Loomer Unleashed - EP134: EXPOSED: Microsoft Allowed China Access To DOD Cyber Systems

00:20:26.000 There is a young female journalist, conservative journalist by the name of Laura Loomer.

00:20:35.000 If America's men acted like Laura Loomer, our problems will be fixed in about five minutes. 0.95

00:20:41.000 Chained herself to Twitter.

00:20:42.000 She chained herself to Twitter.

00:21:33.000 Good evening, and welcome to tonight's episode of Loomer Unleashed.

00:21:36.000 I'm your host, Laura Loomer.

00:21:38.000 We are live right now on Rumble and X, so please be sure that you head on over to rumble.com/slash Laura Loomer.

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00:22:27.000 We have a lot to talk about tonight.

00:22:30.000 I've been in communication with a Navy whistleblower by the name of Tom Schiller, and he has uncovered and exposed something quite extraordinary.

00:22:42.000 Over the last few weeks, I've been in communication with Tom discussing his findings.

00:22:48.000 And we're going to talk about it tonight, but really also just the obstruction within our own government and layers of chain of command and how difficult it is to expose bad actors, how bad it is to expose issues surrounding a vetting crisis, and how hard it is to expose wrongdoing within the United States government.

00:23:11.000 It seems like it's an impossible task to accomplish.

00:23:14.000 And this is a frustration that I personally feel just in my own capacity as an independent journalist, trying to expose Biden holdovers and trying to identify bad actors who are buried within certain agencies.

00:23:27.000 And it takes months and months and months, even with the access that I have.

00:23:31.000 I mean, I have enormous political access.

00:23:33.000 And so I can't imagine how frustrating it is for the average American who is in a role.

00:23:39.000 Perhaps they are a whistleblower within the Army or the Navy or within some type of government agency and just how difficult it is to be ignored and not listened to and to be stonewalled while you are trying to expose wrongdoing.

00:23:56.000 And we're going to have a very extensive and long conversation with my guest, Tom Schiller, tonight.

00:24:03.000 But what I want you to take away from this conversation when I bring Tom on is how long the issue that we discussed tonight has been ongoing.

00:24:18.000 And then just think to yourself, when you're listening to Tom tell his story and expose what he's recently uncovered within our Department of Defense and their contract with Microsoft and how Microsoft has been allowing for Chinese engineers without the DOD claiming, well, the DOD claims they've had no knowledge, right?

00:24:38.000 I mean, it wouldn't surprise me if the DOD is lying because, hey, who could ever imagine, right?

00:24:43.000 Our own government's lying.

00:24:45.000 But this is an ongoing issue that you're going to be exposed to tonight, something that has been happening at the expense of our national security for the last 10 years.

00:24:56.000 And my next guest joining me now to discuss his expose of China's infiltration of our Pentagon cyber defense systems is Tom Schiller, who is the CEO of Next Defense and also a Navy whistleblower.

00:25:12.000 So Tom, thank you so much for joining me tonight.

00:25:14.000 It's a pleasure to have you here.

00:25:16.000 I know you and I have been in communication for several weeks now, and I've been trying to point you in the right direction.

00:25:23.000 And, you know, we had some internal conversations about the sensitivity of this information and whether or not it would be even wise to release this information publicly, given the foreign adversaries involved in the national security implications,

00:25:39.000 if this became public and if our adversary China became aware that people were finally aware of this hidden, dark, deep secret that has been hidden within the Pentagon and the Department of Defense for the last decade, a relic of the administration of Barack Hussein Obama.

00:25:59.000 So I just want to Give you an opportunity to tell our viewers a little bit about yourself and why you decided to, I guess, reach out to me.

00:26:08.000 And really, you've reached out to so many people.

00:26:10.000 And we're going to get into all of this tonight because I think it's pretty shocking.

00:26:14.000 And I want you to name names and say who in the government you contacted about this over the last two years because you've told me that you've been investigating this and trying to bring this to people's attention for two years now.

00:26:28.000 So that's pretty shocking.

00:26:31.000 Well, an overdrive.

00:26:33.000 Yeah, you're to an extent, but yeah, four years, but aggressively these last two years, you have decided to really like ramp up your, ramp up your efforts outside of the nexus of, you know, your chain of command at the Navy.

00:26:47.000 So why don't you just go ahead and tell my viewers about yourself and what you do at the Navy, and then we can dive into this shocking expose.

00:26:58.000 It's really not even received a lot of attention.

00:27:01.000 There's one article in ProPublica about this information, and it doesn't even mention some of the most damning aspects of this whistleblower operation and the extent of the Chinese subversion.

00:27:17.000 But I've decided to dedicate the entire two hours of my program tonight to allowing you to have unlimited time to get all this information out there, right?

00:27:28.000 We don't operate in sound bites like the mainstream media does.

00:27:31.000 I want you to have as much time as you want on my program tonight.

00:27:35.000 It's a two-hour show, sometimes two and a half, if necessary, to tell your story because we're going to clip this and we're going to make sure everybody from Defense Secretary Pete Hegseff to Navy Secretary John Phelan, both of whom I know personally.

00:27:53.000 And I'm going to make sure that this gets to the White House as well because I believe that President Trump needs to see this information.

00:28:00.000 So go ahead.

00:28:02.000 No, I appreciate it.

00:28:03.000 And thanks for having me on the show and for all the effort, you know, helping out with reporting this to people in D.C. and, you know, just everything else.

00:28:11.000 Yeah, it's a long one.

00:28:12.000 You know, ProPublica, they reported kind of more the tip of the iceberg or the mountain that this is.

00:28:19.000 And, you know, as what was mentioned, it's been going on for close to a decade, you know, since 2016.

00:28:25.000 There's evidence I've, you know, tracked and, you know, tried to track down the who, what, when, where, why, et cetera, where it looks like this is started as early as 2014 and 15 when early offerings were done with Microsoft and the United States government.

00:28:40.000 And that's kind of one of the important things to highlight here, too, is it's not just the Department of Defense, it's our entire federal government that's affected by this because every department, every agency is in Microsoft Azure.

00:28:58.000 There's a small sampling of the system.

00:29:01.000 Why don't we start from the beginning and just explain to people what you do, what you do at the Navy, and then we'll start with the basics of what the system is because it's very tech heavy, right?

00:29:12.000 So I want to make sure that people understand all of this because these are kind of complex concepts to understand, like technological concepts, and we're going to walk people through it all.

00:29:22.000 But essentially, you have uncovered the fact that the United States government across all federal agencies uses Microsoft.

00:29:30.000 Microsoft has a very extensive and lucrative contract with the United States government.

00:29:36.000 And per their government, they provide all of the digital infrastructure to the various agencies.

00:29:43.000 And as a result of using Microsoft, right, there are tech support packages.

00:29:49.000 And because different agencies within our federal government have different levels of information, right, depending on whether it's classified or not classified, there are different levels within this Microsoft contract with the federal government that they have to agree to employ individuals with top security clearances to provide the tech support for the various agencies.

00:30:18.000 Now, you can imagine that the highest level of security clearance needed to handle information would revolve around our Intel agencies and also our defense agencies, because those are the levels at which the most classified information is being transmitted across airways and electronically via whether it's work phones or computers via email or some type of cloud storage,

00:30:48.000 you name it, right?

00:30:49.000 The government has all types of ways for communicating, some of which I'm sure that we're not even aware of.

00:30:57.000 So it's important for people to understand that this really, the burden of this and the responsibility of this scandal lies on Microsoft, whether they want to say they were aware or not.

00:31:11.000 It's my understanding that Microsoft is being very cagey and they're not exactly providing a lot of, you know, a lot of statements or a lot of explanation to the media.

00:31:25.000 There really isn't a lot of media coverage on this since the original article came out.

00:31:31.000 And the original article just scratches the surface of how damning this information is and the extent of the information that you've uncovered these last four years.

00:31:41.000 But the name of the system is called Azure.

00:31:47.000 The Microsoft U.S. Government Azure is the technological database which Microsoft manages for the federal government that they have decided to utilize Chinese tech support agents who are located in China for.

00:32:02.000 So just start from what you do at the Navy and how you uncovered this, and then we'll get into the scandal of the cover-up and the lack of action in addressing your concerns as a whistleblower over these last four years and especially over these last two years when you've decided to really ramp up your efforts.

00:32:23.000 Oh, absolutely.

00:32:24.000 So a little bit about myself.

00:32:27.000 You know, I've been in and around the military since About 1997.

00:32:31.000 Started off in the Navy in 97 and was in for about four years over in Japan working as the U.S. Embassy representative.

00:32:39.000 Enjoyed the job, you know, very cool.

00:32:42.000 Then switched over to the Air Force for another four years where I was in cyber, mostly out of Washington State, but deployed overseas, went to PSAP or Prince Solon Air Base when we went into Iraq the second time.

00:32:55.000 Just a whole bunch of different things like that.

00:32:57.000 I took a break in service for a while.

00:32:59.000 I was with the DOD and also as a defense contractor as a GS-15, which is the equivalent of an 06.

00:33:06.000 I was over in Iraq and Afghanistan for a long time managing mission essential operations.

00:33:11.000 Managed the only life-saving mission for the U.S., or the military as a whole, with Operation Horned Owl.

00:33:19.000 You know, managing the systems, the sensors, the aerial, you know, analysts and whatnot that we had.

00:33:27.000 So there was quite a bit and saved a lot of lives, which I'm pretty proud of.

00:33:31.000 But there's been a lot of other accolades like that.

00:33:34.000 In 2018, came back with the Air Force Reserves at first and just switched over to the Navy Reserves back this last September.

00:33:42.000 So been a little bit of bouncing around.

00:33:44.000 I've also helped out like the Space Force for about eight months building software factories.

00:33:50.000 So that's another matter for another day, very similar to this one, but we can touch on that later.

00:33:57.000 But as far as like the Navy, what I do, I do like operations specialists.

00:34:02.000 And actually, I'm going to be starting with a Naval Surface Warfare Center Carderock Division this next year, as soon as the Navy has the funding and whatnot for a lot of these different things.

00:34:13.000 In the meantime, I have my own company as a reservist and doing things on the side.

00:34:19.000 It's called Next Defense.

00:34:21.000 I do a lot of work with various MAJCOM commanders and other generals and whatnot, trying to put together augmented virtual reality training for various MOSs and whatnot.

00:34:33.000 And it's pretty important because we've got a lot of military soldiers, sailors, et cetera, where they just can't get the live training that they need or not as often as they need.

00:34:43.000 So we're trying to augment that by providing virtual reality training.

00:34:48.000 With the concept of it, it's all non-for-profit.

00:34:52.000 And this is actually something I'm trying to help the government and the DOD stand up for them to own and not myself or my company, you know, which currently a lot of other companies do some work with this, with virtual reality training, but they own the software.

00:35:08.000 And it's caused a lot of issues over the years, you know, because updating training and everything else and, you know, coming back and paying more and then them owning it where they can't, the DOD is kind of locked in, they can't switch to another vendor.

00:35:21.000 There's a lot of things like that.

00:35:23.000 But also my path.

00:35:26.000 Oh, no, I was going to say.

00:35:26.000 Sure.

00:35:27.000 And so this contract between Microsoft and our federal government was initiated between 2014 and 2016 under President Barack Hussein Obama.

00:35:39.000 And he's the guy who personally authorized a number of the cybersecurity infrastructure agreements with Microsoft.

00:35:46.000 And then, of course, some of these were later extended to companies like Amazon.

00:35:50.000 And so when did you first discover this national security issue with the fact that Microsoft, per the contract with the federal government that was negotiated by Barack Hussein Obama, was utilizing Chinese foreign nationals to do tech support across all agencies, including at the Pentagon and within our Intel agencies.

00:36:15.000 So I actually found out about this like right away because Microsoft had invited me to come in and interview for the senior most management position with the escort team back in 2016.

00:36:27.000 I think it was June.

00:36:29.000 And came in there.

00:36:31.000 Explain to the viewers what the escort team is.

00:36:34.000 So the escort team is a subcontracted company, staffing company, Insight Global.

00:36:42.000 I have heard that there are a few other companies that do this, but they don't have as much of an online presence.

00:36:47.000 So not sure how they operate or who they are really.

00:36:51.000 But Insight Global, lots of information on that.

00:36:53.000 And that's who I was interviewing with, or through Insight Global with Microsoft.

00:36:58.000 So the escort team, breaking it down, basically they hire personnel that are able to get security clearances, in many cases being reservists, guardsmen, veterans, et cetera.

00:37:15.000 Very Army heavy, you know, folks like that.

00:37:19.000 And when you look into a lot of their backgrounds, they don't come from cybersecurity backgrounds or cyber in general backgrounds.

00:37:26.000 You know, a lot of them have different kind of past records and whatnot that they've done.

00:37:31.000 The most important thing that they decided on was somebody that could get a clearance.

00:37:36.000 That was their biggest prerequisite and could maybe understand PowerShell scripts a little bit.

00:37:44.000 But that's the kind of personnel they brought in.

00:37:47.000 One of the biggest things, I guess maybe it'd be good to just go into like the overview here because we're kind of touching on that quite a bit here too.

00:37:55.000 Yeah, go ahead.

00:37:57.000 So with the overview, and I've broken this down or condensed this as much as possible over the years because I've easily been over, go into like three or four hours of discussing this stuff.

00:38:08.000 So I'll try to be quick.

00:38:10.000 So the background, between 2014 and 2016, President Obama personally authorized a number of cybersecurity infrastructure agreements with Microsoft, later extended to companies such as Amazon.

00:38:22.000 Among authorizations within these agreements was one permitting foreign personnel that did not have, or they did not have U.S. security clearances to operate and manage the U.S. government and Department of Defense cyber infrastructure.

00:38:35.000 Via Microsoft, U.S. government Azure, the only safeguard that Microsoft pitched was the use of an escort team, you know, having escorts that be in place that would supervise, manage, monitor the work being done by the uncleared foreign personnel. 0.99

00:38:53.000 Now, when I first interviewed at Microsoft, which I'll add to this, they made it seem, you know, with me That they pitched the idea to the U.S. government that this would be H-1B visa workers.

00:39:06.000 That was already a red flag.

00:39:08.000 They pitched to the government, allegedly, that they wanted to use their H-1B visa workers because they claimed we've got the best engineers, the best developers, the best.

00:39:18.000 This is so crazy to me, though.

00:39:19.000 Like, you would think that the, I mean, I guess because this took place under Obama, it's not that hard to believe that they would sell us out to us, sell our national security out to a bunch of foreigners. 0.99

00:39:29.000 But it's incredible to think that Microsoft actually presented the idea up front of using foreign workers.

00:39:39.000 And we know that most of these H-1B visa workers come from China and they come from India.

00:39:44.000 And so you'd have a bunch of Indian and Chinese individuals.

00:39:48.000 And we know that in China that the people of China, right, they are required to have a loyalty oath to the Chinese Communist Party.

00:39:56.000 And if you work in industries like tech, you are permitted to collect as much data as possible and hand it over to the CCP.

00:40:06.000 This is expected of you as a citizen of the People's Republic of China.

00:40:11.000 And so I don't think people really understand the implications of this and that if you are working, and this is why the H-1B visa program needs to be completely overhauled and why I'm such a critic of it and why I've been so outspoken about it is because, you know, if you look at all these H-1B visa workers and most of the people employed in Silicon Valley by these big tech giants are H-1B visa workers.

00:40:35.000 It's like 73% of the labor from what I've seen is carried out by H-1B visa workers.

00:40:42.000 So just think about this.

00:40:45.000 All of the personal information that people are sending over the internet and sending in their DMs or posting on social media.

00:40:54.000 And when you ask for tech support, whether it be at Google or whether it be at Microsoft or whether it be at, you know, Amazon or who knows, right?

00:41:03.000 X, Facebook.

00:41:05.000 You think of all these different companies that people use.

00:41:07.000 I don't think a lot of people think of the fact that some Chinese national who has to pledge their allegiance to China, who's on a visa here.

00:41:16.000 And we know that a lot of the people who have visas, whether they be students or people that are working here, they make up what we like to call the fifth column, where it's a workforce.

00:41:27.000 It's like an unofficial citizenry of China operating, right?

00:41:32.000 They call it the fifth column as a spy network for the Chinese Communist Party here in the United States.

00:41:38.000 And so it's kind of a reality check when you think of, and I don't think a lot of people are asking themselves when they put in a support ticket or they have a tech issue.

00:41:49.000 They're not thinking to themselves, who's the person on the other end of the computer that I'm not able to physically see who is able to access all of my personal information, access my code and see what I've been up to, see what I've been sending, see what I've been doing, see the contents of my email, see the contents of my computer.

00:42:10.000 Who is this person that we are giving our personal information to?

00:42:15.000 Whether they ask you to confirm your password or whether they ask you to confirm your username or your social security, all this personal information is being handed over to foreign nationals for the most part. 0.91

00:42:28.000 And while that's disturbing to think of on a personal level, right, just as a regular individual, now imagine the same thing is happening, but with every single employee of the federal government who works in every single agency for the last 10 years, they have been handing over their personal information to Chinese nationals, for the most part, who are doing this overtime tech support. 0.61

00:42:55.000 The tech support is when you, when you describe the escort program, right?

00:42:59.000 And that's why I said for you to explain what the escort program is.

00:43:02.000 Oh, sure.

00:43:03.000 This is a team of individuals within, I mean, I guess various agencies, but as it relates to the Department of Defense, I would imagine that these are people who work within the military, who work in a cyber division, who have a top secret clearance, and they get contracted as part of this contract with Microsoft and the federal government.

00:43:28.000 They get contracted via Microsoft where they're getting paid no more than minimum wage, $15 an hour, maybe, to handle the most classified information that is being transmitted in our country on these databases.

00:43:46.000 And if you are asking for tech support after hours, and we all know that the government operates on a nine-to-five basis, you're going to be transmitted or sent over to some foreign national sitting at a desk in China who is reviewing all of your information.

00:44:04.000 And apparently the Department of Defense, from what you've uncovered, is now saying that they were not aware of this, even though this program, again, it's called Microsoft U.S. Government Azure, has been ongoing for the last 10 years.

00:44:18.000 And so just some facts, and we can discuss this in this overview.

00:44:23.000 Over 98% of foreign personnel involved are located outside of the United States.

00:44:29.000 More than 90% of these foreign personnel operate directly out of China as it relates to the foreign personnel from this government program with Microsoft, Microsoft U.S. government azure.

00:44:43.000 And then this arrangement has effectively allowed Chinese nationals operating from China to access and control critical U.S. government and DOD cyber systems for the last decade. 0.77

00:44:55.000 And so why don't we go through the limitations of the escort system and the concerns that present?

00:45:02.000 Because I'm not a tech person, but you are.

00:45:05.000 And so perhaps you can break it down in layman terms for everybody watching who may not have your technical expertise.

00:45:12.000 But why don't we try to make people understand what the system limitations are in terms of accessing the content and accessing the classified information and the national security concerns that have now been created as a result of Microsoft Azure?

00:45:30.000 Oh, absolutely.

00:45:32.000 So as one thing to correct with the ProPublic article is they were saying this is covering aisle four and five.

00:45:40.000 That's like unclassed, maybe touching on secret, definitely a frustrated, et cetera.

00:45:45.000 However, they were referencing an outdated FedRAMP article from 2017.

00:45:50.000 Since then, they've been granted up to aisle six and top secret.

00:45:54.000 So we're talking about all classification levels.

00:45:57.000 And also earlier this year, just as a segment, Azure AI has also been granted all those same authorization levels.

00:46:04.000 So we're talking about a complete clearance deal.

00:46:10.000 Also talking on that, so with the clearances, we're kind of talking about that earlier, all the things that the escorts have, they are not just cleared by the Department of Defense, they're also cleared through everyone.

00:46:22.000 So everyone that's got a clearance, they've got a DOJ clearance, an FBI clearance, individual clearances with each and every one of the states in the United States.

00:46:31.000 They've got to go through other clearances because of ITAR for international trade and arms regulations, so allied nations, et cetera.

00:46:39.000 Because these escorts have full access to everyone's data across the board, full admin access.

00:46:47.000 And when they open up a VPN session with an engineer based in China per se, they're handing over the reins.

00:46:57.000 They have to review kind of what the ticket is and what the work is involved prior to the session.

00:47:04.000 But during the session, once they've approved of whatever work it is, they're basically opening up that connection and just watching.

00:47:12.000 They're watching as the code goes.

00:47:14.000 They're watching as package, proprietary, closed source stuff is going on, et cetera.

00:47:20.000 They have no insider overview of any of that.

00:47:24.000 But kind of getting back on track, too, with the limitations and concerns.

00:47:28.000 So remote access and control.

00:47:30.000 U.S. escorts virtually escort foreign personnel via VPN, which we're just discussing.

00:47:37.000 Relinquishing control of their laptops, which have full administrative access to Microsoft U.S. government during operations.

00:47:43.000 Limited oversight.

00:47:45.000 Escorts are only permitted to review the PowerShell code, which I've coined as launchpad scripts, initiating proprietary closed source code developed by the aforementioned foreign personnel, which they neither understand nor have access to analyze or vet.

00:48:02.000 As a part of this too, Microsoft came out and tried making excuses, essentially, saying we've got multi-layer security support, you know, lockbox processes, et cetera, et cetera.

00:48:15.000 What they didn't point out, either party, Microsoft or Republica, is that the people that have oversight of this are other global support personnel, also out of China.

00:48:27.000 Insight Global and these escorts have no oversight of lockbox or their multi-fat layer of security infrastructure.

00:48:37.000 They are eyes off, hands off.

00:48:39.000 They have no idea what's going on.

00:48:41.000 And that was also illustrated by the one escort that was saying, we just have to trust these guys and hope they're not doing anything malicious.

00:48:48.000 I mean, that's how crazy it is.

00:48:52.000 Capability gaps.

00:48:53.000 Senior members of the escort team freely admit that escorts cannot interpret the scripts that they do have access to, the PowerShell scripts, and would be equally incapable of assessing proprietary code even if given access.

00:49:06.000 Now, that's coming from myself and three of the senior leadership of the escort team.

00:49:12.000 I won't name names or their positions, but we're talking about the core leadership has said the escorts don't understand code.

00:49:19.000 They're barely able to do their jobs.

00:49:22.000 And that's just a- So if they don't understand code, then that means they wouldn't be able to understand malicious code inserts if when they handed over complete control, right, like sharing your screen or granting somebody the ability, because a lot of times the way this tech support works is you have to download some kind of software and then it allows for somebody else to remote control your computer from another location.

00:49:45.000 That's how a lot of tech support works and people are able to get inside your computer from a faraway land or if you give your computer to even a US-based tech support, they're in your computer and they can examine your computer from a remote location.

00:50:05.000 And this is also how a lot of spyware is installed on computers as well is people who don't know code or they don't know how to code are not going to be able to determine what is regular code from malicious code, especially if it's code from a foreign actor.

00:50:20.000 And so that's a huge problem because it's sounding like the people, and correct me if I'm wrong, because I don't want to diminish anybody's skill set, but it sounds like if these people were truly experts in their field and they were code experts or cybersecurity experts, they would be getting paid probably a lot more than just minimum wage.

00:50:44.000 It sounds like these people are just being paid and contracted out, not for their skill set, but rather the fact that they have a security clearance.

00:50:52.000 Is that a correct assessment?

00:50:55.000 It's even worse than that, too.

00:50:55.000 Oh, absolutely.

00:50:57.000 I mean, one, they're basically hired and paid minimum wage, like you were saying, about $18 to $28 an hour.

00:51:04.000 And the size of the team, Inside Global has got a fixed contract.

00:51:09.000 They make the same money any way you cut it.

00:51:12.000 The size of the team, smaller team, they might be able to pay their people a little bit more.

00:51:17.000 Larger team, they pay their people less.

00:51:20.000 They can't rework that contract, though.

00:51:22.000 So they're really stuck.

00:51:24.000 It's a catch-22 deal.

00:51:26.000 But yeah, and they're based out of Redmond, Washington, which is crazy, you know, because Redmond, Washington and around that area of Washington state is hugely expensive.

00:51:39.000 Housing, 105% above national average.

00:51:42.000 Healthcare, 34% higher, transportation, 30%, groceries, 14%, et cetera, et cetera.

00:51:49.000 But one of the biggest issues, too, which is a huge red flag, is that many of these escorts hold secondary and even third jobs on the side.

00:51:59.000 And we haven't covered this yet, but they all work.

00:52:03.000 Well, we might have actually mentioned this before, but they all work remotely from home.

00:52:07.000 Meaning from home, they have full access to the back end of our governments and departments.

00:52:14.000 And that's a massive problem because if you were to be accessing classified information in Washington, D.C. within the federal government, you would have to be in some type of skiff.

00:52:24.000 So it's pretty crazy to think that people can just be operating these jobs.

00:52:27.000 And if you're thinking of, you know, I imagine a lot of these are young guys, like young kids, right?

00:52:32.000 When I say kids, I mean like people who are like in their, in their early 20s, late 20s, maybe early 30s, right?

00:52:39.000 And if you are making minimum wage in this economy and you're living in a place that far exceeds your income, right?

00:52:52.000 In terms of your quality standard of living, then chances are you're going to have roommates or maybe you live in a place that isn't so nice and the walls are paper thin, right?

00:53:05.000 And some of these like really shoddy apartment complexes.

00:53:11.000 And I'm not trying to criticize people's standard of living, but the facts are is if you're if you're not using headphones or if you have people around you, people could walk around, they could see the type of information that you're discussing.

00:53:24.000 So essentially our classified information here in the United States is being broadcasted to people from the comfort of their own home.

00:53:34.000 And who knows if they're even using like a VPN or what kind of security measures they're taking.

00:53:39.000 The fact that they're taking classified information home with them and they're able to work from home without the proper protections in place that would be established through a SCIF, it's pretty shocking.

00:53:52.000 It's pretty shocking.

00:53:53.000 There's so many elements of this program that are just completely shocked.

00:53:57.000 It just seems almost unbelievable when you examine all these facts and all these findings that you've uncovered.

00:54:04.000 It just seems like it would be a major violation.

00:54:09.000 And my question is, is how has this been allowed to take place for the last 10 years?

00:54:15.000 And what type of, how many, how many foreign actors, what I would like to know is how many bad foreign actors have been aware of this program and have tried to infiltrate?

00:54:25.000 Or how many bad domestic actors have been aware of this program and have tried to infiltrate on behalf of a foreign government, right?

00:54:33.000 When we talk about people being targeted or recruited by foreign governments or foreign intel agencies to serve as operatives, we've seen members of the military defect.

00:54:45.000 We've seen members of the military be charged for giving classified information to China before.

00:54:52.000 We have seen members of our intel agencies in the past leaking classified information.

00:54:59.000 I mean, this doesn't get reported as much as it should, but it happens on a pretty frequent basis.

00:55:06.000 Oh, yeah.

00:55:07.000 Yeah, it just happened, what, a month ago, I think, with the Abraham Lincoln, where a sailor on board, I think it was an Intel or something else of that nature, trying to sell information to China, you know, took it out of the skiff or whatever else and just was like, hey, can you pay me for this?

00:55:23.000 But it happens.

00:55:24.000 And going back to, you know, the environments, the home environments that the escorts work in, accidents happen or violations definitely happen.

00:55:33.000 There's been instances where kids have gotten on the laptops when mom or dad, the escort was away, installed video games and whatnot, you know, and doing like chat and, you know, other kind of stuff.

00:55:46.000 Well, this is the reason why.

00:55:47.000 This is the reason why, if you're in the military, this was established several years ago.

00:55:53.000 I think this happened under the Trump administration.

00:55:55.000 They said that your kids are not allowed to have TikTok on their phones, right?

00:56:02.000 If they live in the same home as you because of spyware.

00:56:04.000 And so, you know, if they have rules for certain members of our Intel agencies, depending on who you are, right?

00:56:15.000 Your children are not allowed to have TikTok downloaded on any of their devices inside your home because it's Chinese spyware. 1.00

00:56:22.000 And so it makes you wonder, one, who's in compliance with these rules?

00:56:26.000 And two, right, obviously, like, there's no compliance whatsoever that's been established for this program because if there were, right, the first line of order would be, don't take classified information home with you.

00:56:38.000 They would have some kind of a designated area in Washington state where you would have to use a badge to clock in and you probably wouldn't be able to take your device or your computer home with you.

00:56:50.000 You probably would have to use it within the room so that it wouldn't be contaminated or somehow hacked or infiltrated.

00:56:59.000 Yeah.

00:57:00.000 No, and it's pretty bad.

00:57:01.000 Like the bulk, if not all, of our armed forces are actually out of compliance, you know, as far as like communications and whatnot that are on their phones.

00:57:10.000 You know, it's mandated that DOD personnel, and I think government-wide really, they're not supposed to and not allowed to be using anything that's not authorized by, say, the DOD.

00:57:22.000 GroupMe or Signal or any of the rest of these are not authorized, and yet all of the various commands and their personnel use them.

00:57:31.000 You know, it is a violation.

00:57:32.000 It is a UCMJ or Uniform Code of Military Justice violation.

00:57:36.000 It's mandated by the branch CIO offices and by the DOD CIO office.

00:57:43.000 They all violate it.

00:57:44.000 And it's because nobody up in those offices is actually making sure that doesn't go on or punishing.

00:57:53.000 I mean, going to commanders and going to commands and finding out, okay, I sent out this mandate.

00:57:59.000 You guys aren't supposed to be using this, are you?

00:58:01.000 And then finding out it does, and then there should be punishment, you know?

00:58:04.000 But nobody's doing anything.

00:58:07.000 So it's pretty rampant.

00:58:08.000 And I think it's created a culture where service members, DOD, government-wide, they just go with the flow.

00:58:17.000 So if they're told, hey, we're using this, even though it's not authorized, they just do it because everybody else is doing it.

00:58:24.000 And that's kind of what has probably created like the Microsoft issue in a lot of ways too.

00:58:29.000 You Know people, well, I think a lot of people know about this.

00:58:33.000 The escorts absolutely know about this.

00:58:35.000 Now, Republica, they reported the one team of 50 people.

00:58:39.000 There's actually four teams over there of about 200 people.

00:58:43.000 And there is a suspicion of about 10 more teams with other companies.

00:58:48.000 So we're talking anywhere between 200 to 700 escorts working daily with folks in China and whatnot.

00:58:55.000 But all of these escorts, none of them have came forward.

00:58:59.000 I had to actually reach out to three of these folks, you know, senior leadership, and convince them to come and speak with the DOG, or I'm sorry, with the DISA OIG office and actually give depositions and reports.

00:59:12.000 They would not talk to the press or anything else.

00:59:14.000 They didn't want their names out there, et cetera, which I respect.

00:59:17.000 But I had to come to them.

00:59:19.000 They didn't come out on their own. 0.97

00:59:21.000 And it's the same with the whole damn team of all that 200 to 700 some odd people, you know, because nobody's ever heard of this, you know. 0.98

00:59:29.000 But I digress. 0.97

00:59:32.000 So other limitations, you know, well, actually, let's kind of go into further.

00:59:37.000 Export, I'm sorry, experience deficit.

00:59:40.000 Like I was saying, they lack backgrounds in cyber security and IT, multiple jobs, we mentioned, work from home, mentioned.

00:59:47.000 That's a big one.

00:59:48.000 And like you were saying with the SCIF thing, that was one of the first questions I asked for the senior most management position managing that team back in 2016 is, is Microsoft going to be providing a SCIF or a secure facility for these escorts?

01:00:03.000 And they told me no.

01:00:05.000 At first, we're going to have everybody working out of the Bravern, which is a building in downtown Bellevue there, which they own.

01:00:10.000 And I'm like, well, is this Flores going to be secure?

01:00:13.000 What's involved here?

01:00:15.000 Very light security, not much involved.

01:00:18.000 But they said eventually they were going to set up more secure facilities at the proper campus in Redmond.

01:00:25.000 That never happened because all the escorts work from home. 0.93

01:00:29.000 So none of that came to pass.

01:00:34.000 Yeah, there's a lot.

01:00:36.000 So going into like the historical context, if you want to kind of branch off into that a little bit.

01:00:43.000 Yeah, I want to take a moment first to take a quick commercial break to thank the sponsor of tonight's episode of Loomer Unleashed, and then we're going to continue with this.

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01:02:57.000 All right, back to our interview with Navy whistleblower Tom Schiller.

01:03:02.000 Tom, I want to get into the role of the individuals within the Obama administration who allowed for this to happen.

01:03:12.000 I know we said we wanted to name some names tonight.

01:03:14.000 And so if there are any individuals who you think bear most of the responsibility for this, I'd love to hear your insight because eventually when there is, if there is, and I hope there is an investigation into how this happened and how the Microsoft Azure system is currently operating across our federal government, I mean, you're telling me that this also includes the United States Secret Service as well.

01:03:41.000 The United States Secret Service is also using this.

01:03:45.000 As far as I know, all of our government uses it.

01:03:48.000 That's a huge problem.

01:03:49.000 That's a huge problem because then essentially the Chinese, who we know are buddy-buddy with Russia and Iran, they could be accessing this information and turning over information as it relates to the security and the safety of the President of the United States to our adversaries. 0.90

01:04:06.000 And this comes at a time where we are experiencing hostilities with China.

01:04:12.000 And also, we have seen that Iran is fiercely denying the fact that they have tried to assassinate President Trump at least two times now.

01:04:22.000 We know that Iran has tried to assassinate President Trump on multiple occasions.

01:04:28.000 They chant death to America constantly. 0.51

01:04:30.000 They chant death to Israel constantly.

01:04:33.000 And so this is very concerning because you have to ask yourself, how much information have they been able to acquire across all the various federal agencies these last 10 years?

01:04:44.000 And what are they doing with this information?

01:04:48.000 Yeah.

01:04:49.000 And the thing is, there's indicators that they have all of it, you know, that they're fully in.

01:04:54.000 And that was also confirmed by former director of the FBI, you know, Ray, where he said they're fully infiltrated in our infrastructure.

01:05:04.000 And I believe it too.

01:05:05.000 I mean, I went back, you know, circling back to after 2016 in that interview, they offered me the job to run the team, hire people, et cetera.

01:05:14.000 I turned it down because of what this is.

01:05:18.000 I was like, this is too many red flags.

01:05:20.000 This has got to be illegal.

01:05:21.000 And one of the first places I reached out to was the FBI, sending in reports right on the day, right after the interview, reached out to the FBI in 2016.

01:05:30.000 So it's been a long time for porting.

01:05:34.000 But the fact that Director Wray, former Director Ray, is saying they're fully in everything else.

01:05:41.000 I'm suspecting he might have been basing that off of reports that I put in because I put in a lot of FBI reports.

01:05:48.000 I think it was every three to six months I'd circle back, reach back out, submit new stuff, you know, and this went on for a good eight years of the reporting efforts.

01:05:58.000 So it's quite a bit.

01:06:00.000 I'd be very shocked if it didn't reach the director at some point.

01:06:04.000 So he may be basing things off or did base things off of my reporting efforts. 0.81

01:06:10.000 The key people that I suspect are behind this damn thing, the number one person, if this is investigated, is Craig Mundy.

01:06:21.000 Historical context, who Craig Mundy is, he was the former science advisor to President Obama while simultaneously being the senior advisor to the CEO of Microsoft. 0.96

01:06:33.000 He was formerly referred to as the man behind Microsoft, and he was attributed with being the decision maker for Microsoft's China strategy for 13 of the company's 18 years in China market as of 2010.

01:06:50.000 Now, he continued in this role, too, for a couple more years, so it was much more than just the 13 years.

01:06:55.000 I consider him to be the key person of interest, aside from APOM himself, likely the principal architect and facilitator of the aforementioned agreements between Obama and Microsoft.

01:07:08.000 And so this Craig Mundy individual, are you saying then he's the decision maker?

01:07:13.000 He was the one who was ultimately the decision maker about whether or not under the Obama administration, this contract between the U.S. federal government and Microsoft was going to be formalized?

01:07:27.000 That's unknown.

01:07:28.000 I mean, I've seen a lot of indicators and things, you know, referenced online, articles, et cetera, that does pinpoint him with many of these meetings that happened.

01:07:38.000 And he would have been the person in that position that he was in to be making these decisions.

01:07:44.000 I mean, especially when he's being attributed as the decision maker for Microsoft's Trina strategy and the man behind Microsoft.

01:07:52.000 You know, when he's running the show over there Wait, wait, wait, wait, wait, wait, wait, wait.

01:08:05.000 Yep, that's what he was.

01:08:06.000 And then he was a science advisor to Obama while being an advisor on China, the Microsoft.

01:08:16.000 So, yeah, all of this at the same time.

01:08:19.000 It's crazy.

01:08:20.000 It's so crazy how infiltrated we are.

01:08:22.000 It is so crazy how infiltrated we are, whether it's with the Biden family and all of their associations with China.

01:08:28.000 I mean, this is incredible what you're telling me that Craig Mundy was the former science advisor to President Barack Hussein Obama.

01:08:37.000 And then at the same time, Craig Mundy is the guy who was behind the strategy for Microsoft to get involved with China and who facilitated their relationship with China.

01:08:50.000 How does somebody like that become a senior advisor to the president of the United States?

01:08:56.000 Money.

01:08:58.000 I mean, Microsoft, and I've kind of went into this in other reporting too, but they were the biggest attributors to Obama's campaign, you know, to get in as a president.

01:09:09.000 And it was against a lot of their best interest because Obama was running on raising taxes of people making over, I think it was $250,000 a year or something like that.

01:09:19.000 So they went against their best interest.

01:09:22.000 It didn't make much sense until he got elected and he put his cabinet together with a whole bunch of lobbyists, including Craig Mundy, who is from Microsoft.

01:09:32.000 And they also brought in some other folks, person from Google and some other big tech companies.

01:09:39.000 But these were the decision makers that came in in Obama's administration.

01:09:44.000 And Craig Mundy was essentially the chair.

01:09:47.000 He was the head decision maker for this little party going on.

01:09:52.000 At the same time, and it wasn't right off the bat that he became the senior advisor to the CEO of Microsoft.

01:09:58.000 He was promoted to that role like a few years after coming on as the science advisor to Obama.

01:10:04.000 So where is Craig Mundy today?

01:10:06.000 Is he still in his position?

01:10:07.000 Is he retired?

01:10:08.000 What does he do now?

01:10:10.000 So he's an interesting character.

01:10:13.000 Yeah, he's still very much involved.

01:10:15.000 He is a senior advisor still for Microsoft and for OpenAI and a number of other places.

01:10:22.000 In fact, he just put together a paper last year, I believe, with Henry Kissinger, who just passed away, I think, last year too.

01:10:30.000 But he was talking about AI.

01:10:32.000 So he's very much in the scene still.

01:10:34.000 So what does he do for Open AI?

01:10:39.000 He's an advisor for OpenAI for sure.

01:10:39.000 Don't know.

01:10:42.000 What all he does is in that advisement role, don't know.

01:10:46.000 But he influences governments.

01:10:49.000 He's got a lot of pull behind the scenes.

01:10:52.000 He's a puppeteer, in my opinion.

01:10:55.000 So he's definitely somebody that needs to be investigated.

01:10:58.000 And I do believe he is the facilitator for this.

01:11:03.000 Is this program, Microsoft Azure, is it unique only to the United States?

01:11:08.000 Or is this a program that's infiltrated in other countries?

01:11:11.000 Because it sounds like it's a program that's supposed to be used by a lot of people across multiple agencies.

01:11:18.000 And so is this something that was customized just for the U.S. federal government and for the United States?

01:11:25.000 Or are other countries also using Microsoft Azure?

01:11:29.000 No, there is other Companies using, or I'm sorry, countries using government Azure services.

01:11:34.000 In fact, the United Kingdom just signed into a five-year contract for government Azure just this last fall.

01:11:41.000 So they are kind of in the same boat that we're in at this point.

01:11:46.000 How far they've migrated in, I hope not far.

01:11:50.000 But yes, there is other countries involved.

01:11:52.000 The thing with Microsoft, though, and many of the service providers, is that they don't build thing from scratch.

01:11:58.000 They clone what they already built.

01:12:01.000 So they took their civilian cloud infrastructure, something they invested a lot of time and money into building, cloned it, built a separate environment, maybe added a little bit of bells and whistles to meet government compliance with security and stuff like that, and then got authorized.

01:12:19.000 They got authorized for, I believe they started with aisle two up to three, maybe four, between 2014 and 16.

01:12:27.000 16 is when they got aisle 4 authorization.

01:12:31.000 17, I believe, is when they got aisle 5, and then they got aisle 6 a little bit after that, and top secret a little bit after that.

01:12:38.000 So they've progressively gotten up there.

01:12:40.000 But back to the, you know, circling back, yeah, they don't build anything from scratch.

01:12:44.000 They didn't build this for us.

01:12:46.000 And I actually suspect that Azure was originally tailored for the Chinese market because piracy and other stuff over in China made it impossible to make any kind of money or revenue out of there.

01:12:59.000 So I think that building this cloud offering and having it so you had to pay to get the service and support and everything else is why they did it for China.

01:13:10.000 And China was actually the first country, from what I can tell, that got a government Azure instance.

01:13:16.000 They got it about a year before we did.

01:13:20.000 So, and on top of that, most of Microsoft's engineers for cloud, which is Azure, and also AI are predominantly out of China.

01:13:31.000 So the same people building this, you know, all of it, are Chinese nationals out of China.

01:13:37.000 It's just nuts.

01:13:39.000 Are there any other programs that the U.S. government could be utilizing that aren't dependent on Chinese engineers?

01:13:48.000 Not that I know.

01:13:48.000 Not civilian-owned, which I was going to go into a little bit further.

01:13:53.000 But my recommendation is that we restore things to a pre-Obama era model, that we go back to the United States government, the Department of Defense, all of the departments and agencies owning and operating their own cyber infrastructure.

01:14:11.000 We need to return to that.

01:14:13.000 Because the second that we went into the cloud and civilian-owned infrastructure was to our own detriment.

01:14:21.000 You know, we handed over the reins to civilians who were all about profit. 0.99

01:14:26.000 And look at what they did with that.

01:14:27.000 They turned around and they said, we can hire cheap labor out of countries like India and China, et cetera, et cetera, underscore the competition or whatever, you know, sell this.

01:14:38.000 And they didn't care about, I mean, it's obvious, in my opinion, they didn't care about national defense.

01:14:46.000 Their idea behind this was profit.

01:14:48.000 And honestly, everything they've done, and I don't think they've made much profit out of this doing that, but I think honestly everything they've done was actually working with the Chinese government.

01:14:58.000 I think Microsoft and the Chinese government are in collaboration on this.

01:15:03.000 I think that something nefarious is afoot.

01:15:08.000 Do you think that Microsoft is aware, it's your professional opinion, that Microsoft is aware of espionage being carried out against the United States government by China?

01:15:22.000 Is that what you're saying?

01:15:24.000 What they've done by doing this, by having this escort team that has no oversight over anything except for the basic launch pad scripts, and then allowing in global support, over 90% out of China, and doing that, they've enabled espionage.

01:15:42.000 Like if you look under the letter of the law, like, and there's many different things they violated here.

01:15:48.000 There are laws they violated, policies, regulations, executive orders.

01:15:54.000 There's so many things violated by doing this across multiple departments and agencies, not just the DOD.

01:16:01.000 But by doing this, according to the letter of the law, they have enabled espionage by doing this.

01:16:09.000 And saying that everything is secure, you know, and everything else, that falls under the False Statements Act.

01:16:17.000 You know, they made false statement by saying, oh, we're 100% U.S., we're secure, et cetera.

01:16:23.000 I beg to differ.

01:16:25.000 I mean, you had the former DOD CIO come out on the record and a number of other senior leadership within DOD cyber and whatnot saying they had no idea this was going on.

01:16:35.000 None.

01:16:37.000 So Microsoft's trying to say that.

01:16:39.000 Didn't somebody during the Obama administration have to sign off on this?

01:16:43.000 Didn't somebody during the Obama administration have to sign off on allowing for foreign nationals to be involved in this database?

01:16:52.000 Because surely there was some type of disclosure with Microsoft when they signed this contract with our federal government that the tech support was going to be carried out by foreign nationals.

01:17:03.000 So who within our government granted authorization to allow for foreign nationals to participate?

01:17:10.000 I mean, this is something that would have required, I imagine, right, authorization at the highest levels of the United States government.

01:17:20.000 Yeah.

01:17:22.000 So in that interview in 2016, I asked that same exact question, like who the approval authority for this was?

01:17:29.000 I was very curious.

01:17:30.000 And I raised all the red flags that I, you know, have been raising here, I raised with Insight Global as well.

01:17:37.000 Told them all about what this was and red flags I discovered, et cetera.

01:17:41.000 And I also asked them, can you, or do you know who the approval authority for this is?

01:17:45.000 Do you have the documentation and paperwork?

01:17:47.000 And they were like, oh, we don't have this yet.

01:17:49.000 They kept assuring me they would let me know, and they didn't, you know, up until I came back in 2020.

01:17:56.000 But that was a question that was heavy with me, was who the hell signed off on this from 2016 until 2020 or so.

01:18:05.000 2020 is when I came, well, I was reached, had somebody from Inside Global reach out to me and asking me if I would want to come on the team as the principal software developer, streamlining the escort process, going into KQL or Kusto query language, similar to SQL, doing a whole bunch of stuff, coming up with custom apps, PTO, et cetera, you name it.

01:18:27.000 But when I came on board and was doing the onboarding, then I got to see who the approval authority was.

01:18:34.000 And it was Barack Obama's name and signature on all of it.

01:18:39.000 He was the person that authorized everything, all of it, across the board.

01:18:44.000 Nobody else, just him.

01:18:47.000 And what year did he authorize this?

01:18:51.000 So the agreements, and there's a number of them.

01:18:54.000 They stretch between 2014 and 2016.

01:19:00.000 I'm assuming that there was probably additional agreements made with other companies, an extension of this agreement with Microsoft, because it's known that Amazon has also got their own escort team, secured escort team doing the same thing.

01:19:13.000 Don't know if they got personnel working out of China, but they are escorting in uncleared personnel. 0.94

01:19:20.000 And then there's other companies like Oracle, where somebody came out on one of the comments and said, I know of at least two escorts working for Oracle doing the same thing.

01:19:30.000 So those agreements were probably also signed off on by Obama while he was in office.

01:19:37.000 Yeah.

01:19:39.000 I think all of this was done right before he got out too, or, you know, during the last few years of his administration, he signed off on this.

01:19:48.000 Like I said, too, I've been trying to.

01:19:50.000 Yeah, I want to get into who you reported this to because, you know, the Department of Defense, obviously you have the Secretary, but you also have other people who work at the Department of Defense.

01:20:00.000 And I know that, you know, even though this went across and this, you know, this spans across all of the various agencies within our federal government, what I'm wondering is, you know, as a member of the Navy, you probably just followed your chain of command.

01:20:21.000 And then when you exhausted your chain of command, you probably contacted the Intel agencies.

01:20:27.000 I mean, I know you have from our own conversations and what we've discussed.

01:20:31.000 And so I want to know who at the Department of Defense specifically you informed about this and whether or not you ever received any kind of communication back.

01:20:42.000 And I want to know when you contacted them, how often you contacted them.

01:20:47.000 And if you don't mind, you know, just kind of briefly running through a summary of who all you have contacted about this and whether you, you know, received a response.

01:20:57.000 You don't have to get into, you know, too much detail, but I think it's important if we name some names because some people are going to say, well, you know, maybe he just didn't bring it to the proper, you know, the attention of the proper people or the people in charge.

01:21:10.000 And you can't just post about this stuff online or talk to people and expect it to go anywhere.

01:21:14.000 Well, I want to know which channels of communication you sent this to and what their response was.

01:21:21.000 Yeah, absolutely.

01:21:23.000 So was it about 2023?

01:21:28.000 There was a number of different emails coming.

01:21:30.000 And at the time, I was with the Air Force Reserves.

01:21:33.000 But there was emails coming through talking about war with China by 2025.

01:21:38.000 General Minihan, who was the commander for AM Mobility Command, said, go to the range, shoot for the head, prepare, prepare, you know, etc.

01:21:46.000 So I responded with my commander and let her know about the situation with this and went forward and reported that to her commander and then that person's commander and et cetera, all the way up to General Minihan.

01:22:02.000 And me and General Minihan had actually been working together at the time.

01:22:05.000 I was one of the bothered warrior trolls on his team helping out with coming up with ideas and solutions to help out the Air Force and etc.

01:22:14.000 All volunteer based and all my own personal time.

01:22:17.000 Brought this to his attention.

01:22:19.000 He acknowledged it, said he's tracking and banging the drum and kind of went from there.

01:22:26.000 I also reported this to another MAGCOM commander, major command commander, General Bauerfiend over at AFSOC Air Force Special Operations Command.

01:22:35.000 And then also reached out to U.S. Cybercom Commander, former General Hawk.

01:22:40.000 And I think you probably know a little bit about that guy.

01:22:43.000 But reached out to me.

01:22:45.000 I only got him fired.

01:22:47.000 And I hope the media is listening now because they harassed me for weeks on end and they still harass me to this day. 0.92

01:22:55.000 And during the Armed Services Committee the other day, several members of Congress were talking shit about me saying that Laura Loomer shouldn't have the influence that she has. 0.99

01:23:05.000 And General Hogg was an outstanding patriot who represented his country in an apolitical manner. 0.89

01:23:11.000 And there's no reason why the NSA director, General Hogg, should have been relieved from his position.

01:23:17.000 And it's like, actually, there are many reasons.

01:23:22.000 And this is what I was trying to explain to people is that when Joe Biden appointed people to serve in his administration, he appointed people who were either one, blindly loyal to him, two, severely anti-Trump to the point where it was like a derangement syndrome.

01:23:40.000 Three, right, you either compromised, you have a Trump derangement syndrome, or you are completely sold out to China or some kind of foreign interest.

01:23:51.000 We've seen how the Biden administration was completely infiltrated by China.

01:23:56.000 We know about their business dealings with China.

01:23:59.000 We know about Hunter Biden.

01:24:01.000 We know about the fact that Joe Biden allowed for an Iranian spy ring to operate inside of the United States State Department.

01:24:11.000 We know that Maher Battar, who is a Palestinian national who has an affinity for students for justice in Palestine and pro-Hamas and pro-Hebollah activities and essentially, you could argue, is an agent for the Muslim Brotherhood, was put in one of the most senior intel Positions overseeing our national intelligence.

01:24:35.000 Working with the National Security Council.

01:24:38.000 So, and it's my understanding that to this day, Maher Batar, who many people have argued is responsible for October 7th, still has a security clearance, still has a security clearance where he's working with Senator, now Senator Adam Schiff.

01:24:57.000 So just let that sink in, if you will, right?

01:24:59.000 And so when people say to me, oh, well, you know, aside from not being loyal to Trump, what were some of the, you know, what were some of the reasons why General Hogg was disqualified in your opinion from serving as NSA director?

01:25:16.000 Well, okay, it's arguably the most important intel agency in our country.

01:25:20.000 We saw how it was weaponized to spy on Donald Trump and abuse the FISA courts and spy on President Trump's allies and to carry out a witch hunt and falsely accuse in coordination and collusion with foreign intelligence agencies and phony dossiers that were padded with and included fabricated information from foreign intel officials.

01:25:45.000 Yeah, I think it's probably a pretty bad idea to have a Biden loyalist overseeing the NSA under a Trump administration, given the fact that Biden's litmus test was orange man bad, right?

01:26:01.000 I think that we can all agree.

01:26:03.000 And for those of you listening now, right, you brought this, you brought this to General Hogg in what year, right?

01:26:09.000 Because we are now in 2025 when he just got fired.

01:26:13.000 And you're telling me that you brought a Chinese espionage plot to him and raised awareness with all the receipts, documenting the fact that the Chinese Communist Party had a backdoor channel straight into our most classified information and our cyber systems at the Pentagon and every other agency within our country, which would include the NSA.

01:26:35.000 And what was his response to you?

01:26:37.000 And when did you do this?

01:26:39.000 So I think by the time I reached out to him, it was 2024, I think.

01:26:46.000 And I CC'd General Manahan and General Bowernfend on the email threat and whatnot.

01:26:52.000 And one thing I should probably call had to cover my own butt too here is that this isn't just like military chain of command reporting as a service member.

01:27:00.000 This is also independent civilian reporting as well.

01:27:04.000 And it's actually been kind of stressed on me to report as a civilian and not as a service member.

01:27:10.000 And it's due to a misconception of a lot of service members because I've spoken with the Navy JAG and they've told me that, no, you do report on both channels as a reservist.

01:27:19.000 Like even if you're off duty, you're not on active status or orders or anything else.

01:27:24.000 If you come across something that affects mission readiness or security, you need to report to both channels, civilian and military.

01:27:33.000 So that's what I was doing.

01:27:34.000 But getting back to Hawk, yeah, when I emailed him, I got an immediate phone call from somebody in his office.

01:27:41.000 I'm thinking one of his OSI people or Air Force OSI, confirming who I was, establishing my identity, et cetera, et cetera.

01:27:49.000 Once they did, you know, they said, well, we'll be back in touch.

01:27:51.000 We're going to set up a meeting with you and him, right, General Hawk.

01:27:55.000 So a couple weeks went by, didn't get a phone call, followed up, talked to his former secretary and some other folks.

01:28:02.000 They said, oh, yeah, let's get you a meeting and everything else.

01:28:05.000 Another couple weeks went by, followed up again.

01:28:07.000 And then I had Air Force Detachment 333, or OSI Detachment, which works directly for the U.S. Cybercom Commander and whatnot, and have one of their agents reach out to me and said, yeah, it's been requested not to contact General Hawk anymore or his office.

01:28:24.000 Like, we want to put you in touch with the proper people or whatever.

01:28:29.000 We're going to find out what's going on.

01:28:30.000 Wow, so the NSA director essentially told you to bug off and not to contact his office anymore when you were trying to alert him to the fact that the Chinese had access to all of our cyber systems,

01:28:46.000 essentially, because who knows if any of these, and I'm sure it probably has happened, who knows how many of these Chinese foreign national tech support operatives via Microsoft have installed a malicious code onto the computers or spyware onto the computers of Intel officials or defense officials or, you know, people working at the Secret Service and people working at the Treasury.

01:29:10.000 Okay.

01:29:11.000 I mean, this just, this is really damning.

01:29:14.000 This is very damning.

01:29:15.000 So hopefully all those people listening, all the people listening who constantly want to defend General Hogg as some, you know, outstanding patriot who did the best he could to defend his country.

01:29:27.000 Yeah, I think you should probably reevaluate your stance on that.

01:29:32.000 I think he should actually be brought in for hearings on this, you know, answering for it.

01:29:38.000 My own personal interactions and whatnot with him in his office is like, yeah, I didn't care for him too much at all.

01:29:46.000 But I digress.

01:29:48.000 But after that, it took about three weeks for Air Force OSI 333 to reach back out to me and give me a couple of leads.

01:29:55.000 They were like, oh, maybe report this to Air Force OSI.

01:29:59.000 And then they were like, oh, we see you're switching over from the Navy.

01:30:01.000 I'm sorry, from the Air Force to the Navy.

01:30:03.000 Let's put you in contact with NCIS.

01:30:05.000 And then they were like, oh, wait, wait, wait.

01:30:07.000 We actually recommend the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency.

01:30:11.000 So I was like, okay.

01:30:12.000 Do you have some contacts?

01:30:13.000 Can you open a case for me?

01:30:14.000 Establish that communication.

01:30:16.000 They were like, oh, no, we don't know anybody.

01:30:18.000 I'm like, all right.

01:30:19.000 So I reached out on my own, was calling around for about a week, trying to get a hold of local offices and other stuff.

01:30:24.000 And then finally, I came across the tip line for the OIG for DCSA.

01:30:29.000 Extremely responsive.

01:30:31.000 You know, they're probably my favorite IG office just because they're so on the ball, you know, responsive and getting things done.

01:30:37.000 They looked into it, did a preliminary for about three weeks or so, came back and said, well, we don't have jurisdiction or purview over this.

01:30:44.000 We believe that the DODIG does.

01:30:47.000 We're going to refer that over to them and actually open a case on your behalf.

01:30:50.000 So I was very thankful and said, great, thank you.

01:30:53.000 DODIG looked it over, sent me back an automated response and said, we've looked over all the things you provided.

01:30:59.000 This is Definitely reason for concern.

01:31:01.000 This caused serious damage and everything else.

01:31:05.000 And we feel that the DOD CIO is the best office to investigate this for us, for the IG.

01:31:12.000 So it was sent over to the DOD CIO at that point.

01:31:15.000 This is after the former DOD CIO retired and you had an acting one in there.

01:31:22.000 So I waited another week or two, didn't hear back, filed a number for the DOD CIO, called up their office and talked to, oh, what was it, Laura Stockwell, I believe?

01:31:33.000 I'm a DOD CIO for people who don't know Katie Arrington, correct?

01:31:39.000 She is currently the acting DOD CIO with Kristen Davies being the DOD CIO select, who's not in there yet, but she's the person that's slated to come in there.

01:31:54.000 And so with the DOD CIO, it's an extremely important role.

01:31:58.000 It's probably the most important cyber role in our country because that individual runs the whole show for our defense, for everything.

01:32:05.000 They set the vision, the direction, they make the mandates.

01:32:09.000 They are the senior most cyber advisor to the Secretary of Defense and to the Commander-in-Chief.

01:32:15.000 It's a very important position.

01:32:18.000 But getting back to that, so I was working with the DOD CIO chief of staff for COS, and she did not want me to tell her anything about this case.

01:32:28.000 She was like, yeah, send me over the ticket number and I'll have my people look into it.

01:32:32.000 So she opened up a DISA OIG investigation and it spoke with those guys.

01:32:38.000 And explain to people watching what DISA is.

01:32:42.000 So it stands for the Defense Information Systems Agency.

01:32:46.000 They set a lot of policies, guidelines, and other things for the Department of Defense, but also other agencies and departments, I believe.

01:32:56.000 So they're kind of the gatekeepers.

01:32:57.000 They make sure everything is done properly.

01:33:00.000 You know, them and kind of a few other agencies too, but predominantly it's DISA that controls stuff.

01:33:10.000 So I was handed over to the IG office for DISA to investigate this.

01:33:15.000 And that was just a whole bunch of nonsense, really.

01:33:19.000 I got on the phone with the investigator.

01:33:22.000 He was working from home for one, which is just pretty unprofessional, I think.

01:33:26.000 And a number of things were said during the call.

01:33:29.000 I'm actually waiting on a FOIA request to come back where I can discuss things or get emails and whatnot back to verbatim be able to discuss this.

01:33:38.000 But from memory, which is important legally, things that were said during the conversation, the biggest one was that he kept asserting that the United States and China are allies and that this was all perfectly normal and authorized.

01:33:54.000 And he repeatedly make this assertion during the interview, which was about two hours.

01:33:59.000 And repeat the name of the individual who kept on saying that the United States and China were allies?

01:34:05.000 I don't know if I can say the name, though.

01:34:09.000 You know, not publicly.

01:34:11.000 Definitely I can tell government personnel.

01:34:14.000 What was the position at least?

01:34:16.000 Can you say that?

01:34:17.000 He was an investigator.

01:34:19.000 That was his position.

01:34:22.000 At the DOD?

01:34:24.000 For DISA OIG, or the Office of Inspector General.

01:34:28.000 Did you ever file any kind of complaint with the FBI or contact the FBI to report this?

01:34:38.000 Oh, yeah, constantly.

01:34:40.000 I think that was kind of like the sole place I was reporting to, sending in like e-forms, emails, phones, calls, even faxes.

01:34:49.000 I was thinking, hey, maybe faxes can get through.

01:34:52.000 You know, those don't just disappear.

01:34:54.000 But I did that all throughout basically the reporting process up until about 2023 where I really got supercharged and started reaching up the DOD chain of command and whatnot.

01:35:05.000 Yeah, there's probably dozens, if not hundreds, of emails and other things I've sent to FBI.

01:35:12.000 And did you ever get a response?

01:35:12.000 Wow.

01:35:15.000 Never.

01:35:16.000 Shocking.

01:35:17.000 I mean, it's really honestly shocking that this has been going on for 10 years and you spent four years and then two of those years supercharged aggressively trying to report this and bring it up the chain of command.

01:35:31.000 You contacted the FBI.

01:35:32.000 Nobody got back to you.

01:35:34.000 You went to Katie Arrington.

01:35:35.000 You went to all of these people, including the NSA director and the esteemed NSA director that they're all up in arms about.

01:35:43.000 Man, he's such a patriot.

01:35:46.000 Allowing China to have backdoor access into our agencies and our cyber control systems. 0.53

01:35:53.000 Yes, what a patriot he is, right?

01:35:58.000 So obviously.

01:36:01.000 I'm sorry, getting back to kind of the deflection kicking the can thing.

01:36:07.000 You know, after DISA, so a big thing to point out too, is that DISA on August 28th, I believe, could be 29th, they closed the case and said they didn't feel they were the right avenue for redress, meaning they didn't feel the right office to correct this or do something about it.

01:36:26.000 This is after deposing four whistleblowers in total, all the senior management for the escort team, all confirming this is going on.

01:36:35.000 Reports, evidence, everything else I'd sent over, right?

01:36:38.000 So they conducted all this, and on that date, they closed the case and said they'd send it up to this a leadership, right?

01:36:47.000 It's good to point out that exact same date was the last day of a three-day trip that Jake Sullivan, the former national security advisor for the White House, made a trip to China to meet with President Xi and discuss cybersecurity, amongst other things.

01:37:04.000 And the last time that a White House National Security Advisor had traveled to China was back during Obama's administration.

01:37:12.000 So it was almost a fact that these two events happen on the same day, no damn way. 0.77

01:37:19.000 That's impossible.

01:37:20.000 No, it's not a coincidence at all.

01:37:23.000 No way.

01:37:24.000 I mean, it sounds like there were people who were in these leadership positions and senior positions who were intentionally trying to stonewall you and tell, they couldn't directly tell you, oh, we're not going to address this because then it would become a scandal given the fact that people know that China is not our friend.

01:37:41.000 And China, it's kind of laughable that Obama and Joe Biden implemented cybersecurity pacts with Xi Jinping, knowing that the Chinese don't respect cybersecurity pacts with the United States.

01:37:54.000 I mean, right before President Trump took office, they hacked into Janet Yellen's email, right?

01:37:59.000 So, I mean, look, they clearly don't respect cybersecurity agreements at all.

01:38:07.000 But from my analysis of this, and I think that the most concerning thing that I get from all of this is that there's a serious obstruction of communication that is taking place.

01:38:18.000 There is a serious black hole in the chain of command, whether it's deliberate and malicious or whether it's a bunch of unqualified people who are just totally checked out for lunch.

01:38:31.000 And I don't know, they're just there to collect a paycheck. 0.99

01:38:34.000 They don't give a shit about our country. 1.00

01:38:36.000 Maybe these people don't give a shit about cybersecurity and they don't give a shit about national security. 0.99

01:38:42.000 It's one or the other, right? 0.99

01:38:44.000 Or maybe, maybe it's both, right?

01:38:46.000 Maybe it's both.

01:38:49.000 But it's unacceptable.

01:38:52.000 Yeah.

01:38:53.000 And it brings up a good point, too, because after DISA, you know, kicked the can, closed the case, same day as that event with Chi happened, whatever, reached back out to the CEO or the chief of staff for the CIO office.

01:39:07.000 And they said, oh, no, we're very much still investigating this.

01:39:10.000 We're still looking into it and everything else.

01:39:13.000 Immediately after that phone call with her, I got an automated reply from the DODIG with her name on it showing she just closed the case.

01:39:21.000 So right after this phone call, we're still actively looking into this and everything else and click, you know, right after the call.

01:39:21.000 Right.

01:39:28.000 So I tried calling back.

01:39:30.000 Could not get a hold of her or anybody else.

01:39:30.000 No response.

01:39:32.000 That was with Katie, with Katie Arrington?

01:39:35.000 Oh, no.

01:39:35.000 So that was with the chief of staff, the former one.

01:39:40.000 I believe her name is Laura Stockholm or something like that.

01:39:43.000 Lauren?

01:39:44.000 Lauren Stockwell, Stockwell, I believe.

01:39:46.000 I have to look at it again.

01:39:47.000 The former chief of staff for who?

01:39:51.000 Oh, for the DOD CIO.

01:39:53.000 Okay.

01:39:54.000 So she was.

01:39:55.000 So Katie Arrington's chief of staff. 1.00

01:40:00.000 So she didn't work for Katie. 0.97

01:40:00.000 Oh, no. 0.97

01:40:02.000 She worked for the former acting.

01:40:06.000 No, you said DOD CIO.

01:40:08.000 So I was just assuming that it was Katie Arrington.

01:40:12.000 Yeah, this is back in 2024.

01:40:15.000 So this is back before elections and before Katie came in, you know, under Trump.

01:40:22.000 But so I tried reaching out to the office all the way up to the elections, basically, couldn't get through.

01:40:29.000 After the elections and after inauguration day, I think on the 21st or something like that, I reached back out to the DOD CIO office, learned that the chief of staff, the person that was kicking the can, everything else, was actually sent home on administrative leave.

01:40:44.000 Her bios page, everything else on that site was taken down.

01:40:48.000 So all indicators was she was getting the boot for whatever reason.

01:40:53.000 So I talked to the military advisor for that office and spoke with him.

01:41:01.000 And I don't have the name up at the moment, but spoke with him.

01:41:05.000 He said he would check into it.

01:41:08.000 Circled back with him a couple weeks later.

01:41:10.000 He said that he did look into it, did reopen the case.

01:41:14.000 So he did confirm the case was closed.

01:41:17.000 And then he was instructed by somebody within the DOD CIO office to forward it to the DODIG for a thorough review.

01:41:26.000 I tried following up for months after that point, seeing, hey, I've got additional evidence.

01:41:33.000 I've got more things I've discovered since originally opening this.

01:41:38.000 Can I get like a DOD safe link or some other way to upload these documents?

01:41:42.000 Can you connect me with the DOD IG, et cetera?

01:41:45.000 None of that.

01:41:46.000 No response.

01:41:48.000 So finally, it was like, I think Katie Arrington just took over as the acting DOD CIO for about maybe a week or two.

01:41:57.000 I reached out to her, got in direct communication, and she said, oh, wow.

01:42:02.000 And she was like, I will directly handle this.

01:42:04.000 I will directly look into this.

01:42:06.000 She'll take the lead, etc.

01:42:08.000 And give us a timeline of when this happened.

01:42:10.000 When did you contact?

01:42:12.000 When did she say this to you?

01:42:14.000 I think this was around April or May of this year.

01:42:18.000 So 2025.

01:42:20.000 It was like shortly after she came in as the acting DOD CIO.

01:42:25.000 And did she ever handle it?

01:42:27.000 I'm guessing no, since this is still ongoing.

01:42:30.000 Yeah, I mean, yes and no.

01:42:32.000 So, you know, she gave me her email address to send things to, you know, not, I couldn't send all of these things through an email because it's just, you know, probably gigabytes of data or whatever.

01:42:44.000 But then she ended up handing it over to the DOD Chief Information Security Officer.

01:42:50.000 So she did not handle it herself, from what I can tell, handed it over to the CISO.

01:42:55.000 Now, what's important to note is that person is a Biden holdover.

01:43:00.000 You know, most of that office is.

01:43:03.000 And that chief information security officer immediately.

01:43:07.000 Who's the Biden holdover?

01:43:08.000 Because as you know, as you know, I've been very focused on identifying Biden holdovers within our national security apparatus.

01:43:16.000 So who is this individual and what is their name?

01:43:21.000 So it's David McKeown.

01:43:25.000 And I'm sorry if he's watching and I misspelled his name or mispronounced.

01:43:30.000 How do you spell his last name?

01:43:32.000 I think it's M-C-K-E-O-W-N. 1.00

01:43:39.000 And his position?

01:43:41.000 So he is the chief information security officer for the Department of Defense.

01:43:46.000 Thank you.

01:43:53.000 Wow.

01:43:56.000 So he started reaching right out to references of mine Because I provided about four reference letters from former commanding officers because it was going through Navy officer boards, Sterling recommendations, everything else.

01:44:10.000 So he's like, oh, well, let me call these people, right?

01:44:13.000 And a few of them called me.

01:44:15.000 One of them in particular was very troubled by the call, called me immediately afterwards.

01:44:20.000 And he let me know that initially when Mr. McKeon, or I'll just say the CISO called him, he was telling him, oh, I'm fully vetted in the case, fully acclimated, know all the details, all the investigation, blah, blah, blah, right?

01:44:37.000 Knew it all.

01:44:37.000 Claimed this.

01:44:39.000 And then immediately started asking the person, like, why didn't Schiller use his chain of command?

01:44:45.000 Right?

01:44:46.000 That would have been evident if he read all the details and evidence and everything else that I did use the chain of command.

01:44:51.000 So right there, either he lied about being fully vetted and acclimated to this issue, or he made a false statement and was trying to defame me.

01:45:01.000 I don't know.

01:45:01.000 But either way, right there, lie number one.

01:45:04.000 Lie number two, he was telling the individual on the phone, I believe Mr. Schiller is confused and mistaken and doesn't understand the difference between civilian azure and government azure.

01:45:19.000 And this was David McKeon who said this to you?

01:45:23.000 Right.

01:45:24.000 Wow.

01:45:24.000 The chief information security officer.

01:45:26.000 Looks like he's got to go.

01:45:27.000 I mean, this is what I'm talking about.

01:45:28.000 All these Biden obstructionists.

01:45:30.000 And this is the problem, right?

01:45:32.000 If we know that the Biden administration is sold out to China, we know that they are compromised by China.

01:45:38.000 That's just a given, right?

01:45:40.000 Investigations have shown this countless time over and over again.

01:45:43.000 Books have been written about this.

01:45:45.000 We've had countless congressional investigations into this.

01:45:48.000 It is a fact that the Biden family, the Biden crime family, the Biden administration, okay, and this extends to Obama because essentially this was Obama's third term, is compromised by China.

01:46:00.000 Why does the Trump Department of Defense have Biden holdovers serving in these very important roles that our entire national security is hinging on?

01:46:13.000 I mean, you want to, you followed your chain of command and now you're being belittled by a guy by the name of David McKeon, who is a chief information security officer who has not been fired yet, even though there's probably a million people out there in the world who are just as qualified or if not even more qualified.

01:46:31.000 Sounds like maybe you should take his job.

01:46:33.000 Who knows?

01:46:34.000 Maybe they should appoint you to something.

01:46:36.000 But for them to talk down to you when you clearly know more about the situation than they do after they stonewall you for four years and then to act like you are confused and to gaslight you into thinking that you don't actually know what you're talking about, these people should be fired.

01:46:54.000 And look, I don't work for the Trump administration and I don't have that authority, but if I did have that type of authority, I would fire them.

01:47:01.000 And I think that Pete Hegseth, if he's watching this, he should fire these individuals.

01:47:06.000 He should fire these individuals who stonewalled you this long.

01:47:10.000 And they should have taken this information directly to Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth.

01:47:14.000 This is a matter that, in my opinion, and I'm not in the military, I've never served, but you don't have to be a rocket scientist to know the national security implications of your adversary having a backdoor channel to your cyber network infrastructure across all government agencies, right?

01:47:31.000 You do not need to have served or be a, you know, cybersecurity specialist or analyst to understand the implications of this.

01:47:41.000 It is criminal.

01:47:43.000 It is criminal that this has been stonewalled and that this was never brought to the attention of Defense Secretary Pete Hagseth.

01:47:50.000 And I know Pete and the fact of the matter is that he's a busy guy.

01:47:55.000 It's hard to get a hold of him, obviously.

01:47:57.000 But the fact that they tried to belittle you instead of trying to work with you to address this is, in my opinion, worthy of not just firing, but there should be an investigation.

01:48:09.000 They should have a congressional investigation into this to see who was complicit, who knew what, who knew what when, and why this was not ever resolved.

01:48:21.000 Yeah, absolutely.

01:48:23.000 And, you know, kind of covering all that too, you know, lie number two, which I was mentioning, where he was saying I was confused, et cetera, again, he got caught in the lie because if he had reviewed the depositions or the clarification interviews, they called them, with the other four people, or all four people with the, you know, multiple hours this went on, he would have known everybody was referencing government azure.

01:48:46.000 So either he did not know the case and was not familiar with it and did not know all the details, or he made that assessment, you know, statement purposefully.

01:48:56.000 I don't know which one, you know, but either way, he was lying.

01:49:00.000 So either got caught in one lie or another twice.

01:49:04.000 But as far as reporting efforts too, so after that nonsense happened, I let Katie Arrington know what Mr. McKeown just did.

01:49:13.000 I let her know exactly what he did and what was reported back to me.

01:49:17.000 She apologized to me and said, oh, I'm very sorry, you know, like sincerely.

01:49:24.000 I was in on the internet, you know, with him calling these people.

01:49:26.000 I didn't hear these things, but I'm going to talk with him directly and handle this.

01:49:31.000 Then she handed me over to the general counsel for the DOD.

01:49:35.000 And this is like basically the legal team advisors, et cetera, to Hagseth.

01:49:40.000 So I reached, you know, one of these people reached out to me, said, hey, we're going to be back in contact.

01:49:45.000 I tried reaching out and following up with this person for like a week or two.

01:49:49.000 Didn't get any response out of that person.

01:49:51.000 So I reached out to Mr. Young, Charles Young, I believe, but he is the DOD general counsel.

01:49:59.000 And he didn't contact me right back, but he had his top military, senior military advisor contact me back.

01:50:05.000 And they said, oh, we're going to look into this, everything else.

01:50:08.000 You know, thank you for bringing this attention, et cetera.

01:50:10.000 Let's see what we can do here, right?

01:50:13.000 I continued with the email thread that was going on.

01:50:16.000 And this is, again, this independent civilian reporting at this point.

01:50:20.000 But email thread.

01:50:21.000 And I also started including the SEC Nav Engine Rooms distro, which is for the Secretary of Defense, all of his office, and also to the Secretary of Defense's distro.

01:50:34.000 And during all of this, emailing back and forth between Mr. Young, the general counsel, et cetera, et cetera, also including Kahady Arrington and a lot of other folks, I got back read receipts because I'm always good about that, requesting read receipts on anything so I can get the acknowledgement things have been read.

01:50:54.000 And one of them came back from Hegseth's senior military advisor or what's it called?

01:51:02.000 Assistant, I believe, actually.

01:51:04.000 So this is General Lariv, I believe.

01:51:09.000 So he's the 8th Army General out of Korea, selected by Hegseth to come in and be his assistant.

01:51:15.000 He's the one that's working with him, travels with him, does everything else with him.

01:51:18.000 So he sent me back a read receipt.

01:51:22.000 And it was interesting because backtracking a little bit, I think it was back right after Hegseth got in and some other things.

01:51:32.000 It was discussed that Lariv, and I'm sorry if I got the name wrong, was going to be his appointed person.

01:51:40.000 So I reached out to him while he was still the 8th Army commander and let him know about the situation twice.

01:51:46.000 So this was much earlier in the year.

01:51:49.000 Sent me read receipts back then too.

01:51:51.000 Never reached back out.

01:51:52.000 And I was asking him, like, please get this information over to Hegseth, you know, et cetera.

01:51:58.000 I don't think he ever did.

01:51:59.000 And he sent me back additional REIT receipts after he was in that position of being the SecDev senior assistant.

01:52:07.000 Again, read receipts, but no response.

01:52:10.000 So there are a number of people within Hegseth's own office, the office of the Secretary of Defense, that to my knowledge have not reported this to him.

01:52:18.000 And I've repeatedly asked.

01:52:20.000 Well, we're going to be, I will text this episode directly to Pete Hegseth because I have his number.

01:52:28.000 And I've known Pete Hagseth for 10 years.

01:52:30.000 So I'm going to be sending this episode directly to Pete Hagseth.

01:52:33.000 So Pete Hagseth is going to see this.

01:52:35.000 So we're going to make sure that Pete Hagseth sees this.

01:52:38.000 And I also know the Navy Secretary.

01:52:40.000 And I know the Navy Secretary's chief of staff.

01:52:43.000 So we're going to make sure that they are all informed about this so that you don't have to deal with this internal gatekeeping that has, you know, served to completely block this information out.

01:52:54.000 And this is why I wanted you to come on because it's important that people hear this.

01:53:00.000 This is the first interview.

01:53:01.000 This is the exclusive interview.

01:53:02.000 The first interview that you've done since this information has come out.

01:53:07.000 It has still not garnered the attention that it deserves.

01:53:10.000 And I wanted to grant you the full extent of this show episode tonight, the full two hours to talk about this and to explain this.

01:53:21.000 Because now everybody's questions have been answered.

01:53:24.000 Well, who did you talk to, right?

01:53:25.000 And did you inform the proper channels, right?

01:53:28.000 Yes, you have exhausted all channels of communication over the last four years.

01:53:32.000 And ultimately now this rests in the hands of Defense Secretary Pete Hexeth to either meet with you or assign somebody to meet with you for a briefing or to address this with Microsoft.

01:53:45.000 I want to continue and I want to, in the next segment, I want to address the additional concerns that arise and are presented with Microsoft's relationship with China.

01:53:58.000 And then I want to conclude the episode with some calls to action for people watching so that people who are watching this and outraged can contact their representatives or contact the DOD and push for some type of a congressional inquiry or congressional investigation.

01:54:18.000 But we need to take a quick commercial break.

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01:57:15.000 We want to thank housingforus.org for sponsoring tonight's episode of Loomer Unleash.

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01:57:23.000 All right, Tom?

01:57:25.000 So, in conclusion, as we wrap this episode up, I want to talk about the additional national security concerns that are presented by Microsoft's relationship with China.

01:57:40.000 And I want to then conclude with just kind of an overview.

01:57:45.000 And I'm going to be posting about this, and I'm going to be writing a report about this on my website as well.

01:57:51.000 So I know it's a lot of information, and people are probably like sitting here thinking, oh my God, this is so much.

01:57:56.000 How am I going to get all this information remember?

01:57:58.000 And what am I going to say to my representative?

01:57:59.000 And how am I going to address this?

01:58:01.000 I'm going to be publishing a synopsis of this interview and a synopsis of the breach, right?

01:58:08.000 I already have the synopsis, the synopsis here in preparation for my interview with Tom Schiller.

01:58:15.000 And I'm going to make it public.

01:58:16.000 I'm going to make this document public so that everybody who lives in the United States who is concerned about this breach can understand just the basic talking points and the basic gist of what has happened.

01:58:33.000 Because I know we've covered a lot of ground tonight.

01:58:35.000 Essentially, Microsoft has allowed for foreign nationals, including Chinese engineers, to manage U.S. government cloud systems, beginning with authorizations from the Obama administration signed off by Barack Hussein Obama himself.

01:58:51.000 These same individuals operated with full administrative privileges and no U.S. security clearances, while so-called escort teams, as you've described them, in the United States had no technical authority or visibility and really no real understanding of code and malicious code.

01:59:12.000 The support model allowed real-time remote access to classified systems by foreign actors who developed and ran proprietary scripts on government servers.

01:59:20.000 It's a big issue.

01:59:22.000 And as you've claimed on this interview, since 2016, you have repeatedly reported this breach to officials in Congress, the Pentagon, intelligence agencies, Department of Defense, and you have been completely ignored.

01:59:39.000 You even went to the FBI and you have not received a single reply from our intelligence agencies.

01:59:47.000 And what we can assess from your brave whistleblower work and what we can assess from this interview tonight is that the Department of Defense and agencies like the FBI and the NSA, and thank God, President Trump fired General Hogg, praise the Lord.

02:00:08.000 They were all aware.

02:00:09.000 They were all aware of this information and they refused to take action.

02:00:17.000 They refused to take action.

02:00:20.000 That is not up for debate.

02:00:22.000 We are not going to have a debate.

02:00:24.000 We are not going to wonder, speculate whether or not they were made aware.

02:00:28.000 They were made aware.

02:00:29.000 You even had direct conversations with General Hogg.

02:00:32.000 And I'm sure you have the receipts to prove this.

02:00:34.000 You have the documentation.

02:00:36.000 And you are in my conversations with you in the time that I've known you.

02:00:41.000 You're a very detail-oriented person and you keep the receipts.

02:00:44.000 So there's no running from this.

02:00:45.000 These people are not going to be able to deny that you never contacted them because you have saved all of your electronic communications and you have all of your correspondences.

02:00:56.000 You even recorded a phone call you had with one of these Chinese, with one of these Chinese tech tech workers or somebody else recorded the phone call and you were able to obtain access to it.

02:01:09.000 And we have that video, right?

02:01:11.000 From my understanding, it was somebody else who was engaged with one of these Microsoft Azure tech support workers based out of China, where they got the tech support worker to actually confirm that they are based out of China operating off-hours tech support for the Department of Defense.

02:01:29.000 And so let's go ahead and play that clip because it is very shocking.

02:01:34.000 And we're not just making this up.

02:01:36.000 This isn't a conspiracy.

02:01:38.000 Tom knows what he's talking about.

02:01:40.000 You know, it's funny because this takes a lot of time to process this information.

02:01:44.000 It is very technical information.

02:01:47.000 And I can imagine these government employees who work nine to five, they just don't really want to have to think more than they actually have to to collect a paycheck.

02:01:55.000 So this actually requires analysis and reviewing documents and reviewing videos and looking at emails and looking at correspondences that have been ongoing for the last 10 years in our country and the last four years since you've started aggressively trying to get some accountability on this matter.

02:02:17.000 So let's go ahead and play this.

02:02:19.000 This was a video that was posted by somebody at the Department of Defense who reached out to Microsoft for technical support and they had an interaction with one of Microsoft Government Azure's Chinese agents.

02:02:39.000 So go ahead and take a listen.

02:02:42.000 Yes, so I understand.

02:02:43.000 So your name is Frida and you're with Microsoft and you're located where again?

02:02:47.000 Yeah, my name is Frida and I work from Microsoft and I'm located in China.

02:02:55.000 Okay, got it.

02:02:56.000 And so for somebody in the U.S. defense industry, you're telling me that after hours, the only place we can call for support is in China?

02:03:06.000 If you want to use the callback, you can just open the ticket in your working time and that will be U.S. support.

02:03:14.000 Okay.

02:03:14.000 All right.

02:03:15.000 Thank you very much.

02:03:20.000 YouTube, Pepper.

02:03:25.000 So her name is probably definitely not Frida.

02:03:29.000 That might be her Microsoft Azure name, but I highly doubt her name is actually Frida.

02:03:34.000 Never heard a Chinese name Frida.

02:03:38.000 Well, if you look at the ticket, she's kind of got up there, too, or he's got up.

02:03:43.000 Her last name's Yu, or YU.

02:03:46.000 So maybe?

02:03:47.000 I've never heard the name Frida myself.

02:03:49.000 I've never heard a Chinese person with the name Frida, right?

02:03:51.000 So who knows?

02:03:52.000 I don't know.

02:03:53.000 Maybe.

02:03:54.000 Perhaps.

02:03:56.000 It's interesting because that individual, I forget his name at the moment, but he's actually a procurement director in the Pentagon for the DOD.

02:04:07.000 And he's having a call for China for support with his Microsoft account.

02:04:12.000 And he's tried tagging people on LinkedIn, you know, a few of the different, I think the former DOD CIO, he's tried tagging, and I think he's tried whistleblowing, you know, but I don't think he's gotten any attention whatsoever.

02:04:26.000 So it's interesting.

02:04:27.000 So are you worried that you're going to face any kind of professional ramification as a result of going public?

02:04:33.000 I mean, I hope that Pete Hagseth and I know that he's an honorable guy.

02:04:36.000 I'm sure he's going to have your back on this.

02:04:38.000 And I'm sure the Navy Secretary would have your back.

02:04:41.000 But how are you protecting yourself right now?

02:04:43.000 I know there are whistleblower protections.

02:04:45.000 And have you contacted an attorney yet?

02:04:51.000 Do you have any type of plan in place to protect yourself as a whistleblower?

02:04:56.000 Because this is the first time you're really going public with this information outside of your private communications in this exclusive interview regarding what you have uncovered.

02:05:07.000 And obviously the ProPublica report never would have come out had it not been for you and all of the information that you have turned over.

02:05:17.000 And at the time that you brought this information to me, you had told me that ProPublica was already working on a story.

02:05:24.000 Right.

02:05:24.000 And so, you know, as a journalist, right, it's kind of like, well, you know, yes, I've had access to this information, but we agreed that we would wait for the ProPublica report to come out.

02:05:40.000 Right.

02:05:40.000 And now it has created an offshoot of other articles, nearly not enough media attention than it's, you know, that it's deserved.

02:05:51.000 It deserves, this honestly should be.

02:05:55.000 The media right now is completely obsessed with Jeffrey Epstein.

02:05:58.000 And I'm not saying that we shouldn't talk about Jeffrey Epstein, but this is what the media should be running stories about cover to cover and asking the White House for comment on.

02:06:06.000 Right.

02:06:07.000 And Epstein, that's another conversation, but this is the type of information that should be broadcasted and aired all over the mainstream media.

02:06:16.000 And so given the fact that ProPublica had already been speaking with you about this matter and they had already been investing their resources into the story, I didn't want to interfere in their report because you had said that they had been successful in contacting some defense officials.

02:06:36.000 And I, you know, didn't want to disrupt their ability to get people on the comments or their own investigation because really I've known about this since I think you first reached out to me in April.

02:06:48.000 And so.

02:06:50.000 In April after my Oval Office meeting with the president.

02:06:54.000 And so people will say, well, why didn't you release this information?

02:06:59.000 Well, because this is an ongoing journalistic investigation.

02:07:02.000 And we decided that at first we didn't even know if we should put this information out in the public.

02:07:08.000 We were hoping that Katie Arrington would reply to Tom in May.

02:07:12.000 We were hoping that with Pete Hagseth's confirmation that this would quietly be resolved so that we didn't have to alert an adversary to the fact that we are now aware that they have access and they're possibly and they probably are spying on us through the access that they have via the Microsoft government Azure system.

02:07:33.000 Because it could have created a lot of national security risks had this been released prior to the proper channels being alerted to it.

02:07:44.000 But Tom and I, just for full transparency for those watching, we agreed that once the ProPublica investigation was complete and they published their article, that I would have him on my show to, like as soon as the article came out.

02:07:57.000 And it literally just came out the other day.

02:07:59.000 So I would have him on the show for a full-length interview.

02:08:03.000 And I agreed that I would distribute this content and, you know, inform the proper channels.

02:08:10.000 And that's what needs to happen.

02:08:11.000 And it's a shame that you should be, you should be getting contacted, in my opinion, by every single news agency.

02:08:20.000 They should want to have you on to talk about this.

02:08:23.000 I hope that you receive full protection as a whistleblower.

02:08:27.000 I hope that Pete Hegseth meets with you and that you're able to personally brief him.

02:08:31.000 I hope the Navy Secretary meets with you.

02:08:33.000 And I hope that your concerns are finally taken seriously and that we can get some type of congressional action on this and that it can get resolved.

02:08:42.000 And I don't think that this is going to go away anytime soon.

02:08:45.000 Microsoft can't just hide behind their computer screens and say that they're not going to provide any type of comment.

02:08:52.000 They're probably going to lawyer up because I imagine that upon further review, who knows?

02:08:58.000 Who knows how long Microsoft is going to continue to keep their lucrative contract?

02:09:05.000 And it is lucrative, but to the tune of how much is this contract with the federal government and Microsoft, do we have a price point on that contract?

02:09:14.000 Yeah, I think it's in the kind of the preach report where I was kind of going over laws, violations, other stuff.

02:09:22.000 But I think it came out to about $30 billion they've made off the United States government since 2015.

02:09:33.000 That doesn't include other things.

02:09:34.000 That's a lot of money.

02:09:35.000 So they're making $30 billion off of having an estimated $30 billion from your assessment off of their contract, Microsoft's contract with the United States government.

02:09:46.000 And so what is Microsoft doing with that money?

02:09:51.000 Well, they're doing a lot of things, right?

02:09:53.000 One of the things that they're doing is they're funding Chinese university students to learn cloud computing and AI.

02:10:00.000 And when this whole H-1B visa crisis erupted in DC, when it turned into a big fight, when we saw Elon Musk fighting with me and others, you know, right before the new year around Christmas time over H-1Bs, I know like Microsoft got a lot of heat because they had announced that they were investing a ton of money into teaching Indians, right?

02:10:23.000 Teaching Indians how to do, you know, AI. 1.00

02:10:27.000 And they were investing a ton of money, if you recall what I'm talking about.

02:10:32.000 And I wish I had the report in front of me, but it was like an astronomical amount of money.

02:10:37.000 And I remember because I know somebody who works at Microsoft and I sent it to them and I said, this is why people hate big tech.

02:10:44.000 You guys have so much money.

02:10:46.000 And why don't you invest this amount of money into teaching American students how to how to develop AI and invest in cloud computing for American students?

02:10:58.000 Why are you only investing in Indians and Chinese?

02:11:01.000 And they said, you know what, you have a point.

02:11:03.000 And this is somebody who has direct communication with the president of Microsoft, right?

02:11:09.000 So I'm going to send them this interview too.

02:11:12.000 I'm not going to use their name because I don't want to burn them.

02:11:17.000 But I'm going to send this to them too.

02:11:19.000 And hopefully Microsoft can give a more forceful, more forceful statement about this because this is very bad.

02:11:28.000 Additionally, they have joint AI ventures with the Chinese government and CCP-linked companies.

02:11:33.000 So it's nice, right?

02:11:35.000 They get to make $30 billion off of their contract with the United States government, and then they go invest it into the CCP and invest it into Chinese students who are all going to be loyal to the CCP.

02:11:48.000 Additionally, the Chinese nationals that Microsoft employs, they have a history of climbing up the ladder at Microsoft and then jumping ship to work for the CCP. 0.97

02:11:57.000 So Microsoft has, there's been several cases of Microsoft providing funding for the training of Chinese nationals to learn these skills in cloud computing and AI and all types of advanced coding.

02:12:09.000 And they get their training, just like we see here in the U.S., they get their training at American universities and they learn our ways and they study in laboratories here, many of those laboratories where you have to have a clearance.

02:12:22.000 And then they go and they defect and they go back to China and they give all the information to the CCP.

02:12:28.000 So that's a problem.

02:12:31.000 So on that too, it's interesting.

02:12:34.000 Level five, or I'm sorry, IL 5 or inherent threat.

02:12:40.000 When that was authorized in January 2017 for Microsoft Azure government and Office 365, at the same time, the Microsoft executive vice president, Kui Liu, who led the division in charge of Office, Bing, and Skype, left Microsoft to go work for Chinese companies tied with the CCP.

02:12:59.000 So it's like, yeah, we'll give you IL-5 clearance.

02:13:03.000 Same time, the guy that developed the things they're being cleared for is going off to go tell the CCP how to break into it or whatever else.

02:13:10.000 Who knows?

02:13:12.000 But there's been tons of instances, even just last year.

02:13:15.000 You know, you had Congressman Jimenez really grill into the president of Microsoft and asking, why are you in China?

02:13:24.000 You know, with the inherent threat of this, blah, blah, blah.

02:13:27.000 And it was right after that grilling that you had like most of the senior AI leadership and developers and engineers in Microsoft jump ship to go to China to start up a normal company to help China and AI and other stuff.

02:13:42.000 You know, but it's just crazy.

02:13:45.000 And then Microsoft, like you said, is partnered with the CCP on a number of things.

02:13:49.000 They're actually partnered with ByteDance and TikTok developing AI.

02:13:55.000 They're building AI for our adversary.

02:13:59.000 At the same time, they're trying to make us build our AI to combat them.

02:14:05.000 It's like, oh, you got to build more AI because your enemies got AI. 0.97

02:14:10.000 They're the ones providing the damn AI to our enemies to begin with. 0.94

02:14:14.000 So it's like creating the issue. 0.99

02:14:16.000 They're creating what needs to be done here.

02:14:19.000 So all of Trump's workings, dealings with, was it Stargate and all this other stuff going on with AI, Microsoft, OpenAI, et cetera, get out of it.

02:14:29.000 Get the hell away from it.

02:14:30.000 Get away from Microsoft. 0.99

02:14:31.000 Get away from this nonsense.

02:14:33.000 And honestly, you know, I've went over damages incurred or whatever by the United States government and the Department of Defense.

02:14:42.000 And I've calculated it comes out to about $2.21 trillion in damages.

02:14:47.000 And that's with R ⁇ D that's been stolen.

02:14:49.000 That's had to be new R ⁇ D programs stood up to combat this or in response to this.

02:14:56.000 Infrastructure that's been damaged, policies that had to be done.

02:15:00.000 There's a lot of things that are involved here.

02:15:03.000 But the total number, after you account for a false statement act or false bat, is treble damages, which comes out to triple.

02:15:13.000 So all in all, if the full letter of the law is executed and if, and I'm saying if Microsoft violated these laws, it's not saying they did, but everything is indicating that they did, you know, they should be nationalized.

02:15:30.000 You know, they should be taken over and turned into basically a U.S. government company at this point for what they've done.

02:15:36.000 At the very least, they shouldn't be in charge of our data or our services any longer.

02:15:42.000 You know, that needs to end.

02:15:45.000 Yeah, I mean, it's pretty evident that their current system, this Microsoft government duure, has left pretty much every single sensitive U.S. cyber infrastructure system exposed to foreign interference and foreign sabotage, mostly from China, under the guise of a commercial partnership between a private company and a government, right?

02:16:11.000 The United States government.

02:16:12.000 So that's a massive problem.

02:16:16.000 It's pretty evident as well that not only is there a massive communication issue going on and there's a lot of gatekeeping, but also too, the oversight mechanisms have completely failed.

02:16:28.000 There is absolutely no oversight Whatsoever.

02:16:31.000 And so there needs to be an investigation too into how these oversight mechanisms are either being completely ignored, they've been completely abandoned, or they're intentionally being pushed aside for the sake of committing espionage.

02:16:45.000 So definitely needs to be investigated and huge problem.

02:16:51.000 And we're going to be pushing out this information.

02:16:54.000 Is there anything else that you wanted to add before we conclude?

02:16:59.000 Sure.

02:17:00.000 Yeah, just, you know, side note, you know, while I've been combating this and not just, you know, with the Department of Defense and other agencies, you know, I've taken this up and personally briefed a number of Congress members and senators.

02:17:13.000 You know, I could name names, but it would probably take quite a while.

02:17:16.000 Talked with Susie Wiles over the phone about this too, the chief of staff for the White House.

02:17:21.000 So there's a lot of folks involved.

02:17:22.000 Elon Musk, he's been fully briefed on this by partners of his in Texas and whatnot.

02:17:29.000 I've been included on the email threads.

02:17:31.000 So he's involved too.

02:17:33.000 There's a lot of stuff.

02:17:34.000 You know, this could take forever.

02:17:35.000 But while I've been doing all this, you know, when the transition team was being stood up and everything else, me and Linda McMahon connected, connected with a number of people that were part of the transition team.

02:17:49.000 I had a good relationship with the campaign team.

02:17:52.000 One thing I put in for was to come in as the new DOD CIO.

02:17:59.000 Now, specifically, because I didn't trust anybody there to get the job done.

02:18:05.000 I didn't trust them to set the right vision, to bring us back to a pre-Obama era model to get stuff back in-house.

02:18:12.000 So I put a package together and did submit for that.

02:18:14.000 So it's been trying.

02:18:16.000 But like you said, there's a whole bunch of Biden holdovers.

02:18:20.000 And I've had on good authority from campaign team members and transition team members that we've got literally thousands of people that are patriotic, that are ready to help out, ready to jump in, and they haven't been interviewed, reached out to nothing.

02:18:37.000 Meanwhile, you still got a full assortment of Biden holdovers in there.

02:18:42.000 So it's crazy.

02:18:44.000 There's no reason for it.

02:18:48.000 Well, your actions are heroic, and you're an American patriot for what you've done.

02:18:54.000 And I really hope that you receive the recognition that you deserve for documenting this over the last four years of your life.

02:19:01.000 And I know what it's like to be subjected to gatekeeping and to have your investigations ignored for years, trust me, which is why I definitely sympathize with you and I can resonate with you and probably why we have a lot in common because, you know,

02:19:19.000 it's very difficult being a truth seeker, but also it's very difficult being ahead of the curve and noticing things when other people either refuse to notice and they want to close their eyes because they don't want to believe what they're seeing in front of their eyes, or they think it's just easier to completely ignore it and pretend like they were never made aware of the situation because they don't know how to address the situation or because they don't want to address the situation.

02:19:46.000 And this cannot be allowed to go on any longer, especially as China continues their campaign of aggression against the United States and also as they continue their campaign of aggression towards Taiwan.

02:20:02.000 And especially as our adversaries join forces to carry out their ultimate goal of multipolarity at the expense of the United States government.

02:20:13.000 This is a massive national security threat.

02:20:16.000 And shame on General Hog and shame on all of these officials at the Department of Defense who ignored you and pretended like they had, you know, no solution, right?

02:20:29.000 Or pretended like they never received your email correspondence or they just completely ghosted you after you were going out of your time.

02:20:36.000 It's not like anybody's paying you overtime the countless hours.

02:20:40.000 I mean, this is the kind of work that people get paid big bucks to do, right?

02:20:43.000 They're private security contractors.

02:20:48.000 This is the type of work that certain cyber defense companies get paid millions of dollars a year in contracts with mega corporations or with governments to manage their cybersecurity.

02:21:02.000 And so the fact that you're doing this for free just because you care about your country and you care about the United States government is very admirable.

02:21:09.000 It's very patriotic.

02:21:11.000 And I'm going to be following this situation closely.

02:21:14.000 As I said, you have my word that I'm going to be sending this to Defense Secretary Hegset.

02:21:19.000 I am going to send this to the Navy Secretary, John Fallon.

02:21:22.000 I'm going to send this to his chief of staff.

02:21:25.000 And I will personally be preparing a report and sending this over to the White House as well, because this is truly an abomination.

02:21:33.000 And hopefully Microsoft is jagged before a congressional hearing, not just for talking points and sound bites, but for an actual investigation that is hopefully going to get us some answers.

02:21:49.000 Because as we have seen, China is not our friend. 0.99

02:21:51.000 They've been incredibly hostile towards the current Trump administration.

02:21:55.000 And essentially, they could completely kneecap our entire federal government.

02:22:01.000 They could completely kneecap our entire electrical grid if they truly wanted to. 1.00

02:22:07.000 And it's kind of scary to think that hostile CCP actors could essentially hack and disable our entire infrastructure across the government.

02:22:18.000 And I imagine that all of our emergency systems and all of our emergency alert systems are tied into the same database because I imagine that they're not like cross-polluting platforms.

02:22:28.000 They're probably keeping one platform for, you know, technological cyber consistency, right?

02:22:33.000 So, I mean, what were to happen if somebody were to install some form of malware to completely disable the entire federal government for an extended period of time?

02:22:44.000 What would that do to our economy?

02:22:46.000 What would that do in the middle of a national security crisis, like a terrorist attack or some kind of natural disaster or some type of pandemic, right?

02:22:56.000 As we saw with China during the COVID era? 0.97

02:23:02.000 Excuse me.

02:23:03.000 Just something that people should be thinking about.

02:23:06.000 Something that people should be thinking about because, I mean, it's absolutely terrifying when you think that they have access.

02:23:14.000 And when you know, I mean, this is not even thinking, this is not even a conspiracy.

02:23:19.000 This is not a speculation.

02:23:21.000 You have the receipts and you have clearly proven that they have access to every single agency within the United States government.

02:23:28.000 And that should terrify everybody.

02:23:30.000 That should be a number one priority.

02:23:32.000 I'm surprised that, you know, our top security officials aren't having an emergency meeting to address this in the situation room.

02:23:39.000 It is that severe.

02:23:41.000 Yeah.

02:23:42.000 And many, you know, people have kind of described the situation or scenario with China have in this access where they can commit what's known as like a cyber 9-11 or cyber Pearl Harbor attack. 0.85

02:23:56.000 There's movies that have been based on this, this theory and books and other stuff.

02:24:01.000 But yeah, what could potentially happen right now, like as soon as you go live with this even, they might decide, oh, they're about to take her toy away and they might just strike.

02:24:13.000 I don't know.

02:24:14.000 But it is that serious. 0.98

02:24:16.000 You know, this needs to get shut the fuck down, you know? 0.98

02:24:19.000 Absolutely. 0.97

02:24:22.000 And hopefully this interview will lead to that happening.

02:24:26.000 Tom, where do people follow you if they want to get in touch with you?

02:24:31.000 I know that you're a very professional person.

02:24:34.000 You're in the Navy.

02:24:35.000 You're not trying to really cause a ruckus.

02:24:38.000 I know that you've expressed to me your desire to have discretion.

02:24:43.000 But if people want to reach out to you, let's say they want to interview you or people want to get in touch with you, how can they reach you?

02:24:50.000 Oh, absolutely.

02:24:52.000 I think email would be best.

02:24:53.000 And it's tomtom.schiller, S-C-H-I-L-L-E-R at nextdefense.us.

02:25:03.000 Reach out to me that way and love to hear from you.

02:25:07.000 Wonderful.

02:25:08.000 Well, hopefully you get a lot of inquiries from reporters who want to have you on to discuss this.

02:25:13.000 I think it's very important.

02:25:14.000 And I really appreciate all the time and effort that you've put into it.

02:25:17.000 It's very admirable.

02:25:18.000 And I'm going to do the best I can to make sure that the proper channels get access to this information.

02:25:25.000 I really appreciate it.

02:25:28.000 Appreciate everything you've done.

02:25:30.000 Renee over at Republica and also Kyle Reyes, who's the owner of Law Enforcement Stadium, put out an article last year covering the same issue.

02:25:38.000 So I'm really thankful that we've got some good patriots and people that are just that concerned and want to get stuff done.

02:25:46.000 Absolutely.

02:25:47.000 Well, thanks so much for coming on my show, Tom.

02:25:50.000 I really appreciate it.

02:25:52.000 Well, thank you.

02:25:54.000 Thank you.

02:25:54.000 Have a good night.

02:25:56.000 You too.

02:25:59.000 Before we close out tonight, I want to take a moment to thank the sponsor of tonight's episode of Lumer Unleashed, Kirk Elliott Precious Metals.

02:26:06.000 Let's cut through the noise.

02:26:08.000 The economy is shaky, banks are failing, inflation's eating your savings, but gold and silver, they've held their value through every single crisis.

02:26:15.000 But don't get burned buying the wrong kind.

02:26:18.000 Those shiny coins and ads, they have a high price and high fees.

02:26:21.000 And when you try to sell, you're going to get less.

02:26:24.000 That's why Dr. Kirk Elliott does it differently with real bullion and no games.

02:26:28.000 So be sure that you visit kepm.com slash lumer and get the straight answers today.

02:26:33.000 Protect what matters before the next crisis hits.

02:26:36.000 You can head on over to kepm.com slash lumer.

02:26:39.000 Kepm.com slash lumer.

02:26:41.000 They've created a landing page here for Loomer Unleash viewers.

02:26:44.000 You can get in touch with Dr. Kirk Elliott and his team of professionals, or you can call 720-605-3900.

02:26:52.000 Again, that's 720-605-3900.

02:26:59.000 That was a pretty heavy interview.

02:27:02.000 I hope that it was informative for all of you.

02:27:04.000 I hope that it was educational, but it's honestly shocking.

02:27:07.000 It's honestly shocking how infiltrated we are by bad foreign actors, especially by the CCP here in our country. 0.94

02:27:17.000 This is a massive national security crisis, and this is the first time Tom Schiller has ever gone public.

02:27:24.000 In a video interview, he agreed to give me the exclusive interview, and I promised that I would do everything in my power to make sure that this information in this interview is delivered to the proper authorities and the proper officials within the United States government, within the Department of Defense, and within the White House.

02:27:42.000 And to all of you watching tonight, that's my commitment to you as well.

02:27:46.000 This needs to end.

02:27:47.000 The fact that this has been ongoing as a result of the administration of Barack Hussein Obama for the last 10 years is absolutely unacceptable and it needs to end.

02:28:01.000 If you enjoyed tonight's episode of Loomer Unleashed, please be sure that you're following me on rumble.com slash Laura Loomer.

02:28:07.000 You can click the green follow button.

02:28:08.000 Be sure that you're always following me.

02:28:10.000 Download the Rumble app, enable notifications on your phone so that you never miss an episode of Loomer Unleashed.

02:28:17.000 And also be sure that you're following me on X at Laura Loomer and also on X at Loomer Unleashed.

02:28:24.000 I'm going to be clipping this interview and posting the clips.

02:28:27.000 I'm sure they're going to go very viral.

02:28:29.000 I'm going to tag all of the appropriate officials within the Trump administration and within the Department of Defense.

02:28:35.000 And then I'm going to send it to them directly because they need to see this information.

02:28:41.000 And I will be doing that throughout the entire weekend so that we can kick off next week with an explosive news cycle.

02:28:48.000 And hopefully Tom Schiller gets the coverage that he deserves for his very brave whistleblower report.

02:28:56.000 If you're a whistleblower and you have a story to tell and you have government corruption or a government scandal or a national security threat that you would also like to expose, you can also contact me by visiting my website, loomered.com.

02:29:10.000 Again, that's loomered.com.

02:29:13.000 And you can message me on the tip section.

02:29:16.000 You can drop down the sidebar of my website.

02:29:22.000 And you can see that I have a tip line there.

02:29:24.000 And you can message me.

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02:29:49.000 With that, thank you so much for tuning in to tonight's episode of Loomer Unleashed.

02:29:53.000 Have a wonderful weekend and I will see you next week for another episode of Loomer Unleashed.

02:29:58.000 Have a great night.

02:29:59.000 There is a young female journalist, conservative journalist by the name of Laura Loomer.

02:30:08.000 If America's men acted like Laura Loomer, our problems will be fixed in about five minutes. 0.95

02:30:14.000 Chain herself. 0.90

02:30:52.000 Tell me you're mountain, murder, murder in my mind. 0.99

Loomer Unleashed - July 18, 2025

EP134: EXPOSED: Microsoft Allowed China Access To DOD Cyber Systems

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