Making Sense - Sam Harris - August 11, 2026


#150 — The Map of Misunderstanding (From the Archive)


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Transcript

Transcript generated with Whisper (turbo).
Toxicity classifications generated with s-nlp/roberta_toxicity_classifier .
Hate speech classifications generated with facebook/roberta-hate-speech-dynabench-r4-target .
00:00:00.000 You're listening to Making Sense with Sam Harris.
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00:00:24.960 Welcome to the Making Sense podcast.
00:00:26.900 I'm Kirby Ferguson, producer here at the show.
00:00:29.000 Sam is on vacation this week, so we are reaching into the archive and bringing back one of our
00:00:33.740 favorite episodes. This is Sam's conversation with the Nobel Prize-winning psychologist Daniel
00:00:38.360 Kahneman, who passed in 2024. It's a timeless conversation and actually one of our funnier
00:00:43.900 episodes. If you've heard it before, it rewards a second listen. Sam will be back next week with
00:00:48.740 a new episode. For now, enjoy The Map of Misunderstanding. Okay, well today I'm bringing
00:00:59.540 you the audio from my live event with Danny Kahneman at the Beacon Theater in New York.
00:01:04.640 This was a sold-out event in a very cool old theater. I'd actually never been to the Beacon
00:01:10.440 before, but it has a storied history in music and comedy. Anyway, it was a great pleasure to share
00:01:17.220 the stage with Danny. Daniel Kahneman, as you may know, is an emeritus professor of psychology at
00:01:22.680 Princeton University and also an emeritus professor of public affairs at Princeton's
00:01:28.580 Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs. He received the Nobel Prize in economics
00:01:33.800 in 2002 for the work he did on decision-making under uncertainty with Amos Tversky. Unfortunately,
00:01:41.680 Tversky died in 1996, and he was a legendary figure who would have certainly shared the Nobel
00:01:48.560 Prize with Danny had he lived longer. They don't give the Nobel posthumously. In any case, I think
00:01:55.220 it's uncontroversial to say that Danny has been the most influential living psychologist for many
00:02:01.060 years now, but he's perhaps best known in the general public for his book Thinking Fast and
00:02:07.920 Slow, which summarizes much of the work he did with Tversky. Michael Lewis also recently wrote
00:02:14.300 a biography of the Kahneman-Tversky collaboration, and that is called The Undoing Project.
00:02:21.060 Anyway, Danny and I covered a lot of ground at The Beacon. We discussed the replication crisis
00:02:26.840 in science, systems one and two, which is to say automatic and unconscious cognitive processes,
00:02:34.320 and more conscious and deliberative ones.
00:02:37.860 We talk about the failure of intuition,
00:02:40.520 even expert intuitions,
00:02:42.980 the power of framing,
00:02:45.460 moral illusions,
00:02:47.480 anticipated regret,
00:02:49.300 the asymmetry between threats and opportunities,
00:02:52.460 the utility of worrying,
00:02:54.440 removing obstacles to wanted behaviors,
00:02:57.340 the remembering self versus the experiencing self,
00:03:01.460 improving the quality of gossip,
00:03:03.060 and many other topics.
00:03:05.980 Anyway, Danny has a fascinating mind,
00:03:08.780 and I think you'll find this a very good introduction
00:03:11.140 to his thinking.
00:03:13.240 Of course, if you want more,
00:03:15.040 his book, Thinking Fast and Slow,
00:03:17.320 also awaits you if you haven't read it.
00:03:20.060 And now I bring you Daniel Kahneman.
00:03:29.000 That's unusual.
00:03:33.060 Well, well, thank you all for coming.
00:03:38.480 Really an honor to be here.
00:03:40.300 Danny, it's a special honor to be here with you.
00:03:42.180 So thank you for coming.
00:03:43.840 My pleasure.
00:03:50.740 It's often said and rarely true that a guest needs no introduction.
00:03:54.900 But in your case, that is virtually true.
00:03:58.540 We're going to talk about your work throughout.
00:04:00.280 So people will, if for the one person who doesn't know who you are, you will understand at the end of the hour.
00:04:06.740 But I guess by way of introduction, I just want to ask, but what is the worst thing about winning the Nobel Prize?
00:04:15.260 That's a hard question, actually.
00:04:17.600 There weren't many downsides to it.
00:04:22.200 Okay, well, nobody wants to hear your problems, Dan.
00:04:24.660 so how would you how do you think about your body of work how do you summarize the
00:04:35.260 intellectual problems you have tried to get your hands around you know it's been just a series of
00:04:41.740 problems that occurred that i worked on there was no big program when you look back of course i mean
00:04:47.820 you see patterns and you see ideas that have been with you for a long time but there was really no
00:04:54.280 plan. I was, you know, you follow, you follow things, you follow ideas, you follow things that
00:05:01.060 you take a fancy to. Really, that's a story of my intellectual life. It's just one thing after
00:05:07.100 another. Judging from the outside, it seems to me that you have told us much of what we now think
00:05:13.280 we know about cognitive bias and cognitive illusion. And really, the picture is of human
00:05:23.620 ignorance having a kind of structure. It's not just that we get things wrong. We get things
00:05:28.420 reliably wrong. And because of that, whole groups, markets, societies can get things wrong because
00:05:35.680 the errors don't cancel themselves out. I mean, bias becomes systematic. And that obviously has
00:05:41.300 implications that touch more or less everything we care about. Let's just, I want to track through
00:05:48.100 your work, you know, as presented in your now famous and well-read book, Thinking Fast and
00:05:54.440 Slow. And I just want to try to tease out what should be significant for all of us at this
00:06:00.580 moment, because, you know, human unreason, unfortunately, becomes more and more relevant,
00:06:04.720 it seems, and we don't get over these problems. And I guess I wanted just to begin to ask you
00:06:11.800 about a problem that's very close to home now, what is called the replication crisis or
00:06:17.660 reproducibility crisis in science, in particular social sciences and in particular psychology.
00:06:23.700 And for those in the room who are not aware of what has happened and how dire this seems,
00:06:28.940 it seems that when you go back to even some of the most celebrated studies in psychology,
00:06:35.140 their reproducibility is on the order of 50, 60 percent in the best case. So there was one study
00:06:41.700 done in that took 21 papers from Nature and Science, which are the most highly regarded
00:06:47.980 journals, and reproduced only 13 of them. And so let's talk about the problem we faced in even
00:06:56.240 doing science in the first place. Well, I mean, you know, the key problem and the reason that
00:07:01.820 this happens is that research is extensive. And it's extensive personally, and it's extensive
00:07:10.240 in terms of money. And so you want it to succeed. So when you're a researcher, you know what you
00:07:16.380 want to find. And that creates biases that you're not fully aware of. And I think a lot of this is
00:07:23.720 simply self-delusion. That is, you know, there is a concept that's known as p-hacking, which is
00:07:30.620 people very honestly deluding themselves about what they find. And there are several tricks of 0.83
00:07:38.080 a trade that people know about them, you are going to do an experiment. So instead of having
00:07:43.580 one dependent variable where you predict the outcome, you take two dependent variables. And
00:07:48.900 then if one of them doesn't work, you stay with the one that doesn't work. You do that and things
00:07:56.700 like that a few times, then it's almost guaranteed that your research will not be replicable.
00:08:02.980 And that happens. It was first discovered in medicine. I mean, it's more important in medicine
00:08:07.800 than it is in psychology, where somebody famously said
00:08:11.340 that most published research in medicine is false.
00:08:15.140 And a fair amount of published psychological research is false, too.
00:08:19.440 Yeah, but even some of the most celebrated results in psychology,
00:08:23.420 like priming and the marshmallow test and...
00:08:27.020 Well, yeah, I mean, it's not only, it's actually,
00:08:31.540 they get celebrated in part because they are surprising.
00:08:35.200 Yeah. And the rule is, you know, the more surprising the result is, the less likely it is to be true.
00:08:42.640 So that's how celebrated results get to be non-replicable.
00:08:47.520 Right. Well, and the scariest thing I heard, I don't know how robust this study was,
00:08:53.040 but someone did a study on trying to replicate unpublished studies and found they replicated better than published studies.
00:09:01.040 Did you hear this? I don't think that's replicable.
00:09:03.040 let's hope not let's talk about system one and two these are the structures that give us so much
00:09:11.740 of our what can be a dispiriting picture of human rationality summarize for us what are these two
00:09:19.160 systems you you talk about i mean before starting with anything else there are clearly two ways that
00:09:25.540 ideas come to mind i mean so if i say two plus two then an idea comes to your mind you haven't
00:09:32.720 ask for it. You're completely passive, basically. Something happens in your memory.
00:09:38.120 If I ask you to multiply, you know, 24 by 17 or something like that, you have to work to get that
00:09:44.080 idea. So it's that dichotomy between the associative, effortless, and the effortful.
00:09:51.800 And that is phenomenologically obvious. You start from there. And how you describe it,
00:09:58.880 And whether you choose to describe it in terms of systems, as I did, or in other terms, that's already a theoretical choice.
00:10:07.300 And in my view, theory is less important than the basic observation of, you know, that there are two ways for ideas to come to mind.
00:10:16.100 And then you have to describe it in a way that could be useful.
00:10:21.200 And what I mean by that is you have to describe the phenomena in a way that will cause, help researchers have good ideas about facts and about experiments to run.
00:10:33.660 And the system one and system two was, it's not my dichotomy and even not my terminology.
00:10:41.360 And in fact, it's a terminology that many people object to, but I chose it quite deliberately.
00:10:47.600 What are the liabilities? Because people in your book, you try to guard against various misunderstandings of this.
00:10:54.820 Well, yes. I mean, you know, there is a rule that you're taught fairly early in psychology, which is never to invoke what is called homunculi, which are little people in your head whose behavior explain your behavior or explain the behavior of people.
00:11:09.800 that's a no-no. And system one and system two are really homunculi. So I knew what I was doing
00:11:16.180 when I picked those. But the reason I did was that system one and system two are agents. They
00:11:24.200 have personalities. And it turns out that the mind is very good at forming pictures and images of
00:11:31.020 agents that have intentions and propensities and traits and they're active. And it's just easy to
00:11:40.160 get your mind around that. And that's why I picked that terminology, which many people find sort of
00:11:45.980 objectionable because they're really not agents in the head. It's just a very useful way to think
00:11:51.980 about it, I think. So there's no analogy to be drawn between a classical, psychological,
00:11:59.520 even Freudian picture of the conscious and the unconscious. How do you think about consciousness
00:12:04.880 and everything that precedes it in light? I mean, you know, it's clearly related in the sense that
00:12:11.120 what I call system one activities, the automatic ones, one characteristic they have is that you're
00:12:18.380 completely unconscious of the process that produces them. You just get, you know, you get
00:12:23.020 the results. You get four when you hear two plus two. In system two activities, you're often
00:12:28.900 unconscious of the process. You know what you're doing when you're calculating. You know what
00:12:33.880 you're doing when you're searching for something in memory. So clearly consciousness and system
00:12:40.600 two tend to go together. It's not a perfect, you know, and who knows what consciousness is anyway,
00:12:45.960 but they tend to go together. And system one is much more likely to be unconscious and automatic.
00:12:52.560 neither system is a perfect guide toward tracking reality but system one is is very effective in
00:13:00.920 many cases otherwise we would it wouldn't have evolved the way it has but i guess maybe let's
00:13:05.840 start with the picture of where our intuitions are reliable and where they reliably fail how
00:13:13.300 do you think about the utility of intuition i'll say first about system one that our representation
00:13:19.680 of the world most of what we know about the world is in system one we're not aware of it so that
00:13:25.880 we're going along in life with producing expectations or being surprised or not being
00:13:33.160 surprised by what happens all of this is automatic we're not aware of it so most of our thinking
00:13:39.400 system one thinking most of it goes on in our mind goes on and we're not aware of it so that's
00:13:44.540 and intuition is defined as, you know, knowing or rather thinking that you know something without
00:13:52.100 knowing why you know it or without knowing where it comes from. And it's fairly clear, actually,
00:13:59.660 I mean, that's a digression, but there is a guy named Gary Klein, a psychologist who really
00:14:04.680 doesn't like anything that I do. And he... How does your system one feel about that?
00:14:11.100 I like Gary a lot, actually, but he believes in intuition and in expert intuition, and he's a great believer in, and he has beautiful data showing, beautiful observations of expert intuition, so he and I, I invited him, actually, to try and figure out our differences, because obviously I'm a skeptic, so where intuition, marvelous, and where is it flawed, and we worked for six years,
00:14:41.100 before we came up with something and we published an article called The Failure to Disagree,
00:14:46.300 because in fact, there is a fairly clear boundary about when you can trust your intuitions and when
00:14:52.500 you can't. And I think that's summarized in three conditions. The first one is the world has to be
00:14:59.900 regular enough. I mean, first of all, intuition is recognition. And that's Herbert Simon said
00:15:06.600 that. You have an intuition. It's just like recognizing, you know, that it's like a child
00:15:11.280 recognizing what a dog is. It's immediate. Now, in order to recognize patterns and reality,
00:15:18.720 which is what true intuitions are, the world has to be regular enough so that there are
00:15:24.620 regularities to be picked up. Then you have to have enough exposure to those regularities to
00:15:30.860 have a chance to learn them. And third, it turns out that intuition depends critically on the time
00:15:38.780 between when you're making a guess and a judgment and when you get feedback about it.
00:15:44.860 The feedback has to be rapid. And if those three conditions are satisfied,
00:15:49.820 then eventually people develop intuition so that the chess players, chess is a prime example,
00:15:55.900 We're all three conditions unsatisfied.
00:15:58.360 So after, you know, many hours, I don't know, 10,000 or not,
00:16:01.940 but many hours, a chess player will have intuitions.
00:16:06.040 All the ideas, all the moves that come to his or her mind
00:16:09.580 are going to be strong moves.
00:16:11.660 That's intuition.
00:16:13.400 Right.
00:16:14.260 So the picture is one of intuition.
00:16:17.100 I mean, they're intuitions that are more innate than others.
00:16:20.340 We're so primed to learn certain things innately
00:16:22.940 that no one remembers learning these things,
00:16:26.160 you know, recognizing a human face, say.
00:16:29.120 But much of what you're calling intuition
00:16:31.620 was at one point learned.
00:16:33.780 So intuition is trainable.
00:16:35.740 There are experts in various domains,
00:16:38.180 chess being a very clear one,
00:16:39.880 that develop what we consider to be expert intuitions.
00:16:43.800 And yet much of the story of the blind spots
00:16:46.940 in our rationality is a story
00:16:50.140 of the failure of expert intuitions.
00:16:52.940 So where do you see the frontier of trainability here?
00:16:56.420 I mean, I think that what happens is that when those conditions are not satisfied, people have intuitions too.
00:17:04.700 That is, you know, they have ideas that come to their mind with high confidence and they think they're right.
00:17:10.380 And so the main thing...
00:17:12.400 I've met these people.
00:17:13.000 Yeah, I mean, you know, we've all met them and we see them in the mirror and, you know, that's...
00:17:19.000 So it turns out you can have intuition for bad reasons.
00:17:25.380 So all it takes is a thought that comes to your mind automatically
00:17:30.160 and with high confidence, and you'll think that it's an intuition,
00:17:33.580 and you'll trust it.
00:17:35.400 But the correlation between confidence and accuracy is not high.
00:17:40.860 That's one of the saddest things about the human condition.
00:17:44.260 You can be very confident in ideas and the correlation.
00:17:49.000 you shouldn't trust your confidence well so but that so that's just you know yes a depressing but
00:17:54.840 fascinating fact that the signature of a high probability that you are correct is what you
00:18:03.960 feel while uttering that sentence i mean psychologically confidence is the marker of
00:18:09.980 your credence in whatever proposition it is you're you're entertaining and yet we know they can become
00:18:16.500 totally uncoupled and often are uncoupled, given what you know or think you know scientifically,
00:18:22.660 how much of that bleeds back into your life and changes your epistemic attitude?
00:18:28.220 Do you hedge your bet? How is Danny Kahneman different given what he has understood about
00:18:35.560 science? Not at all. Not at all? Well, it's even more depressing than I thought.
00:18:39.960 I, you know, in terms of, you know, my intuition's better than being better than they were.
00:18:47.420 No.
00:18:48.060 And furthermore, I have to confess, I'm also very overconfident.
00:18:52.060 So even that I haven't learned.
00:18:54.840 So it's hard to get rid of those things.
00:18:57.900 You're just issuing a long string of apologies.
00:19:00.320 I mean, how do you get through life?
00:19:01.580 Because you should know better.
00:19:03.160 If anyone should know better, you should know better.
00:19:04.760 Yeah, but I don't really feel guilty about it.
00:19:07.660 So how hopeful are you that we can improve?
00:19:14.440 How hopeful are you that an individual can improve?
00:19:17.480 And how hopeful are you that we can design systems of conversation and incentives 0.99
00:19:22.020 that can make some future generation find us more or less unrecognizable in our stupidity? 0.99
00:19:30.380 Well, you know, I should preface by saying that I'm not an optimist in general, 0.98
00:19:36.140 But I'm certainly not an optimist about those questions.
00:19:39.920 I don't think that, you know, I'm a case study
00:19:43.620 because I've been studying that stuff for more than 50 years,
00:19:46.540 and I don't think that my intuitions have really significantly improved.
00:19:50.840 I can catch sometimes, and that's important,
00:19:54.840 I can catch, recognize a situation as one in which I'm likely to be making a mistake.
00:20:02.080 And this is the way that people protect themselves against visual illusions.
00:20:06.140 You can see the illusions and there's no way you can not see it, but you can recognize that
00:20:12.080 this is likely to be an illusion. So don't trust my eyes, take out the ruler. There is an equivalent,
00:20:18.560 you know, there is a similar thing goes on with cognitive illusions. Sometimes you know
00:20:23.700 that your intuitions, your confident thought is unlikely to be true. That's quite rare. It doesn't
00:20:31.300 happen a lot. I don't think that I've become, you know, in any significant way, smarter because of
00:20:37.600 studying errors of cognition. Right. Okay. Let me just absorb that for a second.
00:20:44.680 What you must thirst for on some levels that this understanding of ourselves can be made useful or
00:20:54.520 more useful than it is because the consequences are absolutely dire, right? I mean, our decision
00:21:00.280 making is, one could argue, the most important thing on earth, certainly with respect to human
00:21:06.840 well-being, right? I mean, how we negotiate nuclear test ban treaties, right? I mean,
00:21:12.180 everything from that on down, this is all human conversation, human intuition, errors of judgment,
00:21:20.200 pretensions of knowledge, and sometimes we get it right. And the delta there is extraordinarily
00:21:26.100 consequential. So if I told you that we, over the course of the next 30 years, made astonishing
00:21:33.580 progress on this front, right, so that we, our generation, looks like, you know, bumbling
00:21:41.480 medieval characters compared to what our children or grandchildren begin to see as a new norm,
00:21:49.000 how did we get there? You don't get there. You know, I mean, that's, you know, it's the same as
00:21:54.600 if you told me, will our perceptual system be very different in 60 years? And I don't think so.
00:22:01.340 Let's take one of these biases or sources of bias that you have found, the power of framing,
00:22:07.600 right? We know that if you frame a problem in terms of loss or you frame the same problem in
00:22:13.120 terms of gains, you get a very different set of preferences from people because people are so
00:22:17.920 averse to loss. So the knowledge of that fact, let's say you're a surgeon, right? And you're
00:22:23.100 recommending or at least, you know, proffering a surgery for a condition to your patients who you
00:22:30.040 have a, you know, you have taken a Hippocratic oath to do no harm. And you know, because you read
00:22:35.260 Danny Kahneman's book, that if you put the possibility of outcome in terms of mortality
00:22:40.600 rates versus survival rates, you are going to be moving several dials in your patient's head
00:22:47.060 one way or the other reliably. Can you conceive of us ever agreeing that there's a right answer
00:22:52.700 there, like in terms of what is the ethical duty to frame this correctly? Is there a correct framing
00:22:57.700 or are we just going to keep rolling the dice? Well, I mean, you're, this is a lot of questions
00:23:04.380 at once. In the first place, you know, when you're talking about framing, the person who is
00:23:12.840 subject to the framing, I mean, so you had a surgeon framing something for a patient.
00:23:18.400 First of all, the patient is going to be completely unaware of the fact that there is an alternative frame.
00:23:24.200 That's why it works.
00:23:25.700 It works because you see one thing and you accept the formulation as it is given.
00:23:32.000 So that's why framing works.
00:23:34.900 Now, whether there is a true or not true answer,
00:23:38.400 so I should let me mention the sort of the canonical problem,
00:23:43.260 which actually my late colleague, Amos Sversky, invented.
00:23:47.640 So in one formulation, you have a choice between,
00:23:51.700 well, there is a disease that's going to cause 600 deaths unless something is done.
00:23:57.860 And you have your choice between saving 400 people or a two-third probability of saving 600.
00:24:04.940 Or alternatively, other people get the other framing,
00:24:09.500 that you have a choice between... 0.99
00:24:11.620 Killing 200 people. 1.00
00:24:13.260 killing 200 people for sure, and not allowing them to die, 0.96
00:24:19.200 and a one-third probability that 600 people will die.
00:24:23.340 Is there a correct answer? Is there a correct frame?
00:24:26.840 Now, the interesting thing is people,
00:24:29.380 depending on which frame you presented to them,
00:24:31.640 they make very different choices.
00:24:33.680 But now you confront them with the fact that here you've been inconsistent.
00:24:39.280 and some people will deny it but you know you can convince them this is really the same problem you
00:24:46.480 know if if you save 400 then 200 will die and then what happens is they're dumbfounded that is there
00:24:53.680 are no intuitions we have clear intuitions about what having about what to do with gains we have
00:25:00.560 clear intuitions about what what to do with losses and when you strip it from that language with which
00:25:07.560 we have intuition, we have no idea what to do. So, you know, what is better when you stop to
00:25:15.040 think about, you know, stop thinking about saving or about dying? Well, I've forgotten if that
00:25:21.740 research was ever done, I forgot what the results were. Has the third condition been compared to the
00:25:26.460 first two? What do people do when you give them both framings and dumbfound them? I mean, where
00:25:32.660 do the percentages go with respect? This is not something that we've done formally, but I can tell
00:25:38.760 you that I'm dumbfounded. I have absolutely no idea. I have the same intuitions as everybody
00:25:46.000 else. When it's in the gains, they want to save lives. And when it's in the losses, I don't want
00:25:51.220 people to die. But that's where the intuitions are. When you're talking to me about 600 more
00:25:58.520 people staying alive with a probability two-thirds. Or, you know, when you're talking about numbers of
00:26:04.820 people living, I have absolutely no intuitions about that. So that is quite common in ethical
00:26:12.140 problem and in moral problems, that they're frame dependent. And when you strip the frames away,
00:26:18.020 people are left without a moral intuition. And this is incredibly consequential in
00:26:23.900 when you're thinking about human suffering. So your colleague, Paul Slovic, has done these
00:26:29.080 brilliant experiments where he's shown that if you ask people to support a charity, you talk about
00:26:36.020 a famine in Africa, say, and you show them one little girl attached to a very salient and
00:26:42.520 heartbreaking narrative about how much she's suffering, you get the maximum charitable
00:26:48.040 response. But then you go to another group and you show that same one little girl and tell her
00:26:52.760 story, but you give her a brother and the response diminishes. And if you go to another group and
00:26:59.100 you give them the little girl and her brother, and then you say, in addition to the suffering of
00:27:03.640 these two gorgeous kids, there are 500,000 suffering children behind them suffering the
00:27:11.520 same famine, then the altruistic response goes to the floor. It's precisely the opposite of what we
00:27:17.500 understand system two should be normative, right? The bigger the problem, the more concerned and
00:27:25.140 charitable we should be. So to take that case, there has to, there's a way to correct for this
00:27:30.240 at the level of tax codes and levels of foreign aid and which problems to target. If we know that
00:27:37.700 we are emotionally gamed by the salient personal story and more or less morally blind to statistics
00:27:45.580 and raw numbers. I mean, there's another piece of work that you did, which shows that people are so
00:27:51.000 innumerate with respect to the magnitude of problems that they will more or less pay the
00:27:56.220 same amount, whether they're saving 2,000 lives, 20,000 lives, or 200,000 lives.
00:28:00.720 Yeah. Because basically, and that's a system one characteristic, basically you're saving one life.
00:28:08.860 You're thinking, you have an image, you have stories, and this is what system one works on.
00:28:13.440 And this is where emotions are about. They're about stories. They're not about numbers. So it's always about stories. And what happens when you have 500,000, you have lost a story. A story, to be vivid, has to be about an individual case. And when you dilute it by adding cases, you dilute the emotion.
00:28:35.220 now what you're describing in terms of the moral response to this is no longer an emotional response
00:28:43.780 and this is already you know this is this is cognitive morality this is not emotional morality
00:28:51.020 you have disconnected from the emotion you know that it's better to save 500 000 than than 5 000
00:28:58.080 even if you don't feel better about saving $500,000.
00:29:02.960 So this is passing on to system two.
00:29:07.040 This is passing on to the cognitive system, the responsibility for action.
00:29:12.340 And you don't think that that handoff can be made in a durable way?
00:29:16.360 I think it has to be made by policymakers.
00:29:19.560 And policymakers, you know, we hire some people to think about numbers
00:29:24.240 and to think about it in those ways.
00:29:27.120 But if you want to convince people that this needs to be done, you need to convince them by telling them stories about individuals, because numbers just don't catch the imagination of people.
00:29:41.060 What does the phrase cognitive ease mean in your work?
00:29:45.500 Well, it means that some ideas come very easily to mind and others come with greater and greater difficulty to the point of.
00:29:55.040 so that's that's what cognitive it's it's also called fluency right it's you know what's what's
00:30:03.620 easy to think about and uh there is a correlation between fluency and pleasantness apparently that
00:30:11.620 pleasant things are more fluent they come more easily not always more easily but yes they're
00:30:17.840 more fluent and fluency is pleasant so there is that interaction between fluency and pleasure
00:30:23.680 which I hope replicates. So the picture I get is of, I don't know if you referenced this in
00:30:31.660 your book, I can't remember, but what happens, what we know from split brain studies that for
00:30:37.380 the most part, the left linguistic hemisphere confabulates. It's continually manufacturing
00:30:43.420 discursive stories that ring true to it. And there's, in the case of actual neurological
00:30:51.540 confabulation there's no reality testing going on there's nothing it's just it's telling a story
00:30:57.200 that is being believed but it seems to me that most of us are in a similar mode most of the time
00:31:04.340 there's a very lazy reality testing mechanism coming online and it's just easy to take your
00:31:14.060 own word for it most of the time i think this is really as as you say this is the normal state
00:31:20.400 the normal state is that we're telling ourselves stories we're telling ourselves stories to explain
00:31:27.000 why we believe in things more often than not retrospectively in a way that has bears no
00:31:32.560 relationship to the system one bottom-up reasons why we absolutely i mean but you know for me the
00:31:39.600 the example that was formative in is what happened with post-hypnotic suggestions
00:31:46.920 So you put somebody under hypnosis and you tell them, you know, when I clap my hands,
00:31:53.040 you will feel very warm and you'll open a window and you clap your hands and they get up and open
00:31:59.920 a window. And they know why they opened the window. And it has nothing to do with the suggestion.
00:32:04.760 It comes with a story. They felt really warm and uncomfortable and they needed air and they
00:32:11.380 opened the window. Actually, in this case, you know, the cause, the cause was the hand was clapped.
00:32:18.340 Is that going to replicate? That one replicates, I'm pretty sure. You know, I hope so. Yeah,
00:32:23.820 I'm sure. Do you have a favorite cognitive error or bias? Yeah. Which of your ugly children do you
00:32:32.080 liked the most uh oh yeah i think i mean it's a it's it's not the simplest to explain but my 0.93
00:32:42.380 favorite one is sort of extreme predictions when you have very weak evidence and on the basis of
00:32:49.040 very weak evidence you draw extreme conclusions i call it technically it's called non-regressive
00:32:55.040 prediction and it's my favorite right right where do you see it appearing is there an example of it
00:33:01.260 that you? Oh, I mean, you see it all over the place, but when, you know, one very obvious
00:33:07.800 situation is in job interviews. So, you know, you interview someone and you have a very clear idea
00:33:15.040 of how they will perform. And even when you're told that your ideas are worthless, because in
00:33:21.000 fact, you cannot predict performance or can predict it only very poorly, it doesn't affect
00:33:25.620 it. Next time you interview the person, you have the same confidence. Interview somebody else. I
00:33:32.600 mean, that's something that I discovered very early in my career. I was an officer in the Israeli
00:33:38.160 army as a draftee, and I was interviewing candidates for officer training. And I discovered
00:33:45.560 that I had that uncanny power to know who will be a good officer and who won't be. And I really
00:33:53.640 could tell you know interviewing people i knew their character you get that sense of you know
00:33:59.880 confident knowledge and then the statistics showed that actually we couldn't predict anything
00:34:07.240 and yet the confidence remained it's it's very strange right well so there must be a solution
00:34:14.940 for that those some people following your work must recommend that you either don't do interviews
00:34:20.760 or heavily discount them, right?
00:34:22.800 Yeah, that's absolutely true.
00:34:25.260 Don't do interviews mostly.
00:34:28.000 And don't do interviews in particular
00:34:30.280 because if you run an interview,
00:34:33.060 you will trust it too much.
00:34:35.260 So there have been many cases,
00:34:37.260 studies, I don't know about many,
00:34:39.880 but there have been studies
00:34:41.000 in which you have candidates,
00:34:44.180 you have a lot of information about them.
00:34:46.740 And then if you add an interview,
00:34:48.600 it makes your predictions worse especially if the interviewer is the one who makes the final
00:34:55.640 decision because when you interview this is so much more vivid than all the other information
00:35:01.380 you have that you put way too much weight on it is that also a story about just the power of
00:35:07.020 face-to-face interaction and it's face-to-face interaction it's immediate you know anything
00:35:14.200 that you experience is you know if you is very different from being told about it and you know
00:35:21.000 as scientists one of the remarkable things that i know is how much more i trust my results than
00:35:28.060 anybody else's right so and and that's true of everybody i know you know we trust their own
00:35:34.740 results. Why? No reason. All right, then let's talk about regret. Okay. What is the power of
00:35:46.040 regret in our lives? How do you think about regret? Well, I think regret is an interesting
00:35:53.460 emotion, and it's a special case of an emotion that has to do with counterfactual thinking.
00:36:00.800 That is, regret is not about something that happened.
00:36:03.580 It's about something that could have happened but didn't.
00:36:07.060 And I don't know about regret itself, but anticipated regret,
00:36:12.860 the anticipation of regret plays an important role in lots of decisions.
00:36:17.320 That is, there's a decision and you tell yourself,
00:36:19.320 well, if I don't do this and it happens, then how will I feel?
00:36:25.380 That expectation of regret is very powerful
00:36:28.440 And it's well known in financial decisions and a lot of other decisions.
00:36:34.540 And it's connected to loss aversion as well, right?
00:36:37.240 Well, I mean, it's a form of loss, and it's quite vivid that you're able to anticipate how you will feel if something happens, and that becomes very salient.
00:36:49.700 Well, does the asymmetry with respect to how we view losses and gains make sense, ultimately?
00:36:58.120 I mean, I think at some point in your work, you talk about an evolutionary rationale for it because suffering is worse than pleasure is good, essentially, because there's a survival advantage for those who are making greater efforts to avoid suffering.
00:37:12.860 But it also just seems like there's if you if you put in the balance of possibility, the worst possible misery and the greatest possible pleasure.
00:37:22.320 And if I told you we could have the night we're going to have tonight and it will be a normal night of conversation or there's a part of the evening where I can give you the worst possible misery for a half hour, followed by the best possible pleasure.
00:37:38.680 Let's have a conversation.
00:37:39.960 Yeah. Let's just get a cheese burner and a Diet Coke. The prospect of suffering in this universe
00:37:46.740 seems to overwhelm the prospect of happiness or well-being. I know you put a lot of thought
00:37:53.500 into the power of sequencing. I can imagine that feeling the misery first and the pleasure second
00:37:59.600 would be better than the reverse, but it's not going to be enough to make it seem like a good
00:38:04.800 choice, I would imagine. How do you think of this asymmetry between pleasure and pain?
00:38:08.820 You know, the basic asymmetry is between threats and opportunities, and threats are more immediate, and they're, so in many situations, it's not true everywhere, there are situations where opportunities are very rare, but threats are immediate, and they have to be dealt with immediately, so the priority of threats over opportunities must be built in by a large evolutionary.
00:38:34.660 But do you think we could extract an ethical norm from this asymmetry? For instance, could it be true to say that it is more important to alleviate suffering than to provide pleasure if we had some way to calibrate the magnitude of each?
00:38:53.400 Well, in the first, we did a study, Dick Thaler and Jack Netsch and I did a study a long time ago about intuitions about fairness.
00:39:02.720 And it's absolutely clear that that asymmetry rules intuitions about fairness.
00:39:08.260 That is, there is a very powerful rule of fairness that people identify with not to cause losses.
00:39:17.800 That is, you have to have a very good reason to inflict a loss on someone.
00:39:22.980 The injunction to share your gains is much weaker.
00:39:28.420 So that asymmetry, what we call the rights that people have,
00:39:33.420 quite frequently the negative rights that people have,
00:39:36.260 is the right not to have losses inflicted on you.
00:39:39.340 So there are powerful moral intuitions that go in that direction.
00:39:45.380 And the second question that you asked,
00:39:48.140 because that was a compound question about well-being,
00:39:51.400 yeah i mean i i think you know in in recent decades there's a tremendous emphasis on happiness
00:39:58.980 and the search for happiness and the responsibility of governments to make citizens happy and so on
00:40:05.140 and one of my doubts about this line of work and this line of thinking is that i think that
00:40:11.480 preventing misery is a much better and more important objective than promoting happiness
00:40:17.200 And so the happiness movement, I have my doubts about on those grounds.
00:40:24.460 Given what you said, it's hard to ever be sure that you've found solid ground here.
00:40:29.920 So there's the intuition that you just cited that people have a very strong reaction to imposed losses that they don't have to unshared gains, right?
00:40:40.660 you do something that robs me of something I thought I had, I'm going to feel much worse
00:40:47.420 about that than just the knowledge that you didn't share some abundance that I never had
00:40:51.180 in the first place. But it seems that we could just be a conversation away from standing somewhere
00:40:59.060 that makes that asymmetry look ridiculous, analogous to the Asian disease problem, right?
00:41:05.800 Like it's a framing effect that we are, we may have an evolutionary story to tell about why we're
00:41:10.540 here, but given some opportunity to be happy in this world, it could seem counterproductive.
00:41:18.160 I say this already being anchored to your intuition. I share this situation.
00:41:22.740 I think that in philosophical debates about morality and well-being, there are really two
00:41:32.220 ways of thinking about it. And there is one way about when you're thinking of final states
00:41:37.760 and what everybody will have.
00:41:40.560 And there, there is a powerful intuition
00:41:42.560 that you want people more or less to be equal,
00:41:45.500 or at least not to be too different.
00:41:47.420 But there is another way of thinking about it,
00:41:49.580 which is given the situation under the state of society,
00:41:54.940 how much redistribution do you want to impose?
00:41:58.620 And there, there is an asymmetry
00:42:00.160 because you're taking from some people
00:42:01.960 and giving it to others.
00:42:03.920 And you don't get to the same point.
00:42:06.260 So we have powerful moral intuitions of two kinds, and they're not internally consistent.
00:42:12.900 And loss aversion has a great deal to do with that.
00:42:16.200 So given that there are many things we want and don't want, and we want and don't want them strongly,
00:42:23.340 and we are all moving individually and collectively into an uncertain future where there are threats and opportunities,
00:42:31.080 and we're trying to find our way, how do you think about worrying?
00:42:34.940 What is the advantage of worrying? If there was a way to just not worry, is that an optimal
00:42:40.680 strategy? I think the Dalai Lama most recently articulated this in a meme, but this no doubt
00:42:46.480 predates him. Take the thing you're worried about, right? Either there's something you can do about
00:42:51.600 it or not. If there's something you can do about it, well then do that thing. If you can't do
00:42:55.920 anything about it, well then why worry? Because you're just going to suffer twice, right? How do
00:43:00.400 How do you think about worry, given your work here?
00:43:03.540 Well, I don't think my work leads to any particular conclusions about this.
00:43:08.540 I mean, the Dalai Lama is obviously right.
00:43:10.700 I mean, you know, why worry?
00:43:13.180 Some people are going to tweet that, and it's not going to work out well for you.
00:43:17.120 On the other hand, I would like to see people worry a fair amount about the future.
00:43:24.320 And even because you don't know right now whether or not you'll be able to do anything about it.
00:43:30.160 Right. I mean, maybe worry. The only way to get enough activation energy into the system to actually be motivated to do something is to worry.
00:43:38.140 You know, one of the problems, for example, when you're thinking of climate change, one of the problems, you can't make people worry about something that is so abstract and distant.
00:43:48.560 And, you know, if you make people worry enough, things would change.
00:43:53.920 But there is, scientists are incapable of making the public worry sufficiently about that problem.
00:44:01.220 To steal a technique that you just recommended, if you could make a personal story out of it, that would sell the problem much more effectively.
00:44:10.260 It's just, climate change is a very difficult thing to personalize.
00:44:13.200 It's very difficult to personalize and it's not immediate.
00:44:16.220 So it really, climate change is the worst problem in a way, the problem that we're least well-equipped to deal with because it's remote, it's abstract, and it's not a clear and present danger.
00:44:33.740 I mean, a meteorite coming to Earth, that would mobilize people.
00:44:38.240 Climate change is a much more difficult problem to deal with, and worry is part of that story.
00:44:45.080 it's interesting that a meteorite would be different i mean even if you put it far enough
00:44:50.440 out there so you have an earth crossing asteroid in 75 years there would still be some council
00:44:58.380 of uncertainty people would say well we can't be a hundred percent sure that something isn't going
00:45:03.900 to happen in the next 75 years that will divert this asteroid other people will say well surely
00:45:10.560 we're going to come up with some technology that would be onerously costly for us to invent now,
00:45:16.360 but 20 years from now could be trivially easy for us to invent. So why steal anything from anyone's
00:45:22.160 pocketbook now to deal with it? You could run some of the same arguments, but there's something,
00:45:27.020 the problem is crystallized in a way. The difference is there is a story about the asteroid.
00:45:32.380 You have a clear image of what happens if it hits and the image is a lot clearer than climate
00:45:40.160 change. So one generic issue here is the power of framing. I mean, we are now increasingly
00:45:50.840 becoming students of the power of framing, but we are not, we should just be able to come up with a
00:45:58.680 list of the problems we have every reason to believe are real and significant and sort those
00:46:07.620 problems by the variable of, this is the set of problems that we know that we are very unlikely
00:46:16.340 to feel an emotional response to. We are not wired to be motivated by what we rationally
00:46:23.400 understand in these areas. And then take the cognitive step of deliberately focusing on those
00:46:31.780 problems. If we did that, if everyone in this room did that, what we're then left with is a
00:46:37.080 political problem of selling this attitude toward the rest of I mean you know that you use the you
00:46:42.420 use the tricky word there and the word is we who is we I mean you know in in that story uh who is
00:46:50.060 we so you are talking about a group of people possibly political leaders who are making a
00:46:56.500 decision on behalf of the population that that in a sense they treat like children who do not
00:47:01.920 understand the problem i mean it's it's quite difficult surely you can't be talking about our
00:47:07.560 current political leaders uh no i'm not uh but it's actually i find it difficult to see how
00:47:15.100 democracies can effectively deal with a problem like climate change i mean you know if i had to 0.96
00:47:20.840 to guess i would say china is more likely to come up with effective solutions than the west
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