Making Sense - Sam Harris - June 15, 2016


#38 — The End of Faith Sessions 2


Episode Stats

Length

40 minutes

Words per Minute

160.63715

Word Count

6,508

Sentence Count

352

Misogynist Sentences

5

Hate Speech Sentences

2


Summary

It is often argued that religious beliefs are somehow distinct from other claims to knowledge about the world. What does this mean, and why does it matter? What role does the brain play in such matters? And what role does logic play in them? In this episode, I try to answer these questions and suggest a possible explanation for why we should not be free to believe whatever we want about God, as we are free about science and history, or about whatever we think we want when using words like "poison" or "zero" and "nothing" in order to justify our belief in something we don't even understand. But is there any reason to believe that God exists at all? And why do we need to have beliefs about God to be able to see the world? And how can we make sense of the world if we have no idea what we are supposed to believe about it? This is the first part of a two-part series exploring the nature of beliefs and their relationship to the world we live in, and how they come about? and why they matter so much to us. in the second part of the book, "End of Faith Sessions: A Case of Belief." by Sam Harris. If you're interested in learning more about religion and belief, then you'll need to listen to the second half of this book. This book is a must-listen episode. in which Sam talks about the role of the brain and memory in our understanding of God in our lives. and our relationship with the world, and the role that God plays in our existence. of God and the world of which God plays a key role in all of our beliefs in our world and how we can learn about God's existence and what we can do with God and the importance of God s existence in our reality and God s role in the universe and so on, and what God is really is in the creation of God's creation and existence from the first place and how we should believe in God s creation what we should have in the world . to be free of God, and so that we can be free from doubt and understanding God so we can have a better understanding of Him more of God . to have a more meaningful relationship with Him and more so that he to become a better God to us etc., etc. etc.


Transcript

00:00:00.000 Welcome to the Making Sense Podcast.
00:00:08.820 This is Sam Harris.
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00:00:46.440 Today I'm going to continue with the End of Faith Sessions, Chapter 2.
00:00:50.340 It is often argued that religious beliefs are somehow distinct from other claims to
00:01:04.660 knowledge about the world.
00:01:06.340 There is no doubt that we treat them differently, particularly in the degree to which we demand
00:01:10.640 in ordinary discourse that people justify their beliefs.
00:01:14.080 But this does not indicate that religious beliefs are special in any important sense.
00:01:18.200 What do we mean when we say that a person believes a given proposition about the world?
00:01:24.000 As with all questions about familiar mental events, we must be careful that the familiarity
00:01:28.200 of our terms does not lead us astray.
00:01:30.780 The fact that we have one word for belief does not guarantee that believing is itself a unitary
00:01:36.160 phenomenon.
00:01:37.320 An analogy can be drawn to the case of memory.
00:01:40.000 While people commonly refer to their failures of, quote, memory, decades of experiment have shown
00:01:45.280 that human memory comes in many forms.
00:01:47.980 Not only are our long-term and short-term memories the products of distinct and dissimilar
00:01:52.340 neural circuits, they have themselves been divided into multiple subsystems.
00:01:57.280 To speak simply of memory, therefore, is now rather like speaking of experience.
00:02:02.340 Clearly, we must be more precise about what our mental terms mean before we attempt to
00:02:06.160 understand them at the level of the brain.
00:02:07.740 Even dogs and cats, insofar as they form associations between people, places, and events, can be said
00:02:15.420 to believe many things about the world.
00:02:17.960 But this is not the sort of believing we are after.
00:02:20.880 When we talk about the beliefs to which people consciously subscribe, the house is infested
00:02:25.500 with termites, tofu is not a dessert, Muhammad ascended to heaven on a winged horse.
00:02:31.440 We are talking about beliefs that are communicated and acquired linguistically.
00:02:35.140 Believing a given proposition is a matter of believing that it faithfully represents some
00:02:40.560 state of the world.
00:02:42.140 And this fact yields some immediate insights into the standards by which our beliefs should
00:02:46.260 function.
00:02:47.440 In particular, it reveals why we cannot help but value evidence and demand that propositions
00:02:52.400 about the world logically cohere.
00:02:54.880 These constraints apply equally to matters of religion.
00:02:58.220 Freedom of belief, in anything but the legal sense, is a myth.
00:03:01.960 We will see that we are no more free to believe whatever we want about God than we are free
00:03:06.580 to adopt unjustified beliefs about science or history, or free to mean whatever we want
00:03:12.160 when using words like poison or north or zero.
00:03:16.040 Anyone who would lay claim to such entitlements should not be surprised when the rest of us stop
00:03:20.900 listening to him.
00:03:22.800 Beliefs as Principles of Action
00:03:24.680 The human brain is a prolific generator of beliefs about the world.
00:03:29.540 In fact, the very humanness of any brain consists largely in its capacity to evaluate new statements
00:03:35.240 of propositional truth in light of innumerable others that it already accepts.
00:03:40.120 By recourse to intuitions of truth and falsity, logical necessity and contradiction, human beings
00:03:46.560 are able to knit together private visions of the world that largely cohere.
00:03:50.780 What neural events underlie this process?
00:03:54.160 What must a brain do in order to believe that a given statement is true or false?
00:03:58.920 We currently have no idea.
00:04:00.900 Language processing must play a role, of course,
00:04:03.160 but the challenge will be to discover how the brain brings the products of perception,
00:04:07.420 memory, and reasoning to bear on individual propositions
00:04:10.640 and magically transforms them into the very substance of our living.
00:04:15.420 It was probably the capacity for movement enjoyed by certain primitive organisms
00:04:19.740 that drove the evolution of our sensory and cognitive faculties.
00:04:23.760 This follows from the fact that if no creature could do anything with the information it acquired
00:04:27.980 from the world, nature could not have selected for improvements in the physical structures
00:04:32.100 that gather, store, and process such information.
00:04:35.580 Even a sense as primitive as vision, therefore, seems predicated on the existence of a motor system.
00:04:41.360 If you cannot catch food, avoid becoming food yourself, or wander off a cliff,
00:04:46.300 there doesn't seem to be much reason to see the world in the first place.
00:04:49.940 And certainly refinements in vision, of the sort found everywhere in the animal kingdom,
00:04:54.520 would never have come about at all.
00:04:56.380 For this reason, it seems uncontroversial to say that all higher-order cognitive states,
00:05:01.540 of which beliefs are an example, are in some way an outgrowth of our capacity for action.
00:05:06.960 In adaptive terms, belief has been extraordinarily useful.
00:05:09.920 It is, after all, by believing various propositions about the world
00:05:13.540 that we predict events and consider the likely consequences of our actions.
00:05:18.000 Beliefs are principles of action.
00:05:20.240 Whatever they may be at the level of the brain,
00:05:22.180 they are processes by which our understanding and misunderstanding of the world
00:05:26.240 is represented and made available to guide our behavior.
00:05:30.200 The power that belief has over our emotional lives appears to be total.
00:05:35.000 For every emotion that you are capable of feeling,
00:05:37.200 there is surely a belief that could invoke it in a matter of moments.
00:05:41.580 Consider the following proposition.
00:05:44.040 Your daughter is being slowly tortured in an English jail.
00:05:48.340 What is it that stands between you and the absolute panic
00:05:51.720 that such a proposition would loosen the mind and body of a person who believed it?
00:05:56.560 Perhaps you don't have a daughter, or you know her to be safely at home,
00:06:00.060 or you believe that English jailers are renowned for their congeniality.
00:06:03.560 Whatever the reason, the door to belief has not yet swung upon its hinges.
00:06:09.340 The link between belief and behavior raises the stakes considerably.
00:06:13.520 Some propositions are so dangerous that it may even be ethical to kill people for believing them.
00:06:19.800 Now, as an aside, that is, I think without question,
00:06:25.340 the most controversial sentence I have ever written,
00:06:28.580 and needlessly so if you actually make any effort to understand it in context.
00:06:34.680 But this won't surprise you, and as many of you know,
00:06:38.400 has been lifted out of its context
00:06:41.220 and used to paint me as a total maniac who wants to kill people for thought crimes.
00:06:48.080 So let me start this paragraph again.
00:06:50.540 Back to the text.
00:06:51.600 The link between belief and behavior raises the stakes considerably.
00:06:55.980 Some propositions are so dangerous that it may even be ethical to kill people for believing them.
00:07:01.920 This may seem an extraordinary claim,
00:07:04.420 but it merely enunciates an ordinary fact about the world in which we live.
00:07:08.500 Certain beliefs place their adherence beyond reach of every peaceful means of persuasion,
00:07:13.120 while inspiring them to commit acts of extraordinary violence against others.
00:07:17.500 There is, in fact, no talking to some people.
00:07:19.780 If they cannot be captured, and they often cannot,
00:07:23.420 otherwise tolerant people may be justified in killing them in self-defense.
00:07:27.680 This is what the United States attempted in Afghanistan,
00:07:30.400 and is what we and other Western powers are bound to attempt
00:07:33.420 at even greater cost to ourselves and to innocents abroad elsewhere in the Muslim world.
00:07:38.880 We will continue to spill blood in what is, at bottom, a war of ideas.
00:07:43.680 Let me just highlight a few things that appeared in that paragraph,
00:07:48.120 which many people don't notice.
00:07:49.660 I am talking about the link between belief and action.
00:07:54.220 I'm talking about beliefs as principles of behavior.
00:07:57.600 It should go without saying that I'm talking about beliefs that are behaviorally effective, therefore.
00:08:03.640 I'm talking about the proximate cause of things like suicidal terrorism.
00:08:07.880 I'm talking about beliefs that place people, quote,
00:08:11.140 beyond every peaceful means of persuasion,
00:08:14.320 while inspiring them to commit acts of extraordinary violence against others.
00:08:18.320 So I was never talking about killing people merely for what they think.
00:08:25.880 And here I'll go to my website where I responded to some of the controversy
00:08:31.060 that that sentence provoked, because, again, I think this is important.
00:08:35.480 And here's part of what I say there.
00:08:37.200 When one asks why it would be ethical to drop a bomb on Ayman al-Zawahiri,
00:08:42.240 the current leader of al-Qaeda,
00:08:43.920 the answer cannot be because he killed so many people in the past.
00:08:48.860 To my knowledge, the man hasn't killed anyone personally.
00:08:52.000 However, he is likely to get a lot of innocent people killed
00:08:54.360 for what he and his followers believe about jihad, martyrdom,
00:08:58.700 the ascendancy of Islam, etc.
00:09:01.200 A willingness to take preventative action against a dangerous enemy
00:09:04.220 is compatible with being against the death penalty.
00:09:07.200 Which I am.
00:09:08.440 Whenever we can capture and imprison jihadists, we should.
00:09:12.240 But in many cases, this is either impossible or too risky.
00:09:15.780 So let's linger on this point for a second.
00:09:17.780 If you imagine dropping a bomb on al-Zawahiri or al-Baghdadi,
00:09:23.960 what would justify that?
00:09:26.760 Again, I don't know that these guys have personally killed anyone
00:09:30.080 or will ever kill anyone.
00:09:32.300 But they are part of a machinery that is grinding up innocent lives.
00:09:37.560 And this machinery is built on belief.
00:09:41.480 Belief that is effective.
00:09:43.300 Belief that is the proximate cause of action.
00:09:45.740 If you know someone is disposed to act on his beliefs,
00:09:50.800 his beliefs become continuous with the action
00:09:55.260 that you would be justified in preventing in a case of self-defense, for instance.
00:10:01.020 You don't have to wait to be killed in order to defend yourself.
00:10:05.220 And when you ask why it would be ethical to kill someone
00:10:09.220 who's in a leadership and propagandistic role in an organization like ISIS or al-Qaeda,
00:10:17.300 where they themselves don't kill anyone necessarily.
00:10:20.420 They simply tell people to do it.
00:10:22.180 It has a lot to do with the contents of their minds.
00:10:27.800 All I'm an al-Zawahiri and al-Baghdadi do, as far as I know, is talk.
00:10:34.920 And if we could kill them, we should absolutely do it.
00:10:40.600 And the interesting ethical question is why.
00:10:44.460 And I'm getting at some part of that question in this statement
00:10:50.160 about belief as a proximate cause of action.
00:10:54.360 If you're going to conjure some person who believes crazy things
00:10:58.520 that have no behavioral implication,
00:11:01.880 they're never going to harm anyone
00:11:03.460 or cause anyone else to harm anyone on the basis of their beliefs,
00:11:07.260 well then it doesn't matter what they believe.
00:11:08.960 That is precisely the case where beliefs don't matter.
00:11:12.760 And I would never have thought, much less suggested,
00:11:16.660 that those people should be killed for believing in Jesus, say,
00:11:21.820 or believing that Muhammad is the final prophet of the God of Abraham.
00:11:26.740 But what's interesting about belief and consequential
00:11:30.000 is that in most cases, insofar as something is really believed,
00:11:34.860 it shows up behaviorally.
00:11:37.060 It shows up in the kinds of public policies people want to fight for.
00:11:41.260 That's the whole point of this book.
00:11:43.680 And the boundary between a war of ideas and a real war
00:11:48.480 is not always easy to find.
00:11:51.420 As I say a lot,
00:11:53.380 we have a choice between conversation and violence.
00:11:56.120 We live in perpetual choice between conversation and violence.
00:12:00.300 And that's why it's so important
00:12:01.920 to be able to reason about everything,
00:12:04.980 talk about everything,
00:12:06.520 put everything on the table
00:12:08.020 to be pressure tested against new facts and new arguments.
00:12:12.720 And if you're not willing to do that,
00:12:15.860 you live in perpetual invitation to violence
00:12:20.240 or threaten others with it.
00:12:24.420 Dogmatism is a refusal to reason with other people.
00:12:30.000 And when that refusal becomes highly consequential,
00:12:34.220 when lives depend on it,
00:12:35.980 people are going to go hands-on your body.
00:12:38.900 If there is no talking to you,
00:12:40.900 what are other people going to do with you?
00:12:44.080 If you are standing in the way of,
00:12:46.720 what, life-saving medical research,
00:12:49.660 getting out of a burning building.
00:12:52.260 Surely you remember the case of the
00:12:54.140 Saudi girls' school,
00:12:55.960 where all those poor girls burned alive
00:12:58.680 because the religious police
00:13:00.680 wouldn't let them out of a burning building
00:13:02.660 because they were not appropriately veiled.
00:13:04.520 You had the fathers of some of those girls
00:13:06.980 standing at the gates,
00:13:08.900 being cowed by the religious police.
00:13:11.300 What should those fathers have done?
00:13:13.440 The possibility of violence,
00:13:15.540 necessary violence in that case,
00:13:17.980 starts the moment the conversation ends.
00:13:22.220 The moment there is nothing left to say.
00:13:24.500 The moment you're in the presence of someone
00:13:26.260 who will not listen to reason
00:13:28.320 and your daughter is burning up in a fire.
00:13:32.700 The beliefs that we should care about
00:13:34.680 are the beliefs that suddenly spring into life
00:13:37.660 in this way
00:13:38.860 as shocking impediments
00:13:41.360 to basic human decency
00:13:43.540 and a wide open path to well-being.
00:13:47.820 So, that has been a source
00:13:51.000 of really extraordinary controversy,
00:13:53.260 but for obvious reasons,
00:13:54.600 it is, egg-sized from its context,
00:13:57.840 a fairly shocking sentence.
00:14:00.340 It's a good sentence.
00:14:01.960 It makes for an interesting paragraph.
00:14:03.980 And if you are at all an honest reader,
00:14:06.080 you will understand what the paragraph says.
00:14:09.200 But like many provocative sentences,
00:14:11.560 it has been a gift
00:14:13.360 to malicious and dishonest critics.
00:14:17.560 Back to the text.
00:14:19.440 The necessity for logical coherence.
00:14:23.100 The first thing to notice about beliefs
00:14:25.040 is that they must suffer
00:14:25.900 the company of their neighbors.
00:14:28.080 Beliefs are both logically
00:14:29.140 and semantically related.
00:14:31.500 Each constrains
00:14:32.540 and is in turn constrained by many others.
00:14:35.860 A belief like
00:14:36.560 the Boeing 747
00:14:38.200 is the world's best airplane
00:14:39.940 logically entails
00:14:41.540 many other beliefs
00:14:42.380 that are both more basic,
00:14:44.160 e.g. airplanes exist,
00:14:46.000 and more derivative,
00:14:47.480 e.g. 747s are better than 757s.
00:14:51.240 The belief that some men are husbands
00:14:53.440 demands that the proposition
00:14:55.140 some women are wives
00:14:56.840 also be endorsed,
00:14:58.660 because the very terms
00:14:59.760 husband and wife
00:15:00.740 mutually define one another.
00:15:03.700 I'm pleased to know
00:15:04.400 that that example
00:15:05.100 seems anachronistic now,
00:15:07.020 given that you can have
00:15:08.440 two husbands.
00:15:09.940 in a marriage,
00:15:11.000 but hopefully you still
00:15:11.900 understand the point
00:15:12.660 I was making.
00:15:13.600 Back to the text.
00:15:15.320 In fact,
00:15:16.180 logical and semantic constraints
00:15:17.940 appear to be two sides
00:15:19.440 of the same coin,
00:15:20.840 because our need
00:15:21.760 to understand
00:15:22.460 what words mean
00:15:23.380 in each new context
00:15:24.500 requires that our beliefs
00:15:26.020 be free from contradiction,
00:15:27.680 at least locally.
00:15:29.160 If I am to mean
00:15:30.200 the same thing
00:15:31.160 by the word mother
00:15:32.140 from one instance
00:15:33.420 to the next,
00:15:34.420 I cannot both believe
00:15:35.740 my mother was born in Rome
00:15:37.380 and believe my mother
00:15:39.080 was born in Nevada.
00:15:40.520 Even if my mother
00:15:41.440 were born on an airplane
00:15:42.700 flying at supersonic speeds,
00:15:44.920 these propositions
00:15:45.740 cannot both be true.
00:15:47.460 There are tricks
00:15:48.020 to be played here.
00:15:48.840 Perhaps there's a town
00:15:49.760 called Rome
00:15:50.440 somewhere in the state
00:15:51.280 of Nevada.
00:15:52.240 Or perhaps mother
00:15:53.380 means biological mother
00:15:54.680 in one sentence
00:15:55.460 and adoptive mother
00:15:56.480 in another.
00:15:57.440 But to know
00:15:57.940 what a belief is about,
00:15:59.500 I must know
00:16:00.140 what my words mean.
00:16:01.720 To know what my words mean,
00:16:03.620 my beliefs must be
00:16:04.720 generally consistent.
00:16:06.280 There's just no escaping
00:16:07.060 the fact that there's
00:16:07.700 a tight relationship
00:16:08.700 between the words we use,
00:16:10.680 the type of thoughts
00:16:11.420 we can think,
00:16:12.440 and what we can believe
00:16:13.380 to be true about the world.
00:16:15.280 And behavioral constraints
00:16:16.400 are just as pressing.
00:16:17.940 When going to a friend's
00:16:18.920 home for dinner,
00:16:19.820 I cannot both believe
00:16:21.000 that he lives
00:16:21.560 north of Main Street
00:16:22.660 and south of Main Street,
00:16:24.200 and then act
00:16:25.020 on the basis
00:16:25.580 of what I believe.
00:16:27.060 A normal degree
00:16:27.900 of psychological
00:16:28.720 and bodily integration
00:16:30.160 precludes my being
00:16:31.380 motivated to head
00:16:32.260 in two opposing directions
00:16:33.660 at once.
00:16:34.860 Personal identity itself
00:16:36.260 requires such consistency.
00:16:38.460 Unless a person's beliefs
00:16:39.440 are highly coherent,
00:16:41.220 he will have as many identities
00:16:42.460 as there are mutually
00:16:43.340 incompatible sets of beliefs
00:16:44.840 careening around his brain.
00:16:46.660 If you doubt this,
00:16:47.720 just try to imagine
00:16:48.560 the subjectivity of a man
00:16:50.020 who believes that he spent
00:16:51.040 the entire day in bed
00:16:52.340 with the flu,
00:16:53.480 but also played a round of golf,
00:16:55.420 that his name is Jim,
00:16:56.940 and that his name is Tom,
00:16:58.640 that he has a young son,
00:17:00.300 and that he is childless.
00:17:02.040 Multiply these incompatible
00:17:03.340 beliefs indefinitely,
00:17:04.820 and any sense
00:17:05.560 that their owner
00:17:06.100 is a single subject
00:17:07.460 entirely disappears.
00:17:09.540 There's a degree
00:17:10.240 of logical inconsistency
00:17:11.980 that is incompatible
00:17:13.540 with our notion
00:17:14.200 of personhood,
00:17:15.080 so it seems that the value
00:17:16.400 we put on logical consistency
00:17:17.940 is neither misplaced
00:17:19.360 nor mysterious.
00:17:20.840 In order for my speech
00:17:21.960 to be intelligible
00:17:22.900 to others,
00:17:23.800 and indeed to myself,
00:17:25.680 my beliefs about the world
00:17:26.680 must largely cohere.
00:17:28.460 In order for my behavior
00:17:29.540 to be informed
00:17:30.380 by what I believe,
00:17:31.820 I must believe things
00:17:32.840 that admit of behavior
00:17:34.060 that is at minimum possible.
00:17:36.420 Certain logical relations,
00:17:37.720 after all,
00:17:38.180 seem etched into the very structure
00:17:39.740 of our world.
00:17:40.960 The telephone rings.
00:17:42.440 Either it is my brother
00:17:43.580 on the line
00:17:44.280 or it isn't.
00:17:45.520 I may believe
00:17:46.140 one proposition
00:17:46.860 or the other,
00:17:47.880 or I may believe
00:17:48.560 that I do not know,
00:17:49.980 but under no circumstances
00:17:51.300 is it acceptable
00:17:52.160 for me to believe both.
00:17:54.220 Departures from normativity,
00:17:55.880 in particular with respect
00:17:56.920 to the rules of inference
00:17:58.160 that lead us
00:17:58.800 to construct new beliefs
00:18:00.040 on the basis of old ones,
00:18:01.660 have been the subject
00:18:02.300 of much research
00:18:03.220 and much debate.
00:18:04.600 Whatever construal
00:18:05.520 of these matters one adopts,
00:18:07.220 no one believes
00:18:07.980 that human beings
00:18:08.700 are perfect engines
00:18:09.880 of coherence.
00:18:11.200 Our inevitable failures
00:18:12.260 of rationality
00:18:13.200 can take many forms,
00:18:14.820 ranging from mere
00:18:15.600 logical inconsistencies
00:18:16.980 to radical discontinuities
00:18:18.700 in subjectivity itself.
00:18:20.600 Most of the literature
00:18:21.400 on self-deception,
00:18:22.700 for instance,
00:18:23.520 suggests that a person
00:18:24.400 can tacitly believe
00:18:25.640 one proposition
00:18:26.460 while successfully
00:18:27.820 convincing himself
00:18:28.680 of his antithesis.
00:18:30.240 For example,
00:18:30.740 my wife is having an affair,
00:18:32.500 my wife is faithful.
00:18:34.000 Though considerable controversy
00:18:35.280 still surrounds
00:18:36.040 the question of how
00:18:37.120 or whether
00:18:37.800 such cognitive contortions
00:18:39.340 actually occur.
00:18:40.720 Other failures
00:18:41.400 of psychological integration,
00:18:43.280 ranging from
00:18:43.780 split-brain patients
00:18:44.880 to cases of
00:18:45.700 quote,
00:18:46.140 multiple personality,
00:18:47.780 are at least
00:18:48.160 partially explicable
00:18:49.400 in terms of areas
00:18:50.660 of belief processing
00:18:51.800 in the brain
00:18:52.480 that have become
00:18:53.040 structurally and or
00:18:54.120 functionally partitioned
00:18:55.480 from one another.
00:18:56.640 And here's a section
00:18:57.460 that relates an experience
00:18:58.740 that I still find
00:18:59.960 just incredible.
00:19:02.000 The section is called
00:19:02.700 The American Embassy.
00:19:04.340 A case in point,
00:19:05.780 while traveling in France,
00:19:07.140 my fiancé and I
00:19:08.160 experienced a bizarre
00:19:09.180 partitioning of our beliefs
00:19:10.460 about the American Embassy
00:19:11.620 in Paris.
00:19:12.940 Belief System 1,
00:19:14.440 as the events of September 11th
00:19:16.020 still cast a shadow
00:19:17.000 over the world,
00:19:18.280 we had decided to avoid
00:19:19.560 obvious terrorist targets
00:19:21.000 while traveling.
00:19:21.680 First on our list
00:19:23.160 of such places
00:19:23.840 was the American Embassy
00:19:24.940 in Paris.
00:19:26.200 Paris is home
00:19:26.920 to the largest
00:19:27.540 Muslim population
00:19:28.540 in the Western world,
00:19:30.060 and this embassy
00:19:30.660 had already been
00:19:31.320 the target
00:19:31.780 of a foiled suicide plot.
00:19:33.600 The American Embassy
00:19:34.240 would have been
00:19:34.700 the last place
00:19:35.540 we would have
00:19:35.960 willingly visited
00:19:36.720 while in France.
00:19:38.700 Belief System 2,
00:19:40.120 prior to our arrival
00:19:41.220 in Paris,
00:19:42.100 we had difficulty
00:19:42.800 finding a hotel room.
00:19:44.600 Every hotel we checked
00:19:45.660 was full,
00:19:46.860 except for one
00:19:47.520 on the right bank,
00:19:48.600 which had abundant vacancies.
00:19:49.960 The woman at reservations
00:19:51.500 even offered us
00:19:52.240 a complimentary upgrade
00:19:53.400 to a suite.
00:19:54.500 She also gave us
00:19:55.100 a choice of view.
00:19:56.280 We could face
00:19:56.840 the inner courtyard
00:19:57.560 or outward,
00:19:58.720 overlooking the American Embassy.
00:20:00.500 Which view would you choose,
00:20:01.640 I asked.
00:20:02.540 Oh, the view of the embassy,
00:20:03.680 she replied.
00:20:04.480 It's much more peaceful.
00:20:06.140 I envisioned
00:20:06.700 a large embassy garden.
00:20:08.680 Great, I said.
00:20:09.420 We'll take it.
00:20:10.500 The next day,
00:20:11.120 we arrived at the hotel
00:20:12.200 and found we had been
00:20:13.020 given a room
00:20:13.640 with a courtyard view.
00:20:15.340 Both my fiancé
00:20:16.240 and I were disappointed.
00:20:17.680 We had, after all,
00:20:18.460 been promised a view
00:20:19.280 of the American Embassy.
00:20:20.780 We called a friend
00:20:21.480 living in Paris
00:20:22.240 to inform her
00:20:23.020 of our whereabouts.
00:20:24.460 Our friend,
00:20:25.000 who is wise
00:20:25.540 in the ways of the world,
00:20:26.840 had this to say.
00:20:28.100 That hotel is directly
00:20:29.220 next to the American Embassy.
00:20:30.780 That's why they're
00:20:31.320 offering you an upgrade.
00:20:32.480 Have you guys
00:20:32.860 lost your minds?
00:20:34.020 Do you know what day it is?
00:20:35.220 It's the 4th of July.
00:20:37.640 The appearance
00:20:38.140 of this degree
00:20:38.900 of inconsistency
00:20:39.920 in our lives
00:20:40.560 was astounding.
00:20:42.120 We had spent
00:20:42.800 the better part
00:20:43.500 of the day
00:20:44.060 simultaneously
00:20:45.060 trying to avoid
00:20:46.640 and gain proximity
00:20:47.960 to the very same
00:20:49.840 point in space.
00:20:51.560 Realizing this,
00:20:52.540 we could scarcely
00:20:53.300 have been more surprised
00:20:54.440 had we both grown antlers.
00:20:56.620 But what seems
00:20:57.220 psychologically
00:20:57.860 so mysterious
00:20:58.760 may be quite trivial
00:20:59.860 in neurological terms.
00:21:01.720 It appears
00:21:02.140 that the phrase
00:21:02.800 American Embassy,
00:21:04.500 spoken in two
00:21:05.120 different contexts,
00:21:06.760 merely activated
00:21:07.600 distinct networks
00:21:08.600 of association
00:21:09.280 within our brains.
00:21:11.040 Consequently,
00:21:11.580 the phrase
00:21:12.000 had acquired
00:21:12.520 two distinct meanings.
00:21:13.680 In the first case,
00:21:15.520 it signified
00:21:16.000 a prime terrorist target.
00:21:17.940 In the second,
00:21:18.580 it promised
00:21:19.040 a desirable view
00:21:20.040 from a hotel window.
00:21:21.460 The significance
00:21:21.940 of the phrase
00:21:22.640 in the world,
00:21:23.480 however,
00:21:23.840 is single
00:21:24.440 and indivisible,
00:21:25.880 since only one building
00:21:27.120 answers to this name
00:21:28.180 in Paris.
00:21:29.220 The communication
00:21:29.780 between these networks
00:21:30.900 of neurons
00:21:31.420 appeared to be negligible.
00:21:33.100 Our brains
00:21:33.620 were effectively partitioned.
00:21:35.560 The flimsiness
00:21:36.260 of this partition
00:21:37.040 was revealed
00:21:37.640 by just how easily
00:21:38.800 it came down.
00:21:40.200 All it took
00:21:40.880 for me to unify
00:21:41.740 my fiancée's outlook
00:21:43.120 on this subject
00:21:43.920 was to turn to her,
00:21:45.840 she who was still
00:21:46.760 silently coveting
00:21:47.920 a view of the
00:21:48.420 American Embassy,
00:21:49.640 and say,
00:21:50.280 with obvious alarm,
00:21:51.720 this hotel is ten feet
00:21:53.340 from the American Embassy.
00:21:55.320 The partition came down,
00:21:56.980 and she was as flabbergasted
00:21:58.320 as I was.
00:21:59.620 And yet,
00:21:59.900 the psychologically
00:22:00.600 irreconcilable facts
00:22:02.120 are these.
00:22:03.040 On the day in question,
00:22:04.520 never was there a time
00:22:05.860 when we would have
00:22:06.620 willingly placed ourselves
00:22:08.000 near the American Embassy,
00:22:09.460 and never was there
00:22:10.720 a time
00:22:11.140 when we were not
00:22:11.760 eager to move
00:22:12.560 to a room
00:22:13.140 with a view of it.
00:22:14.780 I don't know
00:22:15.120 if there's any more
00:22:15.580 to say
00:22:16.140 to extract
00:22:17.600 meaning
00:22:18.700 from that episode,
00:22:20.120 but I just gotta say
00:22:21.900 in my memory,
00:22:23.240 it was such
00:22:24.140 a flabbergasting
00:22:25.120 moment.
00:22:26.220 I mean,
00:22:26.520 both of these
00:22:27.880 meanings
00:22:28.920 of American Embassy
00:22:30.440 and our attitude
00:22:31.720 toward them
00:22:32.420 had been spelled out
00:22:34.280 with crystal
00:22:35.680 clarity
00:22:36.620 to both of us.
00:22:38.580 Okay,
00:22:38.720 I mean,
00:22:38.900 we had articulated
00:22:40.700 that we were not
00:22:41.940 going to go near
00:22:42.520 the American Embassy,
00:22:44.000 especially on the
00:22:45.280 4th of July.
00:22:46.780 I mean,
00:22:46.980 there actually had been
00:22:48.160 talk in the news
00:22:49.560 about what a prime
00:22:51.040 target it was,
00:22:52.360 and we were
00:22:53.140 simultaneously making
00:22:54.320 our best effort
00:22:55.440 to get a room
00:22:56.800 with a view of it.
00:22:58.000 This is one thing
00:22:58.580 I do remember,
00:22:59.240 and I didn't write
00:23:00.140 about it.
00:23:00.780 There was something
00:23:01.540 about this experience
00:23:03.240 of waking up
00:23:04.640 from this dream
00:23:05.960 of incoherence,
00:23:07.800 suddenly recognizing
00:23:09.980 that both of us
00:23:11.520 had been led
00:23:12.360 to this spot
00:23:13.860 by just an
00:23:15.700 astounding
00:23:16.640 level of
00:23:18.020 logical blindness
00:23:19.060 and shared,
00:23:20.980 right?
00:23:21.600 The fact that
00:23:22.480 neither of us
00:23:23.300 recognized
00:23:24.020 that the American
00:23:24.920 Embassy
00:23:25.340 is the American
00:23:26.220 Embassy
00:23:26.640 led us both
00:23:28.300 to become
00:23:29.040 suddenly
00:23:29.840 fairly superstitious.
00:23:32.140 I certainly
00:23:33.060 don't believe
00:23:33.900 and didn't believe
00:23:35.040 that there's
00:23:36.100 any plan
00:23:36.920 working
00:23:37.600 that would
00:23:38.640 have led us
00:23:39.500 to our doom,
00:23:40.740 but the fact
00:23:42.220 that we had
00:23:42.760 decided not
00:23:43.900 to go there
00:23:44.720 and yet wound
00:23:45.660 up there
00:23:46.340 was fairly
00:23:48.140 creepy.
00:23:49.720 It just
00:23:50.060 actually seemed
00:23:50.960 impossible
00:23:51.500 that we were
00:23:52.400 in that situation,
00:23:53.520 and yet we were.
00:23:54.640 All I can say
00:23:55.200 is it had the
00:23:55.700 character of a
00:23:56.360 Twilight Zone
00:23:56.960 episode,
00:23:58.040 where we suddenly
00:23:58.580 felt that the
00:23:59.320 world
00:23:59.940 and our own
00:24:01.020 minds
00:24:01.580 may not be
00:24:02.720 what they
00:24:03.920 seemed.
00:24:04.840 In any case,
00:24:05.440 we promptly
00:24:06.080 checked out
00:24:06.580 of the hotel
00:24:07.100 to the
00:24:08.000 absolute
00:24:08.540 bewilderment
00:24:09.440 of the staff,
00:24:11.180 and a
00:24:12.080 powerful wind
00:24:12.880 of superstition
00:24:13.680 blew us
00:24:14.500 across the city
00:24:15.620 to some other
00:24:16.620 hotel that we
00:24:17.480 managed to find.
00:24:18.780 Back to the text.
00:24:20.320 While behavioral
00:24:21.400 and linguistic
00:24:22.060 necessity
00:24:22.720 demands that we
00:24:23.580 seek coherence
00:24:24.500 among our beliefs
00:24:25.280 wherever we can,
00:24:26.880 we know that
00:24:27.460 total coherence,
00:24:28.660 even in a
00:24:29.160 maximally
00:24:29.700 integrated brain,
00:24:30.980 would be
00:24:31.300 impossible to
00:24:32.000 achieve.
00:24:33.020 This becomes
00:24:33.520 apparent the
00:24:34.080 moment we
00:24:34.420 imagine a
00:24:34.980 person's beliefs
00:24:35.680 recorded as a
00:24:36.520 list of
00:24:36.880 assertions,
00:24:37.720 like,
00:24:38.340 I'm walking
00:24:38.880 in the park,
00:24:40.100 parks generally
00:24:40.880 have animals,
00:24:42.240 lions are
00:24:42.840 animals,
00:24:43.780 and so on,
00:24:44.800 each being a
00:24:45.400 belief unto
00:24:45.860 itself as well
00:24:46.560 as a possible
00:24:47.160 basis upon which
00:24:48.040 to form further
00:24:48.900 inferences,
00:24:49.740 both good ones,
00:24:50.780 I may soon see
00:24:51.540 an animal,
00:24:52.380 and bad ones,
00:24:53.400 I may soon see
00:24:54.160 a lion,
00:24:55.180 and hence new
00:24:55.860 beliefs about
00:24:56.640 the world.
00:24:57.660 If perfect
00:24:58.220 coherence is to
00:24:58.900 be had,
00:24:59.860 each new
00:25:00.380 belief must be
00:25:01.060 checked against
00:25:01.600 all others,
00:25:02.740 and every
00:25:03.200 combination thereof,
00:25:04.760 for logical
00:25:05.380 contradictions.
00:25:06.680 But here we
00:25:07.140 encounter a minor
00:25:07.960 computational difficulty.
00:25:09.760 The number of
00:25:10.300 necessary comparisons
00:25:11.260 grows exponentially
00:25:12.400 as each new
00:25:13.260 proposition is added
00:25:14.200 to the list.
00:25:15.360 How many beliefs
00:25:15.960 could a perfect
00:25:16.740 brain check for
00:25:17.640 logical contradictions?
00:25:19.040 The answer is
00:25:19.940 surprising.
00:25:21.180 Even if a computer
00:25:21.920 were as large as
00:25:22.760 the known universe,
00:25:24.180 built of components
00:25:25.000 no larger than
00:25:25.780 protons,
00:25:26.260 with switching
00:25:27.220 speeds as fast
00:25:28.220 as the speed
00:25:28.760 of light,
00:25:29.560 all laboring
00:25:30.160 in parallel
00:25:30.740 from the moment
00:25:31.440 of the Big Bang
00:25:32.220 up to the present,
00:25:33.500 it would still
00:25:33.940 be fighting to
00:25:34.580 add belief
00:25:35.240 number 300
00:25:36.200 to its list.
00:25:37.900 What does it
00:25:38.400 say about the
00:25:38.860 possibility of our
00:25:39.620 ever guaranteeing
00:25:40.600 that our worldview
00:25:41.220 is perfectly free
00:25:42.220 from contradiction?
00:25:43.600 It is not even
00:25:44.280 a dream within
00:25:45.020 a dream.
00:25:46.380 And yet,
00:25:46.720 given the demands
00:25:47.460 of language and
00:25:48.260 behavior,
00:25:49.180 it remains true
00:25:50.000 that we must
00:25:50.460 strive for coherence
00:25:51.700 wherever it is
00:25:52.840 in doubt,
00:25:53.580 because failure
00:25:54.300 here is synonymous
00:25:55.400 with a failure
00:25:56.080 of either
00:25:56.540 linguistic sense
00:25:57.560 or behavioral
00:25:58.520 possibility.
00:26:00.440 Beliefs as
00:26:01.040 representations
00:26:01.540 of the world
00:26:02.420 For even the
00:26:03.840 most basic
00:26:04.460 knowledge of the
00:26:05.180 world to be
00:26:05.660 possible,
00:26:06.740 regularities in
00:26:07.460 a nervous system
00:26:08.220 must consistently
00:26:09.020 mirror regularities
00:26:10.280 in the environment.
00:26:11.600 If a different
00:26:12.080 assemblage of
00:26:12.760 neurons in my
00:26:13.460 brain fired
00:26:14.220 whenever I saw
00:26:14.900 a person's face,
00:26:16.240 I would have no
00:26:16.800 way to form a
00:26:17.400 memory of him.
00:26:18.180 His face could
00:26:18.780 look like a face
00:26:19.420 one moment and
00:26:20.480 a toaster the next,
00:26:21.640 and I would have
00:26:22.080 no reason to be
00:26:22.700 surprised by the
00:26:23.540 inconsistency,
00:26:24.660 for there would
00:26:25.020 be nothing for a
00:26:25.660 given pattern of
00:26:26.540 neural activity to
00:26:27.400 be consistent with.
00:26:28.800 As Steven Pinker
00:26:29.500 points out,
00:26:30.560 it is only the
00:26:31.160 orderly mirroring
00:26:32.200 between a system
00:26:33.000 that processes
00:26:33.680 information,
00:26:34.740 a brain or a
00:26:35.500 computer,
00:26:36.300 and the laws of
00:26:37.300 logic or
00:26:37.860 probability that
00:26:39.020 explains,
00:26:39.840 quote,
00:26:40.440 how rationality can
00:26:41.660 emerge from
00:26:42.300 mindless physical
00:26:43.220 process in the
00:26:43.980 first place.
00:26:45.280 End quote.
00:26:46.360 Words are
00:26:46.940 arranged in a
00:26:47.700 systematic,
00:26:48.400 rule-based way,
00:26:49.760 syntax,
00:26:50.680 and beliefs are
00:26:51.500 likewise,
00:26:52.120 in that they
00:26:53.160 must logically
00:26:53.820 cohere,
00:26:54.920 because both
00:26:55.440 body and
00:26:56.100 world are so
00:26:56.880 arranged.
00:26:58.360 Consider the
00:26:58.900 statement,
00:26:59.860 there is an
00:27:00.260 apple and an
00:27:01.020 orange in
00:27:01.680 Jack's lunchbox.
00:27:03.240 The syntactical
00:27:04.120 and hence
00:27:04.540 logical significance
00:27:05.700 of the word
00:27:06.340 and guarantees
00:27:07.760 that anyone who
00:27:08.600 believes this
00:27:09.220 statement will
00:27:09.880 also believe the
00:27:10.760 following propositions,
00:27:12.660 there is an
00:27:13.100 apple in Jack's
00:27:13.880 lunchbox,
00:27:14.840 and there is an
00:27:15.980 orange in Jack's
00:27:16.940 lunchbox.
00:27:18.000 This is not due
00:27:18.860 to some magical
00:27:19.560 property that syntax
00:27:20.660 holds over the
00:27:21.580 world.
00:27:22.480 Rather, it is a
00:27:23.320 simple consequence
00:27:23.980 of the fact that
00:27:24.680 we use words like
00:27:25.900 and to mirror the
00:27:27.440 orderly behavior of
00:27:28.580 objects.
00:27:29.640 Someone who will
00:27:30.300 endorse the
00:27:30.820 conjunction of two
00:27:31.680 statements while
00:27:32.540 denying them
00:27:33.160 individually either
00:27:34.380 does not understand
00:27:35.240 the use of the
00:27:35.900 word and or does
00:27:37.320 not understand
00:27:37.960 things like apples,
00:27:39.180 oranges, and
00:27:39.780 lunchboxes.
00:27:40.920 It just so happens
00:27:41.620 that we live in a
00:27:42.320 universe in which
00:27:43.300 if you put an
00:27:43.920 apple and an
00:27:44.580 orange in Jack's
00:27:45.380 lunchbox, you
00:27:46.400 will be able to
00:27:46.960 pull out an
00:27:47.560 apple, an
00:27:48.280 orange, or both.
00:27:49.220 There's a point
00:27:49.940 at which the
00:27:50.380 meanings of
00:27:50.940 words, their
00:27:51.780 syntactical
00:27:52.440 relations, and
00:27:53.600 rationality itself
00:27:54.800 can no longer be
00:27:55.740 divorced from the
00:27:56.440 orderly behavior of
00:27:57.440 objects in the
00:27:58.140 world.
00:27:59.020 As I say in an
00:27:59.980 end note here,
00:28:01.180 there are
00:28:01.980 exceptions here.
00:28:03.520 Certain words and
00:28:04.660 concepts run afoul of
00:28:06.680 ordinary logic.
00:28:08.120 And I say, for
00:28:08.580 instance, one cannot
00:28:09.640 put the shadow of an
00:28:11.080 apple and the shadow
00:28:12.440 of an orange in
00:28:13.660 Jack's lunchbox,
00:28:14.820 close the lid, and
00:28:15.800 then expect to
00:28:16.360 retrieve one or the
00:28:17.240 other at the end
00:28:17.780 of the day.
00:28:18.160 That's just based
00:28:20.040 on an understanding
00:28:20.900 of what shadows
00:28:22.200 are.
00:28:23.060 They are not
00:28:23.440 objects of the
00:28:24.760 same sort.
00:28:25.720 And I should also
00:28:26.220 say that quantum
00:28:27.120 mechanics obviously
00:28:28.560 runs afoul of our
00:28:29.880 intuitions here, and
00:28:31.200 that is what is so
00:28:32.260 hard and
00:28:32.820 counterintuitive about
00:28:34.280 it, and why it
00:28:35.380 resists a mapping
00:28:36.940 onto our realistic
00:28:38.520 and logical
00:28:39.420 expectations of the
00:28:40.860 world.
00:28:41.640 Back to the text.
00:28:43.440 Whatever beliefs
00:28:44.260 are, none of us
00:28:45.440 harbors an infinite
00:28:46.300 number of them.
00:28:46.980 While philosophers
00:28:48.320 may doubt whether
00:28:49.100 beliefs are the
00:28:49.760 sort of thing that
00:28:50.360 can be counted, it
00:28:51.700 is clear that we
00:28:52.300 have a finite amount
00:28:53.120 of storage in our
00:28:53.980 brains, a finite
00:28:55.260 number of discrete
00:28:56.100 memories, and a
00:28:57.440 finite vocabulary that
00:28:58.700 waxes and wanes
00:28:59.660 somewhere well shy of
00:29:01.180 100,000 words.
00:29:03.040 There is a distinction
00:29:03.780 to be made,
00:29:04.680 therefore, between
00:29:05.720 beliefs that are
00:29:06.420 causally active, i.e.
00:29:08.300 those that we
00:29:08.780 already have in our
00:29:09.700 heads, and those
00:29:11.020 that can be
00:29:11.400 constructed on demand.
00:29:12.620 If believing is
00:29:13.880 anything like
00:29:14.460 perceiving, it is
00:29:15.700 obvious that our
00:29:16.240 intuitions about how
00:29:17.120 many of our
00:29:17.560 beliefs are present
00:29:18.420 within us at any
00:29:19.280 given moment might be
00:29:20.520 unreliable.
00:29:21.600 Studies of change
00:29:22.520 blindness, for
00:29:23.180 instance, have
00:29:23.700 revealed that we do
00:29:24.280 not perceive nearly as
00:29:25.400 much of the world as
00:29:26.180 we think we do, since a
00:29:27.540 large percentage of the
00:29:28.540 visual scene can be
00:29:29.440 suddenly altered without
00:29:30.420 our noticing.
00:29:31.900 Off text.
00:29:32.440 Now, if you haven't
00:29:33.540 seen change blindness
00:29:35.220 demonstrations, they're
00:29:36.640 pretty phenomenal.
00:29:37.500 So the demonstration
00:29:38.640 runs this way.
00:29:39.660 You'll show someone a
00:29:40.640 slide, let's say, of a
00:29:42.660 picture of a family
00:29:43.520 picnicking in the
00:29:44.840 park, and change it to
00:29:47.300 another slide that is
00:29:48.740 identical to the
00:29:49.540 first, but for the
00:29:50.880 fact that you have
00:29:51.560 changed something like
00:29:53.500 20% of its visual
00:29:55.520 properties, like removed
00:29:57.140 a tree, or removed a
00:29:58.820 person, or, you know,
00:30:01.160 put a buffalo in the
00:30:02.700 scene.
00:30:03.520 And it can take people
00:30:05.540 an astonishingly long
00:30:07.480 time to notice the
00:30:09.360 difference between the
00:30:10.220 two images.
00:30:11.240 You know, once you see
00:30:11.920 what has changed, you
00:30:13.280 just, you can't believe
00:30:14.420 that it took you any
00:30:15.400 time at all to notice
00:30:16.280 it.
00:30:16.940 Back to the text.
00:30:18.660 An analogy with
00:30:19.300 computer gaming also
00:30:20.280 seems apropos.
00:30:21.760 Current generations of
00:30:22.740 computer games do not
00:30:23.700 compute parts of their
00:30:24.680 virtual world until a
00:30:25.780 player makes a move
00:30:26.760 that demands their
00:30:27.900 existence.
00:30:28.960 Perhaps many of our
00:30:29.760 cognitive commitments
00:30:30.560 are just like this.
00:30:31.980 So I'm saying that we
00:30:32.880 may not have the
00:30:35.980 stable model of
00:30:37.420 reality that we
00:30:38.800 think we have.
00:30:39.500 We may continue to
00:30:41.400 compute things all the
00:30:43.240 time and on the fly.
00:30:44.640 And we do this
00:30:45.520 perceptually, clearly.
00:30:47.220 We're not seeing
00:30:48.120 everything all the
00:30:49.640 time that we think
00:30:50.880 we're seeing with our
00:30:51.780 eyes open, pointed in
00:30:52.980 the right direction, as
00:30:54.740 change blindness
00:30:56.040 demonstrates.
00:30:57.780 And we may not
00:30:59.700 believe things all the
00:31:02.100 time the way we seem
00:31:03.760 to, but construct
00:31:05.700 beliefs on the fly
00:31:07.380 much more often than
00:31:09.260 we think we do.
00:31:10.420 And there is a kind of
00:31:11.200 confabulatory way we
00:31:13.900 do generate our
00:31:15.600 opinions about the
00:31:16.360 world.
00:31:17.280 You can notice this in
00:31:18.840 various experiments, and
00:31:20.500 you can notice this about
00:31:21.440 yourself.
00:31:22.520 You just start saying
00:31:23.600 things, even on new
00:31:25.380 topics.
00:31:26.500 Think of what it's like
00:31:27.340 to be asked a question
00:31:28.320 that you have never been
00:31:29.520 asked before.
00:31:30.080 For instance, if I
00:31:31.160 were to ask you, do
00:31:32.740 you think human beings
00:31:33.920 will ever outgrow
00:31:35.700 violence entirely?
00:31:38.120 Right?
00:31:38.360 Now, maybe you've
00:31:39.220 thought about this
00:31:39.740 before, maybe you
00:31:40.420 haven't.
00:31:41.280 I doubt anyone has
00:31:42.200 asked you to answer
00:31:44.380 that question.
00:31:45.780 I don't think I've
00:31:46.600 ever been asked that
00:31:47.240 question.
00:31:48.300 You know, I ask you
00:31:48.800 the question, now give
00:31:49.640 me an answer.
00:31:50.780 If you try this, I
00:31:53.140 think it will be the
00:31:53.780 rare person among you
00:31:55.660 who will simply pause
00:31:58.140 for a moment, reflect,
00:32:00.080 and say, I don't
00:32:01.900 know.
00:32:03.040 Of course, it is a
00:32:04.120 perfectly reasonable
00:32:05.360 position.
00:32:06.540 In fact, I think maybe
00:32:08.520 the only reasonable
00:32:10.080 position to take on
00:32:11.700 that question.
00:32:12.820 Right?
00:32:13.420 I certainly don't
00:32:14.380 know.
00:32:15.100 But most people ask
00:32:16.720 that question could
00:32:18.040 answer it one of two
00:32:19.380 ways, I think with
00:32:20.900 real confidence.
00:32:22.060 And they would begin
00:32:22.840 to just form an
00:32:24.520 answer.
00:32:24.980 They would start
00:32:25.860 talking, and it would
00:32:27.260 go something like this.
00:32:28.140 It would be, oh, no,
00:32:28.840 no, no.
00:32:29.060 We're never going
00:32:29.780 to outgrow violence
00:32:30.660 because it's just so
00:32:32.440 deeply rooted in us.
00:32:33.940 We are apes.
00:32:35.440 And unless we outgrow
00:32:36.480 our humanity, unless we
00:32:37.920 change ourselves
00:32:38.880 fundamentally so that
00:32:39.980 we're no longer
00:32:40.780 human, the potential
00:32:42.200 for violence will
00:32:42.960 always be there.
00:32:44.880 That sounds pretty
00:32:45.680 good.
00:32:46.560 Okay.
00:32:47.020 That's what I
00:32:47.700 believe.
00:32:48.780 Or we'll have to
00:32:50.620 outgrow violence at
00:32:51.520 some point because the
00:32:53.200 power of our
00:32:53.960 technology is only
00:32:55.340 increasing.
00:32:55.840 The ability for one
00:32:57.600 person to destroy the
00:32:59.400 lives of many others,
00:33:01.220 even millions of
00:33:02.160 others, is only
00:33:03.500 increasing.
00:33:04.700 And it's hard to see
00:33:05.420 how that will ever
00:33:06.460 change.
00:33:07.300 So at a certain
00:33:08.640 point, we will have
00:33:09.500 to figure out how to
00:33:10.740 cancel our violent
00:33:12.300 impulses.
00:33:13.140 And we will do this.
00:33:14.220 It will be, at some
00:33:15.520 point, the most
00:33:16.200 important thing for us
00:33:17.660 to do.
00:33:18.380 The human capacity for
00:33:19.500 violence will become
00:33:21.060 literally insufferable
00:33:23.300 at a certain point.
00:33:25.380 Okay.
00:33:26.040 That sounds pretty
00:33:26.700 good, too.
00:33:27.840 So you could just
00:33:28.840 start talking, and
00:33:31.240 if your internal
00:33:32.220 bullshit detector
00:33:33.640 doesn't go off, that
00:33:35.220 can suffice to be
00:33:36.880 your belief.
00:33:39.100 Right?
00:33:39.380 Now, did you harbor
00:33:40.180 that belief, either
00:33:41.620 one of them, before
00:33:42.600 talking?
00:33:43.880 Probably not.
00:33:44.800 But the fact that they
00:33:45.880 survive coincidence with
00:33:48.240 all the things you do
00:33:49.100 believe, the fact that
00:33:50.200 you didn't say anything
00:33:51.300 in either of those
00:33:52.560 answers that contradicts
00:33:55.260 something you know to
00:33:56.100 be true, well, then
00:33:57.740 that kind of
00:33:58.720 confabulation will
00:34:00.300 survive and pass as
00:34:02.560 a belief that you
00:34:03.480 have harbored about
00:34:04.680 the world, and
00:34:05.600 perhaps now harbor
00:34:06.440 going forward, because
00:34:07.420 you said as much.
00:34:09.220 Okay.
00:34:10.120 Back to the text.
00:34:11.960 Whether most of what
00:34:12.940 we believe is always
00:34:13.640 present within our
00:34:14.500 minds, or whether it
00:34:15.400 must be continually
00:34:16.120 reconstructed, it seems
00:34:17.580 that many beliefs must
00:34:18.500 be freshly vetted before
00:34:19.700 they can guide our
00:34:20.460 behavior.
00:34:20.880 This is demonstrated
00:34:22.560 whenever we come to
00:34:23.560 doubt a proposition that
00:34:24.660 we previously believed.
00:34:26.340 Just consider what it
00:34:27.220 is like to forget the
00:34:28.320 multiplication table.
00:34:30.080 12 times 7 equals?
00:34:32.100 All of us have had
00:34:33.040 moments when 84 just
00:34:34.520 didn't sound quite right.
00:34:36.100 At such times, we may
00:34:37.040 be forced to perform
00:34:37.820 some additional
00:34:38.480 calculations, before we
00:34:40.200 can again be said to
00:34:41.260 believe that 12 times
00:34:42.320 7 equals 84.
00:34:44.080 Or consider what it
00:34:45.140 is like to fall into
00:34:45.960 doubt over a familiar
00:34:47.060 person's name.
00:34:48.240 Is his name really
00:34:49.180 Jeff?
00:34:50.120 Is that what I call
00:34:50.820 him?
00:34:51.800 It is clear that even
00:34:52.600 very well-worn beliefs
00:34:54.000 can occasionally fail to
00:34:55.240 achieve credibility in
00:34:56.460 the present.
00:34:57.520 Such failures of truth
00:34:58.560 testing have important
00:35:00.040 implications, to which we
00:35:01.500 now turn.
00:35:03.040 A matter of true and
00:35:04.560 false.
00:35:06.060 Imagine that you are
00:35:06.820 having dinner in a
00:35:07.640 restaurant with several
00:35:08.460 old friends.
00:35:09.620 You leave the table
00:35:10.360 briefly to use the
00:35:11.320 restroom, and upon your
00:35:12.640 return, you hear one of
00:35:13.560 your friends whisper,
00:35:14.920 just be quiet, he can't
00:35:16.200 know any of this.
00:35:16.800 What are you to make
00:35:18.440 of this statement?
00:35:19.680 Everything turns on
00:35:20.700 whether you believe that
00:35:21.440 you are the he in
00:35:22.260 question.
00:35:23.200 If you are a woman, and
00:35:24.480 therefore excluded by
00:35:25.460 this choice of pronoun,
00:35:26.840 you would probably feel
00:35:27.540 nothing but curiosity.
00:35:29.220 Upon retaking your seat,
00:35:30.360 you might even whisper,
00:35:31.260 who are you guys talking
00:35:32.520 about?
00:35:33.360 If you are a man, on the
00:35:34.540 other hand, things have
00:35:35.640 just gotten interesting.
00:35:36.920 What secret could your
00:35:37.980 friends be keeping from
00:35:38.980 you?
00:35:39.620 If your birthday is a
00:35:40.800 few weeks away, you
00:35:41.860 might assume that a
00:35:42.520 surprise party has been
00:35:43.560 planned in your honor.
00:35:44.440 If not, more
00:35:45.940 Shakespearean possibilities
00:35:47.300 await your consideration.
00:35:49.380 Given your prior
00:35:50.120 cognitive commitments, and
00:35:52.020 the contextual cues in
00:35:53.380 which the utterance was
00:35:54.220 spoken, some credence
00:35:56.060 granting circuit inside
00:35:57.300 your brain will begin to
00:35:58.820 test a variety of
00:35:59.860 possibilities.
00:36:01.280 You will study your
00:36:02.040 friends' faces.
00:36:03.460 Are their expressions
00:36:04.180 compatible with the more
00:36:05.380 nefarious interpretations
00:36:06.600 of this statement that are
00:36:07.560 now occurring to you?
00:36:08.820 Has one of your friends
00:36:09.640 just confessed to
00:36:10.560 sleeping with your wife?
00:36:12.220 When could this have
00:36:13.020 happened?
00:36:13.320 There has always been a
00:36:14.700 certain chemistry between
00:36:15.700 them.
00:36:16.620 Suffice it to say that
00:36:17.420 whichever interpretation of
00:36:18.580 these events becomes a
00:36:19.520 matter of belief for you
00:36:20.720 will have important
00:36:21.880 personal and social
00:36:22.900 consequences.
00:36:24.320 At present, we have no
00:36:25.340 understanding of what it
00:36:26.420 means, at the level of the
00:36:27.800 brain, to say that a
00:36:29.280 person believes or
00:36:30.200 disbelieves a given
00:36:31.180 proposition.
00:36:32.320 And yet it is upon this
00:36:33.320 difference that all
00:36:34.300 subsequent cognitive and
00:36:35.560 behavioral commitments
00:36:36.480 turn.
00:36:37.760 And going off text now,
00:36:39.620 I would say that this has
00:36:41.240 changed a little bit since I
00:36:43.140 wrote that, in part because
00:36:44.500 of the neuroimaging work I
00:36:46.460 did to finish my PhD in
00:36:48.780 neuroscience, as well as
00:36:50.260 some subsequent work I did
00:36:51.360 with my friend Jonas Kaplan,
00:36:53.340 which hopefully will soon be
00:36:54.540 published.
00:36:55.140 We know more about which
00:36:57.180 regions of the brain are
00:36:58.980 active when people believe
00:37:00.580 and disbelieve various
00:37:02.040 propositions.
00:37:03.160 And I summarize the first of
00:37:05.840 those studies in my book,
00:37:07.640 The Moral Landscape.
00:37:08.440 But there are regions of the
00:37:09.940 ventromedial prefrontal cortex
00:37:11.560 often associated with reward
00:37:14.620 and self-reference, self-
00:37:17.280 representation, that are more
00:37:18.900 active when we judge something
00:37:21.280 to be true.
00:37:22.780 And in these studies, judging
00:37:25.840 something to be false was
00:37:27.140 associated with activity in the
00:37:29.980 insula, which is often involved
00:37:32.980 in more visceral rejection states,
00:37:36.100 like feelings of disgust.
00:37:38.080 So I still consider that work
00:37:39.920 quite preliminary, but the
00:37:41.860 believing brain is not entirely
00:37:43.680 a black box anymore.
00:37:46.200 And another graduate student in
00:37:48.340 the lab at UCLA where I did that
00:37:50.140 work, Pamela Douglas, came along a
00:37:52.880 few years later and used a machine
00:37:55.500 learning analysis on my data to see
00:37:58.020 if she could detect whether or not
00:38:00.320 people believed or disbelieved
00:38:02.240 various propositions at the single
00:38:04.980 statement level.
00:38:06.560 So just training on half the
00:38:08.740 experiment, she went into the
00:38:10.860 other half of the data blind with
00:38:13.160 a machine learning tool to see if
00:38:15.360 she could discriminate whether
00:38:16.600 people believed or disbelieved
00:38:18.480 propositions.
00:38:19.740 And she found that she could do that
00:38:21.280 with 90% accuracy.
00:38:23.900 So even in this very crude paradigm
00:38:26.560 that was not at all designed to be
00:38:29.120 able to detect individual instances
00:38:31.680 of belief or disbelief.
00:38:33.440 Rather, it was designed to compare
00:38:35.200 all of the belief and disbelief
00:38:37.020 trials in a statistically simpler
00:38:40.060 way.
00:38:41.240 She was able to detect belief and
00:38:43.320 disbelief with 90% accuracy.
00:38:45.480 So it was an interesting tweak on that
00:38:47.840 experiment and certainly portends a
00:38:52.060 future where we will have mind
00:38:54.600 reading and lie detection technology
00:38:56.480 that is reliable.
00:38:58.840 I think there's no question about
00:38:59.940 that.
00:39:00.700 And whether you find that terrifying
00:39:02.520 and Orwellian or a great relief
00:39:06.200 certainly depends on your own
00:39:08.420 beliefs about how that technology is
00:39:11.060 likely to be used.
00:39:12.940 Back to the text.
00:39:14.500 To believe the proposition we must
00:39:16.240 tend to use.
00:39:23.820 If you'd like to continue listening to
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00:39:55.440 Thank you.
00:40:00.840 Thank you.