Juno News - November 22, 2018


The UK's Bungling of Brexit - Lawton with Lilico

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Andrew Lillico, the lead economist for the official Leave campaign, and managing director at Europe Economics, joins me to talk about the possibility of a second referendum, and why he thinks there's no realistic chance of it happening.

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00:00:00 I'm very pleased to be sitting down right now with Andrew Lillico, the lead economist
00:00:06 for the official Leave campaign for Brexit, also managing director at Europe Economics,
00:00:12 where we are right now.
00:00:13 Andrew, good to be with you.
00:00:14 Thanks very much for your time.
00:00:15 Good afternoon.
00:00:16 We've spoken on the radio before.
00:00:18 Very good to be doing it on your turf right now at a very critical time.
00:00:22 Let's talk about where we are right now, because I know that we've had a lot of people, certainly
00:00:27 from the Remain side of the Brexit discussion, try to force another vote.
00:00:32 And I think there seems to be this general sense among that side that if you were to do
00:00:37 this all over again, people wouldn't want the Leave to happen.
00:00:42 Do you think that's actually a valid analysis, that if you were to do this all over again,
00:00:48 the same result wouldn't emerge?
00:00:49 Well, I don't think there's any realistic chance that we're going to have a second vote.
00:00:55 And if we did have a second vote, I think that would, first of all, I mean, that would
00:00:59 be so enormously anti-democratic, it would make a huge change.
00:01:03 I think that people need to understand what's being suggested there.
00:01:07 It's a fairly sacred principle of British democracy, that when you vote for something,
00:01:13 that's the thing that happens.
00:01:14 You can vote later to do something else.
00:01:16 But imagine if we elected an MP, and then somebody said, oh, I don't really like that MP,
00:01:22 so we're going to have another election.
00:01:24 But that MP doesn't sit whilst we have the other election.
00:01:26 The original MP sits.
00:01:28 What's being suggested here isn't that we, the objection isn't to, we leave the EU and
00:01:33 then sometime in the future we might have a vote on rejoining.
00:01:36 That would be fine.
00:01:37 I mean, I don't think we'd probably want to do that very soon, but there's no objection
00:01:40 in principle to doing that.
00:01:42 But what's being proposed by these people is that even though we voted to leave, we then
00:01:47 shouldn't leave, but instead have another vote.
00:01:50 I think that that would have absolutely enormous ramifications for the whole way that politics
00:01:54 is done.
00:01:55 I think there would be an enormous boycott by leave campaigners.
00:01:59 I think it would shatter confidence in British democracy.
00:02:01 I think it would have implications for things like, suppose that a Jeremy Corbyn government
00:02:05 were elected in the future.
00:02:06 People saying then that the establishment would say, well, we don't like Jeremy Corbyn, so we're
00:02:10 not going to let him be the prime minister.
00:02:12 We're just going to have another election, and another one, and another one, until the people
00:02:15 pick something else.
00:02:16 I think it's an absolutely extraordinary claim, and I think it's a very dangerous claim as
00:02:21 well, and that people underestimate what's being proposed here.
00:02:25 I don't think, mercifully, there's any realistic chance of it happening.
00:02:29 The reality is that we're going to be leaving next March.
00:02:32 That's what's going to happen.
00:02:33 And that means that the entire discussion at this point is coming down to what that looks
00:02:39 like, and what that departure from the European Union actually manifests itself as, and you've
00:02:45 got a number of discussions that have happened around this, and I'll talk about the Checkers
00:02:50 proposal in a moment, but where there are a lot of people that are pushing for suggestions
00:02:54 that are not actually what Brexit was supposed to be.
00:02:57 And you've said what I think should be common sense, Brexit means Brexit, but why has this
00:03:02 become so overcomplicated, and why have people tried to find a lot more of a complicated work
00:03:07 around to what should be, and what, if we go by the referendum, was a very simple and direct
00:03:13 premise?
00:03:13 I think there's been a key error in the way that the government has approached the issue
00:03:19 of Brexit, of making the negotiations with the European Union be what Brexit was about.
00:03:24 And so people still, they ask, well, what kind of Brexit do you want, or that kind of language.
00:03:30 Now, to me, what that would mean is, well, once we've left the EU, do we want to have some
00:03:35 new alliance with, say, the United States, or an alliance with Canada and Australia, or do
00:03:40 we want to work together with countries around the periphery of Europe, a kind of ring-donut
00:03:44 alliance, or do we just want to stand by ourselves in the world?
00:03:49 Do we want to, when we do those things, do we want to cut regulation, taxes, do a kind
00:03:53 of Singapore-esque model or something?
00:03:56 Those are the questions, right?
00:03:58 After we've left, how do we conduct ourselves around the world?
00:04:01 What people have tried to do instead is to say, what Brexit's about is what we do with
00:04:05 the EU.
00:04:06 I mean, that's, we're not leaving the EU in order to have another relationship with
00:04:10 the EU.
00:04:10 That's renegotiating your relationship with the EU.
00:04:13 We had a go at that under David Cameron.
00:04:15 It didn't work.
00:04:16 And people didn't like the renegotiation that he'd achieved.
00:04:19 And so we then chose to leave.
00:04:21 So then having another renegotiation is just the wrong way of framing the question.
00:04:25 We've chosen to leave the EU.
00:04:27 So although in due course, doubtless, we'll have some sort of trade deal with the EU.
00:04:33 It may not be next year.
00:04:35 It might not be in five years' time.
00:04:36 But by 2030, we'll certainly have some sort of trade deal with the EU.
00:04:40 It has a trade deal with all of its near partners.
00:04:43 And I don't see why that needs to be controversial at all.
00:04:47 Make more than page eight of the newspapers.
00:04:49 It doesn't have to be that big a deal.
00:04:52 But what people have tried to do instead is to cling on to as much of EU membership as
00:04:57 they possibly could.
00:04:58 It's just a mistake.
00:04:59 The EU has been our central geopolitical partnership for more than 40 years.
00:05:03 And we've done quite well out of it as a geopolitical partnership.
00:05:06 We faced down the Soviet Union. 0.74
00:05:08 We absorbed the post-fascist states of the Iberian Peninsula.
00:05:12 We absorbed the post-communist states of Eastern Europe.
00:05:15 We did all kinds of wonderful things together.
00:05:17 At the same time, we developed in Europe an economic philosophy much more in line with
00:05:22 British traditions.
00:05:23 But that's all over now.
00:05:26 And we've chosen to leave that geopolitical partnership.
00:05:30 So saying, well, we're leaving that geopolitical partnership, but now we're going to have the
00:05:35 EU as our main geopolitical partnership, seems to me to be just absurd.
00:05:38 It's just not what the vote was about at all.
00:05:40 And that seems to me to be the root cause of the problem.
00:05:43 One kind of iconic illustration of this came early on when, even though we were leaving
00:05:48 the EU, we decided that we weren't going to negotiate new trade deals with the US or Canada
00:05:54 or Australia or whoever, whilst we were in the process of leaving.
00:05:58 Well, what did our post-Brexit trading arrangements with the US have to do with the EU?
00:06:05 Nothing to do with them at all.
00:06:07 We should have just said, well, we're doing that.
00:06:09 I mean, yeah, something like that could have happened and would have happened irrespective
00:06:12 of Brexit.
00:06:13 Even if Remain had won, there still could have been and should have been a trade discussion
00:06:17 with the United States.
00:06:18 Well, there would have been a trade discussion at EU level.
00:06:20 But whilst we're in the EU, we don't have any competence to negotiate our own trade deals.
00:06:25 So what we should have said was, well, we're leaving.
00:06:27 Obviously, we can't negotiate a trade deal that will start before we've actually left.
00:06:31 But if we're negotiating a trade deal that starts after we've left, that's nothing to
00:06:35 do with the EU.
00:06:35 It doesn't have any competence over what we do after we've left the EU.
00:06:39 There's been a lot, I think.
00:06:40 In some way, it's been a novelty.
00:06:42 But I think there is a serious discussion to be had about KANZUK, this idea of an alliance between
00:06:47 Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the UK.
00:06:51 And those countries, obviously, are as geographically disparate as countries can be.
00:06:56 But do you think that is the future of these sorts of trade and other geopolitical relationships,
00:07:01 that geography in this day and age is far less significant than other factors?
00:07:05 I don't really think that's right, no.
00:07:08 Because I think that in the case of KANZUK, that is true. 1.00
00:07:13 But I think that's a fairly unique case.
00:07:15 Because there aren't that many other kinds of arrangements where you have such culturally
00:07:20 similar people so geographically diverse.
00:07:23 More normally, one needs geographical similarity in order to have the cultural and linguistic
00:07:29 and political traditions similarity, traditions of regulation and so on.
00:07:37 Otherwise, the distance tends to break those things up.
00:07:42 And so I don't think that it's going to be true in general that everybody's going to be
00:07:45 forming alliances of that sort.
00:07:47 I think that it's important that normally geography dominates.
00:07:53 And I'm not even sure that there's room in the world for that many geographically disparate 0.62
00:07:59 arrangements.
00:08:00 I think that it is quite likely we will see increased concentration on regional alliances
00:08:04 of various sorts, increased concentration of political union within the European Union.
00:08:10 We have the Russians forming their zone. 0.97
00:08:12 We've got ASEAN and the East Asians.
00:08:16 We've got the new NAFTA II.
00:08:19 I can't believe it's not NAFTA on there.
00:08:22 But I would see KANZUK as almost like a... 1.00
00:08:29 If you imagined you cut out some felt shapes from a square piece of felt,
00:08:35 then you'd have a shape left over at the end.
00:08:38 That's almost what KANZUK's like. 0.99
00:08:40 It's the thing which can one...
00:08:42 There can be one of those that fills in the world in that kind of way as the bit that's left over.
00:08:48 Why is that able to, in your view, overcome those geographical barriers, though?
00:08:55 I think that it is because the political traditions and the ways of approaching things are so similar.
00:09:04 When people from Britain meet people from Australia or Canada or New Zealand, they get along immediately, right?
00:09:12 People understand.
00:09:13 You understand the humour.
00:09:14 We watch many of the same daytime soaps and comedy shows.
00:09:20 And there's a natural sense, even body language and things like that work in much the same way.
00:09:25 People understand each other in a different way.
00:09:27 It's not the same when you're dealing with people, even from continental Europe, who are quite similar, much more similar to people from Britain than people from China or Japan or many other parts of the world are.
00:09:39 But the people from the KANZUK countries, there's a very natural and automatic alignment.
00:09:44 And one of the things about the European Union was, as it's moved towards its deeper political union, we in Britain have found that, although we were happy to go along with it quite a long way, in the end, there was just a little bit too much difference between us.
00:09:59 Some of our constitutional traditions, the ways that they thought of things, the balance between the individual and the state, the attitudes to regulation and the freedom and the balance between diversity of approaches and the level playing field.
00:10:18 It isn't that the Europeans were enormously distant from us.
00:10:21 They're much more similar to us than the Japanese or some others.
00:10:24 But they were different enough that we found that we couldn't quite go along with it.
00:10:28 And if you think, from a British perspective, that that's why we're leaving the EU, that they were pretty happy to be together with medium-sized countries of similar values and by working together we can achieve more than we would individually, but found that in the end we just couldn't quite go along with it.
00:10:45 The natural thing from the British point of view is to think, well, is there anyone else out there that might be more similar to us, that we might not face that particular barrier of finding that in the end we couldn't take that final step?
00:10:57 And I think if you frame the question in that way, it answers itself.
00:11:01 There's nobody in the world that's remotely as close to the UK as the New Zealanders, Australians and Canadians.
00:11:08 So that's the natural thing for us to try doing in that context.
00:11:11 And I think that the one important feature of that relative to the European Union is because we have natural affinities, it won't be necessary to impose the same kind of one-size-fits-all approach.
00:11:25 Within the European Union, they were trying to force together countries that had quite different political traditions, cultural traditions, in many cases had been at war with each other historically.
00:11:35 So they had to overcome natural antipathies rather than natural alignments.
00:11:41 Whereas in the case of the Kansak countries, you don't need to do any of that.
00:11:46 And so I don't think we would need to have anything like the same forcing of regulatory convergence, legal convergence.
00:11:54 These things will just happen quite naturally.
00:11:55 That doesn't mean you wouldn't have any institutions at all.
00:11:58 I mean, even the UN has some kind of institutions.
00:12:01 But it does mean that the things that you had wouldn't be anything like the European Union's agenda at all.
00:12:07 To bring it back to that very idea that seemed to drive Brexit for so many people, there was a lot that certainly in Western press coverage we were seeing that was framing it as about immigration wholly or about, you know, just this populist wave that we're seeing in other parts of the world really coming home to roost in the UK.
00:12:25 And there were, I think, a number of people that were saying that the arguments for Brexit on the immigration, on the anti-elite, on the populism were in spite of the economics of it.
00:12:36 Whereas there was this entire other stream that I don't think got as much play outside of the UK and perhaps not even in the UK in some of the media coverage, which was that it was an economically positive move or even in some cases economically neutral, but not as catastrophic as some of the remain alarmists were saying.
00:12:53 And we've now seen a little bit of a bump, I'd say, or I'd say a negative bump immediately in sort of that shock reaction to the Brexit vote, which seemed to rebound in terms of the markets.
00:13:06 But when we look at the economics of this, what's the part of the story that you find is missing from the people that say a leave, a true Brexit is going to be economically disastrous?
00:13:17 OK, so two things there. First of all, just a little point about the immigration.
00:13:22 So the immigration issue, I think, should be understood as being the most retail or the most everyday life version of the loss of sovereignty.
00:13:32 So when people said, oh, well, we've lost sovereignty and that means that we don't have the ability to set some obscure piece of financial services regulation or some engineering company can't do quite what they want to do, that all might seem for most people very distant to them.
00:13:47 They don't quite know what that means or why they would care.
00:13:50 But when the government says, well, we would like to keep immigration to the tens of thousands instead of the hundreds of thousands, and then every year it's the hundreds of thousands, and the government says, well, that's because the EU says we have to let lots of people in.
00:14:05 And actually, for all the talk that much of the net immigration from outside the EU is larger than the EU, it's actually the EU bit, which hasn't worked out as the government expected, that tells people what losing sovereignty means.
00:14:22 What losing sovereignty means is our government can't do what it wants to do.
00:14:28 And people see that. People visibly see that in their neighborhoods and in their communities.
00:14:31 And that, of course, then translates, that then gives them a sense of what that might mean for the businesses and so on and other parts.
00:14:38 So I see the immigration question as just a reflection, a retail version of the sovereignty question.
00:14:44 And that has implications for all kinds of business regulation and lots of other things as well.
00:14:50 Now, the thing that I would say about the economics of Brexit,
00:14:55 I don't think you should assume that Brexit is going to make a large difference economically either way.
00:15:02 So it isn't really about we leave the EU so as to make some enormous, at least in the short term, economic gain.
00:15:10 I think that would be a mistake to imagine that's the point.
00:15:12 The key thing about the economics of Brexit is that they're not sufficiently negative to deter us from grasping the very considerable self-determination opportunities,
00:15:23 the increased stability of the union, less likelihood of Scotland leaving, for example, now that we're leaving the EU,
00:15:30 and a greater ability to direct and choose the sort of structure of economy that we want.
00:15:37 So it gives us more control over what we do, for good or ill.
00:15:41 We might well use it to screw up.
00:15:43 We might elect Jeremy Corbyn and do all kinds of catastrophic things.
00:15:48 Absolutely, that's the choice that you make by increasing your freedom.
00:15:52 You increase your freedom to make errors as well.
00:15:55 But that's our call.
00:15:58 I rather like the, so there used to be a famous saying of Chesterton's that there were two kinds of activities in life.
00:16:06 So one was things like being a polar explorer, which if somebody did it, you'd rather he did it well.
00:16:12 Whereas another thing he said was like blowing your nose, that once you're past being a child,
00:16:18 we'd rather a person blows his nose for himself, be he ever so bad at doing it.
00:16:23 And the point of that is that the key things that we would want to do for ourselves post-Brexit,
00:16:30 the way we manage our economy and our society and so on, are like that blowing of our nose.
00:16:34 Whether we do it well or whether we do it badly, we want to do it for ourselves.
00:16:39 And when we think of the economics of that, though, it's a mistake, I think, to imagine that,
00:16:46 first of all, it's a mistake to think that the EU is primarily a trade deal.
00:16:50 It isn't a trading agreement.
00:16:51 It's a political union.
00:16:52 That's the point of it.
00:16:53 And so by leaving the European Union, the key loss that you make is losing having the EU set your policy for you.
00:17:01 Because the EU is quite good at setting policies in all kinds of ways.
00:17:04 And most of the countries that you benefit from that, if you're Italy or if you're Poland or lots of other countries,
00:17:09 the fact that the EU overrides your national government and makes you do various things
00:17:13 that your political system wouldn't choose to do for itself, is an enormous gain.
00:17:18 For us, not so much.
00:17:19 At least we hope that we can outperform the EU in terms of the things which are best for us by making choices for ourselves.
00:17:28 So one of the things that you should expect is, it won't happen straight away,
00:17:32 but over time, as new things turn up to do, we would expect that by doing them our own slightly different way,
00:17:40 we will end up doing them better.
00:17:42 Now one illustration of that is, many of the things that the EU has done,
00:17:48 part of the EU's traditions involved a ratchet.
00:17:51 So once any measure is in place, it's enormously difficult to undo it, to reverse it.
00:17:55 Because you have to get 28 sets of countries, 28 sets of ducks in a row, in order to decide to undo it.
00:18:02 Now that means that either the EU is sometimes deterred from acting early enough when it should,
00:18:09 or it acts, and if it's not clear what the right thing to do is, it can get it wrong and be stuck with that.
00:18:15 Whereas the British political system, for good or real, and it leads to lots of political controversy of various sorts,
00:18:24 is very good at U-turns.
00:18:25 So we try something, we got it wrong, we'll go back, we have another go, we try it again.
00:18:29 So people have a sense of being empowered to try and experiment to make mistakes.
00:18:34 When the best things to do are obvious, like reducing tariffs or stripping away non-tariff barriers in well-trailed areas.
00:18:41 Should be obvious anyway.
00:18:43 Yeah.
00:18:43 When the best things to do are obvious, then there are advantages in the ratchet process.
00:18:48 You don't want the forces of reaction.
00:18:50 Once you've finally decided to strip away that silly agricultural subsidy or whatever,
00:18:54 you don't want the forces of reaction coming in and saying, oh, that's going to destroy everything, we best undo that measure.
00:19:01 Whereas, if you don't know what the best thing to do is, if you're working out how to regulate something completely new,
00:19:08 commercial exploitation of space or artificial intelligence or driverless cars or vaping or green technologies or hyperloop systems,
00:19:19 or all kinds of things that will turn up in the future, if you don't know what the best way to regulate is,
00:19:24 there are enormous advantages in being able to experiment, get it wrong, and have another try.
00:19:29 And I think that the UK has a considerable opportunity over the next decade or 15 years
00:19:35 to become a world leader in the regulation of many of these new and emerging technologies.
00:19:39 It will be able, through experimentation, through getting it wrong and trying again,
00:19:43 to move faster, to be more flexible than the EU, and it will gain from that kind of regulation.
00:19:48 A second set of areas where we should be able to gain relative to the EU is that we will be able to do trade deals
00:19:55 with countries that the EU would struggle to do trade deals with.
00:19:59 Now, it isn't that the EU is disastrously bad, but the EU gets a bit of a bad press on trade deals
00:20:03 because the EU, for many years, was quite a keen supporter of the global process.
00:20:10 So it was hoping to force things through at the global level rather than making specific deals.
00:20:16 Then it switched to doing specific deals later.
00:20:19 But nonetheless, I think that the fact that the average US trade deal takes about 18 months to,
00:20:24 whereas the average EU trade deal is, what, seven years or something,
00:20:27 is rather telling of the difficulties that you have when you have to get so many different interests to agree in order to do anything.
00:20:34 And so I would expect that the UK will make quite a rapid trade deal with the United States, with Australia.
00:20:44 It may well do trade deals with Japan, even though the EU already has a draft agreement with Japan.
00:20:51 It may well be that the UK gets its agreement through finally with Japan before the EU does.
00:20:58 Because as things stand, even the Canadian deal is in question, with the Italians at this stage saying that.
00:21:05 Even when you get that far down the road, the EU still looks like it might reverse certain trade deals.
00:21:11 You can't really imagine that happening with the UK.
00:21:13 So the UK will do extra trade deals around the different countries.
00:21:17 So a second area, as well as better regulation, will be better trade deals.
00:21:22 A third area, which is quite important for us, is I think that by being in the EU, we tended to destabilise it.
00:21:29 So the EU tried for far too long to accommodate the possibility that the UK might eventually join the euro.
00:21:36 And by doing that, it progressed political integration within the eurozone too slowly.
00:21:43 It should have moved some years, a decade and more ago, towards an elected president, a treasury function, debt raising at euro level,
00:21:53 which was properly backed by the EU, sorry, by the ECB, by the European Central Bank, backing the sovereign debt of the EU.
00:22:02 And the fact that it didn't move down those proper governance paths that were required to make the currency stable,
00:22:09 has led to some of the problems that you had with the eurozone.
00:22:11 And I believe, and I hope, that with the UK leaving, that really strips out, that guts the non-euro EU.
00:22:21 There's really, after the UK, there's really only Poland left that's still a serious non-euro EU member.
00:22:30 Which, no offense to Poland, doesn't have the same implications as the UK.
00:22:33 Exactly.
00:22:34 It's not nearly so significant.
00:22:36 It's still big, but it's not nearly as big as the UK.
00:22:40 And so I would expect that what will happen is, now that the UK is left quite quickly, say, by 2025,
00:22:48 all the countries who are in the EU will have to choose between joining the euro
00:22:54 or being rolled together with Norway into a second tier of EEA slash non-euro EU.
00:23:01 That'll all just become one thing.
00:23:03 Incidentally, by the way, I think that that would probably have happened, even with the UK in the EU.
00:23:11 I think that would have eventually happened, which is one reason why it's silly to suggest that we leave the EU and then go for a Norway-type model or a Norway-plus-customers-union-type model or any of those kind of things.
00:23:23 Being a bit like Norway is where we would have ended up if we remained in the EU.
00:23:27 So it would have come full circle to had no Brexit happened in the first place.
00:23:31 Exactly.
00:23:31 So I don't understand what the point is of leaving the EU in order to get us to where we would have been if we'd stayed in the EU.
00:23:38 And that...
00:23:38 But just coming in terms of what's an advantage.
00:23:41 So if the EU integrates better politically, then I think that that will enable it to grow faster, which is good for us because we'll be able to export more to it.
00:23:49 So that's a third area of growth.
00:23:50 Just a couple more quick ones.
00:23:52 Yes, absolutely.
00:23:53 So we obviously won't have to make our... send money to the EU, so that will save us some money.
00:23:58 So although I have every confidence that the government will spend the same money incompetently, it will at least spend the money incompetently within the UK.
00:24:06 It's like the nose blowing.
00:24:07 At least they're doing it here.
00:24:08 Instead of somewhere else.
00:24:09 Exactly.
00:24:10 So the government will squander lots of money in the UK instead of squandering money in, you know, Italy or Bulgaria or wherever.
00:24:16 Poland, yeah.
00:24:20 Quite an important thing is it'll make the union more secure.
00:24:24 So we're less likely now that over the medium term Scotland will end up leaving the United Kingdom.
00:24:30 It's a much bigger step for it to leave the UK if we're outside the EU than it would have been if we were both inside the EU.
00:24:37 So even though I think, I mean, we won fairly handily 11% in 2014 to maintain the union, it's whatever residual risk there was that eventually Scotland might leave.
00:24:50 It's probably been eliminated by four, you know, who can say after 30 years ahead, but probably for the next 30 years, there's not much chance now that Scotland will leave.
00:25:00 So that, again, that increased stability to the union is another potentially important economic gain, quite apart from the political and other kinds of gains associated with it.
00:25:10 Those are a few.
00:25:11 There are some other things we could carry on all day.
00:25:12 But that gives you some sense.
00:25:15 Now, I expect that those, one thing about that is it's lots of different little sorts.
00:25:19 What people want in economic arguments, they don't want anything as complicated as there are nine ways you gain or something.
00:25:25 What they want to do is they want to say, well, we estimate that you lose this amount of trade by leaving the EU with the EU and we want the one factor that balances that.
00:25:34 But it isn't like that.
00:25:35 In fact, it isn't that when you are taking control of your ability to execute policy right across the board, it isn't about there being one thing that you object to.
00:25:45 No, and that speaks to, I think, how linked to the point of excess the EU has become in all of these different areas that should be sovereign United Kingdom areas and files.
00:25:57 And I guess that brings us to a question I want to close on that I fear the answer to, but I have to ask it nonetheless.
00:26:04 Are you, given the current political and economic climate, confident or, dare I say, optimistic that what you would like to see happen with Brexit actually happens in March?
00:26:16 What would have been best would have been if we'd been able to do a fairly rapid free trade agreement with the EU.
00:26:23 I don't think it was absolutely crucial, but that would have been the best scenario.
00:26:26 I think it's now, we're now probably looking at 60 to 70% chance of no deal at all.
00:26:33 And there's a pretty high probability, perhaps 25%, that we just tough out no deal.
00:26:40 And so it's like both sides decide that they don't like each other that much for the medium term.
00:26:45 Perhaps 35%, maybe a percent probability.
00:26:49 The single most likely thing is that we have no deal, and then fairly quickly we cobble together some sort of face-saving just enough that we get along.
00:26:58 Just to tie this over even until a bigger deal could happen.
00:27:01 Well, yeah, I mean, not necessarily committing to any longer term deal.
00:27:06 Maybe some very vague political commitment to seek to have no tariffs at some point in the future.
00:27:12 But nothing, but some very minimalist kind of arrangement.
00:27:15 I think that those sorts of no deal scenarios are the most likely now, and they're not that desirable.
00:27:21 But I didn't, no, to me, we aren't leaving the EU in order to have a deal with the EU.
00:27:26 So if we don't have a deal with the EU straight away, I don't think that should be considered to be that much of a problem.
00:27:31 But are you optimistic that the sovereignty that the Leave campaigners sought will actually be realized?
00:27:39 Well, it does in a no deal scenario, right?
00:27:41 And apart from no deal scenarios, there's some probability still that the EU panics a bit and we end up with a Canada Plus.
00:27:49 That's what we refer to our preferred free trade agreements as by the model of the Canadian deal with the EU.
00:27:58 So there's a non-tributeal chance of that.
00:28:01 There are some, there's some outside chance that we end up with some quite bad thing happening,
00:28:06 like committing to remain in the customs union over the long term or something of that sort.
00:28:12 There's some risks that we end up with with those scenarios.
00:28:15 Because, again, politicians might panic and we might end up with an EEA plus customs union thing for quite a long time.
00:28:22 I think that that would simply lead to a Brexit 2.0 movement where we'd have another movement to try to get us out of that over the medium term
00:28:32 because it would be so restrictive.
00:28:34 And as I say, that would, all that that would achieve is to get us two or three years earlier to exactly where we would have ended up if we'd remained in the EU anyway.
00:28:42 So there's absolutely no point in committing to an EEA plus customs union arrangement over the medium term.
00:28:48 It's just silliness.
00:28:50 I think that the likelihood is that we will end up with either a no deal or a Canada Plus tight deal in the short term.
00:28:59 That's the vast majority of the probability.
00:29:01 If we don't do that, then most of the rest of the probability is we end up, we have a Brexit 2.0
00:29:07 and after another six painful years of arguing about this, we finally get ourselves out.
00:29:13 I think that would be quite bad for British politics to carry on.
00:29:18 It's been quite bad.
00:29:19 It's a fairly toxic political environment we've had for the past couple of years, even as things stand.
00:29:24 And I've never seen anything like the unwillingness of the Remain side to accept that they lost in this particular campaign.
00:29:32 I've never seen – and that's just – politics doesn't really work if you don't accept that the other team can win.
00:29:38 And I don't think the Remainers have really accepted that the – some of them have, right?
00:29:43 There's been a reasonable number of had, but there's been a hard core of Remainers who've just refused to accept that they lost.
00:29:49 And I find that extraordinary.
00:29:51 And if we were to establish that, if we were to have, say, a second referendum or something like that, that could really poison UK politics for a very long time.
00:29:59 So I really hope that that doesn't happen.
00:30:02 But as things stand, I would say the most likely scenario is no deal or perhaps a Canada Plus deal.
00:30:09 If there's no deal, we'll end up with a Canada Plus deal in a few years' time.
00:30:13 I really hope it doesn't have to make more than page four of the papers.
00:30:16 And like a true economist, I ask a yes or no question and I get an answer with probabilities, which I like.
00:30:20 So we've got the options.
00:30:22 Dr. Andrew Lillico, thank you very much for your time and insight.
00:30:25 I really appreciate it.
00:30:26 You're welcome.
00:30:28 For the True North Initiative, I'm Andrew Lutton.
00:30:29 Thank you.
00:30:35 Thank you.
00:30:36 Thank you.