#446 — How to Do the Most Good
Episode Stats
Words per minute
206.70366
Harmful content
Hate speech
2
sentences flagged
Summary
In this episode, Dr. Michael Plante joins me to talk about the competing theories of utilitarianism, consequentialism, and deontology. We discuss which is better: utilitarianism or consequentialism? And which is more deontological?
Transcript
00:00:00.000
Welcome to the Making Sense Podcast. This is Sam Harris. Just a note to say that if you're
00:00:11.740
hearing this, you're not currently on our subscriber feed, and we'll only be hearing
00:00:15.720
the first part of this conversation. In order to access full episodes of the Making Sense
00:00:20.060
Podcast, you'll need to subscribe at samharris.org. We don't run ads on the podcast, and therefore
00:00:26.240
it's made possible entirely through the support of our subscribers. So if you enjoy what we're
00:00:30.200
doing here, please consider becoming one. I'm here with Michael Plant. Michael, thanks for joining
00:00:39.320
me. Thanks for having me on. So we were introduced by Peter Singer, and I think you, was he your
00:00:45.080
dissertation advisor? He was. All right, so maybe you can give your background before we jump into
00:00:50.340
the topics of mutual interest. Well, so I'm a philosopher and global happiness researcher.
00:00:56.240
And I kind of got started on this interest stage, about 16. I first came across philosophy. My
00:01:01.720
first lesson on philosophy, I came across the idea of utilitarianism, that we should maximize
00:01:05.980
happiness. And I thought, oh, wow, that's, I don't know if that's the whole story of ethics,
00:01:09.680
but that's a massive story of ethics. You might say it was a waking up moment. And then over the
00:01:16.700
next 20 years, I've kind of pursued two topics. There's this philosophical question, or should we
00:01:20.860
maximize happiness? I mean, I thought that was quite plausible, but lots of people thought it was
00:01:24.580
nuts. So what's going on there? And then this empirical question of, well, how do we do that?
00:01:29.260
You know, what in fact, you know, how can we apply happiness research to finding out what really we
00:01:32.960
ought to do? And I've been kind of pursuing those tracks, and those have taken me to what I'm doing
00:01:37.160
now. So maybe we should define a few terms before we proceed. I mean, a couple will be very easy,
00:01:42.980
and then I think happiness will be very hard. But you just mentioned utilitarianism. How do you
00:01:49.440
define that? And do you differentiate it from consequentialism? And what is the rival metaethical
00:01:56.480
position or positions that, if they exist, I'm uncertain as to whether they actually exist,
00:02:02.320
but we can talk about that. Well, so utilitarianism is, or classical utilitarianism,
00:02:06.320
is the view that what one ought to do is to maximize the sum total of happiness. And then that differs
00:02:11.880
from consequentialism, where consequentialism is one ought to do the most good. So you don't necessarily
00:02:17.580
have to define good in terms of happiness. You can think of that as desires or other sorts of
00:02:22.340
things. And then these kind of consequentialist theories contrast with what are called sort of
00:02:27.360
deontological or kind of common sense ethical theories, where those theories will say, sometimes
00:02:33.400
you should maximize the good, but also there are constraints. There are things you shouldn't do.
00:02:39.040
You know, you shouldn't kill people to, you know, save lives, perhaps. And there are prerogatives.
00:02:43.920
So there are things you, you maybe would be good for you to do, but you don't have to do. So maybe
00:02:48.980
the utilitarian might say, look, you should give lots and lots of money to charity. And the
00:02:52.900
deontologist would say, well, you know, I recognize it would be better in some way for the, you know,
00:02:57.000
for the world, for people if I did that, but I don't have to do that. I have these kind of,
00:03:00.340
these kind of prerogatives. So that's that kind of lay of the land.
00:03:03.260
Now, do you feel that one of these positions wins? I mean, how would you define your
00:03:08.660
meta-ethics and in the, I mean, I think I've said this before in the podcast, but perhaps you're
00:03:14.900
unaware of it. I do think any sane deontology collapses to some form of consequentialism
00:03:21.480
covertly. I mean, if you say it's not all about maximizing the good, there's some very important
00:03:27.000
principles that we must hold to, like, you know, cons categorical imperative or some other
00:03:34.780
deontological principle. To my eye, what is smuggled in there covertly is the claim that
00:03:40.340
that principle is on balance good, right? I mean, like if someone knew that the categorical
00:03:47.220
imperative was guaranteed to produce the worst outcomes across the board, I don't think most
00:03:53.080
deontologists would bite the bullet there and say, yeah, that's what we want, the worst outcomes across
00:03:57.140
the board. They're holding to it because it is on its face intuitively a great way to implement
00:04:03.040
something like rule utilitarianism or rule consequentialism. What's your thoughts on that?
00:04:08.780
So lots of the objections which you might make are kind of against utilitarianism,
00:04:12.260
that it's taking maximizing too seriously, are also problems you're likely to find to a lesser
00:04:16.780
degree in non-consequentialist theories. So an example is, you know, sort of a kind of a classic
00:04:21.980
differentiating point would be you shouldn't kill one person to save lives. So you might say,
00:04:27.600
well, you shouldn't kill one person to save five people. And the consequences might say,
00:04:30.540
well, look, you probably should do that, you know, assuming that's just sort of a, there's no kind
00:04:34.300
of extra complexity to it. But then if you kind of up the ante and you say, well, what about if you
00:04:38.240
kill one person to save a million lives or a billion lives? Then the moderate consequentialist
00:04:42.600
might think, well, this is outweighed, these kind of normative badness of killing is outweighed by the
00:04:47.940
kind of the goodness of the life saved. So you might think that there's kind of still what's going on
00:04:53.680
under the hood of these deontological theories is there's still kind of some implicit maths going on,
00:04:58.880
like trading off bits and pieces. But, uh, so that's sort of an accusation that consequentialists
00:05:04.180
might make against deontologists, but I mean, deontologists will, will kind of fight back and
00:05:08.620
say, well, actually, look, you don't, I mean, there are kind of conceptions of deontological
00:05:12.000
theories where you, you kind of can't do it exactly like that. And so it's kind of a, there's an open
00:05:17.220
debate, uh, which, you know, perhaps we, it's kind of too much in the weeds, but as to whether you can
00:05:21.920
just reduce, um, deontological theories to kind of looking at value plus some kind of other normative
00:05:27.100
principles, and you know, some people think you can, and other people think that, think that you
00:05:30.200
can't. Yeah. The attacks on consequentialism always boil down in my experience to not actually
00:05:37.800
paying attention to the full set of consequences that follow from any action. So when someone says,
00:05:43.880
well, if you're a consequentialist, you should be happy to have your doctor come, you know,
00:05:47.920
you show up to the doctor's office for a checkup, your doctor, knowing that he's got five other
00:05:53.140
patients who could use your organs, uh, he should, could just come out and, you know, anesthetize
00:05:57.300
you and kill you and, and transplant your organs and his other patients. And that's a net benefit
0.87
00:06:01.380
for the world. Uh, you know, five people get organs and, and one person dies. And that's often
00:06:06.720
put forward or examples like that are often put forward as kind of a knockdown argument against
00:06:10.640
consequentialism. But what people are not adding on the balance there is all of the consequences
00:06:15.560
that follow from such a callous and horrific practice, right? I mean, if all, if everyone
00:06:21.340
knew that at any moment they might be swept off the street and butchered for the benefit
00:06:25.920
of others, I mean, what kind of society would we be living in? And what, you know, what would
00:06:29.440
it be, what would it mean to be a doctor and how would you feel about your doctor and how
00:06:32.860
would the doctor be able to, you know, sleep at night, et cetera. I mean, so the consequences
00:06:36.880
just propagate endlessly from a practice like that. And it's just obviously awful. And no one
00:06:41.780
wants to live in that society for good reason. But again, this is all just a story
00:06:44.800
of consequences. It's not the story of some abstract principle. But anyway, we don't have
00:06:48.500
to get wrapped around that axle. I just wanted to touch that. So if you're a consequentialist
00:06:54.020
of, of whatever description, what should you care about in the end?
00:06:59.360
Well, there are kind of a few options as to which kind of consequences you're going to say
00:07:03.560
matter. So one which, um, I think any consequentialist is going to buy into is, is wellbeing. So wellbeing
00:07:10.040
kind of term of art and philosophy for what ultimately makes someone's life go well for them
00:07:13.980
kind of three canonical theories of wellbeing. You've got hedonism. So happiness is what
00:07:18.160
matters. You've got desire theories where getting what you want is what matters. And
00:07:21.420
then you've got this thing called the objective list where it's usually a few things. Maybe
00:07:25.000
it's, you know, a happiness and desires are on there, but it might also be things like
00:07:28.780
truth, beauty, love achievement. And I think there's, you know, so any, any, that's going
00:07:32.720
to be kind of one of the key consequences. You might also think maybe there's, you want
00:07:36.520
to account for kind of equality or justice. It's kind of a, you might think it's a bit
00:07:40.300
of an open question as to whether those are a kind of dental logical principles or sort
00:07:43.800
of a value-based principles. But when I think about this and what kind of, kind of motivates
00:07:49.040
my thinking is that it just seems that I find it, I just find it very compelling that when
00:07:53.480
we're thinking about what makes someone's go life for, uh, let their life go well for
00:07:56.640
them. It's their, their happiness and their suffering. It's the kind of the quality of life
00:08:00.480
for them. It's how they, how they feel overall. And this is, I guess it's a, you know, there
00:08:05.040
are some bits of philosophy that think that this is, is kind of a mad theory and kind of
00:08:09.300
Nozick and the experience machine, you know, would you be, if you, if you really believe
00:08:12.540
in happiness, would you plug yourself into a matrix style scenario? But I think in kind
00:08:16.080
of weighing up the three theories of, of wellbeing, I just think that the hedonism, the idea that
00:08:20.660
what, what makes your life go well for you is how you feel overall. I think that's got
00:08:23.980
the, uh, that's kind of got the strongest arguments behind it and that motivates lots
00:08:28.460
Yeah. I mean, I think so to take Nozick's experience machine refutation of consequentialism here,
00:08:34.420
utilitarianism. It's again, is what, what he's pressing on there is the intuition, which I think
00:08:40.500
is widely shared by people is that, that we should have something like a reality bias, right?
00:08:46.220
That you don't want to be, you don't want your state of subjective wellbeing to be totally uncoupled
00:08:52.500
from the reality of your life in the world. You don't want to be in relationship with, um,
00:08:58.460
seeming others who are not in fact others. So you don't want to be hallucinating about everything,
00:09:02.840
right? So this is why you wouldn't want to be in the matrix. If you, in fact, you wouldn't want to
00:09:06.120
be in the matrix. Now I would grant that under there's certain conditions under which the matrix
00:09:10.860
becomes more and more tempting and reality becomes less and less. So, right. I mean, we can imagine
00:09:15.580
just some forced choice between a very awful universe that is real and a simulated one, which is
00:09:22.740
perfect. In which case we might begin to wonder, well, what's the point of reality in that case? But
00:09:28.360
I think it's, again, that this is, it's a story of, of yet more consequences at the level of people's
00:09:34.860
experience. I mean, to know that you're, um, you know, let me just imagine, you know, having the
00:09:39.860
best day of your life and you, or years of your life and you're in a relationship with people who
00:09:45.560
are incredibly important to you, who you love and to find out at some point that all of this was a
00:09:50.640
hallucination, right? And, uh, there was no, which is to say not merely that it's impermanent,
00:09:56.380
which any experienced empirical reality is. We'll all discover that at death, but, or the, even just
00:10:02.280
the end of any hour, but there would be this additional knowledge that it was fake in some
00:10:07.640
sense, right? Like the person you thought you were in the presence of sharing meaning and love with
00:10:13.020
was not a person, right? They had, they had no point of view on you. It was all just a hall of
00:10:17.660
mirrors. I think that we get an icky feeling from that and it's understandable. And that icky
00:10:23.140
feeling translates into a degradation of the wellbeing we would find in that circumstance.
00:10:29.780
But again, I, you, I don't think we can press that too far. I think having a, a loose reality
00:10:35.960
bias makes sense, but I think that you could easily argue for a ways in which you would want your view
00:10:41.880
of yourself or the world to not be the most brutal, high contrast, you know, right at all times view.
00:10:49.680
If in fact that would prove dysfunctional and corrosive in, in other ways, which I think it's,
00:10:55.660
you know, the, it's pretty easy to see that it might.
00:10:58.540
Yeah. So, I mean, in addition to that, I think a reason not to get into the,
00:11:02.540
into the experience machine is I think we have more responsibilities. If you're just stuck in
00:11:06.100
the experience machine, you can't make a difference to, to anyone else. I also, um,
00:11:10.960
a couple of more thoughts. I also think it's sort of, I'm using that the experience machine is taken
00:11:15.000
as a sort of a slam dunk objection to hedonism. When, you know, if we look at how technology is
00:11:19.880
changing, we are increasingly living in something like the experience machine. I mean, there are
00:11:23.440
some days where like, I don't leave my house. Like I interact with people the whole day,
00:11:27.660
you know, through, through the, the magic of, uh, of the internet and so on. Am I, am I in fact in
00:11:32.980
the experience machine? Right. But anyway, leaving those, uh, those bits to the side, I think a point
00:11:38.280
that's really substantially overlooked is when there's discussion about what wellbeing is, it's
00:11:42.960
often, okay. So the argument is, is happiness the only thing that matters. And then there's this sort
00:11:48.080
of, there's this sort of cognitive mistake from being, well, if happiness isn't the only thing
00:11:51.260
that matters, then it doesn't actually matter very much. And so I, I often find I have to remind
00:11:55.720
people, even if they are not hedonists and few people are, and that's, you know, that's fine.
00:12:00.020
But look, even if you don't think it's anything that matter, you do still think that it matters.
00:12:03.860
If you didn't think that it matter, you would think that people's suffering and misery
00:12:06.940
didn't matter in and of itself. And that's a very peculiar thought. So it's at least going to be
00:12:12.600
one of the things that matter, or it's going to be very important to whatever it is else that
00:12:16.840
matters intrinsically. So if you're engaging in morality and you're not taking happiness seriously
00:12:21.720
and taking suffering seriously, then you're missing a major, a major part of, um, of what really
00:12:27.520
matters. So what do you do with the fact that happiness and wellbeing are these elastic concepts that
00:12:34.600
are really impossible to define in any kind of closed way, because there's, there are frontiers
00:12:40.640
of happiness and wellbeing that we are gradually exploring. And presumably there are experiences
00:12:46.840
that, uh, we would all recognize that are, you know, better than any we've yet had. And they're
00:12:52.080
sort of out there on the horizon. And we can't, we can't really close our accounts with reality at
00:12:56.320
this point and say, Hey, you know, wellbeing, ultimate human wellbeing is this because a thousand
00:13:00.980
years from now, it may consist of something, you know, that, that we can't even form a concept
00:13:05.940
around presently. And what do you do with the fact that, and this is explicit in many of the
00:13:11.060
objections to the concept of happiness, because it somehow seems thin and doesn't somehow capture
00:13:17.100
everything that's worth wanting. What do you do with the fact that there are certain forms of
00:13:21.300
suffering and stress that seem integral to the deeper reaches of wellbeing, you know, so that it's not,
00:13:29.320
it can't purely be about avoiding pain or avoiding stress or maximizing short-term pleasure, right?
00:13:37.040
I mean, we all know what it's like to, or many of us know what it's like to go to the gym and work
00:13:41.000
out hard. And if you could experience sample that hour, it would be true to say that much of it was
00:13:47.340
excruciating. Uh, and if you were having that experience for some other reason, like if you woke up
00:13:51.820
in the middle of the night and felt the way you felt, you know, doing a deadlift or whatever, you would
00:13:55.980
run straight to the hospital, you know, convince you're, you're about to die. But because of the
00:14:01.040
context and because of the consequences of spending that hour that way, most people learn to love that
00:14:06.940
experience, even if it's negatively valenced as a matter of, you know, sensation and physiology while
00:14:12.640
having it, how do you define wellbeing or flourishing or happiness to encompass those wrinkles?
00:14:20.420
Yeah. So I think the definitional problems are maybe not so sharp. I mean, in, in kind of philosophy,
00:14:28.100
we just sort of nail them down one way or another. So wellbeing, what makes your life go well for you
00:14:32.980
overall? And then happiness, I just understand as feeling good overall. So it has this intrinsic
00:14:38.940
quality of pleasure. If you don't know what pleasure is, sorry, I don't think I can tell you what that
00:14:43.480
feels like, but that's sort of the, you know, the kind of end of the line. We just sort of recognize
00:14:47.860
there is an intuitive kind of pleasantness, kind of positive or negative valence in our experiences.
00:14:52.920
So then there's this question about the causes of happiness and, you know, what does happiness
00:14:57.040
consist in? So what I think happiness consists in is positive valence experience. And then what are
00:15:01.420
the causes of happiness? Well, you know, that's a, that's an empirical question. You're, you're
00:15:05.160
absolutely right that, you know, our, we can possibly discover lots about what are the causes of
00:15:11.440
happiness and how do they compare to each other over time? And what in fact are the best ways to
00:15:16.260
promote happiness, which hopefully we will, we will come to a due course on the bit about
00:15:20.400
suffering. Yeah. This comes up quite a bit as like, well, you know, but if you only live the
00:15:24.420
happy life, wouldn't you, this is a bit like the point you're making about kind of consequentialism
00:15:28.000
people say, well, if you, if you only experience happiness, that would in fact not maximize your
00:15:32.500
sum total of happiness over time, because you need the misery to have some happiness. But I mean,
00:15:36.580
I think that's, you know, sort of fine as a fact of the matter. If you're looking at your
00:15:40.360
experiences over time, then you, you do want some kind of good stuff and, and, and, and some bad stuff.
00:15:45.280
If you're going to, um, you know, have the greatest area under the line. I mean, we, you know, we know
00:15:50.080
this, we, uh, we do things like we take ourselves camping because we know it's going to be a miserable
00:15:55.400
experience so that then we can go back to civilization and enjoy the fruits of civilization.
00:15:59.900
Some of us do. I've stopped camping. I've retired.
00:16:04.840
I mean, you've, you've had the camping experience and maybe that, you know, you can remember,
00:16:10.380
Yeah. Well, so, but do you actually think that my intuition kind of runs the other way? I don't
00:16:15.460
think we need awful things to compare our happiness to, to recognize that we're happy. I think happiness
00:16:21.640
or human wellbeing could become increasingly refined such that the thing you're comparing the best
00:16:28.280
experience to is like, it's still a very good experience. It's just not, not nearly as good
00:16:33.700
as the best. So there's some version of camping that is better than what 99% of people experience
00:16:39.140
on a day-to-day basis, but which could become the, the reference point if one were needed of
00:16:44.460
comparison to some yet future state that's even more blissful and expansive and creative and
00:16:49.420
beautiful and, and encompassing of depth and intuitions that we, you know, very few people
00:16:56.480
Yeah. So I don't think I agree with you. It's not sort of logically necessary, but if you look at how
00:17:00.620
kind of happiness seems to work for people, it's, uh, it's highly comparative and there's some
00:17:05.000
kind of oddnesses about the things we choose that could compare ourselves to and, uh, and not others.
00:17:09.420
So I'll kind of, uh, a case in point that's kind of relevant for the moment is in the kind of the
00:17:14.820
West of world, you know, your side of the pond, my side of the pond, we're talking about a cost of
00:17:17.840
living crisis. Okay. And people are sort of feeling like they're, they're feeling the pinch, incomes are
00:17:23.140
going down, things are more expensive, but look, here's sort of another perspective on this.
00:17:27.100
If you earn the median salary in the U S which are like $40,000, you're in the top 2% of the global
00:17:34.360
distribution. And if you think about how many people, I think it's more than that. I thought
00:17:38.620
the, um, you said median, but I think the mean per capita GDP in the U S is like 65,000, something
00:17:45.480
like that. It's, I think it's, it is higher than that, but it's higher than the UK. Yeah. I'm, I'm
00:17:49.580
thinking, I'm thinking of the median. I don't, I don't know the meat, the mean, uh, GDP. Yeah. I guess,
00:17:53.480
I guess the median way is considerably lower because there's some very rich people. Yes.
00:17:57.100
Yeah. And then, um, if you're looking, uh, not just at the moment, but across time, I mean,
00:18:02.420
you know, how long of, when did homo sapiens become homo sapiens? But if by, by one estimate,
00:18:07.680
there's like 120 billion people who have ever lived. So if you put those together, if you're
00:18:12.360
alive today and earning a median salary in the U S you're in the top 0.1 to richest people,
00:18:17.940
0.1% of rich people who have ever lived. Yes. And yet what are people talking about? They're
00:18:23.040
saying, ah, it's the cost of living crisis. Things are so expensive. And, and when I,
00:18:27.100
what I make this point to people, they'll look at me like I'm strange. Well, you know,
00:18:31.100
of course that's not relevant. Like that's not how I think about my life, but you know,
00:18:34.400
that's the, that's the kind of curiosity there is that, um, how there are certain things we
00:18:39.180
compare our lives to and sort of naturally intuitively, but we could make different
00:18:43.380
comparisons. And so relating to your point, you know, we could, uh, you know, bring ourselves
00:18:47.900
to think of the misery in the world that we are otherwise avoiding. And that would give
00:18:51.480
us, uh, uh, greater happiness. But in fact, you know, we, we're in quite narrow tracks
00:18:56.600
and the kind of, we just compare ourselves to the things which are salient, the people
00:18:59.400
near around us. Yeah. And so in practice, maybe you do need that reminding now and then
00:19:04.500
of, of some misfortune that can make you grateful for the rest of your, uh, for the other parts
00:19:08.800
of your life. Well, this issue of comparison, I think runs pretty deep because given that
00:19:13.620
so much of our judgments of our own wellbeing and, and in fact, our experience of whether or not
00:19:20.720
we are flourishing is based on comparison is based on context. It's based on the, on the
00:19:27.060
cognitive framing that is laid over the, just the cut the raw sensory experience of being
00:19:34.440
oneself moment to moment. One could ask, I mean, what, what is the, we're going to get,
00:19:39.560
going to get into kind of effective altruism and what is, you know, what, what problems on
00:19:43.360
earth are worth solving and how we prioritize those things. But if it's a matter of alleviating
00:19:48.580
suffering and alleviating the most excruciating suffering first, presumably and maximizing
00:19:54.620
human wellbeing, maybe it's in fact true to say that the homeless on the streets of San
00:20:00.140
Francisco are suffering more than the poorest of the poor in sub-Saharan Africa or in an
00:20:06.760
Indian village or somewhere where objectively they are more deprived, right? Because there's
0.96
00:20:10.500
no one starving to death in San Francisco, whatever their condition. I mean, they could, they
00:20:14.660
might be dying of fentanyl abuse or something else, but there's no one starving to death
00:20:19.680
in America. That's just not a thing because there's just so much food and you can go to
00:20:24.140
a shelter, you can, you can go to a pantry or you can go to a dumpster. I mean, you can
00:20:27.960
get food, but there are places on earth where people still starve to death. Happily, that's
00:20:33.280
less and less the case. And yet, if you imagine the experience of being homeless, you know,
00:20:39.000
right outside of Salesforce Tower or wherever you are in San Francisco, the prospect of comparing
00:20:44.780
the unraveling of your life with the lives that seem to be going on so smoothly all around you
00:20:50.240
suggests to me that it's at least conceivable that that suffering, that mental suffering,
00:20:55.480
the experience of being in that bad condition is worse than much or maybe everything that's going
00:21:01.940
on in objectively poorer parts of the world. How do you think about that?
00:21:06.580
Yeah, I find that extremely plausible and very probably true. Having walked through the streets
00:21:13.360
of San Francisco and also visited some of the poorest bits of the world, yeah, I would imagine
00:21:18.240
If you'd like to continue listening to this conversation, you'll need to subscribe at
00:21:23.720
samharris.org. Once you do, you'll get access to all full-length episodes of the Making Sense
00:21:29.000
podcast. The Making Sense podcast is ad-free and relies entirely on listener support, and you