to weaken

00:01:25.640 trust in our fundamental institutions and processes, threaten communities, sow division

00:01:32.220 and ultimately influence policy.

00:01:37.840 As CISA's officials recently told this committee, foreign interference can take multiple forms.

00:01:44.380 Threat actors may aggressively threaten or coerce their targets into acting in a certain

00:01:50.300 way.

00:01:51.300 This is a common activity impacting Canada's diverse communities and can involve threats

00:01:56.920 to them or their family outside Canada.

00:02:01.260 Threat actors may also cultivate relationships with targets to manipulate them into providing

00:02:07.860 favors and valuable information or may conduct corrupt or illicit financing activities.

00:02:15.920 It is also important to note that threat actors may use others as proxies to conduct these

00:02:21.280 activities on their behalf.

00:02:22.920 The techniques that foreign state actors employ to influence public discourse, the behavior

00:02:29.860 of individual Canadians and even our democratic processes to their advantage.

00:02:35.520 We have also observed them to deploy cyber attacks, disinformation campaigns and espionage

00:02:41.880 to these ends.

00:02:43.920 Foreign interference is therefore a complex and enduring threat to Canada's sovereignty.

00:02:48.580 I can assure you that CSIS takes all allegations of foreign interference very seriously and

00:02:53.900 uses its authorities under the CSIS Act to investigate, provide advice to government and,

00:02:59.640 where appropriate, take measures to reduce the threat.

00:03:03.440 Having resilience to foreign interference is one way to mitigate its coercive effects.

00:03:08.880 CSIS has spoken publicly in a variety of forums to warn Canadians about these threats and

00:03:15.400 these techniques and inform them of ways they can protect themselves.

00:03:19.680 We have also provided defensive briefings to elected officials from all orders of government

00:03:24.800 across Canada.

00:03:26.800 Perhaps most central to these efforts is our engagement with Canadian communities.

00:03:31.620 We have been clear that the principal threat to Canada comes from the People's Republic

00:03:35.240 of China.

00:03:36.840 But to be clear, the threat does not come from the Chinese people, but rather from the

00:03:41.120 Chinese Communist Party and the government of China.

00:03:44.180 Indeed, we are keenly aware that Chinese communities are often the primary victims of PRC foreign

00:03:49.980 interference efforts in Canada.

00:03:52.960 We therefore continue to invest significant effort in building relationships with

00:04:00.440 individuals communities and community leaders to establish and sustain trust

00:04:05.300 and to offer our support and partnership in their protection furthermore furthermore

00:04:13.880 these efforts are not limited to Chinese Canadian communities CSIS takes

00:04:20.060 allegation of authorized released of classified information very seriously

00:04:24.560 compromises of this kind can reveal sensitive sources methodologies and

00:04:29.960 techniques through Canada's adversaries they are listening this can subsequently

00:04:36.080 threaten the integrity of our operations and even the physical safety and

00:04:39.980 security of human sources and employees ultimately such releases can hinder our

00:04:45.320 ability to protect Canadians therefore I would like to remind the committee that

00:04:49.460 just as with other recent appearances in front of a proc in other communities

00:04:53.300 here I am limited in what we can say in an unclassified setting ceases cannot

00:04:59.000 publicly in fact prohibited from commenting on operational matters and classified information

00:05:04.680 in order to protect the safety and security of canadians nonetheless i welcome this opportunity

00:05:10.440 for a frank and transparent discussion to the extent possible on the foreign difference threats

00:05:15.240 to canada that canada faces and we'll be happy to answer your questions thank you madam chair

00:05:23.240 thank you so much mr vignon um and so we will start with our six minute rounds it will start

00:05:28.280 with mr cooper followed by mrs romanado suivi per madame goudreau and then mr julian everyone

00:05:44.600 that comment should go through the chair and there should be one voice being heard at a time

00:05:50.680 mr cooper six minutes to you well thank you very much madam chair thank you to the witnesses and i

00:05:55.720 I would like to just express and associate myself with the remarks of Mr. Binot in saying

00:06:02.720 that the interference that we see in the threat posed by the Beijing Communist Party has nothing

00:06:07.560 to do with Chinese Canadians who are victims of the regime and their interference activities.

00:06:13.080 It's very important we keep that in mind at all times during our deliberations on this matter.

00:06:20.660 Mr. Vinault, how many times did CSIS brief the Prime Minister regarding Beijing's interference in the 2019 and 2021 elections?

00:06:35.560 Thank you, Madam Chair. I have been Director of CSIS since 2017.

00:06:41.700 I have had many opportunities to brief the Prime Minister, Cabinet, and different ministers on the subject of national security,

00:06:48.620 including specifically on foreign interference i would not have a specific breakdown of the

00:06:53.960 number of times since 2017 but this has been a topic of ongoing briefings will you undertake

00:07:00.880 then to provide the committee with the list of all the dates that you briefed the prime minister

00:07:08.240 but cesus briefed the prime minister in regards to interference activities by

00:07:14.300 beijing related to the 2019 and 2021 elections so um madam chair i understand that yesterday the

00:07:23.420 national security intelligence advisor was asked for a similar request and uh my reaction to this

00:07:28.740 would be to probably work with the privy council office to have a consolidated response uh to the

00:07:34.280 committee uh through you madam chair and uh will you also uh undertake to do the same with respect

00:07:41.460 to a list of all the dates that CSIS briefed any minister PMO staff ministers

00:07:48.080 office staff or security cleared Liberal Party staff related to Beijing's

00:07:53.720 interference in the 2019 and 2021 elections so madam chair I think you

00:07:59.460 know as just mentioned we will endeavor to to collide as much of that information

00:08:03.480 possible and bearing any specific national security considerations we

00:08:08.940 endeavor to to provide as much as possible to the committee okay and uh and i guess consistent with

00:08:15.020 that or in addition to that will you undertake to provide a list of all individuals who are present

00:08:20.140 at these briefings to the degree that this is possible um i will probably have to defer to uh

00:08:28.460 the extent to which we know we will again you know provide the information in the context of uh of uh

00:08:34.620 any bearing any other uh national security considerations but we'll probably have to rely

00:08:38.940 also on the privy council office uh for some of the attendance of these briefings so that

00:08:43.660 consolidated piece will hopefully be answering many of these questions madam chair thank you

00:08:49.180 very much on uh february 24th 2023 sam cooper of global news reported that three weeks before the

00:08:55.740 2019 election cesus officials gave an urgent briefing to senior aides in the prime minister's

00:09:01.420 office warning them that a liberal candidate who is a sitting liberal mp now had received assistance

00:09:09.260 from beijing's toronto consulate in his nomination campaign what are the names of the pmo aids who

00:09:16.940 were briefed madam chair as i have just indicated we'll have to review the the list of the and the

00:09:25.180 dates of such briefing it will be important to remind uh colleagues that you know i will

00:09:32.940 or this committee i should say that uh the uh i do not take the premise of that the the question

00:09:39.820 at face value i need to be able to provide information respecting the the proper uh

00:09:46.540 classification of the information so uh that the the spirit of that of that question will

00:09:52.620 be answered through the consolidated response. And to that end, did CISIS brief the Prime Minister?

00:10:04.380 CISIS, as I mentioned. No, no, no, but specifically in relation to the 2019 circumstances

00:10:10.700 surrounding a Liberal candidate and Beijing's consulate in Toronto assisting him in his nomination

00:10:16.860 campaign so maybe madam chair on that question i think it's important to um to put in context

00:10:23.100 that information that is in in the public domain uh may or may not be coming from uh from the

00:10:29.500 service or from other agencies uh there's been uh indeed uh information that is now reported by the

00:10:35.820 media uh and um it is not because the information is in the media that i'm at liberty to confirm or

00:10:42.620 or deny the specific nature of classified information.

00:10:45.980 So along these lines, I will not be able to provide a specific answer to that allegation.

00:10:50.980 I understand that you're not able to provide a specific answer at this time,

00:10:54.580 but again, would you undertake to go back and provide this committee with any date

00:11:04.260 or dates that the Prime Minister was briefed on this matter?

00:11:08.180 I will be able to provide, Madam Chair, a consolidated response to PCO of dates where the subject of foreign interference was discussed.

00:11:17.860 However, I am not at liberty to disclose information directly and indirectly that would provide classified information in a public setting.

00:11:26.220 So there will be a limit, Madam Chair, to the specificity of the topic discussed.

00:11:32.100 But as I said, I think it's important that people understand that foreign interference was indeed briefed regularly.

00:11:38.180 Okay, and the same would apply with respect to Liberal Party staff or other officials who may have been briefed.

00:11:45.940 If you could also undertake that, if they were briefed, to come back to this committee,

00:11:52.400 having regard for what you had previously said, unless it doesn't apply in that case.

00:11:56.540 We will, I think in the spirit of these hearings, Madam Chair,

00:12:00.640 we will absolutely endeavor to provide the most consolidated and thorough response possible to the committee.

00:12:06.040 Thank you.

00:12:08.500 thank you and now mrs romanado up to six minutes for you

00:12:17.060 thank you very much madam madam chair um i'd like to thank the witnesses for being with us today

00:12:23.300 and for providing uh the information that they are able to because i understand full well

00:12:29.220 given security issues we can't um publicly discuss in public things that we do not have clearance

00:12:36.340 for. My first question is for Mr. Vigneault. I'd like to know a little bit about the tools that

00:12:42.500 CSIS has to disrupt foreign interference and in the Rosenberg report that was released this week

00:12:48.940 it says that one of the options CSIS has is to engage with diplomats who may try to interfere

00:12:54.320 in our elections. So if a foreign official was trying to interfere in our election

00:13:00.000 does CSIS have the tools in its mandate to address that so thank you for the question and madam chair

00:13:08.980 through you I would say that the CSIS Act provides a number of tools for CSIS to investigate foreign

00:13:15.600 interference activities including when it comes to diplomats posting in Canada we are as an

00:13:24.000 intelligence service our professional are looking at the best way possible to get at the intelligence

00:13:29.760 using all the techniques that are available to us.

00:13:32.780 And when we do face questions or situation where there's a specific threat activity,

00:13:40.320 we are also using, and we have used and will continue to use,

00:13:44.080 our threat reduction measures mandate to engage in those activities.

00:13:48.840 We will often, you know, work with partners.

00:13:52.680 We will not work in isolation because, you know, these issues are very complex

00:13:57.460 and you do not want to take an action and have unintended consequences,

00:14:01.580 so we work in partnership.

00:14:02.880 So in this case, when it comes time to diplomat,

00:14:05.680 you would likely be working with the Department of Global Affairs Canada, GAC, to do so.

00:14:11.240 But I can assure the committee that, as I said in my opening remarks,

00:14:14.060 that CSIS and our partners at this table,

00:14:17.380 we do take any allegations of foreign interference extremely seriously.

00:14:22.200 We investigate these allegations,

00:14:24.140 And we use all the tools at our disposal to try to better understand, characterize these activities and reduce the threat where possible.

00:14:33.480 Okay. And thank you very much. CSIS has the ability to share information with the RCMP for them to launch an investigation. Is that correct?

00:14:42.160 Yes, CSIS is actually over the years, since the inception of CSIS in 1984, we have developed between the CSIS and the RCMP very elaborate processes, processes to be able to share information.

00:15:00.340 I think the committee has heard some of the challenges that exist in using intelligence and passing it on to law enforcement agencies or investigative bodies, because intelligence is not a question of evidence.

00:15:15.080 So, you know, the RCMP in this specific case needs to determine how to use the information and further their own investigation.

00:15:23.360 It is a complex process. The two organizations working with the Department of Justice continue to work on this issue.

00:15:29.420 The notion of using intelligence to pursue law enforcement matters continues to be a challenge that, you know, a number of organizations are actively working on.

00:15:41.700 But we do have robust processes with the RCMP and with other law enforcement and investigative bodies to do such an exchange.

00:15:50.880 so on that um mr vigno i'm i'm sure you're aware that yesterday the uh deputy minister of public

00:15:57.600 safety confirmed that there are actually no investigations into allegations of foreign

00:16:01.200 interference uh from the last election underway so based on your your previous response that

00:16:07.920 information is shared uh what they have in front of them they do not have any impact of investigations

00:16:13.840 i'd like to just talk a little bit about the briefings next you mentioned that you do

00:16:18.240 participate in briefings of the panel do you personally do that briefing or is that somebody

00:16:23.680 else on your team or along with you i normally i'm the one would be doing these briefings

00:16:31.120 there may have been one or two that my uh my colleague deputy director operations may have

00:16:36.800 undertook but it's normally it would be myself briefing the panel directly okay and from what

00:16:42.880 i understand um based on those briefings there has been no um incident or incidents of

00:16:50.640 interference that have threatened the integrity of the election is that correct

00:16:54.720 uh madam chair uh the uh it's indeed the conclusion that the the panel has taken uh

00:17:00.800 they received a lot of information a lot of briefings and the the panel uh can tell you

00:17:06.320 having been part of the discussions have been challenging us on our information on better

00:17:10.880 understanding the panel members wanting to better understand what we had and i can tell you that it

00:17:16.000 has been a very uh robust exchange and the committee uh the panel have come to conclusions

00:17:22.000 in 2019 and also for the elections in 2021 that indeed that the information did not reach that

00:17:28.880 threshold and um based on my information and my experience uh for what it's worth madam chair

00:17:35.920 i would say that i concur with that conclusion perfect and i have only about 30 seconds left

00:17:42.080 um you mentioned that you could not comment on um media reports that may or may not have come from

00:17:50.080 uh thesis whether it be leaks and so on and so forth as you probably know my son is an intelligence

00:17:56.480 officer of the canadian armed forces and i take the the issue of security and national security

00:18:01.760 extremely seriously could you explain quickly what a leak could mean to the intelligence sharing of

00:18:08.320 five eyes and what would that happen if we were to have leaks of top secret information so madam

00:18:14.480 chair uh very quickly i would say that um the bread and butter of of uh intelligence organization

00:18:21.120 is our ability to collect secrets and and keep secrets and use those secrets you know with the

00:18:26.960 appropriate people when that ability is threatened it undermines the confidence of our partners

00:18:32.320 domestically and internationally and this is something we take very seriously but i would say

00:18:36.800 it's also the ability of our to protect our people and our sources people who put their lives at risk

00:18:41.600 to uh protect canada so would you say thank you sorry letting information like this out would

00:18:47.440 actually put our members of the canadian armed forces at risk if you can give it in one answer

00:18:54.160 i would take it i would say that any any uh information that is disclosed uh uh in a

00:18:59.360 unauthorized way uh you do not know the consequences you cannot foresee the

00:19:03.760 consequences down the road so i think it's it's very serious thank you i have to end our time

00:19:09.360 there and i would just like to keep it tight um i will go medium normandy she's gonna see

00:19:15.520 ms normanda six minutes thank you very much to all of the witnesses for being here

00:19:20.720 You just mentioned that it's a hypothetical situation where there are leaks, but in fact

00:19:31.660 we had a leak apparently to global and this has serious consequences.

00:19:38.740 But is it perhaps because that the people who had that information were dissatisfied

00:19:48.040 with how the information was handled by CSIS or the government, and does it say something

00:19:59.360 about the tensions that might exist, Madam Chair?

00:20:05.700 I would say that in an intelligence agency like ours, there are always different points

00:20:13.760 of view and very serious discussions, but I want to assure the committee that issues

00:20:22.260 dealing directly with interference constitute a very important issue, and we discuss them

00:20:31.940 very seriously with all of our people, so there's no problem there.

00:20:39.480 There are measures in CSIS for people who are dissatisfied with how information is being

00:20:49.960 handled to take a user process to deal with that.

00:20:58.060 We have in CIRA as well a complaint process to deal with classified information.

00:21:09.480 So there are processes and forums for people to explore these concerns.

00:21:18.200 It's not an issue that there is this kind of tension within CSIS.

00:21:24.160 Thank you.

00:21:25.160 I want to come back to the issue of donations to the Trudeau Foundation.

00:21:31.520 We know that when the Chinese government is making donations, it's because it is political

00:21:38.560 interference, how do you deal with this, and do they come to CSIS directly, these kind

00:21:48.380 of complaints?

00:21:49.380 This is an important question, and it's a complex matter with respect to the foundation

00:21:58.100 in question.

00:21:59.100 I believe it operates at arm's length from the government, so it is not something that

00:22:05.220 CSIS would get involved with directly.

00:22:07.960 said, if we are aware of information involving a foreign actor that is undertaking disruption

00:22:21.980 activities or interference, then we can take action.

00:22:25.540 On the specific question, CSIS doesn't necessarily have the last word because depending on the

00:22:32.660 situation there may be other agencies organizations involved but in my

00:22:38.840 experience CSIS is involved in the discussions thank you you mentioned in

00:22:44.900 your opening remarks that when it is appropriate one of the roles of CSIS is

00:22:50.120 to encounter threats what happens in those situations and what who else has

00:22:58.660 a role to play in deciding whether those steps are taken.

00:23:02.940 Madam Chair, the powers that CSIS has for countering threats go back to 1998, I believe,

00:23:16.780 the changes were made then, and it's always evolving how we use those powers.

00:23:24.080 As I mentioned earlier, generally we don't work alone.

00:23:28.580 We work with our partners to understand clearly the context of the situation and the impacts

00:23:38.520 to ensure that we take the most specific action possible to deal with the threat.

00:23:50.140 So we would not usually take action without consulting our agency before taking action.

00:24:00.520 We heard that from our previous witnesses, that is, Elections Canada and the Commissioner's

00:24:09.020 Office, that they are not able to take specific action.

00:24:15.380 So I would like to hear from you, since the Prime Minister seemed to brush aside the recommendation

00:24:25.640 that more needed to be done.

00:24:28.400 So is there enough power available to deal with these situations for CSIS?

00:24:35.860 I mentioned in my opening remarks, Madam Chair, that foreign interference is taken seriously

00:24:45.020 and over the past few years we have noted that the types and sophistication of foreign

00:24:54.460 interference have evolved, have increased.

00:24:58.140 They have learned how we work and the types of powers that we have and what we can do.

00:25:06.720 And that is why we need to protect certain parts of our information.

00:25:15.180 CSIS, the CSE, the RCMP, and the Commissioner's Office all have complementary powers.

00:25:26.820 we need more tools in our toolbox that's certainly something that we can look at

00:25:31.940 we work very well together but there is certainly room for improvement

00:25:42.660 thank you thank you very much madame chair and thank you very much for our witnesses monsieur

00:25:50.340 vignon i was attempted to ask the same question asked yesterday which is the articles by

00:25:56.820 robert fife and stephen chase in the global mail and sam cooper and global news if you could

00:26:02.500 acknowledge their factual articles i don't believe you're willing to do that however

00:26:07.460 i i do want to ask whether the concerns around multiple liberal and conservative candidates

00:26:14.900 being involved potentially being favored by beijing if this is something that you can confirm

00:26:23.540 whether there are multiple Liberal and Conservative candidates that are of concern.

00:26:28.660 Madam Chair, I think the member has had the preview of my answers. I will not be able to

00:26:37.620 speak specifically about who may or may not have been a subject of interference. What I can say,

00:26:45.460 and we have said that publicly many times over the last number of years, is that for interference

00:26:51.860 is the actors were engaged in foreign interference against Canadians do so at

00:26:56.960 all levels of government at the federal provincial and municipal level and

00:27:02.140 they're doing it across party lines the goal here for the country organizations

00:27:09.540 want to interfere is to favor their own their own interest and therefore whatever

00:27:15.440 way they decide to determine that there those interests would be pursued more

00:27:19.880 fair most effectively they will engage and that's why we have seen uh for interference across uh

00:27:26.200 party lines and across uh different levels of government now i i want to ask you uh following

00:27:32.680 up on madame romanado's question around foreign diplomats uh when we have a case of a foreign

00:27:38.920 diplomat that is involved in um in potentially provoking violations of our laws in this case the

00:27:46.600 Canada elections act what are the steps that CSIS can take in the case of that diplomat

00:27:52.120 what what is open to the Canadian government as well so I would say um the the um probably uh

00:28:00.840 madam chair I would structure my answer in in two ways the first is what CSIS can do which is

00:28:06.040 uh we would investigate the uh uh the information we would pursue all uh using all techniques to

00:28:12.360 find as much as possible about the interference of of diplomats based in canada when we have that

00:28:19.560 information then there's uh the options of the service taking uh the measures directly ourselves

00:28:25.400 using our threat reduction mandate but in the case of a foreign diplomat it would uh i do not foresee

00:28:31.720 scenario in which we would not engage a global affairs canada is the authority in canada to

00:28:37.800 ensure that the enforcement of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations they are

00:28:44.920 the ones who are interacting on a day-to-day basis with foreign diplomats and at that point

00:28:49.960 there are different tools the disposal of the government to Global Affairs Canada to be able

00:28:55.800 to enforce the Vienna Convention up to and including declaring someone personal non grata

00:29:01.880 from the country um and so uh again thank you yeah okay yeah thank you that that response to

00:29:08.840 my question uh you did say something that disturbed me um a few minutes ago you said and i and i quote

00:29:14.760 i've got quotation marks around it intelligence is not a question of evidence making the distinction

00:29:21.320 between intelligence you receive and the evidence that the rcmp or the commissioner of elections can

00:29:27.000 act on so my question is how do you validate intelligence then in that case to ensure

00:29:34.040 that you're moving from intelligence to actual evidence that is actionable

00:29:40.600 thank you for the question madam chair i'll respond if that's okay we constantly work with

00:29:45.960 our partners in law enforcement as the director mentioned with the commissioner of canada elections

00:29:50.920 and we share that information we have those discussions and they are really the ultimate

00:29:55.000 authority to know what could be of use to them the challenge for us and the

00:29:59.440 challenge in the system currently is we need to be able to protect our methods

00:30:03.280 of operation we need to be able to protect our human sources our technical

00:30:07.420 sources our employees and so that sometimes poses challenges as was

00:30:11.740 mentioned by the panel yesterday in terms of converting that intelligence

00:30:15.320 into evidence but the decision in terms of whether to use that information it

00:30:20.320 could belong to the Public Prosecutor Office it could belong of course the

00:30:23.500 rcmp colleagues and perhaps i'll turn to my rcmp colleague if he there's anything he wants to add

00:30:28.940 from his perspective in terms of uh sharing information but i can say that it is a very

00:30:33.980 close partnership ongoing discussions and we work quite closely with all involved

00:30:38.940 agencies in trying to action that information

00:30:41.660 now i will go to my next question that deals with the diaspora you talked about the measures

00:30:56.460 to decrease the threat of foreign interference what are the measures you are undertaking with

00:31:03.580 the diaspora namely i'm talking here about the chinese diaspora diaspora but also with the

00:31:09.740 Russian-Iranian diasporas.

00:31:12.840 So, Madam Chair, it's a very good question, as mentioned in my opening remarks.

00:31:22.180 It is a very sensitive issue, and it is a priority for CSIS.

00:31:30.980 and cultural communities in Canada are being pressured when it comes to foreign interference.

00:31:42.940 And to answer your question, in the last year, we've published a report on foreign interference.

00:31:51.020 We've published it in the different Chinese dialects and in Russian.

00:31:57.820 We've released a guide for communities to better counter foreign interference.

00:32:05.520 So this is a tool.

00:32:06.920 It's a public information tool.

00:32:09.580 We engage people to talk to us to see what more can be done.

00:32:15.300 Merci beaucoup.

00:32:17.420 Thank you very much.

00:32:18.820 We will now go for a five-minute round.

00:32:25.880 Madam Dancho, you have the floor.

00:32:28.120 Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chair.

00:32:29.580 Thank you to the witnesses for being with us today.

00:32:32.040 Regarding the specific allegations report in the Globe and Mail

00:32:35.300 from CSIS documents that Beijing was responsible for illegal cash donations,

00:32:40.280 tax receipts, and hiring campaign workers using illegal methods,

00:32:43.880 as well as disinformation campaigns in the 2021 election,

00:32:47.080 this information from CSIS would have been shared with our Five Eyes intelligence allies.

00:32:51.540 Is that correct?

00:32:53.560 Madam Chair, as I mentioned earlier,

00:32:55.880 I will not be in a position to comment specifically on these allegations, this information.

00:33:03.100 What I can say, however, is that indeed CSIS and our intelligence partners

00:33:07.860 do share information extensively with international partners.

00:33:13.760 Foreign interference, amongst other threats, is one that is shared by many countries.

00:33:19.420 The PRC specifically and other countries are engaging in foreign interference in other countries.

00:33:23.420 And one of the advantages we have is having a number of countries, not only among the five, but more broadly in Western Europe, in Asia, in the Middle East, we work very closely with these partners to share information.

00:33:37.840 And that is one way we have to protect Canadians, is to benefit from the enriched picture here.

00:33:43.120 It was also reported that a Consul General of Beijing took credit for the defeat of a Conservative MP in the 2021 election. Is that correct?

00:33:51.260 uh madam chair i would uh unfortunately have to retain my answer i cannot specifically confirm

00:33:59.180 some of the information that is in the public domain in this current setting this has been

00:34:04.380 asked i'll ask again was the prime minister briefed of any of this information and when would that

00:34:08.780 have been what would have been the dates madam chair we will be as i uh answer to the previous

00:34:15.100 question we endeavor to be able to provide information to the booking with pco uh to this

00:34:21.820 committee in terms of what has been uh briefed and who has been briefed but i'm not in a position to

00:34:27.020 specifically answer the question thank you mr venia i appreciate your service to this country

00:34:31.420 but i am surprised of course you were all aware that you were coming to this committee today and

00:34:35.100 i know you all take i'm sure very detailed notes in your calendar so i'm a bit surprised that

00:34:39.020 that information is not readily available to committee members as i'm sure you anticipated

00:34:42.700 the questions of when the prime minister would or would not have been briefed by you or others in

00:34:47.100 cesis but i would appreciate if you would provide that in short order uh to the committee thank you

00:34:52.460 to the rcmp has cesis shared any of this information regarding election interference with you

00:34:59.020 uh any sharing of information would have been done through the site committee

00:35:02.700 and then if uh if uh it falls into the criminal space the rcmp would investigate

00:35:07.740 and you're not investigating we're not investigating any elements from the 2019 or

00:35:14.460 the 2021 elections we did not receive any actionable intelligence that would warrant

00:35:20.260 us to initiate a criminal investigation so no charges have been laid to anyone concerning any

00:35:25.260 election interference is that correct no charges have been laid and no charges have been laid

00:35:29.800 concerning the beijing police stations illegally operating in canada for the purpose of terrorizing

00:35:34.640 Chinese Canadians no charges have been laid in that regard either no but the RCMP has taken over

00:35:39.020 to actions on four specific sites where we were present in uniform marked vehicles to demonstrate

00:35:45.700 to the community that we're taking this seriously and we've had a positive impact on the actions

00:35:51.460 that we've taken and that positive impact in particular does that mean that the operations

00:35:55.660 from those illegally illegal Beijing police stations have ceased we are our understanding

00:36:01.180 is they've ceased and we're continuing investigation of the ongoing anytime you have a representative

00:36:05.660 from the embassy who's a law enforcement relation uh liaison officer comes up to us and not pleased

00:36:10.140 with the actions we take we took i think that's a sign that we did our job i appreciate very much

00:36:15.820 in that regard uh yesterday i believe it was shared in committee from the deputy of

00:36:20.300 minister of public safety that legislative changes would need to be made or he implied

00:36:24.140 that they would need to be made for charges to be laid is that correct

00:36:26.540 that legislative changes would need to be made for the rcmp to lay charges is that correct when

00:36:32.540 we talk about legislative changes the rcmp operates in the criminal environment and this is the work

00:36:37.180 that michelle alluded to earlier my colleague with regards to the work we do with the service

00:36:41.260 the service is in the intel business but as the intel starts building towards a criminal offense

00:36:47.260 that's when it's shifted the rcmp so we work with the existing legislation that we have under the

00:36:51.820 thank you would a criminal would a change to the criminal code be needed to lay charges based on

00:36:57.500 the evidence that you have concerning the police stations or election interference we always

00:37:01.980 entertain new new tools uh under the code has the minister of public safety or anybody from

00:37:06.620 government the prime minister's office been briefed that legislative changes would need to be made for

00:37:10.380 charges to be laid not to my knowledge uh none of those briefings have happened i'm saying not to

00:37:16.940 my knowledge okay so the rcmp has not informed the prime minister or any of his cabinets uh that

00:37:22.620 legislative changes are needed for charges to be late the rcmp will go through public safety uh

00:37:27.740 to for for any change in legislation will you be pursuing any of those briefs thank you very much

00:37:33.180 thank you to everyone for your for your feedback um excellent and this brings us to mr fergus

00:37:39.740 Thank you very much, Madam Chair.

00:37:44.620 And I first want to thank our witnesses who are here with us today.

00:37:52.120 I feel very encouraged to see the coordination between the RCMP, our CSIS partners.

00:38:04.580 It's very important to see this coordination so that you are working together to protect

00:38:10.720 Canadians and playing our part with our international partners.

00:38:17.780 Mr. Vignon, I want to come back to an answer you gave to Mr. Cooper when he talked about

00:38:24.860 allegations that have come out in the media.

00:38:31.220 If I remember correctly, you confirmed – or rather, you could not confirm the veracity

00:38:46.780 of those allegations.

00:38:48.840 These allegations may or may not come from CSIS.

00:38:56.580 And this leads me to a sensitive question now.

00:38:59.320 I know you can't comment about the specific case,

00:39:02.500 but so let me just take this into a hypothetical range.

00:39:06.540 When you see, you know, with your knowledge of foreign interference

00:39:11.440 and the different techniques which are used in foreign interference,

00:39:16.540 is it possible, in your opinion,

00:39:19.900 that unverified or unconfirmed leaks from secret sources

00:39:28.220 that may or may not come from official sources could in itself represent a form of foreign interference

00:39:37.500 um madam chair i will answer in english or rather in french if you don't mind

00:39:49.580 i think that this is one of the key aspects of this whole situation

00:39:54.140 foreign interference is very complex there is a whole spectrum of activity

00:40:02.380 that goes from a diplomat that might speak openly to exercise influence and

00:40:13.100 that would be acceptable and then there is a whole category of activities that

00:40:19.900 would be a gray area that would be a little more secretive or would be revealed only later

00:40:28.700 and that would also be foreign interference in a way so that that's very complex as you

00:40:35.300 can see so.

00:40:36.300 United Front Work Department is the organization, UFWD, United Front Work Department is an

00:40:45.300 organization of the Communist Party.

00:40:47.100 is as old as the chinese communist party um under xi jinping this organization you know has been

00:40:54.300 uh provided new budgets and that now they're they're the budget of the organization dedicated

00:41:00.860 to engage uh the the chinese abroad but also to interfere in in other countries internal affairs

00:41:08.540 that done by the fwd the budget of that organization now is bigger than their entire

00:41:14.060 department of foreign affairs so the the budget of an organization dedicated to foreign interference

00:41:20.540 is now larger than the entire uh over diplomatic work that the the the prc is engaging in it gives

00:41:27.420 you a sense of how important this is and i would say very quickly madam chair this is why um the

00:41:34.140 president of china jiji ping calls the ufwd one of its magic weapons so then it's not beyond reasonable

00:41:44.060 to see that undermining democratic systems, democratic institutions, could be a primary purpose of the UFWD.

00:41:58.380 Chair, in terms of foreign interference writ large, carried out by the PRC, but also we have seen it by Russia,

00:42:05.260 this information is one of this very specific tool that is being used.

00:42:08.440 That is why, as an intelligence service, we have very rigorous processes to be able to ingest information, challenge that information, validate it, assess it, and that's how intelligence is then put together at the end.

00:42:23.680 and so that I would just invite everybody to be mindful that you know some of the

00:42:29.060 information that may be public domain could be accurate could also be an

00:42:33.360 information that is part of that process that it's still part of an evaluation

00:42:37.220 assessment process so this is why we are very concerned when we see this in the

00:42:41.980 public domain to because you know you need to have experts also be able to

00:42:46.960 to assess the specific information.

00:42:49.260 Thank you.

00:42:51.280 Madame Normandie, two minutes and demi.

00:42:54.240 Two and a half minutes for Ms. Normandie.

00:42:57.200 I understand that you can't say whether or not

00:43:02.040 the information that was provided to the Globe and Mail

00:43:06.520 is accurate, but there is information

00:43:09.920 that indicate that some CSIS officials

00:43:13.340 may have leaked information about how information was managed with the PMO, and the Prime Minister

00:43:22.600 has brushed aside the possibility that one of his candidates may have had interference

00:43:31.060 work in his favor.

00:43:33.260 So we've got these activities by the Communist Party of China.

00:43:40.980 But I want to hear about whether there are any tensions between your organization and

00:43:47.540 the prime minister and the PMO.

00:43:49.940 Thank you.

00:43:50.940 Through you, Madam Chair, there are various aspects to that question.

00:43:55.460 So I would like to quickly say that there is an investigation underway by CSIS and our

00:44:03.620 partners regarding the sources of the information, the leak.

00:44:08.860 We are in a democracy.

00:44:11.960 People do have the right to speak freely, and as I said earlier, in response to a question,

00:44:22.140 if there are means that exist already for people to express their discontent regarding

00:44:31.820 relations with the Prime Minister's office.

00:44:36.180 It is clear that our work is to inform the government, and we have every means available

00:44:43.460 to us to do that.

00:44:45.560 And so I can say that communication is open so that CSIS can provide all of the required

00:44:54.500 information.

00:44:55.500 Very quickly, I have little time, but on another issue, would it be useful for CSIS to have

00:45:03.340 a registry of foreign officials and actors for – to be able to track down interference?

00:45:12.960 Yes, Madam Chair.

00:45:14.960 I had the opportunity to appear before a different parliamentary committee with Minister Mendicino

00:45:23.260 a few weeks ago, and I would say in response to that question that, yes, CISAs have been

00:45:30.400 talking about foreign influence for the last few years, foreign interference, and I think

00:45:40.200 that tool would be useful. It wouldn't solve all our problems, but it would increase transparency.

00:45:45.860 Thank you.

00:45:46.860 Mr. Giulia.

00:45:47.860 Thank you very much, Madam Chair.

00:45:52.860 I know that you can't share information about Five Eyes.

00:46:00.760 That said, there are similar measures that have to be taken by our partners.

00:46:09.800 If we look, for example, at Chinese interference, there are other examples, and I think they

00:46:17.840 They are fairly much public knowledge, and there are solutions in place, other places.

00:46:27.400 When Donald Trump was elected, there was a lot of interference by Russia.

00:46:37.300 The same occurred with Brexit in the United Kingdom.

00:46:44.600 And we had the convoy, as it was called, here in Canada, and we know that Russia was involved

00:46:53.880 in that.

00:46:54.880 So what lessons can we draw from our partners on that, and how can we apply them in Canada?

00:47:04.160 We talk about interference where the diaspora of people from other countries is concerned,

00:47:15.920 but also within Canada, like the convoy.

00:47:19.500 Thank you.

00:47:21.000 Madam Chair, if I may, there were a few aspects that were mentioned that don't match the information

00:47:32.160 that I have, including foreign interference in the convoy activities.

00:47:40.500 That's not the information I have, but I can address lessons that we can draw from

00:47:47.180 situations in other countries.

00:47:51.540 Canada is very fortunate because we have a lot of partners and allies around the world.

00:47:56.300 We work confidentially with other countries through Five Eyes but also other means.

00:48:06.720 The lessons concerning the register that was already mentioned, that's one that we can

00:48:17.440 take from other countries.

00:48:18.900 There are things done in Canada that can be useful to other countries as well.

00:48:27.480 Some of them are confidential, and this is how we build our partnerships.

00:48:32.260 Thank you.

00:48:34.300 We will now go to Mr. Bertold for four minutes.

00:48:39.020 Thank you, Madam Chair.

00:48:40.420 Mr. Vignon, I have a question for you.

00:48:43.140 I'm a little bit of a novice when it comes to security levels and things.

00:48:49.640 I asked the same question of Ms. Thomas.

00:48:53.340 When information is provided to somebody in a political party that is classified, can

00:49:01.940 that person provide information to others?

00:49:06.120 Madam Chair, is one thing that we need to keep learning about and drawing lessons about

00:49:15.360 because that is one of the examples.

00:49:18.040 The process isn't as clear as that.

00:49:24.220 There are ways for people who have classified information to be able to share it in order

00:49:35.120 to provide advice to people just like we've got certain committees but the

00:49:43.340 actual information is classified is that correct yes the specific information is

00:49:50.780 classified so if a person provides shares that information that is illegal so to

00:49:58.580 speak if it is classified yes specific information would probably be considered

00:50:12.440 illegally shared but in my experience this is an information that needs to be

00:50:20.700 held to see how the information can be used yes I understand your there's the

00:50:26.460 a distinction between the specific information and advice.

00:50:30.780 So if CSIS is investigating a specific candidate, then that information can't be shared.

00:50:41.460 I understand the need for the committee members to have specific answers to their questions,

00:50:50.460 But I do have to just take a moment to say that it is not just a matter of providing

00:50:57.660 the information and then washing our hands of it, but rather to provide it along with

00:51:02.760 means to use it.

00:51:04.560 Yes, we understand that classified information under the current system remains classified

00:51:11.100 and it has to be classified and can't be shared, Madam Chair.

00:51:17.320 specific information can't be shared. That's correct.

00:51:22.940 Mr. Vigneault, Ms. Thomas said that CSIS was informed a number of time – of a number

00:51:30.420 of complaints regarding foreign interference in 2019-21. Can you confirm that or rather

00:51:41.800 to the RCMP?

00:51:42.800 no it's very rare that information would be sent to us do you have any

00:51:47.960 information that that any information was provided from ministers offices and

00:52:00.020 others no any information that we would have would involve the site committee

00:52:08.720 Can you talk about foreign interference by Beijing in 2019, 2021?

00:52:18.380 Has anything come to your office?

00:52:19.720 No.

00:52:20.720 You haven't provided information either to the minister or cabinet?

00:52:25.280 No.

00:52:26.280 If somebody did so without going through the regular channels, I wouldn't know.

00:52:32.120 Well, just going by memory, that's one thing.

00:52:38.360 But can you go through the communications with the cabinet and all others to make sure that that is not the case?

00:52:50.800 Yes, I can commit to doing that.

00:52:52.940 Thank you.

00:52:53.600 Thank you, Madam Chair.

00:52:56.440 Merci, Monsieur Bertolt.

00:52:57.580 Thank you, Mr. Bertolt.

00:53:00.720 Hoda, you will have four minutes and 20 seconds.

00:53:05.360 Thank you.

00:53:05.980 so many more questions and uh never enough time um i want to thank the witnesses first and foremost

00:53:13.820 at the beginning of uh the statements it was mentioned that many chinese canadians become

00:53:19.100 victim of this type of foreign interference that occurs would you also say that candidates could

00:53:25.420 also become blindsided and victim of this type of foreign interference canada candidates um um

00:53:34.380 Madam Speaker, Madam Chair, sorry, I would say that the purpose of foreign interference

00:53:42.120 is to again push an agenda of a foreign country.

00:53:46.800 And so as we have mentioned, it takes many different forms and absolutely that could

00:53:51.520 include engaging candidates, engaging staff, engaging people of different part of the Canadian

00:54:01.060 civil society.

00:54:02.460 So as we have said, everybody is potentially, depending on their position, could be subject to foreign interference.

00:54:09.920 And does your agency regularly inform parliamentarians, brief them on foreign interference and how to protect themselves,

00:54:18.380 especially if a candidate may be a victim of foreign interference?

00:54:22.200 Would your agency brief them about this and have they done so in these occurrences in the past?

00:54:28.040 So, Madam Chair, we do have briefed many parliamentarians across party lines, across different levels of government, as I mentioned before.

00:54:40.920 We also continue to publicly speak about foreign interference.

00:54:44.800 We have publications that exist in terms of specifically foreign interference

00:54:49.340 and the guide available in multiple languages to help people to understand very concretely what foreign interference is

00:54:58.600 and what they could do about that.

00:55:00.780 And so the service, the CSIS, has been engaged with our partners, and I believe that the chief also has examples.

00:55:09.540 Yes.

00:55:11.960 Yes, thank you for the question.

00:55:13.500 I would just add that since 2017, the CSC has been putting out publications with regards to threats of democratic institutions.

00:55:21.160 And one of the things that we clearly outline in that booklet or in the guidance we've provided to democratic institutions and around general elections is that foreign interference could happen to those that are voters, as well as candidates, as well as politicians.

00:55:38.880 So as recently as the 2021 election as well.

00:55:42.020 because I don't have that much time I also wanted to get into more things how

00:55:46.080 many countries how many given countries might be involved in these types of

00:55:49.880 activity in Canada do you have a ballpark figure of how many countries are

00:55:55.340 involved so madam chair I would say that we have publicly acknowledge the

00:56:01.280 difference activities of the the PRC of Iran and of Russia and there are other

00:56:07.660 countries also involved in in that foreign difference in our in our overall country not

00:56:13.420 just in the democratic electoral processes so there are a few countries that you acknowledge

00:56:19.260 publicly but how many countries is there a number an idea is it a lot greater than three or is it

00:56:29.260 you know just a few greater than three um madam chair it's uh i would say that uh it is it is

00:56:38.220 more than three uh we're not talking about every country engaging in these activities the most

00:56:43.260 countries do not resort to these types of actions but indeed we are concerned about a few other

00:56:48.540 countries uh would a public inquiry be and many of former directors of theses have commented on

00:56:56.140 this recently do you believe a public inquiry might be a good forum for us to continue this

00:57:02.380 conversation and do you think that thesis and our country would have something to gain uh

00:57:09.100 instead of having it in in a in a committee hearing like this or at nc cop or you know

00:57:15.020 briefings to cite and we've seen that the rosenberg report has recently come out and i'm

00:57:20.220 sure that you were involved in briefings with them in order for them to reach their conclusions

00:57:25.820 so having done all of these things and being engaged in in these ways do you think a public

00:57:31.900 inquiry on top of that uh would be beneficial madam chair i'd say that um the goal of uh uh

00:57:39.580 the the focus of of ccss of the last number of years has been to publicly engage in talking

00:57:45.580 about foreign interference we're using all platforms available to us including parliamentary

00:57:49.820 committees um so uh whatever decision is made uh to to continue this discussion cesus would be uh

00:57:57.580 of course engage actively and continue the discussion the one of course remaining uh

00:58:03.580 consideration is the classified information how can we find the best possible way of having

00:58:08.700 classified information you know uh part of of a of a classified discussion but uh inform the

00:58:15.580 the proper debate without becoming public is that the key conundrum so with that i would like to

00:58:20.560 thank um all of our guests for coming um it's been really interesting and something that i

00:58:25.980 often hear is you know when does the public get to know these meetings are taking place in public

00:58:30.440 you've really demonstrated just the level of detail and just the layers of it so i can speak

00:58:39.440 for myself to say i appreciate that you are responsible for our security and that you are

00:58:45.020 doing really important work so I thank you and for being available today I

00:58:48.560 thank you and I'm going to let witnesses go so we can get to the next just it's

00:58:52.820 related to the witnesses just very briefly madam chair mr. you know

00:58:58.300 undertook to provide a consolidated response in consultation with PCO I would

00:59:05.080 ask that the clerk contact the PCO to request that those that response be

00:59:12.500 provided within a week these are the briefings were matters that I think were

00:59:21.740 easily easy to anticipate and would not require a significant amount of time for

00:59:28.120 calendars to be checked so I think we I appreciate that and I have full

00:59:36.520 confidence that everyone who is appearing here will get us information

00:59:40.620 quickly as possible i have not found one person yet who does not take this matter seriously and

00:59:46.940 who wants to ensure that our elections are protected um open and transparent and fair

00:59:52.220 so i would ask that you provide us information as quickly as possible to the clerk if there's

00:59:57.020 other information you would like to provide us to the clerk and we'll make sure it's circulated to

01:00:00.940 all members with that to on behalf of committee members thank you for your service and to your

01:00:05.980 teams have a great day and we'll get ready for the next panel for committee members i am going to

01:00:11.740 pause a suspend for um till 12 20 so that everyone has time to go to the washroom or take a health

01:00:20.300 break or whatever you need to do and we will resume at 12 20 with the next panel thank you and have a

01:00:26.460 Have a good day.

Juno News - March 02, 2023

China Hearings ｜ CSIS Director David Vigneault questioned on foreign interference

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