Juno News - April 04, 2023


Federal government says legal challenge against Emergencies Act is ＂moot＂


Episode Stats


Length

40 minutes

Words per minute

198.55998

Word count

8,025

Sentence count

350

Harmful content

Misogyny

2

sentences flagged

Toxicity

5

sentences flagged

Hate speech

6

sentences flagged


Summary

Summaries generated with gmurro/bart-large-finetuned-filtered-spotify-podcast-summ .

This week on Canada's Most Reverent Talk Show, Andrew Lawton is in a hotel room in Montreal with no studio audience to record the show. He talks about the impact of April Fools Day and the carbon tax hike, and what the government should do about it. Plus, the federal court hearing on the Emergencies Act, and more.

Transcript

Transcript generated with Whisper (turbo).
Misogyny classifications generated with MilaNLProc/bert-base-uncased-ear-misogyny .
Toxicity classifications generated with s-nlp/roberta_toxicity_classifier .
Hate speech classifications generated with facebook/roberta-hate-speech-dynabench-r4-target .
00:00:00.000 Welcome to Canada's Most Irreverent Talk Show. This is the Andrew Lawton Show, brought to you by True North.
00:00:10.520 Hello and welcome to another edition of Canada's Most Irreverent Talk Show.
00:00:15.560 This is the Andrew Lawton Show on True North, and in a bit of a different venue than we normally do for the show.
00:00:22.180 I guess that's par for the course lately, because we did the live show in Ottawa a couple of weeks back
00:00:27.360 at the Canada Strong and Free Networking Conference. There is no studio audience here. I am in a hotel room in Montreal.
00:00:34.460 So you have to do, when you're doing a show from a hotel, that like one angle where no one sees your messy bed from the night before.
00:00:42.760 So that's the angle I'm sitting in now. If I tilt the camera one inch in either direction, I'll just look like a big old slob on a camera. 0.99
00:00:49.700 More than usual, I guess. So don't answer that. But it is good to talk to you. It is Tuesday, April 4th, 2023.
00:00:56.460 Hope you've gone through April Fool's Day without any particularly acute pain, apart from, of course, the increase in the carbon tax,
00:01:05.400 which just makes the jokes for people. When a tax increase is going up on April Fool's Day, it just writes the lines for the opposition.
00:01:13.440 But alas, that was not enough to elicit a bit of shame from the government and perhaps hold back on that,
00:01:18.620 which is why we spent some time talking about that with Sylvain Charlebois last week.
00:01:22.920 And interestingly enough, I had mostly good feedback to that interview with the Dalhousie professor,
00:01:30.100 but I had one negative comment who said, why didn't I instead talk to producers of food in this country?
00:01:36.380 And I said to him, I would absolutely do that. If you have any recommendations, please send them along,
00:01:41.720 because I don't think that one person has all the answers.
00:01:44.060 But I must say, I do think Sylvain Charlebois is very level-headed about this, especially when he takes aim at supply management,
00:01:50.740 when he talks about the effect of carbon tax, when he talks about all of the supply chains.
00:01:55.340 And I liked his prescription for this, quite frankly, which is get rid of sales tax on all grocery store products,
00:02:02.100 on all food products. Don't do this little silly thing where, well, sometimes a product's a snack,
00:02:07.220 and sometimes it's a grocery, and the size depends on it, and all of that.
00:02:11.920 So we'll definitely talk about this more, because as I said, Canadians are certainly left holding the bag
00:02:17.460 when the government allows inflation to be as bad as it is right now.
00:02:22.340 So we're going to do things a little bit differently today.
00:02:25.360 I'm going to have an interview later on with Tracy Wilson about firearms.
00:02:28.800 We spoke at the Canada Strong and Free Networking Conference,
00:02:32.180 but with the recommendations from the Nova Scotia Mass Casualty Commission report,
00:02:37.080 there is, I think, perhaps a bit more timeliness to that interview.
00:02:41.220 And I also want to talk about a different side of the Chinese foreign interference story.
00:02:47.040 I want to talk about the CSIS angle, because we've been talking about the politics of it,
00:02:50.840 what China's doing, what Justin Trudeau didn't do.
00:02:53.560 But let's go back and discuss for a moment, when we have Andrew Kirshon,
00:02:57.440 a former CSIS intelligence officer, that idea of what goes into these documents,
00:03:02.700 of what the leak really is.
00:03:04.140 Was it a whistleblower? Is it a leaker?
00:03:06.340 And I think Andrew Kirshon goes against where a lot of other conservatives are on this issue,
00:03:10.840 but I still think he's a thoughtful guy, so I want to hear him out on it.
00:03:14.720 But let's start off with the big news this week,
00:03:17.020 which is the federal court hearing on the Emergencies Act.
00:03:22.300 The government, you may remember, it feels like a long time ago,
00:03:25.240 but a year ago in February, invoked the Emergencies Act.
00:03:28.820 It was Justin Trudeau's big, bold, chest-thumping stand
00:03:32.280 against the peaceful trucker convoy protest.
00:03:35.560 And the Emergencies Act has been the subject of several legal challenges.
00:03:40.840 Three in particular are being heard this week.
00:03:43.420 One by the Canadian Constitution Foundation,
00:03:46.320 one by the Canadian Civil Liberties Association,
00:03:49.460 and one by Frontline Nurses, 0.86
00:03:52.140 which is an advocacy group that is a bit more aligned,
00:03:54.900 I think, with where the convoy was,
00:03:57.320 rather than just taking the strict civil liberties angle
00:04:00.140 that the CCLA and CCF are.
00:04:03.280 But these three groups are making their cases.
00:04:05.820 The first day of the hearings was yesterday.
00:04:08.440 They are still underway today by the time you are watching this, most likely.
00:04:12.600 Maybe they've wrapped up by the time you're watching it.
00:04:14.440 Depends on when you're watching it.
00:04:15.860 And the last day of the hearings is going to be tomorrow.
00:04:18.800 Now, this will be the first opportunity for a judge
00:04:23.180 to weigh in on the legality of the Emergencies Act.
00:04:26.800 And I just want to take a moment on that,
00:04:28.580 because we had the big Public Order Emergency Commission.
00:04:31.380 We had the seven weeks of witness testimony,
00:04:34.320 of documentary evidence, and all of that.
00:04:36.500 And certainly there was a lot that came out of that,
00:04:38.720 a lot of information.
00:04:40.000 But the final report from Commissioner Paul Rouleau,
00:04:43.080 who is a judge,
00:04:44.120 the final report was not legally binding in any way.
00:04:47.600 He didn't find legal liability.
00:04:49.820 He didn't find criminal or civil liability.
00:04:52.540 He found what he thought was the takeaway from this
00:04:55.960 and made some recommendations for the future.
00:04:58.980 But that is not something that carries any legal weight.
00:05:02.900 The Supreme Court will probably ultimately have to decide this.
00:05:06.940 But right now, it is before the federal court.
00:05:09.760 After that, it goes to the Federal Court of Appeal.
00:05:11.700 I'm already just writing off that this is going to happen
00:05:15.700 and it's going to be appealed and we're going to get there.
00:05:18.020 But what's interesting right now is how little the federal government
00:05:20.980 even wants to have this discussion.
00:05:23.360 They're doing this old trick that they love doing on cases
00:05:26.020 that are related to vaccine mandates or COVID fines,
00:05:29.140 where they say, it's moot.
00:05:30.860 We don't need to have this federal court hearing
00:05:33.240 over the Emergencies Act because it is moot.
00:05:35.880 The Emergencies Act is no longer in effect.
00:05:38.380 Therefore, there is no reason to have this.
00:05:40.140 We can all just forget about it.
00:05:41.300 And move on.
00:05:42.860 And this was a once, well, basically a once in a lifetime
00:05:46.400 because so far the Emergencies Act has only been used once.
00:05:49.400 So it's once in anyone's lifetime.
00:05:51.000 But it was a one-time deal as far as Canada is concerned right now.
00:05:55.280 Despite the successor, the Emergencies Act being the successor
00:05:58.760 to the War Measures Act,
00:06:00.460 the Emergencies Act has only been used once.
00:06:03.600 And that was to deal with the Freedom Convoy.
00:06:06.400 So it's the kind of situation where perhaps some judicial oversight,
00:06:09.700 some more guidance, some more scrutiny about whether it was appropriately applied
00:06:14.320 would be a good idea.
00:06:15.960 But the federal government is saying, well, you know, we don't really need to
00:06:18.280 because if it comes up again, the circumstances are going to be different.
00:06:21.660 So this decision that you get on its use here isn't really going to be applicable.
00:06:25.840 And they just want to conveniently sweep it under the rug, move on, never to look at it again.
00:06:31.420 In their view, they had the Public Order Emergency Commission.
00:06:34.520 It vindicated Justin Trudeau.
00:06:36.020 No reason to discuss any further.
00:06:38.540 So that was really what dominated a lot of day one.
00:06:41.440 You had the CCF and the CCLA and frontline nurses saying,
00:06:45.980 no, we absolutely need to hear this.
00:06:47.420 And the Attorney General's lawyer saying, Justin Trudeau's lawyer saying,
00:06:51.820 yeah, it's just moot now.
00:06:53.500 Don't even bother with it.
00:06:54.600 We don't need to deal with this at all.
00:06:57.260 And in my experience, I mean, this has been a winnable argument.
00:07:00.800 That was how the federal court managed to strike down
00:07:03.520 the challenge against the air travel vaccine mandate.
00:07:06.560 They said it was moot.
00:07:07.260 They said the mandate is no longer there.
00:07:09.260 We don't need to hear it.
00:07:10.380 We don't need to hear the case.
00:07:11.360 Even if the government might say, have said they'll bring it back,
00:07:14.220 we can just deal with that then.
00:07:15.820 So mootness has become a big weapon for the government in the COVID era,
00:07:21.720 where, again, the whole point of it is that you don't want to be litigating cases
00:07:25.000 where it's purely an academic exercise,
00:07:27.600 where there's no practical reality that will emerge from it.
00:07:31.760 But the problem is that it is the extenuating circumstances of the last three years
00:07:36.560 that have, in the government's view,
00:07:38.640 licensed the state to do all these things that they're now saying are moot.
00:07:42.460 So the reality here now is that we're supposed to just shrug our shoulders and say,
00:07:47.440 well, maybe it won't come up again.
00:07:49.360 So yeah, it probably doesn't matter.
00:07:50.800 But I actually don't think that is the appropriate call at all.
00:07:53.880 And I'm glad that the federal court judge seemed to be pushing back against this.
00:07:58.120 We're going to do a full recap of the hearings on Thursday's show,
00:08:02.180 once we've heard all of the arguments and counter arguments and all of that before the court.
00:08:07.020 So that's going to be something to keep an eye out for.
00:08:08.780 But I wanted to give you a bit of a primer on weaponized mootness,
00:08:12.380 which is the federal...
00:08:13.680 I mean, it sounds like such a bland word,
00:08:15.280 but it is a concept that the government certainly is weaponizing
00:08:18.700 against people that care about constitutional rights.
00:08:22.280 We are going to talk now about Chinese interference.
00:08:25.740 Now, this is a big story.
00:08:27.620 It's one that's kept on going.
00:08:29.020 We've discussed it mostly in a political context,
00:08:31.820 because I think that's where the accountability on this is also going to ultimately going to rely.
00:08:36.480 We've had two politicians that have had to leave their caucuses over this.
00:08:40.360 Handong, the federal liberal, and Vincent Kuh, the provincial progressive conservative.
00:08:45.380 Both of them have insisted they did no wrong whatsoever.
00:08:48.600 But there has also been a slew of damning stories,
00:08:52.440 both in Global News and the Globe and Mail,
00:08:54.860 based on CSIS reports that point fingers at these two gentlemen
00:08:58.460 and several others that have not been named like they have.
00:09:02.400 And, you know, I think that these stories are in the public interest.
00:09:06.400 And I think when China is interfering in Canada's elections,
00:09:08.820 and you have this information being put to the government,
00:09:11.500 and the government is not doing anything about it,
00:09:13.680 it's something that the public ought to know about.
00:09:16.160 But my decision on that, my perspective on that,
00:09:19.480 may be different and, in fact, is different from what the law says
00:09:22.840 about what information can be shared with the public.
00:09:26.100 And, I mean, this is why confidential, classified, secret, top secret,
00:09:30.020 all of these designations exist.
00:09:31.920 So, I want to talk about this with Andrew Kirsch,
00:09:34.320 who we had on the show about his memoir previously.
00:09:36.980 I was never here.
00:09:38.140 He's a former CSIS intelligence officer
00:09:40.280 and has a bit of a different take on this
00:09:42.160 than most people on the right in Canada do.
00:09:44.940 Andrew Kirsch joins me now.
00:09:46.640 Andrew, good to talk to you again.
00:09:47.760 Thanks for coming on today.
00:09:49.680 Thanks for having me back.
00:09:50.700 It's great to be here.
00:09:52.320 Yeah, it's good to talk to you again.
00:09:54.020 I enjoyed our last chat,
00:09:55.760 which was that higher-level discussion
00:09:57.900 and some specifics as well about your experience in CSIS.
00:10:02.260 And I wanted to actually use that experience
00:10:05.040 as a jumping-off point for this story
00:10:06.740 because, obviously, I've been covering on this show
00:10:08.640 the Chinese interference stuff for several months now,
00:10:12.680 it's been.
00:10:13.260 And I think the political side of it
00:10:15.300 and the global geopolitical side of it
00:10:17.320 has been well-covered.
00:10:18.180 But we haven't actually talked about the,
00:10:20.640 I think, the fundamental question here
00:10:22.520 of what is in these reports,
00:10:24.940 these documents that have now been leaked
00:10:27.100 to the Globe and Mail and to Global News.
00:10:29.820 And just to put some context around
00:10:31.680 how people should be interpreting
00:10:34.040 what they're reading about these things.
00:10:35.620 So let me just ask you, generally speaking,
00:10:38.880 as someone who devoted your life for a time
00:10:41.420 to service in CSIS,
00:10:43.240 how did you feel when you learned that there was a leak?
00:10:47.260 Yeah, I wasn't too happy about it.
00:10:48.780 You know, I've been very defensive
00:10:51.680 about the organization.
00:10:53.120 I'm not happy with the leaks.
00:10:54.940 You know, I don't think that's a whistleblower.
00:10:56.640 I think they're leakers.
00:10:58.800 You know, we take-
00:11:00.080 Explain that difference because I know there is one.
00:11:02.700 So I think a whistleblower,
00:11:04.860 and I'm not a lawyer,
00:11:05.800 so don't quote me on the legal definitions,
00:11:07.400 but where there is a, you know,
00:11:09.380 blowing the whistle on legal activities
00:11:11.440 or wrongdoing or where I think there are some,
00:11:14.600 there's some protections around releasing
00:11:17.020 otherwise sensitive information
00:11:18.520 where it's in this very specific,
00:11:21.320 you know, circumstances.
00:11:22.780 Whereas in this case,
00:11:23.720 I think it was just a situation
00:11:25.380 where the person took sensitive classified documents
00:11:27.940 and kind of dumped them on the public.
00:11:29.800 And I don't think they exposed
00:11:31.280 certainly no wrongdoing of the organization.
00:11:34.780 You know, these were reports that were sent out
00:11:36.540 and through appropriate channels.
00:11:37.780 And this person felt like
00:11:39.340 they wanted more people to read them,
00:11:41.260 which, you know, is not in our independent,
00:11:43.960 we're not allowed to make those decisions
00:11:45.580 independently on the collection side, right?
00:11:47.560 Like CSIS has its role,
00:11:48.800 which is to collect, analyze,
00:11:50.720 and advise government on threats
00:11:52.060 to national security.
00:11:53.000 And then the deciders decide, right?
00:11:55.060 We're not always be happy with what they decide,
00:11:57.300 but that's the way it kind of works.
00:11:59.200 That's how the system works together.
00:12:01.260 So, you know,
00:12:01.940 when I see somebody kind of breaching
00:12:03.620 on the advising part
00:12:06.100 because they don't feel like the deciders
00:12:07.420 made the right decision,
00:12:08.260 I say, well, that's not, you know,
00:12:09.100 that's not our job.
00:12:10.480 That's not on people's,
00:12:12.280 that's not their decision to make.
00:12:13.980 And that's why I felt,
00:12:15.900 I said, not very comfortable
00:12:17.340 because there are repercussions,
00:12:19.060 ramifications, right?
00:12:19.940 When we are out there,
00:12:21.040 when I was out there,
00:12:21.740 we're talking about last time
00:12:23.040 as intelligence officer,
00:12:24.080 knocking on doors
00:12:24.780 and asking people
00:12:25.540 to give me confidential secret,
00:12:27.420 you know, information
00:12:28.360 that I can then, you know,
00:12:30.120 put in reports
00:12:31.000 and investigate national security.
00:12:32.320 I'm promising confidentiality.
00:12:33.920 I'm saying the things you tell me
00:12:35.340 and all will be protected
00:12:36.280 and take that oath.
00:12:37.960 And when we work with our partners
00:12:39.540 and Five Eyes community,
00:12:40.400 we give them the same promise,
00:12:41.760 the protection
00:12:42.260 and maintaining the integrity
00:12:43.400 of the information.
00:12:44.540 So when it gets out,
00:12:45.380 it's a really bad look.
00:12:47.040 Now, in this case,
00:12:48.460 I think it's our own information
00:12:49.720 that we've compromised.
00:12:50.540 So I don't know if our partners
00:12:51.280 will be upset with us,
00:12:52.860 but it's, you know,
00:12:54.720 this is sensitive stuff.
00:12:56.120 These are things,
00:12:57.100 and I'm not sure
00:12:57.600 the specific sources of them,
00:12:58.740 but it really does get
00:12:59.940 into sources and methods
00:13:01.060 and maybe people can make
00:13:02.620 some observations
00:13:03.280 about how this information
00:13:04.260 was collected.
00:13:05.040 And so those people
00:13:05.720 we're investigating
00:13:06.560 can better protect themselves
00:13:08.340 from our investigative measures,
00:13:10.200 right, which is,
00:13:11.280 you know, what we don't want
00:13:12.460 to happen.
00:13:13.160 So I mean, it's a long answer,
00:13:14.840 but yeah, I don't like it.
00:13:17.000 I know many of my former colleagues
00:13:19.220 don't like it.
00:13:20.220 I'm sure the organization
00:13:20.740 doesn't like it.
00:13:21.720 And whatever we think about
00:13:23.160 the value of the information
00:13:25.440 we have, you know,
00:13:25.980 a lot of people say,
00:13:26.580 well, this is good
00:13:27.820 that we know about these things.
00:13:29.180 It's important.
00:13:29.920 Remember, there's a cost
00:13:30.840 to that as well.
00:13:31.680 There's a risk
00:13:32.460 when our information
00:13:33.400 gets out like this.
00:13:35.120 So I just don't want
00:13:36.160 to forget that.
00:13:37.280 Now, I would just point out here,
00:13:39.160 you're a former conservative
00:13:40.840 candidate provincially in 2018.
00:13:43.300 So I don't know
00:13:44.300 how you identify politically now,
00:13:46.140 but you're not a partisan liberal.
00:13:47.960 This isn't coming from
00:13:48.800 a place of supporting the liberals,
00:13:51.220 which is I think
00:13:51.720 where a lot of the defense
00:13:52.640 of your position on that
00:13:53.960 has come from
00:13:54.520 in the last couple of months.
00:13:55.420 You know what?
00:13:55.920 It's really been interesting.
00:13:57.000 So I put out a tweet on tweet.
00:13:58.760 I don't tweet a lot.
00:13:59.440 I don't love social media,
00:14:00.660 but that's probably good.
00:14:01.300 That's probably why.
00:14:02.180 I know.
00:14:03.520 So I may be a bad candidate,
00:14:04.860 but I put out a tweet
00:14:06.000 about how I did not
00:14:07.400 appreciate the leaks.
00:14:08.780 I did not like
00:14:09.460 the whistleblowers,
00:14:10.620 you know,
00:14:11.360 column there
00:14:12.280 in the Globe and Mail
00:14:13.300 saying, you know,
00:14:13.720 this is why I did it.
00:14:14.920 The person who called himself
00:14:15.900 a whistleblower,
00:14:16.400 I just said he was a leaker.
00:14:17.580 This is why I did it
00:14:18.840 and all these things.
00:14:19.960 So, you know,
00:14:20.720 I wrote what I think
00:14:22.260 was a harsh but fair
00:14:23.900 kind of a Twitter thread
00:14:25.520 and it was retweeted
00:14:26.120 by liberal supporters
00:14:27.280 and partisans.
00:14:28.060 I'm sure some bots
00:14:29.000 and I kind of joke
00:14:30.620 by the way they find out
00:14:31.620 that I ran for the PCs.
00:14:32.800 You know,
00:14:32.900 there's a lot of things
00:14:33.740 with I hate Doug Ford
00:14:35.240 and the hashtags
00:14:36.420 and I was like,
00:14:37.120 I ran, you know.
00:14:38.360 So in my opinion,
00:14:40.360 this is a nonpartisan issue.
00:14:41.580 It shouldn't be a partisan issue.
00:14:42.620 You know,
00:14:42.720 all parties are at risk.
00:14:44.560 All levels of government
00:14:45.480 are at risk.
00:14:46.240 It doesn't have to be
00:14:47.540 a partisan issue.
00:14:48.600 It's become one,
00:14:49.480 unfortunately.
00:14:51.400 But yeah,
00:14:52.440 it's definitely been
00:14:52.980 a talking point on one side
00:14:54.380 and I said,
00:14:55.920 coming from a,
00:14:56.680 you know,
00:14:57.480 former PC candidate
00:14:58.440 in 2018,
00:14:59.600 by no means
00:15:01.120 a partisan liberal supporter.
00:15:03.400 I think you can safely say that.
00:15:05.780 But let's take the position
00:15:07.540 you've put forward
00:15:08.420 and advance it a bit
00:15:09.540 because I agree
00:15:10.280 that whistleblower protections
00:15:11.420 generally are when someone
00:15:12.640 is exposing legal wrongdoing
00:15:14.740 and generally within
00:15:15.420 their own organization.
00:15:16.540 And in this case,
00:15:17.120 I think actually CESIS
00:15:18.020 comes off quite well in the leak
00:15:19.780 and it's the government
00:15:20.860 that comes off
00:15:21.880 not particularly well.
00:15:23.140 But assuming we take it every,
00:15:25.020 take it all at face value
00:15:26.140 and we'll get into that
00:15:27.200 in a couple of moments.
00:15:28.440 We have allegations
00:15:29.740 that China was interfering,
00:15:31.560 that CESIS knew about it,
00:15:32.900 that they had some
00:15:33.760 very specific examples
00:15:35.140 of politicians and candidates
00:15:36.940 that were either involved
00:15:38.620 or were the passive beneficiaries
00:15:40.860 of this support.
00:15:42.220 CESIS takes this to the government
00:15:43.580 and it looks like the government
00:15:45.680 did not take this seriously.
00:15:47.580 I think that's what the reports
00:15:48.920 that we've seen have shown.
00:15:50.320 So what is the proper recourse?
00:15:51.940 Because there's a part
00:15:53.400 of what you're saying
00:15:54.060 that it sounds like
00:15:54.740 it's just to say,
00:15:55.740 oh well,
00:15:56.160 the government had that call
00:15:57.340 and maybe another government
00:15:58.340 will take it differently.
00:16:00.700 Well, you're saying
00:16:01.200 on behalf of the leaker
00:16:02.660 or the people who are...
00:16:03.740 Well, I'm trying to understand
00:16:06.020 what your position is
00:16:07.420 on what should have happened
00:16:08.640 in this case,
00:16:09.420 if anything,
00:16:10.300 if someone were very frustrated
00:16:12.180 that this was getting handed
00:16:13.460 to the government
00:16:14.000 and they weren't taking it seriously.
00:16:15.980 Well, look,
00:16:16.260 it kind of goes
00:16:16.720 to our previous point there.
00:16:18.140 I ran for office.
00:16:19.040 You want to be a decision maker?
00:16:20.400 You go and become
00:16:21.280 a decision maker.
00:16:22.000 You want to go work
00:16:22.540 for a political party
00:16:23.240 and you think
00:16:23.680 that things are not happening
00:16:25.140 and you want to see happen.
00:16:27.180 You volunteer,
00:16:28.020 you get involved,
00:16:28.640 you be a public person,
00:16:29.740 you advocate for your positions.
00:16:31.460 You don't have to necessarily
00:16:32.840 put your name on the ballot,
00:16:33.980 but you can go be a staffer
00:16:35.900 and try to go to a ministry
00:16:36.880 or some area
00:16:38.600 that you're passionate about
00:16:39.460 and knowledgeable about
00:16:40.120 and say,
00:16:40.360 these are the policy positions
00:16:41.700 that I think
00:16:42.140 that we should take.
00:16:43.420 I think that,
00:16:44.420 you know,
00:16:44.520 more than anything
00:16:44.900 is probably my frustration
00:16:45.820 because if this person
00:16:48.020 and I don't know
00:16:48.900 who this person is
00:16:49.760 or whether they work
00:16:50.800 for CSIS or not,
00:16:51.600 I think it's a lot of people,
00:16:52.920 I guess,
00:16:53.320 is what we're seeing too.
00:16:55.000 If they were a very public
00:16:56.060 senior person
00:16:56.760 that had access
00:16:57.280 to this information
00:16:58.060 and they resigned their post
00:17:00.620 and said,
00:17:01.040 the reason why I'm resigning
00:17:02.220 is because I don't think
00:17:03.060 we're taking this issue seriously,
00:17:05.140 there are a lot of public reports
00:17:06.640 that they can point to
00:17:07.520 that would demonstrate that.
00:17:08.660 I mean,
00:17:08.760 we have what in Sierra,
00:17:09.900 I always get the acronyms wrong,
00:17:11.200 so apologies for that,
00:17:12.320 but the INSERA and ENSICOP,
00:17:14.460 we've been doing,
00:17:15.760 CSIS has been putting out reports
00:17:17.140 on foreign interference
00:17:18.060 for years.
00:17:19.800 The CSIS has been reviewed
00:17:21.320 and the recommendations
00:17:22.960 have come from
00:17:24.360 parliamentary committees
00:17:26.900 or ENSICOP
00:17:27.920 that is non-partisan,
00:17:30.280 that's chaired by a Liberal MP
00:17:31.500 and they're saying
00:17:32.260 their recommendations
00:17:32.940 that we should be doing.
00:17:34.880 Those recommendations
00:17:35.780 haven't been adhered to.
00:17:37.340 So there's plenty
00:17:38.500 of public information
00:17:39.520 that suggests
00:17:40.180 that this is a problem
00:17:41.120 that should be actioned
00:17:43.080 without just kind of dumping
00:17:44.480 the sensitive reporting
00:17:47.880 on it
00:17:48.480 into the public.
00:17:50.940 I think that so,
00:17:52.220 yeah,
00:17:52.580 that was one of my points
00:17:53.980 to the person
00:17:54.900 to say,
00:17:55.200 hey, look,
00:17:55.440 come on out,
00:17:56.240 put your name to it.
00:17:57.380 Like,
00:17:57.500 let's talk about it
00:17:58.220 if you want to talk about it
00:17:59.160 and not in a threatening way,
00:18:00.140 but like,
00:18:00.760 I think that would almost do better.
00:18:02.020 I was in a meeting
00:18:02.920 and I don't think
00:18:03.900 we did a good job with this
00:18:05.400 and we should do better.
00:18:06.720 For me,
00:18:08.140 that's a more convincing argument,
00:18:09.720 to be honest,
00:18:10.500 than letting this play out
00:18:11.680 this way.
00:18:13.540 Yeah,
00:18:13.960 and I mean,
00:18:14.600 to be honest,
00:18:15.140 my view on this,
00:18:16.260 and you may have some people
00:18:17.680 that,
00:18:18.060 whether you call them
00:18:18.540 a leaker or a whistleblower,
00:18:19.640 they think they're smarter
00:18:20.340 than the system
00:18:20.960 and they think they can leak it
00:18:22.580 and keep their identity guarded
00:18:23.960 and never be outed,
00:18:25.280 but you would have to assume
00:18:26.820 that someone doing this,
00:18:28.280 knowing what they're doing,
00:18:30.420 would be doing it
00:18:31.320 with the full expectation
00:18:32.520 that they're going
00:18:33.600 to be identified
00:18:34.700 and they're going
00:18:35.200 to be punished
00:18:35.760 in some way,
00:18:36.620 whatever that is.
00:18:37.360 And in that way,
00:18:38.160 it almost looks
00:18:38.760 more favorably upon you
00:18:40.180 if you do just come out
00:18:41.120 and name yourself
00:18:42.100 before someone else names you.
00:18:44.220 Yeah,
00:18:44.400 and I don't want to,
00:18:45.420 you know,
00:18:45.640 harp too much
00:18:46.740 on the one person
00:18:47.500 as I don't know
00:18:48.480 the situation
00:18:49.200 and who that person is,
00:18:50.800 right?
00:18:51.080 But this is coming
00:18:52.800 from somebody
00:18:53.060 who wrote a book.
00:18:53.720 I mean,
00:18:53.880 I wrote a memoir
00:18:55.380 about working for CSIS
00:18:58.260 and you better believe
00:18:59.240 that I was concerned
00:19:00.300 about my,
00:19:01.140 you know,
00:19:01.280 considered and was concerned
00:19:02.460 about my Security
00:19:03.160 Information Act obligations.
00:19:05.320 And,
00:19:05.680 you know,
00:19:06.400 they say you're only
00:19:08.740 kind of guilty
00:19:09.520 when the judge finds you
00:19:10.460 guilty,
00:19:11.220 but I had my name
00:19:12.160 and my face in the book.
00:19:13.360 And so I was ready to say,
00:19:14.400 this is why I said it.
00:19:15.840 This is what I think
00:19:16.480 it's not in violation.
00:19:17.780 I didn't do names
00:19:19.060 of former colleagues
00:19:19.860 or any operational,
00:19:21.140 you know,
00:19:21.540 information that can
00:19:22.360 give things away.
00:19:23.460 But I acknowledge
00:19:24.780 people might be mad at me.
00:19:26.540 You know,
00:19:26.720 I acknowledge that the CSIS
00:19:28.960 was not going to be happy
00:19:30.380 about the book being written.
00:19:32.580 So,
00:19:33.380 yeah,
00:19:33.620 it's not a great feeling.
00:19:34.720 I'm sure,
00:19:35.600 you know,
00:19:36.240 the person has got
00:19:36.960 all sorts of stuff
00:19:38.560 going on inside of them
00:19:39.580 about what they feel
00:19:40.300 they need to do,
00:19:41.380 what they feel
00:19:41.860 they want the public
00:19:42.420 to hear
00:19:42.960 and what their obligations are.
00:19:46.280 But,
00:19:46.860 yeah,
00:19:47.960 I think that
00:19:48.720 maybe would have been,
00:19:51.580 if they really want
00:19:52.720 to have that conversation,
00:19:53.740 you've got to kind of have it.
00:19:54.800 You've got to lead it.
00:19:55.560 You've got to be in front of it
00:19:56.860 because what's happened
00:19:57.600 with things that are coming
00:19:59.060 left and right
00:19:59.620 and showing up
00:20:00.160 in newspaper articles
00:20:01.020 one day
00:20:01.640 and the next article
00:20:03.220 the next day,
00:20:04.260 it kind of gets away.
00:20:05.440 You know,
00:20:05.740 it can get a little muddled.
00:20:07.180 I assume there's not,
00:20:08.440 you know,
00:20:08.740 one centralized database
00:20:10.180 of CSIS documents
00:20:11.620 and information
00:20:12.320 and reports
00:20:12.860 that any of the,
00:20:13.820 you know,
00:20:14.260 3,000 some odd employees
00:20:15.520 at CSIS can go
00:20:16.460 and peruse at their leisure.
00:20:17.980 Things are,
00:20:18.880 I assume,
00:20:19.220 quite siloed
00:20:20.000 and segmented.
00:20:21.080 So,
00:20:21.560 let's talk about
00:20:22.420 just the logistics
00:20:23.180 of how many people
00:20:24.400 would likely have access
00:20:25.820 to information
00:20:26.680 of this nature
00:20:28.200 on a particular file
00:20:29.460 and I'm assuming
00:20:30.200 it would vary
00:20:31.200 but when you're getting
00:20:32.700 into this level
00:20:33.760 of specificity,
00:20:35.060 are we talking about
00:20:36.080 five people,
00:20:37.320 50 people,
00:20:38.260 500 people?
00:20:40.160 Well,
00:20:40.880 you know,
00:20:41.160 I don't know
00:20:43.200 the exact numbers
00:20:44.460 or could I probably say
00:20:45.480 but I'll say this
00:20:47.220 that,
00:20:48.000 you know,
00:20:48.160 these,
00:20:48.680 the classified
00:20:49.640 or sensitive documents
00:20:50.520 that were,
00:20:51.280 you know,
00:20:52.480 leaked,
00:20:52.980 those were distributed
00:20:54.240 to a large
00:20:56.080 number of people.
00:20:57.480 I think there were
00:20:57.960 across the five I's
00:20:59.460 so the number
00:20:59.940 of other intelligence services
00:21:01.200 to I think PCO,
00:21:02.640 PMO,
00:21:03.200 like there's a,
00:21:03.640 there's a big list.
00:21:05.280 Once the,
00:21:06.000 once kind of those
00:21:07.680 get out of the organization
00:21:08.980 and I don't know
00:21:09.840 how many people
00:21:10.280 are on that mailing list
00:21:11.000 but it's not,
00:21:11.680 you know,
00:21:11.820 it's not one,
00:21:12.620 right?
00:21:12.920 It's,
00:21:13.280 it seemed like
00:21:13.800 they were a few
00:21:15.400 and when you start
00:21:17.340 getting into
00:21:17.960 specific reports
00:21:19.340 that were sent out,
00:21:20.400 yeah,
00:21:20.520 you can probably drill down
00:21:21.560 who's on the receiving list
00:21:22.740 of a report,
00:21:24.460 who is on the inside
00:21:25.620 of a case file,
00:21:26.740 working specific investigations.
00:21:28.200 Absolutely,
00:21:28.760 that stuff
00:21:29.300 is pretty tightly controlled.
00:21:31.060 I think if you work
00:21:31.620 with or for
00:21:35.020 the service
00:21:36.840 and you can be
00:21:37.700 pretty confident
00:21:39.100 that they do a good job
00:21:40.560 of protecting it
00:21:41.260 and to your earlier question
00:21:42.980 about will this get out,
00:21:44.520 the more information
00:21:45.700 the,
00:21:46.520 the,
00:21:46.920 the people reveal
00:21:48.580 about what they know,
00:21:49.700 the easier it's going to be
00:21:50.560 to narrow down,
00:21:52.040 you know,
00:21:52.400 who had access
00:21:53.300 to all of that information.
00:21:54.540 I think that's ultimately
00:21:55.200 what you're getting,
00:21:55.840 kind of getting down to.
00:21:58.740 They are,
00:21:59.460 they are tightly controlled
00:22:00.400 not everyone gets access
00:22:01.200 to everything.
00:22:01.900 There's this,
00:22:02.600 you need to know principle.
00:22:03.840 You hear,
00:22:04.520 you may be familiar with it
00:22:05.960 but even if you have
00:22:07.380 the highest levels
00:22:08.220 of national security,
00:22:09.140 even if you're cleared
00:22:10.120 to,
00:22:10.600 to whatever the highest
00:22:11.420 clearance is,
00:22:12.400 if you don't need
00:22:13.500 to know that information
00:22:14.600 then you should not be
00:22:15.760 provided that information.
00:22:16.900 You know,
00:22:16.980 you don't get read in
00:22:17.860 on every file.
00:22:18.640 I can't walk down
00:22:19.340 the hall at CSIS
00:22:21.180 and say,
00:22:21.480 Hey,
00:22:21.640 what do you,
00:22:22.160 you know,
00:22:22.320 what are you working on?
00:22:24.040 Hey,
00:22:24.220 what's happening in China today?
00:22:25.440 What's happening in Afghanistan today?
00:22:27.060 What's going on?
00:22:27.740 You know,
00:22:27.920 what's,
00:22:28.380 you know,
00:22:28.720 what's going on over there,
00:22:29.880 right?
00:22:30.360 The,
00:22:30.560 you're,
00:22:30.760 you're generally restricted
00:22:32.420 to what you have specific access to.
00:22:34.780 Now,
00:22:34.940 certain areas would have,
00:22:36.120 you know,
00:22:36.280 that can be broad.
00:22:38.380 You know,
00:22:38.500 when I was,
00:22:39.860 when I was working there
00:22:40.740 and I was in a support desk,
00:22:41.920 that can mean a lot
00:22:42.520 of different files
00:22:43.260 in a very kind of shallow level,
00:22:45.840 a lot of different investigations,
00:22:47.300 or someone working
00:22:48.220 one investigation
00:22:49.000 with a tight team
00:22:50.260 will have all the information
00:22:51.860 on,
00:22:52.580 you know,
00:22:52.760 a very,
00:22:53.140 a very small investigation.
00:22:54.900 So,
00:22:55.660 yeah,
00:22:55.900 it's interesting to see
00:22:57.040 as these can come out,
00:22:59.220 I make assessments about,
00:23:00.460 okay,
00:23:00.640 like how close was this person
00:23:02.820 to the reporting
00:23:04.580 versus,
00:23:05.820 or the collection of the information
00:23:07.040 versus the reporting,
00:23:08.120 which would be on,
00:23:09.180 was this distributed
00:23:09.940 to a decision maker?
00:23:10.920 And therefore,
00:23:11.800 you know,
00:23:12.020 they're getting selective intelligence
00:23:13.840 and saying,
00:23:14.880 why am I the only one
00:23:15.840 who got this
00:23:16.660 and more people need to hear?
00:23:18.360 Or is it somebody
00:23:19.520 who is,
00:23:20.540 you know,
00:23:20.960 collecting this information,
00:23:21.880 passing it up
00:23:22.380 and feel like it's not going anywhere?
00:23:24.000 I think those are,
00:23:25.260 you know,
00:23:25.420 those are different things.
00:23:26.760 I saw a Twitter thread
00:23:28.040 from,
00:23:28.540 from someone recently
00:23:29.460 and I can't recall who it was
00:23:31.000 and I think they probably
00:23:31.860 had some connection
00:23:32.580 to the intelligence world
00:23:34.360 that said intelligence reports
00:23:35.900 are not to be taken
00:23:36.860 as,
00:23:37.380 you know,
00:23:37.600 100% ironclad fact.
00:23:39.540 They're,
00:23:39.780 they're meant to be reports
00:23:41.080 that are then taken
00:23:41.880 along with other various inputs.
00:23:43.600 We saw that during
00:23:44.400 the Public Order Emergency Commission
00:23:46.360 where CSIS had this report
00:23:47.860 and the government
00:23:48.280 ultimately found something else.
00:23:50.220 So I'm just curious
00:23:51.000 if you should,
00:23:51.580 could shine some light on that.
00:23:52.940 I mean,
00:23:53.120 these documents,
00:23:54.080 and I don't know
00:23:54.620 the formal title of them
00:23:56.520 and there are probably several,
00:23:58.120 what is the proper way
00:24:00.000 to receive those?
00:24:01.320 Are they,
00:24:01.600 are they,
00:24:02.200 is there a margin of error
00:24:03.240 on these things
00:24:03.860 or is it as certain
00:24:05.420 as it comes
00:24:05.940 or as certain as CSIS is
00:24:07.260 when these things
00:24:08.120 are put in paper?
00:24:09.820 Yeah,
00:24:10.040 I mean,
00:24:10.340 the nature of intelligence,
00:24:12.600 it's dynamic.
00:24:13.240 It's kind of evolving.
00:24:14.720 You can have,
00:24:15.780 you're building a picture
00:24:16.880 and you're trying
00:24:17.460 to provide information
00:24:18.580 and assessment
00:24:19.740 of that information.
00:24:20.480 You're processing information
00:24:22.160 into,
00:24:23.140 you know,
00:24:23.300 in this case,
00:24:23.960 intelligence assessments
00:24:24.860 to say,
00:24:25.480 this is,
00:24:26.280 you know,
00:24:26.400 what we think is,
00:24:27.340 is happening.
00:24:28.220 This is the picture.
00:24:29.060 But yeah,
00:24:29.920 it's,
00:24:30.900 you know,
00:24:31.440 getting it right or wrong
00:24:32.360 or just making,
00:24:33.400 making informed links
00:24:35.240 and then later on
00:24:35.980 information comes up
00:24:37.140 that challenges
00:24:38.360 that hypothesis
00:24:39.200 or changes it
00:24:40.120 a little bit
00:24:40.760 or put some context
00:24:42.100 and nuance
00:24:42.820 onto reports.
00:24:44.320 So,
00:24:45.160 you know,
00:24:45.640 in a case,
00:24:46.560 in a case like this
00:24:47.380 or in the fact
00:24:49.000 that this is a threat
00:24:50.280 like this,
00:24:51.240 that CSIS
00:24:51.760 is a core part
00:24:53.020 of CSIS's mandate
00:24:53.880 that's,
00:24:54.620 you know,
00:24:54.960 foreign influenced activities
00:24:56.540 that is kind
00:24:57.820 of a nuanced threat.
00:25:00.040 You will see
00:25:00.940 reporting that comes out
00:25:01.880 that is just trying
00:25:02.520 to provide people
00:25:04.020 a picture
00:25:05.520 of what's going on
00:25:06.380 that they can make
00:25:07.400 decisions based on,
00:25:09.040 right?
00:25:09.180 And that's why
00:25:09.660 it is great,
00:25:10.580 right?
00:25:10.780 It is,
00:25:11.520 you make
00:25:11.940 the best decisions
00:25:13.420 you can.
00:25:13.980 You make risk-informed
00:25:15.080 decisions,
00:25:16.020 threat-informed decisions.
00:25:17.160 And I think that's
00:25:18.340 one of the concerns
00:25:20.220 you have is,
00:25:21.500 well,
00:25:21.820 did this person
00:25:22.580 who is,
00:25:23.980 access to information,
00:25:24.900 they have access
00:25:25.220 to everything
00:25:25.880 or are they selectively
00:25:27.760 getting access to it?
00:25:28.860 Do they know
00:25:29.420 what risk mitigation
00:25:30.600 has put in place?
00:25:31.720 So,
00:25:32.260 you know,
00:25:32.440 what decisions
00:25:33.100 were made
00:25:33.740 with that information?
00:25:35.820 You know,
00:25:36.240 that is,
00:25:36.920 we don't know.
00:25:37.760 That's not always
00:25:38.480 provided what kind
00:25:39.860 of is happening
00:25:40.540 behind the scenes.
00:25:41.840 We kind of see,
00:25:42.500 okay,
00:25:42.780 well,
00:25:43.700 they got this
00:25:45.680 and they did that,
00:25:46.720 but we don't know
00:25:47.240 everything they got,
00:25:47.960 we don't know
00:25:48.200 everything they did,
00:25:49.260 right?
00:25:49.500 And that's,
00:25:50.120 I think,
00:25:50.540 one of the challenges
00:25:51.080 of getting selective
00:25:52.040 leaks of documents
00:25:54.040 is,
00:25:54.900 yeah,
00:25:55.180 it's not going
00:25:55.520 to provide
00:25:55.780 the whole picture.
00:25:56.600 I'm not saying
00:25:57.120 the information
00:25:57.800 passed along
00:25:58.680 is wrong.
00:25:59.720 I'm not saying
00:26:00.100 that the documents
00:26:01.180 given weren't
00:26:01.820 like at the time
00:26:03.080 accurate pictures
00:26:04.740 of what we knew
00:26:05.440 then or about
00:26:06.200 the specific threat
00:26:07.000 then,
00:26:08.000 but it's hard
00:26:08.940 to say,
00:26:09.340 like,
00:26:09.480 this is the smoking
00:26:10.240 gun,
00:26:10.800 right?
00:26:11.140 It's,
00:26:11.640 that doesn't
00:26:12.980 always the case
00:26:13.580 in these types
00:26:14.560 of investigations.
00:26:16.200 Yeah,
00:26:16.620 and it's funny
00:26:17.080 because I know
00:26:17.660 that some of my
00:26:18.380 audience right now
00:26:19.160 is like seething
00:26:19.940 because we've been
00:26:20.520 going hard on this
00:26:21.260 story based on
00:26:22.160 these reports
00:26:22.840 for the last,
00:26:23.260 not at you,
00:26:24.000 just probably at me
00:26:24.740 more than anything
00:26:25.300 because they,
00:26:26.200 you know,
00:26:26.400 they know I've been
00:26:26.880 talking about this
00:26:27.640 and it's one of
00:26:28.280 these things,
00:26:28.620 as a journalist,
00:26:29.200 I'm inclined
00:26:29.880 towards more information
00:26:31.200 and the more
00:26:31.680 the better
00:26:32.080 and then we can
00:26:32.660 decide from it
00:26:33.420 and I realize
00:26:34.760 there is a,
00:26:35.640 I mean,
00:26:35.820 perhaps it's a
00:26:36.420 philosophical point
00:26:37.320 more than it's
00:26:37.840 a legal point
00:26:38.480 about what the
00:26:39.600 limit is,
00:26:40.100 at what point
00:26:40.740 does it become
00:26:41.340 justifiable to do
00:26:42.860 this and I think,
00:26:44.400 you know,
00:26:44.640 there is one sort
00:26:45.560 of takeaway of
00:26:46.160 if you feel it's
00:26:47.220 worth staking your
00:26:48.100 life and your
00:26:48.720 career and the
00:26:49.880 legal punishments
00:26:50.780 on,
00:26:51.600 then okay,
00:26:52.500 let the cards
00:26:53.000 fall where they
00:26:53.520 may.
00:26:54.120 Well,
00:26:54.380 and I want to
00:26:54.900 say this to folks
00:26:55.800 too because,
00:26:56.560 you know,
00:26:56.820 I get asked a lot
00:26:57.840 about the leaks
00:26:59.180 and the documents
00:26:59.800 and those types
00:27:00.240 of things and I
00:27:01.780 feel like I want
00:27:02.940 to present that
00:27:03.960 context which is
00:27:05.720 these have,
00:27:06.260 you know,
00:27:06.500 threats and risks
00:27:07.140 and let's add
00:27:08.420 new ones to it
00:27:09.140 but I dedicated
00:27:11.060 10 years of my
00:27:11.720 life to investigating
00:27:13.540 threats to national
00:27:14.260 security and many
00:27:15.160 of my colleagues
00:27:15.720 have as well
00:27:16.280 and this is one
00:27:16.700 of them,
00:27:17.280 right?
00:27:17.720 So I do not
00:27:19.620 want to discount
00:27:20.200 the risk.
00:27:20.920 I do not
00:27:21.580 and the threat.
00:27:22.420 I do not want
00:27:23.100 to come across
00:27:23.860 in any way
00:27:24.360 that's saying
00:27:24.780 that,
00:27:25.060 you know,
00:27:26.120 there's nothing
00:27:26.880 to see here
00:27:27.780 and nobody
00:27:28.740 worried.
00:27:29.000 No,
00:27:29.180 that is absolutely
00:27:29.960 not the case,
00:27:30.780 right?
00:27:31.000 The CSIS
00:27:31.600 has been putting
00:27:32.100 in their public
00:27:32.680 reports.
00:27:33.400 There have been
00:27:33.800 recommendations
00:27:34.240 coming out
00:27:34.740 of government
00:27:35.020 bodies that
00:27:35.660 this is a threat,
00:27:36.640 this is a concern,
00:27:38.040 this is something
00:27:38.400 we should do
00:27:38.760 more about
00:27:39.520 and there are
00:27:41.580 legitimate questions
00:27:42.380 to be asked
00:27:43.180 100% about
00:27:44.600 what did the
00:27:45.400 government know
00:27:46.000 and what did
00:27:46.980 they do
00:27:47.460 and was that
00:27:48.240 appropriate,
00:27:49.280 right?
00:27:49.660 And if they did,
00:27:50.900 you know,
00:27:51.020 and then there's
00:27:51.320 the nuance which
00:27:52.280 is,
00:27:53.180 well,
00:27:53.340 look,
00:27:53.580 if they didn't
00:27:54.440 do more,
00:27:55.860 is that because
00:27:56.540 they benefited,
00:27:57.500 right?
00:27:57.740 And I think
00:27:58.020 everyone wants to
00:27:58.820 get and those
00:27:59.760 are absolutely
00:28:00.900 100% fair
00:28:02.700 questions that
00:28:04.240 we should be
00:28:04.780 asking,
00:28:05.120 which people
00:28:05.380 are calling
00:28:05.640 for public
00:28:06.040 inquiry or
00:28:07.300 more sunlight
00:28:08.160 and more
00:28:08.760 transparency and
00:28:09.700 I agree.
00:28:10.280 So,
00:28:10.640 you know,
00:28:11.180 I don't want to
00:28:11.760 discount that
00:28:12.440 and be used to
00:28:13.120 say,
00:28:13.340 well,
00:28:13.540 you know,
00:28:13.820 the leaker's not
00:28:15.320 a whistleblower
00:28:15.980 and therefore,
00:28:16.680 you know,
00:28:16.860 this is a big
00:28:17.400 brew,
00:28:17.680 how about
00:28:18.080 nothing?
00:28:18.600 Absolutely not.
00:28:19.280 You know,
00:28:19.720 we have an
00:28:20.740 intelligence service
00:28:21.300 that's been
00:28:21.560 working on this.
00:28:22.580 We've been sending 1.00
00:28:23.080 reports up
00:28:23.940 and it is a real
00:28:25.380 threat and we
00:28:25.980 should do
00:28:26.520 more 100%.
00:28:28.020 So,
00:28:29.400 yeah,
00:28:29.600 I,
00:28:29.860 you know,
00:28:30.280 I get the
00:28:31.320 blowback, 0.80
00:28:31.840 I get the
00:28:32.120 frustration.
00:28:32.940 I always feel
00:28:34.320 like because I'm
00:28:34.860 from the
00:28:35.100 intelligence community,
00:28:35.780 I need to
00:28:36.380 say,
00:28:36.620 look,
00:28:36.760 guys,
00:28:37.060 you know,
00:28:37.280 don't put my
00:28:37.920 former colleagues
00:28:38.480 at risk by
00:28:39.020 dumping,
00:28:39.400 you know,
00:28:39.900 sensitive intel
00:28:40.520 out.
00:28:41.300 But my
00:28:42.040 goodness,
00:28:42.380 we,
00:28:42.740 you know,
00:28:42.900 there's plenty
00:28:43.440 of public
00:28:43.960 information that
00:28:44.960 says this is a
00:28:45.540 problem that we
00:28:46.480 should be doing
00:28:46.820 more about.
00:28:48.060 This has sparked
00:28:48.920 a conversation
00:28:49.620 about that.
00:28:51.180 And,
00:28:51.740 yeah,
00:28:53.380 I'm not saying
00:28:53.940 there's no public
00:28:54.460 benefit.
00:28:54.900 I'm just saying
00:28:55.360 I wish we didn't
00:28:55.820 get here because
00:28:56.800 of leaks.
00:28:57.740 Yeah,
00:28:58.180 and I agree
00:28:58.920 process is
00:28:59.640 important.
00:29:00.120 I mean,
00:29:00.280 it's the old
00:29:00.720 thing about,
00:29:01.300 you know,
00:29:01.480 if police
00:29:01.880 search someone
00:29:02.520 without a
00:29:02.920 warrant and
00:29:03.360 they find
00:29:03.740 something there
00:29:04.260 but they
00:29:04.540 weren't allowed
00:29:04.920 to have
00:29:05.180 searched in
00:29:05.920 the first
00:29:06.260 place,
00:29:06.580 there's a
00:29:07.260 remedy
00:29:07.620 available to
00:29:08.640 that person.
00:29:09.280 So,
00:29:09.600 I know it's
00:29:10.200 not a
00:29:10.460 perfectly
00:29:10.760 analogous
00:29:11.320 situation,
00:29:12.040 but you
00:29:12.360 can't just
00:29:12.780 take this
00:29:13.140 Machiavellian
00:29:13.960 approach to
00:29:14.920 these things,
00:29:16.000 which I think
00:29:16.600 we can agree
00:29:17.060 on in
00:29:17.520 principle,
00:29:18.020 if not
00:29:18.400 necessarily
00:29:19.300 in the
00:29:19.620 specific case
00:29:20.320 here.
00:29:20.620 You might
00:29:21.000 like this
00:29:21.460 leak,
00:29:21.660 you might
00:29:21.880 not like
00:29:22.160 the next
00:29:22.480 one,
00:29:22.860 and if
00:29:23.180 we're going
00:29:23.360 to rely
00:29:23.740 on individual
00:29:24.340 people who
00:29:25.060 feel empowered
00:29:25.820 to do it,
00:29:26.940 I don't think
00:29:27.620 that's a
00:29:27.860 great system,
00:29:29.380 so whatever
00:29:30.120 we feel
00:29:30.720 about this,
00:29:31.220 but once
00:29:32.160 again,
00:29:32.600 foreign
00:29:33.040 interference,
00:29:33.700 that's a
00:29:34.040 core CSIS
00:29:35.100 mandate threat
00:29:36.080 since 1984
00:29:37.080 that our
00:29:40.040 Security Intelligence
00:29:41.260 Service has
00:29:41.700 been asked
00:29:41.920 to investigate
00:29:42.520 and advise
00:29:43.420 government on,
00:29:44.160 and they've
00:29:44.500 been doing
00:29:44.820 that,
00:29:45.760 and now
00:29:46.440 we've got
00:29:46.620 to figure
00:29:46.840 out what
00:29:48.480 do we do,
00:29:48.900 what do we
00:29:49.060 not do,
00:29:49.880 why,
00:29:50.940 and what
00:29:51.500 should we
00:29:51.700 do going
00:29:52.020 forward now
00:29:53.080 that we
00:29:53.440 are having
00:29:53.880 this
00:29:54.060 conversation
00:29:54.540 because that
00:29:55.000 will require
00:29:56.200 further action,
00:29:57.620 and look,
00:29:58.920 as a political
00:29:59.340 candidate,
00:29:59.720 I have some
00:30:00.140 insight in
00:30:00.520 how nominations
00:30:01.140 work,
00:30:01.900 and those
00:30:02.580 are messy
00:30:03.360 things,
00:30:05.680 that's no
00:30:06.440 easy solutions
00:30:07.080 on how to
00:30:07.340 tidy those
00:30:07.740 things up
00:30:08.160 or the
00:30:08.320 political
00:30:08.480 process,
00:30:09.000 but clearly,
00:30:10.140 clearly,
00:30:10.900 you know,
00:30:12.020 I think there
00:30:12.680 are steps
00:30:12.960 that we
00:30:13.220 can and
00:30:13.580 should take.
00:30:14.780 All right,
00:30:15.420 well,
00:30:15.540 the fantastic
00:30:16.260 book written
00:30:16.780 by this
00:30:17.340 gentleman,
00:30:17.700 Andrew Kirsch,
00:30:18.280 is I
00:30:18.700 Was Never
00:30:19.200 Here,
00:30:19.760 My True
00:30:20.240 Canadian
00:30:20.640 Spy Story
00:30:21.420 of Coffee's
00:30:22.060 Codenames
00:30:22.520 and Covert
00:30:23.360 Operations.
00:30:24.520 You can,
00:30:24.880 in the age
00:30:25.260 of terrorism,
00:30:26.240 you can get
00:30:26.600 that on
00:30:27.080 Amazon,
00:30:27.620 an indigo,
00:30:28.280 and I
00:30:28.720 would encourage
00:30:29.100 you to read
00:30:29.500 it.
00:30:29.640 It was a lot
00:30:29.960 of fun,
00:30:30.400 and you
00:30:30.700 can also
00:30:30.980 check my
00:30:31.400 interview with
00:30:32.140 Andrew from
00:30:32.560 several months
00:30:33.100 ago to get
00:30:34.220 a little bit
00:30:34.600 more information
00:30:35.400 about that.
00:30:36.000 Andrew,
00:30:36.200 thank you so
00:30:36.720 much for your
00:30:37.140 time and
00:30:37.640 candour,
00:30:38.000 sir.
00:30:38.660 Thank you.
00:30:39.100 Thanks for
00:30:39.320 having me.
00:30:39.640 That was
00:30:40.320 former CSIS
00:30:41.280 intelligence
00:30:41.800 officer Andrew
00:30:42.760 Kirsch,
00:30:43.520 and as
00:30:43.900 mentioned,
00:30:44.320 you should
00:30:44.500 definitely
00:30:44.800 check out
00:30:45.340 his book,
00:30:46.160 I Was
00:30:46.460 Never
00:30:46.640 Here.
00:30:46.940 It's not
00:30:47.180 a salacious
00:30:47.960 or thriller
00:30:49.020 type book,
00:30:49.980 but it's a
00:30:50.520 tremendously
00:30:50.920 valuable resource
00:30:52.180 to understand a
00:30:53.860 government agency
00:30:54.700 in Canada that
00:30:55.440 so often flies
00:30:56.380 under the radar
00:30:56.900 because it's not
00:30:58.300 necessarily as sexy
00:30:59.240 as like the
00:30:59.700 Jason Bourne movies
00:31:00.520 as far as what
00:31:01.200 they do,
00:31:01.620 but they do
00:31:02.420 play a role,
00:31:03.120 and as we're
00:31:03.480 seeing in the
00:31:04.200 course of the
00:31:04.900 Chinese interference 0.92
00:31:05.760 story,
00:31:06.220 they were
00:31:06.620 playing,
00:31:07.180 they were
00:31:07.380 doing their
00:31:07.760 part,
00:31:08.220 and the
00:31:08.600 government,
00:31:09.240 it seems,
00:31:09.700 was not
00:31:10.120 doing its
00:31:10.760 part.
00:31:11.140 So let me
00:31:11.960 know what you
00:31:12.200 think about
00:31:12.500 that in the
00:31:13.260 comments.
00:31:14.300 Turning from
00:31:14.840 one agency to
00:31:15.980 another,
00:31:16.420 though,
00:31:16.600 we spoke last
00:31:17.340 week about the
00:31:18.000 Mass Casualty
00:31:19.240 Commission's
00:31:19.760 report,
00:31:20.360 and this was
00:31:21.000 the commission
00:31:21.880 that was struck
00:31:22.780 to deal with
00:31:23.420 that horrific
00:31:24.140 killing spree in
00:31:25.900 Portapic,
00:31:26.700 Nova Scotia,
00:31:27.560 two years,
00:31:28.140 actually putting
00:31:28.780 three years ago
00:31:29.700 now,
00:31:30.440 and the one
00:31:31.460 thing that I
00:31:32.040 would point out
00:31:32.720 to a lot of
00:31:33.360 people about
00:31:33.980 this thing that
00:31:34.780 I said on the
00:31:35.260 show last
00:31:35.720 week is
00:31:36.220 that it
00:31:37.020 looks like
00:31:37.800 the
00:31:38.340 recommendations
00:31:39.040 in the
00:31:39.660 report were
00:31:40.580 just written
00:31:41.260 by the
00:31:41.820 most radical
00:31:44.080 activists in
00:31:44.880 each particular
00:31:45.600 category.
00:31:46.380 So the
00:31:47.020 recommendations on
00:31:48.060 domestic violence
00:31:48.960 looked like they
00:31:49.620 were written by
00:31:50.560 activists in
00:31:51.620 that sector who
00:31:52.360 again may have a
00:31:53.200 legitimate cause,
00:31:54.140 but it's not one
00:31:54.960 connected to what
00:31:55.620 happened in
00:31:56.540 Nova Scotia,
00:31:57.220 at least as
00:31:57.920 much as the
00:31:58.400 report made it
00:31:59.100 seem.
00:31:59.720 And the
00:32:00.120 firearm section
00:32:00.980 looked like it
00:32:01.520 was ripped right
00:32:02.400 out of what the
00:32:03.900 most rabid gun
00:32:05.280 control activists
00:32:06.060 in this country
00:32:06.700 seek at every
00:32:07.980 turn, and they
00:32:08.620 just look for
00:32:09.220 opportunities to
00:32:10.100 advance this
00:32:10.660 agenda irrespective
00:32:11.940 of the facts of
00:32:13.180 the case.
00:32:13.640 And in the Nova
00:32:14.300 Scotia killing
00:32:15.520 spree, the
00:32:16.140 firearms were all
00:32:17.240 illegally owned,
00:32:18.020 so no changes to
00:32:19.440 the legal ownership
00:32:20.540 regime for guns in
00:32:21.660 Canada would have
00:32:22.660 done anything.
00:32:23.840 But that part is
00:32:24.980 conveniently left
00:32:26.440 out of the
00:32:27.200 narrative.
00:32:28.420 A couple of weeks
00:32:29.000 ago when I was in
00:32:29.860 Ottawa for the
00:32:30.820 Canada Strong and
00:32:31.680 Free Networking
00:32:32.360 Conference, I sat
00:32:33.440 down with Tracy
00:32:34.580 Wilson from the
00:32:35.560 Canadian Coalition
00:32:36.360 for Firearm
00:32:37.680 Rights, and I'm
00:32:38.280 actually going to
00:32:38.860 be speaking at
00:32:39.920 their AGM in
00:32:41.140 Ottawa in June, so
00:32:42.400 if you are a
00:32:43.060 CCFR member, I do
00:32:44.160 hope you come out
00:32:45.000 and say hello and
00:32:46.560 hear what I'm
00:32:47.080 speaking about.
00:32:47.620 I have no idea
00:32:48.200 what I'm speaking
00:32:48.820 about yet because
00:32:49.460 it's in June, so
00:32:50.220 things could change.
00:32:50.940 There's no point in
00:32:51.660 writing a speech
00:32:52.580 now, but it was
00:32:53.600 great to see Tracy
00:32:54.420 Wilson in Ottawa a
00:32:55.880 couple of weeks ago
00:32:56.600 as well.
00:32:57.140 We were chatting
00:32:57.780 just to contextualize
00:32:58.840 this before the
00:32:59.720 Mass Casualty
00:33:00.460 Commission report
00:33:01.180 came out, but it's
00:33:02.620 really, as I
00:33:03.360 mentioned, a lot
00:33:04.160 of the same
00:33:04.540 themes and
00:33:05.340 dynamics that we
00:33:06.880 were discussing
00:33:07.440 that are part of
00:33:08.100 this bigger picture
00:33:08.820 of the gun issue
00:33:10.280 in Canada that
00:33:11.520 were coming up
00:33:12.280 that we now see
00:33:12.980 reflected in that
00:33:14.020 report.
00:33:17.760 You're tuned in
00:33:18.900 to the Andrew
00:33:19.680 Lawton Show.
00:33:22.520 And joining me is
00:33:23.740 Tracy Wilson, the
00:33:24.880 Vice President of
00:33:25.840 Public Relations
00:33:26.580 for the Canadian
00:33:27.600 Coalition for
00:33:28.540 Firearm Rights, a
00:33:29.800 group that's always 0.60
00:33:30.320 been a great
00:33:30.880 supporter of True
00:33:31.460 North, and I've
00:33:31.940 always been a great
00:33:32.660 supporter and
00:33:33.160 member of them.
00:33:35.680 Look, I think it's
00:33:37.000 not really breaking
00:33:38.100 news to say that gun
00:33:39.180 owners have been
00:33:39.720 under assault with
00:33:40.700 Justin Trudeau's
00:33:41.520 government.
00:33:42.160 We've had the
00:33:42.800 Order and Council
00:33:43.800 Bill, C-21, a
00:33:45.120 number of reforms
00:33:46.060 and regulations.
00:33:47.560 Even just as we
00:33:48.360 were chatting a
00:33:48.940 moment ago, how do
00:33:50.360 you even as a gun
00:33:51.060 owner begin to
00:33:52.040 tackle all of
00:33:53.340 these things?
00:33:53.760 Because it really
00:33:54.140 is a battle on
00:33:54.820 many fronts that
00:33:55.540 the government's
00:33:56.020 waging.
00:33:56.900 It absolutely is.
00:33:57.880 And in fact, to
00:33:59.160 me, as a gun
00:34:00.140 owner, I've been a
00:34:00.680 gun owner for 27
00:34:01.600 years.
00:34:02.260 I'm a mom.
00:34:03.140 I'm a grandma.
00:34:04.080 I want to save her
00:34:04.880 country, too.
00:34:05.920 And I know it's not
00:34:06.680 my community committing
00:34:07.980 the violence.
00:34:08.940 So for me, the
00:34:09.940 problem is, is it's
00:34:11.420 sort of a breach of
00:34:12.640 the social contract
00:34:14.200 that I made with the
00:34:15.340 government where they
00:34:16.120 said, here's the
00:34:17.100 regulations in order to
00:34:18.200 be a gun owner.
00:34:19.260 Here's what you can
00:34:19.900 have.
00:34:20.320 Here's what you can do.
00:34:21.100 And I said, okay.
00:34:22.220 And I complied with
00:34:23.120 them, regardless of how 0.96
00:34:24.100 ridiculous some of them 0.99
00:34:25.060 are, and at the end 0.99
00:34:26.460 of the day, it doesn't
00:34:27.120 matter.
00:34:27.500 They just are still
00:34:28.560 coming at us, still
00:34:29.760 trying to confiscate
00:34:30.640 our legally acquired
00:34:31.520 property, even though
00:34:32.680 we've done nothing to
00:34:33.600 warrant it.
00:34:34.380 And it's incredibly
00:34:35.620 frustrating.
00:34:36.580 So frustrating that,
00:34:37.820 yeah, we're taking
00:34:38.420 them to court.
00:34:39.340 We've seen a little
00:34:40.460 bit of optimism, I'd
00:34:41.460 say, in the last few
00:34:42.320 months, not from the
00:34:43.120 federal government, but
00:34:43.980 from provinces.
00:34:44.980 I think Alberta really
00:34:46.340 started this off.
00:34:47.260 They appointed a very
00:34:48.260 firearms-focused,
00:34:49.600 firearms-owners-focused
00:34:50.620 CFO, Terry Bryan.
00:34:51.820 They've also now,
00:34:52.540 under Danielle Smith,
00:34:53.280 really said, we're not
00:34:54.380 playing ball, which
00:34:55.060 did the federal
00:34:55.640 government's gun
00:34:56.300 confiscation.
00:34:57.380 Has this been an area
00:34:58.840 where there's a bit of
00:34:59.560 hope that you can
00:35:00.340 lobby provincial
00:35:01.100 governments in a way
00:35:01.840 that might not have
00:35:02.420 been top of mind
00:35:03.460 for your agenda?
00:35:04.400 Yeah, well, in fact,
00:35:05.400 when the CCFR first
00:35:06.800 launched our federal
00:35:07.840 court action back in
00:35:08.880 2020, immediately
00:35:10.180 after the big
00:35:11.080 sweeping gun ban,
00:35:12.340 we had written to
00:35:13.500 the different
00:35:14.040 provinces, to the
00:35:15.800 attorney generals of
00:35:16.940 each province, asking
00:35:18.160 them to intervene on
00:35:19.040 our court challenge.
00:35:20.220 And we didn't hear
00:35:20.900 back from any of them.
00:35:22.220 And then, after
00:35:23.380 Danielle Smith took
00:35:24.280 over, we heard
00:35:25.740 back from them,
00:35:26.320 they've actually
00:35:26.820 intervened on our,
00:35:28.700 they filed an
00:35:29.400 application to intervene
00:35:30.400 on our court challenge,
00:35:31.420 and it was approved by
00:35:32.800 the associate chief
00:35:34.060 justice of the federal
00:35:34.940 court.
00:35:35.560 So, Alberta's all in,
00:35:37.440 Saskatchewan's right
00:35:38.280 behind them,
00:35:39.360 Manitoba, Yukon, and
00:35:40.920 New Brunswick have all
00:35:41.740 been very vocal against
00:35:42.960 this.
00:35:43.280 Not Ontario,
00:35:43.940 though.
00:35:44.160 We're still waiting for,
00:35:45.120 well, that's the thing
00:35:46.140 with Doug, right?
00:35:46.860 I think he's perfectly
00:35:47.860 comfortable where he is,
00:35:48.980 and he doesn't like to
00:35:50.280 rock the boat either
00:35:51.020 way.
00:35:51.820 At the same time, I've
00:35:52.840 known Doug Ford a long
00:35:53.720 time, and I know he
00:35:55.120 doesn't support the war
00:35:56.080 on gun owners.
00:35:57.100 He knows that the
00:35:58.280 problem is crime
00:35:59.040 violence and gun
00:35:59.740 smuggling.
00:36:00.660 A lot of, I mean,
00:36:01.620 you mentioned this a
00:36:02.320 moment ago, a lot of
00:36:03.860 people might not realize,
00:36:04.880 because gun owners
00:36:05.520 probably seem a bit
00:36:06.420 rebellious to the Canadian 0.97
00:36:07.480 culture, but they're
00:36:08.580 very compliant by
00:36:10.000 definition, individuals.
00:36:11.520 You know, we get the
00:36:12.500 paperwork, we get the
00:36:13.440 forms, we, you know,
00:36:14.280 make sure that this is
00:36:15.060 locked and this is locked.
00:36:16.120 And at a certain point,
00:36:18.140 you reach a breaking
00:36:18.940 point, I think, where
00:36:19.900 gun owners are saying
00:36:20.900 it's just not worth
00:36:21.620 being in this hobby
00:36:22.400 anymore, and that's my
00:36:23.660 fear.
00:36:24.080 Are you seeing that, or
00:36:24.900 are they really digging
00:36:25.540 their heels in and
00:36:26.100 saying, no, I'm fighting
00:36:27.180 for this right to keep
00:36:28.020 my property?
00:36:28.840 There's two things I'm
00:36:29.760 really afraid of.
00:36:30.520 Number one, people just
00:36:31.560 giving up, getting rid of
00:36:33.040 their stuff, and
00:36:33.680 abandoning our community
00:36:35.020 altogether, because to
00:36:37.240 the people who
00:36:37.920 participate, it's
00:36:39.080 incredibly important.
00:36:40.520 The other thing I'm
00:36:41.220 afraid of is non-compliance,
00:36:43.700 and I'll tell you why.
00:36:44.580 I know a lot of people
00:36:45.880 sort of promote that
00:36:47.320 idea, but here's the
00:36:48.560 thing, in any
00:36:49.620 functioning civil society
00:36:51.480 and democracy, you
00:36:53.180 don't want people
00:36:54.220 willingly breaking the
00:36:55.240 law, but when you
00:36:56.560 force people to that
00:36:57.640 edge, when they've
00:36:58.520 complied with every law
00:36:59.540 and every regulation
00:37:00.420 you put before them,
00:37:02.160 and then you still
00:37:02.840 come at them, and the 0.99
00:37:03.700 idea is you're coming 0.97
00:37:04.580 to kick in their
00:37:05.180 doors and take their
00:37:06.540 stuff, people just say,
00:37:08.440 forget it, I am sick
00:37:09.460 and tired of complying,
00:37:10.900 because it hasn't paid
00:37:11.780 off for me.
00:37:12.300 So I think those are
00:37:14.360 the two things that
00:37:15.060 frighten me most, and
00:37:16.180 thirdly, the fact that
00:37:18.660 all the effort, resources
00:37:20.220 and focus is on legal
00:37:21.940 gun owners, and
00:37:22.960 meanwhile, we've got
00:37:23.760 crime blowing up out of
00:37:25.300 control all across the
00:37:26.940 country, and especially
00:37:27.740 in places like Toronto,
00:37:29.680 Montreal, and Vancouver.
00:37:31.080 Yeah, and gun owners
00:37:31.980 are actually the toughest
00:37:32.940 people in terms of
00:37:34.300 wanting to go after gun
00:37:35.380 crime.
00:37:36.100 The issue is just the
00:37:37.540 liberals have a very broad
00:37:38.820 definition of what a gun
00:37:40.020 criminal is, and they
00:37:41.420 basically think a gun
00:37:42.220 owner is inherently a bad
00:37:43.500 person that needs all of
00:37:44.520 these regulations heaped
00:37:45.500 upon them.
00:37:46.080 Either that, or they at
00:37:46.980 least want the public to
00:37:47.940 think that, because it's
00:37:48.940 very politically expedient
00:37:50.340 to, you know, beat up
00:37:51.940 the opposition or to beat
00:37:53.060 up their opponents with,
00:37:54.820 you know, they're going to
00:37:55.940 make assault weapons
00:37:57.020 legal again, or scary
00:37:58.580 things like that.
00:37:59.720 I think down deep the
00:38:00.640 liberals know, Marco
00:38:02.000 Mendicino knows he's a
00:38:03.600 crown prosecutor in his
00:38:05.240 previous business life.
00:38:07.340 They've got all kinds of
00:38:08.700 lawyers, they've got Bill
00:38:09.680 Blair, who was chief of
00:38:10.680 police in Toronto.
00:38:11.840 These people know full
00:38:12.820 well what they're doing
00:38:13.760 isn't going to have a
00:38:14.900 demonstrable public safety
00:38:16.620 benefit, but they know
00:38:18.020 it's going to have an
00:38:18.900 actual public, or an
00:38:20.400 actual political impact,
00:38:22.340 and that's why they do it,
00:38:23.600 which is horrible, and
00:38:25.480 it's un-Canadian.
00:38:27.720 Tracy Wilson, thank you.
00:38:29.000 Thank you.
00:38:29.820 That was Tracy Wilson,
00:38:31.300 spokesperson for the
00:38:32.500 Canadian Coalition for
00:38:33.680 Firearm Rights, as I
00:38:34.760 mentioned, going to be at
00:38:35.840 their AGM in Ottawa.
00:38:37.600 come June, so that
00:38:38.820 should be a great time.
00:38:40.000 I don't even know if
00:38:40.500 we're going out to a
00:38:41.040 range or not, probably
00:38:41.840 not, because we're going
00:38:42.900 to be in a downtown
00:38:43.860 Ottawa hotel, I believe,
00:38:45.440 but you never know.
00:38:46.420 I need to get out to a
00:38:47.220 range, actually.
00:38:47.920 All of these restrictions
00:38:49.020 have just made it so
00:38:50.260 difficult to do anything
00:38:51.900 with certain firearms in
00:38:53.080 Canada, so now we are
00:38:54.800 going to have to, as
00:38:56.180 gun owners, if you are
00:38:57.160 one of them, dig in a
00:38:58.080 little bit more, and
00:38:59.340 make sure you don't just
00:39:00.300 give up, because that was
00:39:01.600 what Tracy and I were
00:39:02.380 discussing there, that
00:39:03.240 some people are saying,
00:39:04.240 you know, this is just
00:39:04.840 too difficult a hobby to
00:39:05.940 deal with, maybe it's
00:39:06.840 not worth the hassle,
00:39:07.760 maybe it's not worth
00:39:09.060 doing it, but people
00:39:09.980 need to say, no, this is
00:39:11.000 our livelihood, this is
00:39:12.400 our life, this is our
00:39:13.600 hobby, this is our
00:39:14.620 pastime, this is our
00:39:15.580 sport, this is the way
00:39:17.040 we feed our family in
00:39:18.280 some cases.
00:39:18.940 I mean, firearms mean
00:39:19.900 so many different things
00:39:20.860 to different people, but
00:39:22.200 to the liberals, they mean
00:39:23.620 weaponry, and to the
00:39:24.720 liberals, gun owners mean
00:39:26.320 criminals, and that is the,
00:39:28.100 they are the ones who are 0.66
00:39:29.120 radical, they are the
00:39:29.940 ones who are fringe, so
00:39:31.300 we can't let them
00:39:32.200 reframe the narrative
00:39:33.540 around law-abiding
00:39:34.500 peaceful gun owners, so
00:39:35.840 that's a little bit of a
00:39:37.060 teaser of what you'll see
00:39:37.940 more of on the show in
00:39:39.180 the months ahead, as
00:39:39.800 these regulations and
00:39:41.240 laws continue to work
00:39:42.680 their way through the
00:39:43.280 system, we'll keep
00:39:44.120 talking about it here,
00:39:45.420 and as I've said to
00:39:46.360 people, if you are not a
00:39:47.320 gun owner, you surely
00:39:48.300 can engage with this from
00:39:49.960 a property rights
00:39:50.880 perspective, and from a
00:39:52.020 science and evidence-based
00:39:53.460 policy perspective, you
00:39:54.860 don't need to like guns
00:39:55.820 or no guns to realize
00:39:57.920 what the government is
00:39:59.020 doing here.
00:39:59.640 That does it for us
00:40:01.020 for today, we'll be back
00:40:01.840 on Thursday with another
00:40:03.660 regular edition of the
00:40:04.840 Andrew Lawton Show, and
00:40:06.060 as I said earlier, a
00:40:07.240 post-mortem of the
00:40:08.300 federal court hearing on
00:40:09.460 the Emergencies Act,
00:40:10.640 that's coming up in a
00:40:11.580 couple days' time.
00:40:12.580 Hope you have a great
00:40:13.760 rest of the week, though.
00:40:14.640 Thank you, God bless, and
00:40:15.980 good day to you all.
00:40:17.100 Thanks for listening to
00:40:18.000 the Andrew Lawton Show.
00:40:19.520 Support the program by
00:40:20.540 donating to True North
00:40:21.560 at www.tnc.news.