#283： The Complacent Class
Episode Stats
Summary
Tyler Cowen argues that Americans are losing their dynamism. In his new book, "The Complacent Class: The Self-Defeating Quest for the American Dream," he argues that we have become a "complacent class."
Transcript
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Brett McKay here and welcome to another edition of the Art of Manliness podcast.
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If you grow up in America, you hear a lot of narratives about our country that speak
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to our shared sense of character. For example, we're a nation of restless pioneers always
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striking out for greener pastures or that we have a risk-taking entrepreneurial spirit
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that spurs innovation and economic growth. Well, my guest today argues that while these
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narratives may have been true at one point in American history, the statistics show that
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in recent decades, Americans have lost some of that pioneering entrepreneurial get-up-and-go
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attitude. Instead, we've become pretty complacent. His name is Tyler Cowen. He's an economist at
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George Mason University, writer at his blog Marginal Revolution, and the author of several
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books. His latest is called The Complacent Class, The Self-Defeating Quest for the American
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Dream. And today on the show, Tyler and I discuss the statistics that indicate Americans are
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losing their dynamism, that we're moving less and starting fewer businesses, as well as the
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effect this trend is having on our economy and culture. Tyler also provides some insight
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on what's causing this complacency, what to do to overcome it, and how it's likely leading
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us to an era of severe disruption. If you enjoyed my podcast with Neil Howe about the generational
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theory of history, you're going to love this episode. Tyler's ideas dovetail nicely with
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Howe's cyclical view of history. After the show's over, check out our show notes at
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aom.is slash complacent, where you can find links to resources where you can delve deeper
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Long been a fan of your work. You got a new book out, The Complacent Class, The Self-Defeating
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Quest for the American Dream. And it's all about how you make the case that America sort of lost
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its dynamism. We're not as dynamic as we once were. But before we get into that, what do you
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mean by dynamism? Because oftentimes when we hear that word, we think of it as in positive terms,
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like everything's just fantastic and wonderful. But as I read your book, I kind of got the idea
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that that wasn't necessarily the case. Well, our rate of economic growth has been slower.
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We move across the country at much lower rates than in decades past. We're much more paranoid
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with our children. We won't let them play outside nearly as much. We take more medications to relieve
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our anxiety. If you look at each and every different sphere of American life, we even until recently protest
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much less against politics we don't like. We see that people are trying to dig in and play it safe
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Okay. And you argue that we've become a complacent class and that this complacent class is composed
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of different groups. It's not just middle class people or upper class or just poor. It cuts across
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the boards. But I'm curious, how does the complacent class manifest itself differently amongst these
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different socioeconomic groups? Well, I identify three different groups. There are people who are
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really quite well off the top 1% or 3%. And they, in a sense, have everything in life. And ultimately,
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their main interest is in preserving the status quo. And for all their intellectual talk about things
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being different in America, the actual urgency they feel in that regard has not been very high,
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perhaps at least until the last election. There's then the middle class, which is increasingly
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uncomfortable. But their main strategy has been to dig themselves in to make sure that no benefits are
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taken away from them, to make sure that no one builds a cheaper house next to theirs, just to try to
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cement in their lives. And they have a less dynamic perspective than middle class Americans might have
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had in the 50s or 60s. And then there are lower income groups, you might think, well, how could
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they possibly be complacent? But if you compare those individuals, say, to the 1960s, and how people
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behaved in terms of protest, and simply not putting up with what the system was giving them, again,
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it's actually much more passive. So this is occurring across different socioeconomic classes.
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Okay. So what are some of the big factors, like big picture factors that have led to the rise of this
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I think it's ultimately a historical story that we had really a great deal of dynamism in the 1960s and the
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early part of the 1970s. It was a very active America taking a lot of chances, putting a man on the moon
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in seven years. But the funny thing is, people don't actually like that. People very much want security.
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So we made a conscious decision as a nation to do anything possible to lower our crime rate,
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including putting a lot more people in jail. We made a conscious decision to make our cities nicer
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over time, even if that would mean they would grow less. We made a conscious decision our children
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would encounter essentially no risk, even if that means they wouldn't learn the same number of valuable
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lessons growing up. So I think it's a fundamental imperfection in human nature that people most of
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all want security, not liberty or dynamism. There are some exceptions to that, but for the most part,
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Sure. So let's talk about some of these ways that you've seen the complacent class manifest itself.
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One of the more interesting aspects that I liked in your book, you talk about how the decline in
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America mobility. America has this sort of idea of itself as being a nation of pioneers,
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constantly on the move. But you argue that we're not moving around as much. So can you give us an
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idea of how much geographic mobility has declined in the past few decades?
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Well, if you look at people crossing state lines and moving, that's fallen by about 50%
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since the peak of American mobility in the 1970s and the 1980s. So the old vision was, you know,
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maybe you lived in Mississippi and you would move up to Detroit to take a job in an automobile plant.
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Or if that plant closed down, you might move to Houston to, you know, work on an oil rig.
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And that's not the case anymore. We're much more a service sector economy. Geographically,
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different parts of this country, they look more alike. And the notion that a dentist will say,
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leave Columbus, Ohio for Denver, Colorado, because people there, you know, need more of their teeth
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fixing. That's just not a significant reason to move. So people find where they want to live
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and then they stay there. And I mean, why, why is this such a bad thing? I mean,
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couldn't that mean that people are suddenly down and establishing roots and deeply connected
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communities? That's all true. But here's a very important point. I think it's rational for each
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and every individual. But when everyone does that at the societal level, our labor markets adjust
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much more slowly when there's a recession. And we saw that during the last recession.
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It's harder to start a new business because the influx of new labor to any one area is not that
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strong. It's harder for failing regions to adjust and move on. And we saw this, you know, in the rust
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belt right before the last election. So there's this overall decline of dynamism at the social level
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that hurts people. But of course, for every person, myself included, most of us live somewhere we like
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and we don't want to leave and moving is a big disruption. But there's something socially valuable
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about having a people who are somewhat more willing to move.
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Yeah. And this kind of connects to that idea of matching that you talk about too in the book that
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we've become better at matching our personal preferences to everything in life, communities as
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well. But what are some other ways that matching, like this increased ability to match our preferences,
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Well, two areas would be music and then mating. So look at music. Whatever song I want to hear
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on YouTube or on Spotify, I can hear it right now in an instant for free. It sounds wonderful as a
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listener. It is wonderful. But it also means for the first time in history, people are paying much
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more attention to the back catalog of past music than to current music. So in my view, current musical
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creativity is declining. The audience interest isn't there. You're listening, you know, to the Beatles or
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the Rolling Stones or Bon Jovi or whatever. So again, it's a kind of behavior that in the moment for
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the individual is rational. But for society as a whole has some bad long run consequences.
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If you look at marriage, dating and mating, it's much easier today to find someone of exactly your
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interests, your social class, your desired income level and meet, date and marry them. And again,
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that's led arguably to happier marriages. But it's also worsened the issue of income inequality
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because you now have, say, two law partners marrying each other. The resulting family is
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extremely wealthy. The children typically do very well. But that's also a barrier to upward
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mobility. Yeah. So like in the past, the lawyer might marry his secretary.
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Correct. Right. You know, he or she might be a very smart person, but wouldn't have that same
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income multiplier effect as what we're seeing today.
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I think connected to this decrease in mobility, you argue that this decrease in mobility
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has counterintuitively helped the reemergence of segregation in America. So why is segregation
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Well, let's keep in mind first, there are several different kinds of segregation. The one that's
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gone up the most by far is what is called income segregation. That is, it used to be that
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well-off and poor people lived quite close to each other. And that was very good for the mobility
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of poor Americans. There's a lot of evidence toward that conclusion. Now it's more likely
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the case that wealthy people live in Manhattan or San Francisco and poorer people live much
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further away. So there's less mixing. I think it makes us less dynamic and it makes American
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mobility more static. Now, racial segregation commands a lot of attention. That's a more complicated
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story. There are some notable ways in which racial segregation is going down. So suburbs are more
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mixed race than before. That's mostly a good thing. But if you look at American schools,
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very often they're more racially segregated. And if you look at the worst off areas, they too tend
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to be more rather than less racially segregated. So I would say on that metric, we're not seeing this
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kind of ongoing progress we had hoped for from the civil rights movement. It's pretty much stuck or in
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some ways even going in reverse. But so I mean, civil rights laws prohibit explicit discrimination
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and segregation. So how is that happening? I don't think it's explicit for the most part. It's
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happening through price and income. So people who have more money matched to the more expensive
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neighborhoods, those neighborhoods then limit the amount of high density residential construction,
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which makes it harder for people to rent cheaper apartments.
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And you have the most productive, wealthiest parts of America, such as the Bay Area,
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just become, you know, impossibly expensive and difficult to afford. And other people live further
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away. They either have terrible commutes, or they're simply locked out of that economic dynamism.
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And besides income and race, I mean, another way that we're seeing segregation happening on a
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Oh, that's correct. And this is why you have Donald Trump, you know, losing the popular vote,
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really by a fair amount, but winning the electoral college by also not a landslide, as he sometimes
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claims. But, you know, he won the electoral college. And it's because Democrats are so clustered,
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say, in a relatively small number of densely populated states, New York, California, Hillary Clinton
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wins by large margins. And then you have less populated states, but a lot of them that tend to be
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more conservative or Trumpian or whatever you would call it. And that's a result of more political
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segregation. And I don't mean this as a comment on any one candidate, but overall, I think it's
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unhealthy. It's a better America when you have more Republicans and Democrats living right next door to
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each other. And you see it also across marriage. Democrats and Republicans don't want to marry each other
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anymore. That kind of segues to the other idea that you argue that we've become complacent in our
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politics as well. And perhaps this geographic segregation along political ideologies is contributing to
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that gridlock that we've seen in our government in the past few decades.
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Absolutely. So Congress doesn't get problems solved. Americans online, they're nastier to each other than
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they used to be. The sense of a common purpose is weakened. And the idea that either Hillary Clinton,
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Donald Trump, was somehow, you know, a fundamentally illegitimate force, to me, those are unhealthy
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developments, no matter what you think of the particular candidates. More and more Americans think the
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We're going to take a quick break for a word from our sponsors. And now back to the show.
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And how else has our political system become complacent, where we emphasize safety, security,
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Well, the most static part of the budget is what we spend on entitlements, social security,
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Medicare, Medicaid. And I'm not trying to make an argument that those are necessarily bad expenditures.
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But over time, they take up a higher and higher percentage of the federal budget,
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because we're aging and because healthcare costs are going up.
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So in terms of investing money for research and development, or new projects, or revitalizing
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infrastructure, or the current day equivalent of sending a man to the moon, there's basically
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no money for those things. And I find it worrying that in percentage terms, we're spending more and
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more on being safe, and less and less on being dynamic. That's a kind of fiscal lock-in.
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Right, right. So again, neither Republicans or Democrats will touch social security or Medicaid or
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That's correct. And the only question is how much more will we spend. And even under President Obama,
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the projected budgets for discretionary spending were basically slated to be going down over time.
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So let's turn our attention to business. In America, we again, we have this idea that we're
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entrepreneurial, we're, you know, businesses are always starting up. And we have this idea, I mean,
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we're always hearing about these tech disruptors that are coming out of Silicon Valley. So
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there's an impression that we still have that entrepreneurial dynamism. But you make the case
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that we're not. So what are some of the statistics out there about declining entrepreneurship in
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Well, I would stress first, we do have some of the dynamism. And the main place you see it is in
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Silicon Valley. That has been a very productive sector. It's changed our lives in some significant
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ways. And that's great. The problem is that most of the American economy isn't like that.
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So if you look at most of the service sector economy, which is about 80% of GDP, in most of
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it, measured rates of productivity growth are barely above zero. You look at healthcare, you
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look at education, you look at the efficiency of our government. Those are hard to measure,
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but it doesn't seem they're making big gains. In some regards, they're going backwards.
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They're becoming more and more expensive. And we're at best getting these modest gains.
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Most of life is not like Moore's law and the iPhone. That's America's dynamic sector.
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Our long run hope is that tech seeps into everything and brings back a new glory time of
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economic growth of 4%. But that's pretty far away. Three out of our last four decades,
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you know, we haven't managed productivity growth of much beyond something like 1% per year.
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And why are Americans starting fewer and fewer businesses? Is it just more expensive or harder
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I think it's a number of reasons all at once. So startups, for all the publicity they receive,
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as a percentage of overall business, that has been going down in this country since the 1980s,
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every single decade going down. I think some of it is in a lot of sectors, you have a winner-take-all
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effect where, say, in retail, there are fewer, you know, small, cute, little niche businesses
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and chains are more significant. That's part of it. Part of it is the burden of regulation
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on businesses higher and large businesses can cope with that better than small businesses.
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And then I think another part is this ineffable psychological loss in America that we are more
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complacent and less dynamic. So all three of those at once, you end up with a business climate
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that is outside of the Bay Area, for the most part, pretty static.
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Yeah. And you also argue that, you know, when people do start businesses in America, they're not
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that ambitious with them. Like, you're just seeing a lot of, you know, app companies or lifestyle
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companies. You're not seeing people trying to, you know, invent the next light bulb. So, I mean,
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why have American entrepreneurs lost that desire to create, you know, life-changing businesses?
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Well, it's hard to do, of course. And again, we have had some life-changing businesses,
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but oddly, some of them make us more complacent. So if you look at Silicon Valley, you look at
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something like Facebook, well, we're better connected to friends. It's improving how we
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use our leisure time. I mean, that is something that's wonderful, but it's not feeding into the
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rest of the real economy the way the Industrial Revolution or the mechanical revolutions of the first
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part of the 20th century did, where you have just a complete onslaught of everything changing at
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once. If you compare American life in, say, 1900 to 1950, everything has changed. Electricity,
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running water, radio, the automobile, everything's different. If you compare our last 50 years,
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which I've witnessed personally, other than computers, you know, most of the stuff is the same.
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My car is a little safer, a little nicer. I'm still driving a car. I'm still cooking,
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you know, basically in a 1950s kitchen. The physical stuff of my personal universe,
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computers aside, has not changed much in 50 years.
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Right. And going back to the idea that these new Silicon Valley startups, they increase complacency,
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like a lot of the technology that they're developing is just increasing matching, like
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matching preferences better, right? Talking about Spotify.
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That's right. So I can buy a better antiques collection because of eBay, for instance,
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or match to my high school friends better because of Facebook. And again, those are real gains,
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but it's mostly about leisure time and not making our whole economy more productive in a broad-based way.
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Right. So the complacent class, we were putting a premium on safety, stability, and comfort,
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Well, here's the thing. In the long run, someone has to pay the bills. Personally,
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a lot of us have debts. Our government socially has significant debt and pension liabilities,
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unfunded liabilities. And the way we're going to pay all that off is by being dynamic. And if we're
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not sufficiently dynamic, a crunch will come and there will be a societal crisis and people will speak
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up because they're not seeing enough gains. They're not expecting to be better off than their
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parents. And I think we're essentially at this point already where people have realized what we're
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doing isn't working. We've maybe made some hasty decisions in terms of how we might try to fix that.
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But you can't just stay on a track of no change for your whole life, either individually or socially.
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It's asking for trouble. You'll end up getting bigger changes that you can't control at all.
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Right, right. So it's good to have a bit of instability all the time instead of
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a lot of instability all at once due to your trying to control volatility.
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That's right. The greater wisdom is in realizing you cannot control all risk
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and accepting some and learning how to manage it rather than pushing all of it out the door.
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So you think you're seeing signs of the age of complacency coming to an end. I mean,
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what are some of those signs that you're seeing?
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Well, if you look at the few weeks right after the inauguration of Trump, we saw a level of public
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protest in this country. We basically had not seen since the early 1970s. I think that's the
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single biggest indicator. And again, it's not a question of whether you're for or against,
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simply that the response and the urgency of it was so strong and so immediate. And I think now in
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this country, there is a realization we cannot stay on our previous track. The wealth won't be
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there forever. Mentally, psychologically, I think in the last two years, people have very much flipped.
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And I think we're in for a new age of turmoil, a bit like parts of the 1960s. It will be painful.
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We'll hate it. But ultimately, I think in the longer run, it will regenerate our vitality.
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And so I mean, what's your hunch? And it seems at the end of the book, you kind of you argue for
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this sort of generational or cyclical idea of history. So go through these bouts of stability,
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and then there's instability. I mean, what's your hunch of what the next 20 or 30 years are going
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to be like? I think there'll be in some ways quite a bit like the 1960s and early 70s, a lot of turmoil,
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possibly a foreign war that becomes unpopular, very high amounts of protest and polarization,
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racial and segregation issues reemerging, except we're going to run that experiment over with
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information technology, which makes response times much quicker, the news cycle more accelerated.
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And that to me is dangerous, because last time we did this in the 60s and 70s, we came out of it
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fine. The 80s and 90s are a great era of American revitalization. And I do think we'll see that again.
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But we're running a higher risk, because with Twitter and Facebook, you know, fake news is
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accelerated very quickly. There's a lot more propaganda, there's a lot more surveillance.
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We'll see how it goes. And do you think we're doomed to just repeat this cycle over and over?
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Say we go through this next crisis, and we get back on, you know, to a road of stability?
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Are we just going to sow the seeds for another era of, you know, great turmoil?
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Absolutely. We'll dig in again and want to be safe. I would say today, in terms of age,
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there are so many Americans who basically, as mature adults, only saw the 80s, 90s, and what
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came after that. And they expect things are always going to be nice. The 80s and 90s were mostly great
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decades for America. But if you look at the longer run of American history, whether it's the age of
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Andrew Jackson, or the Civil War, or the fights over civil rights, or the problems of the 1930s,
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or, you know, the protests and riots of the 60s, that's not what this country is.
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There are periodic times of calm, and different forms of chaos have always reemerged. And the
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people who grew up just seeing 80s and 90s, I don't think they've internalized that they see it in the
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history books, they don't yet get that it's real, and they're starting to see it. And for a lot of
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Definitely. So someone who's listening to this, they're, they're thinking, okay,
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America is becoming more, more complacent, I don't want to be complacent.
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How can people thrive in the age of complacency?
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Well, one thing you can do is just look at your immediate friends, spouse, and neighborhood,
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and ask yourself, who am I surrounding myself with? Are they just people who are like I am?
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Or am I doing something, you know, in an environment with truly diverse peers? And I don't just mean
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ethnically or racially diverse, but people who are really different from you. And just ask yourself
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that hard question. And you know, the answers will vary for different people. But see what you
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might do to change that. Talk more to people you disagree with. You know, think more, what chances
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might you take? I think most of us have a kind of status quo bias in life. There's one experiment that
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was run, where people came to the researchers with big decisions. And the researchers flipped a coin for
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people. And half of them were told to make a change. And actually, most of the people who made the change
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were happy afterwards, but they might not have done it on their own. So think more like that,
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Right. And is this where some of your ideas you laid out in Average is Over come in as well?
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Yes. You know, my book Average is Over, it talks about automation and the new age of smart machines
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and how it's changing American jobs. I think that's showing, you know, why it was the older system was
00:24:47.260
slowing down for so many people. But unless you're really good at working with computers in some way,
00:24:51.980
it's harder and harder to make a good living and see your wage increase over time. And unfortunately,
00:24:57.480
I don't think any more than 15 or 20 percent of this country is really good at working with
00:25:02.460
computers. So we've seen a lot of real wage stagnation for many groups.
00:25:06.240
Yeah, I saw there's an article that's been going around lately about making the push for coding being
00:25:12.280
the new blue collar job. I thought was interesting.
00:25:15.680
I mean, that's fine. But, you know, not that many people can code. And over time,
00:25:19.560
machines will code on their own. Encoding is relatively easily outsourced to foreigners.
00:25:25.460
So, you know, the really good jobs are for people who integrate the information world
00:25:29.860
and the physical world and the world of the people they work with. And that requires a lot
00:25:38.500
And hard skills. You need to bring them together.
00:25:40.680
Well, Tyler, this has been a great conversation. Where can people go to learn more about the book
00:25:44.600
Well, they can just Google my name, Tyler Cowen, Complacent Class. They can buy the book
00:25:49.760
at Barnes & Noble on Amazon. I'm on Twitter. My handle is at Tyler Cowen. I write a blog called
00:25:56.340
Marginal Revolution. But just start with Google, my name and the phrase Complacent Class.
00:26:02.300
Fantastic. Well, Tyler Cowen, thank you so much for your time. It's been a pleasure.
00:26:06.220
My guest today was Tyler Cowen. He is the author of the book, The Complacent Class. It's available
00:26:10.440
on Amazon.com and bookstores everywhere. You can also find out more information about Tyler
00:26:14.580
's work at marginalrevolution.com. Also, check out our show notes at aom.is
00:26:19.960
slash complacent where you can find links to resources where you can delve deeper into this
00:26:23.500
topic. Well, that wraps up another edition of the Art of Manliness podcast. For more manly tips
00:26:32.580
and advice, make sure to check out the Art of Manliness website at artofmanliness.com. If you
00:26:36.540
enjoy this show, I'd appreciate it if you give us a review on iTunes or Stitcher. That helps us out a
00:26:39.940
lot. As always, I thank you for your continued support. And until next time, this is Brett McKay telling