#365 — Reality Check
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Summary
Sam Harris remembers his friend Dan Dennett, who died this week at the age of 80, after a long and illustrious career as a philosopher and writer. He talks about their friendship, how they met, and what it was like to share a stage with him and Christopher Hitchens at various atheist and free-thinking events. He also talks about the time they shared a mock boxing ring in front of 5,000 people in Mexico, and the time he and Hitchens debated a bunch of people in a weird debate in a mock ring, which turned out to be a lot of fun. And he talks about why he doesn t think philosophy should be treated as a separate discipline from science, and why he thinks it should be seen as a companion to science, rather than a replacement for it, in his new book, "The Horsemen: A Companion to Science and Reason." The Horsemen of Reason is out now, and you can read the full transcript of that conversation here. You'll also get a free copy of the transcript of the debate in which Hitchens and Dawkins debated Dawkins and Dawkins at Beyond Belief, which is available on YouTube here, here, and here, where you can watch the full video version of the speech Hitchens gave on the topic here. Thanks for listening to this episode of the Making Sense Podcast. We don't run ads on the podcast, and therefore it's made possible entirely through the support of our subscribers. by becoming a supporter of the podcast. Please consider becoming one of our premium memberships, so you can get a better listening experience and get access to all the best episodes of Making Sense Sense Podcasts, wherever you get the most of it's best listening and the most information you can access the most profoundest podcasting opportunities in the making sense and much more! making sense of what we're doing here. Thank you for listening, making sense, and remember that you're listening with your mind and learning about the things you care about the world, and making sense everywhere you do it, and helping us make sense of the most important things in the most meaningful things we can do that matters most of all of us have a chance to understand the most influential things we get in the world. Thank you, again and truly appreciating what we all get to know you, right here and everywhere they're making sense. Your support makes the world a little bit more of it, day-to-day.
Transcript
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Welcome to the Making Sense Podcast. This is Sam Harris. Just a note to say that if you're
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Okay, well, my friend Dan Dennett died about 10 days ago. I was traveling, and then I got sick,
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and couldn't record, so I'm just now getting an opportunity to say a few things about him.
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As I'm sure all of you know, Dan was an extraordinarily productive philosopher.
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He really distinguished himself among philosophers by taking science seriously. This is evident
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throughout his books, but his book Darwin's Dangerous Idea, in which he argues that Darwin's
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notion of natural selection was simply the best idea anyone has ever had, is really a wonderful bridge
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between philosophy and science. And it's among many that Dan built. One often hears philosophy as a
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discipline denigrated, especially by scientists and technologists. And there's even an implicit
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denigration in some of Dan's work, and in some of mine as well. I think it's worth clarifying this.
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Dan often approached philosophy as a kind of handmaiden to science, and he was definitely
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not alone in doing this. On this view, the chief purpose of philosophy is to clear up conceptual
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confusion and to spot the many forms of learned error and well-trained ignorance that develop,
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even in science, so that we can get on with the work of actually understanding the world.
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The philosopher Bernard Williams once said that the problem with this approach to philosophy
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is that philosophy can't do what science does, that is, produce new knowledge. So it gives the
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impression that philosophy is just what scientists sound like when they're off-duty. And I understand
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this criticism as well. It's a little hard to say what philosophy is or should be, really. It's been
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many things historically. And I agree that as an academic discipline, there are many backwaters
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and dry patches that one need not explore. Or exploring them, one shouldn't get stuck there.
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Generally, my view of philosophy is that it's not so much its own discipline at this point,
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as it is clarity of thought with the special purpose of making sense of our lives and of our knowledge
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of the world. Its purpose isn't to do the work of science or of history or of journalism or of any
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other field in which we produce knowledge. Its purpose is to think clearly about what the
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discoveries in those fields mean or might mean. The point of philosophy is to see how all the puzzle
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pieces fit together. I'm not sure that Dan would have agreed with that, but he certainly spent a lot of
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time working on the part of the puzzle that contains biology and psychology and cognitive science.
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I didn't get to spend that much time with Dan in person. We attended several conferences together
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over a couple of decades. Perhaps the first was the second Beyond Belief conference at the Salk Institute
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in 2007. We went to TED together and Ciudad de la Cidez in Mexico, where we participated in a weird debate,
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which pitted him and me and Christopher Hitchens against Rabbi Shmuley Botiak, Robert Wright,
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Dinesh D'Souza, and Nassim Taleb, none of whom made a bit of sense. Really, if you want to see some brains
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totally misfire, watch what those guys had to say on that occasion. The podium was set in a mock
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boxing ring, and we were standing in front of 5,000 mostly religious and, I think, mostly bewildered
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Mexicans. Needless to say, it was an honor to share the stage with Dan and Hitch. Dan and I also went to
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various atheist and free thought conferences together. Actually, before Mexico, we taped a conversation
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with Hitch and Richard Dawkins in Hitch's apartment. That was before an atheist conference
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in D.C. Video of that conversation is still available on YouTube, and the transcript got worked up into a
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book titled The Four Horsemen, to which the inimitable Stephen Fry wrote a preface. I think the last time I
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actually saw Dan might have been eight years ago at TED, and he was always great company. Beyond wanting to
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discuss serious ideas, he just loved life. He loved good food, and wine, and music, and the beauty of
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nature. He was a big guy with a very big appetite for living, and it was infectious. However, like many of
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my professional friendships, most of my relationship with Dan took place over email, and I spent the better
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part of a day and night last week rereading this correspondence going back 20 years. It was frankly a little
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alarming to see how much I'd forgotten, and reading this had a strange effect, because I realized at some point
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that it was not so much reminding me of Dan as it was allowing me to relive my primary experience of him, because
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again, most of our relationship was a matter of exchanging these emails in the first place.
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So I read through hundreds of emails, and relived a lot of fun and not-so-fun moments with Dan. I saw
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the moment Dan, Richard, and I consciously inducted Hitch into our circle. Apparently people had been
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referring to the three of us as the three horsemen of the apocalypse, which I don't actually remember,
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and we decided that Hitch would be the perfect fourth, which of course he was. I saw the planning that went on
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for a wonderful dinner we had at Hitch's apartment in Washington, before which we recorded that two-hour
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conversation, and I was amazed to see how excited Dan was to be doing this. He really was having a lot of fun.
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So reading this correspondence gave me a second helping of my friendship with Dan, and with many others, with
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Steven Pinker, and Richard Dawkins, and Hitch. In many cases, there were several of us on various threads
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together. I just came away so grateful to have had these guys in my corner. Looking back at all these
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exchanges, I can see that I was often tempted to be more pugnacious than would have been useful,
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and Dan especially came to my rescue. And I'd forgotten pretty much all of these interventions.
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Dan was in his mid to late 60s, when we had most of our correspondence, and I was in my early 40s.
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As I said, there were often others on the thread, Richard and Steve, and sometimes our mutual agent,
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John Brockman. Richard and I tend to be pretty similar in wanting to say things as intemperately as we think them.
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And Dan was always the voice of moderation, and there were definitely times when I needed to hear that voice.
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And the encouragement, and the criticism, and the congratulations when things went well.
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All of these guys gave me a lot. And Dan gave me a lot. And I'd forgotten how much.
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As I said, most of our correspondence came earlier on, during the Four Horsemen slash New Atheist
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period, where we had a bit of a good cop, bad cop routine going. Dan was the good cop,
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and Richard, Hitch, and I were the bad ones. And I think he liked it that way.
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Needless to say, he still caught a lot of our bad press. Most people treated us like a four-headed
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atheist. However, in truth, Dan's contributions to new atheism were different. In his book, Breaking the
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Spell, his purpose wasn't to prove religion wrong or to denounce its evils. Rather, he wanted to explain
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why so many people persist in defending the indefensible. He argued that it wasn't that so
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many people sincerely believe in God, but rather they believed in belief, and even many atheists
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believed in belief. Now, Dan and I were both capable of overreacting to criticism and to what we
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perceived to be unfair attacks. As I review our emails, I see we each admonish the other to be
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more measured in our responses than we often managed in our first drafts. We would occasionally
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show each other essays and letters to the editor. Needless to say, all of this admonishment is
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somewhat adorable, given that when we fell out over free will, we gave each other both barrels,
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both in public and in private. And you can read the public version of that on my blog somewhere.
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I believe it's all there, including his initial review of my book, Free Will, to which I reacted
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badly. It took us about two years to bury the hatchet, and you can hear how fully we did that in a
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conversation I recorded at the TED conference in 2016, which again, I think might be the last time
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I ever saw Dan in person. And you can hear that conversation on episode 39 of this podcast.
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Dan and I didn't agree about free will. I'm not even sure we agreed about what we disagreed about,
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nor did we agree about other topics in the philosophy of mind, like the hard problem of consciousness.
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And like many of my smart friends, Dan had no interest in meditation. But we both loved
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reason and science and the other principles that produce real intellectual life and political
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freedom. And I will definitely miss Dan's voice. My heart goes out to Susan, his wife, and the rest of
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his family, and to his many friends and students who were much closer to him than I was. I am very sorry for
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your loss. Okay. There are just a few things going on in the world at the moment. Campus protests,
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Iran. No doubt I will talk about all of that soon. Today I'm speaking with David Wallace-Wells.
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David is a best-selling science writer and essayist who focuses on climate change, technology,
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and the future of the planet and how we live on it. David has been a national fellow at the New
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America Foundation, a columnist and deputy editor at New York Magazine. Previously he was at the Paris
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Review, and now he is a regular columnist for the New York Times. He is also the author of a much
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celebrated book on climate change titled The Uninhabitable Earth. We covered a lot of ground here.
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We talk about the pollution of our information landscape, much of it through the lens of COVID.
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We discuss the false picture of reality that so many people acquired during COVID, how the various
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countries fared during the pandemic, our preparation for future pandemics, how we naturally normalize
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danger and death. Then we move on to climate change. We talk about the current global consensus,
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the amount of warming we can expect, the effects of air pollution quite apart from warming, global
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versus local considerations, Greta Thunberg and climate catastrophism, growth versus degrowth,
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the role of market forces, carbon taxes, the consequences of political stagnation, the U.S. national
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debt, the best way to attack the candidacy of Donald Trump. I thought David had a very good idea on this
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front, as you'll hear, and we cover a few other topics. And now I bring you David Wallace-Wells.
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I am here with David Wallace-Wells. David, thanks for joining me.
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So, how did you get into journalism? I associate you with New York Magazine and the New York Times.
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Are you currently affiliated with both, or is it just the New York Times?
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Just the Times, yeah. I write a weekly piece for the opinion sections, basically a column that goes
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out as a newsletter, and I write a column for the magazine once a month and some features too.
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And I've been there for about almost two years now.
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A long time before that at New York. And before that, a somewhat bumpier road. I worked at Slate,
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I worked in book publishing, I worked at the New York Sun, this neocon newspaper in New York.
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And yeah, just in the Paris Review as a deputy editor at the literary magazine for a while.
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Oh, cool. I like the Paris Review, especially those iconic interviews with writers.
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Yeah, they're incredible. That was, you know, one of the best part of the job was,
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I did one with William Gibson, but I edited a bunch of them. And
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they're also much more collaborative than you may think at the outset. So,
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you're basically writing it with the writer who's being interviewed all the time.
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Hmm. Nice. And how would you describe your political orientation?
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You know, about 10 years ago, I was writing a profile of this guy, Ben Kunkel, who was one of
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the founders of N Plus One, and is a pretty left-wing guy. And as it happens, also pretty
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concerned with climate, which I became later on. And he asked me the same question during the
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reporting. And I said, you know, I think I'd have to call myself a neoliberal. And he just like rolled
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out of his chair laughing, thinking like how ridiculous it could be for someone to call
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themselves a neoliberal. You know, I'm a child of the 90s. I grew up in, I was born in 82 and grew
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up in New York in the 90s. And I think on some animal level, I processed all of the meta-narratives
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of that era quite deeply. So, I was, you know, a sophisticated enough teenager to think that
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progress wasn't inevitable, you know, prosperity and justice weren't laws of the universe.
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But that over long enough timelines, we were kind of moving in the right direction, and
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that the U.S. was part of that story. And I've had like a lot of people, a kind of a
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bumpier last decade or decade and a half, where a lot of those assumptions seem much less safe
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to me to make, and the world seems much messier and more complicated than I had thought it
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was, both domestically and internationally. And probably it's also meant that I've moved
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quite a bit to the left of where I was when I described myself as a neoliberal 10 or 12
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years ago. But I also think of myself as someone who is pretty resistant to tribal thinking and
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like team-based thinking about the world, and spend a fair amount of time, I think, trying
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to interrogate anything I see in myself as a kind of doctrinaire position or perspective.
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And that means often getting irritated and frustrated with people who I think of as political
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allies, because I don't think they're being quite serious enough about, you know, asking
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Yeah, so I want to cover a bunch of topics here, which are, you know, on the surface, they
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seem unrelated, but they're all connected to our, what many of us perceive to be our degrading
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capacity to talk about problems and implement solutions. There's a political dysfunction,
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there's a failure to converge in any kind of reasonable timeframe in a fact-based discussion
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on a statement of, you know, what's happening in the world. I mean, it's kind of a shared reality.
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So let's start with the information landscape, which you probably agree, many of us perceive
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it as just astonishingly polluted at this moment. And the one problem is that any attempt
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to clean it up is considered to be censorship by at least half of our society. I mean, now
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we're taking an American perspective here, although this is probably true across much of the world.
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And, you know, I wouldn't say that censorship is never a problem, but many people consider
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any effort to contain algorithmically amplified lies and however consequential as a step toward
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some kind of dystopia. And even to worry about misinformation and disinformation, as I've begun
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to do in these previous sentences, among Republicans, certainly, is just to be branded some kind of
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elitist stooge at this point, right? This is just, these are just not problems. So I'm just wondering
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how you view, I mean, there's sort of the media and social media side of this and then the political
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side, right? And the rise of populism, especially. How do you view the current moment and what's it
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like to navigate it as a journalist at The Times?
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I think it's a big mess. When my colleagues or, you know, people in the sort of mainstream
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establishment media talk about these issues, they often do talk about, you know, disinformation and
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they're talking about the distortions of social media and the way that it inflames many of our sort
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of intuitive tribal feelings about the world and the state of the world. I tend to think that the changes
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that we've seen over the last five years are kind of bigger and more fundamental than that.
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I, you know, 20 years ago, people worried a lot about American culture trending in a, you know,
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kind of idiocracy, dystopia direction. We worried about the dumbing down of our population, of our
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culture. And, you know, I think there are certain ways in which that's undeniably unfolding. On the other
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hand, I think in the last five or 10 years as this incredible explosion of pretty high-minded,
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pretty serious curiosity, you know, in other parts of the new media landscape. So you can see certain
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algorithmic problems when you're looking at, you know, Twitter or TikTok. But when you look at what's
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happening on YouTube or in podcasts, it seems to me like we just have a huge new population of people
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who demographically and professionally a half generation ago would not have been really
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intellectuals now playing the role of intellectuals in public, but also many of them just processing
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news from the world on their own. And, you know, on some level that has to be progress and it has to
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be a good thing. When I think about, you know, just imagining the equivalent like Silicon Valley elite
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from 20 years ago, they were just not, you know, listening to three-hour podcasts about,
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you know, some 17th century event or like, you know, the path of the plague through Europe or
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whatever it is. It just was a very different kind of more business-centered culture. And that's true
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of more traditional business centers too. And now I think almost everyone of some education and sort of
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status thinks of themselves as a thinker and thinks of part of their job as figuring out the state of
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the world in the future. And that is, you know, like I said, you kind of have to count it as progress.
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On the other hand, it's meant that it's possible for many of us to treat those conversations,
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which are in many ways abstracted and separated from the way the real world is unfolding, as though
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those conversations are the real world and not to confront ourselves or be confronted with contrary
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facts or contrary arguments. And so we have this combination of forces where we have many people
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thinking and talking in much more sophisticated and informed ways, but producing just an awful lot of,
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I think, pretty damaging narrativization and mischaracterization of all the shifts that we're
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living through. And, you know, it's maybe because of what I cover and what I write about. It's also
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because of, you know, the recent history that we've all lived through. But I think of this, I guess,
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primarily in terms of the pandemic, where it almost seemed like every month I was both arguing with
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journalists at places like the New York Times about how they were describing the pace of the pandemic
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and the course of the pandemic and what it sort of required of us. And also arguing with
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contrarians who seem to be far too extreme in their rejection of establishment wisdom and
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establishment understanding. And I don't know, given the information landscape that we've landed in
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now in 2024, against the political backdrop in which all of that's unfolding, whether we can get
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back to a place where, you know, we have to argue from real facts with one another. But it does seem like
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a quite, quite distressing situation where, you know, you have pretty prominent people with pretty
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large followings and whose followings have grown a lot over the last five years talking about the net
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harm that vaccines have done to the population or, you know, on any number of points about the course of
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the pandemic. Really, really, I think, over-correcting for some of the real oversights
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and shortcomings of conventional public health messaging, but over-correcting in ways that I
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think are, you know, have left us in a worse place. And, you know, we could talk about some of the
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particulars there, but in the big picture, it's like half of states, I think, have passed laws
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restricting the ability of public health officials to impose any behavioral restrictions in the face of a
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future pandemic, independent of how transmissible or lethal that pandemic might be. You know,
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reasonable people can say, can take issue with the way that the American pandemic was handled.
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But like, the idea that we should do absolutely nothing in the face of all possible future pandemic
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threats just seems to me to be just a horrible over-correction and a real indictment of how, you
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know, how narrow-minded, narrow-mindedly we're all thinking about what we just went through and the
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lessons it really offers us. Yeah. Well, let's look at this through the lens of COVID because I think
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that's, it was transformational on multiple fronts and, you know, I think diagnostic of much that ails
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us. I mean, you sound more sanguine about the signal that's in the noise than I feel on most days. I mean,
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when you, you know, when thinking about, you know, what I continue to refer to as podcastistan and
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Substackistan, you know, the main places of alternative media where you can see the virtually
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complete erosion of trust in, in our institutions, you know, more or less, you know, just the evidence
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of it just clocks in, you know, minute by minute, you know, in all of these conversations.
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Um, and so that even, uh, you know, uh, the most esteemed journal on earth, which you work for the
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New York times has very little status out there in the, in the wilds of podcasts and, and YouTube.
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And I mean, it's just, it's, or it has negative status. Yeah. I mean, it's, it really is, it,
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you know, it would be referred to as, you know, sneeringly as a source. I mean, just to tell you,
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so COVID is a good place to start because I think it is true to say that if you polled the audiences
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of the biggest podcasts, I mean, you start with Joe Rogan and work your way down. I think you would
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find a totally bewildering inversion of reality and it would be believed with, you know, something
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like, you know, religious zeal, which is to say that if you, I mean, I don't, obviously I don't have
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these data, but I would bet, you know, if you could find me a casino, I could, where I could place this
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bet, I would, I would wager a lot on it. If you polled Rogan's audience, I think you would find that
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a majority believe that COVID was basically a non-issue. It was just, at the end of the day, not really
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much worse than the flu. And, you know, who knows really how many people died from it. I mean,
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surely the data are massively exaggerated. Lots of people died, you know, with COVID and not from
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COVID, including people getting hit by buses. Whereas many, many people, possibly many millions
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of people have been killed by the vaccines, right? I mean, the vaccines have been a, just a disaster.
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And one that was really just engineered to not only harm us in some strange way and, and produce
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windfall profits for the nefarious pharmaceutical companies, but really it was, they were tools of
00:25:42.640
social control, right? Somebody over in Davos just decided one day that they were going to figure out
00:25:49.460
how to subvert democracies globally and get people to bend the knee to all kinds of Orwellian
00:25:56.020
strictures that we acquiesce to perversely and just maddeningly and to our shame. And, you know,
00:26:04.360
what you need are the, you know, the renegades like RFK Jr. to reboot the system from someplace
00:26:11.300
outside it where all establishments are distrusted, you know, eternally. We need, we need the Snowdens
00:26:17.620
of the world to leak everything and the Vivek Ramaswamis of the world to drive out the moneylenders.
00:26:24.120
And this is just, it's just corruption, institutional corruption as far as the eye can see. And the
00:26:30.560
whole COVID story, the lesson to learn from the pandemic is that it was just a colossal act of
00:26:35.900
self-harm and nothing, literally nothing is as the New York Times would say it is, right? That I think
00:26:46.060
is well over 50% of the audience believes something like that. I mean, you know, feel free to react to
00:26:51.840
that, but I just, and this is an audience that is, you know, arguably this is an audience that is on
00:26:56.560
any given day considerably bigger than any other audience that you could name. These are podcast
00:27:02.940
episodes where the numbers of listeners, you know, at the end of the week or at the end of the month
00:27:08.200
exceed, you know, the finale of Game of Thrones, right? I mean, these are just enormous numbers of
00:27:14.140
people listening to these long form conversations.
00:27:16.660
Yeah. And I, you know, at a, at a baseline, I would say, I agree with just about everything
00:27:21.840
you've said and your, and your perspective on, on it all. And I think it's really, you know,
00:27:27.360
damaging and, and worrisome. A few things to mention. One is, you know, a lot of these fears
00:27:35.620
as they were expressed, especially early on in the pandemic about this sort of Orwellian takeover
00:27:40.400
really have not come to pass in any meaningful way, which is to say, even taking seriously the
00:27:46.980
possibility that somebody might've been trying to get you to take a vaccine for some nefarious
00:27:51.920
future purpose, or they were trying to lock you in your home for some, you know, out of some sense
00:27:57.600
of, you know, social control. All of that pressure disappeared relatively quickly. We are not living
00:28:04.580
in the world that, you know, Naomi Wolf warned us about. We're not living in a world in which we're
00:28:09.540
being pinned down and syringes forced into our arms every six months. We're not being tested as we
00:28:15.260
walk out the door. We're not being told that we can't leave our homes. We're not being told we can't
00:28:20.300
go to school. The long-term vision that was offered as this kind of, this is a stepping stone,
00:28:27.020
a global stepping stone to a kind of new totalitarian order, just as obviously not come to pass.
00:28:34.320
There was a period of time in 2020 when our lives were restricted to some degree. But I think
00:28:41.040
even in remembering that history, we often overstate how significant and how intrusive those
00:28:46.740
restrictions really were and how politically divisive they were. If you look at the data,
00:28:53.480
all through 2020, red states and blue states across the board imposed roughly the same level
00:29:00.440
of restrictions. They all closed schools at the same time. They all restricted social gatherings
00:29:04.340
at the same time. They all issued mask advisories at the same time. By the fall of 2020, there was some
00:29:10.920
difference starting to emerge between red states and blue states, but it was relatively small. And if
00:29:15.880
you look at the mobility data that Google and others have assembled, people were still moving around at
00:29:21.020
somewhere between 90 and 98 percent of what they'd been doing before the pandemic. We remember that time
00:29:28.160
now, so many of us, as a period of intense government-directed lockdown. And mostly,
00:29:36.340
it wasn't that. Mostly, it was a culture of fear, partly cultivated by public officials,
00:29:43.860
I think for good reason, but partly cultivated by them, but also embodied and instantiated by individuals
00:29:51.040
who were largely scared. And I think in retrospect, we've made this collective mistake. And this is
00:29:58.200
the big point I want to make is this is not just like an information problem about what Joe Rogan says
00:30:03.940
about the pandemic. It's a problem at the level of the consumer too. So many people have revised their
00:30:12.620
own memories of the pandemic or have a distorted memory of that period and think of it as a much more
00:30:18.320
progressive, much longer lasting, much more restrictive regime than we really had. I think
00:30:25.140
to sort of pin the blame for all of the disruption on someone else, as opposed to really reckoning with
00:30:32.520
what it meant that given the facts, and we all basically did know the facts, we did know roughly
00:30:37.380
what the fatality rate was, we did know what the age skew of the disease was, all of those things were
00:30:41.640
publicly available in the winter of 2020. You know, as early as the first data coming out of China,
00:30:46.480
all of that has been really quite remarkably vindicated in the years since. Responding to
00:30:51.440
that set of facts and that set of data, most of us had a really quite panicked response.
00:30:57.900
Even if we knew that, you know, I'm 41 years old, even if, and I was, you know, whenever 37,
00:31:03.380
when the pandemic hit, even if I knew that the risk of dying given an infection was incredibly low
00:31:07.760
for a healthy 37-year-old male, I was still scared to get the disease. And part of that was because I was
00:31:13.520
spending time with my father-in-law who was immunocompromised and older, but part of it was
00:31:16.680
just pure pandemic fear. And I think a huge amount of what we remember as the emotional, social,
00:31:23.520
and political disruptions of 2020 are, or were projections of that fear, which we don't want
00:31:30.580
to acknowledge and we want to blame someone else for. And so we've kind of collectively decided,
00:31:35.200
and again, this is not just, you know, in Substackistan, it's among, you know, good liberals I know in
00:31:40.460
Brooklyn, we decided that we went too far and that if we had the chance to do it again,
00:31:45.400
we would do things differently. We'd be much more open and much more voluntary. And, you know,
00:31:51.620
that is, I think, a bad lesson to take going forward, especially if we're going to apply it
00:31:57.060
to potential future pandemics that could be considerably worse. But it's also just at the
00:32:03.760
But the audience I'm talking about, for the most part, didn't feel that same fear. I mean,
00:32:09.940
they were not afraid of the disease or they were not as afraid of the disease as you were in Brooklyn
00:32:17.660
or wherever you were, but they were quite afraid and remain so of the vaccines. That was the thing
00:32:24.540
that really spooked them, the idea that these novel vaccines who are doing who knows what to your DNA,
00:32:31.440
which now may have yet killed millions, even tens of millions, and that information is being
00:32:37.320
suppressed by the powers that be. I mean, that's where this has gone for that audience.
00:32:43.100
I think that's absolutely true, but I think it also tells you something about the timeline,
00:32:46.140
which is to say that the real partisan gaps opened up with behavior and response to the disease,
00:32:51.200
not in 2020, but in 2021. You started to see them in the fall of 2020, but then they really opened up
00:32:58.360
with the arrival of vaccines. And then there was another bump when there was a consideration,
00:33:02.200
they were never really implemented, but a consideration of vaccine mandates later on in
00:33:06.280
2021. And I agree that that is the thing that now dominates. It's the sort of, it's the looking
00:33:12.800
glass through which our memory of, or the prism through which our memory of the pandemic has been
00:33:18.920
distorted. And I think it's, I think it's, I mean, from my perspective, the vaccines are and were a
00:33:27.020
miracle. We could have actually gotten them a lot faster, but even getting them within 10 months or 11
00:33:32.780
months counts as one of the great achievements in human history. When you look not just in the U.S.,
00:33:38.260
but all around the world, whenever the vaccines arrive, they, you know, if they were taken in great
00:33:42.920
enough numbers, they essentially eliminated the pandemic in one, in one go. In the U.K., for
00:33:48.580
instance, they had much worse, two big initial waves that were much worse than we had in the U.S.
00:33:53.760
And they got the vaccines and basically haven't had anything comparable since. The U.S. is a little
00:33:58.540
bit of a murkier picture because we, we had, you know, less successful vaccine uptake. And yeah, to your
00:34:04.320
point, it's just, you know, it's just, if we, if we can tell ourselves stories that involve something
00:34:12.820
like 10, 15, 20 million vaccine deaths, if we can even entertain that idea without feeling like the
00:34:21.200
world is contradicting us, we're in a really bad place. And that's the place that we're in right now.
00:34:26.960
Um, and I think some of the natural features of COVID played a role here. I think that, you know,
00:34:34.280
it's significant that the fatality rate was something like 1% at the population level. It's
00:34:39.060
changes based on the demographic structure of the population, but something like 1%,
00:34:43.100
which means that even if you knew a hundred people who got sick, probably you may only know one or two
00:34:47.980
people or even zero people who actually died from it. And it allows you, especially as a survivor
00:34:52.860
on the other side of the pandemic, to look back and think it was not that big a deal.
00:34:57.500
But of course we know, we know not just from official COVID deaths and death certificates.
00:35:01.960
We know from the excess mortality studies that the U S has lost something like 1.1, 1.2 million people
00:35:08.560
that we would not have lost in the absence of the pandemic. We know that it's almost entirely driven
00:35:14.700
by COVID-19 because the waves of those excess deaths matches perfectly the wave of the waves of
00:35:21.460
infection as they pass through the country, as they pass through states, as they pass through local
00:35:25.260
communities. You know, there's no reason that if the problem were lockdowns, that we would be having
00:35:29.920
huge surges when there was a wave of infections and not a week later when people were still locked
00:35:34.620
in their homes, but the number of infections were lower. It's just indisputable that this was
00:35:39.800
a major disease. It was primarily punishing us because of how novel it was, how inexperienced our
00:35:45.800
immune systems were. But you know, it proved at the global scale to be incredibly punishing.
00:35:50.900
Best estimates are something like 25 or 30 million people died. And best estimates are that those
00:35:55.020
vaccines, as they rolled out, saved several multiples of that number of lives, which means
00:35:59.760
this is really one of the great medical, biomedical, and political and social interventions in the
00:36:05.980
history of the world. And exactly why the people who turned against it turned against it is an incredibly
00:36:12.520
complicated, deep question. I'm sure you have lots of thoughts, but I would just start by saying,
00:36:17.000
you know, as a counterfactual, it's interesting to consider the possibility that the vaccines were
00:36:23.580
approved before the election, before, you know, before the Biden-Trump election. You know, there's
00:36:29.360
some reporting, I think, plausible that the approval was delayed out of fear that it would be used in a
00:36:35.220
political way, but probably the original timeline would have meant the vaccines were given approval just
00:36:40.200
before the election. It's possible, given the margins of that election, that Donald Trump might have
00:36:45.240
benefited, you know, to the, to, to a reelection on the basis of those approvals. And then how the
00:36:51.560
country, particularly the sort of, you know, I don't know exactly how you want to characterize on the
00:36:56.580
political spectrum, what you're calling Substackistan. It's, you know, it's some mix of center-right and
00:37:01.540
fringe, including, and, you know, and some just, just fringe independent of a particular political
00:37:07.000
ideologies, but exactly how those people would have responded to, to the vaccine if Donald Trump was
00:37:12.480
president and his people were designing the rollout is, I think it's a really important and interesting
00:37:17.500
counterfactual history to consider. I think it's quite possible that we'd be living in a much less
00:37:22.820
pandemic divided nation than we are now. But that's not to say that there's much that we could do now,
00:37:27.980
or even in retrospect, if we could take a time machine back in time to really change the course
00:37:32.960
of that, or that we might want to, I mean, would it have been worth a second Trump, you know,
00:37:37.700
second Trump term to have, you know, support for vaccines among Republicans at, you know,
00:37:43.400
75 instead of 55 percent? I don't know. Yeah. Although the few times that Trump has tried to
00:37:48.340
take credit for the vaccine in front of a loving audience, he was instantly rebuked by that audience.
00:37:54.520
Which is most, even more remarkable because it's, he is such a tribune of the whole movement that
00:38:00.000
almost anything he says becomes a cause for them. Yeah. And the fact that they can't, they can,
00:38:05.760
they can like follow him almost anywhere, but not to the vaccines is really quite remarkable.
00:38:11.380
On the other hand, you know, I would just say as a, as a baseline, important to keep in mind,
00:38:16.940
95% of American seniors got at least one shot by the end of 2021. And we know it's, it's probably
00:38:23.900
higher than that, but the CDC actually stopped counting at 95% because they, they don't want to
00:38:28.180
like over promise. And they think that the data might get a little unreliable at that level,
00:38:32.320
but it was, it was, it surpassed the threshold of 95% of American seniors. The, the risk of this
00:38:37.500
disease was concentrated in seniors in a quite dramatic way. The age skew is, you know, for an
00:38:41.680
eight-year-old, it's like thousand times more deadly than for an eight-year-old. Right. And so
00:38:46.740
like in a certain logical way, those are the people that we needed to get. And we got almost all of them
00:38:51.680
in the calendar year in which we, we began rolling out vaccines. And so we can compare ourselves
00:38:56.920
to other countries in terms of vaccination uptake, especially among the middle-aged, we fell way
00:39:01.420
behind, which is why when Delta came so many more Americans died than other, in other countries.
00:39:05.880
But on some level, like our first job here was to protect the elderly. And even in spite of the
00:39:10.860
partisan dynamics, even in spite of the vaccine skepticism, we got the vast, vast, vast majority
00:39:17.120
of the most vulnerable people, some protection on a relatively fast timeline. And so one of the
00:39:23.180
things that we're talking about, I think, or at least I'm talking about, is the way in which
00:39:27.720
these questions and these debates almost separate from the facts on the ground, not just in terms of
00:39:34.800
do we acknowledge how many people died of COVID, do we acknowledge how, how many people took vaccines,
00:39:39.540
but how many of the people who are expressing vaccine skepticism now took the vaccines? The data
00:39:44.740
suggests quite a large share. And, you know, and are we treating the distortions of our discourse,
00:39:51.780
the sort of ugliness of our, of our public discourse around these issues as a substitute
00:39:56.480
for the data that we know we have about who actually got the shots. And I'm just as appalled
00:40:03.780
and horrified and scared about what the state of, you know, scientific discourse and public
00:40:08.280
trust is as you are. But I also think there's some reasons to think that when you look at the
00:40:13.060
actual, you know, behavioral data, not just with vaccines, but how much people were moving
00:40:17.140
around, how much social distancing people were doing at various points of the pandemic, there was
00:40:21.300
actually less division and less hostility to behaviors that we could take to protect ourselves
00:40:27.260
and protect those around us than, than it seems on the sort of narrative surface.
00:40:31.160
Hmm. And do we still think the punchline was that something like 1.2 million Americans died
00:40:38.620
unnecessarily or that we wouldn't have died from COVID, something like 300,000 more died than
00:40:47.660
needed to die based on vaccine hesitancy and something like three to 4 million lives were
00:40:54.820
saved in the end by the vaccine. Is it those numbers square with what you think you know?
00:41:00.440
Yeah. The one, the, what the first number is the one that I think is a little complicated
00:41:03.460
to assess. It was like, how do we think about that death toll? Was that, how much of that was
00:41:07.020
avoidable? You know, how much, who do we, what other countries do we compare ourselves to in the
00:41:12.820
heat of the spring and summer of 2020? A lot of people were willing to say that the entire pandemic
00:41:19.400
was Trump's fault and that every American death was, was on his desk and on his responsibility.
00:41:25.980
You know, Joe Biden said, you know, any, any president who's presided over a couple of hundred
00:41:30.100
thousand American deaths does not deserve to be president. And Joe Biden has now presided over
00:41:34.560
about 750,000 American deaths. So I think a lot of those narratives that we told ourselves at the
00:41:39.660
outset of the pandemic were politically naive, epidemiologically naive. And it means that many
00:41:45.720
of, you know, many of the deaths that we saw were probably on some level unavoidable. We shouldn't look
00:41:51.360
at the scale of COVID death and say, all of that is a sign of our national failing. The question of
00:41:56.820
exactly what share of that 1.2 million is, was avoidable. I think people are going to be debating
00:42:02.460
for generations. My own sense is, yeah, probably something like, something like the share that you
00:42:07.220
suggested, maybe a little bit more if it's, if it's, you know, maybe 500,000 of the 1.2 million
00:42:12.180
could have been avoided. But, you know, hardly any country in the world really thrived and succeeded
00:42:18.360
in ultimately containing the disease, even until the arrival of vaccines. Those countries, which were
00:42:24.160
celebrated in 2020 as being the most successful at limiting the spread of the disease, they ended up
00:42:29.360
in a better place than the US did or the UK did, but they didn't end up in a place that, you know,
00:42:33.120
they had defeated the pandemic. They, everybody suffered. And one of the things that's most
00:42:37.860
remarkable to me about that is that you see, you know, political blowback, even for those leaders
00:42:41.560
in those countries who, who did quite well. So just into Ardern and in New Zealand, you know,
00:42:46.220
had to resign. I mean, not just because of her COVID policies, but, you know, she, she was incredibly
00:42:50.760
popular in 2020. And then by 2022 was incredibly unpopular in that country. There was a political
00:42:55.860
backlash against Xi Jinping and China that was powered in part by the COVID lockdowns there,
00:43:00.680
just from an epidemiological level, like China did well in containing the virus, but there was,
00:43:05.800
he, he suffered a huge backlash there, you know, and across, across the world, Canada did relatively
00:43:10.780
well, but Trudeau has suffered, you know, it's, there's almost nobody who came out a hero at the
00:43:15.680
level of national leader, almost anywhere in the world, whether they were somebody who suffered through a
00:43:20.040
brutal pandemic or someone who managed a relatively easy one, no matter what level of suffering or
00:43:24.640
what kind of suffering countries went through, almost all of them looked at their leaders and
00:43:28.760
said, like, we don't like this guy's running things. And I think that gets back to something
00:43:33.020
I was saying earlier, which is the way in which we are trying to make sense of the disruptions and
00:43:37.680
suffering that we all went through over the last couple of years, in part by pinning blame on
00:43:40.960
someone, some discreet authority, partly out of hopes that we could get them out of office or
00:43:46.200
kick them out of power, or at least learn our lessons so that in the future, we wouldn't listen
00:43:50.500
to people like them. And, you know, I think the universality of that feeling across the world
00:43:54.980
shows that it doesn't say all that much about how individual leaders manage things. It says a lot more
00:44:00.700
about how hard it is to live through a pandemic, how much we don't actually want to do that and how
00:44:05.060
much we want to pretend that it was possible to avoid.
00:44:07.200
But what about the response of Sweden, which was much maligned at the time as being reckless and
00:44:15.720
then much celebrated as being at worst equivalent to what we did? I mean, they did not lock down in
00:44:22.580
the way that we did. And as far as excess mortality viewed from this distance of hindsight, what do we
00:44:30.860
Well, I would say for sure, the initial criticism was overstated. It turns out that even in 2020,
00:44:38.160
before the arrival of vaccines, Sweden died a lot less than the United States did. And I think that
00:44:44.040
is a really important distinction to make in thinking about all of these questions. It's like,
00:44:47.760
how did we do before the vaccines? And how did we do after the vaccines? Because in the big sweep of
00:44:52.580
the pandemic, the most important factor in determining a country's outcomes was how many people got sick
00:44:58.960
before they were vaccinated and how many people got sick after they were vaccinated. And in 2020,
00:45:03.960
Sweden did considerably worse than its neighbors, which are its natural comparisons by every measure
00:45:09.720
of COVID and excess mortality. So I think 10 times as many Swedes died as Norwegians, something like
00:45:15.500
that level compared to Denmark. And Finland and Iceland are also much better. After the arrival of
00:45:22.280
vaccines, you know, things leveled out so that depending on the database that you look at,
00:45:27.340
the ones I trust, they're still a little behind those countries. They're still doing a little bit
00:45:30.980
worse than their peers, but it's in the same rough band. There are other analyses, including ones that
00:45:36.340
the Swedish government has put together that suggests that they actually outperformed their
00:45:39.860
neighbors. But like I said, I think the better models there suggest something like slightly below the
00:45:45.440
performance of their peers. But there are a lot of complications and caveats that are important to
00:45:51.920
acknowledge when telling the story. One is the one that I mentioned that, you know, you really do need to
00:45:56.220
divide the experience before vaccines than the experience after. Because if you get the whole
00:46:01.080
population vaccinated on day one, and the pandemic goes on for several years, like that's going to
00:46:05.140
make a big difference. Another is that Sweden talked about its pandemic response as hands-off.
00:46:10.860
And it was in some ways, most of their guidance was offered as guidance. But some schools did shut
00:46:17.640
down in Sweden. Some stores did shut down. There were travel restrictions. People did move around a lot
00:46:22.760
less. Much of that was voluntary in the sense that the police weren't going around ticketing people
00:46:27.600
when they left their homes in the same way that they were in other parts of Europe. But they also
00:46:30.880
weren't doing that much in the United States. There are isolated incidents here and there of people
00:46:34.840
getting ticketed for being in parks or beaches. There was a period of time in the late spring of
00:46:39.480
2020 when in some U.S. states and municipalities, there was some sort of surveillance of that kind.
00:46:45.500
But by and large, we did the same thing. We told people that they shouldn't move around much or
00:46:51.460
socialize. And then we didn't do much to enforce those rules. When you look at some of the data
00:46:55.840
that's been examined by the Oxford Blavatnik School of Government, they've done an international
00:47:01.200
comparative study of COVID mitigation measures. And they look at, I think it's like eight or 10
00:47:06.340
different categories of restrictions. You know, Sweden is not unusually open in the spring and summer
00:47:11.760
of 2020. It's a little bit more open than some of its European neighbors. It's about as open as the
00:47:16.940
U.S. is. And so their experience there was less confrontational. It was less patronizing in certain
00:47:24.240
ways than the U.S. was. But at the level of individual behavior and how it was guided and
00:47:29.880
policed, I think there's actually considerably less difference between the two countries than we've told
00:47:34.840
ourselves there was. And they had other natural advantages that, you know, they don't have a ton of
00:47:38.200
people coming in and out of the country in the same way that the U.S. does. They have high levels
00:47:42.860
of social trust. All those things played a role too. But I think in the big picture, you'd have to say
00:47:47.760
Sweden did not have the disaster that was predicted at the time. But it is also not necessarily a model
00:47:53.240
for how a country like the U.S. could operate, in part because we're not so far from them and their
00:47:59.300
policies as some of the Sweden advocates want to make us believe. And in part because the U.S. is just
00:48:04.960
a different and more complicated country to manage than Sweden is. And in thinking about
00:48:10.060
the comparison of the U.S. and Sweden, I just want to raise one particular anecdote, which I think is
00:48:14.840
really illustrative. And that is that in May of 2020, in May, Anthony Fauci was interviewed on CNN
00:48:22.960
by Chris Cuomo. And Chris Cuomo said, you're losing the argument. People are getting tired. They're sick
00:48:29.020
of staying at home. They're not going to do this much longer. What do you say to them?
00:48:34.120
And Fauci said, you're right. We are. We can't do this indefinitely. And everybody ultimately has
00:48:40.160
to decide for themselves when they return to their normal life and what level of risk they're
00:48:45.140
comfortable with. And this is not in 2022. It's not even in 2021 after the vaccines. It's in like month
00:48:52.640
three of the pandemic. I think fewer than 100,000 Americans had died at that point. And you have
00:48:58.940
the person who is the face of the quote unquote lockdown saying very publicly, this is all voluntary.
00:49:05.640
And I know that I'm not going to convince everyone. Now we all took messages from Fauci later on as more
00:49:12.460
hard line and more confrontational than that. Absolutely. And he was not always that deferential
00:49:18.840
to the judgment of individuals. But it's a reminder that a huge amount of this pandemic
00:49:24.080
timeline that we remember as, you know, authoritarian dictatorial lockdowns directed from the top by Tony
00:49:30.780
Fauci, it just wasn't that way. You know, I hear Bill Maher talking about a two-year lockdown. It's like
00:49:38.540
he didn't miss recording a single show. And yes, he did it for a while without an audience, but
00:49:43.720
that's a way of keeping one another safe and adjusting to a, you know, epidemiological environment
00:49:48.940
that's threatening. And maybe we, maybe we wouldn't want to do it in exactly the same way the next time
00:49:53.700
we can talk about those lessons. We can talk about what we might've learned or what we could do better.
00:49:57.380
But I think as a, just a baseline, we should remember that the country as a whole navigated
00:50:03.780
this pandemic as libertarians, not as, you know, figures in an Orwellian nightmare. And many of us
00:50:12.360
chose to stay at home and live in fear. And some people still are staying at home and living in
00:50:16.440
fear. And some of them even have good reason to. But overall, we made decisions on our own. We
00:50:22.720
processed information on our own. And then we got really angry because we weren't happy with the
00:50:28.560
world that we were living in. Not because someone like Anthony Fauci or Donald Trump, who was the
00:50:34.660
president at the time, was coming around to our houses, locking thousands of people up, you know,
00:50:40.040
nailing doors shut like they did in China. Nothing like that happened here. And we may feel that our
00:50:46.760
lives were really restricted and limited. In many ways they were. But to your point earlier, it was
00:50:51.760
not an Orwellian nightmare in the same way that I think many of us kind of falsely now remember it to
00:50:57.080
be. Do you think we learned anything from the pandemic that would allow us to respond better
00:51:04.460
next time? Or do you think it actually degraded our capacity to respond next time?
00:51:10.700
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