#224： Why Smart People Do Stupid Things With Malcolm Gladwell
Episode Stats
Summary
Malcolm Gladwell has a new podcast out called Revisionist History, where he goes back in history to uncover overlooked or misinterpreted stories and pulls insights from them so we can apply them to our lives today or at least think about them. In this episode, Malcolm and I discuss how Wilt Chamberlain found a better way to shoot free throws that increased his free throw percentage, but he purposely decided to stop doing it. And what we can learn from him on avoiding that mistake. We also discuss the art of finding insightful stories in the mundane, asking good questions, and why you might want to decline an acceptance to a prestigious university.
Transcript
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Brett McKay here and welcome to another edition of the Art of Manliness podcast.
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Why do we sometimes not do the thing we know that works or works better? We've all probably
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had instances in our life where we knew there's a better way to achieve our goal or achieve
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success, but we don't do it. Why? Why is that? Well, that's one of the many questions my guest
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today has explored in his writing career. His name is Malcolm Gladwell. Many of you have probably
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read some of his books like Outliers or Tipping Point or David and Goliath. Malcolm's got a new
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podcast out called Revisionist History where he goes back in history to uncover overlooked or
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misinterpreted stories and pulls insights from them so we can apply them to our lives today or
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at least think about it. Today on the show, Malcolm and I discuss how Wilt Chamberlain found a better
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way to shoot free throws that increased his free throw percentage rate considerably, but
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he purposely decided to stop doing it and what we can learn from him on avoiding that mistake.
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We also discuss the art of finding insightful stories in the mundane, asking good questions,
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and why you might want to decline that acceptance to a prestigious university. Lots of stuff to
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chew on in this podcast. After you're done, check out the show notes at aom.is slash Gladwell.
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Well, I've long been a fan of your work and I'm enjoying your new podcast, Revisionist History,
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and we'll talk about that today because you've got some great topics you're delving into,
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but I'd like to get meta first because I've been curious about this. You've made a career
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out of taking what seems on the surface very mundane or obscure stories. You've written about
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infomercials or catch up, but then you show how they can provide insights into complex problems
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that cut across domains. I'm curious, what's your process of going about that? I mean,
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it seems like it requires a lot of curiosity. So how do you, how did you develop that curiosity?
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Oh, you know, I never know how to answer that question. I, um, I, you know, I'm a little bit of a magpie
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to like collect ideas and quirky stories and things and, um, puzzle over them for a long time to figure
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out, uh, uh, how they can be useful. So a lot of it is just, I have a big, I have a big random
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group of things that I'm always looking to find a home for. Um, but, uh, also I don't know. I just,
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I, I, I, I think I'm, um, uh, because I'm not an expert in anything, I'm, I move horizontally
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through ideas, not vertically. Um, so I never, you know, if you think about it, I've never
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written a book or even an article that was almost never, that was solely about one thing. I don't
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go deep. I go wide. Um, so I'm as, I, I was puzzled and, um, by people who go deep, people who go
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deep are puzzled by me who goes wide. And, you know, I don't, when I look at someone who writes
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an entire book about a single subject and goes into fascinating detail, I always wonder how on earth
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did they do that? No, it's just not mine. Like about the toothpick or something like that.
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Yeah. Not my way of thinking about the world. And it seems like it requires asking good questions.
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Um, and one thing I remember in how, uh, what the dog saw, you, you talked about, there's certain
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people you want to ask questions, like the higher ups, people at the top of the chain aren't usually
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the ones you want to ask questions. It's in the middle. Why are people who are in the middle or,
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you know, down on the, who are actually doing the work, the best people ask questions?
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Yeah. Um, well, because they're, uh, they're seeing things from a different perspective and
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they are freed of certain kinds of constraints. So to give you an example, I got, there was a
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report that came out, um, from the Rand Corporation, uh, some months ago that was talking about how,
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how the staff at the SEC had increased dramatically in size over the last couple of years. And at the
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Rand's having a conference and I told them I would do a Q and A, um, at the conference about this
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report. Cause I think it's really interesting to what happens to decision-making when there's more
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people in the room. And the question came up, well, who should we do the Q and A with? Do we want to get,
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you know, someone way, way high at the NFC or do you want to get someone in the middle? And my sentence
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was actually, you want the person in the middle because they actually see the, we want to get into the
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nitty gritty of what happens when you make crucial time limited decisions with 50 people. And before you
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used to do it with six, right. And I want to know what that feels like. I don't know, is that good?
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Is it bad? Is it, is it, you know, I want really mundane things like, is it harder to schedule a meeting
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when you've got 50 in the room? Like, does that mean you can't have a meeting as quickly? Is it harder
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or less hard to reach consensus? Is it, you know, you don't want to, you're not actually interested
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and probably they couldn't tell you what the subject of the meeting was, right? So anyway,
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yeah, I don't really care about the subject. What I want to know is just what happens to people when
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they're in a different sort of context. And the person who can answer that question, I almost want
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to talk to, I almost want to go as low as I can. I, you know, I almost want the person sitting in the
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corner. He didn't say anything at all. I'm just just taking notes. Um, you know, some of the
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assistant, I don't know if we can get that low, but, but the person who led the meeting has a
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completely different, you know, they're thinking about the politics, not as who they have to report
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to, the sensitivity, the material there. So they're almost, they're not who we want in this instance.
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Right. Now maybe if I was, if I'm, uh, if I'm a national security reporter for the New York times,
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I do want that person because my goal is to find out what, uh, what came out of the meeting,
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what the decision was, but I'm not interested in my perspective is different. I'm interested in,
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it's not what has drawn me to this example. So it's just a kind of, um, it just depends what
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questions you're asking. And because I'm very interested in process questions, it means I'm
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very often not interested in the person at the top. Gotcha. Um, so another thing you're,
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I think you're really good at is taking really complex ideas and simplifying them for just regular
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folks to understand. And I think that's actually a really important skill for people to develop
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because our society economy is becoming more and more complex. Um, so I'm curious, do you have a
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process that you go through to simplify complex ideas?
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No, but it was very much a part of, uh, uh, my kind of upbringing, you know, my mother is someone
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who's a, one of the, one of the things, a writer and writes in an incredibly clear and transparent
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way. And I remember as a child being very kind of, um, taken by how clear her writing was as a model
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for me. And then my father sent that petition that who's from talking to people in his field,
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I came to understand that he was someone who was, um, whose kind of specialty was, uh, he would take
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the 10 page proof and turn it into a two page proof. Um, so I still feel it's in my blood somehow to
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want to, um, uh, and he was also, he would teach me math as a child and would, would take something that
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I was hopelessly befuddled about it and resolve it and explain it in incredibly elegant, simple way.
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And so I think I just sort of came to think of that as, um, the highest form of, um, communication,
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you know, to, is to, and I remember even as a small boy, I was like, you know, like many boys
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endlessly played board games and I, or card games. And I would always,
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insist on being the one who explained the game to everyone else if they hadn't played it before
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because I was always convinced I could explain it better than anybody else. And I could even
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explain it better than the instructions. I always found instructions lacking, you know,
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and you know how you get a new board game when you're like eight years old and you read the
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instructions and then it'd make no sense. This would infuriate me. The way they were written
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would infuriate me. I would always have my own way of kind of explaining how they worked.
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Right. And then again, this is because you're focused on processes again. It's that you,
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Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. No, that's like, even the very simple thing, instructions on games.
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The first thing you should tell, you should say is what the point of the game is, right? What
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is winning in this game? And they wouldn't do that. They wouldn't say the first line should
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be, you know, in Monopoly, the winner is the person who dot, dot, dot. And then explain the
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rules, right? But they would always, somehow they would feel like the point of the game was
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supposed to kind of emerge from an understanding of the rules, which strikes me as crazy, completely
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backwards. So that was a, I guess I've been doing this all my life.
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Doing your entire life. It's really interesting. So let's talk about some of the things you've
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written about and what you're doing on your podcast now. And as I've read your work and
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as I've been listening to your podcast, Revisionist History, it seems like a common idea that you
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explore is why people, you know, they'll know what they need to do, that there's a better way to do
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something, but they don't do it. Um, and you explore this idea, uh, that I thought was completely
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fascinating in your podcast about, uh, the granny shot in basketball. Yeah. Can you talk about like
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what we can learn about why humans sort of self-sabotage themselves from Wilt Chamberlain
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and the granny shot? Yeah, that was the first episode. Um, it's funny, you know, the, I, I didn't
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think that was one of the stronger episodes and yet it seems to be the one that people, listeners
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have gravitated to the most, which just shows you what a bad judge you are of, of your, of
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one's own work. But that I was, I was reading, I can't remember why. I was really, um, uh,
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interesting book on Wilt Chamberlain and it just describes his greatest game, a hundred point
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game in 1962, I think one's still the greatest basketball game anyone's ever played. And he
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shot 28 for 32 from the line. And which is weird because he's a terrible, he was famously
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a terrible free throw shooter. So then you keep reading and you realize, oh wait, that
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season was one of the only seasons in his career where he consistently shot under him
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because, uh, his team had brought in a famous, one of those kind of, one of the famous old
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school, um, actually a guy from the, what was it called? I think the Hebrew league. So the
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Jewish basketball league of Philadelphia, the guy named Cy Castleman, famous free throw
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shooter who shot underhand and was brought in to coach teach Wilt Chamberlain this, this
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way of shooting. And all of a sudden Wilt Chamberlain becomes a fantastic free throw
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shooter. And then the first thing he does after becoming a fantastic free throw shooter
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is go, go back to shooting the old way. So he could be a terrible one again. Um, which
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struck me as being so bizarre that I thought, and, but also not just, but done more
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than just bizarre, so typical of human beings that we don't, we don't always do the thing
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that's right or correct for us or best. We, we're very often quite happy to go back and
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do the thing that got us into trouble, right? I mean, there's a million examples. People
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who have a problem with alcohol relapse, you know, or, you know, we all have bad habits,
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we know they're bad and we persist in doing them. And so I thought it would be really interesting
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to kind of use the free throw story as a way of talking about that very human tendency,
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uh, to behave stupidly, even when we know better. So, you know, the distinct from we do stupid
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things all the time just because we don't, we don't know better, but we also do stupid
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things when we do know better. So I wanted that second case. Uh, and then I, what made
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the show work, I think, is that I went and interviewed Rick Barry, who was one of the few basketball
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players to ever consistently use the underheaded free throw. And, uh, even he would do it, you
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know, even though he was, he was almost, I mean, he was not reviled, but made fun of for using
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this kind of awkward shot. And he turns out to be this incredibly compelling character. Um,
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and so that, uh, the episode is just all about Will Chamberlain and Rick Barry, and then trying
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to make sense of why is it that some people can do some kind of, be the first, be one of the few
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to be willing to try some new idea. And the rest of us are hostiles.
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Right. And you talk about, you get into that whole idea in sociology of thresholds where
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some of us need a lot of people to be doing something before we're like, yeah, I'll do
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Yeah. If you think about it as a kind of peer pressure model that, um, some people, all of
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us will do even the most ridiculous thing if enough people are also doing the ridiculous
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thing. Right. I mean, so there's, but some people don't require a lot to go first before
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they act. And that difference in how many people, how many of your peers need to be doing something
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before you'll join in is called your threshold. And the low threshold people don't need a lot
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about us to go first and high threshold people need the world to go first before they'll
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join in. Um, and, uh, Wilt Chamberlain was a high threshold person. He was not going to
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continue shooting the underhanded free throw. Um, if he was going to be the only one or one
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of the only people, he didn't want to be, didn't want to stand out in that way. Um, whereas
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Rick Barry is someone who is quite happy to be the only person in the NBA to shoot that
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way. It doesn't bother him that he's that kind of took his whole career. He persisted
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in doing things that sort of set him apart from, from others. And, uh, that's a kind
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of, that way of understanding our behavior is really interesting because it frames our choices
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in social terms. It says the reason you do certain things may have nothing to do with
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the quality of the idea or your own personal preferences. It just has to do with the social
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context. You know, that your 12 year old, your 18 year old son will drive a hundred miles an
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hour while drunk, even though he knows that is a terrible idea. If he's in a car full of
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his friends who are all drunk and urging him to drive a hundred miles an hour, right? It's
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just social. He doesn't want to do it. He doesn't believe in that. He's a lot smarter
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than that. But in the moment, surrounded by his peers, egging him on, he's capable of doing
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something very stupid. That is a profoundly human reaction.
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Well, I'm curious when your research, have you found anything where you can sort of inculcate,
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you know, sort of an antidote to that where you can actually height, you know, raise your threshold
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to where you'll just do something even if other people are saying, don't do that or do this?
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Well, there's a great example of this in binge drinking on campus that what people, this is one
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of the single most effective interventions against drinking on campus. They ask students whether
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they, what percentage of students they thought engaged in binge drinking. And most students
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said they thought it was something like 60% or 70% of a lot of students. They thought that
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binge drinking was something the majority did. And so that's why they did it. They felt they
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were, to not binge drink would be to stand out. And then they informed them that the real number
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is actually something like 20%. It's a minority. And just telling students that something they
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thought was something everyone did was actually something that very few people did dramatically
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reduced the incidence of binge drinking. So there what you're doing is you're playing
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with thresholds. You're saying that a behavior that people thought was commonplace,
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was actually rare. And the minute you say that a behavior is rare, the social context in which
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I think I've heard a similar study with that, with hookup culture, where they'll tell, ask
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students, like, how many people, how many of your peers do you think are engaging in sexual
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relationships, like on the first date? And everyone thought everyone was doing it. But then they
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informed them, no, it's actually a small percentage. And then that reduced the amount.
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It's the same. It's a remarkably effective way of... Same thing happens. You know, if you think
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about something simple like wearing your seatbelt, Americans were resistant for years to wearing
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your seatbelt. But now it's second nature. Now, if you don't wear your seatbelt, you stand
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out so much that it's almost impossible not to buckle up. And can you imagine... I can't remember
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being in a car where someone wasn't wearing your seatbelt. I mean, it would be... Everyone
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would remark on it. They would think you were weird and strange. I mean, the kind of social
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pressure now around wearing your seatbelt is overwhelming. That was not true in 1980.
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Yeah. And I think... And you explore this idea of, like, people knowing what they should do.
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There's a better way to do something, but they don't do it. You also hit on this a bit. And David and
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Goliath, where you talk about, again, basketball, but this team of 12-year-old girls who were
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utilizing the full-court press all the time to win basketball games. That seems to be related to
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that. Because, like, no one else does it, but this one team decided that this is what they're going to
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do. Yeah. Well, you don't... Basketball teams, particularly youth girls' basketball teams,
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don't play that way because it's obnoxious. If you press against a group of 12-year-old girls,
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they won't be able to get the ball off the court. I mean, and so that you can't actually play
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basketball if you press 100% of the time against, you know, relatively, you know, non-elite,
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even boys' basketball at that age. You know, the game becomes impossible to play. So you have
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to be willing to disrupt the game in a really profound way to play that way, right? You have
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to be pretty bold and thick-skinned because the other team, the other parents, particularly,
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I even got really angry because no one's shooting. It's just all turnovers. It's like, you know,
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and so that was the sort of funny thing was that, you know, this is not a strategy that... It's a
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strategy that requires, at least in the beginning, some pretty thick-skinned, obnoxious people
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And you talk about Rick Barry was sort of like, he was sort of thick-skinned and obnoxious. He
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didn't have a really good reputation. Even though you talk about his biography, like he had these
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quotes from his parents who just like kind of, you know, eviscerated him a little bit and that he
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Yeah, he's not... He didn't care what people think about him. I don't actually think... I think he's
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very pleasant. I actually think he thought he was a nice, good person, but he just doesn't...
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You know, the rest of us spend a lot of time doing things and saying things that we think
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will win the approval of those around us. He does not. It's not even on the table. He does what he
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thinks is right. And that is a really... That's a sure way to make enemies. You know, he went on and on
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about how... He's absolutely right. He does not understand why in the NBA, when someone misses a
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free throw, all the members of his team congratulate him. You know, he's like, why are you... The guy just blew it.
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He just botched an incredibly important and straightforward basketball play. And you're
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reinforcing his mistake by clapping on the back and high-fiving him and doing whatever you
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do. He's like, that's crazy. You should be doing the opposite. You should be shaming this guy
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for missing the free throw. He's right. I mean, why are you congratulating someone for screwing
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him? Yeah. You're creating a social context in which people don't feel they have to be great
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And... But you can see why someone who feels that way would be ostracized on the basketball
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Yeah. At Dwight Howard for missing the free throw in the final minute of the game.
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And that's not going to endear you to Dwight Howard.
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Well, Malcolm, something I've noticed, you're very passionate about education, particularly
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education philanthropy. Because I saw the tweet storm that you did a while back ago. And I have
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two questions related to education, because I think they're connected in a way. In David
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and Goliath, you talk about how the way many college students go about deciding which college
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to attend actually can stunt their academic growth. Can you flesh that idea out a bit?
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Yeah. That's called Big Fish Little Pond Theory. And it says that it just is a psychological observation
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that it's really hard to be in the bottom half of any classroom. It really makes it difficult
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for you to remain confident, to learn what you need to learn, to persevere. And there's
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all kinds of evidence for this. And so putting a student in a situation where he or she is in
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the bottom half is perilous. It's not always bad. It just increases the chances that, particularly
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if you're engaged in something that's very difficult, that you're going to drop out.
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So I'd use the example of science and math classes. It's really hard to be in the bottom
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half of a difficult math class. And when we look at why dropout rates are so high in science
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and math education, and they are extremely high, that's what's happening, is that if you're
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taking calculus and you're the worst person, you're the worst student in the class, chances
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of you finishing the year in that class are just minimal. And so what that says is that
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the best place, the best environment to be when you're looking for a college is not the
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most elite college you can get into, but the college where your chances of being in the top
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half are greatest. So the best college for you is not the best college you can get into.
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Right. So if there's a choice between an Ivy League school and a state school, go with
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Many people will be better off in the state school because you'll be in a situation where
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you feel much more confident. And so your chances of getting a science degree or a law degree
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or a medical degree or what have you may be much greater in a non-elite place than an elite
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place. And that consideration, that simple rule, I think is very often ignored. And students
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are so obsessed with the kind of getting into the most prestigious school they can, that they
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forget that the most prestigious school may not be the best school for you.
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Right. And haven't they done studies where they found that, you know, looking at long-term
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trends, I know they've done this with law school at least, that, you know, which school
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you attended overall doesn't affect how well you do as a lawyer later on. You could go to
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a state school and you've done just as well financially as if a kid who went to Harvard.
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Yeah. It's not, generally speaking, when people do, economists do very careful studies of the
00:26:31.440
usefulness of an elite education, what they discover is it's not as useful as you think.
00:26:38.720
So that it's really, people from Harvard do well because the kind of person who goes to
00:26:44.140
Harvard does well in the world. They would do just as well if they didn't. It's not Harvard,
00:26:48.340
in other words, it's making them succeed in life. It's the fact that they're a very, very
00:26:54.060
smart, talented person. And so, um, it's their personal characteristics, not the characteristics
00:27:00.560
of their school that are predicted of their success. So once you account for that, you realize
00:27:06.120
that additional advantage that accrues from, um, the reputation of your undergraduate school
00:27:15.220
is small. It's just, we exaggerate it. It's just not the case that it makes a huge amount
00:27:22.120
of difference where you go. It just makes you feel good in the moment saying that that got
00:27:25.400
accepted to Brown. That's where I'm going to go. Yeah. So I think this idea is connected to a recent
00:27:32.060
podcast episode you did on revisionist history. Um, this idea that going with the most prestigious
00:27:36.640
school can backfire on a person individually. It also seems, uh, it's connected to your idea of how
00:27:43.060
education philanthropy is done. Um, so in the past 20 years, there's been a boom in donations to
00:27:49.300
American universities, big donations. Uh, but you argue that the way it's done is actually not all
00:27:54.940
that productive. Uh, why is that? Well, there's been, there has been this dramatic uptick in large
00:28:02.980
gifts. So a hundred million dollar plus gifts to American institutions, college institutions.
00:28:07.480
They've all overwhelmingly gone to schools that are already rich. So, you know, the last heart,
00:28:16.560
you know, the last $400 million, last two $400 million donations in, uh, in, um, the world of,
00:28:25.100
of higher ed, uh, Phil Knight's gift, Sanford and John Paulson's gift to Harvard went to schools with,
00:28:33.660
uh, an endowment of $22 billion and $36 billion respectively. People are giving lots of money
00:28:41.840
to schools that already have lots of money. And that episode of revisionist history said,
00:28:46.940
first of all, why? That's kind of crazy. Why would you, what sense does it, does it make
00:28:53.840
to give money to people who are already rich, to institutions that are already rich? It would
00:28:58.640
be like me writing a check to Bill Gates. Why would I, why would I do that? You know? Um,
00:29:05.480
and the second point, sort of the broader point is that when we give money away, we usually do a kind
00:29:13.000
of return on, on our investment calculation, right? We say how much good can be purchased with my money?
00:29:19.920
And my argument is that if you give $400 million to a school that already has 36 billion, there's not
00:29:28.620
much more they can do with that money. You know, they're, they've already, presumably, if you have
00:29:33.860
that much money in the bank, they're already doing the kinds of things that money can buy. You know,
00:29:39.680
they're, they've already set up the lab. They've already funded the research. They've already
00:29:44.560
supported the student in financial aid. You know, whereas if you give that $400 million to a school
00:29:52.000
that has $100 million in the bank, there's an amazing amount they can do with that money.
00:29:58.100
They can, so it's, you know, when you, your return on your investment, when you give money
00:30:02.960
to a needy school, it's just vastly greater than if you give money to a wealthy school, just as it would
00:30:10.380
be in real life if you're giving money away. The person living at the poverty line can do an
00:30:16.860
extraordinary amount with $1,000. $1,000 given to a billionaire is meaningless. Um, and I, my puzzle
00:30:26.020
that I'm trying to solve in that episode is why on earth does this very common sense principle, which is
00:30:32.540
really clear when it comes to giving to people. Why on earth is that ignored when it comes to giving to
00:30:38.820
institutions? And it seems like there's a little bit of that Matthew effect going on, right? Like
00:30:43.700
success. We just want to, we want to go with the winner. So we give them more. Yeah. Which makes
00:30:49.380
no sense. I think what I actually said in an interview recently, though, I thought that, uh,
00:30:56.460
it was, if you give anyone who gives money to Princeton, which is on a per capita basis,
00:31:01.200
the wealthiest educational institution in the history of mankind, anyone who gives money to Princeton
00:31:06.340
is committing a, I think that's a moral obscenity. That's, it's wrong. There's no other way around
00:31:11.840
it. I mean, you know, we should just burn your money. You know, if you're going to, it's just a
00:31:17.900
school that is a tiny school. It's, I don't remember how much money they have in the bank, but on a
00:31:22.980
per capita basis, they are, you know, they're, they're basically, they're like one of those little
00:31:28.500
islands in the South Pacific where everyone's a millionaire. Right. As you were describing that,
00:31:34.200
it made me think of like stocks, right? And stocks, like the idea is, do you want to like,
00:31:38.400
one of the things you do is you find the stocks that are undervalued and you invest in that.
00:31:43.640
Like people, that makes sense to people. I think like the schools that are poor or don't have that
00:31:47.800
much money or like sort of the undervalued stocks, there's a lot of opportunity for growth. Um,
00:31:51.940
and then investing world, like you don't want to invest in the company that's overpriced,
00:31:55.160
has already reached its peak price. That's what it seems people will do with philanthropy.
00:31:59.580
Yes, that's exactly right. That, that kind of, it's funny, you know, and so this is another area
00:32:07.420
where in certain realms, I think we think rationally, or at least we tend to think rationally,
00:32:14.360
but then in other areas we don't. So we think rationally about stocks, usually, but when it comes
00:32:22.920
to educational philanthropy, we're completely unwilling to kind of, or not always, but
00:32:29.560
many people, many, many wealthy people who are normally, um, very thoughtful and intelligent,
00:32:35.620
um, are unwilling to, um, to, uh, use those, use their same thinkers rationally when it comes
00:32:48.640
It's interesting. Well, Malcolm, one thing, um, I'd like to talk to shifting gears here a bit.
00:32:53.100
I think one thing a lot of people don't know about you is that you're an avid runner. Uh, in fact,
00:32:58.020
I just learned, uh, two years ago, you were 50 years old. You ran a four minute, 54 second
00:33:04.400
mile, which blows my mind because I'm just, uh, it takes me like 13 minutes to run a mile.
00:33:10.440
When did you start running? And I'm curious, is there's anything you've learned from running
00:33:15.580
running that you applied to your work as a writer?
00:33:19.960
Oh, I was, uh, well, I was a, I ran a lot in, um, high school and then, uh, very successfully.
00:33:29.420
And then I stopped and really didn't race again for 30 years. Um, although I ran a little bit,
00:33:37.160
but I was standard, started to run seriously again in my, in my fifties. Um, uh, what, what
00:33:44.860
is, I mean, running is about, um, I don't know that there's a direct overlap with writing,
00:33:51.660
except that it gives you a period of time, extended period of time for reflection. And I just think,
00:33:58.020
right, if you're going to be a successful writer, you need to have extended periods of reflection.
00:34:03.100
And so you go for a 10 mile run, that's a good, you know, hour and change where that you have with
00:34:11.340
your, that you're alone with your thoughts. And so that can be, uh, there's a nice overlap between
00:34:19.320
the, um, the opportunity given by a long run and the requirements of writing.
00:34:27.580
Well, Malcolm, this has been a great conversation. Where can people learn more about your work in
00:34:31.180
your new podcast, revisionist history? Well, we have a website, revisionist history.com where,
00:34:38.060
um, all the episodes are available for download. And, and I have a website gladwell.com where a lot
00:34:45.280
of my writing is archived. And so I think between the two of those websites, uh, you can pretty much
00:34:51.500
get the full story. Fantastic. Well, Malcolm Gladwell, thank you so much for your time. It's been a
00:34:55.320
pleasure. Great. It's been really fun. Thank you. My guest today was Malcolm Gladwell. He's
00:35:01.120
the author of several books that you can find on amazon.com, uh, but be sure to share his new
00:35:04.860
podcast, revisionist history. You can go to revisionist history.com to download episodes
00:35:08.720
there or search for it on iTunes. It's a really great show. Also check out the show notes for
00:35:13.300
this podcast at aom.is slash Gladwell. Well, that wraps up another edition of the art of manliness
00:35:30.560
podcast. For more manly tips and advice, make sure to check out the art of manliness website at
00:35:34.320
artofmanliness.com. And if you enjoy this show, have gotten something out of it, I'd appreciate it
00:35:38.360
if you give us a review on iTunes, it helps us out a lot. As always, thank you for tuning
00:35:42.060
your support. And until next time, this is Brett McKay telling you to stay manly.