#145 — The Information War
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Summary
Renee DiResta is the Director of Research at New Knowledge and the Head of Policy at the non-profit Data for Democracy. She investigates the spread of hyper-partisan and destructive narratives across social networks, and she's co-authored a recent report on the Russian disinformation campaign both before and since the 2016 presidential election. She's advised politicians and policymakers, including members of Congress, the State Department, and CNN, and many other outlets. She s a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and a Truman National Security Project security fellow. She also holds degrees in computer science and political science from SUNY Stony Brook. As you ll hear, Renee was recommended to me by my friend and former podcast guest, Tristan Harris, who recommended her as an authority on just what happened with the Russian influence campaign in recent years. And Renee did not disappoint. In this episode, I speak with Renee about how she came to be thinking about the problem of bots, and how they intersect with her research into how social platforms are having profound impacts on policy and society, and the specific problem we re going to be talking about: The Russian Disinformation Campaign (or, as she calls it, the "Deep State.") by her research co-author, Tristan Harris. We don t run ads on the podcast, and therefore, our support is made possible entirely through the support of our subscribers. Please consider becoming a supporter of the podcast by becoming a subscriber. You ll get a better listen and a better understanding of what we re doing here. Thanks for listening! Sam Harris - The Making Sense Podcast: This is a podcast that s all about what we're doing here, not just talking about, and why you should be listening to the podcast is making sense, and not listening to it, and what you should listen to it. - Thank you for listening to this podcast, too, right here, right? Thank you, Ms. Harris? - Alyssa, and so on and so much so that you can help us make sense of it, too much more so that it helps us make it so that we can be a better listening experience, and that s not just a good one, too can be more of that, too is a good thing, and we can do it, right so much of it so much more of it is not just that, you can say so, too says so, we really do that, right ...
Transcript
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Renee is the Director of Research at New Knowledge and the Head of Policy at the non-profit Data
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And she investigates the spread of hyper-partisan and destructive narratives across social networks.
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She's co-authored a recent report on the Russian disinformation campaign, both before and since
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She's advised politicians and policymakers, members of Congress, the State Department.
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Her work has been featured in the New York Times and the Washington Post and CNN and many
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She's a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and a Truman National Security Project security
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She also holds degrees in computer science and political science from SUNY Stony Brook.
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As you'll hear, Renee was recommended to me by my friend and former podcast guest, Tristan
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Harris, who recommended her as an authority on just what happened with the Russian influence
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So without further ado, I bring you Renee DiResta.
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I was introduced to you through our mutual friend, Tristan Harris.
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I had written an essay about bots, and he read it, and he shared it to Facebook, funny
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enough, and we discovered that we had about 60 mutual friends, even though we'd never met.
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And we met for breakfast a couple days later, and he wanted to talk about what I was seeing
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and the things I was writing about, and how they intersected with his vision of social
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platforms as having profound impacts on individuals.
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My research into how social platforms are having profound impacts on policy and society,
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and we had breakfast, hit it off, and I think had breakfast again a couple days later.
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So many people will recall he's been on the podcast, and I think he's actually been described
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as the conscience of Silicon Valley, just in terms of how he has been sounding the alarm
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on the toxic business model of social media in particular.
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So you touched on it there for a second, but give us a snapshot of your background and
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how you come to be thinking about the problem of bots and also just the specific problem
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we're going to be talking about of the Russian disinformation campaign and hacking of democracy.
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Yeah, so it's sort of a convoluted way that I got to investigating Russia and disinformation.
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I became a mom, and I had just moved to San Francisco a little bit prior, and I had to
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get my kid onto a preschool waiting list, which is unfortunate.
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Not like a nice preschool, just like a preschool.
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And I knew California had some anti-vax problems, and I started Googling for the data sets.
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The California Department of Public Health has public data sets where they tell you vaccination
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Anyway, I looked and I thought, God, this is a disaster waiting to happen.
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And lo and behold, a couple months later, the Disneyland measles outbreak, in fact, did
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And I said, hey, you know, we should have a law for this now.
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And they told me they were introducing something.
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And what wound up happening was that there was this extraordinary thing as the bill took
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shape, which was that the legislators were finding that polling in their districts was
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Like, people really liked the idea of eliminating what were called personal belief exemptions,
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the right to just kind of voluntarily opt your kids out.
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But the social media conversation was like 99 percent negative.
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It was very hard to even find a single positive tweet or positive Facebook post expressing support
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And so I started looking into why that was and discovered this entire kind of ecosystem
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of what was this hybrid between almost activism and manipulation.
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So there were very real activists who had very real points of view.
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And then they were doing things like using automation.
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So the reason that they were dominating the Twitter ecosystem was that they were actually
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So they were just kind of spamming the hashtags that anytime you search for anything related
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to the bill in the hashtag, you would find their content.
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So this is kind of, you know, this is sort of like a guerrilla marketing tactic.
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And I thought, how interesting that they were using it and then realized that there were like
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There were people pretending to be from California who weren't from California.
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They were created within days of the bill being introduced.
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And they existed solely to talk about this bill.
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And then I discovered these communities on Facebook,
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things with names like Tweet for Vaccine Freedom,
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where there were actually moderators in the group who were posting instructions on
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for people from out of state how they could get involved.
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And the answer was create a persona, change your location ID to somewhere in California
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So they sort of, you know, kind of at the time it seemed brazen.
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But these tactics to shape consensus, to really create the illusion that there was a mass
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And so a very small group of people using social media as an amplifier were able to achieve dominance,
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And it led me to think this is fascinating because what we have here is this form of activism
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where there is kind of like a real core and then there's some manipulative tactics
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But if you're not looking for the manipulation, you don't see it.
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And most people aren't going looking, you know, they're not digging into this stuff.
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So it was a kind of a first indication that our policy conversations, our social conversations
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were not necessarily reflective of, you know, kind of the reality on the ground,
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the stuff that we were still seeing in the polls.
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And then a couple of months after that law was all, you know, all done, I got a call
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from some folks in the Obama administration in the digital service saying, hey, we've read
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your research because I published about this in Wired.
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We'd like you to come down and look at some of the stuff that's going on with ISIS.
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And I said, you know, I don't know anything about ISIS or about terrorism, candidly.
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When they said, no, no, you have to understand the tactics are identical.
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The same kind of, you know, kind of owning the narrative, owning the hashtags, reaching
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out to people, pulling them into secret Facebook groups.
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The idea that the terrorists were actually following some of these kind of radicalization
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pathways, these efforts to kind of dominate the conversation.
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Anytime there was a real world event related to ISIS, they would get things trending on Twitter.
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And so people in the administration wanted to understand how this was happening and what
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So that was how I wound up getting more involved in this in sort of a more official capacity
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was first kind of conspiracy theorists and terrorists.
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And then and then Russia was Russia was following the 2016 election.
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There was a sense that, again, there had been these bizarre bot operations and they were far
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more nefarious and sophisticated than anyone had realized.
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Before we get into the Russia case specifically, how do you view the the role of social media
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Do you distinguish between the culpability or the negligence of Twitter versus Facebook
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Are there right lines between how they have misplayed this or are they very similar in the
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I think that, you know, they've kind of they've really evolved a lot since 2015.
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In the early conversations about ISIS, there was a, you know, just to kind of take you back
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to 2015, the attitude wasn't, oh, God, we've got terrorists on our platform.
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It was, you know, Facebook, to its credit, took that attitude from day one.
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It was just this is a violation of our terms of service.
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YouTube would kind of take down the beheading videos as they popped up.
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Twitter, if you go back and you read articles from 2015 is, you know, I've been doing a lot
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of going back and looking at the conversations from that time.
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You see a lot of sympathy for Twitter and this idea that if you take down ISIS, what comes
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This is a slippery slope and, you know, interesting co-on to ponder.
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So, you know, well, I mean, if we take down ISIS, I mean, who knows what we have to take
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You know, one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter.
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And, you know, and I would be sitting there in these rooms hearing these conversations
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saying, like, these are beheading videos, you guys.
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But that's where we were in 2015 and, you know, go back and read things that people
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like the, you know, entities like the EFF were putting out and you'll see that this was
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What would, you know, what would happen if we were to silence ISIS?
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Would we inadvertently silence things that were tangentially related to ISIS?
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And then from there, would we silence, you know, certain types of expression of Islam and
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And it was a very different kind of mindset back then.
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I think that the context has changed so much over the last year, in part because of stuff
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like what Tristan is doing and the tech hearings.
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And I think that 2016 was almost like the sort of, you know, Pearl Harbor that made people
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realize that, you know, holy shit, this actually does have an impact.
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And maybe we do have to do something to get ahead of this because everybody's doing it now.
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Reading recent articles specifically about Facebook makes me think that there is just
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You can't put enough people on it to appropriately vet the content and the algorithms don't seem
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And so the mistakes that people plus algorithms are making are so flagrant.
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I mean, they're preserving, you know, the accounts of known terrorist organizations.
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They're deleting the accounts of, you know, Muslim reformers or ex-Muslims who simply say
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I mean, there's just people can't figure out which end is up, apparently.
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And once you view these platforms as publishing platforms that are responsible for their content,
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it's understandable that you would want to, given the kinds of things we're going to talk
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There's a lot of, you know, Tristan and others have done a lot of work on
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changing the conversation around culpability and accountability.
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And I think that, again, in 2015, 2016, you know, there would be references to things like
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the CDA 230, the Communication Decency Act Section 230, that gives them the right to moderate,
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which they chose to use as their right to not moderate.
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And the norms, I would say, that evolved in the industry around not wanting to be seen as being
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censors in any way at the time, which meant that they left a whole lot of stuff up and
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And then now the shift, kind of the pendulum swinging hard in the other direction, which is
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leading to allegations that the conservatives are being censored and allegations that, per
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I think there was an article about this in the New York Times over the weekend has led to
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some disasters where they take down people fighting extremists in Myanmar and leave the
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So, yeah, there's a, I think that the recognition that they are culpable, that fundamental change
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in the attitudes of the public has led them to start to try to take more responsibility.
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And right now it's being done in something of kind of a ham-handed way.
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Yeah, well, they're certainly culpable for the business model that have kind of a less
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of a view of Twitter here, because Twitter doesn't seem to have its business model together
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But clearly Facebook, you know, per Tristan's point, that their business model promotes
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And the fact that they continue to do that is just selecting for these crazy conspiratorial
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And then they're trying to kind of curate against those, but they're still amplifying those because
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And at least that's the way it seems as of my recent reading of the New York Times.
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Is that still your understanding of the bad geometry over there?
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So I see a lot of, you know, I try to focus on the disinformation piece.
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There are some people who work on privacy, some who think about monopoly, you know, a lot
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of different grievances with tech platforms these days.
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But I see a lot of the manipulation specifically, I would say, comes from a combination of three
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There's this mass consolidation of audiences on a handful of very few platforms.
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And that's just because as the web moved from these kind of, you know, decentralization,
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where there's always been manipulation and disinformation and lies on the Internet, right?
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But the mass consolidation of audiences onto a very small handful of platforms meant that
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if you were going to run a manipulative campaign, much like if you were going to run a campaign
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for, you know, Pepsi, you only had to really blanket five different sites.
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And then the second piece was the precision targeting, right?
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So the ads business model, the thing that you're referring to, these are attention brokers,
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which means they make money if you spend time on the platform.
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So they gather information about the user in order to show the user things that they want
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And then also as they're gathering that information, it does double duty in that they can use it to
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And then I would say the last piece of this is the algorithms that you're describing and
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the fact that for a very, very long time now, they've been very easy to game.
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And when we think about what you're describing, the idea that that outrage gets clicks, that's
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And the algorithm, particularly things like the recommendation engines, they're not sophisticated
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So there is no sense of downstream harm or psychological harm or any other type of harm.
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All they know is this content gets clicks and this content drives engagement.
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And if I show this content to this person, they're going to stay on the platform longer.
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And I think one of the interesting challenges here is as we think about recommendation engines,
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that's where there is, in my opinion, a greater sense of culpability and a greater requirement
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for responsibility on the part of the platforms.
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And that's because they've moved into acting as a curator, right?
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And the recommendation engines, in particular, often surface things that are not necessarily,
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you know, what we would necessarily want them to be showing.
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This is how you get at things like, you know, my anti-vaxxers, right?
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I had an anti-vax account, an account that was active in anti-vax groups.
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It just sort of sat in the groups and, you know, kind of observed.
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And it was being referred into Pizzagate groups.
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So long before Pizzagate was a matter of national conversation, long before that guy showed up
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with a gun and shot up a pizza place thinking that Hillary Clinton was running a sex dungeon
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out of the basement, these personas that were prone to conspiratorial thinking, the recommendation
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engine recognized that there was a correlation and people who were prone to conspiracy, you
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know, conspiracy type A would be interested in Pizzagate, which we can call conspiracy type
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And then soon enough, QAnon started to show up in the recommendation engine.
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And so the question becomes, you know, where is the line?
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And, you know, what the platform is actively making a recommendation here, these accounts
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have never gone and proactively searched for Pizzagate and QAnon.
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Should we have the recommendation engine not surface that type of content?
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Or is even making that suggestion a form of censorship?
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These are the kinds of conversations I think we'll start to see more of in 2019.
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Okay, well, let's focus on the topic at hand, which is Russian interference in
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I guess democracies everywhere, but specifically the U.S. presidential election in 2016, and
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the recent report that you helped produce on this, which runs to 100 pages, and I'll put
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First, I just got a big picture, sort of political partisan question.
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It seems to me that many people, certainly most Trump supporters, continue to doubt whether
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Is there any basis for doubt about that at this point?
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This is just crystal clear as a matter of what our intelligence services tell us and as a
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matter of what people like you can ascertain by just studying online behavior.
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I mean, you know, sure, there can be some small group of people who continues to, you
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know, live like ostriches, but that doesn't mean that it didn't happen.
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And what do you do with the charge that we do the same thing all the time everywhere ourselves?
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So there's really nothing to complain about here.
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Well, I mean, we probably do it to each other at this point, right?
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There's evidence of that as far back as 2016, you know, some things that, insinuations about
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There's a whole lot of, you know, evidence that domestic groups can and do do this as
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And that's why what I keep going to when I talk about this topic publicly is that this
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This is not a one, you know, one state, you know, one foreign actor interfering in one
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This is sort of just an ongoing global challenge at this point.
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If we're speaking specifically about Russia and whether that happened, I think that it's
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And the other thing that seems incontrovertible is that it happened to favor the election of
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Trump in many obvious ways and in many surprising ways that we'll go into.
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And in your report, you break down three ways which their meddling influence things and
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We're going to be talking about one of them, but I'll just run through those three quickly
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The first is there were attempts to actually hack online voting systems.
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And, you know, that's been reported on elsewhere.
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Secondly, there was just this very well-known and consequential cyber attack on the Democratic
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National Committee and the leaking of that material through WikiLeaks.
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And that was obviously to the great disadvantage of the Clinton campaign.
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Then finally, and this is what we're going to focus on, there was just this social influence
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based on the disinformation campaign of the sort that you've just described, using bots
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and fake personas and targeting various groups.
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This was surprising that when you get into the details of who was targeted and the kinds
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of messages that were spread, it's fairly sophisticated and, you know, amazingly cynical.
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There's a kind of morbid fun you can imagine these people were having at our expense in how
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they played one community against another in American society.
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And this was coming from something called the Internet Research Agency.
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What, we'll call them the IRA as you do in your report.
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What is the IRA and what were they doing to us?
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So the IRA is, you can think of them a little bit as a social media marketing agency meets
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So what they did, to a large extent, was they kind of built these pages, they built these
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communities, they built these personas, and they pretended to be Americans, Americans of
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So some were Southern Confederates, some were Texas secessionists, some were Black liberationists.
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It really, they had all of these personas, they really ran the gamut.
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What they were doing was they were creating pages to appeal to tribalism.
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So a lot of the conversation about the IRA over the last two years has referred to this
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idea that they were exploiting divisions in society.
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But the data set that I had access to, which was provided by the tech platforms to the Senate
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Intelligence Committee, was the first time that anybody saw the full scope, you know, through
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And what we saw there was not a media marketing, you know, meme shit poster type agency that
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was just throwing out memes haphazardly and trying to exploit divisions.
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The IRA originally started as a entity that was designed to propagandize to Russian citizens,
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to Ukrainian citizens, to people who were in Russia's sphere of influence.
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And the early stuff in the data set, Twitter provided the earliest possible information
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of the material the companies gave us, was actually Russian language tweets talking about
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It was talking about, you know, it was creating conspiracy theories about the downing of the
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So the early activities of the IRA were very much focused inward, focused domestically.
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And then around 2015, they turned their energy to the United States in what the Mueller and
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some of the Eastern District court indictments have been referring to as Project LOCTA.
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So Project LOCTA was when the effort to grow these American tribes really started.
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And there was still this goal of amplifying tribalism in the U.S.
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This was not a short-term social media operation to screw around with an election.
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This was a long game to develop extended relationships, trusted relationships with Americans.
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And what they did was they created these pages.
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So an example would be Heart of Texas was a page that really amplified notions of Texas
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Almost all of their pages, an LGBT page, pages targeting the Black community, pages targeting
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Confederate aficionados, all of these pages were designed around the idea of pride and
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pride in whatever particular tribe they were targeting.
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So the vast majority of the content, particularly in 2015 in the early days, was, you know, we
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And so this idea that you should have pride in your tribe was what they reinforced over and
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And then you would see them periodically slide in content that was either political or divisive.
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And sometimes that would be about othering another group.
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So we are, you know, some of the content targeting the Black community in particular did this.
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And so a lot of exploitation of real grievances tied to real news events.
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So constant drumbeat of pride plus leveraging real harms to exploit feelings of alienation.
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Sometimes you would see them do this with political content.
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So as the primaries heated up, that was where you started to see them weaving in their support
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for candidate Trump, weaving in their opposition to candidate Clinton.
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I'm looking at your report now and I'm seeing this list of themes.
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And I'll just tick off some of these because it's, again, rather diabolical and clever how
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they were playing both sides of the board here.
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So they would focus on, you know, the Black community and Black Lives Matter and issues
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But also they would amplify pro-police, Blue Lives Matter pages.
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You had anti-refugee messages and, you know, immigration, border issues, Texas culture,
00:26:05.660
as you said, Southern culture, Confederate history, various separatist movements, Muslim
00:26:10.420
issues, LGBT issues, meme culture, red pill culture, gun rights in the Second Amendment,
00:26:18.600
pro-Trump and anti-Clinton, and more anti-Clinton in the form of pro-Bernie Sanders and Jill
00:26:24.720
Stein, Tea Party stuff, religious rights, Native American issues.
00:26:29.580
And all of this is just sowing divisiveness and conflict.
00:26:35.400
Although it really does seem there was, to a surprising degree, a focus on the Black community.
00:26:43.360
Do you have more information about or just an opinion about why that was such an emphasis
00:26:50.560
So there were about, there were 81 Facebook pages, 133 Instagram accounts.
00:26:55.680
Of the 81 Facebook pages, 30 focused on the Black community.
00:27:01.440
Now, there were, there were other pages that focused on other kind of traditionally left-leaning
00:27:05.480
groups, as you mentioned, Muslims, Native Americans, Latinos.
00:27:10.300
So there was, you know, there were other kind of non-Black lefty pages.
00:27:14.280
Before we go on, Renee, I just, so those numbers don't sound very large.
00:27:18.280
So 81 Facebook pages sounds like not even a drop in the ocean.
00:27:22.640
I think we should give some sense of the scale of what happened here.
00:27:31.000
I think there were about 62,000 posts across them.
00:27:34.220
There were 133 Instagram accounts, 116,000 posts across them.
00:27:38.780
There were about 187 million engagements on the Instagram content and another 75 million
00:27:46.840
And an engagement is like a like or a share or a comment.
00:27:50.040
But the pages, to be totally, totally clear, they had what I would call like a long tail.
00:27:55.880
Like 20 of them were successful enough that they had, you know, in the hundreds of thousands
00:28:06.280
And then a lot of the remainder, the long tail was just crap.
00:28:10.540
And so one of the things that was actually interesting was you could see them in the
00:28:15.840
So pivoting their failures, going in there and actually and saying like, OK, well, one
00:28:23.020
A lot of people have seen some of the memes of like Hillary fighting Satan.
00:28:25.940
There were about 900 posts by that account before it found Jesus.
00:28:30.440
It started as a Kermit the Frog meme page, you know, memes of like Kermit sipping tea and
00:28:36.800
And they didn't seem to get enough traction there.
00:28:41.820
And it was, you know, sharing these kind of ridiculous Homer Simpson memes again, just
00:28:45.620
like messing around with American culture, seeing what stuck.
00:28:48.680
When that didn't stick, all of a sudden it became a religious page devoted to Jesus.
00:28:53.600
That seemed they seem to have then kind of like nailed it.
00:28:56.320
You start to see the memes doing things like like for Jesus.
00:29:00.240
When you do something like, say, like like for Jesus, share for Jesus, they're getting
00:29:07.520
So you actually see them kind of hitting their stride with standard kind of tactics of social
00:29:12.820
media audience growth with examples like this, this Army of Jesus account.
00:29:17.860
So there is absolutely true that many of their pages were complete failures that had no lift.
00:29:22.960
But then some of their pages were actually if you go and you look at the audience reach
00:29:28.020
using things like CrowdTangle and you look at their engagements versus the engagements
00:29:31.400
for other conservative pages or other black media, you do see them kind of popping up in
00:29:36.220
the, you know, top 20, top 50 in terms of engagement overall.
00:29:41.140
So when, you know, am I saying this, these were like the best possible pages for this content
00:29:49.000
No, but what they did do was they achieved substantial success with some of them and
00:29:55.200
they use their successful pages to direct people to their other pages.
00:30:00.600
So the black community was particularly, they did this particularly, this was a, I can't say
00:30:07.120
effectively necessarily because I can't see the conversion data.
00:30:09.780
I know that they showed people these other memes.
00:30:11.640
I don't know if people converted to the page for these other memes.
00:30:15.080
But what they were doing was they were saying, if you like this content from our page Blackstagram
00:30:20.380
that you're following, here's some other, you know, hey, look at this other group called
00:30:25.780
Now, of course, there's no disclosure that the Internet Research Agency is also running
00:30:30.020
And then they're saying, look at this other content from this page called Blacktivist.
00:30:32.860
Look at this other content from this page called Nefertiti's Community.
00:30:35.900
So a lot of this kind of cross-pollination of audiences in an attempt to push people so that
00:30:40.560
if they're following one of their accounts, one of their pages, they're inundated with
00:30:47.400
And they're also amplifying legitimate pages that are highly polarized in their message.
00:30:53.800
So what's agey here is that not only creating their own fake partisan accounts.
00:31:00.000
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