Making Sense - Sam Harris - May 01, 2024


#365 — Reality Check


Episode Stats

Length

51 minutes

Words per Minute

174.1043

Word Count

9,011

Sentence Count

439

Hate Speech Sentences

3


Summary

Sam Harris remembers his friend Dan Dennett, who died this week at the age of 80, after a long and illustrious career as a philosopher and writer. He talks about their friendship, how they met, and what it was like to share a stage with him and Christopher Hitchens at various atheist and free-thinking events. He also talks about the time they shared a mock boxing ring in front of 5,000 people in Mexico, and the time he and Hitchens debated a bunch of people in a weird debate in a mock ring, which turned out to be a lot of fun. And he talks about why he doesn t think philosophy should be treated as a separate discipline from science, and why he thinks it should be seen as a companion to science, rather than a replacement for it, in his new book, "The Horsemen: A Companion to Science and Reason." The Horsemen of Reason is out now, and you can read the full transcript of that conversation here. You'll also get a free copy of the transcript of the debate in which Hitchens and Dawkins debated Dawkins and Dawkins at Beyond Belief, which is available on YouTube here, here, and here, where you can watch the full video version of the speech Hitchens gave on the topic here. Thanks for listening to this episode of the Making Sense Podcast. We don't run ads on the podcast, and therefore it's made possible entirely through the support of our subscribers. by becoming a supporter of the podcast. Please consider becoming one of our premium memberships, so you can get a better listening experience and get access to all the best episodes of Making Sense Sense Podcasts, wherever you get the most of it's best listening and the most information you can access the most profoundest podcasting opportunities in the making sense and much more! making sense of what we're doing here. Thank you for listening, making sense, and remember that you're listening with your mind and learning about the things you care about the world, and making sense everywhere you do it, and helping us make sense of the most important things in the most meaningful things we can do that matters most of all of us have a chance to understand the most influential things we get in the world. Thank you, again and truly appreciating what we all get to know you, right here and everywhere they're making sense. Your support makes the world a little bit more of it, day-to-day.


Transcript

00:00:00.000 Welcome to the Making Sense Podcast. This is Sam Harris. Just a note to say that if you're
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00:00:45.440 Okay, well, my friend Dan Dennett died about 10 days ago. I was traveling, and then I got sick,
00:00:53.980 and couldn't record, so I'm just now getting an opportunity to say a few things about him.
00:01:00.140 As I'm sure all of you know, Dan was an extraordinarily productive philosopher.
00:01:05.080 He really distinguished himself among philosophers by taking science seriously. This is evident
00:01:11.380 throughout his books, but his book Darwin's Dangerous Idea, in which he argues that Darwin's
00:01:18.620 notion of natural selection was simply the best idea anyone has ever had, is really a wonderful bridge
00:01:24.860 between philosophy and science. And it's among many that Dan built. One often hears philosophy as a
00:01:32.860 discipline denigrated, especially by scientists and technologists. And there's even an implicit
00:01:39.520 denigration in some of Dan's work, and in some of mine as well. I think it's worth clarifying this.
00:01:46.780 Dan often approached philosophy as a kind of handmaiden to science, and he was definitely
00:01:53.320 not alone in doing this. On this view, the chief purpose of philosophy is to clear up conceptual
00:02:00.520 confusion and to spot the many forms of learned error and well-trained ignorance that develop,
00:02:09.420 even in science, so that we can get on with the work of actually understanding the world.
00:02:14.180 The philosopher Bernard Williams once said that the problem with this approach to philosophy
00:02:19.580 is that philosophy can't do what science does, that is, produce new knowledge. So it gives the
00:02:27.340 impression that philosophy is just what scientists sound like when they're off-duty. And I understand
00:02:32.840 this criticism as well. It's a little hard to say what philosophy is or should be, really. It's been
00:02:40.800 many things historically. And I agree that as an academic discipline, there are many backwaters
00:02:46.900 and dry patches that one need not explore. Or exploring them, one shouldn't get stuck there.
00:02:54.840 Generally, my view of philosophy is that it's not so much its own discipline at this point,
00:03:00.580 as it is clarity of thought with the special purpose of making sense of our lives and of our knowledge
00:03:07.820 of the world. Its purpose isn't to do the work of science or of history or of journalism or of any
00:03:14.820 other field in which we produce knowledge. Its purpose is to think clearly about what the
00:03:19.680 discoveries in those fields mean or might mean. The point of philosophy is to see how all the puzzle
00:03:26.220 pieces fit together. I'm not sure that Dan would have agreed with that, but he certainly spent a lot of
00:03:31.260 time working on the part of the puzzle that contains biology and psychology and cognitive science.
00:03:37.700 I didn't get to spend that much time with Dan in person. We attended several conferences together
00:03:43.620 over a couple of decades. Perhaps the first was the second Beyond Belief conference at the Salk Institute
00:03:50.920 in 2007. We went to TED together and Ciudad de la Cidez in Mexico, where we participated in a weird debate,
00:04:01.920 which pitted him and me and Christopher Hitchens against Rabbi Shmuley Botiak, Robert Wright,
00:04:10.840 Dinesh D'Souza, and Nassim Taleb, none of whom made a bit of sense. Really, if you want to see some brains
00:04:19.120 totally misfire, watch what those guys had to say on that occasion. The podium was set in a mock
00:04:25.920 boxing ring, and we were standing in front of 5,000 mostly religious and, I think, mostly bewildered
00:04:32.620 Mexicans. Needless to say, it was an honor to share the stage with Dan and Hitch. Dan and I also went to
00:04:39.040 various atheist and free thought conferences together. Actually, before Mexico, we taped a conversation
00:04:45.360 with Hitch and Richard Dawkins in Hitch's apartment. That was before an atheist conference
00:04:52.160 in D.C. Video of that conversation is still available on YouTube, and the transcript got worked up into a
00:04:59.580 book titled The Four Horsemen, to which the inimitable Stephen Fry wrote a preface. I think the last time I
00:05:08.060 actually saw Dan might have been eight years ago at TED, and he was always great company. Beyond wanting to
00:05:15.800 discuss serious ideas, he just loved life. He loved good food, and wine, and music, and the beauty of
00:05:24.220 nature. He was a big guy with a very big appetite for living, and it was infectious. However, like many of
00:05:33.220 my professional friendships, most of my relationship with Dan took place over email, and I spent the better
00:05:40.360 part of a day and night last week rereading this correspondence going back 20 years. It was frankly a little
00:05:48.400 alarming to see how much I'd forgotten, and reading this had a strange effect, because I realized at some point
00:05:55.600 that it was not so much reminding me of Dan as it was allowing me to relive my primary experience of him, because
00:06:05.500 again, most of our relationship was a matter of exchanging these emails in the first place.
00:06:11.020 So I read through hundreds of emails, and relived a lot of fun and not-so-fun moments with Dan. I saw
00:06:19.880 the moment Dan, Richard, and I consciously inducted Hitch into our circle. Apparently people had been
00:06:25.600 referring to the three of us as the three horsemen of the apocalypse, which I don't actually remember,
00:06:30.760 and we decided that Hitch would be the perfect fourth, which of course he was. I saw the planning that went on
00:06:38.600 for a wonderful dinner we had at Hitch's apartment in Washington, before which we recorded that two-hour
00:06:43.660 conversation, and I was amazed to see how excited Dan was to be doing this. He really was having a lot of fun.
00:06:52.200 So reading this correspondence gave me a second helping of my friendship with Dan, and with many others, with
00:06:58.060 Steven Pinker, and Richard Dawkins, and Hitch. In many cases, there were several of us on various threads
00:07:03.740 together. I just came away so grateful to have had these guys in my corner. Looking back at all these
00:07:11.840 exchanges, I can see that I was often tempted to be more pugnacious than would have been useful,
00:07:18.000 and Dan especially came to my rescue. And I'd forgotten pretty much all of these interventions.
00:07:24.800 Dan was in his mid to late 60s, when we had most of our correspondence, and I was in my early 40s.
00:07:32.820 As I said, there were often others on the thread, Richard and Steve, and sometimes our mutual agent,
00:07:37.720 John Brockman. Richard and I tend to be pretty similar in wanting to say things as intemperately as we think them.
00:07:45.080 And Dan was always the voice of moderation, and there were definitely times when I needed to hear that voice.
00:07:50.180 And the encouragement, and the criticism, and the congratulations when things went well.
00:07:56.340 All of these guys gave me a lot. And Dan gave me a lot. And I'd forgotten how much.
00:08:04.540 As I said, most of our correspondence came earlier on, during the Four Horsemen slash New Atheist
00:08:12.160 period, where we had a bit of a good cop, bad cop routine going. Dan was the good cop,
00:08:18.740 and Richard, Hitch, and I were the bad ones. And I think he liked it that way.
00:08:24.440 Needless to say, he still caught a lot of our bad press. Most people treated us like a four-headed
00:08:29.200 atheist. However, in truth, Dan's contributions to new atheism were different. In his book, Breaking the
00:08:37.100 Spell, his purpose wasn't to prove religion wrong or to denounce its evils. Rather, he wanted to explain
00:08:44.540 why so many people persist in defending the indefensible. He argued that it wasn't that so
00:08:50.020 many people sincerely believe in God, but rather they believed in belief, and even many atheists
00:08:56.400 believed in belief. Now, Dan and I were both capable of overreacting to criticism and to what we
00:09:04.560 perceived to be unfair attacks. As I review our emails, I see we each admonish the other to be
00:09:10.900 more measured in our responses than we often managed in our first drafts. We would occasionally
00:09:16.300 show each other essays and letters to the editor. Needless to say, all of this admonishment is
00:09:22.940 somewhat adorable, given that when we fell out over free will, we gave each other both barrels,
00:09:30.020 both in public and in private. And you can read the public version of that on my blog somewhere.
00:09:38.360 I believe it's all there, including his initial review of my book, Free Will, to which I reacted
00:09:44.540 badly. It took us about two years to bury the hatchet, and you can hear how fully we did that in a
00:09:52.640 conversation I recorded at the TED conference in 2016, which again, I think might be the last time
00:09:59.580 I ever saw Dan in person. And you can hear that conversation on episode 39 of this podcast.
00:10:07.640 Dan and I didn't agree about free will. I'm not even sure we agreed about what we disagreed about,
00:10:13.400 nor did we agree about other topics in the philosophy of mind, like the hard problem of consciousness.
00:10:18.420 And like many of my smart friends, Dan had no interest in meditation. But we both loved
00:10:25.220 reason and science and the other principles that produce real intellectual life and political
00:10:32.040 freedom. And I will definitely miss Dan's voice. My heart goes out to Susan, his wife, and the rest of
00:10:39.200 his family, and to his many friends and students who were much closer to him than I was. I am very sorry for
00:10:45.900 your loss. Okay. There are just a few things going on in the world at the moment. Campus protests,
00:10:56.580 Iran. No doubt I will talk about all of that soon. Today I'm speaking with David Wallace-Wells.
00:11:04.800 David is a best-selling science writer and essayist who focuses on climate change, technology,
00:11:10.860 and the future of the planet and how we live on it. David has been a national fellow at the New
00:11:16.720 America Foundation, a columnist and deputy editor at New York Magazine. Previously he was at the Paris
00:11:23.040 Review, and now he is a regular columnist for the New York Times. He is also the author of a much
00:11:29.860 celebrated book on climate change titled The Uninhabitable Earth. We covered a lot of ground here.
00:11:37.200 We talk about the pollution of our information landscape, much of it through the lens of COVID.
00:11:45.060 We discuss the false picture of reality that so many people acquired during COVID, how the various
00:11:51.400 countries fared during the pandemic, our preparation for future pandemics, how we naturally normalize
00:11:58.140 danger and death. Then we move on to climate change. We talk about the current global consensus,
00:12:03.600 the amount of warming we can expect, the effects of air pollution quite apart from warming, global
00:12:10.420 versus local considerations, Greta Thunberg and climate catastrophism, growth versus degrowth,
00:12:17.640 the role of market forces, carbon taxes, the consequences of political stagnation, the U.S. national
00:12:24.660 debt, the best way to attack the candidacy of Donald Trump. I thought David had a very good idea on this
00:12:31.100 front, as you'll hear, and we cover a few other topics. And now I bring you David Wallace-Wells.
00:12:44.260 I am here with David Wallace-Wells. David, thanks for joining me.
00:12:48.320 My pleasure. Great to be here.
00:12:50.140 So, how did you get into journalism? I associate you with New York Magazine and the New York Times.
00:12:57.520 Are you currently affiliated with both, or is it just the New York Times?
00:13:01.940 Just the Times, yeah. I write a weekly piece for the opinion sections, basically a column that goes
00:13:07.580 out as a newsletter, and I write a column for the magazine once a month and some features too.
00:13:12.160 And I've been there for about almost two years now.
00:13:14.640 Right.
00:13:15.040 A long time before that at New York. And before that, a somewhat bumpier road. I worked at Slate,
00:13:21.940 I worked in book publishing, I worked at the New York Sun, this neocon newspaper in New York.
00:13:27.800 And yeah, just in the Paris Review as a deputy editor at the literary magazine for a while.
00:13:33.340 Oh, cool. I like the Paris Review, especially those iconic interviews with writers.
00:13:39.300 Yeah, they're incredible. That was, you know, one of the best part of the job was,
00:13:43.080 I did one with William Gibson, but I edited a bunch of them. And
00:13:45.440 they're also much more collaborative than you may think at the outset. So,
00:13:49.400 you're basically writing it with the writer who's being interviewed all the time.
00:13:52.620 Hmm. Nice. And how would you describe your political orientation?
00:13:58.980 You know, about 10 years ago, I was writing a profile of this guy, Ben Kunkel, who was one of
00:14:07.440 the founders of N Plus One, and is a pretty left-wing guy. And as it happens, also pretty
00:14:12.200 concerned with climate, which I became later on. And he asked me the same question during the
00:14:16.020 reporting. And I said, you know, I think I'd have to call myself a neoliberal. And he just like rolled
00:14:22.100 out of his chair laughing, thinking like how ridiculous it could be for someone to call
00:14:25.700 themselves a neoliberal. You know, I'm a child of the 90s. I grew up in, I was born in 82 and grew
00:14:31.400 up in New York in the 90s. And I think on some animal level, I processed all of the meta-narratives
00:14:40.660 of that era quite deeply. So, I was, you know, a sophisticated enough teenager to think that
00:14:46.200 progress wasn't inevitable, you know, prosperity and justice weren't laws of the universe.
00:14:51.740 But that over long enough timelines, we were kind of moving in the right direction, and
00:14:56.420 that the U.S. was part of that story. And I've had like a lot of people, a kind of a
00:15:01.720 bumpier last decade or decade and a half, where a lot of those assumptions seem much less safe
00:15:07.460 to me to make, and the world seems much messier and more complicated than I had thought it
00:15:12.240 was, both domestically and internationally. And probably it's also meant that I've moved
00:15:17.080 quite a bit to the left of where I was when I described myself as a neoliberal 10 or 12
00:15:22.140 years ago. But I also think of myself as someone who is pretty resistant to tribal thinking and
00:15:30.420 like team-based thinking about the world, and spend a fair amount of time, I think, trying
00:15:36.860 to interrogate anything I see in myself as a kind of doctrinaire position or perspective.
00:15:41.500 And that means often getting irritated and frustrated with people who I think of as political
00:15:47.340 allies, because I don't think they're being quite serious enough about, you know, asking
00:15:51.820 themselves the hard questions.
00:15:54.440 Yeah, so I want to cover a bunch of topics here, which are, you know, on the surface, they
00:16:00.820 seem unrelated, but they're all connected to our, what many of us perceive to be our degrading
00:16:08.780 capacity to talk about problems and implement solutions. There's a political dysfunction,
00:16:17.360 there's a failure to converge in any kind of reasonable timeframe in a fact-based discussion
00:16:25.220 on a statement of, you know, what's happening in the world. I mean, it's kind of a shared reality.
00:16:31.240 So let's start with the information landscape, which you probably agree, many of us perceive
00:16:39.160 it as just astonishingly polluted at this moment. And the one problem is that any attempt
00:16:45.500 to clean it up is considered to be censorship by at least half of our society. I mean, now
00:16:52.100 we're taking an American perspective here, although this is probably true across much of the world.
00:16:57.280 And, you know, I wouldn't say that censorship is never a problem, but many people consider
00:17:02.740 any effort to contain algorithmically amplified lies and however consequential as a step toward
00:17:11.020 some kind of dystopia. And even to worry about misinformation and disinformation, as I've begun
00:17:18.680 to do in these previous sentences, among Republicans, certainly, is just to be branded some kind of
00:17:25.480 elitist stooge at this point, right? This is just, these are just not problems. So I'm just wondering
00:17:30.740 how you view, I mean, there's sort of the media and social media side of this and then the political
00:17:36.780 side, right? And the rise of populism, especially. How do you view the current moment and what's it
00:17:44.000 like to navigate it as a journalist at The Times?
00:17:46.780 I think it's a big mess. When my colleagues or, you know, people in the sort of mainstream
00:17:53.220 establishment media talk about these issues, they often do talk about, you know, disinformation and
00:17:59.340 they're talking about the distortions of social media and the way that it inflames many of our sort
00:18:06.060 of intuitive tribal feelings about the world and the state of the world. I tend to think that the changes
00:18:14.020 that we've seen over the last five years are kind of bigger and more fundamental than that.
00:18:18.660 I, you know, 20 years ago, people worried a lot about American culture trending in a, you know,
00:18:25.280 kind of idiocracy, dystopia direction. We worried about the dumbing down of our population, of our
00:18:32.600 culture. And, you know, I think there are certain ways in which that's undeniably unfolding. On the other
00:18:38.080 hand, I think in the last five or 10 years as this incredible explosion of pretty high-minded,
00:18:45.220 pretty serious curiosity, you know, in other parts of the new media landscape. So you can see certain
00:18:52.320 algorithmic problems when you're looking at, you know, Twitter or TikTok. But when you look at what's
00:18:58.560 happening on YouTube or in podcasts, it seems to me like we just have a huge new population of people
00:19:04.940 who demographically and professionally a half generation ago would not have been really
00:19:10.900 intellectuals now playing the role of intellectuals in public, but also many of them just processing
00:19:17.220 news from the world on their own. And, you know, on some level that has to be progress and it has to
00:19:25.260 be a good thing. When I think about, you know, just imagining the equivalent like Silicon Valley elite
00:19:31.580 from 20 years ago, they were just not, you know, listening to three-hour podcasts about,
00:19:37.640 you know, some 17th century event or like, you know, the path of the plague through Europe or
00:19:43.140 whatever it is. It just was a very different kind of more business-centered culture. And that's true
00:19:49.080 of more traditional business centers too. And now I think almost everyone of some education and sort of
00:19:56.380 status thinks of themselves as a thinker and thinks of part of their job as figuring out the state of
00:20:02.860 the world in the future. And that is, you know, like I said, you kind of have to count it as progress.
00:20:09.020 On the other hand, it's meant that it's possible for many of us to treat those conversations,
00:20:15.540 which are in many ways abstracted and separated from the way the real world is unfolding, as though
00:20:23.540 those conversations are the real world and not to confront ourselves or be confronted with contrary
00:20:29.640 facts or contrary arguments. And so we have this combination of forces where we have many people
00:20:35.180 thinking and talking in much more sophisticated and informed ways, but producing just an awful lot of,
00:20:41.960 I think, pretty damaging narrativization and mischaracterization of all the shifts that we're
00:20:49.420 living through. And, you know, it's maybe because of what I cover and what I write about. It's also
00:20:54.840 because of, you know, the recent history that we've all lived through. But I think of this, I guess,
00:20:59.700 primarily in terms of the pandemic, where it almost seemed like every month I was both arguing with
00:21:06.940 journalists at places like the New York Times about how they were describing the pace of the pandemic
00:21:11.400 and the course of the pandemic and what it sort of required of us. And also arguing with
00:21:16.060 contrarians who seem to be far too extreme in their rejection of establishment wisdom and
00:21:22.460 establishment understanding. And I don't know, given the information landscape that we've landed in
00:21:28.380 now in 2024, against the political backdrop in which all of that's unfolding, whether we can get
00:21:34.480 back to a place where, you know, we have to argue from real facts with one another. But it does seem like
00:21:41.440 a quite, quite distressing situation where, you know, you have pretty prominent people with pretty
00:21:50.020 large followings and whose followings have grown a lot over the last five years talking about the net
00:21:56.820 harm that vaccines have done to the population or, you know, on any number of points about the course of
00:22:03.920 the pandemic. Really, really, I think, over-correcting for some of the real oversights
00:22:10.740 and shortcomings of conventional public health messaging, but over-correcting in ways that I
00:22:16.920 think are, you know, have left us in a worse place. And, you know, we could talk about some of the
00:22:22.320 particulars there, but in the big picture, it's like half of states, I think, have passed laws
00:22:26.380 restricting the ability of public health officials to impose any behavioral restrictions in the face of a
00:22:33.260 future pandemic, independent of how transmissible or lethal that pandemic might be. You know,
00:22:40.540 reasonable people can say, can take issue with the way that the American pandemic was handled.
00:22:45.860 But like, the idea that we should do absolutely nothing in the face of all possible future pandemic
00:22:52.000 threats just seems to me to be just a horrible over-correction and a real indictment of how, you
00:22:57.360 know, how narrow-minded, narrow-mindedly we're all thinking about what we just went through and the
00:23:01.500 lessons it really offers us. Yeah. Well, let's look at this through the lens of COVID because I think
00:23:07.020 that's, it was transformational on multiple fronts and, you know, I think diagnostic of much that ails
00:23:15.420 us. I mean, you sound more sanguine about the signal that's in the noise than I feel on most days. I mean,
00:23:23.740 when you, you know, when thinking about, you know, what I continue to refer to as podcastistan and
00:23:29.360 Substackistan, you know, the main places of alternative media where you can see the virtually
00:23:37.820 complete erosion of trust in, in our institutions, you know, more or less, you know, just the evidence
00:23:44.220 of it just clocks in, you know, minute by minute, you know, in all of these conversations.
00:23:49.240 Um, and so that even, uh, you know, uh, the most esteemed journal on earth, which you work for the
00:23:57.060 New York times has very little status out there in the, in the wilds of podcasts and, and YouTube.
00:24:05.040 And I mean, it's just, it's, or it has negative status. Yeah. I mean, it's, it really is, it,
00:24:10.820 you know, it would be referred to as, you know, sneeringly as a source. I mean, just to tell you,
00:24:15.680 so COVID is a good place to start because I think it is true to say that if you polled the audiences
00:24:21.320 of the biggest podcasts, I mean, you start with Joe Rogan and work your way down. I think you would
00:24:26.940 find a totally bewildering inversion of reality and it would be believed with, you know, something
00:24:35.820 like, you know, religious zeal, which is to say that if you, I mean, I don't, obviously I don't have
00:24:41.840 these data, but I would bet, you know, if you could find me a casino, I could, where I could place this
00:24:45.920 bet, I would, I would wager a lot on it. If you polled Rogan's audience, I think you would find that
00:24:51.360 a majority believe that COVID was basically a non-issue. It was just, at the end of the day, not really
00:24:59.540 much worse than the flu. And, you know, who knows really how many people died from it. I mean,
00:25:06.260 surely the data are massively exaggerated. Lots of people died, you know, with COVID and not from
00:25:12.580 COVID, including people getting hit by buses. Whereas many, many people, possibly many millions
00:25:19.820 of people have been killed by the vaccines, right? I mean, the vaccines have been a, just a disaster.
00:25:26.900 And one that was really just engineered to not only harm us in some strange way and, and produce
00:25:36.820 windfall profits for the nefarious pharmaceutical companies, but really it was, they were tools of
00:25:42.640 social control, right? Somebody over in Davos just decided one day that they were going to figure out
00:25:49.460 how to subvert democracies globally and get people to bend the knee to all kinds of Orwellian
00:25:56.020 strictures that we acquiesce to perversely and just maddeningly and to our shame. And, you know,
00:26:04.360 what you need are the, you know, the renegades like RFK Jr. to reboot the system from someplace
00:26:11.300 outside it where all establishments are distrusted, you know, eternally. We need, we need the Snowdens
00:26:17.620 of the world to leak everything and the Vivek Ramaswamis of the world to drive out the moneylenders.
00:26:24.120 And this is just, it's just corruption, institutional corruption as far as the eye can see. And the
00:26:30.560 whole COVID story, the lesson to learn from the pandemic is that it was just a colossal act of
00:26:35.900 self-harm and nothing, literally nothing is as the New York Times would say it is, right? That I think
00:26:46.060 is well over 50% of the audience believes something like that. I mean, you know, feel free to react to
00:26:51.840 that, but I just, and this is an audience that is, you know, arguably this is an audience that is on
00:26:56.560 any given day considerably bigger than any other audience that you could name. These are podcast
00:27:02.940 episodes where the numbers of listeners, you know, at the end of the week or at the end of the month
00:27:08.200 exceed, you know, the finale of Game of Thrones, right? I mean, these are just enormous numbers of
00:27:14.140 people listening to these long form conversations.
00:27:16.660 Yeah. And I, you know, at a, at a baseline, I would say, I agree with just about everything
00:27:21.840 you've said and your, and your perspective on, on it all. And I think it's really, you know,
00:27:27.360 damaging and, and worrisome. A few things to mention. One is, you know, a lot of these fears
00:27:35.620 as they were expressed, especially early on in the pandemic about this sort of Orwellian takeover
00:27:40.400 really have not come to pass in any meaningful way, which is to say, even taking seriously the
00:27:46.980 possibility that somebody might've been trying to get you to take a vaccine for some nefarious
00:27:51.920 future purpose, or they were trying to lock you in your home for some, you know, out of some sense
00:27:57.600 of, you know, social control. All of that pressure disappeared relatively quickly. We are not living
00:28:04.580 in the world that, you know, Naomi Wolf warned us about. We're not living in a world in which we're
00:28:09.540 being pinned down and syringes forced into our arms every six months. We're not being tested as we
00:28:15.260 walk out the door. We're not being told that we can't leave our homes. We're not being told we can't
00:28:20.300 go to school. The long-term vision that was offered as this kind of, this is a stepping stone,
00:28:27.020 a global stepping stone to a kind of new totalitarian order, just as obviously not come to pass.
00:28:34.320 There was a period of time in 2020 when our lives were restricted to some degree. But I think
00:28:41.040 even in remembering that history, we often overstate how significant and how intrusive those
00:28:46.740 restrictions really were and how politically divisive they were. If you look at the data,
00:28:53.480 all through 2020, red states and blue states across the board imposed roughly the same level
00:29:00.440 of restrictions. They all closed schools at the same time. They all restricted social gatherings
00:29:04.340 at the same time. They all issued mask advisories at the same time. By the fall of 2020, there was some
00:29:10.920 difference starting to emerge between red states and blue states, but it was relatively small. And if
00:29:15.880 you look at the mobility data that Google and others have assembled, people were still moving around at
00:29:21.020 somewhere between 90 and 98 percent of what they'd been doing before the pandemic. We remember that time
00:29:28.160 now, so many of us, as a period of intense government-directed lockdown. And mostly,
00:29:36.340 it wasn't that. Mostly, it was a culture of fear, partly cultivated by public officials,
00:29:43.860 I think for good reason, but partly cultivated by them, but also embodied and instantiated by individuals
00:29:51.040 who were largely scared. And I think in retrospect, we've made this collective mistake. And this is
00:29:58.200 the big point I want to make is this is not just like an information problem about what Joe Rogan says
00:30:03.940 about the pandemic. It's a problem at the level of the consumer too. So many people have revised their
00:30:12.620 own memories of the pandemic or have a distorted memory of that period and think of it as a much more
00:30:18.320 progressive, much longer lasting, much more restrictive regime than we really had. I think
00:30:25.140 to sort of pin the blame for all of the disruption on someone else, as opposed to really reckoning with
00:30:32.520 what it meant that given the facts, and we all basically did know the facts, we did know roughly
00:30:37.380 what the fatality rate was, we did know what the age skew of the disease was, all of those things were
00:30:41.640 publicly available in the winter of 2020. You know, as early as the first data coming out of China,
00:30:46.480 all of that has been really quite remarkably vindicated in the years since. Responding to
00:30:51.440 that set of facts and that set of data, most of us had a really quite panicked response.
00:30:57.900 Even if we knew that, you know, I'm 41 years old, even if, and I was, you know, whenever 37,
00:31:03.380 when the pandemic hit, even if I knew that the risk of dying given an infection was incredibly low
00:31:07.760 for a healthy 37-year-old male, I was still scared to get the disease. And part of that was because I was
00:31:13.520 spending time with my father-in-law who was immunocompromised and older, but part of it was
00:31:16.680 just pure pandemic fear. And I think a huge amount of what we remember as the emotional, social,
00:31:23.520 and political disruptions of 2020 are, or were projections of that fear, which we don't want
00:31:30.580 to acknowledge and we want to blame someone else for. And so we've kind of collectively decided,
00:31:35.200 and again, this is not just, you know, in Substackistan, it's among, you know, good liberals I know in
00:31:40.460 Brooklyn, we decided that we went too far and that if we had the chance to do it again,
00:31:45.400 we would do things differently. We'd be much more open and much more voluntary. And, you know,
00:31:51.620 that is, I think, a bad lesson to take going forward, especially if we're going to apply it
00:31:57.060 to potential future pandemics that could be considerably worse. But it's also just at the
00:32:01.420 level of truth-telling, delusional.
00:32:03.760 But the audience I'm talking about, for the most part, didn't feel that same fear. I mean,
00:32:09.940 they were not afraid of the disease or they were not as afraid of the disease as you were in Brooklyn
00:32:17.660 or wherever you were, but they were quite afraid and remain so of the vaccines. That was the thing
00:32:24.540 that really spooked them, the idea that these novel vaccines who are doing who knows what to your DNA,
00:32:31.440 which now may have yet killed millions, even tens of millions, and that information is being
00:32:37.320 suppressed by the powers that be. I mean, that's where this has gone for that audience.
00:32:43.100 I think that's absolutely true, but I think it also tells you something about the timeline,
00:32:46.140 which is to say that the real partisan gaps opened up with behavior and response to the disease,
00:32:51.200 not in 2020, but in 2021. You started to see them in the fall of 2020, but then they really opened up
00:32:58.360 with the arrival of vaccines. And then there was another bump when there was a consideration,
00:33:02.200 they were never really implemented, but a consideration of vaccine mandates later on in
00:33:06.280 2021. And I agree that that is the thing that now dominates. It's the sort of, it's the looking
00:33:12.800 glass through which our memory of, or the prism through which our memory of the pandemic has been
00:33:18.920 distorted. And I think it's, I think it's, I mean, from my perspective, the vaccines are and were a
00:33:27.020 miracle. We could have actually gotten them a lot faster, but even getting them within 10 months or 11
00:33:32.780 months counts as one of the great achievements in human history. When you look not just in the U.S.,
00:33:38.260 but all around the world, whenever the vaccines arrive, they, you know, if they were taken in great
00:33:42.920 enough numbers, they essentially eliminated the pandemic in one, in one go. In the U.K., for
00:33:48.580 instance, they had much worse, two big initial waves that were much worse than we had in the U.S.
00:33:53.760 And they got the vaccines and basically haven't had anything comparable since. The U.S. is a little
00:33:58.540 bit of a murkier picture because we, we had, you know, less successful vaccine uptake. And yeah, to your
00:34:04.320 point, it's just, you know, it's just, if we, if we can tell ourselves stories that involve something
00:34:12.820 like 10, 15, 20 million vaccine deaths, if we can even entertain that idea without feeling like the
00:34:21.200 world is contradicting us, we're in a really bad place. And that's the place that we're in right now.
00:34:26.960 Um, and I think some of the natural features of COVID played a role here. I think that, you know,
00:34:34.280 it's significant that the fatality rate was something like 1% at the population level. It's
00:34:39.060 changes based on the demographic structure of the population, but something like 1%,
00:34:43.100 which means that even if you knew a hundred people who got sick, probably you may only know one or two
00:34:47.980 people or even zero people who actually died from it. And it allows you, especially as a survivor
00:34:52.860 on the other side of the pandemic, to look back and think it was not that big a deal.
00:34:57.500 But of course we know, we know not just from official COVID deaths and death certificates.
00:35:01.960 We know from the excess mortality studies that the U S has lost something like 1.1, 1.2 million people
00:35:08.560 that we would not have lost in the absence of the pandemic. We know that it's almost entirely driven
00:35:14.700 by COVID-19 because the waves of those excess deaths matches perfectly the wave of the waves of
00:35:21.460 infection as they pass through the country, as they pass through states, as they pass through local
00:35:25.260 communities. You know, there's no reason that if the problem were lockdowns, that we would be having
00:35:29.920 huge surges when there was a wave of infections and not a week later when people were still locked
00:35:34.620 in their homes, but the number of infections were lower. It's just indisputable that this was
00:35:39.800 a major disease. It was primarily punishing us because of how novel it was, how inexperienced our
00:35:45.800 immune systems were. But you know, it proved at the global scale to be incredibly punishing.
00:35:50.900 Best estimates are something like 25 or 30 million people died. And best estimates are that those
00:35:55.020 vaccines, as they rolled out, saved several multiples of that number of lives, which means
00:35:59.760 this is really one of the great medical, biomedical, and political and social interventions in the
00:36:05.980 history of the world. And exactly why the people who turned against it turned against it is an incredibly
00:36:12.520 complicated, deep question. I'm sure you have lots of thoughts, but I would just start by saying,
00:36:17.000 you know, as a counterfactual, it's interesting to consider the possibility that the vaccines were
00:36:23.580 approved before the election, before, you know, before the Biden-Trump election. You know, there's
00:36:29.360 some reporting, I think, plausible that the approval was delayed out of fear that it would be used in a
00:36:35.220 political way, but probably the original timeline would have meant the vaccines were given approval just
00:36:40.200 before the election. It's possible, given the margins of that election, that Donald Trump might have
00:36:45.240 benefited, you know, to the, to, to a reelection on the basis of those approvals. And then how the
00:36:51.560 country, particularly the sort of, you know, I don't know exactly how you want to characterize on the
00:36:56.580 political spectrum, what you're calling Substackistan. It's, you know, it's some mix of center-right and
00:37:01.540 fringe, including, and, you know, and some just, just fringe independent of a particular political
00:37:07.000 ideologies, but exactly how those people would have responded to, to the vaccine if Donald Trump was
00:37:12.480 president and his people were designing the rollout is, I think it's a really important and interesting
00:37:17.500 counterfactual history to consider. I think it's quite possible that we'd be living in a much less
00:37:22.820 pandemic divided nation than we are now. But that's not to say that there's much that we could do now,
00:37:27.980 or even in retrospect, if we could take a time machine back in time to really change the course
00:37:32.960 of that, or that we might want to, I mean, would it have been worth a second Trump, you know,
00:37:37.700 second Trump term to have, you know, support for vaccines among Republicans at, you know,
00:37:43.400 75 instead of 55 percent? I don't know. Yeah. Although the few times that Trump has tried to
00:37:48.340 take credit for the vaccine in front of a loving audience, he was instantly rebuked by that audience.
00:37:54.520 Which is most, even more remarkable because it's, he is such a tribune of the whole movement that
00:38:00.000 almost anything he says becomes a cause for them. Yeah. And the fact that they can't, they can,
00:38:05.760 they can like follow him almost anywhere, but not to the vaccines is really quite remarkable.
00:38:11.380 On the other hand, you know, I would just say as a, as a baseline, important to keep in mind,
00:38:16.940 95% of American seniors got at least one shot by the end of 2021. And we know it's, it's probably
00:38:23.900 higher than that, but the CDC actually stopped counting at 95% because they, they don't want to
00:38:28.180 like over promise. And they think that the data might get a little unreliable at that level,
00:38:32.320 but it was, it was, it surpassed the threshold of 95% of American seniors. The, the risk of this
00:38:37.500 disease was concentrated in seniors in a quite dramatic way. The age skew is, you know, for an
00:38:41.680 eight-year-old, it's like thousand times more deadly than for an eight-year-old. Right. And so
00:38:46.740 like in a certain logical way, those are the people that we needed to get. And we got almost all of them
00:38:51.680 in the calendar year in which we, we began rolling out vaccines. And so we can compare ourselves
00:38:56.920 to other countries in terms of vaccination uptake, especially among the middle-aged, we fell way
00:39:01.420 behind, which is why when Delta came so many more Americans died than other, in other countries.
00:39:05.880 But on some level, like our first job here was to protect the elderly. And even in spite of the
00:39:10.860 partisan dynamics, even in spite of the vaccine skepticism, we got the vast, vast, vast majority
00:39:17.120 of the most vulnerable people, some protection on a relatively fast timeline. And so one of the
00:39:23.180 things that we're talking about, I think, or at least I'm talking about, is the way in which
00:39:27.720 these questions and these debates almost separate from the facts on the ground, not just in terms of
00:39:34.800 do we acknowledge how many people died of COVID, do we acknowledge how, how many people took vaccines,
00:39:39.540 but how many of the people who are expressing vaccine skepticism now took the vaccines? The data
00:39:44.740 suggests quite a large share. And, you know, and are we treating the distortions of our discourse,
00:39:51.780 the sort of ugliness of our, of our public discourse around these issues as a substitute
00:39:56.480 for the data that we know we have about who actually got the shots. And I'm just as appalled
00:40:03.780 and horrified and scared about what the state of, you know, scientific discourse and public
00:40:08.280 trust is as you are. But I also think there's some reasons to think that when you look at the
00:40:13.060 actual, you know, behavioral data, not just with vaccines, but how much people were moving
00:40:17.140 around, how much social distancing people were doing at various points of the pandemic, there was
00:40:21.300 actually less division and less hostility to behaviors that we could take to protect ourselves
00:40:27.260 and protect those around us than, than it seems on the sort of narrative surface.
00:40:31.160 Hmm. And do we still think the punchline was that something like 1.2 million Americans died
00:40:38.620 unnecessarily or that we wouldn't have died from COVID, something like 300,000 more died than
00:40:47.660 needed to die based on vaccine hesitancy and something like three to 4 million lives were
00:40:54.820 saved in the end by the vaccine. Is it those numbers square with what you think you know?
00:41:00.440 Yeah. The one, the, what the first number is the one that I think is a little complicated
00:41:03.460 to assess. It was like, how do we think about that death toll? Was that, how much of that was
00:41:07.020 avoidable? You know, how much, who do we, what other countries do we compare ourselves to in the
00:41:12.820 heat of the spring and summer of 2020? A lot of people were willing to say that the entire pandemic
00:41:19.400 was Trump's fault and that every American death was, was on his desk and on his responsibility.
00:41:25.980 You know, Joe Biden said, you know, any, any president who's presided over a couple of hundred
00:41:30.100 thousand American deaths does not deserve to be president. And Joe Biden has now presided over
00:41:34.560 about 750,000 American deaths. So I think a lot of those narratives that we told ourselves at the
00:41:39.660 outset of the pandemic were politically naive, epidemiologically naive. And it means that many
00:41:45.720 of, you know, many of the deaths that we saw were probably on some level unavoidable. We shouldn't look
00:41:51.360 at the scale of COVID death and say, all of that is a sign of our national failing. The question of
00:41:56.820 exactly what share of that 1.2 million is, was avoidable. I think people are going to be debating
00:42:02.460 for generations. My own sense is, yeah, probably something like, something like the share that you
00:42:07.220 suggested, maybe a little bit more if it's, if it's, you know, maybe 500,000 of the 1.2 million
00:42:12.180 could have been avoided. But, you know, hardly any country in the world really thrived and succeeded
00:42:18.360 in ultimately containing the disease, even until the arrival of vaccines. Those countries, which were
00:42:24.160 celebrated in 2020 as being the most successful at limiting the spread of the disease, they ended up
00:42:29.360 in a better place than the US did or the UK did, but they didn't end up in a place that, you know,
00:42:33.120 they had defeated the pandemic. They, everybody suffered. And one of the things that's most
00:42:37.860 remarkable to me about that is that you see, you know, political blowback, even for those leaders
00:42:41.560 in those countries who, who did quite well. So just into Ardern and in New Zealand, you know,
00:42:46.220 had to resign. I mean, not just because of her COVID policies, but, you know, she, she was incredibly
00:42:50.760 popular in 2020. And then by 2022 was incredibly unpopular in that country. There was a political
00:42:55.860 backlash against Xi Jinping and China that was powered in part by the COVID lockdowns there,
00:43:00.680 just from an epidemiological level, like China did well in containing the virus, but there was,
00:43:05.800 he, he suffered a huge backlash there, you know, and across, across the world, Canada did relatively
00:43:10.780 well, but Trudeau has suffered, you know, it's, there's almost nobody who came out a hero at the
00:43:15.680 level of national leader, almost anywhere in the world, whether they were somebody who suffered through a
00:43:20.040 brutal pandemic or someone who managed a relatively easy one, no matter what level of suffering or
00:43:24.640 what kind of suffering countries went through, almost all of them looked at their leaders and
00:43:28.760 said, like, we don't like this guy's running things. And I think that gets back to something
00:43:33.020 I was saying earlier, which is the way in which we are trying to make sense of the disruptions and
00:43:37.680 suffering that we all went through over the last couple of years, in part by pinning blame on
00:43:40.960 someone, some discreet authority, partly out of hopes that we could get them out of office or
00:43:46.200 kick them out of power, or at least learn our lessons so that in the future, we wouldn't listen
00:43:50.500 to people like them. And, you know, I think the universality of that feeling across the world
00:43:54.980 shows that it doesn't say all that much about how individual leaders manage things. It says a lot more
00:44:00.700 about how hard it is to live through a pandemic, how much we don't actually want to do that and how
00:44:05.060 much we want to pretend that it was possible to avoid.
00:44:07.200 But what about the response of Sweden, which was much maligned at the time as being reckless and
00:44:15.720 then much celebrated as being at worst equivalent to what we did? I mean, they did not lock down in
00:44:22.580 the way that we did. And as far as excess mortality viewed from this distance of hindsight, what do we
00:44:30.160 think about Sweden?
00:44:30.860 Well, I would say for sure, the initial criticism was overstated. It turns out that even in 2020,
00:44:38.160 before the arrival of vaccines, Sweden died a lot less than the United States did. And I think that
00:44:44.040 is a really important distinction to make in thinking about all of these questions. It's like,
00:44:47.760 how did we do before the vaccines? And how did we do after the vaccines? Because in the big sweep of
00:44:52.580 the pandemic, the most important factor in determining a country's outcomes was how many people got sick
00:44:58.960 before they were vaccinated and how many people got sick after they were vaccinated. And in 2020,
00:45:03.960 Sweden did considerably worse than its neighbors, which are its natural comparisons by every measure
00:45:09.720 of COVID and excess mortality. So I think 10 times as many Swedes died as Norwegians, something like
00:45:15.500 that level compared to Denmark. And Finland and Iceland are also much better. After the arrival of
00:45:22.280 vaccines, you know, things leveled out so that depending on the database that you look at,
00:45:27.340 the ones I trust, they're still a little behind those countries. They're still doing a little bit
00:45:30.980 worse than their peers, but it's in the same rough band. There are other analyses, including ones that
00:45:36.340 the Swedish government has put together that suggests that they actually outperformed their
00:45:39.860 neighbors. But like I said, I think the better models there suggest something like slightly below the
00:45:45.440 performance of their peers. But there are a lot of complications and caveats that are important to
00:45:51.920 acknowledge when telling the story. One is the one that I mentioned that, you know, you really do need to
00:45:56.220 divide the experience before vaccines than the experience after. Because if you get the whole
00:46:01.080 population vaccinated on day one, and the pandemic goes on for several years, like that's going to
00:46:05.140 make a big difference. Another is that Sweden talked about its pandemic response as hands-off.
00:46:10.860 And it was in some ways, most of their guidance was offered as guidance. But some schools did shut
00:46:17.640 down in Sweden. Some stores did shut down. There were travel restrictions. People did move around a lot
00:46:22.760 less. Much of that was voluntary in the sense that the police weren't going around ticketing people
00:46:27.600 when they left their homes in the same way that they were in other parts of Europe. But they also
00:46:30.880 weren't doing that much in the United States. There are isolated incidents here and there of people
00:46:34.840 getting ticketed for being in parks or beaches. There was a period of time in the late spring of
00:46:39.480 2020 when in some U.S. states and municipalities, there was some sort of surveillance of that kind.
00:46:45.500 But by and large, we did the same thing. We told people that they shouldn't move around much or
00:46:51.460 socialize. And then we didn't do much to enforce those rules. When you look at some of the data
00:46:55.840 that's been examined by the Oxford Blavatnik School of Government, they've done an international
00:47:01.200 comparative study of COVID mitigation measures. And they look at, I think it's like eight or 10
00:47:06.340 different categories of restrictions. You know, Sweden is not unusually open in the spring and summer
00:47:11.760 of 2020. It's a little bit more open than some of its European neighbors. It's about as open as the
00:47:16.940 U.S. is. And so their experience there was less confrontational. It was less patronizing in certain
00:47:24.240 ways than the U.S. was. But at the level of individual behavior and how it was guided and
00:47:29.880 policed, I think there's actually considerably less difference between the two countries than we've told
00:47:34.840 ourselves there was. And they had other natural advantages that, you know, they don't have a ton of
00:47:38.200 people coming in and out of the country in the same way that the U.S. does. They have high levels
00:47:42.860 of social trust. All those things played a role too. But I think in the big picture, you'd have to say
00:47:47.760 Sweden did not have the disaster that was predicted at the time. But it is also not necessarily a model
00:47:53.240 for how a country like the U.S. could operate, in part because we're not so far from them and their
00:47:59.300 policies as some of the Sweden advocates want to make us believe. And in part because the U.S. is just
00:48:04.960 a different and more complicated country to manage than Sweden is. And in thinking about
00:48:10.060 the comparison of the U.S. and Sweden, I just want to raise one particular anecdote, which I think is
00:48:14.840 really illustrative. And that is that in May of 2020, in May, Anthony Fauci was interviewed on CNN
00:48:22.960 by Chris Cuomo. And Chris Cuomo said, you're losing the argument. People are getting tired. They're sick
00:48:29.020 of staying at home. They're not going to do this much longer. What do you say to them?
00:48:34.120 And Fauci said, you're right. We are. We can't do this indefinitely. And everybody ultimately has
00:48:40.160 to decide for themselves when they return to their normal life and what level of risk they're
00:48:45.140 comfortable with. And this is not in 2022. It's not even in 2021 after the vaccines. It's in like month
00:48:52.640 three of the pandemic. I think fewer than 100,000 Americans had died at that point. And you have
00:48:58.940 the person who is the face of the quote unquote lockdown saying very publicly, this is all voluntary.
00:49:05.640 And I know that I'm not going to convince everyone. Now we all took messages from Fauci later on as more
00:49:12.460 hard line and more confrontational than that. Absolutely. And he was not always that deferential
00:49:18.840 to the judgment of individuals. But it's a reminder that a huge amount of this pandemic
00:49:24.080 timeline that we remember as, you know, authoritarian dictatorial lockdowns directed from the top by Tony
00:49:30.780 Fauci, it just wasn't that way. You know, I hear Bill Maher talking about a two-year lockdown. It's like
00:49:38.540 he didn't miss recording a single show. And yes, he did it for a while without an audience, but
00:49:43.720 that's a way of keeping one another safe and adjusting to a, you know, epidemiological environment
00:49:48.940 that's threatening. And maybe we, maybe we wouldn't want to do it in exactly the same way the next time
00:49:53.700 we can talk about those lessons. We can talk about what we might've learned or what we could do better.
00:49:57.380 But I think as a, just a baseline, we should remember that the country as a whole navigated
00:50:03.780 this pandemic as libertarians, not as, you know, figures in an Orwellian nightmare. And many of us
00:50:12.360 chose to stay at home and live in fear. And some people still are staying at home and living in
00:50:16.440 fear. And some of them even have good reason to. But overall, we made decisions on our own. We
00:50:22.720 processed information on our own. And then we got really angry because we weren't happy with the
00:50:28.560 world that we were living in. Not because someone like Anthony Fauci or Donald Trump, who was the
00:50:34.660 president at the time, was coming around to our houses, locking thousands of people up, you know,
00:50:40.040 nailing doors shut like they did in China. Nothing like that happened here. And we may feel that our
00:50:46.760 lives were really restricted and limited. In many ways they were. But to your point earlier, it was
00:50:51.760 not an Orwellian nightmare in the same way that I think many of us kind of falsely now remember it to
00:50:57.080 be. Do you think we learned anything from the pandemic that would allow us to respond better
00:51:04.460 next time? Or do you think it actually degraded our capacity to respond next time?
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00:51:40.700 Bye-bye.