In this episode of Loomer Unleashed, Laura talks with Tom Schiller, CEO of Next Defense and a Navy Whistleblower, about his investigation of China's alleged involvement in the Defense Department's cyber defense systems.
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00:22:30.000I've been in communication with a Navy whistleblower by the name of Tom Schiller, and he has uncovered and exposed something quite extraordinary.
00:22:42.000Over the last few weeks, I've been in communication with Tom discussing his findings.
00:22:48.000And we're going to talk about it tonight, but really also just the obstruction within our own government and layers of chain of command and how difficult it is to expose bad actors, how bad it is to expose issues surrounding a vetting crisis, and how hard it is to expose wrongdoing within the United States government.
00:23:11.000It seems like it's an impossible task to accomplish.
00:23:14.000And this is a frustration that I personally feel just in my own capacity as an independent journalist, trying to expose Biden holdovers and trying to identify bad actors who are buried within certain agencies.
00:23:27.000And it takes months and months and months, even with the access that I have.
00:23:31.000I mean, I have enormous political access.
00:23:33.000And so I can't imagine how frustrating it is for the average American who is in a role.
00:23:39.000Perhaps they are a whistleblower within the Army or the Navy or within some type of government agency and just how difficult it is to be ignored and not listened to and to be stonewalled while you are trying to expose wrongdoing.
00:23:56.000And we're going to have a very extensive and long conversation with my guest, Tom Schiller, tonight.
00:24:03.000But what I want you to take away from this conversation when I bring Tom on is how long the issue that we discussed tonight has been ongoing.
00:24:18.000And then just think to yourself, when you're listening to Tom tell his story and expose what he's recently uncovered within our Department of Defense and their contract with Microsoft and how Microsoft has been allowing for Chinese engineers without the DOD claiming, well, the DOD claims they've had no knowledge, right?
00:24:38.000I mean, it wouldn't surprise me if the DOD is lying because, hey, who could ever imagine, right?
00:24:45.000But this is an ongoing issue that you're going to be exposed to tonight, something that has been happening at the expense of our national security for the last 10 years.
00:24:56.000And my next guest joining me now to discuss his expose of China's infiltration of our Pentagon cyber defense systems is Tom Schiller, who is the CEO of Next Defense and also a Navy whistleblower.
00:25:12.000So Tom, thank you so much for joining me tonight.
00:25:16.000I know you and I have been in communication for several weeks now, and I've been trying to point you in the right direction.
00:25:23.000And, you know, we had some internal conversations about the sensitivity of this information and whether or not it would be even wise to release this information publicly, given the foreign adversaries involved in the national security implications,
00:25:39.000if this became public and if our adversary China became aware that people were finally aware of this hidden, dark, deep secret that has been hidden within the Pentagon and the Department of Defense for the last decade, a relic of the administration of Barack Hussein Obama.
00:25:59.000So I just want to Give you an opportunity to tell our viewers a little bit about yourself and why you decided to, I guess, reach out to me.
00:26:08.000And really, you've reached out to so many people.
00:26:10.000And we're going to get into all of this tonight because I think it's pretty shocking.
00:26:14.000And I want you to name names and say who in the government you contacted about this over the last two years because you've told me that you've been investigating this and trying to bring this to people's attention for two years now.
00:26:33.000Yeah, you're to an extent, but yeah, four years, but aggressively these last two years, you have decided to really like ramp up your, ramp up your efforts outside of the nexus of, you know, your chain of command at the Navy.
00:26:47.000So why don't you just go ahead and tell my viewers about yourself and what you do at the Navy, and then we can dive into this shocking expose.
00:26:58.000It's really not even received a lot of attention.
00:27:01.000There's one article in ProPublica about this information, and it doesn't even mention some of the most damning aspects of this whistleblower operation and the extent of the Chinese subversion.
00:27:17.000But I've decided to dedicate the entire two hours of my program tonight to allowing you to have unlimited time to get all this information out there, right?
00:27:28.000We don't operate in sound bites like the mainstream media does.
00:27:31.000I want you to have as much time as you want on my program tonight.
00:27:35.000It's a two-hour show, sometimes two and a half, if necessary, to tell your story because we're going to clip this and we're going to make sure everybody from Defense Secretary Pete Hegseff to Navy Secretary John Phelan, both of whom I know personally.
00:27:53.000And I'm going to make sure that this gets to the White House as well because I believe that President Trump needs to see this information.
00:28:03.000And thanks for having me on the show and for all the effort, you know, helping out with reporting this to people in D.C. and, you know, just everything else.
00:28:12.000You know, ProPublica, they reported kind of more the tip of the iceberg or the mountain that this is.
00:28:19.000And, you know, as what was mentioned, it's been going on for close to a decade, you know, since 2016.
00:28:25.000There's evidence I've, you know, tracked and, you know, tried to track down the who, what, when, where, why, et cetera, where it looks like this is started as early as 2014 and 15 when early offerings were done with Microsoft and the United States government.
00:28:40.000And that's kind of one of the important things to highlight here, too, is it's not just the Department of Defense, it's our entire federal government that's affected by this because every department, every agency is in Microsoft Azure.
00:28:58.000There's a small sampling of the system.
00:29:01.000Why don't we start from the beginning and just explain to people what you do, what you do at the Navy, and then we'll start with the basics of what the system is because it's very tech heavy, right?
00:29:12.000So I want to make sure that people understand all of this because these are kind of complex concepts to understand, like technological concepts, and we're going to walk people through it all.
00:29:22.000But essentially, you have uncovered the fact that the United States government across all federal agencies uses Microsoft.
00:29:30.000Microsoft has a very extensive and lucrative contract with the United States government.
00:29:36.000And per their government, they provide all of the digital infrastructure to the various agencies.
00:29:43.000And as a result of using Microsoft, right, there are tech support packages.
00:29:49.000And because different agencies within our federal government have different levels of information, right, depending on whether it's classified or not classified, there are different levels within this Microsoft contract with the federal government that they have to agree to employ individuals with top security clearances to provide the tech support for the various agencies.
00:30:18.000Now, you can imagine that the highest level of security clearance needed to handle information would revolve around our Intel agencies and also our defense agencies, because those are the levels at which the most classified information is being transmitted across airways and electronically via whether it's work phones or computers via email or some type of cloud storage,
00:30:49.000The government has all types of ways for communicating, some of which I'm sure that we're not even aware of.
00:30:57.000So it's important for people to understand that this really, the burden of this and the responsibility of this scandal lies on Microsoft, whether they want to say they were aware or not.
00:31:11.000It's my understanding that Microsoft is being very cagey and they're not exactly providing a lot of, you know, a lot of statements or a lot of explanation to the media.
00:31:25.000There really isn't a lot of media coverage on this since the original article came out.
00:31:31.000And the original article just scratches the surface of how damning this information is and the extent of the information that you've uncovered these last four years.
00:31:41.000But the name of the system is called Azure.
00:31:47.000The Microsoft U.S. Government Azure is the technological database which Microsoft manages for the federal government that they have decided to utilize Chinese tech support agents who are located in China for.
00:32:02.000So just start from what you do at the Navy and how you uncovered this, and then we'll get into the scandal of the cover-up and the lack of action in addressing your concerns as a whistleblower over these last four years and especially over these last two years when you've decided to really ramp up your efforts.
00:32:42.000Then switched over to the Air Force for another four years where I was in cyber, mostly out of Washington State, but deployed overseas, went to PSAP or Prince Solon Air Base when we went into Iraq the second time.
00:32:55.000Just a whole bunch of different things like that.
00:32:57.000I took a break in service for a while.
00:32:59.000I was with the DOD and also as a defense contractor as a GS-15, which is the equivalent of an 06.
00:33:06.000I was over in Iraq and Afghanistan for a long time managing mission essential operations.
00:33:11.000Managed the only life-saving mission for the U.S., or the military as a whole, with Operation Horned Owl.
00:33:19.000You know, managing the systems, the sensors, the aerial, you know, analysts and whatnot that we had.
00:33:27.000So there was quite a bit and saved a lot of lives, which I'm pretty proud of.
00:33:31.000But there's been a lot of other accolades like that.
00:33:34.000In 2018, came back with the Air Force Reserves at first and just switched over to the Navy Reserves back this last September.
00:33:42.000So been a little bit of bouncing around.
00:33:44.000I've also helped out like the Space Force for about eight months building software factories.
00:33:50.000So that's another matter for another day, very similar to this one, but we can touch on that later.
00:33:57.000But as far as like the Navy, what I do, I do like operations specialists.
00:34:02.000And actually, I'm going to be starting with a Naval Surface Warfare Center Carderock Division this next year, as soon as the Navy has the funding and whatnot for a lot of these different things.
00:34:13.000In the meantime, I have my own company as a reservist and doing things on the side.
00:34:21.000I do a lot of work with various MAJCOM commanders and other generals and whatnot, trying to put together augmented virtual reality training for various MOSs and whatnot.
00:34:33.000And it's pretty important because we've got a lot of military soldiers, sailors, et cetera, where they just can't get the live training that they need or not as often as they need.
00:34:43.000So we're trying to augment that by providing virtual reality training.
00:34:48.000With the concept of it, it's all non-for-profit.
00:34:52.000And this is actually something I'm trying to help the government and the DOD stand up for them to own and not myself or my company, you know, which currently a lot of other companies do some work with this, with virtual reality training, but they own the software.
00:35:08.000And it's caused a lot of issues over the years, you know, because updating training and everything else and, you know, coming back and paying more and then them owning it where they can't, the DOD is kind of locked in, they can't switch to another vendor.
00:35:27.000And so this contract between Microsoft and our federal government was initiated between 2014 and 2016 under President Barack Hussein Obama.
00:35:39.000And he's the guy who personally authorized a number of the cybersecurity infrastructure agreements with Microsoft.
00:35:46.000And then, of course, some of these were later extended to companies like Amazon.
00:35:50.000And so when did you first discover this national security issue with the fact that Microsoft, per the contract with the federal government that was negotiated by Barack Hussein Obama, was utilizing Chinese foreign nationals to do tech support across all agencies, including at the Pentagon and within our Intel agencies.
00:36:15.000So I actually found out about this like right away because Microsoft had invited me to come in and interview for the senior most management position with the escort team back in 2016.
00:36:31.000Explain to the viewers what the escort team is.
00:36:34.000So the escort team is a subcontracted company, staffing company, Insight Global.
00:36:42.000I have heard that there are a few other companies that do this, but they don't have as much of an online presence.
00:36:47.000So not sure how they operate or who they are really.
00:36:51.000But Insight Global, lots of information on that.
00:36:53.000And that's who I was interviewing with, or through Insight Global with Microsoft.
00:36:58.000So the escort team, breaking it down, basically they hire personnel that are able to get security clearances, in many cases being reservists, guardsmen, veterans, et cetera.
00:37:15.000Very Army heavy, you know, folks like that.
00:37:19.000And when you look into a lot of their backgrounds, they don't come from cybersecurity backgrounds or cyber in general backgrounds.
00:37:26.000You know, a lot of them have different kind of past records and whatnot that they've done.
00:37:31.000The most important thing that they decided on was somebody that could get a clearance.
00:37:36.000That was their biggest prerequisite and could maybe understand PowerShell scripts a little bit.
00:37:44.000But that's the kind of personnel they brought in.
00:37:47.000One of the biggest things, I guess maybe it'd be good to just go into like the overview here because we're kind of touching on that quite a bit here too.
00:37:57.000So with the overview, and I've broken this down or condensed this as much as possible over the years because I've easily been over, go into like three or four hours of discussing this stuff.
00:38:10.000So the background, between 2014 and 2016, President Obama personally authorized a number of cybersecurity infrastructure agreements with Microsoft, later extended to companies such as Amazon.
00:38:22.000Among authorizations within these agreements was one permitting foreign personnel that did not have, or they did not have U.S. security clearances to operate and manage the U.S. government and Department of Defense cyber infrastructure.
00:38:35.000Via Microsoft, U.S. government Azure, the only safeguard that Microsoft pitched was the use of an escort team, you know, having escorts that be in place that would supervise, manage, monitor the work being done by the uncleared foreign personnel.
00:38:53.000Now, when I first interviewed at Microsoft, which I'll add to this, they made it seem, you know, with me That they pitched the idea to the U.S. government that this would be H-1B visa workers.
00:39:08.000They pitched to the government, allegedly, that they wanted to use their H-1B visa workers because they claimed we've got the best engineers, the best developers, the best.
00:39:19.000Like, you would think that the, I mean, I guess because this took place under Obama, it's not that hard to believe that they would sell us out to us, sell our national security out to a bunch of foreigners.
00:39:29.000But it's incredible to think that Microsoft actually presented the idea up front of using foreign workers.
00:39:39.000And we know that most of these H-1B visa workers come from China and they come from India.
00:39:44.000And so you'd have a bunch of Indian and Chinese individuals.
00:39:48.000And we know that in China that the people of China, right, they are required to have a loyalty oath to the Chinese Communist Party.
00:39:56.000And if you work in industries like tech, you are permitted to collect as much data as possible and hand it over to the CCP.
00:40:06.000This is expected of you as a citizen of the People's Republic of China.
00:40:11.000And so I don't think people really understand the implications of this and that if you are working, and this is why the H-1B visa program needs to be completely overhauled and why I'm such a critic of it and why I've been so outspoken about it is because, you know, if you look at all these H-1B visa workers and most of the people employed in Silicon Valley by these big tech giants are H-1B visa workers.
00:40:35.000It's like 73% of the labor from what I've seen is carried out by H-1B visa workers.
00:40:45.000All of the personal information that people are sending over the internet and sending in their DMs or posting on social media.
00:40:54.000And when you ask for tech support, whether it be at Google or whether it be at Microsoft or whether it be at, you know, Amazon or who knows, right?
00:41:05.000You think of all these different companies that people use.
00:41:07.000I don't think a lot of people think of the fact that some Chinese national who has to pledge their allegiance to China, who's on a visa here.
00:41:16.000And we know that a lot of the people who have visas, whether they be students or people that are working here, they make up what we like to call the fifth column, where it's a workforce.
00:41:27.000It's like an unofficial citizenry of China operating, right?
00:41:32.000They call it the fifth column as a spy network for the Chinese Communist Party here in the United States.
00:41:38.000And so it's kind of a reality check when you think of, and I don't think a lot of people are asking themselves when they put in a support ticket or they have a tech issue.
00:41:49.000They're not thinking to themselves, who's the person on the other end of the computer that I'm not able to physically see who is able to access all of my personal information, access my code and see what I've been up to, see what I've been sending, see what I've been doing, see the contents of my email, see the contents of my computer.
00:42:10.000Who is this person that we are giving our personal information to?
00:42:15.000Whether they ask you to confirm your password or whether they ask you to confirm your username or your social security, all this personal information is being handed over to foreign nationals for the most part.
00:42:28.000And while that's disturbing to think of on a personal level, right, just as a regular individual, now imagine the same thing is happening, but with every single employee of the federal government who works in every single agency for the last 10 years, they have been handing over their personal information to Chinese nationals, for the most part, who are doing this overtime tech support.
00:42:55.000The tech support is when you, when you describe the escort program, right?
00:42:59.000And that's why I said for you to explain what the escort program is.
00:43:03.000This is a team of individuals within, I mean, I guess various agencies, but as it relates to the Department of Defense, I would imagine that these are people who work within the military, who work in a cyber division, who have a top secret clearance, and they get contracted as part of this contract with Microsoft and the federal government.
00:43:28.000They get contracted via Microsoft where they're getting paid no more than minimum wage, $15 an hour, maybe, to handle the most classified information that is being transmitted in our country on these databases.
00:43:46.000And if you are asking for tech support after hours, and we all know that the government operates on a nine-to-five basis, you're going to be transmitted or sent over to some foreign national sitting at a desk in China who is reviewing all of your information.
00:44:04.000And apparently the Department of Defense, from what you've uncovered, is now saying that they were not aware of this, even though this program, again, it's called Microsoft U.S. Government Azure, has been ongoing for the last 10 years.
00:44:18.000And so just some facts, and we can discuss this in this overview.
00:44:23.000Over 98% of foreign personnel involved are located outside of the United States.
00:44:29.000More than 90% of these foreign personnel operate directly out of China as it relates to the foreign personnel from this government program with Microsoft, Microsoft U.S. government azure.
00:44:43.000And then this arrangement has effectively allowed Chinese nationals operating from China to access and control critical U.S. government and DOD cyber systems for the last decade.
00:44:55.000And so why don't we go through the limitations of the escort system and the concerns that present?
00:45:02.000Because I'm not a tech person, but you are.
00:45:05.000And so perhaps you can break it down in layman terms for everybody watching who may not have your technical expertise.
00:45:12.000But why don't we try to make people understand what the system limitations are in terms of accessing the content and accessing the classified information and the national security concerns that have now been created as a result of Microsoft Azure?
00:45:32.000So as one thing to correct with the ProPublic article is they were saying this is covering aisle four and five.
00:45:40.000That's like unclassed, maybe touching on secret, definitely a frustrated, et cetera.
00:45:45.000However, they were referencing an outdated FedRAMP article from 2017.
00:45:50.000Since then, they've been granted up to aisle six and top secret.
00:45:54.000So we're talking about all classification levels.
00:45:57.000And also earlier this year, just as a segment, Azure AI has also been granted all those same authorization levels.
00:46:04.000So we're talking about a complete clearance deal.
00:46:10.000Also talking on that, so with the clearances, we're kind of talking about that earlier, all the things that the escorts have, they are not just cleared by the Department of Defense, they're also cleared through everyone.
00:46:22.000So everyone that's got a clearance, they've got a DOJ clearance, an FBI clearance, individual clearances with each and every one of the states in the United States.
00:46:31.000They've got to go through other clearances because of ITAR for international trade and arms regulations, so allied nations, et cetera.
00:46:39.000Because these escorts have full access to everyone's data across the board, full admin access.
00:46:47.000And when they open up a VPN session with an engineer based in China per se, they're handing over the reins.
00:46:57.000They have to review kind of what the ticket is and what the work is involved prior to the session.
00:47:04.000But during the session, once they've approved of whatever work it is, they're basically opening up that connection and just watching.
00:47:45.000Escorts are only permitted to review the PowerShell code, which I've coined as launchpad scripts, initiating proprietary closed source code developed by the aforementioned foreign personnel, which they neither understand nor have access to analyze or vet.
00:48:02.000As a part of this too, Microsoft came out and tried making excuses, essentially, saying we've got multi-layer security support, you know, lockbox processes, et cetera, et cetera.
00:48:15.000What they didn't point out, either party, Microsoft or Republica, is that the people that have oversight of this are other global support personnel, also out of China.
00:48:27.000Insight Global and these escorts have no oversight of lockbox or their multi-fat layer of security infrastructure.
00:48:41.000And that was also illustrated by the one escort that was saying, we just have to trust these guys and hope they're not doing anything malicious.
00:48:53.000Senior members of the escort team freely admit that escorts cannot interpret the scripts that they do have access to, the PowerShell scripts, and would be equally incapable of assessing proprietary code even if given access.
00:49:06.000Now, that's coming from myself and three of the senior leadership of the escort team.
00:49:12.000I won't name names or their positions, but we're talking about the core leadership has said the escorts don't understand code.
00:49:22.000And that's just a- So if they don't understand code, then that means they wouldn't be able to understand malicious code inserts if when they handed over complete control, right, like sharing your screen or granting somebody the ability, because a lot of times the way this tech support works is you have to download some kind of software and then it allows for somebody else to remote control your computer from another location.
00:49:45.000That's how a lot of tech support works and people are able to get inside your computer from a faraway land or if you give your computer to even a US-based tech support, they're in your computer and they can examine your computer from a remote location.
00:50:05.000And this is also how a lot of spyware is installed on computers as well is people who don't know code or they don't know how to code are not going to be able to determine what is regular code from malicious code, especially if it's code from a foreign actor.
00:50:20.000And so that's a huge problem because it's sounding like the people, and correct me if I'm wrong, because I don't want to diminish anybody's skill set, but it sounds like if these people were truly experts in their field and they were code experts or cybersecurity experts, they would be getting paid probably a lot more than just minimum wage.
00:50:44.000It sounds like these people are just being paid and contracted out, not for their skill set, but rather the fact that they have a security clearance.
00:51:26.000But yeah, and they're based out of Redmond, Washington, which is crazy, you know, because Redmond, Washington and around that area of Washington state is hugely expensive.
00:51:42.000Healthcare, 34% higher, transportation, 30%, groceries, 14%, et cetera, et cetera.
00:51:49.000But one of the biggest issues, too, which is a huge red flag, is that many of these escorts hold secondary and even third jobs on the side.
00:51:59.000And we haven't covered this yet, but they all work.
00:52:03.000Well, we might have actually mentioned this before, but they all work remotely from home.
00:52:07.000Meaning from home, they have full access to the back end of our governments and departments.
00:52:14.000And that's a massive problem because if you were to be accessing classified information in Washington, D.C. within the federal government, you would have to be in some type of skiff.
00:52:24.000So it's pretty crazy to think that people can just be operating these jobs.
00:52:27.000And if you're thinking of, you know, I imagine a lot of these are young guys, like young kids, right?
00:52:32.000When I say kids, I mean like people who are like in their, in their early 20s, late 20s, maybe early 30s, right?
00:52:39.000And if you are making minimum wage in this economy and you're living in a place that far exceeds your income, right?
00:52:52.000In terms of your quality standard of living, then chances are you're going to have roommates or maybe you live in a place that isn't so nice and the walls are paper thin, right?
00:53:05.000And some of these like really shoddy apartment complexes.
00:53:11.000And I'm not trying to criticize people's standard of living, but the facts are is if you're if you're not using headphones or if you have people around you, people could walk around, they could see the type of information that you're discussing.
00:53:24.000So essentially our classified information here in the United States is being broadcasted to people from the comfort of their own home.
00:53:34.000And who knows if they're even using like a VPN or what kind of security measures they're taking.
00:53:39.000The fact that they're taking classified information home with them and they're able to work from home without the proper protections in place that would be established through a SCIF, it's pretty shocking.
00:53:53.000There's so many elements of this program that are just completely shocked.
00:53:57.000It just seems almost unbelievable when you examine all these facts and all these findings that you've uncovered.
00:54:04.000It just seems like it would be a major violation.
00:54:09.000And my question is, is how has this been allowed to take place for the last 10 years?
00:54:15.000And what type of, how many, how many foreign actors, what I would like to know is how many bad foreign actors have been aware of this program and have tried to infiltrate?
00:54:25.000Or how many bad domestic actors have been aware of this program and have tried to infiltrate on behalf of a foreign government, right?
00:54:33.000When we talk about people being targeted or recruited by foreign governments or foreign intel agencies to serve as operatives, we've seen members of the military defect.
00:54:45.000We've seen members of the military be charged for giving classified information to China before.
00:54:52.000We have seen members of our intel agencies in the past leaking classified information.
00:54:59.000I mean, this doesn't get reported as much as it should, but it happens on a pretty frequent basis.
00:55:07.000Yeah, it just happened, what, a month ago, I think, with the Abraham Lincoln, where a sailor on board, I think it was an Intel or something else of that nature, trying to sell information to China, you know, took it out of the skiff or whatever else and just was like, hey, can you pay me for this?
00:55:24.000And going back to, you know, the environments, the home environments that the escorts work in, accidents happen or violations definitely happen.
00:55:33.000There's been instances where kids have gotten on the laptops when mom or dad, the escort was away, installed video games and whatnot, you know, and doing like chat and, you know, other kind of stuff.
00:55:47.000This is the reason why, if you're in the military, this was established several years ago.
00:55:53.000I think this happened under the Trump administration.
00:55:55.000They said that your kids are not allowed to have TikTok on their phones, right?
00:56:02.000If they live in the same home as you because of spyware.
00:56:04.000And so, you know, if they have rules for certain members of our Intel agencies, depending on who you are, right?
00:56:15.000Your children are not allowed to have TikTok downloaded on any of their devices inside your home because it's Chinese spyware.
00:56:22.000And so it makes you wonder, one, who's in compliance with these rules?
00:56:26.000And two, right, obviously, like, there's no compliance whatsoever that's been established for this program because if there were, right, the first line of order would be, don't take classified information home with you.
00:56:38.000They would have some kind of a designated area in Washington state where you would have to use a badge to clock in and you probably wouldn't be able to take your device or your computer home with you.
00:56:50.000You probably would have to use it within the room so that it wouldn't be contaminated or somehow hacked or infiltrated.
00:57:01.000Like the bulk, if not all, of our armed forces are actually out of compliance, you know, as far as like communications and whatnot that are on their phones.
00:57:10.000You know, it's mandated that DOD personnel, and I think government-wide really, they're not supposed to and not allowed to be using anything that's not authorized by, say, the DOD.
00:57:22.000GroupMe or Signal or any of the rest of these are not authorized, and yet all of the various commands and their personnel use them.
00:58:08.000And I think it's created a culture where service members, DOD, government-wide, they just go with the flow.
00:58:17.000So if they're told, hey, we're using this, even though it's not authorized, they just do it because everybody else is doing it.
00:58:24.000And that's kind of what has probably created like the Microsoft issue in a lot of ways too.
00:58:29.000You Know people, well, I think a lot of people know about this.
00:58:33.000The escorts absolutely know about this.
00:58:35.000Now, Republica, they reported the one team of 50 people.
00:58:39.000There's actually four teams over there of about 200 people.
00:58:43.000And there is a suspicion of about 10 more teams with other companies.
00:58:48.000So we're talking anywhere between 200 to 700 escorts working daily with folks in China and whatnot.
00:58:55.000But all of these escorts, none of them have came forward.
00:58:59.000I had to actually reach out to three of these folks, you know, senior leadership, and convince them to come and speak with the DOG, or I'm sorry, with the DISA OIG office and actually give depositions and reports.
00:59:12.000They would not talk to the press or anything else.
00:59:14.000They didn't want their names out there, et cetera, which I respect.
00:59:21.000And it's the same with the whole damn team of all that 200 to 700 some odd people, you know, because nobody's ever heard of this, you know.
00:59:48.000And like you were saying with the SCIF thing, that was one of the first questions I asked for the senior most management position managing that team back in 2016 is, is Microsoft going to be providing a SCIF or a secure facility for these escorts?
01:00:36.000So going into like the historical context, if you want to kind of branch off into that a little bit.
01:00:43.000Yeah, I want to take a moment first to take a quick commercial break to thank the sponsor of tonight's episode of Loomer Unleashed, and then we're going to continue with this.
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01:02:57.000All right, back to our interview with Navy whistleblower Tom Schiller.
01:03:02.000Tom, I want to get into the role of the individuals within the Obama administration who allowed for this to happen.
01:03:12.000I know we said we wanted to name some names tonight.
01:03:14.000And so if there are any individuals who you think bear most of the responsibility for this, I'd love to hear your insight because eventually when there is, if there is, and I hope there is an investigation into how this happened and how the Microsoft Azure system is currently operating across our federal government, I mean, you're telling me that this also includes the United States Secret Service as well.
01:03:41.000The United States Secret Service is also using this.
01:03:45.000As far as I know, all of our government uses it.
01:03:49.000That's a huge problem because then essentially the Chinese, who we know are buddy-buddy with Russia and Iran, they could be accessing this information and turning over information as it relates to the security and the safety of the President of the United States to our adversaries.
01:04:06.000And this comes at a time where we are experiencing hostilities with China.
01:04:12.000And also, we have seen that Iran is fiercely denying the fact that they have tried to assassinate President Trump at least two times now.
01:04:22.000We know that Iran has tried to assassinate President Trump on multiple occasions.
01:04:28.000They chant death to America constantly.
01:04:30.000They chant death to Israel constantly.
01:04:33.000And so this is very concerning because you have to ask yourself, how much information have they been able to acquire across all the various federal agencies these last 10 years?
01:04:44.000And what are they doing with this information?
01:05:05.000I mean, I went back, you know, circling back to after 2016 in that interview, they offered me the job to run the team, hire people, et cetera.
01:05:14.000I turned it down because of what this is.
01:05:18.000I was like, this is too many red flags.
01:05:21.000And one of the first places I reached out to was the FBI, sending in reports right on the day, right after the interview, reached out to the FBI in 2016.
01:05:34.000But the fact that Director Wray, former Director Ray, is saying they're fully in everything else.
01:05:41.000I'm suspecting he might have been basing that off of reports that I put in because I put in a lot of FBI reports.
01:05:48.000I think it was every three to six months I'd circle back, reach back out, submit new stuff, you know, and this went on for a good eight years of the reporting efforts.
01:06:00.000I'd be very shocked if it didn't reach the director at some point.
01:06:04.000So he may be basing things off or did base things off of my reporting efforts.
01:06:10.000The key people that I suspect are behind this damn thing, the number one person, if this is investigated, is Craig Mundy.
01:06:21.000Historical context, who Craig Mundy is, he was the former science advisor to President Obama while simultaneously being the senior advisor to the CEO of Microsoft.
01:06:33.000He was formerly referred to as the man behind Microsoft, and he was attributed with being the decision maker for Microsoft's China strategy for 13 of the company's 18 years in China market as of 2010.
01:06:50.000Now, he continued in this role, too, for a couple more years, so it was much more than just the 13 years.
01:06:55.000I consider him to be the key person of interest, aside from APOM himself, likely the principal architect and facilitator of the aforementioned agreements between Obama and Microsoft.
01:07:08.000And so this Craig Mundy individual, are you saying then he's the decision maker?
01:07:13.000He was the one who was ultimately the decision maker about whether or not under the Obama administration, this contract between the U.S. federal government and Microsoft was going to be formalized?
01:07:28.000I mean, I've seen a lot of indicators and things, you know, referenced online, articles, et cetera, that does pinpoint him with many of these meetings that happened.
01:07:38.000And he would have been the person in that position that he was in to be making these decisions.
01:07:44.000I mean, especially when he's being attributed as the decision maker for Microsoft's Trina strategy and the man behind Microsoft.
01:07:52.000You know, when he's running the show over there Wait, wait, wait, wait, wait, wait, wait, wait.
01:08:22.000It is so crazy how infiltrated we are, whether it's with the Biden family and all of their associations with China.
01:08:28.000I mean, this is incredible what you're telling me that Craig Mundy was the former science advisor to President Barack Hussein Obama.
01:08:37.000And then at the same time, Craig Mundy is the guy who was behind the strategy for Microsoft to get involved with China and who facilitated their relationship with China.
01:08:50.000How does somebody like that become a senior advisor to the president of the United States?
01:08:58.000I mean, Microsoft, and I've kind of went into this in other reporting too, but they were the biggest attributors to Obama's campaign, you know, to get in as a president.
01:09:09.000And it was against a lot of their best interest because Obama was running on raising taxes of people making over, I think it was $250,000 a year or something like that.
01:09:19.000So they went against their best interest.
01:09:22.000It didn't make much sense until he got elected and he put his cabinet together with a whole bunch of lobbyists, including Craig Mundy, who is from Microsoft.
01:09:32.000And they also brought in some other folks, person from Google and some other big tech companies.
01:09:39.000But these were the decision makers that came in in Obama's administration.
01:09:44.000And Craig Mundy was essentially the chair.
01:09:47.000He was the head decision maker for this little party going on.
01:09:52.000At the same time, and it wasn't right off the bat that he became the senior advisor to the CEO of Microsoft.
01:09:58.000He was promoted to that role like a few years after coming on as the science advisor to Obama.
01:12:01.000So they took their civilian cloud infrastructure, something they invested a lot of time and money into building, cloned it, built a separate environment, maybe added a little bit of bells and whistles to meet government compliance with security and stuff like that, and then got authorized.
01:12:19.000They got authorized for, I believe they started with aisle two up to three, maybe four, between 2014 and 16.
01:12:27.00016 is when they got aisle 4 authorization.
01:12:31.00017, I believe, is when they got aisle 5, and then they got aisle 6 a little bit after that, and top secret a little bit after that.
01:12:38.000So they've progressively gotten up there.
01:12:40.000But back to the, you know, circling back, yeah, they don't build anything from scratch.
01:12:46.000And I actually suspect that Azure was originally tailored for the Chinese market because piracy and other stuff over in China made it impossible to make any kind of money or revenue out of there.
01:12:59.000So I think that building this cloud offering and having it so you had to pay to get the service and support and everything else is why they did it for China.
01:13:10.000And China was actually the first country, from what I can tell, that got a government Azure instance.
01:13:16.000They got it about a year before we did.
01:13:20.000So, and on top of that, most of Microsoft's engineers for cloud, which is Azure, and also AI are predominantly out of China.
01:13:31.000So the same people building this, you know, all of it, are Chinese nationals out of China.
01:13:48.000Not civilian-owned, which I was going to go into a little bit further.
01:13:53.000But my recommendation is that we restore things to a pre-Obama era model, that we go back to the United States government, the Department of Defense, all of the departments and agencies owning and operating their own cyber infrastructure.
01:14:27.000They turned around and they said, we can hire cheap labor out of countries like India and China, et cetera, et cetera, underscore the competition or whatever, you know, sell this.
01:14:38.000And they didn't care about, I mean, it's obvious, in my opinion, they didn't care about national defense.
01:14:48.000And honestly, everything they've done, and I don't think they've made much profit out of this doing that, but I think honestly everything they've done was actually working with the Chinese government.
01:14:58.000I think Microsoft and the Chinese government are in collaboration on this.
01:15:03.000I think that something nefarious is afoot.
01:15:08.000Do you think that Microsoft is aware, it's your professional opinion, that Microsoft is aware of espionage being carried out against the United States government by China?
01:15:24.000What they've done by doing this, by having this escort team that has no oversight over anything except for the basic launch pad scripts, and then allowing in global support, over 90% out of China, and doing that, they've enabled espionage.
01:15:42.000Like if you look under the letter of the law, like, and there's many different things they violated here.
01:15:48.000There are laws they violated, policies, regulations, executive orders.
01:15:54.000There's so many things violated by doing this across multiple departments and agencies, not just the DOD.
01:16:01.000But by doing this, according to the letter of the law, they have enabled espionage by doing this.
01:16:09.000And saying that everything is secure, you know, and everything else, that falls under the False Statements Act.
01:16:17.000You know, they made false statement by saying, oh, we're 100% U.S., we're secure, et cetera.
01:16:25.000I mean, you had the former DOD CIO come out on the record and a number of other senior leadership within DOD cyber and whatnot saying they had no idea this was going on.
01:16:39.000Didn't somebody during the Obama administration have to sign off on this?
01:16:43.000Didn't somebody during the Obama administration have to sign off on allowing for foreign nationals to be involved in this database?
01:16:52.000Because surely there was some type of disclosure with Microsoft when they signed this contract with our federal government that the tech support was going to be carried out by foreign nationals.
01:17:03.000So who within our government granted authorization to allow for foreign nationals to participate?
01:17:10.000I mean, this is something that would have required, I imagine, right, authorization at the highest levels of the United States government.
01:17:30.000And I raised all the red flags that I, you know, have been raising here, I raised with Insight Global as well.
01:17:37.000Told them all about what this was and red flags I discovered, et cetera.
01:17:41.000And I also asked them, can you, or do you know who the approval authority for this is?
01:17:45.000Do you have the documentation and paperwork?
01:17:47.000And they were like, oh, we don't have this yet.
01:17:49.000They kept assuring me they would let me know, and they didn't, you know, up until I came back in 2020.
01:17:56.000But that was a question that was heavy with me, was who the hell signed off on this from 2016 until 2020 or so.
01:18:05.0002020 is when I came, well, I was reached, had somebody from Inside Global reach out to me and asking me if I would want to come on the team as the principal software developer, streamlining the escort process, going into KQL or Kusto query language, similar to SQL, doing a whole bunch of stuff, coming up with custom apps, PTO, et cetera, you name it.
01:18:27.000But when I came on board and was doing the onboarding, then I got to see who the approval authority was.
01:18:34.000And it was Barack Obama's name and signature on all of it.
01:18:39.000He was the person that authorized everything, all of it, across the board.
01:19:00.000I'm assuming that there was probably additional agreements made with other companies, an extension of this agreement with Microsoft, because it's known that Amazon has also got their own escort team, secured escort team doing the same thing.
01:19:13.000Don't know if they got personnel working out of China, but they are escorting in uncleared personnel.
01:19:20.000And then there's other companies like Oracle, where somebody came out on one of the comments and said, I know of at least two escorts working for Oracle doing the same thing.
01:19:30.000So those agreements were probably also signed off on by Obama while he was in office.
01:19:39.000I think all of this was done right before he got out too, or, you know, during the last few years of his administration, he signed off on this.
01:19:48.000Like I said, too, I've been trying to.
01:19:50.000Yeah, I want to get into who you reported this to because, you know, the Department of Defense, obviously you have the Secretary, but you also have other people who work at the Department of Defense.
01:20:00.000And I know that, you know, even though this went across and this, you know, this spans across all of the various agencies within our federal government, what I'm wondering is, you know, as a member of the Navy, you probably just followed your chain of command.
01:20:21.000And then when you exhausted your chain of command, you probably contacted the Intel agencies.
01:20:27.000I mean, I know you have from our own conversations and what we've discussed.
01:20:31.000And so I want to know who at the Department of Defense specifically you informed about this and whether or not you ever received any kind of communication back.
01:20:42.000And I want to know when you contacted them, how often you contacted them.
01:20:47.000And if you don't mind, you know, just kind of briefly running through a summary of who all you have contacted about this and whether you, you know, received a response.
01:20:57.000You don't have to get into, you know, too much detail, but I think it's important if we name some names because some people are going to say, well, you know, maybe he just didn't bring it to the proper, you know, the attention of the proper people or the people in charge.
01:21:10.000And you can't just post about this stuff online or talk to people and expect it to go anywhere.
01:21:14.000Well, I want to know which channels of communication you sent this to and what their response was.
01:21:28.000There was a number of different emails coming.
01:21:30.000And at the time, I was with the Air Force Reserves.
01:21:33.000But there was emails coming through talking about war with China by 2025.
01:21:38.000General Minihan, who was the commander for AM Mobility Command, said, go to the range, shoot for the head, prepare, prepare, you know, etc.
01:21:46.000So I responded with my commander and let her know about the situation with this and went forward and reported that to her commander and then that person's commander and et cetera, all the way up to General Minihan.
01:22:02.000And me and General Minihan had actually been working together at the time.
01:22:05.000I was one of the bothered warrior trolls on his team helping out with coming up with ideas and solutions to help out the Air Force and etc.
01:22:14.000All volunteer based and all my own personal time.
01:22:19.000He acknowledged it, said he's tracking and banging the drum and kind of went from there.
01:22:26.000I also reported this to another MAGCOM commander, major command commander, General Bauerfiend over at AFSOC Air Force Special Operations Command.
01:22:35.000And then also reached out to U.S. Cybercom Commander, former General Hawk.
01:22:40.000And I think you probably know a little bit about that guy.
01:22:47.000And I hope the media is listening now because they harassed me for weeks on end and they still harass me to this day.
01:22:55.000And during the Armed Services Committee the other day, several members of Congress were talking shit about me saying that Laura Loomer shouldn't have the influence that she has.
01:23:05.000And General Hogg was an outstanding patriot who represented his country in an apolitical manner.
01:23:11.000And there's no reason why the NSA director, General Hogg, should have been relieved from his position.
01:23:17.000And it's like, actually, there are many reasons.
01:23:22.000And this is what I was trying to explain to people is that when Joe Biden appointed people to serve in his administration, he appointed people who were either one, blindly loyal to him, two, severely anti-Trump to the point where it was like a derangement syndrome.
01:23:40.000Three, right, you either compromised, you have a Trump derangement syndrome, or you are completely sold out to China or some kind of foreign interest.
01:23:51.000We've seen how the Biden administration was completely infiltrated by China.
01:23:56.000We know about their business dealings with China.
01:24:01.000We know about the fact that Joe Biden allowed for an Iranian spy ring to operate inside of the United States State Department.
01:24:11.000We know that Maher Battar, who is a Palestinian national who has an affinity for students for justice in Palestine and pro-Hamas and pro-Hebollah activities and essentially, you could argue, is an agent for the Muslim Brotherhood, was put in one of the most senior intel Positions overseeing our national intelligence.
01:24:35.000Working with the National Security Council.
01:24:38.000So, and it's my understanding that to this day, Maher Batar, who many people have argued is responsible for October 7th, still has a security clearance, still has a security clearance where he's working with Senator, now Senator Adam Schiff.
01:24:57.000So just let that sink in, if you will, right?
01:24:59.000And so when people say to me, oh, well, you know, aside from not being loyal to Trump, what were some of the, you know, what were some of the reasons why General Hogg was disqualified in your opinion from serving as NSA director?
01:25:16.000Well, okay, it's arguably the most important intel agency in our country.
01:25:20.000We saw how it was weaponized to spy on Donald Trump and abuse the FISA courts and spy on President Trump's allies and to carry out a witch hunt and falsely accuse in coordination and collusion with foreign intelligence agencies and phony dossiers that were padded with and included fabricated information from foreign intel officials.
01:25:45.000Yeah, I think it's probably a pretty bad idea to have a Biden loyalist overseeing the NSA under a Trump administration, given the fact that Biden's litmus test was orange man bad, right?
01:26:03.000And for those of you listening now, right, you brought this, you brought this to General Hogg in what year, right?
01:26:09.000Because we are now in 2025 when he just got fired.
01:26:13.000And you're telling me that you brought a Chinese espionage plot to him and raised awareness with all the receipts, documenting the fact that the Chinese Communist Party had a backdoor channel straight into our most classified information and our cyber systems at the Pentagon and every other agency within our country, which would include the NSA.
01:26:39.000So I think by the time I reached out to him, it was 2024, I think.
01:26:46.000And I CC'd General Manahan and General Bowernfend on the email threat and whatnot.
01:26:52.000And one thing I should probably call had to cover my own butt too here is that this isn't just like military chain of command reporting as a service member.
01:27:00.000This is also independent civilian reporting as well.
01:27:04.000And it's actually been kind of stressed on me to report as a civilian and not as a service member.
01:27:10.000And it's due to a misconception of a lot of service members because I've spoken with the Navy JAG and they've told me that, no, you do report on both channels as a reservist.
01:27:19.000Like even if you're off duty, you're not on active status or orders or anything else.
01:27:24.000If you come across something that affects mission readiness or security, you need to report to both channels, civilian and military.
01:27:34.000But getting back to Hawk, yeah, when I emailed him, I got an immediate phone call from somebody in his office.
01:27:41.000I'm thinking one of his OSI people or Air Force OSI, confirming who I was, establishing my identity, et cetera, et cetera.
01:27:49.000Once they did, you know, they said, well, we'll be back in touch.
01:27:51.000We're going to set up a meeting with you and him, right, General Hawk.
01:27:55.000So a couple weeks went by, didn't get a phone call, followed up, talked to his former secretary and some other folks.
01:28:02.000They said, oh, yeah, let's get you a meeting and everything else.
01:28:05.000Another couple weeks went by, followed up again.
01:28:07.000And then I had Air Force Detachment 333, or OSI Detachment, which works directly for the U.S. Cybercom Commander and whatnot, and have one of their agents reach out to me and said, yeah, it's been requested not to contact General Hawk anymore or his office.
01:28:24.000Like, we want to put you in touch with the proper people or whatever.
01:28:29.000We're going to find out what's going on.
01:28:30.000Wow, so the NSA director essentially told you to bug off and not to contact his office anymore when you were trying to alert him to the fact that the Chinese had access to all of our cyber systems,
01:28:46.000essentially, because who knows if any of these, and I'm sure it probably has happened, who knows how many of these Chinese foreign national tech support operatives via Microsoft have installed a malicious code onto the computers or spyware onto the computers of Intel officials or defense officials or, you know, people working at the Secret Service and people working at the Treasury.
01:29:15.000So hopefully all those people listening, all the people listening who constantly want to defend General Hogg as some, you know, outstanding patriot who did the best he could to defend his country.
01:29:27.000Yeah, I think you should probably reevaluate your stance on that.
01:29:32.000I think he should actually be brought in for hearings on this, you know, answering for it.
01:29:38.000My own personal interactions and whatnot with him in his office is like, yeah, I didn't care for him too much at all.
01:30:31.000You know, they're probably my favorite IG office just because they're so on the ball, you know, responsive and getting things done.
01:30:37.000They looked into it, did a preliminary for about three weeks or so, came back and said, well, we don't have jurisdiction or purview over this.
01:30:47.000We're going to refer that over to them and actually open a case on your behalf.
01:30:50.000So I was very thankful and said, great, thank you.
01:30:53.000DODIG looked it over, sent me back an automated response and said, we've looked over all the things you provided.
01:30:59.000This is Definitely reason for concern.
01:31:01.000This caused serious damage and everything else.
01:31:05.000And we feel that the DOD CIO is the best office to investigate this for us, for the IG.
01:31:12.000So it was sent over to the DOD CIO at that point.
01:31:15.000This is after the former DOD CIO retired and you had an acting one in there.
01:31:22.000So I waited another week or two, didn't hear back, filed a number for the DOD CIO, called up their office and talked to, oh, what was it, Laura Stockwell, I believe?
01:31:33.000I'm a DOD CIO for people who don't know Katie Arrington, correct?
01:31:39.000She is currently the acting DOD CIO with Kristen Davies being the DOD CIO select, who's not in there yet, but she's the person that's slated to come in there.
01:31:54.000And so with the DOD CIO, it's an extremely important role.
01:31:58.000It's probably the most important cyber role in our country because that individual runs the whole show for our defense, for everything.
01:32:05.000They set the vision, the direction, they make the mandates.
01:32:09.000They are the senior most cyber advisor to the Secretary of Defense and to the Commander-in-Chief.
01:32:18.000But getting back to that, so I was working with the DOD CIO chief of staff for COS, and she did not want me to tell her anything about this case.
01:32:28.000She was like, yeah, send me over the ticket number and I'll have my people look into it.
01:32:32.000So she opened up a DISA OIG investigation and it spoke with those guys.
01:32:38.000And explain to people watching what DISA is.
01:32:42.000So it stands for the Defense Information Systems Agency.
01:32:46.000They set a lot of policies, guidelines, and other things for the Department of Defense, but also other agencies and departments, I believe.
01:32:57.000They make sure everything is done properly.
01:33:00.000You know, them and kind of a few other agencies too, but predominantly it's DISA that controls stuff.
01:33:10.000So I was handed over to the IG office for DISA to investigate this.
01:33:15.000And that was just a whole bunch of nonsense, really.
01:33:19.000I got on the phone with the investigator.
01:33:22.000He was working from home for one, which is just pretty unprofessional, I think.
01:33:26.000And a number of things were said during the call.
01:33:29.000I'm actually waiting on a FOIA request to come back where I can discuss things or get emails and whatnot back to verbatim be able to discuss this.
01:33:38.000But from memory, which is important legally, things that were said during the conversation, the biggest one was that he kept asserting that the United States and China are allies and that this was all perfectly normal and authorized.
01:33:54.000And he repeatedly make this assertion during the interview, which was about two hours.
01:33:59.000And repeat the name of the individual who kept on saying that the United States and China were allies?
01:34:05.000I don't know if I can say the name, though.
01:34:54.000But I did that all throughout basically the reporting process up until about 2023 where I really got supercharged and started reaching up the DOD chain of command and whatnot.
01:35:05.000Yeah, there's probably dozens, if not hundreds, of emails and other things I've sent to FBI.
01:35:17.000I mean, it's really honestly shocking that this has been going on for 10 years and you spent four years and then two of those years supercharged aggressively trying to report this and bring it up the chain of command.
01:36:01.000I'm sorry, getting back to kind of the deflection kicking the can thing.
01:36:07.000You know, after DISA, so a big thing to point out too, is that DISA on August 28th, I believe, could be 29th, they closed the case and said they didn't feel they were the right avenue for redress, meaning they didn't feel the right office to correct this or do something about it.
01:36:26.000This is after deposing four whistleblowers in total, all the senior management for the escort team, all confirming this is going on.
01:36:35.000Reports, evidence, everything else I'd sent over, right?
01:36:38.000So they conducted all this, and on that date, they closed the case and said they'd send it up to this a leadership, right?
01:36:47.000It's good to point out that exact same date was the last day of a three-day trip that Jake Sullivan, the former national security advisor for the White House, made a trip to China to meet with President Xi and discuss cybersecurity, amongst other things.
01:37:04.000And the last time that a White House National Security Advisor had traveled to China was back during Obama's administration.
01:37:12.000So it was almost a fact that these two events happen on the same day, no damn way.
01:37:24.000I mean, it sounds like there were people who were in these leadership positions and senior positions who were intentionally trying to stonewall you and tell, they couldn't directly tell you, oh, we're not going to address this because then it would become a scandal given the fact that people know that China is not our friend.
01:37:41.000And China, it's kind of laughable that Obama and Joe Biden implemented cybersecurity pacts with Xi Jinping, knowing that the Chinese don't respect cybersecurity pacts with the United States.
01:37:54.000I mean, right before President Trump took office, they hacked into Janet Yellen's email, right?
01:37:59.000So, I mean, look, they clearly don't respect cybersecurity agreements at all.
01:38:07.000But from my analysis of this, and I think that the most concerning thing that I get from all of this is that there's a serious obstruction of communication that is taking place.
01:38:18.000There is a serious black hole in the chain of command, whether it's deliberate and malicious or whether it's a bunch of unqualified people who are just totally checked out for lunch.
01:38:31.000And I don't know, they're just there to collect a paycheck.
01:38:34.000They don't give a shit about our country.
01:38:36.000Maybe these people don't give a shit about cybersecurity and they don't give a shit about national security.
01:38:53.000And it brings up a good point, too, because after DISA, you know, kicked the can, closed the case, same day as that event with Chi happened, whatever, reached back out to the CEO or the chief of staff for the CIO office.
01:39:07.000And they said, oh, no, we're very much still investigating this.
01:39:10.000We're still looking into it and everything else.
01:39:13.000Immediately after that phone call with her, I got an automated reply from the DODIG with her name on it showing she just closed the case.
01:39:21.000So right after this phone call, we're still actively looking into this and everything else and click, you know, right after the call.
01:40:15.000So this is back before elections and before Katie came in, you know, under Trump.
01:40:22.000But so I tried reaching out to the office all the way up to the elections, basically, couldn't get through.
01:40:29.000After the elections and after inauguration day, I think on the 21st or something like that, I reached back out to the DOD CIO office, learned that the chief of staff, the person that was kicking the can, everything else, was actually sent home on administrative leave.
01:40:44.000Her bios page, everything else on that site was taken down.
01:40:48.000So all indicators was she was getting the boot for whatever reason.
01:40:53.000So I talked to the military advisor for that office and spoke with him.
01:41:01.000And I don't have the name up at the moment, but spoke with him.
01:42:32.000So, you know, she gave me her email address to send things to, you know, not, I couldn't send all of these things through an email because it's just, you know, probably gigabytes of data or whatever.
01:42:44.000But then she ended up handing it over to the DOD Chief Information Security Officer.
01:42:50.000So she did not handle it herself, from what I can tell, handed it over to the CISO.
01:42:55.000Now, what's important to note is that person is a Biden holdover.
01:43:56.000So he started reaching right out to references of mine Because I provided about four reference letters from former commanding officers because it was going through Navy officer boards, Sterling recommendations, everything else.
01:44:10.000So he's like, oh, well, let me call these people, right?
01:44:15.000One of them in particular was very troubled by the call, called me immediately afterwards.
01:44:20.000And he let me know that initially when Mr. McKeon, or I'll just say the CISO called him, he was telling him, oh, I'm fully vetted in the case, fully acclimated, know all the details, all the investigation, blah, blah, blah, right?
01:44:46.000That would have been evident if he read all the details and evidence and everything else that I did use the chain of command.
01:44:51.000So right there, either he lied about being fully vetted and acclimated to this issue, or he made a false statement and was trying to defame me.
01:45:01.000But either way, right there, lie number one.
01:45:04.000Lie number two, he was telling the individual on the phone, I believe Mr. Schiller is confused and mistaken and doesn't understand the difference between civilian azure and government azure.
01:45:19.000And this was David McKeon who said this to you?
01:45:45.000We've had countless congressional investigations into this.
01:45:48.000It is a fact that the Biden family, the Biden crime family, the Biden administration, okay, and this extends to Obama because essentially this was Obama's third term, is compromised by China.
01:46:00.000Why does the Trump Department of Defense have Biden holdovers serving in these very important roles that our entire national security is hinging on?
01:46:13.000I mean, you want to, you followed your chain of command and now you're being belittled by a guy by the name of David McKeon, who is a chief information security officer who has not been fired yet, even though there's probably a million people out there in the world who are just as qualified or if not even more qualified.
01:46:31.000Sounds like maybe you should take his job.
01:46:34.000Maybe they should appoint you to something.
01:46:36.000But for them to talk down to you when you clearly know more about the situation than they do after they stonewall you for four years and then to act like you are confused and to gaslight you into thinking that you don't actually know what you're talking about, these people should be fired.
01:46:54.000And look, I don't work for the Trump administration and I don't have that authority, but if I did have that type of authority, I would fire them.
01:47:01.000And I think that Pete Hegseth, if he's watching this, he should fire these individuals.
01:47:06.000He should fire these individuals who stonewalled you this long.
01:47:10.000And they should have taken this information directly to Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth.
01:47:14.000This is a matter that, in my opinion, and I'm not in the military, I've never served, but you don't have to be a rocket scientist to know the national security implications of your adversary having a backdoor channel to your cyber network infrastructure across all government agencies, right?
01:47:31.000You do not need to have served or be a, you know, cybersecurity specialist or analyst to understand the implications of this.
01:47:43.000It is criminal that this has been stonewalled and that this was never brought to the attention of Defense Secretary Pete Hagseth.
01:47:50.000And I know Pete and the fact of the matter is that he's a busy guy.
01:47:55.000It's hard to get a hold of him, obviously.
01:47:57.000But the fact that they tried to belittle you instead of trying to work with you to address this is, in my opinion, worthy of not just firing, but there should be an investigation.
01:48:09.000They should have a congressional investigation into this to see who was complicit, who knew what, who knew what when, and why this was not ever resolved.
01:48:23.000And, you know, kind of covering all that too, you know, lie number two, which I was mentioning, where he was saying I was confused, et cetera, again, he got caught in the lie because if he had reviewed the depositions or the clarification interviews, they called them, with the other four people, or all four people with the, you know, multiple hours this went on, he would have known everybody was referencing government azure.
01:48:46.000So either he did not know the case and was not familiar with it and did not know all the details, or he made that assessment, you know, statement purposefully.
01:48:56.000I don't know which one, you know, but either way, he was lying.
01:49:00.000So either got caught in one lie or another twice.
01:49:04.000But as far as reporting efforts too, so after that nonsense happened, I let Katie Arrington know what Mr. McKeown just did.
01:49:13.000I let her know exactly what he did and what was reported back to me.
01:49:17.000She apologized to me and said, oh, I'm very sorry, you know, like sincerely.
01:49:24.000I was in on the internet, you know, with him calling these people.
01:49:26.000I didn't hear these things, but I'm going to talk with him directly and handle this.
01:49:31.000Then she handed me over to the general counsel for the DOD.
01:49:35.000And this is like basically the legal team advisors, et cetera, to Hagseth.
01:49:40.000So I reached, you know, one of these people reached out to me, said, hey, we're going to be back in contact.
01:49:45.000I tried reaching out and following up with this person for like a week or two.
01:49:49.000Didn't get any response out of that person.
01:49:51.000So I reached out to Mr. Young, Charles Young, I believe, but he is the DOD general counsel.
01:49:59.000And he didn't contact me right back, but he had his top military, senior military advisor contact me back.
01:50:05.000And they said, oh, we're going to look into this, everything else.
01:50:08.000You know, thank you for bringing this attention, et cetera.
01:50:21.000And I also started including the SEC Nav Engine Rooms distro, which is for the Secretary of Defense, all of his office, and also to the Secretary of Defense's distro.
01:50:34.000And during all of this, emailing back and forth between Mr. Young, the general counsel, et cetera, et cetera, also including Kahady Arrington and a lot of other folks, I got back read receipts because I'm always good about that, requesting read receipts on anything so I can get the acknowledgement things have been read.
01:50:54.000And one of them came back from Hegseth's senior military advisor or what's it called?
01:51:59.000And he sent me back additional REIT receipts after he was in that position of being the SecDev senior assistant.
01:52:07.000Again, read receipts, but no response.
01:52:10.000So there are a number of people within Hegseth's own office, the office of the Secretary of Defense, that to my knowledge have not reported this to him.
01:52:40.000And I know the Navy Secretary's chief of staff.
01:52:43.000So we're going to make sure that they are all informed about this so that you don't have to deal with this internal gatekeeping that has, you know, served to completely block this information out.
01:52:54.000And this is why I wanted you to come on because it's important that people hear this.
01:53:25.000And did you inform the proper channels, right?
01:53:28.000Yes, you have exhausted all channels of communication over the last four years.
01:53:32.000And ultimately now this rests in the hands of Defense Secretary Pete Hexeth to either meet with you or assign somebody to meet with you for a briefing or to address this with Microsoft.
01:53:45.000I want to continue and I want to, in the next segment, I want to address the additional concerns that arise and are presented with Microsoft's relationship with China.
01:53:58.000And then I want to conclude the episode with some calls to action for people watching so that people who are watching this and outraged can contact their representatives or contact the DOD and push for some type of a congressional inquiry or congressional investigation.
01:54:18.000But we need to take a quick commercial break.
01:54:20.000I want to take a moment to thank the sponsor of tonight's episode of Loomer Unleash, Housing for Us.
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01:57:25.000So, in conclusion, as we wrap this episode up, I want to talk about the additional national security concerns that are presented by Microsoft's relationship with China.
01:57:40.000And I want to then conclude with just kind of an overview.
01:57:45.000And I'm going to be posting about this, and I'm going to be writing a report about this on my website as well.
01:57:51.000So I know it's a lot of information, and people are probably like sitting here thinking, oh my God, this is so much.
01:57:56.000How am I going to get all this information remember?
01:57:58.000And what am I going to say to my representative?
01:58:16.000I'm going to make this document public so that everybody who lives in the United States who is concerned about this breach can understand just the basic talking points and the basic gist of what has happened.
01:58:33.000Because I know we've covered a lot of ground tonight.
01:58:35.000Essentially, Microsoft has allowed for foreign nationals, including Chinese engineers, to manage U.S. government cloud systems, beginning with authorizations from the Obama administration signed off by Barack Hussein Obama himself.
01:58:51.000These same individuals operated with full administrative privileges and no U.S. security clearances, while so-called escort teams, as you've described them, in the United States had no technical authority or visibility and really no real understanding of code and malicious code.
01:59:12.000The support model allowed real-time remote access to classified systems by foreign actors who developed and ran proprietary scripts on government servers.
01:59:22.000And as you've claimed on this interview, since 2016, you have repeatedly reported this breach to officials in Congress, the Pentagon, intelligence agencies, Department of Defense, and you have been completely ignored.
01:59:39.000You even went to the FBI and you have not received a single reply from our intelligence agencies.
01:59:47.000And what we can assess from your brave whistleblower work and what we can assess from this interview tonight is that the Department of Defense and agencies like the FBI and the NSA, and thank God, President Trump fired General Hogg, praise the Lord.
02:00:45.000These people are not going to be able to deny that you never contacted them because you have saved all of your electronic communications and you have all of your correspondences.
02:00:56.000You even recorded a phone call you had with one of these Chinese, with one of these Chinese tech tech workers or somebody else recorded the phone call and you were able to obtain access to it.
02:01:11.000From my understanding, it was somebody else who was engaged with one of these Microsoft Azure tech support workers based out of China, where they got the tech support worker to actually confirm that they are based out of China operating off-hours tech support for the Department of Defense.
02:01:29.000And so let's go ahead and play that clip because it is very shocking.
02:01:47.000And I can imagine these government employees who work nine to five, they just don't really want to have to think more than they actually have to to collect a paycheck.
02:01:55.000So this actually requires analysis and reviewing documents and reviewing videos and looking at emails and looking at correspondences that have been ongoing for the last 10 years in our country and the last four years since you've started aggressively trying to get some accountability on this matter.
02:02:19.000This was a video that was posted by somebody at the Department of Defense who reached out to Microsoft for technical support and they had an interaction with one of Microsoft Government Azure's Chinese agents.
02:03:56.000It's interesting because that individual, I forget his name at the moment, but he's actually a procurement director in the Pentagon for the DOD.
02:04:07.000And he's having a call for China for support with his Microsoft account.
02:04:12.000And he's tried tagging people on LinkedIn, you know, a few of the different, I think the former DOD CIO, he's tried tagging, and I think he's tried whistleblowing, you know, but I don't think he's gotten any attention whatsoever.
02:04:27.000So are you worried that you're going to face any kind of professional ramification as a result of going public?
02:04:33.000I mean, I hope that Pete Hagseth and I know that he's an honorable guy.
02:04:36.000I'm sure he's going to have your back on this.
02:04:38.000And I'm sure the Navy Secretary would have your back.
02:04:41.000But how are you protecting yourself right now?
02:04:43.000I know there are whistleblower protections.
02:04:45.000And have you contacted an attorney yet?
02:04:51.000Do you have any type of plan in place to protect yourself as a whistleblower?
02:04:56.000Because this is the first time you're really going public with this information outside of your private communications in this exclusive interview regarding what you have uncovered.
02:05:07.000And obviously the ProPublica report never would have come out had it not been for you and all of the information that you have turned over.
02:05:17.000And at the time that you brought this information to me, you had told me that ProPublica was already working on a story.
02:05:24.000And so, you know, as a journalist, right, it's kind of like, well, you know, yes, I've had access to this information, but we agreed that we would wait for the ProPublica report to come out.
02:05:55.000The media right now is completely obsessed with Jeffrey Epstein.
02:05:58.000And I'm not saying that we shouldn't talk about Jeffrey Epstein, but this is what the media should be running stories about cover to cover and asking the White House for comment on.
02:06:07.000And Epstein, that's another conversation, but this is the type of information that should be broadcasted and aired all over the mainstream media.
02:06:16.000And so given the fact that ProPublica had already been speaking with you about this matter and they had already been investing their resources into the story, I didn't want to interfere in their report because you had said that they had been successful in contacting some defense officials.
02:06:36.000And I, you know, didn't want to disrupt their ability to get people on the comments or their own investigation because really I've known about this since I think you first reached out to me in April.
02:06:50.000In April after my Oval Office meeting with the president.
02:06:54.000And so people will say, well, why didn't you release this information?
02:06:59.000Well, because this is an ongoing journalistic investigation.
02:07:02.000And we decided that at first we didn't even know if we should put this information out in the public.
02:07:08.000We were hoping that Katie Arrington would reply to Tom in May.
02:07:12.000We were hoping that with Pete Hagseth's confirmation that this would quietly be resolved so that we didn't have to alert an adversary to the fact that we are now aware that they have access and they're possibly and they probably are spying on us through the access that they have via the Microsoft government Azure system.
02:07:33.000Because it could have created a lot of national security risks had this been released prior to the proper channels being alerted to it.
02:07:44.000But Tom and I, just for full transparency for those watching, we agreed that once the ProPublica investigation was complete and they published their article, that I would have him on my show to, like as soon as the article came out.
02:07:57.000And it literally just came out the other day.
02:07:59.000So I would have him on the show for a full-length interview.
02:08:03.000And I agreed that I would distribute this content and, you know, inform the proper channels.
02:08:11.000And it's a shame that you should be, you should be getting contacted, in my opinion, by every single news agency.
02:08:20.000They should want to have you on to talk about this.
02:08:23.000I hope that you receive full protection as a whistleblower.
02:08:27.000I hope that Pete Hegseth meets with you and that you're able to personally brief him.
02:08:31.000I hope the Navy Secretary meets with you.
02:08:33.000And I hope that your concerns are finally taken seriously and that we can get some type of congressional action on this and that it can get resolved.
02:08:42.000And I don't think that this is going to go away anytime soon.
02:08:45.000Microsoft can't just hide behind their computer screens and say that they're not going to provide any type of comment.
02:08:52.000They're probably going to lawyer up because I imagine that upon further review, who knows?
02:08:58.000Who knows how long Microsoft is going to continue to keep their lucrative contract?
02:09:05.000And it is lucrative, but to the tune of how much is this contract with the federal government and Microsoft, do we have a price point on that contract?
02:09:14.000Yeah, I think it's in the kind of the preach report where I was kind of going over laws, violations, other stuff.
02:09:22.000But I think it came out to about $30 billion they've made off the United States government since 2015.
02:09:35.000So they're making $30 billion off of having an estimated $30 billion from your assessment off of their contract, Microsoft's contract with the United States government.
02:09:46.000And so what is Microsoft doing with that money?
02:09:51.000Well, they're doing a lot of things, right?
02:09:53.000One of the things that they're doing is they're funding Chinese university students to learn cloud computing and AI.
02:10:00.000And when this whole H-1B visa crisis erupted in DC, when it turned into a big fight, when we saw Elon Musk fighting with me and others, you know, right before the new year around Christmas time over H-1Bs, I know like Microsoft got a lot of heat because they had announced that they were investing a ton of money into teaching Indians, right?
02:10:23.000Teaching Indians how to do, you know, AI.
02:10:27.000And they were investing a ton of money, if you recall what I'm talking about.
02:10:32.000And I wish I had the report in front of me, but it was like an astronomical amount of money.
02:10:37.000And I remember because I know somebody who works at Microsoft and I sent it to them and I said, this is why people hate big tech.
02:10:46.000And why don't you invest this amount of money into teaching American students how to how to develop AI and invest in cloud computing for American students?
02:10:58.000Why are you only investing in Indians and Chinese?
02:11:01.000And they said, you know what, you have a point.
02:11:03.000And this is somebody who has direct communication with the president of Microsoft, right?
02:11:09.000So I'm going to send them this interview too.
02:11:12.000I'm not going to use their name because I don't want to burn them.
02:11:17.000But I'm going to send this to them too.
02:11:19.000And hopefully Microsoft can give a more forceful, more forceful statement about this because this is very bad.
02:11:28.000Additionally, they have joint AI ventures with the Chinese government and CCP-linked companies.
02:11:35.000They get to make $30 billion off of their contract with the United States government, and then they go invest it into the CCP and invest it into Chinese students who are all going to be loyal to the CCP.
02:11:48.000Additionally, the Chinese nationals that Microsoft employs, they have a history of climbing up the ladder at Microsoft and then jumping ship to work for the CCP.
02:11:57.000So Microsoft has, there's been several cases of Microsoft providing funding for the training of Chinese nationals to learn these skills in cloud computing and AI and all types of advanced coding.
02:12:09.000And they get their training, just like we see here in the U.S., they get their training at American universities and they learn our ways and they study in laboratories here, many of those laboratories where you have to have a clearance.
02:12:22.000And then they go and they defect and they go back to China and they give all the information to the CCP.
02:12:34.000Level five, or I'm sorry, IL 5 or inherent threat.
02:12:40.000When that was authorized in January 2017 for Microsoft Azure government and Office 365, at the same time, the Microsoft executive vice president, Kui Liu, who led the division in charge of Office, Bing, and Skype, left Microsoft to go work for Chinese companies tied with the CCP.
02:12:59.000So it's like, yeah, we'll give you IL-5 clearance.
02:13:03.000Same time, the guy that developed the things they're being cleared for is going off to go tell the CCP how to break into it or whatever else.
02:13:12.000But there's been tons of instances, even just last year.
02:13:15.000You know, you had Congressman Jimenez really grill into the president of Microsoft and asking, why are you in China?
02:13:24.000You know, with the inherent threat of this, blah, blah, blah.
02:13:27.000And it was right after that grilling that you had like most of the senior AI leadership and developers and engineers in Microsoft jump ship to go to China to start up a normal company to help China and AI and other stuff.
02:14:16.000They're creating what needs to be done here.
02:14:19.000So all of Trump's workings, dealings with, was it Stargate and all this other stuff going on with AI, Microsoft, OpenAI, et cetera, get out of it.
02:14:33.000And honestly, you know, I've went over damages incurred or whatever by the United States government and the Department of Defense.
02:14:42.000And I've calculated it comes out to about $2.21 trillion in damages.
02:14:47.000And that's with R ⁇ D that's been stolen.
02:14:49.000That's had to be new R ⁇ D programs stood up to combat this or in response to this.
02:14:56.000Infrastructure that's been damaged, policies that had to be done.
02:15:00.000There's a lot of things that are involved here.
02:15:03.000But the total number, after you account for a false statement act or false bat, is treble damages, which comes out to triple.
02:15:13.000So all in all, if the full letter of the law is executed and if, and I'm saying if Microsoft violated these laws, it's not saying they did, but everything is indicating that they did, you know, they should be nationalized.
02:15:30.000You know, they should be taken over and turned into basically a U.S. government company at this point for what they've done.
02:15:36.000At the very least, they shouldn't be in charge of our data or our services any longer.
02:15:45.000Yeah, I mean, it's pretty evident that their current system, this Microsoft government duure, has left pretty much every single sensitive U.S. cyber infrastructure system exposed to foreign interference and foreign sabotage, mostly from China, under the guise of a commercial partnership between a private company and a government, right?
02:16:16.000It's pretty evident as well that not only is there a massive communication issue going on and there's a lot of gatekeeping, but also too, the oversight mechanisms have completely failed.
02:16:28.000There is absolutely no oversight Whatsoever.
02:16:31.000And so there needs to be an investigation too into how these oversight mechanisms are either being completely ignored, they've been completely abandoned, or they're intentionally being pushed aside for the sake of committing espionage.
02:16:45.000So definitely needs to be investigated and huge problem.
02:16:51.000And we're going to be pushing out this information.
02:16:54.000Is there anything else that you wanted to add before we conclude?
02:17:00.000Yeah, just, you know, side note, you know, while I've been combating this and not just, you know, with the Department of Defense and other agencies, you know, I've taken this up and personally briefed a number of Congress members and senators.
02:17:13.000You know, I could name names, but it would probably take quite a while.
02:17:16.000Talked with Susie Wiles over the phone about this too, the chief of staff for the White House.
02:17:35.000But while I've been doing all this, you know, when the transition team was being stood up and everything else, me and Linda McMahon connected, connected with a number of people that were part of the transition team.
02:17:49.000I had a good relationship with the campaign team.
02:17:52.000One thing I put in for was to come in as the new DOD CIO.
02:17:59.000Now, specifically, because I didn't trust anybody there to get the job done.
02:18:05.000I didn't trust them to set the right vision, to bring us back to a pre-Obama era model to get stuff back in-house.
02:18:12.000So I put a package together and did submit for that.
02:18:16.000But like you said, there's a whole bunch of Biden holdovers.
02:18:20.000And I've had on good authority from campaign team members and transition team members that we've got literally thousands of people that are patriotic, that are ready to help out, ready to jump in, and they haven't been interviewed, reached out to nothing.
02:18:37.000Meanwhile, you still got a full assortment of Biden holdovers in there.
02:18:48.000Well, your actions are heroic, and you're an American patriot for what you've done.
02:18:54.000And I really hope that you receive the recognition that you deserve for documenting this over the last four years of your life.
02:19:01.000And I know what it's like to be subjected to gatekeeping and to have your investigations ignored for years, trust me, which is why I definitely sympathize with you and I can resonate with you and probably why we have a lot in common because, you know,
02:19:19.000it's very difficult being a truth seeker, but also it's very difficult being ahead of the curve and noticing things when other people either refuse to notice and they want to close their eyes because they don't want to believe what they're seeing in front of their eyes, or they think it's just easier to completely ignore it and pretend like they were never made aware of the situation because they don't know how to address the situation or because they don't want to address the situation.
02:19:46.000And this cannot be allowed to go on any longer, especially as China continues their campaign of aggression against the United States and also as they continue their campaign of aggression towards Taiwan.
02:20:02.000And especially as our adversaries join forces to carry out their ultimate goal of multipolarity at the expense of the United States government.
02:20:13.000This is a massive national security threat.
02:20:16.000And shame on General Hog and shame on all of these officials at the Department of Defense who ignored you and pretended like they had, you know, no solution, right?
02:20:29.000Or pretended like they never received your email correspondence or they just completely ghosted you after you were going out of your time.
02:20:36.000It's not like anybody's paying you overtime the countless hours.
02:20:40.000I mean, this is the kind of work that people get paid big bucks to do, right?
02:20:48.000This is the type of work that certain cyber defense companies get paid millions of dollars a year in contracts with mega corporations or with governments to manage their cybersecurity.
02:21:02.000And so the fact that you're doing this for free just because you care about your country and you care about the United States government is very admirable.
02:21:11.000And I'm going to be following this situation closely.
02:21:14.000As I said, you have my word that I'm going to be sending this to Defense Secretary Hegset.
02:21:19.000I am going to send this to the Navy Secretary, John Fallon.
02:21:22.000I'm going to send this to his chief of staff.
02:21:25.000And I will personally be preparing a report and sending this over to the White House as well, because this is truly an abomination.
02:21:33.000And hopefully Microsoft is jagged before a congressional hearing, not just for talking points and sound bites, but for an actual investigation that is hopefully going to get us some answers.
02:21:49.000Because as we have seen, China is not our friend.
02:21:51.000They've been incredibly hostile towards the current Trump administration.
02:21:55.000And essentially, they could completely kneecap our entire federal government.
02:22:01.000They could completely kneecap our entire electrical grid if they truly wanted to.
02:22:07.000And it's kind of scary to think that hostile CCP actors could essentially hack and disable our entire infrastructure across the government.
02:22:18.000And I imagine that all of our emergency systems and all of our emergency alert systems are tied into the same database because I imagine that they're not like cross-polluting platforms.
02:22:28.000They're probably keeping one platform for, you know, technological cyber consistency, right?
02:22:33.000So, I mean, what were to happen if somebody were to install some form of malware to completely disable the entire federal government for an extended period of time?
02:22:46.000What would that do in the middle of a national security crisis, like a terrorist attack or some kind of natural disaster or some type of pandemic, right?
02:22:56.000As we saw with China during the COVID era?
02:23:42.000And many, you know, people have kind of described the situation or scenario with China have in this access where they can commit what's known as like a cyber 9-11 or cyber Pearl Harbor attack.
02:23:56.000There's movies that have been based on this, this theory and books and other stuff.
02:24:01.000But yeah, what could potentially happen right now, like as soon as you go live with this even, they might decide, oh, they're about to take her toy away and they might just strike.
02:24:35.000You're not trying to really cause a ruckus.
02:24:38.000I know that you've expressed to me your desire to have discretion.
02:24:43.000But if people want to reach out to you, let's say they want to interview you or people want to get in touch with you, how can they reach you?
02:25:30.000Renee over at Republica and also Kyle Reyes, who's the owner of Law Enforcement Stadium, put out an article last year covering the same issue.
02:25:38.000So I'm really thankful that we've got some good patriots and people that are just that concerned and want to get stuff done.
02:25:59.000Before we close out tonight, I want to take a moment to thank the sponsor of tonight's episode of Lumer Unleashed, Kirk Elliott Precious Metals.
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02:27:02.000I hope that it was informative for all of you.
02:27:04.000I hope that it was educational, but it's honestly shocking.
02:27:07.000It's honestly shocking how infiltrated we are by bad foreign actors, especially by the CCP here in our country.
02:27:17.000This is a massive national security crisis, and this is the first time Tom Schiller has ever gone public.
02:27:24.000In a video interview, he agreed to give me the exclusive interview, and I promised that I would do everything in my power to make sure that this information in this interview is delivered to the proper authorities and the proper officials within the United States government, within the Department of Defense, and within the White House.
02:27:42.000And to all of you watching tonight, that's my commitment to you as well.
02:27:47.000The fact that this has been ongoing as a result of the administration of Barack Hussein Obama for the last 10 years is absolutely unacceptable and it needs to end.
02:28:01.000If you enjoyed tonight's episode of Loomer Unleashed, please be sure that you're following me on rumble.com slash Laura Loomer.
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02:28:08.000Be sure that you're always following me.
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02:28:24.000I'm going to be clipping this interview and posting the clips.
02:28:27.000I'm sure they're going to go very viral.
02:28:29.000I'm going to tag all of the appropriate officials within the Trump administration and within the Department of Defense.
02:28:35.000And then I'm going to send it to them directly because they need to see this information.
02:28:41.000And I will be doing that throughout the entire weekend so that we can kick off next week with an explosive news cycle.
02:28:48.000And hopefully Tom Schiller gets the coverage that he deserves for his very brave whistleblower report.
02:28:56.000If you're a whistleblower and you have a story to tell and you have government corruption or a government scandal or a national security threat that you would also like to expose, you can also contact me by visiting my website, loomered.com.