Juno News - April 04, 2023


Federal government says legal challenge against Emergencies Act is ＂moot＂


Episode Stats

Length

40 minutes

Words per Minute

198.55998

Word Count

8,025

Sentence Count

350

Misogynist Sentences

2

Hate Speech Sentences

6


Summary


Transcript

00:00:00.000 Welcome to Canada's Most Irreverent Talk Show. This is the Andrew Lawton Show, brought to you by True North.
00:00:10.520 Hello and welcome to another edition of Canada's Most Irreverent Talk Show.
00:00:15.560 This is the Andrew Lawton Show on True North, and in a bit of a different venue than we normally do for the show.
00:00:22.180 I guess that's par for the course lately, because we did the live show in Ottawa a couple of weeks back
00:00:27.360 at the Canada Strong and Free Networking Conference. There is no studio audience here. I am in a hotel room in Montreal.
00:00:34.460 So you have to do, when you're doing a show from a hotel, that like one angle where no one sees your messy bed from the night before.
00:00:42.760 So that's the angle I'm sitting in now. If I tilt the camera one inch in either direction, I'll just look like a big old slob on a camera.
00:00:49.700 More than usual, I guess. So don't answer that. But it is good to talk to you. It is Tuesday, April 4th, 2023.
00:00:56.460 Hope you've gone through April Fool's Day without any particularly acute pain, apart from, of course, the increase in the carbon tax,
00:01:05.400 which just makes the jokes for people. When a tax increase is going up on April Fool's Day, it just writes the lines for the opposition.
00:01:13.440 But alas, that was not enough to elicit a bit of shame from the government and perhaps hold back on that,
00:01:18.620 which is why we spent some time talking about that with Sylvain Charlebois last week.
00:01:22.920 And interestingly enough, I had mostly good feedback to that interview with the Dalhousie professor,
00:01:30.100 but I had one negative comment who said, why didn't I instead talk to producers of food in this country?
00:01:36.380 And I said to him, I would absolutely do that. If you have any recommendations, please send them along,
00:01:41.720 because I don't think that one person has all the answers.
00:01:44.060 But I must say, I do think Sylvain Charlebois is very level-headed about this, especially when he takes aim at supply management,
00:01:50.740 when he talks about the effect of carbon tax, when he talks about all of the supply chains.
00:01:55.340 And I liked his prescription for this, quite frankly, which is get rid of sales tax on all grocery store products,
00:02:02.100 on all food products. Don't do this little silly thing where, well, sometimes a product's a snack,
00:02:07.220 and sometimes it's a grocery, and the size depends on it, and all of that.
00:02:11.920 So we'll definitely talk about this more, because as I said, Canadians are certainly left holding the bag
00:02:17.460 when the government allows inflation to be as bad as it is right now.
00:02:22.340 So we're going to do things a little bit differently today.
00:02:25.360 I'm going to have an interview later on with Tracy Wilson about firearms.
00:02:28.800 We spoke at the Canada Strong and Free Networking Conference,
00:02:32.180 but with the recommendations from the Nova Scotia Mass Casualty Commission report,
00:02:37.080 there is, I think, perhaps a bit more timeliness to that interview.
00:02:41.220 And I also want to talk about a different side of the Chinese foreign interference story.
00:02:47.040 I want to talk about the CSIS angle, because we've been talking about the politics of it,
00:02:50.840 what China's doing, what Justin Trudeau didn't do.
00:02:53.560 But let's go back and discuss for a moment, when we have Andrew Kirshon,
00:02:57.440 a former CSIS intelligence officer, that idea of what goes into these documents,
00:03:02.700 of what the leak really is.
00:03:04.140 Was it a whistleblower? Is it a leaker?
00:03:06.340 And I think Andrew Kirshon goes against where a lot of other conservatives are on this issue,
00:03:10.840 but I still think he's a thoughtful guy, so I want to hear him out on it.
00:03:14.720 But let's start off with the big news this week,
00:03:17.020 which is the federal court hearing on the Emergencies Act.
00:03:22.300 The government, you may remember, it feels like a long time ago,
00:03:25.240 but a year ago in February, invoked the Emergencies Act.
00:03:28.820 It was Justin Trudeau's big, bold, chest-thumping stand
00:03:32.280 against the peaceful trucker convoy protest.
00:03:35.560 And the Emergencies Act has been the subject of several legal challenges.
00:03:40.840 Three in particular are being heard this week.
00:03:43.420 One by the Canadian Constitution Foundation,
00:03:46.320 one by the Canadian Civil Liberties Association,
00:03:49.460 and one by Frontline Nurses,
00:03:52.140 which is an advocacy group that is a bit more aligned,
00:03:54.900 I think, with where the convoy was,
00:03:57.320 rather than just taking the strict civil liberties angle
00:04:00.140 that the CCLA and CCF are.
00:04:03.280 But these three groups are making their cases.
00:04:05.820 The first day of the hearings was yesterday.
00:04:08.440 They are still underway today by the time you are watching this, most likely.
00:04:12.600 Maybe they've wrapped up by the time you're watching it.
00:04:14.440 Depends on when you're watching it.
00:04:15.860 And the last day of the hearings is going to be tomorrow.
00:04:18.800 Now, this will be the first opportunity for a judge
00:04:23.180 to weigh in on the legality of the Emergencies Act.
00:04:26.800 And I just want to take a moment on that,
00:04:28.580 because we had the big Public Order Emergency Commission.
00:04:31.380 We had the seven weeks of witness testimony,
00:04:34.320 of documentary evidence, and all of that.
00:04:36.500 And certainly there was a lot that came out of that,
00:04:38.720 a lot of information.
00:04:40.000 But the final report from Commissioner Paul Rouleau,
00:04:43.080 who is a judge,
00:04:44.120 the final report was not legally binding in any way.
00:04:47.600 He didn't find legal liability.
00:04:49.820 He didn't find criminal or civil liability.
00:04:52.540 He found what he thought was the takeaway from this
00:04:55.960 and made some recommendations for the future.
00:04:58.980 But that is not something that carries any legal weight.
00:05:02.900 The Supreme Court will probably ultimately have to decide this.
00:05:06.940 But right now, it is before the federal court.
00:05:09.760 After that, it goes to the Federal Court of Appeal.
00:05:11.700 I'm already just writing off that this is going to happen
00:05:15.700 and it's going to be appealed and we're going to get there.
00:05:18.020 But what's interesting right now is how little the federal government
00:05:20.980 even wants to have this discussion.
00:05:23.360 They're doing this old trick that they love doing on cases
00:05:26.020 that are related to vaccine mandates or COVID fines,
00:05:29.140 where they say, it's moot.
00:05:30.860 We don't need to have this federal court hearing
00:05:33.240 over the Emergencies Act because it is moot.
00:05:35.880 The Emergencies Act is no longer in effect.
00:05:38.380 Therefore, there is no reason to have this.
00:05:40.140 We can all just forget about it.
00:05:41.300 And move on.
00:05:42.860 And this was a once, well, basically a once in a lifetime
00:05:46.400 because so far the Emergencies Act has only been used once.
00:05:49.400 So it's once in anyone's lifetime.
00:05:51.000 But it was a one-time deal as far as Canada is concerned right now.
00:05:55.280 Despite the successor, the Emergencies Act being the successor
00:05:58.760 to the War Measures Act,
00:06:00.460 the Emergencies Act has only been used once.
00:06:03.600 And that was to deal with the Freedom Convoy.
00:06:06.400 So it's the kind of situation where perhaps some judicial oversight,
00:06:09.700 some more guidance, some more scrutiny about whether it was appropriately applied
00:06:14.320 would be a good idea.
00:06:15.960 But the federal government is saying, well, you know, we don't really need to
00:06:18.280 because if it comes up again, the circumstances are going to be different.
00:06:21.660 So this decision that you get on its use here isn't really going to be applicable.
00:06:25.840 And they just want to conveniently sweep it under the rug, move on, never to look at it again.
00:06:31.420 In their view, they had the Public Order Emergency Commission.
00:06:34.520 It vindicated Justin Trudeau.
00:06:36.020 No reason to discuss any further.
00:06:38.540 So that was really what dominated a lot of day one.
00:06:41.440 You had the CCF and the CCLA and frontline nurses saying,
00:06:45.980 no, we absolutely need to hear this.
00:06:47.420 And the Attorney General's lawyer saying, Justin Trudeau's lawyer saying,
00:06:51.820 yeah, it's just moot now.
00:06:53.500 Don't even bother with it.
00:06:54.600 We don't need to deal with this at all.
00:06:57.260 And in my experience, I mean, this has been a winnable argument.
00:07:00.800 That was how the federal court managed to strike down
00:07:03.520 the challenge against the air travel vaccine mandate.
00:07:06.560 They said it was moot.
00:07:07.260 They said the mandate is no longer there.
00:07:09.260 We don't need to hear it.
00:07:10.380 We don't need to hear the case.
00:07:11.360 Even if the government might say, have said they'll bring it back,
00:07:14.220 we can just deal with that then.
00:07:15.820 So mootness has become a big weapon for the government in the COVID era,
00:07:21.720 where, again, the whole point of it is that you don't want to be litigating cases
00:07:25.000 where it's purely an academic exercise,
00:07:27.600 where there's no practical reality that will emerge from it.
00:07:31.760 But the problem is that it is the extenuating circumstances of the last three years
00:07:36.560 that have, in the government's view,
00:07:38.640 licensed the state to do all these things that they're now saying are moot.
00:07:42.460 So the reality here now is that we're supposed to just shrug our shoulders and say,
00:07:47.440 well, maybe it won't come up again.
00:07:49.360 So yeah, it probably doesn't matter.
00:07:50.800 But I actually don't think that is the appropriate call at all.
00:07:53.880 And I'm glad that the federal court judge seemed to be pushing back against this.
00:07:58.120 We're going to do a full recap of the hearings on Thursday's show,
00:08:02.180 once we've heard all of the arguments and counter arguments and all of that before the court.
00:08:07.020 So that's going to be something to keep an eye out for.
00:08:08.780 But I wanted to give you a bit of a primer on weaponized mootness,
00:08:12.380 which is the federal...
00:08:13.680 I mean, it sounds like such a bland word,
00:08:15.280 but it is a concept that the government certainly is weaponizing
00:08:18.700 against people that care about constitutional rights.
00:08:22.280 We are going to talk now about Chinese interference.
00:08:25.740 Now, this is a big story.
00:08:27.620 It's one that's kept on going.
00:08:29.020 We've discussed it mostly in a political context,
00:08:31.820 because I think that's where the accountability on this is also going to ultimately going to rely.
00:08:36.480 We've had two politicians that have had to leave their caucuses over this.
00:08:40.360 Handong, the federal liberal, and Vincent Kuh, the provincial progressive conservative.
00:08:45.380 Both of them have insisted they did no wrong whatsoever.
00:08:48.600 But there has also been a slew of damning stories,
00:08:52.440 both in Global News and the Globe and Mail,
00:08:54.860 based on CSIS reports that point fingers at these two gentlemen
00:08:58.460 and several others that have not been named like they have.
00:09:02.400 And, you know, I think that these stories are in the public interest.
00:09:06.400 And I think when China is interfering in Canada's elections,
00:09:08.820 and you have this information being put to the government,
00:09:11.500 and the government is not doing anything about it,
00:09:13.680 it's something that the public ought to know about.
00:09:16.160 But my decision on that, my perspective on that,
00:09:19.480 may be different and, in fact, is different from what the law says
00:09:22.840 about what information can be shared with the public.
00:09:26.100 And, I mean, this is why confidential, classified, secret, top secret,
00:09:30.020 all of these designations exist.
00:09:31.920 So, I want to talk about this with Andrew Kirsch,
00:09:34.320 who we had on the show about his memoir previously.
00:09:36.980 I was never here.
00:09:38.140 He's a former CSIS intelligence officer
00:09:40.280 and has a bit of a different take on this
00:09:42.160 than most people on the right in Canada do.
00:09:44.940 Andrew Kirsch joins me now.
00:09:46.640 Andrew, good to talk to you again.
00:09:47.760 Thanks for coming on today.
00:09:49.680 Thanks for having me back.
00:09:50.700 It's great to be here.
00:09:52.320 Yeah, it's good to talk to you again.
00:09:54.020 I enjoyed our last chat,
00:09:55.760 which was that higher-level discussion
00:09:57.900 and some specifics as well about your experience in CSIS.
00:10:02.260 And I wanted to actually use that experience
00:10:05.040 as a jumping-off point for this story
00:10:06.740 because, obviously, I've been covering on this show
00:10:08.640 the Chinese interference stuff for several months now,
00:10:12.680 it's been.
00:10:13.260 And I think the political side of it
00:10:15.300 and the global geopolitical side of it
00:10:17.320 has been well-covered.
00:10:18.180 But we haven't actually talked about the,
00:10:20.640 I think, the fundamental question here
00:10:22.520 of what is in these reports,
00:10:24.940 these documents that have now been leaked
00:10:27.100 to the Globe and Mail and to Global News.
00:10:29.820 And just to put some context around
00:10:31.680 how people should be interpreting
00:10:34.040 what they're reading about these things.
00:10:35.620 So let me just ask you, generally speaking,
00:10:38.880 as someone who devoted your life for a time
00:10:41.420 to service in CSIS,
00:10:43.240 how did you feel when you learned that there was a leak?
00:10:47.260 Yeah, I wasn't too happy about it.
00:10:48.780 You know, I've been very defensive
00:10:51.680 about the organization.
00:10:53.120 I'm not happy with the leaks.
00:10:54.940 You know, I don't think that's a whistleblower.
00:10:56.640 I think they're leakers.
00:10:58.800 You know, we take-
00:11:00.080 Explain that difference because I know there is one.
00:11:02.700 So I think a whistleblower,
00:11:04.860 and I'm not a lawyer,
00:11:05.800 so don't quote me on the legal definitions,
00:11:07.400 but where there is a, you know,
00:11:09.380 blowing the whistle on legal activities
00:11:11.440 or wrongdoing or where I think there are some,
00:11:14.600 there's some protections around releasing
00:11:17.020 otherwise sensitive information
00:11:18.520 where it's in this very specific,
00:11:21.320 you know, circumstances.
00:11:22.780 Whereas in this case,
00:11:23.720 I think it was just a situation
00:11:25.380 where the person took sensitive classified documents
00:11:27.940 and kind of dumped them on the public.
00:11:29.800 And I don't think they exposed
00:11:31.280 certainly no wrongdoing of the organization.
00:11:34.780 You know, these were reports that were sent out
00:11:36.540 and through appropriate channels.
00:11:37.780 And this person felt like
00:11:39.340 they wanted more people to read them,
00:11:41.260 which, you know, is not in our independent,
00:11:43.960 we're not allowed to make those decisions
00:11:45.580 independently on the collection side, right?
00:11:47.560 Like CSIS has its role,
00:11:48.800 which is to collect, analyze,
00:11:50.720 and advise government on threats
00:11:52.060 to national security.
00:11:53.000 And then the deciders decide, right?
00:11:55.060 We're not always be happy with what they decide,
00:11:57.300 but that's the way it kind of works.
00:11:59.200 That's how the system works together.
00:12:01.260 So, you know,
00:12:01.940 when I see somebody kind of breaching
00:12:03.620 on the advising part
00:12:06.100 because they don't feel like the deciders
00:12:07.420 made the right decision,
00:12:08.260 I say, well, that's not, you know,
00:12:09.100 that's not our job.
00:12:10.480 That's not on people's,
00:12:12.280 that's not their decision to make.
00:12:13.980 And that's why I felt,
00:12:15.900 I said, not very comfortable
00:12:17.340 because there are repercussions,
00:12:19.060 ramifications, right?
00:12:19.940 When we are out there,
00:12:21.040 when I was out there,
00:12:21.740 we're talking about last time
00:12:23.040 as intelligence officer,
00:12:24.080 knocking on doors
00:12:24.780 and asking people
00:12:25.540 to give me confidential secret,
00:12:27.420 you know, information
00:12:28.360 that I can then, you know,
00:12:30.120 put in reports
00:12:31.000 and investigate national security.
00:12:32.320 I'm promising confidentiality.
00:12:33.920 I'm saying the things you tell me
00:12:35.340 and all will be protected
00:12:36.280 and take that oath.
00:12:37.960 And when we work with our partners
00:12:39.540 and Five Eyes community,
00:12:40.400 we give them the same promise,
00:12:41.760 the protection
00:12:42.260 and maintaining the integrity
00:12:43.400 of the information.
00:12:44.540 So when it gets out,
00:12:45.380 it's a really bad look.
00:12:47.040 Now, in this case,
00:12:48.460 I think it's our own information
00:12:49.720 that we've compromised.
00:12:50.540 So I don't know if our partners
00:12:51.280 will be upset with us,
00:12:52.860 but it's, you know,
00:12:54.720 this is sensitive stuff.
00:12:56.120 These are things,
00:12:57.100 and I'm not sure
00:12:57.600 the specific sources of them,
00:12:58.740 but it really does get
00:12:59.940 into sources and methods
00:13:01.060 and maybe people can make
00:13:02.620 some observations
00:13:03.280 about how this information
00:13:04.260 was collected.
00:13:05.040 And so those people
00:13:05.720 we're investigating
00:13:06.560 can better protect themselves
00:13:08.340 from our investigative measures,
00:13:10.200 right, which is,
00:13:11.280 you know, what we don't want
00:13:12.460 to happen.
00:13:13.160 So I mean, it's a long answer,
00:13:14.840 but yeah, I don't like it.
00:13:17.000 I know many of my former colleagues
00:13:19.220 don't like it.
00:13:20.220 I'm sure the organization
00:13:20.740 doesn't like it.
00:13:21.720 And whatever we think about
00:13:23.160 the value of the information
00:13:25.440 we have, you know,
00:13:25.980 a lot of people say,
00:13:26.580 well, this is good
00:13:27.820 that we know about these things.
00:13:29.180 It's important.
00:13:29.920 Remember, there's a cost
00:13:30.840 to that as well.
00:13:31.680 There's a risk
00:13:32.460 when our information
00:13:33.400 gets out like this.
00:13:35.120 So I just don't want
00:13:36.160 to forget that.
00:13:37.280 Now, I would just point out here,
00:13:39.160 you're a former conservative
00:13:40.840 candidate provincially in 2018.
00:13:43.300 So I don't know
00:13:44.300 how you identify politically now,
00:13:46.140 but you're not a partisan liberal.
00:13:47.960 This isn't coming from
00:13:48.800 a place of supporting the liberals,
00:13:51.220 which is I think
00:13:51.720 where a lot of the defense
00:13:52.640 of your position on that
00:13:53.960 has come from
00:13:54.520 in the last couple of months.
00:13:55.420 You know what?
00:13:55.920 It's really been interesting.
00:13:57.000 So I put out a tweet on tweet.
00:13:58.760 I don't tweet a lot.
00:13:59.440 I don't love social media,
00:14:00.660 but that's probably good.
00:14:01.300 That's probably why.
00:14:02.180 I know.
00:14:03.520 So I may be a bad candidate,
00:14:04.860 but I put out a tweet
00:14:06.000 about how I did not
00:14:07.400 appreciate the leaks.
00:14:08.780 I did not like
00:14:09.460 the whistleblowers,
00:14:10.620 you know,
00:14:11.360 column there
00:14:12.280 in the Globe and Mail
00:14:13.300 saying, you know,
00:14:13.720 this is why I did it.
00:14:14.920 The person who called himself
00:14:15.900 a whistleblower,
00:14:16.400 I just said he was a leaker.
00:14:17.580 This is why I did it
00:14:18.840 and all these things.
00:14:19.960 So, you know,
00:14:20.720 I wrote what I think
00:14:22.260 was a harsh but fair
00:14:23.900 kind of a Twitter thread
00:14:25.520 and it was retweeted
00:14:26.120 by liberal supporters
00:14:27.280 and partisans.
00:14:28.060 I'm sure some bots
00:14:29.000 and I kind of joke
00:14:30.620 by the way they find out
00:14:31.620 that I ran for the PCs.
00:14:32.800 You know,
00:14:32.900 there's a lot of things
00:14:33.740 with I hate Doug Ford
00:14:35.240 and the hashtags
00:14:36.420 and I was like,
00:14:37.120 I ran, you know.
00:14:38.360 So in my opinion,
00:14:40.360 this is a nonpartisan issue.
00:14:41.580 It shouldn't be a partisan issue.
00:14:42.620 You know,
00:14:42.720 all parties are at risk.
00:14:44.560 All levels of government
00:14:45.480 are at risk.
00:14:46.240 It doesn't have to be
00:14:47.540 a partisan issue.
00:14:48.600 It's become one,
00:14:49.480 unfortunately.
00:14:51.400 But yeah,
00:14:52.440 it's definitely been
00:14:52.980 a talking point on one side
00:14:54.380 and I said,
00:14:55.920 coming from a,
00:14:56.680 you know,
00:14:57.480 former PC candidate
00:14:58.440 in 2018,
00:14:59.600 by no means
00:15:01.120 a partisan liberal supporter.
00:15:03.400 I think you can safely say that.
00:15:05.780 But let's take the position
00:15:07.540 you've put forward
00:15:08.420 and advance it a bit
00:15:09.540 because I agree
00:15:10.280 that whistleblower protections
00:15:11.420 generally are when someone
00:15:12.640 is exposing legal wrongdoing
00:15:14.740 and generally within
00:15:15.420 their own organization.
00:15:16.540 And in this case,
00:15:17.120 I think actually CESIS
00:15:18.020 comes off quite well in the leak
00:15:19.780 and it's the government
00:15:20.860 that comes off
00:15:21.880 not particularly well.
00:15:23.140 But assuming we take it every,
00:15:25.020 take it all at face value
00:15:26.140 and we'll get into that
00:15:27.200 in a couple of moments.
00:15:28.440 We have allegations
00:15:29.740 that China was interfering,
00:15:31.560 that CESIS knew about it,
00:15:32.900 that they had some
00:15:33.760 very specific examples
00:15:35.140 of politicians and candidates
00:15:36.940 that were either involved
00:15:38.620 or were the passive beneficiaries
00:15:40.860 of this support.
00:15:42.220 CESIS takes this to the government
00:15:43.580 and it looks like the government
00:15:45.680 did not take this seriously.
00:15:47.580 I think that's what the reports
00:15:48.920 that we've seen have shown.
00:15:50.320 So what is the proper recourse?
00:15:51.940 Because there's a part
00:15:53.400 of what you're saying
00:15:54.060 that it sounds like
00:15:54.740 it's just to say,
00:15:55.740 oh well,
00:15:56.160 the government had that call
00:15:57.340 and maybe another government
00:15:58.340 will take it differently.
00:16:00.700 Well, you're saying
00:16:01.200 on behalf of the leaker
00:16:02.660 or the people who are...
00:16:03.740 Well, I'm trying to understand
00:16:06.020 what your position is
00:16:07.420 on what should have happened
00:16:08.640 in this case,
00:16:09.420 if anything,
00:16:10.300 if someone were very frustrated
00:16:12.180 that this was getting handed
00:16:13.460 to the government
00:16:14.000 and they weren't taking it seriously.
00:16:15.980 Well, look,
00:16:16.260 it kind of goes
00:16:16.720 to our previous point there.
00:16:18.140 I ran for office.
00:16:19.040 You want to be a decision maker?
00:16:20.400 You go and become
00:16:21.280 a decision maker.
00:16:22.000 You want to go work
00:16:22.540 for a political party
00:16:23.240 and you think
00:16:23.680 that things are not happening
00:16:25.140 and you want to see happen.
00:16:27.180 You volunteer,
00:16:28.020 you get involved,
00:16:28.640 you be a public person,
00:16:29.740 you advocate for your positions.
00:16:31.460 You don't have to necessarily
00:16:32.840 put your name on the ballot,
00:16:33.980 but you can go be a staffer
00:16:35.900 and try to go to a ministry
00:16:36.880 or some area
00:16:38.600 that you're passionate about
00:16:39.460 and knowledgeable about
00:16:40.120 and say,
00:16:40.360 these are the policy positions
00:16:41.700 that I think
00:16:42.140 that we should take.
00:16:43.420 I think that,
00:16:44.420 you know,
00:16:44.520 more than anything
00:16:44.900 is probably my frustration
00:16:45.820 because if this person
00:16:48.020 and I don't know
00:16:48.900 who this person is
00:16:49.760 or whether they work
00:16:50.800 for CSIS or not,
00:16:51.600 I think it's a lot of people,
00:16:52.920 I guess,
00:16:53.320 is what we're seeing too.
00:16:55.000 If they were a very public
00:16:56.060 senior person
00:16:56.760 that had access
00:16:57.280 to this information
00:16:58.060 and they resigned their post
00:17:00.620 and said,
00:17:01.040 the reason why I'm resigning
00:17:02.220 is because I don't think
00:17:03.060 we're taking this issue seriously,
00:17:05.140 there are a lot of public reports
00:17:06.640 that they can point to
00:17:07.520 that would demonstrate that.
00:17:08.660 I mean,
00:17:08.760 we have what in Sierra,
00:17:09.900 I always get the acronyms wrong,
00:17:11.200 so apologies for that,
00:17:12.320 but the INSERA and ENSICOP,
00:17:14.460 we've been doing,
00:17:15.760 CSIS has been putting out reports
00:17:17.140 on foreign interference
00:17:18.060 for years.
00:17:19.800 The CSIS has been reviewed
00:17:21.320 and the recommendations
00:17:22.960 have come from
00:17:24.360 parliamentary committees
00:17:26.900 or ENSICOP
00:17:27.920 that is non-partisan,
00:17:30.280 that's chaired by a Liberal MP
00:17:31.500 and they're saying
00:17:32.260 their recommendations
00:17:32.940 that we should be doing.
00:17:34.880 Those recommendations
00:17:35.780 haven't been adhered to.
00:17:37.340 So there's plenty
00:17:38.500 of public information
00:17:39.520 that suggests
00:17:40.180 that this is a problem
00:17:41.120 that should be actioned
00:17:43.080 without just kind of dumping
00:17:44.480 the sensitive reporting
00:17:47.880 on it
00:17:48.480 into the public.
00:17:50.940 I think that so,
00:17:52.220 yeah,
00:17:52.580 that was one of my points
00:17:53.980 to the person
00:17:54.900 to say,
00:17:55.200 hey, look,
00:17:55.440 come on out,
00:17:56.240 put your name to it.
00:17:57.380 Like,
00:17:57.500 let's talk about it
00:17:58.220 if you want to talk about it
00:17:59.160 and not in a threatening way,
00:18:00.140 but like,
00:18:00.760 I think that would almost do better.
00:18:02.020 I was in a meeting
00:18:02.920 and I don't think
00:18:03.900 we did a good job with this
00:18:05.400 and we should do better.
00:18:06.720 For me,
00:18:08.140 that's a more convincing argument,
00:18:09.720 to be honest,
00:18:10.500 than letting this play out
00:18:11.680 this way.
00:18:13.540 Yeah,
00:18:13.960 and I mean,
00:18:14.600 to be honest,
00:18:15.140 my view on this,
00:18:16.260 and you may have some people
00:18:17.680 that,
00:18:18.060 whether you call them
00:18:18.540 a leaker or a whistleblower,
00:18:19.640 they think they're smarter
00:18:20.340 than the system
00:18:20.960 and they think they can leak it
00:18:22.580 and keep their identity guarded
00:18:23.960 and never be outed,
00:18:25.280 but you would have to assume
00:18:26.820 that someone doing this,
00:18:28.280 knowing what they're doing,
00:18:30.420 would be doing it
00:18:31.320 with the full expectation
00:18:32.520 that they're going
00:18:33.600 to be identified
00:18:34.700 and they're going
00:18:35.200 to be punished
00:18:35.760 in some way,
00:18:36.620 whatever that is.
00:18:37.360 And in that way,
00:18:38.160 it almost looks
00:18:38.760 more favorably upon you
00:18:40.180 if you do just come out
00:18:41.120 and name yourself
00:18:42.100 before someone else names you.
00:18:44.220 Yeah,
00:18:44.400 and I don't want to,
00:18:45.420 you know,
00:18:45.640 harp too much
00:18:46.740 on the one person
00:18:47.500 as I don't know
00:18:48.480 the situation
00:18:49.200 and who that person is,
00:18:50.800 right?
00:18:51.080 But this is coming
00:18:52.800 from somebody
00:18:53.060 who wrote a book.
00:18:53.720 I mean,
00:18:53.880 I wrote a memoir
00:18:55.380 about working for CSIS
00:18:58.260 and you better believe
00:18:59.240 that I was concerned
00:19:00.300 about my,
00:19:01.140 you know,
00:19:01.280 considered and was concerned
00:19:02.460 about my Security
00:19:03.160 Information Act obligations.
00:19:05.320 And,
00:19:05.680 you know,
00:19:06.400 they say you're only
00:19:08.740 kind of guilty
00:19:09.520 when the judge finds you
00:19:10.460 guilty,
00:19:11.220 but I had my name
00:19:12.160 and my face in the book.
00:19:13.360 And so I was ready to say,
00:19:14.400 this is why I said it.
00:19:15.840 This is what I think
00:19:16.480 it's not in violation.
00:19:17.780 I didn't do names
00:19:19.060 of former colleagues
00:19:19.860 or any operational,
00:19:21.140 you know,
00:19:21.540 information that can
00:19:22.360 give things away.
00:19:23.460 But I acknowledge
00:19:24.780 people might be mad at me.
00:19:26.540 You know,
00:19:26.720 I acknowledge that the CSIS
00:19:28.960 was not going to be happy
00:19:30.380 about the book being written.
00:19:32.580 So,
00:19:33.380 yeah,
00:19:33.620 it's not a great feeling.
00:19:34.720 I'm sure,
00:19:35.600 you know,
00:19:36.240 the person has got
00:19:36.960 all sorts of stuff
00:19:38.560 going on inside of them
00:19:39.580 about what they feel
00:19:40.300 they need to do,
00:19:41.380 what they feel
00:19:41.860 they want the public
00:19:42.420 to hear
00:19:42.960 and what their obligations are.
00:19:46.280 But,
00:19:46.860 yeah,
00:19:47.960 I think that
00:19:48.720 maybe would have been,
00:19:51.580 if they really want
00:19:52.720 to have that conversation,
00:19:53.740 you've got to kind of have it.
00:19:54.800 You've got to lead it.
00:19:55.560 You've got to be in front of it
00:19:56.860 because what's happened
00:19:57.600 with things that are coming
00:19:59.060 left and right
00:19:59.620 and showing up
00:20:00.160 in newspaper articles
00:20:01.020 one day
00:20:01.640 and the next article
00:20:03.220 the next day,
00:20:04.260 it kind of gets away.
00:20:05.440 You know,
00:20:05.740 it can get a little muddled.
00:20:07.180 I assume there's not,
00:20:08.440 you know,
00:20:08.740 one centralized database
00:20:10.180 of CSIS documents
00:20:11.620 and information
00:20:12.320 and reports
00:20:12.860 that any of the,
00:20:13.820 you know,
00:20:14.260 3,000 some odd employees
00:20:15.520 at CSIS can go
00:20:16.460 and peruse at their leisure.
00:20:17.980 Things are,
00:20:18.880 I assume,
00:20:19.220 quite siloed
00:20:20.000 and segmented.
00:20:21.080 So,
00:20:21.560 let's talk about
00:20:22.420 just the logistics
00:20:23.180 of how many people
00:20:24.400 would likely have access
00:20:25.820 to information
00:20:26.680 of this nature
00:20:28.200 on a particular file
00:20:29.460 and I'm assuming
00:20:30.200 it would vary
00:20:31.200 but when you're getting
00:20:32.700 into this level
00:20:33.760 of specificity,
00:20:35.060 are we talking about
00:20:36.080 five people,
00:20:37.320 50 people,
00:20:38.260 500 people?
00:20:40.160 Well,
00:20:40.880 you know,
00:20:41.160 I don't know
00:20:43.200 the exact numbers
00:20:44.460 or could I probably say
00:20:45.480 but I'll say this
00:20:47.220 that,
00:20:48.000 you know,
00:20:48.160 these,
00:20:48.680 the classified
00:20:49.640 or sensitive documents
00:20:50.520 that were,
00:20:51.280 you know,
00:20:52.480 leaked,
00:20:52.980 those were distributed
00:20:54.240 to a large
00:20:56.080 number of people.
00:20:57.480 I think there were
00:20:57.960 across the five I's
00:20:59.460 so the number
00:20:59.940 of other intelligence services
00:21:01.200 to I think PCO,
00:21:02.640 PMO,
00:21:03.200 like there's a,
00:21:03.640 there's a big list.
00:21:05.280 Once the,
00:21:06.000 once kind of those
00:21:07.680 get out of the organization
00:21:08.980 and I don't know
00:21:09.840 how many people
00:21:10.280 are on that mailing list
00:21:11.000 but it's not,
00:21:11.680 you know,
00:21:11.820 it's not one,
00:21:12.620 right?
00:21:12.920 It's,
00:21:13.280 it seemed like
00:21:13.800 they were a few
00:21:15.400 and when you start
00:21:17.340 getting into
00:21:17.960 specific reports
00:21:19.340 that were sent out,
00:21:20.400 yeah,
00:21:20.520 you can probably drill down
00:21:21.560 who's on the receiving list
00:21:22.740 of a report,
00:21:24.460 who is on the inside
00:21:25.620 of a case file,
00:21:26.740 working specific investigations.
00:21:28.200 Absolutely,
00:21:28.760 that stuff
00:21:29.300 is pretty tightly controlled.
00:21:31.060 I think if you work
00:21:31.620 with or for
00:21:35.020 the service
00:21:36.840 and you can be
00:21:37.700 pretty confident
00:21:39.100 that they do a good job
00:21:40.560 of protecting it
00:21:41.260 and to your earlier question
00:21:42.980 about will this get out,
00:21:44.520 the more information
00:21:45.700 the,
00:21:46.520 the,
00:21:46.920 the people reveal
00:21:48.580 about what they know,
00:21:49.700 the easier it's going to be
00:21:50.560 to narrow down,
00:21:52.040 you know,
00:21:52.400 who had access
00:21:53.300 to all of that information.
00:21:54.540 I think that's ultimately
00:21:55.200 what you're getting,
00:21:55.840 kind of getting down to.
00:21:58.740 They are,
00:21:59.460 they are tightly controlled
00:22:00.400 not everyone gets access
00:22:01.200 to everything.
00:22:01.900 There's this,
00:22:02.600 you need to know principle.
00:22:03.840 You hear,
00:22:04.520 you may be familiar with it
00:22:05.960 but even if you have
00:22:07.380 the highest levels
00:22:08.220 of national security,
00:22:09.140 even if you're cleared
00:22:10.120 to,
00:22:10.600 to whatever the highest
00:22:11.420 clearance is,
00:22:12.400 if you don't need
00:22:13.500 to know that information
00:22:14.600 then you should not be
00:22:15.760 provided that information.
00:22:16.900 You know,
00:22:16.980 you don't get read in
00:22:17.860 on every file.
00:22:18.640 I can't walk down
00:22:19.340 the hall at CSIS
00:22:21.180 and say,
00:22:21.480 Hey,
00:22:21.640 what do you,
00:22:22.160 you know,
00:22:22.320 what are you working on?
00:22:24.040 Hey,
00:22:24.220 what's happening in China today?
00:22:25.440 What's happening in Afghanistan today?
00:22:27.060 What's going on?
00:22:27.740 You know,
00:22:27.920 what's,
00:22:28.380 you know,
00:22:28.720 what's going on over there,
00:22:29.880 right?
00:22:30.360 The,
00:22:30.560 you're,
00:22:30.760 you're generally restricted
00:22:32.420 to what you have specific access to.
00:22:34.780 Now,
00:22:34.940 certain areas would have,
00:22:36.120 you know,
00:22:36.280 that can be broad.
00:22:38.380 You know,
00:22:38.500 when I was,
00:22:39.860 when I was working there
00:22:40.740 and I was in a support desk,
00:22:41.920 that can mean a lot
00:22:42.520 of different files
00:22:43.260 in a very kind of shallow level,
00:22:45.840 a lot of different investigations,
00:22:47.300 or someone working
00:22:48.220 one investigation
00:22:49.000 with a tight team
00:22:50.260 will have all the information
00:22:51.860 on,
00:22:52.580 you know,
00:22:52.760 a very,
00:22:53.140 a very small investigation.
00:22:54.900 So,
00:22:55.660 yeah,
00:22:55.900 it's interesting to see
00:22:57.040 as these can come out,
00:22:59.220 I make assessments about,
00:23:00.460 okay,
00:23:00.640 like how close was this person
00:23:02.820 to the reporting
00:23:04.580 versus,
00:23:05.820 or the collection of the information
00:23:07.040 versus the reporting,
00:23:08.120 which would be on,
00:23:09.180 was this distributed
00:23:09.940 to a decision maker?
00:23:10.920 And therefore,
00:23:11.800 you know,
00:23:12.020 they're getting selective intelligence
00:23:13.840 and saying,
00:23:14.880 why am I the only one
00:23:15.840 who got this
00:23:16.660 and more people need to hear?
00:23:18.360 Or is it somebody
00:23:19.520 who is,
00:23:20.540 you know,
00:23:20.960 collecting this information,
00:23:21.880 passing it up
00:23:22.380 and feel like it's not going anywhere?
00:23:24.000 I think those are,
00:23:25.260 you know,
00:23:25.420 those are different things.
00:23:26.760 I saw a Twitter thread
00:23:28.040 from,
00:23:28.540 from someone recently
00:23:29.460 and I can't recall who it was
00:23:31.000 and I think they probably
00:23:31.860 had some connection
00:23:32.580 to the intelligence world
00:23:34.360 that said intelligence reports
00:23:35.900 are not to be taken
00:23:36.860 as,
00:23:37.380 you know,
00:23:37.600 100% ironclad fact.
00:23:39.540 They're,
00:23:39.780 they're meant to be reports
00:23:41.080 that are then taken
00:23:41.880 along with other various inputs.
00:23:43.600 We saw that during
00:23:44.400 the Public Order Emergency Commission
00:23:46.360 where CSIS had this report
00:23:47.860 and the government
00:23:48.280 ultimately found something else.
00:23:50.220 So I'm just curious
00:23:51.000 if you should,
00:23:51.580 could shine some light on that.
00:23:52.940 I mean,
00:23:53.120 these documents,
00:23:54.080 and I don't know
00:23:54.620 the formal title of them
00:23:56.520 and there are probably several,
00:23:58.120 what is the proper way
00:24:00.000 to receive those?
00:24:01.320 Are they,
00:24:01.600 are they,
00:24:02.200 is there a margin of error
00:24:03.240 on these things
00:24:03.860 or is it as certain
00:24:05.420 as it comes
00:24:05.940 or as certain as CSIS is
00:24:07.260 when these things
00:24:08.120 are put in paper?
00:24:09.820 Yeah,
00:24:10.040 I mean,
00:24:10.340 the nature of intelligence,
00:24:12.600 it's dynamic.
00:24:13.240 It's kind of evolving.
00:24:14.720 You can have,
00:24:15.780 you're building a picture
00:24:16.880 and you're trying
00:24:17.460 to provide information
00:24:18.580 and assessment
00:24:19.740 of that information.
00:24:20.480 You're processing information
00:24:22.160 into,
00:24:23.140 you know,
00:24:23.300 in this case,
00:24:23.960 intelligence assessments
00:24:24.860 to say,
00:24:25.480 this is,
00:24:26.280 you know,
00:24:26.400 what we think is,
00:24:27.340 is happening.
00:24:28.220 This is the picture.
00:24:29.060 But yeah,
00:24:29.920 it's,
00:24:30.900 you know,
00:24:31.440 getting it right or wrong
00:24:32.360 or just making,
00:24:33.400 making informed links
00:24:35.240 and then later on
00:24:35.980 information comes up
00:24:37.140 that challenges
00:24:38.360 that hypothesis
00:24:39.200 or changes it
00:24:40.120 a little bit
00:24:40.760 or put some context
00:24:42.100 and nuance
00:24:42.820 onto reports.
00:24:44.320 So,
00:24:45.160 you know,
00:24:45.640 in a case,
00:24:46.560 in a case like this
00:24:47.380 or in the fact
00:24:49.000 that this is a threat
00:24:50.280 like this,
00:24:51.240 that CSIS
00:24:51.760 is a core part
00:24:53.020 of CSIS's mandate
00:24:53.880 that's,
00:24:54.620 you know,
00:24:54.960 foreign influenced activities
00:24:56.540 that is kind
00:24:57.820 of a nuanced threat.
00:25:00.040 You will see
00:25:00.940 reporting that comes out
00:25:01.880 that is just trying
00:25:02.520 to provide people
00:25:04.020 a picture
00:25:05.520 of what's going on
00:25:06.380 that they can make
00:25:07.400 decisions based on,
00:25:09.040 right?
00:25:09.180 And that's why
00:25:09.660 it is great,
00:25:10.580 right?
00:25:10.780 It is,
00:25:11.520 you make
00:25:11.940 the best decisions
00:25:13.420 you can.
00:25:13.980 You make risk-informed
00:25:15.080 decisions,
00:25:16.020 threat-informed decisions.
00:25:17.160 And I think that's
00:25:18.340 one of the concerns
00:25:20.220 you have is,
00:25:21.500 well,
00:25:21.820 did this person
00:25:22.580 who is,
00:25:23.980 access to information,
00:25:24.900 they have access
00:25:25.220 to everything
00:25:25.880 or are they selectively
00:25:27.760 getting access to it?
00:25:28.860 Do they know
00:25:29.420 what risk mitigation
00:25:30.600 has put in place?
00:25:31.720 So,
00:25:32.260 you know,
00:25:32.440 what decisions
00:25:33.100 were made
00:25:33.740 with that information?
00:25:35.820 You know,
00:25:36.240 that is,
00:25:36.920 we don't know.
00:25:37.760 That's not always
00:25:38.480 provided what kind
00:25:39.860 of is happening
00:25:40.540 behind the scenes.
00:25:41.840 We kind of see,
00:25:42.500 okay,
00:25:42.780 well,
00:25:43.700 they got this
00:25:45.680 and they did that,
00:25:46.720 but we don't know
00:25:47.240 everything they got,
00:25:47.960 we don't know
00:25:48.200 everything they did,
00:25:49.260 right?
00:25:49.500 And that's,
00:25:50.120 I think,
00:25:50.540 one of the challenges
00:25:51.080 of getting selective
00:25:52.040 leaks of documents
00:25:54.040 is,
00:25:54.900 yeah,
00:25:55.180 it's not going
00:25:55.520 to provide
00:25:55.780 the whole picture.
00:25:56.600 I'm not saying
00:25:57.120 the information
00:25:57.800 passed along
00:25:58.680 is wrong.
00:25:59.720 I'm not saying
00:26:00.100 that the documents
00:26:01.180 given weren't
00:26:01.820 like at the time
00:26:03.080 accurate pictures
00:26:04.740 of what we knew
00:26:05.440 then or about
00:26:06.200 the specific threat
00:26:07.000 then,
00:26:08.000 but it's hard
00:26:08.940 to say,
00:26:09.340 like,
00:26:09.480 this is the smoking
00:26:10.240 gun,
00:26:10.800 right?
00:26:11.140 It's,
00:26:11.640 that doesn't
00:26:12.980 always the case
00:26:13.580 in these types
00:26:14.560 of investigations.
00:26:16.200 Yeah,
00:26:16.620 and it's funny
00:26:17.080 because I know
00:26:17.660 that some of my
00:26:18.380 audience right now
00:26:19.160 is like seething
00:26:19.940 because we've been
00:26:20.520 going hard on this
00:26:21.260 story based on
00:26:22.160 these reports
00:26:22.840 for the last,
00:26:23.260 not at you,
00:26:24.000 just probably at me
00:26:24.740 more than anything
00:26:25.300 because they,
00:26:26.200 you know,
00:26:26.400 they know I've been
00:26:26.880 talking about this
00:26:27.640 and it's one of
00:26:28.280 these things,
00:26:28.620 as a journalist,
00:26:29.200 I'm inclined
00:26:29.880 towards more information
00:26:31.200 and the more
00:26:31.680 the better
00:26:32.080 and then we can
00:26:32.660 decide from it
00:26:33.420 and I realize
00:26:34.760 there is a,
00:26:35.640 I mean,
00:26:35.820 perhaps it's a
00:26:36.420 philosophical point
00:26:37.320 more than it's
00:26:37.840 a legal point
00:26:38.480 about what the
00:26:39.600 limit is,
00:26:40.100 at what point
00:26:40.740 does it become
00:26:41.340 justifiable to do
00:26:42.860 this and I think,
00:26:44.400 you know,
00:26:44.640 there is one sort
00:26:45.560 of takeaway of
00:26:46.160 if you feel it's
00:26:47.220 worth staking your
00:26:48.100 life and your
00:26:48.720 career and the
00:26:49.880 legal punishments
00:26:50.780 on,
00:26:51.600 then okay,
00:26:52.500 let the cards
00:26:53.000 fall where they
00:26:53.520 may.
00:26:54.120 Well,
00:26:54.380 and I want to
00:26:54.900 say this to folks
00:26:55.800 too because,
00:26:56.560 you know,
00:26:56.820 I get asked a lot
00:26:57.840 about the leaks
00:26:59.180 and the documents
00:26:59.800 and those types
00:27:00.240 of things and I
00:27:01.780 feel like I want
00:27:02.940 to present that
00:27:03.960 context which is
00:27:05.720 these have,
00:27:06.260 you know,
00:27:06.500 threats and risks
00:27:07.140 and let's add
00:27:08.420 new ones to it
00:27:09.140 but I dedicated
00:27:11.060 10 years of my
00:27:11.720 life to investigating
00:27:13.540 threats to national
00:27:14.260 security and many
00:27:15.160 of my colleagues
00:27:15.720 have as well
00:27:16.280 and this is one
00:27:16.700 of them,
00:27:17.280 right?
00:27:17.720 So I do not
00:27:19.620 want to discount
00:27:20.200 the risk.
00:27:20.920 I do not
00:27:21.580 and the threat.
00:27:22.420 I do not want
00:27:23.100 to come across
00:27:23.860 in any way
00:27:24.360 that's saying
00:27:24.780 that,
00:27:25.060 you know,
00:27:26.120 there's nothing
00:27:26.880 to see here
00:27:27.780 and nobody
00:27:28.740 worried.
00:27:29.000 No,
00:27:29.180 that is absolutely
00:27:29.960 not the case,
00:27:30.780 right?
00:27:31.000 The CSIS
00:27:31.600 has been putting
00:27:32.100 in their public
00:27:32.680 reports.
00:27:33.400 There have been
00:27:33.800 recommendations
00:27:34.240 coming out
00:27:34.740 of government
00:27:35.020 bodies that
00:27:35.660 this is a threat,
00:27:36.640 this is a concern,
00:27:38.040 this is something
00:27:38.400 we should do
00:27:38.760 more about
00:27:39.520 and there are
00:27:41.580 legitimate questions
00:27:42.380 to be asked
00:27:43.180 100% about
00:27:44.600 what did the
00:27:45.400 government know
00:27:46.000 and what did
00:27:46.980 they do
00:27:47.460 and was that
00:27:48.240 appropriate,
00:27:49.280 right?
00:27:49.660 And if they did,
00:27:50.900 you know,
00:27:51.020 and then there's
00:27:51.320 the nuance which
00:27:52.280 is,
00:27:53.180 well,
00:27:53.340 look,
00:27:53.580 if they didn't
00:27:54.440 do more,
00:27:55.860 is that because
00:27:56.540 they benefited,
00:27:57.500 right?
00:27:57.740 And I think
00:27:58.020 everyone wants to
00:27:58.820 get and those
00:27:59.760 are absolutely
00:28:00.900 100% fair
00:28:02.700 questions that
00:28:04.240 we should be
00:28:04.780 asking,
00:28:05.120 which people
00:28:05.380 are calling
00:28:05.640 for public
00:28:06.040 inquiry or
00:28:07.300 more sunlight
00:28:08.160 and more
00:28:08.760 transparency and
00:28:09.700 I agree.
00:28:10.280 So,
00:28:10.640 you know,
00:28:11.180 I don't want to
00:28:11.760 discount that
00:28:12.440 and be used to
00:28:13.120 say,
00:28:13.340 well,
00:28:13.540 you know,
00:28:13.820 the leaker's not
00:28:15.320 a whistleblower
00:28:15.980 and therefore,
00:28:16.680 you know,
00:28:16.860 this is a big
00:28:17.400 brew,
00:28:17.680 how about
00:28:18.080 nothing?
00:28:18.600 Absolutely not.
00:28:19.280 You know,
00:28:19.720 we have an
00:28:20.740 intelligence service
00:28:21.300 that's been
00:28:21.560 working on this.
00:28:22.580 We've been sending
00:28:23.080 reports up
00:28:23.940 and it is a real
00:28:25.380 threat and we
00:28:25.980 should do
00:28:26.520 more 100%.
00:28:28.020 So,
00:28:29.400 yeah,
00:28:29.600 I,
00:28:29.860 you know,
00:28:30.280 I get the
00:28:31.320 blowback,
00:28:31.840 I get the
00:28:32.120 frustration.
00:28:32.940 I always feel
00:28:34.320 like because I'm
00:28:34.860 from the
00:28:35.100 intelligence community,
00:28:35.780 I need to
00:28:36.380 say,
00:28:36.620 look,
00:28:36.760 guys,
00:28:37.060 you know,
00:28:37.280 don't put my
00:28:37.920 former colleagues
00:28:38.480 at risk by
00:28:39.020 dumping,
00:28:39.400 you know,
00:28:39.900 sensitive intel
00:28:40.520 out.
00:28:41.300 But my
00:28:42.040 goodness,
00:28:42.380 we,
00:28:42.740 you know,
00:28:42.900 there's plenty
00:28:43.440 of public
00:28:43.960 information that
00:28:44.960 says this is a
00:28:45.540 problem that we
00:28:46.480 should be doing
00:28:46.820 more about.
00:28:48.060 This has sparked
00:28:48.920 a conversation
00:28:49.620 about that.
00:28:51.180 And,
00:28:51.740 yeah,
00:28:53.380 I'm not saying
00:28:53.940 there's no public
00:28:54.460 benefit.
00:28:54.900 I'm just saying
00:28:55.360 I wish we didn't
00:28:55.820 get here because
00:28:56.800 of leaks.
00:28:57.740 Yeah,
00:28:58.180 and I agree
00:28:58.920 process is
00:28:59.640 important.
00:29:00.120 I mean,
00:29:00.280 it's the old
00:29:00.720 thing about,
00:29:01.300 you know,
00:29:01.480 if police
00:29:01.880 search someone
00:29:02.520 without a
00:29:02.920 warrant and
00:29:03.360 they find
00:29:03.740 something there
00:29:04.260 but they
00:29:04.540 weren't allowed
00:29:04.920 to have
00:29:05.180 searched in
00:29:05.920 the first
00:29:06.260 place,
00:29:06.580 there's a
00:29:07.260 remedy
00:29:07.620 available to
00:29:08.640 that person.
00:29:09.280 So,
00:29:09.600 I know it's
00:29:10.200 not a
00:29:10.460 perfectly
00:29:10.760 analogous
00:29:11.320 situation,
00:29:12.040 but you
00:29:12.360 can't just
00:29:12.780 take this
00:29:13.140 Machiavellian
00:29:13.960 approach to
00:29:14.920 these things,
00:29:16.000 which I think
00:29:16.600 we can agree
00:29:17.060 on in
00:29:17.520 principle,
00:29:18.020 if not
00:29:18.400 necessarily
00:29:19.300 in the
00:29:19.620 specific case
00:29:20.320 here.
00:29:20.620 You might
00:29:21.000 like this
00:29:21.460 leak,
00:29:21.660 you might
00:29:21.880 not like
00:29:22.160 the next
00:29:22.480 one,
00:29:22.860 and if
00:29:23.180 we're going
00:29:23.360 to rely
00:29:23.740 on individual
00:29:24.340 people who
00:29:25.060 feel empowered
00:29:25.820 to do it,
00:29:26.940 I don't think
00:29:27.620 that's a
00:29:27.860 great system,
00:29:29.380 so whatever
00:29:30.120 we feel
00:29:30.720 about this,
00:29:31.220 but once
00:29:32.160 again,
00:29:32.600 foreign
00:29:33.040 interference,
00:29:33.700 that's a
00:29:34.040 core CSIS
00:29:35.100 mandate threat
00:29:36.080 since 1984
00:29:37.080 that our
00:29:40.040 Security Intelligence
00:29:41.260 Service has
00:29:41.700 been asked
00:29:41.920 to investigate
00:29:42.520 and advise
00:29:43.420 government on,
00:29:44.160 and they've
00:29:44.500 been doing
00:29:44.820 that,
00:29:45.760 and now
00:29:46.440 we've got
00:29:46.620 to figure
00:29:46.840 out what
00:29:48.480 do we do,
00:29:48.900 what do we
00:29:49.060 not do,
00:29:49.880 why,
00:29:50.940 and what
00:29:51.500 should we
00:29:51.700 do going
00:29:52.020 forward now
00:29:53.080 that we
00:29:53.440 are having
00:29:53.880 this
00:29:54.060 conversation
00:29:54.540 because that
00:29:55.000 will require
00:29:56.200 further action,
00:29:57.620 and look,
00:29:58.920 as a political
00:29:59.340 candidate,
00:29:59.720 I have some
00:30:00.140 insight in
00:30:00.520 how nominations
00:30:01.140 work,
00:30:01.900 and those
00:30:02.580 are messy
00:30:03.360 things,
00:30:05.680 that's no
00:30:06.440 easy solutions
00:30:07.080 on how to
00:30:07.340 tidy those
00:30:07.740 things up
00:30:08.160 or the
00:30:08.320 political
00:30:08.480 process,
00:30:09.000 but clearly,
00:30:10.140 clearly,
00:30:10.900 you know,
00:30:12.020 I think there
00:30:12.680 are steps
00:30:12.960 that we
00:30:13.220 can and
00:30:13.580 should take.
00:30:14.780 All right,
00:30:15.420 well,
00:30:15.540 the fantastic
00:30:16.260 book written
00:30:16.780 by this
00:30:17.340 gentleman,
00:30:17.700 Andrew Kirsch,
00:30:18.280 is I
00:30:18.700 Was Never
00:30:19.200 Here,
00:30:19.760 My True
00:30:20.240 Canadian
00:30:20.640 Spy Story
00:30:21.420 of Coffee's
00:30:22.060 Codenames
00:30:22.520 and Covert
00:30:23.360 Operations.
00:30:24.520 You can,
00:30:24.880 in the age
00:30:25.260 of terrorism,
00:30:26.240 you can get
00:30:26.600 that on
00:30:27.080 Amazon,
00:30:27.620 an indigo,
00:30:28.280 and I
00:30:28.720 would encourage
00:30:29.100 you to read
00:30:29.500 it.
00:30:29.640 It was a lot
00:30:29.960 of fun,
00:30:30.400 and you
00:30:30.700 can also
00:30:30.980 check my
00:30:31.400 interview with
00:30:32.140 Andrew from
00:30:32.560 several months
00:30:33.100 ago to get
00:30:34.220 a little bit
00:30:34.600 more information
00:30:35.400 about that.
00:30:36.000 Andrew,
00:30:36.200 thank you so
00:30:36.720 much for your
00:30:37.140 time and
00:30:37.640 candour,
00:30:38.000 sir.
00:30:38.660 Thank you.
00:30:39.100 Thanks for
00:30:39.320 having me.
00:30:39.640 That was
00:30:40.320 former CSIS
00:30:41.280 intelligence
00:30:41.800 officer Andrew
00:30:42.760 Kirsch,
00:30:43.520 and as
00:30:43.900 mentioned,
00:30:44.320 you should
00:30:44.500 definitely
00:30:44.800 check out
00:30:45.340 his book,
00:30:46.160 I Was
00:30:46.460 Never
00:30:46.640 Here.
00:30:46.940 It's not
00:30:47.180 a salacious
00:30:47.960 or thriller
00:30:49.020 type book,
00:30:49.980 but it's a
00:30:50.520 tremendously
00:30:50.920 valuable resource
00:30:52.180 to understand a
00:30:53.860 government agency
00:30:54.700 in Canada that
00:30:55.440 so often flies
00:30:56.380 under the radar
00:30:56.900 because it's not
00:30:58.300 necessarily as sexy
00:30:59.240 as like the
00:30:59.700 Jason Bourne movies
00:31:00.520 as far as what
00:31:01.200 they do,
00:31:01.620 but they do
00:31:02.420 play a role,
00:31:03.120 and as we're
00:31:03.480 seeing in the
00:31:04.200 course of the
00:31:04.900 Chinese interference
00:31:05.760 story,
00:31:06.220 they were
00:31:06.620 playing,
00:31:07.180 they were
00:31:07.380 doing their
00:31:07.760 part,
00:31:08.220 and the
00:31:08.600 government,
00:31:09.240 it seems,
00:31:09.700 was not
00:31:10.120 doing its
00:31:10.760 part.
00:31:11.140 So let me
00:31:11.960 know what you
00:31:12.200 think about
00:31:12.500 that in the
00:31:13.260 comments.
00:31:14.300 Turning from
00:31:14.840 one agency to
00:31:15.980 another,
00:31:16.420 though,
00:31:16.600 we spoke last
00:31:17.340 week about the
00:31:18.000 Mass Casualty
00:31:19.240 Commission's
00:31:19.760 report,
00:31:20.360 and this was
00:31:21.000 the commission
00:31:21.880 that was struck
00:31:22.780 to deal with
00:31:23.420 that horrific
00:31:24.140 killing spree in
00:31:25.900 Portapic,
00:31:26.700 Nova Scotia,
00:31:27.560 two years,
00:31:28.140 actually putting
00:31:28.780 three years ago
00:31:29.700 now,
00:31:30.440 and the one
00:31:31.460 thing that I
00:31:32.040 would point out
00:31:32.720 to a lot of
00:31:33.360 people about
00:31:33.980 this thing that
00:31:34.780 I said on the
00:31:35.260 show last
00:31:35.720 week is
00:31:36.220 that it
00:31:37.020 looks like
00:31:37.800 the
00:31:38.340 recommendations
00:31:39.040 in the
00:31:39.660 report were
00:31:40.580 just written
00:31:41.260 by the
00:31:41.820 most radical
00:31:44.080 activists in
00:31:44.880 each particular
00:31:45.600 category.
00:31:46.380 So the
00:31:47.020 recommendations on
00:31:48.060 domestic violence
00:31:48.960 looked like they
00:31:49.620 were written by
00:31:50.560 activists in
00:31:51.620 that sector who
00:31:52.360 again may have a
00:31:53.200 legitimate cause,
00:31:54.140 but it's not one
00:31:54.960 connected to what
00:31:55.620 happened in
00:31:56.540 Nova Scotia,
00:31:57.220 at least as
00:31:57.920 much as the
00:31:58.400 report made it
00:31:59.100 seem.
00:31:59.720 And the
00:32:00.120 firearm section
00:32:00.980 looked like it
00:32:01.520 was ripped right
00:32:02.400 out of what the
00:32:03.900 most rabid gun
00:32:05.280 control activists
00:32:06.060 in this country
00:32:06.700 seek at every
00:32:07.980 turn, and they
00:32:08.620 just look for
00:32:09.220 opportunities to
00:32:10.100 advance this
00:32:10.660 agenda irrespective
00:32:11.940 of the facts of
00:32:13.180 the case.
00:32:13.640 And in the Nova
00:32:14.300 Scotia killing
00:32:15.520 spree, the
00:32:16.140 firearms were all
00:32:17.240 illegally owned,
00:32:18.020 so no changes to
00:32:19.440 the legal ownership
00:32:20.540 regime for guns in
00:32:21.660 Canada would have
00:32:22.660 done anything.
00:32:23.840 But that part is
00:32:24.980 conveniently left
00:32:26.440 out of the
00:32:27.200 narrative.
00:32:28.420 A couple of weeks
00:32:29.000 ago when I was in
00:32:29.860 Ottawa for the
00:32:30.820 Canada Strong and
00:32:31.680 Free Networking
00:32:32.360 Conference, I sat
00:32:33.440 down with Tracy
00:32:34.580 Wilson from the
00:32:35.560 Canadian Coalition
00:32:36.360 for Firearm
00:32:37.680 Rights, and I'm
00:32:38.280 actually going to
00:32:38.860 be speaking at
00:32:39.920 their AGM in
00:32:41.140 Ottawa in June, so
00:32:42.400 if you are a
00:32:43.060 CCFR member, I do
00:32:44.160 hope you come out
00:32:45.000 and say hello and
00:32:46.560 hear what I'm
00:32:47.080 speaking about.
00:32:47.620 I have no idea
00:32:48.200 what I'm speaking
00:32:48.820 about yet because
00:32:49.460 it's in June, so
00:32:50.220 things could change.
00:32:50.940 There's no point in
00:32:51.660 writing a speech
00:32:52.580 now, but it was
00:32:53.600 great to see Tracy
00:32:54.420 Wilson in Ottawa a
00:32:55.880 couple of weeks ago
00:32:56.600 as well.
00:32:57.140 We were chatting
00:32:57.780 just to contextualize
00:32:58.840 this before the
00:32:59.720 Mass Casualty
00:33:00.460 Commission report
00:33:01.180 came out, but it's
00:33:02.620 really, as I
00:33:03.360 mentioned, a lot
00:33:04.160 of the same
00:33:04.540 themes and
00:33:05.340 dynamics that we
00:33:06.880 were discussing
00:33:07.440 that are part of
00:33:08.100 this bigger picture
00:33:08.820 of the gun issue
00:33:10.280 in Canada that
00:33:11.520 were coming up
00:33:12.280 that we now see
00:33:12.980 reflected in that
00:33:14.020 report.
00:33:17.760 You're tuned in
00:33:18.900 to the Andrew
00:33:19.680 Lawton Show.
00:33:22.520 And joining me is
00:33:23.740 Tracy Wilson, the
00:33:24.880 Vice President of
00:33:25.840 Public Relations
00:33:26.580 for the Canadian
00:33:27.600 Coalition for
00:33:28.540 Firearm Rights, a
00:33:29.800 group that's always
00:33:30.320 been a great
00:33:30.880 supporter of True
00:33:31.460 North, and I've
00:33:31.940 always been a great
00:33:32.660 supporter and
00:33:33.160 member of them.
00:33:35.680 Look, I think it's
00:33:37.000 not really breaking
00:33:38.100 news to say that gun
00:33:39.180 owners have been
00:33:39.720 under assault with
00:33:40.700 Justin Trudeau's
00:33:41.520 government.
00:33:42.160 We've had the
00:33:42.800 Order and Council
00:33:43.800 Bill, C-21, a
00:33:45.120 number of reforms
00:33:46.060 and regulations.
00:33:47.560 Even just as we
00:33:48.360 were chatting a
00:33:48.940 moment ago, how do
00:33:50.360 you even as a gun
00:33:51.060 owner begin to
00:33:52.040 tackle all of
00:33:53.340 these things?
00:33:53.760 Because it really
00:33:54.140 is a battle on
00:33:54.820 many fronts that
00:33:55.540 the government's
00:33:56.020 waging.
00:33:56.900 It absolutely is.
00:33:57.880 And in fact, to
00:33:59.160 me, as a gun
00:34:00.140 owner, I've been a
00:34:00.680 gun owner for 27
00:34:01.600 years.
00:34:02.260 I'm a mom.
00:34:03.140 I'm a grandma.
00:34:04.080 I want to save her
00:34:04.880 country, too.
00:34:05.920 And I know it's not
00:34:06.680 my community committing
00:34:07.980 the violence.
00:34:08.940 So for me, the
00:34:09.940 problem is, is it's
00:34:11.420 sort of a breach of
00:34:12.640 the social contract
00:34:14.200 that I made with the
00:34:15.340 government where they
00:34:16.120 said, here's the
00:34:17.100 regulations in order to
00:34:18.200 be a gun owner.
00:34:19.260 Here's what you can
00:34:19.900 have.
00:34:20.320 Here's what you can do.
00:34:21.100 And I said, okay.
00:34:22.220 And I complied with
00:34:23.120 them, regardless of how
00:34:24.100 ridiculous some of them
00:34:25.060 are, and at the end
00:34:26.460 of the day, it doesn't
00:34:27.120 matter.
00:34:27.500 They just are still
00:34:28.560 coming at us, still
00:34:29.760 trying to confiscate
00:34:30.640 our legally acquired
00:34:31.520 property, even though
00:34:32.680 we've done nothing to
00:34:33.600 warrant it.
00:34:34.380 And it's incredibly
00:34:35.620 frustrating.
00:34:36.580 So frustrating that,
00:34:37.820 yeah, we're taking
00:34:38.420 them to court.
00:34:39.340 We've seen a little
00:34:40.460 bit of optimism, I'd
00:34:41.460 say, in the last few
00:34:42.320 months, not from the
00:34:43.120 federal government, but
00:34:43.980 from provinces.
00:34:44.980 I think Alberta really
00:34:46.340 started this off.
00:34:47.260 They appointed a very
00:34:48.260 firearms-focused,
00:34:49.600 firearms-owners-focused
00:34:50.620 CFO, Terry Bryan.
00:34:51.820 They've also now,
00:34:52.540 under Danielle Smith,
00:34:53.280 really said, we're not
00:34:54.380 playing ball, which
00:34:55.060 did the federal
00:34:55.640 government's gun
00:34:56.300 confiscation.
00:34:57.380 Has this been an area
00:34:58.840 where there's a bit of
00:34:59.560 hope that you can
00:35:00.340 lobby provincial
00:35:01.100 governments in a way
00:35:01.840 that might not have
00:35:02.420 been top of mind
00:35:03.460 for your agenda?
00:35:04.400 Yeah, well, in fact,
00:35:05.400 when the CCFR first
00:35:06.800 launched our federal
00:35:07.840 court action back in
00:35:08.880 2020, immediately
00:35:10.180 after the big
00:35:11.080 sweeping gun ban,
00:35:12.340 we had written to
00:35:13.500 the different
00:35:14.040 provinces, to the
00:35:15.800 attorney generals of
00:35:16.940 each province, asking
00:35:18.160 them to intervene on
00:35:19.040 our court challenge.
00:35:20.220 And we didn't hear
00:35:20.900 back from any of them.
00:35:22.220 And then, after
00:35:23.380 Danielle Smith took
00:35:24.280 over, we heard
00:35:25.740 back from them,
00:35:26.320 they've actually
00:35:26.820 intervened on our,
00:35:28.700 they filed an
00:35:29.400 application to intervene
00:35:30.400 on our court challenge,
00:35:31.420 and it was approved by
00:35:32.800 the associate chief
00:35:34.060 justice of the federal
00:35:34.940 court.
00:35:35.560 So, Alberta's all in,
00:35:37.440 Saskatchewan's right
00:35:38.280 behind them,
00:35:39.360 Manitoba, Yukon, and
00:35:40.920 New Brunswick have all
00:35:41.740 been very vocal against
00:35:42.960 this.
00:35:43.280 Not Ontario,
00:35:43.940 though.
00:35:44.160 We're still waiting for,
00:35:45.120 well, that's the thing
00:35:46.140 with Doug, right?
00:35:46.860 I think he's perfectly
00:35:47.860 comfortable where he is,
00:35:48.980 and he doesn't like to
00:35:50.280 rock the boat either
00:35:51.020 way.
00:35:51.820 At the same time, I've
00:35:52.840 known Doug Ford a long
00:35:53.720 time, and I know he
00:35:55.120 doesn't support the war
00:35:56.080 on gun owners.
00:35:57.100 He knows that the
00:35:58.280 problem is crime
00:35:59.040 violence and gun
00:35:59.740 smuggling.
00:36:00.660 A lot of, I mean,
00:36:01.620 you mentioned this a
00:36:02.320 moment ago, a lot of
00:36:03.860 people might not realize,
00:36:04.880 because gun owners
00:36:05.520 probably seem a bit
00:36:06.420 rebellious to the Canadian
00:36:07.480 culture, but they're
00:36:08.580 very compliant by
00:36:10.000 definition, individuals.
00:36:11.520 You know, we get the
00:36:12.500 paperwork, we get the
00:36:13.440 forms, we, you know,
00:36:14.280 make sure that this is
00:36:15.060 locked and this is locked.
00:36:16.120 And at a certain point,
00:36:18.140 you reach a breaking
00:36:18.940 point, I think, where
00:36:19.900 gun owners are saying
00:36:20.900 it's just not worth
00:36:21.620 being in this hobby
00:36:22.400 anymore, and that's my
00:36:23.660 fear.
00:36:24.080 Are you seeing that, or
00:36:24.900 are they really digging
00:36:25.540 their heels in and
00:36:26.100 saying, no, I'm fighting
00:36:27.180 for this right to keep
00:36:28.020 my property?
00:36:28.840 There's two things I'm
00:36:29.760 really afraid of.
00:36:30.520 Number one, people just
00:36:31.560 giving up, getting rid of
00:36:33.040 their stuff, and
00:36:33.680 abandoning our community
00:36:35.020 altogether, because to
00:36:37.240 the people who
00:36:37.920 participate, it's
00:36:39.080 incredibly important.
00:36:40.520 The other thing I'm
00:36:41.220 afraid of is non-compliance,
00:36:43.700 and I'll tell you why.
00:36:44.580 I know a lot of people
00:36:45.880 sort of promote that
00:36:47.320 idea, but here's the
00:36:48.560 thing, in any
00:36:49.620 functioning civil society
00:36:51.480 and democracy, you
00:36:53.180 don't want people
00:36:54.220 willingly breaking the
00:36:55.240 law, but when you
00:36:56.560 force people to that
00:36:57.640 edge, when they've
00:36:58.520 complied with every law
00:36:59.540 and every regulation
00:37:00.420 you put before them,
00:37:02.160 and then you still
00:37:02.840 come at them, and the
00:37:03.700 idea is you're coming
00:37:04.580 to kick in their
00:37:05.180 doors and take their
00:37:06.540 stuff, people just say,
00:37:08.440 forget it, I am sick
00:37:09.460 and tired of complying,
00:37:10.900 because it hasn't paid
00:37:11.780 off for me.
00:37:12.300 So I think those are
00:37:14.360 the two things that
00:37:15.060 frighten me most, and
00:37:16.180 thirdly, the fact that
00:37:18.660 all the effort, resources
00:37:20.220 and focus is on legal
00:37:21.940 gun owners, and
00:37:22.960 meanwhile, we've got
00:37:23.760 crime blowing up out of
00:37:25.300 control all across the
00:37:26.940 country, and especially
00:37:27.740 in places like Toronto,
00:37:29.680 Montreal, and Vancouver.
00:37:31.080 Yeah, and gun owners
00:37:31.980 are actually the toughest
00:37:32.940 people in terms of
00:37:34.300 wanting to go after gun
00:37:35.380 crime.
00:37:36.100 The issue is just the
00:37:37.540 liberals have a very broad
00:37:38.820 definition of what a gun
00:37:40.020 criminal is, and they
00:37:41.420 basically think a gun
00:37:42.220 owner is inherently a bad
00:37:43.500 person that needs all of
00:37:44.520 these regulations heaped
00:37:45.500 upon them.
00:37:46.080 Either that, or they at
00:37:46.980 least want the public to
00:37:47.940 think that, because it's
00:37:48.940 very politically expedient
00:37:50.340 to, you know, beat up
00:37:51.940 the opposition or to beat
00:37:53.060 up their opponents with,
00:37:54.820 you know, they're going to
00:37:55.940 make assault weapons
00:37:57.020 legal again, or scary
00:37:58.580 things like that.
00:37:59.720 I think down deep the
00:38:00.640 liberals know, Marco
00:38:02.000 Mendicino knows he's a
00:38:03.600 crown prosecutor in his
00:38:05.240 previous business life.
00:38:07.340 They've got all kinds of
00:38:08.700 lawyers, they've got Bill
00:38:09.680 Blair, who was chief of
00:38:10.680 police in Toronto.
00:38:11.840 These people know full
00:38:12.820 well what they're doing
00:38:13.760 isn't going to have a
00:38:14.900 demonstrable public safety
00:38:16.620 benefit, but they know
00:38:18.020 it's going to have an
00:38:18.900 actual public, or an
00:38:20.400 actual political impact,
00:38:22.340 and that's why they do it,
00:38:23.600 which is horrible, and
00:38:25.480 it's un-Canadian.
00:38:27.720 Tracy Wilson, thank you.
00:38:29.000 Thank you.
00:38:29.820 That was Tracy Wilson,
00:38:31.300 spokesperson for the
00:38:32.500 Canadian Coalition for
00:38:33.680 Firearm Rights, as I
00:38:34.760 mentioned, going to be at
00:38:35.840 their AGM in Ottawa.
00:38:37.600 come June, so that
00:38:38.820 should be a great time.
00:38:40.000 I don't even know if
00:38:40.500 we're going out to a
00:38:41.040 range or not, probably
00:38:41.840 not, because we're going
00:38:42.900 to be in a downtown
00:38:43.860 Ottawa hotel, I believe,
00:38:45.440 but you never know.
00:38:46.420 I need to get out to a
00:38:47.220 range, actually.
00:38:47.920 All of these restrictions
00:38:49.020 have just made it so
00:38:50.260 difficult to do anything
00:38:51.900 with certain firearms in
00:38:53.080 Canada, so now we are
00:38:54.800 going to have to, as
00:38:56.180 gun owners, if you are
00:38:57.160 one of them, dig in a
00:38:58.080 little bit more, and
00:38:59.340 make sure you don't just
00:39:00.300 give up, because that was
00:39:01.600 what Tracy and I were
00:39:02.380 discussing there, that
00:39:03.240 some people are saying,
00:39:04.240 you know, this is just
00:39:04.840 too difficult a hobby to
00:39:05.940 deal with, maybe it's
00:39:06.840 not worth the hassle,
00:39:07.760 maybe it's not worth
00:39:09.060 doing it, but people
00:39:09.980 need to say, no, this is
00:39:11.000 our livelihood, this is
00:39:12.400 our life, this is our
00:39:13.600 hobby, this is our
00:39:14.620 pastime, this is our
00:39:15.580 sport, this is the way
00:39:17.040 we feed our family in
00:39:18.280 some cases.
00:39:18.940 I mean, firearms mean
00:39:19.900 so many different things
00:39:20.860 to different people, but
00:39:22.200 to the liberals, they mean
00:39:23.620 weaponry, and to the
00:39:24.720 liberals, gun owners mean
00:39:26.320 criminals, and that is the,
00:39:28.100 they are the ones who are
00:39:29.120 radical, they are the
00:39:29.940 ones who are fringe, so
00:39:31.300 we can't let them
00:39:32.200 reframe the narrative
00:39:33.540 around law-abiding
00:39:34.500 peaceful gun owners, so
00:39:35.840 that's a little bit of a
00:39:37.060 teaser of what you'll see
00:39:37.940 more of on the show in
00:39:39.180 the months ahead, as
00:39:39.800 these regulations and
00:39:41.240 laws continue to work
00:39:42.680 their way through the
00:39:43.280 system, we'll keep
00:39:44.120 talking about it here,
00:39:45.420 and as I've said to
00:39:46.360 people, if you are not a
00:39:47.320 gun owner, you surely
00:39:48.300 can engage with this from
00:39:49.960 a property rights
00:39:50.880 perspective, and from a
00:39:52.020 science and evidence-based
00:39:53.460 policy perspective, you
00:39:54.860 don't need to like guns
00:39:55.820 or no guns to realize
00:39:57.920 what the government is
00:39:59.020 doing here.
00:39:59.640 That does it for us
00:40:01.020 for today, we'll be back
00:40:01.840 on Thursday with another
00:40:03.660 regular edition of the
00:40:04.840 Andrew Lawton Show, and
00:40:06.060 as I said earlier, a
00:40:07.240 post-mortem of the
00:40:08.300 federal court hearing on
00:40:09.460 the Emergencies Act,
00:40:10.640 that's coming up in a
00:40:11.580 couple days' time.
00:40:12.580 Hope you have a great
00:40:13.760 rest of the week, though.
00:40:14.640 Thank you, God bless, and
00:40:15.980 good day to you all.
00:40:17.100 Thanks for listening to
00:40:18.000 the Andrew Lawton Show.
00:40:19.520 Support the program by
00:40:20.540 donating to True North
00:40:21.560 at www.tnc.news.