The Debrief With MyronGainesX - This ＂Queen Of Cuba＂ Spied For Fidel Castro： Ana Montes

00:00:00.820 And we are live. What's up, guys? Welcome to FedIt. Today, we're going to be covering the Ana Montez case, Cuban espionage, man.

00:00:07.380 I know you guys like these spy cases. Let's get right into it.

00:00:12.680 I was a special agent with Homeland Security Investigations, okay, guys? HSI.

00:00:16.040 The cases that I did mostly were human smuggling and drug trafficking.

00:00:21.200 No one else has these documents, by the way.

00:00:23.440 Here's what FedIt covers.

00:00:24.560 Dr. Lafredo confirmed lacerations due to stepping on glass.

00:00:31.400 Murder Investigations.

00:00:32.400 You see him reaching in his jacket. You don't know.

00:00:34.660 And he's positioning.

00:00:35.320 Been on February 13, 2019.

00:00:37.000 You're facing two counts of two meditative murder.

00:00:40.180 Bracketeering and Rico conspiracies.

00:00:41.900 Young Slime Life here and after referred to as YSL.

00:00:44.540 This is 6ix9ine, and then this is Billy Seiko right here.

00:00:48.020 Now, when they first started, guys, 6ix9ine ran with me.

00:00:50.640 I'm a Fed. I'm watching this music video.

00:00:52.860 You know, I'm Bobby Mahala.

00:00:54.080 Hey, this shit lit.

00:00:54.980 But at the same time, I'm pausing.

00:00:56.460 Oh, wait, who this?

00:00:57.700 Right?

00:00:58.120 Oh, who's that in the back?

00:01:00.320 Firearms and violent crime.

00:01:01.640 A.K.A. Bush Icy violated.

00:01:03.500 In order to stay away from the victim.

00:01:05.220 Robert Bush Icy arrested after shooting at King of Diamonds.

00:01:07.540 Miami strip club injured one person.

00:01:09.200 This is the one that's going to fuck him up because this gun is not tracing me.

00:01:12.720 Well, it happened at the gun range.

00:01:13.920 Here's your boy, 42 Doug, right here on the left.

00:01:16.140 Okay.

00:01:16.500 Sex trafficking and sex crimes.

00:01:17.900 They can effectively link him to paying an underage girl.

00:01:21.040 I'm going to lock my 50-11 right.

00:01:22.540 And the first bomb went off right here.

00:01:25.660 Suspect to set down a backstack on the site of the second explosion inspired by Al-Qaeda.

00:01:30.780 Two terrorists, his brothers, the Zokar Sarnev and Tamerlan Sarnev.

00:01:35.360 When the cartels shipped drugs into the country.

00:01:37.380 This guy got arrested for espionage, okay?

00:01:40.080 Trading secrets with the Russians for monetary compensation.

00:01:43.760 The largest corrupt police bust in New Orleans history.

00:01:48.340 The days of the police are gone.

00:01:49.980 So he was in this bad boy.

00:01:51.500 We're going to go over his past, the gang guys, so that this all makes sense.

00:02:01.800 All right.

00:02:02.480 And we are back.

00:02:03.160 What's up, guys?

00:02:03.640 Welcome to Fetit Man.

00:02:04.520 I got my special guest with me.

00:02:05.600 You guys have come to learn and love her at this point.

00:02:08.120 Hello.

00:02:09.000 It's me again.

00:02:09.720 Your favorite Venezuelan that can't speak English.

00:02:11.580 I hate that nickname, by the way.

00:02:14.860 Hi, guys.

00:02:16.520 As I've been saying before, I've been reading your comments on the latest videos.

00:02:22.340 So keep it up with the cases.

00:02:25.020 We are going to do Ana Montes tonight, which is a Cuban spy.

00:02:31.580 And yeah, I don't know which one we're going to do next, but I'll be keeping it up with your comments to see like which one is the best case for the next episode.

00:02:40.740 Okay.

00:02:41.580 Sorry, guys.

00:02:42.240 I re-plugged in my soundboard because Chris's soundboard sucks.

00:02:45.920 But yeah, man.

00:02:46.700 Long story short, guys, we're going to cover Ana Montes.

00:02:48.680 This is a Cuban espionage case.

00:02:50.480 I kind of sprung this one up on Angelica here.

00:02:53.860 So she's like her specialization is like, you know, serial killers and weirdos that like kill boyfriends.

00:03:00.120 People with psychological problems, mostly.

00:03:02.600 There you go.

00:03:04.060 This lady might have.

00:03:05.020 Well, you know what?

00:03:05.900 Well, you'll see right now in a second with this documentary.

00:03:08.460 We're going to be reacting, guys, to a documentary in this thing.

00:03:11.200 But before I get into that, real quick, I want to let you all know why women deserve less is in stores right now.

00:03:17.060 Okay.

00:03:17.740 Go ahead and get the book.

00:03:19.680 Here's a hard copy version, the author's version.

00:03:21.520 Happy Valentine's Day for everybody.

00:03:23.000 Yeah, actually, yeah, we're recording this on Valentine's Day.

00:03:26.140 Yeah, that's how we're spending our our Valentine's.

00:03:28.560 But yeah, guys, get the book, man.

00:03:29.900 It's out right now.

00:03:30.560 It's doing pretty well.

00:03:31.680 Number one bestselling feminist theory.

00:03:33.760 And on top of that, it's number nine in self-help and number 12 in books worldwide.

00:03:39.980 So it hit 10 earlier, but I guess I just lost two spots.

00:03:43.720 But yeah, for self-help, I'm right behind.

00:03:46.200 Let's see here.

00:03:47.320 I beat out David Goggins and Robert Greene.

00:03:50.640 And I think I beat out Jordan Peterson.

00:03:53.260 Yeah, I beat out Jordan Peterson, too.

00:03:54.460 Oh, I was going to buy that book.

00:03:56.360 Which one?

00:03:56.820 12 Rules for Life?

00:03:57.740 Yes.

00:03:58.280 Yeah.

00:03:58.680 I love Jordan Peterson.

00:03:59.900 Yeah.

00:04:00.080 Shout out to him.

00:04:00.740 He's a G.

00:04:01.680 But yeah, as you guys can see here, pretty much these are the books that are ahead.

00:04:05.360 I'm trying to get back into that top 10.

00:04:08.200 Well, this is for self-help, but this is for the self-help thing.

00:04:10.840 But let's go back to top, like, these are the bestseller books, period, right?

00:04:17.300 So I'm number 12 right now.

00:04:18.800 And that's not bad for first book ever and not really, you know, having that much of an author background.

00:04:25.060 But yeah, beat out a couple of other well-known books.

00:04:28.000 But yeah, these are the top books right now as of technically it's January 15th at 2 in the morning.

00:04:33.940 So, well, wait.

00:04:35.680 No, 2.25 a.m.

00:04:37.000 So yeah, guys, we're working.

00:04:38.180 Burn that midnight oil for y'all.

00:04:39.520 Yeah.

00:04:40.320 And then let's see here.

00:04:42.040 And then, yeah, and then obviously number one in Feminist Theory, which is hilarious because, oh, I got number one and number two.

00:04:48.140 Okay, Donna Murphy and myself.

00:04:51.500 I didn't even realize that.

00:04:53.100 And then this book right here, Ho Tactics, I guess this is like my antagonist right here.

00:04:57.700 You know, I'm teaching now women deserve less than over here.

00:04:59.680 They're teaching you how to be a 304 and get the most out of guys.

00:05:02.500 So look, it's a battle of the sexes, man.

00:05:04.440 But we're winning.

00:05:04.860 Yeah, this book, I think, teaches you how to, yes, it's how to mind.

00:05:07.560 No way.

00:05:07.920 Mind F a guy into whatever.

00:05:10.280 So, yeah, it is what it is.

00:05:11.940 But, yeah, guys, book is in stores now, man.

00:05:13.780 Get it on Kindle and paperback.

00:05:16.540 And then also I'm going to be releasing it on Audible very soon, probably next week while I'm in Dubai.

00:05:21.440 We'll try to get it out there and Audible for you guys because Mo's editing it right now as we speak.

00:05:25.660 And what else?

00:05:27.440 And then I'll do a hardcover copy version of it soon.

00:05:30.920 And then I'm also going to do signed ones with the hardcover.

00:05:33.460 Okay, guys?

00:05:34.020 So stay tuned for that.

00:05:35.080 I got a bunch of messages from you guys saying, yo, I want a hardcover version.

00:05:37.480 So that's going to come very soon.

00:05:38.680 And I'll sign a couple of those.

00:05:40.380 Do you think people have already, like, read it?

00:05:42.880 Yeah, a bunch of people have read it already.

00:05:44.340 Already?

00:05:44.800 Yeah.

00:05:45.080 That quick?

00:05:45.620 I mean, you know.

00:05:46.300 It's 86 pages.

00:05:47.760 It's short because women is service, right?

00:05:49.740 Exactly.

00:05:50.360 Yeah.

00:05:50.600 I know.

00:05:51.100 So, yeah.

00:05:53.540 And it got some good reviews.

00:05:54.740 I got some haters, of course, right?

00:05:56.200 You're always going to have haters.

00:05:57.600 But for the most part, 84 ratings, man.

00:05:59.520 And it's at a 4.8 out of 5.

00:06:04.060 So, yeah, man.

00:06:04.620 It's doing pretty well.

00:06:06.080 Anyway.

00:06:06.720 But, guys, yeah.

00:06:08.320 Don't forget to like the video.

00:06:09.400 Subscribe to the channel.

00:06:10.300 Now, let's get into the documentary, right?

00:06:12.520 With Anna Montez.

00:06:13.420 Guys, this is Declassified.

00:06:14.440 This is a pretty good show.

00:06:16.940 Yeah.

00:06:18.260 Angie, anything you want to say before we get into it?

00:06:20.560 Not really.

00:06:22.220 I'm just kind of like a little out of my sound of comfort here.

00:06:27.900 It's time to get out of that comfort zone.

00:06:29.800 Yeah.

00:06:30.420 We're not going to talk about crazies.

00:06:31.780 We're going to talk about traitors now.

00:06:33.680 Yeah.

00:06:34.060 You got to be diversified.

00:06:35.340 I keep it up.

00:06:37.160 All right, guys.

00:06:38.160 We're going to get into it right now with this documentary.

00:06:41.300 Actually, real quick, before I even do the documentary,

00:06:44.640 I'll give you guys a little bit of background.

00:06:46.080 Here is Anna Montez right here, okay?

00:06:51.360 Anna Berlin Montez, born February 28th to 1957,

00:06:54.680 is a former American senior analyst at the Defense Intelligence Agency

00:06:57.560 in the United States who spied on behalf of the Cuban government for 17 years, okay?

00:07:01.840 So who is the DIA?

00:07:03.400 This is who they are, guys.

00:07:04.420 The Defense Intelligence Agency, a.k.a.

00:07:06.240 the DIA is an intelligence agency and combat support agency

00:07:10.480 of the United States Department of Defense,

00:07:11.780 specializing in defense and military intelligence.

00:07:13.700 A component of the DOD and intelligence community IC,

00:07:17.600 DIA informs national, civilian, and defense policymakers

00:07:20.040 about the military intentions and capabilities of foreign governments

00:07:22.800 and non-state actors.

00:07:24.240 It also provides intelligence assistance, integration, and coordination

00:07:27.020 across uniform military service intelligence components,

00:07:30.220 which remain structurally separate from the DIA.

00:07:33.400 The agency's role encompasses the collection and analysis

00:07:35.780 of military-related foreign political economic industrial geographic

00:07:39.280 and medical and health intelligence.

00:07:42.100 DIA produces approximately one quarter of all intelligence content

00:07:45.040 that goes into the president's daily brief.

00:07:47.540 So, guys, these dudes are pretty important, and they're pretty big.

00:07:51.460 They comprise, there's 13-plus intelligence agencies, right?

00:07:56.740 And these guys comprise of 25%.

00:07:58.880 So these guys are right next to the big boys of NSA and CIA, okay?

00:08:03.980 And they specialize on the military side.

00:08:06.220 So now that you guys know what the DIA is and who Anna Montez is

00:08:10.260 from a bird's-eye view, let's get into the documentary.

00:08:16.480 There was a Cuban agent with access to classified information

00:08:21.520 placing our entire nation's future at risk.

00:08:24.260 The spy was almost certainly in our building.

00:08:26.940 I think it's the betrayal that gets me.

00:08:29.280 Like, how dare you?

00:08:30.740 It's a sensitive time because we were launching a war.

00:08:33.840 Our boys and girls in uniform are going to die

00:08:36.620 because she stabbed him in the back.

00:08:46.940 I'm going to skip this intro.

00:08:51.520 And the thing I like about this, guys, is these are cases

00:08:53.520 that were typically, like, classified

00:08:54.940 or had some kind of secret components to them.

00:08:57.760 And then, you know, with this documentary,

00:08:59.840 because it's relatively new, I think this is, what, from, like, 2021?

00:09:03.160 Or they declassify some of the content

00:09:05.760 so that we can, like, you know, get a more insider look

00:09:07.760 into how the investigation was done.

00:09:09.320 So this is one thing I like about this show.

00:09:13.820 Almost every nation in the world spies.

00:09:19.060 That's a fact.

00:09:19.900 And when it comes to our biggest threats, guys,

00:09:22.540 it's the Chinese, the Russians, the Cubans,

00:09:26.560 and surprisingly, guys, the Mossad as well.

00:09:30.840 And I learned that from Andrew Busamante.

00:09:32.800 I think, guys, go back and watch the interview

00:09:34.300 that I did with him on Fresh and Fit.

00:09:37.000 He was a former CIA officer.

00:09:38.720 And we talked about different intelligence capabilities

00:09:40.340 of the different agencies.

00:09:41.640 And he was of the different nations, excuse me.

00:09:44.360 And he was saying how the Mossad is extremely underrated

00:09:46.820 and will do whatever it takes to get ahead,

00:09:50.020 which all I'm going to say is John F. Kennedy and them boys,

00:09:55.060 which I'm going to bring Ryan Dawson on,

00:09:56.880 and we're going to talk about that, okay?

00:09:58.240 And also, speaking of them boys,

00:10:01.340 stealing nuclear secrets.

00:10:03.180 All documented fact, by the way.

00:10:04.880 We're going to talk about that with Ryan Dawson as well.

00:10:07.420 I look forward to that.

00:10:08.600 It's going to be really cool, guys.

00:10:11.600 But anyway, but without me getting into that,

00:10:13.500 and then also France has a very capable intelligence agency.

00:10:17.420 And this is kind of how the world works, guys.

00:10:19.040 After World War II, you've got to understand

00:10:20.700 that it's been a battle of proxy wars,

00:10:23.340 intelligence agencies stealing secrets,

00:10:25.520 stealing nuclear secrets,

00:10:26.760 stealing proliferation secrets,

00:10:28.080 and just getting an edge on other countries

00:10:30.760 because waging all-out war

00:10:32.240 isn't really something that's done in today's day and age.

00:10:36.040 Now, of course, you've got the Iraq war

00:10:38.260 and what's going on in Ukraine, whatever.

00:10:39.420 But these aren't full-fledged wars

00:10:41.240 like World War I and World War II, okay?

00:10:44.520 The wars nowadays are far more covert.

00:10:48.820 Most nations in the world spy against the United States.

00:10:51.900 We are the number one target.

00:10:55.080 There are at least 70, give or take 10,

00:10:59.120 nations spying on the U.S.

00:11:01.720 If you were to believe there are probably

00:11:06.020 in excess of 100,000 foreign agents

00:11:08.200 working in this country,

00:11:10.320 that's not paranoia.

00:11:11.840 That's a good guess.

00:11:15.980 My name's Chris Simmons.

00:11:17.720 I was a career intelligence officer

00:11:19.180 with the Defense Intelligence Agency

00:11:21.000 where I headed counterintelligence analysis

00:11:23.540 for the Americas team.

00:11:25.500 The Defense Intelligence Agency

00:11:26.740 is the Pentagon's intelligence apparatus.

00:11:29.260 DIA is focused on the national security structure

00:11:32.380 of every nation in the world.

00:11:34.320 And, guys, the Pentagon,

00:11:35.200 for all my foreign guys out there

00:11:36.460 that might not know,

00:11:37.520 the Pentagon is the head of,

00:11:39.400 is where basically the Department of Defense,

00:11:41.180 a.k.a. the U.S. military,

00:11:42.860 is headquartered at in the United States

00:11:44.320 out of Washington, D.C.

00:11:46.040 It's got a lot of secrets, right?

00:11:47.840 What was that?

00:11:48.400 It's got, like, a lot of nation secrets

00:11:50.200 in there, right?

00:11:51.080 Oh, yeah, of course.

00:11:51.800 Yeah, yeah, yeah.

00:11:52.100 I mean, we're definitely going to have,

00:11:53.280 you know, classified information

00:11:54.440 that, you know, they went and gathered

00:11:56.440 on foreign nations to, you know, maintain the edge.

00:11:58.340 That's what intelligence is,

00:11:59.200 is basically just knowing more

00:12:00.420 than the other places

00:12:02.000 to put yourself in a good position

00:12:03.400 for, you know, an advantage.

00:12:06.800 The way we became engaged with this case,

00:12:10.460 a woman who led part of the FBI investigation

00:12:13.520 took the initiative to set up the meeting.

00:12:16.080 The FBI explained.

00:12:17.220 Okay, FBI, guys.

00:12:18.660 The FBI is the agency

00:12:19.720 that is predominantly tasked

00:12:21.360 with investigating

00:12:22.720 any type of counterintelligence

00:12:26.520 or espionage, okay?

00:12:28.340 So they do the criminal investigation portion

00:12:31.460 anytime there's some type of espionage,

00:12:34.260 treason, selling secrets,

00:12:35.380 any of this stuff,

00:12:36.500 FBI takes lead on that.

00:12:37.720 It's actually, I think their main programmatic areas,

00:12:40.800 guys, is number one is obviously terrorism,

00:12:43.520 number two is counterintelligence slash espionage,

00:12:46.260 and then number three is public corruption.

00:12:47.840 Those are the three main things

00:12:49.120 that the FBI focuses on mostly.

00:12:51.320 And then after that, pretty much, you know,

00:12:52.700 it switches every year, right?

00:12:53.860 Child exploitation, bank robberies,

00:12:56.460 organized crime, et cetera.

00:12:58.180 But ever since 9-11,

00:12:59.620 terrorism has been number one,

00:13:01.000 with counterintelligence very close behind.

00:13:04.300 And that we've heard you and your team

00:13:07.840 are the best there are on Cuban intelligence,

00:13:10.040 and we are part of an FBI spy case

00:13:13.020 that involved Cuba,

00:13:14.860 which had been dragging on for three years,

00:13:16.940 and we're frustrated.

00:13:18.040 Can you help us?

00:13:21.100 I was so concerned about the damage

00:13:23.460 that this mole could have already inflicted

00:13:25.300 and will continue to inflict.

00:13:26.680 That I immediately called Scott Carmichael.

00:13:29.420 Scott Carmichael was head

00:13:31.580 of our investigation side.

00:13:34.580 I love being a spy hunter.

00:13:37.060 I love the chase.

00:13:39.140 Nothing would make me happier

00:13:40.340 than for somebody to say...

00:13:42.640 Okay, so you guys can see here,

00:13:44.300 Scott Carmichael,

00:13:45.380 it says criminal investigator here

00:13:46.320 at Defense Intelligence Agency, retired.

00:13:48.120 More than likely, what he was

00:13:49.700 was something called

00:13:50.440 Office of Inspector General, guys, or OIG.

00:13:53.300 So he's not an FBI agent.

00:13:55.260 He is a special agent

00:13:56.520 that works under DIA

00:13:58.780 that does more internal investigations.

00:14:00.900 However, the FBI, guys, okay,

00:14:04.120 is the main agency,

00:14:05.600 and I'm going to go ahead

00:14:06.240 and share a screen with y'all

00:14:07.540 real quick here.

00:14:09.980 Well, Scott...

00:14:11.540 So you guys can

00:14:13.080 kind of get an idea here

00:14:15.800 because we got a lot of foreign people here

00:14:17.340 that may or may not know.

00:14:19.120 All right, so the FBI

00:14:20.560 is the Domestic Intelligence Security Service

00:14:23.380 of the United States

00:14:23.920 and its principal law enforcement agency, okay,

00:14:26.040 operating under the jurisdiction

00:14:27.220 of the United States Department of Justice,

00:14:29.280 oh, hold on.

00:14:29.940 Is this not showing on screen?

00:14:32.680 Oh, hold on.

00:14:33.820 My bad, guys.

00:14:34.940 If it's, for some odd reason,

00:14:36.340 it's, like, really, really enlarged.

00:14:39.420 Why is it not?

00:14:41.740 Oh, my bad.

00:14:42.920 I'm looking at the wrong thing.

00:14:44.020 Sorry, guys.

00:14:44.580 Had a mind, a brain fart right there.

00:14:46.780 Okay.

00:14:48.960 Okay.

00:14:51.840 Operating under the jurisdiction

00:14:52.920 of the U.S. Department of Justice,

00:14:54.340 the FBI is also a member

00:14:55.440 of the U.S. Intelligence Community

00:14:56.480 and reports both

00:14:57.280 to both the Attorney General

00:14:59.020 and the Director of National Intelligence

00:15:00.340 as a leading U.S.

00:15:01.660 counterterrorism,

00:15:02.320 counterintelligence,

00:15:03.080 and criminal investigative organization.

00:15:05.880 FBI has jurisdiction over

00:15:06.900 violations of more than

00:15:08.240 200 categories of federal crime.

00:15:09.500 So, guys,

00:15:09.840 the FBI is the United States'

00:15:11.500 biggest federal law enforcement agency,

00:15:13.180 and they have two hats that they wear.

00:15:16.540 They are a law enforcement agency,

00:15:17.980 but they're also an intelligence agency.

00:15:19.680 So, let me explain the difference here

00:15:20.640 because people always get this confused.

00:15:22.900 A law enforcement agency, guys,

00:15:24.680 is tasked with enforcing, right,

00:15:27.860 violations of the U.S. code, right,

00:15:30.380 U.S.C., United States code.

00:15:31.780 They're charged with enforcing

00:15:33.200 the federal laws, okay?

00:15:34.540 And they go after you

00:15:37.500 for violating said laws.

00:15:39.580 The intelligence agencies, right,

00:15:41.840 their job is to gather intelligence,

00:15:44.120 not necessarily to arrest people,

00:15:46.140 but to gather intelligence

00:15:47.260 to give the United States

00:15:48.220 an edge against adversaries

00:15:50.640 of foreign governments, okay?

00:15:52.620 Typically, most intelligence agencies,

00:15:54.780 right, especially like the CIA,

00:15:56.820 the DIA, NSA, et cetera,

00:15:58.580 their job is to collect information,

00:16:00.720 typically on foreign nationals, okay?

00:16:03.100 The FBI's mission

00:16:05.360 is to collect intelligence

00:16:06.820 on domestic individuals, okay?

00:16:09.600 Whenever something is occurring

00:16:11.020 in the United States.

00:16:12.280 So, if something happens, right,

00:16:13.660 of national security concern

00:16:14.820 in the United States,

00:16:16.140 it goes to the FBI.

00:16:18.080 If it's international,

00:16:19.160 it goes over to the CIA.

00:16:21.020 And this is why the two agencies

00:16:22.160 have been fighting for a while

00:16:23.280 and why there were issues with 9-11

00:16:24.980 where some of the, you know,

00:16:26.400 the terrorists were found

00:16:27.740 in the United States.

00:16:29.200 The CIA knew about it,

00:16:30.360 but they didn't share the information

00:16:31.120 with the FBI, et cetera, et cetera.

00:16:32.820 And there wasn't a lot of communication,

00:16:34.600 which is what led to, you know,

00:16:35.540 the formation of Department of Homeland Security

00:16:37.400 and everything else that happened

00:16:38.460 after 9-11, which is a whole other story.

00:16:40.480 But the main thing to take away here

00:16:43.060 is that intelligence agencies

00:16:45.240 and law enforcement agencies

00:16:46.320 are two different animals.

00:16:48.840 However, the FBI has a very unique situation

00:16:51.220 where they are both an intelligence agency

00:16:53.440 as well as a law enforcement agency,

00:16:55.120 which ends up hurting them a little bit

00:16:56.960 because there are FBI agents,

00:16:59.360 and I know this from my personal experience

00:17:00.560 working with them,

00:17:01.140 that have never made a criminal arrest

00:17:02.520 in their career.

00:17:03.960 Yes, I said that.

00:17:05.400 There are FBI agents

00:17:06.700 that have been on the job

00:17:07.880 for 10 to 20 years

00:17:09.260 that have never made a criminal arrest

00:17:10.780 where they were the case agent

00:17:11.860 and actually ran the case.

00:17:13.560 Why?

00:17:14.000 Because a lot of times

00:17:14.800 when you do intelligence,

00:17:15.740 well, you're just gathering information

00:17:17.100 and, you know,

00:17:17.900 trying to prevent stuff,

00:17:18.940 and, you know,

00:17:19.780 your job is to kind of collect information.

00:17:21.440 That's it.

00:17:21.820 Like, you're not necessarily

00:17:22.520 arresting people.

00:17:23.540 However, when you're doing

00:17:24.780 criminal investigations,

00:17:25.820 yeah, you're going out there

00:17:26.740 and arresting people.

00:17:27.380 So I'll give you an example

00:17:28.520 of what I mean by this.

00:17:29.780 The FBI has something called squads, okay?

00:17:31.880 And the reason why I know this so well

00:17:32.860 is because a very good friend of mine

00:17:33.760 is an FBI agent.

00:17:34.480 So, you know,

00:17:36.260 I worked with them quite a bit.

00:17:37.260 I understand how their agency works.

00:17:38.900 They work a lot differently

00:17:39.900 than Homeland Security,

00:17:40.780 but once you start doing

00:17:42.420 certain types of cases,

00:17:43.260 I had a gang case

00:17:44.120 with Lion King's one time,

00:17:45.280 and I also did another case

00:17:46.540 that dealt with some,

00:17:47.540 how do I say this without,

00:17:50.760 I'm just going to say

00:17:51.360 some Sri Lankans

00:17:52.060 and some national security, right?

00:17:53.360 And then you guys can go ahead

00:17:54.460 and deduct whatever you want

00:17:55.800 from that.

00:17:56.460 But, and I was working

00:17:57.540 with FBI on that.

00:17:59.060 So, what was I going to say?

00:18:02.100 Oh, okay.

00:18:02.660 So you'll get like an FBI agent

00:18:03.860 that let's say does like

00:18:04.860 counterintelligence, right?

00:18:06.800 And then you'll get another FBI agent

00:18:08.260 that does, let's say, bank robberies.

00:18:09.820 That agent that does bank robberies

00:18:11.580 will probably make several arrests

00:18:13.200 that year

00:18:13.660 because the banks are calling

00:18:15.100 all the time.

00:18:15.640 Hey, we got robbed.

00:18:16.420 Hey, we got robbed again.

00:18:17.300 Hey, we got robbed, blah, blah, blah.

00:18:18.440 Which I know some of you guys

00:18:19.540 are like, what the hell?

00:18:20.440 Yes, bank robberies

00:18:21.140 are fairly common, guys.

00:18:22.220 I know.

00:18:22.380 I don't know why people

00:18:23.880 do them today.

00:18:24.600 Yeah, yeah, they still are.

00:18:26.060 I was surprised by that too

00:18:27.280 because I asked my friend

00:18:28.320 about this.

00:18:28.740 I was like, wait,

00:18:29.340 because he was telling me,

00:18:30.040 oh, bro, I got to go

00:18:30.800 respond to a bank robbery.

00:18:32.180 And I was like, bro,

00:18:33.300 you're like in a,

00:18:34.100 in like a gang squad.

00:18:35.560 Why are you going to

00:18:36.120 respond to a bank robbery?

00:18:37.220 He was like, yeah,

00:18:37.940 they need help, blah, blah, blah.

00:18:39.100 This is like the fifth bank robbery

00:18:40.440 of the week or some wild like that.

00:18:41.940 And this was, yeah,

00:18:42.840 this was when I was

00:18:43.940 in Laredo, Texas.

00:18:44.780 He was out of San Antonio.

00:18:46.180 Right.

00:18:46.740 And I mean, San Antonio,

00:18:48.280 it's kind of dangerous, right?

00:18:50.060 There's a lot of crime

00:18:52.380 like, bro, like people still

00:18:53.420 rob banks like that.

00:18:54.580 And this is back in like 2017.

00:18:56.640 He's like, yeah, bro,

00:18:57.280 it's actually very common still.

00:18:58.560 And I was like, wow.

00:18:59.520 Like I didn't realize.

00:19:00.480 How with all the technology

00:19:01.520 and like all the stuff

00:19:02.440 in the banks?

00:19:03.060 You know, that's a good question.

00:19:04.160 That's what I thought too.

00:19:05.140 But like people,

00:19:06.000 they pass a no,

00:19:06.980 like they just go in there,

00:19:08.040 run, get the money out

00:19:08.900 and then leave.

00:19:09.600 They don't take the marked bills.

00:19:11.140 Like, right.

00:19:12.400 You know, they got like

00:19:13.160 a getaway card that like

00:19:14.160 doesn't have plates

00:19:14.900 or is like stolen

00:19:15.900 or something like that.

00:19:16.680 So yeah, it's still very common.

00:19:19.560 But going back to what I was saying

00:19:20.700 to bring this all back

00:19:21.440 full circle for you.

00:19:22.100 I don't want to go

00:19:22.480 on a random rant,

00:19:23.260 but I really want you guys

00:19:24.560 to understand how the FBI

00:19:25.380 works here because

00:19:26.380 what you see on TV isn't true.

00:19:27.980 So that bank,

00:19:29.500 that agent that's

00:19:30.220 in the bank robbery squad,

00:19:31.380 he's going to be making

00:19:32.500 a lot of arrests

00:19:32.980 because that's what I would

00:19:33.760 consider like a response group.

00:19:35.600 So they're getting called out

00:19:36.780 at two in the morning,

00:19:37.720 you know, whatever

00:19:38.220 bank robbery happened

00:19:39.240 or, you know,

00:19:40.340 during banking hours,

00:19:41.380 whatever happens.

00:19:42.600 And they're doing

00:19:43.240 those investigations.

00:19:43.900 They're arresting people,

00:19:44.760 right?

00:19:45.620 Whereas someone,

00:19:46.700 an agent that works

00:19:47.500 in counterintelligence,

00:19:49.200 right?

00:19:49.500 Or even terrorism,

00:19:52.580 right?

00:19:52.780 A JTTF joint terrorism

00:19:53.880 task force squad guy.

00:19:55.940 They're might making arrests

00:19:57.240 once every five to 10 years

00:19:59.120 and once every 20 years,

00:20:00.380 right?

00:20:01.160 Because your mission

00:20:03.060 when you're doing

00:20:03.620 counterintelligence,

00:20:04.540 when you're doing

00:20:05.160 terrorism, whatever,

00:20:06.340 you're there to prevent it.

00:20:08.000 You don't want it to happen.

00:20:09.460 Okay?

00:20:09.960 When a terrorist attack

00:20:10.980 is successful,

00:20:12.060 that's bad, guys.

00:20:13.280 We're talking about

00:20:14.000 the economy getting hurt,

00:20:15.760 you know,

00:20:15.980 stock market going wild.

00:20:17.100 Like, it's not good

00:20:18.320 for anybody.

00:20:19.300 So their job is to kind of

00:20:20.420 thwart attacks a lot

00:20:21.420 of the times.

00:20:22.300 So you're not making arrests,

00:20:24.120 right?

00:20:24.640 And a lot of times

00:20:25.440 when you're thwarting attacks,

00:20:26.540 I'll be honest,

00:20:27.120 they'll bring guys in like me.

00:20:28.220 They used to work

00:20:28.620 for Homeland Security.

00:20:30.480 Hey, this guy,

00:20:31.400 we can't prove that he's doing

00:20:32.700 material support to terrorists,

00:20:34.000 but, you know,

00:20:35.100 we know he's here on a visa.

00:20:36.280 Okay.

00:20:37.120 Guys like me come in?

00:20:38.140 All right, motherfucker.

00:20:38.760 We know, you know,

00:20:39.900 you're involved in some stuff.

00:20:40.920 Maybe you do an interview.

00:20:42.100 He doesn't want to confess.

00:20:42.880 He doesn't want to say anything.

00:20:43.980 He doesn't want to cooperate.

00:20:44.740 Cool.

00:20:44.940 Just deport his ass.

00:20:45.700 Bam.

00:20:46.140 You know what I mean?

00:20:46.520 Get him out of here.

00:20:47.520 All right?

00:20:48.360 And that's how a lot of

00:20:49.740 terrorism cases

00:20:50.440 are actually conducted

00:20:51.340 and stopped, guys,

00:20:52.200 is a Homeland Security

00:20:53.600 Special Agent

00:20:54.100 will come in, right?

00:20:55.440 Use that immigration authority,

00:20:56.840 right?

00:20:57.640 Do an interview.

00:20:58.900 Bring him in

00:20:59.480 under immigration pretenses.

00:21:01.280 Do an interview.

00:21:02.240 They don't want to talk.

00:21:02.900 They don't want to cooperate.

00:21:03.800 Identify other individuals.

00:21:05.180 Kick him out.

00:21:05.680 Bam.

00:21:06.940 Give him with the big

00:21:07.840 and crisis averted.

00:21:10.460 Man, I'm getting kind of nervous.

00:21:12.300 Yeah.

00:21:12.760 Why is that?

00:21:13.720 Yeah, they're going to kick you out, too.

00:21:15.740 Just kidding.

00:21:17.760 She's legally here, guys,

00:21:18.700 before you guys make all jokes.

00:21:19.680 Yeah, I am.

00:21:20.320 Yeah, she's here legally.

00:21:21.320 But anyway, what was I going to say?

00:21:23.240 So, yeah.

00:21:23.720 So, and I say that, guys,

00:21:25.020 to show you the vast difference,

00:21:28.140 okay,

00:21:28.980 in different types of FBI agents

00:21:31.060 within the same agency.

00:21:32.180 You got one guy

00:21:33.060 kicking in doors

00:21:33.840 and arresting people

00:21:34.540 that are robbing banks,

00:21:35.340 and then you got another guy

00:21:36.380 that might not make an arrest

00:21:37.360 for years.

00:21:38.180 So, this goes to kind of,

00:21:40.060 that's kind of a microcosm

00:21:41.220 of the bigger situation here

00:21:42.520 where the FBI

00:21:43.300 is a criminal investigative agency

00:21:46.040 while simultaneously

00:21:46.820 being an intelligence agency,

00:21:48.140 but both missions

00:21:50.060 are very different,

00:21:51.640 which is why

00:21:52.280 the FBI can be fairly

00:21:53.560 discombobulated at times, right?

00:21:55.240 They're a big agency,

00:21:56.720 but they have

00:21:58.240 two different missions,

00:21:59.180 and having two different missions

00:22:00.420 a lot of times

00:22:01.000 dilutes the focus

00:22:02.580 of the agency's

00:22:04.280 overall mission,

00:22:05.560 okay?

00:22:06.720 So, and yes,

00:22:08.780 the CIA does not do

00:22:09.780 criminal investigations, guys.

00:22:10.800 That is the FBI

00:22:12.400 that does that.

00:22:13.240 The CIA does stuff overseas.

00:22:15.260 You know, the waterboarding

00:22:16.040 and all that fun stuff,

00:22:16.940 they ain't doing that here, okay?

00:22:18.240 Well, at least not to my knowledge.

00:22:20.780 All right.

00:22:21.760 All right.

00:22:22.260 Let's get back to

00:22:23.220 the documentary,

00:22:25.880 but that was an overview

00:22:27.520 of how the Bureau

00:22:29.100 really works.

00:22:31.340 Like the video, by the way.

00:22:32.680 You guys are not going to get

00:22:33.800 detailed information like that

00:22:35.020 anywhere else,

00:22:35.560 because, quite frankly,

00:22:36.480 none of these YouTubers

00:22:37.080 have ever done a criminal case,

00:22:38.480 let alone done a criminal case

00:22:39.740 alongside the Bureau

00:22:40.960 knows how they work.

00:22:42.560 No espionage is occurring.

00:22:44.040 We've got these few tidbits

00:22:45.000 of information.

00:22:45.860 Can you help us out?

00:22:47.080 You bet.

00:22:48.000 I especially love

00:22:49.240 what are termed

00:22:50.060 unsub investigations,

00:22:51.300 unknown subject investigations.

00:22:53.340 And those are investigations

00:22:54.680 where you have good reason

00:22:56.220 to believe that espionage

00:22:57.360 is occurring.

00:22:58.440 You have absolutely no idea

00:22:59.900 who might be doing it.

00:23:00.900 FBI was trying to identify

00:23:06.180 a Cuban spy who was possibly

00:23:07.580 in the D.C. area,

00:23:08.640 and they knew a few tidbits

00:23:09.720 of information about the spy,

00:23:11.420 but they had no idea

00:23:13.000 who this person was,

00:23:14.680 where this person worked.

00:23:15.880 Well, that's a problem,

00:23:17.700 because what they were talking

00:23:18.980 about is the possibility

00:23:19.980 that there was a Cuban agent

00:23:21.120 with access to classified information.

00:23:22.960 And this is a problem, guys,

00:23:28.760 because Cuba is a huge ally

00:23:30.240 of who?

00:23:31.280 Mother Russia.

00:23:32.640 And as you guys know,

00:23:34.200 we've had, you know,

00:23:35.140 issues with Russia

00:23:35.880 for a very long time.

00:23:37.260 I mean, most of the spies

00:23:38.140 that we catch,

00:23:38.760 a lot of the times,

00:23:39.440 are typically from Russia

00:23:40.660 or China,

00:23:41.380 at least the most prolific ones.

00:23:43.200 And vice versa,

00:23:44.160 a lot of our spies

00:23:45.340 get caught in their countries.

00:23:47.740 Cuba does not pose

00:23:49.180 a credible military threat

00:23:50.720 to the United States.

00:23:51.660 The real danger

00:23:52.700 of Cuban intelligence operations

00:23:54.040 is that the intelligence take

00:23:56.000 is shared by Cuba

00:23:57.500 with other countries.

00:23:59.460 He shares information

00:24:00.380 with Iran, China, Russia,

00:24:03.560 even Venezuela, North Korea.

00:24:06.080 Oh, your people.

00:24:08.040 I knew it.

00:24:09.240 Your people.

00:24:09.960 I knew it.

00:24:11.440 What makes Cuba important

00:24:15.080 is that it's the world's

00:24:17.160 biggest intelligence trafficker.

00:24:20.340 And I say that

00:24:21.380 in the context of

00:24:22.320 the sale or barter

00:24:23.820 of U.S. secrets

00:24:24.660 is now one of the central engines

00:24:27.220 of the Cuban economy.

00:24:29.580 Whether it's political secrets,

00:24:31.500 economic secrets,

00:24:32.880 military secrets,

00:24:34.140 every country

00:24:34.980 has interest

00:24:36.100 in the United States

00:24:37.040 and Cuba.

00:24:38.340 And that's a good point

00:24:39.240 because Cuba

00:24:39.780 is in a very good

00:24:40.980 geographic location,

00:24:42.980 right,

00:24:43.720 to extract information

00:24:45.200 from the United States,

00:24:47.080 surreptitiously,

00:24:47.600 of course,

00:24:48.280 and then sell it

00:24:49.460 to the United States' enemies.

00:24:51.740 So you guys can see

00:24:52.440 how much of a threat

00:24:53.140 Cuba really is

00:24:53.860 to the United States.

00:24:55.200 Their ability

00:24:55.980 to steal secrets,

00:24:57.480 they outperform

00:24:58.340 almost every nation

00:24:59.380 in the world.

00:25:03.840 The Cubans are so good

00:25:05.040 for several reasons.

00:25:06.720 At the start

00:25:07.620 of the Cold War,

00:25:08.780 the Russians

00:25:09.320 and all the Warsaw Pact allies

00:25:11.100 saw the Cubans

00:25:12.180 as useful partners

00:25:13.640 that would not draw attention

00:25:15.560 like they would.

00:25:17.200 The Russians,

00:25:18.620 the Poles,

00:25:19.660 every service in the world

00:25:21.040 trained the Cubans.

00:25:24.860 Cuba exploited the perception

00:25:26.900 that they're not a threat

00:25:28.040 because it lowers

00:25:29.140 their cost of espionage

00:25:30.280 and it gets them more clients

00:25:31.860 because situations

00:25:33.080 that would be hard

00:25:33.720 for the Chinese

00:25:34.240 or Russians to do,

00:25:35.920 Cuban agents

00:25:36.440 can do easily.

00:25:37.200 Building a non-sub case

00:25:44.520 is like putting

00:25:46.060 a puzzle together.

00:25:47.520 The challenge is

00:25:48.700 you don't know

00:25:49.660 what the puzzle looks like

00:25:51.320 and you don't know

00:25:52.120 how many pieces there are.

00:25:54.060 The FBI's case,

00:25:55.240 they had three

00:25:55.820 very distinct

00:25:57.000 pieces of the puzzle

00:25:59.140 as they shared

00:26:00.420 their puzzle pieces.

00:26:02.100 Turns out

00:26:02.900 I had the fourth puzzle piece.

00:26:07.200 That one piece

00:26:09.660 of information

00:26:11.080 fit perfectly

00:26:13.100 into

00:26:13.640 what they had just shared

00:26:15.840 and when

00:26:16.820 we put it all together

00:26:17.920 I told them

00:26:18.960 that the FBI

00:26:20.020 is looking in the wrong place

00:26:21.400 because the unsub

00:26:24.100 doing the three things

00:26:24.940 you just shared

00:26:25.600 coupled with the

00:26:26.620 fourth piece of the puzzle

00:26:27.800 there are probably

00:26:29.680 40 or 50 people

00:26:31.560 that could do

00:26:32.440 what your unsub

00:26:33.480 can do

00:26:34.000 and in all likelihood

00:26:35.400 is working.

00:26:36.080 Okay, that's good.

00:26:37.300 So they narrowed down

00:26:38.260 the pool

00:26:38.920 of potential suspects

00:26:40.200 which is huge guys

00:26:41.080 in an unsub case.

00:26:42.520 You're talking about

00:26:43.560 how many people

00:26:44.600 have classified information

00:26:45.720 literally hundreds.

00:26:47.740 How many have

00:26:48.720 information that can

00:26:50.480 compromise the United States?

00:26:51.720 So whenever you're able

00:26:53.960 to whittle down the list

00:26:55.040 that's half the game

00:26:56.000 when you do these types

00:26:56.760 of unsub cases

00:26:57.840 which is typically

00:26:58.340 how most espionage cases

00:26:59.740 begin.

00:27:01.480 Within the confines

00:27:02.560 of the Defense Intelligence Agency

00:27:04.120 even more narrowly

00:27:05.780 the spy was almost

00:27:06.800 certainly in our building.

00:27:12.220 What was the information

00:27:13.680 that the FBI had?

00:27:15.680 What did they show you?

00:27:18.080 The information

00:27:18.960 that our colleagues

00:27:19.800 shared with us

00:27:21.180 remains classified

00:27:22.680 to this day.

00:27:23.900 I knew

00:27:27.100 that was going to happen.

00:27:28.700 Guys, let me tell y'all something.

00:27:30.000 As a former government guy

00:27:31.060 that used to work

00:27:31.600 with the FBI

00:27:32.080 and these intelligence agencies

00:27:33.200 fairly often

00:27:34.400 these guys

00:27:35.520 classify everything, right?

00:27:37.120 When in doubt

00:27:37.660 it's classified, okay?

00:27:39.460 Because you know

00:27:40.320 that you ain't going

00:27:41.120 to get in trouble

00:27:41.700 if you just classify it.

00:27:43.000 And the other thing too

00:27:43.640 I want to make very clear

00:27:44.680 to y'all

00:27:45.060 a lot of the time

00:27:46.400 classified information

00:27:47.960 isn't classified

00:27:48.940 because the information

00:27:50.000 is actually

00:27:51.080 like secret.

00:27:53.120 It's classified

00:27:54.000 because the way

00:27:54.920 it was gathered

00:27:55.920 is secret.

00:27:56.940 Let me make that distinction

00:27:57.800 one more time.

00:28:00.820 A lot of the time guys

00:28:02.000 when information

00:28:02.620 is classified

00:28:03.560 right?

00:28:04.280 Whether it's secret

00:28:04.880 confidential

00:28:05.480 top secret

00:28:06.140 SCI

00:28:06.480 whatever it is

00:28:07.160 it's not that

00:28:08.460 the information

00:28:09.080 in itself

00:28:10.220 is secret

00:28:11.440 most of the time

00:28:12.860 not all the time

00:28:13.600 but most of the time

00:28:15.000 it's because

00:28:15.960 the way

00:28:16.740 it was gathered

00:28:17.780 reveals techniques

00:28:19.020 and is going

00:28:20.140 to compromise

00:28:20.940 typically

00:28:21.660 some source

00:28:23.200 or some type

00:28:24.040 of asset

00:28:24.620 that we have

00:28:25.400 because that information

00:28:26.580 is so

00:28:27.800 narrowly given

00:28:29.460 or so hard

00:28:30.420 to come by

00:28:31.200 or it is so tightly

00:28:32.720 tied to someone

00:28:34.620 that

00:28:35.580 if it gets out

00:28:37.140 it would immediately

00:28:37.780 divulge who the source is

00:28:39.020 or how it was gathered

00:28:40.140 which would hurt us.

00:28:41.220 So the methodologies

00:28:42.120 of how it was gathered

00:28:43.020 is what they're trying

00:28:44.100 to protect a lot of times

00:28:45.020 not the information

00:28:46.300 in and of itself.

00:28:48.620 Okay?

00:28:49.480 So

00:28:49.700 I want to make that

00:28:51.880 distinction for you guys

00:28:52.620 as well

00:28:53.040 because a lot of people

00:28:55.220 don't know that

00:28:55.680 they think

00:28:55.960 oh my god

00:28:56.440 this is like

00:28:56.900 really secret stuff

00:28:57.640 I mean guys

00:28:58.520 I've seen stuff

00:28:59.720 that's considered

00:29:00.220 oh my god

00:29:00.760 this is classified

00:29:01.260 whatever

00:29:01.520 and you're looking at it

00:29:02.260 and you're like

00:29:02.440 bro this is public knowledge

00:29:03.460 what the hell

00:29:03.980 but you know

00:29:05.440 but it's because

00:29:06.120 it was gathered

00:29:07.100 a certain way

00:29:07.760 that they had to

00:29:08.500 keep it that way

00:29:09.060 right?

00:29:10.840 Because

00:29:11.160 it would

00:29:12.320 and the other thing

00:29:13.180 too I want to say

00:29:13.740 for y'all too

00:29:14.160 is a guy that did

00:29:14.900 criminal investigations

00:29:16.100 versus like doing

00:29:16.940 counterintelligence

00:29:19.240 or these types

00:29:19.720 of classified cases

00:29:20.920 they're very overrated

00:29:22.240 right?

00:29:22.480 I don't want to be

00:29:22.920 a jerk or anything

00:29:24.120 or a party pooper

00:29:24.820 but the reality is

00:29:25.640 you can't use

00:29:26.860 classified information

00:29:28.340 in criminal investigations

00:29:30.220 you can't

00:29:31.520 okay?

00:29:32.140 Because anything

00:29:32.800 that goes into

00:29:33.720 a criminal case

00:29:34.580 is discoverable

00:29:35.780 and things that are

00:29:36.680 discoverable

00:29:37.340 guess what?

00:29:38.380 They need to be

00:29:38.920 declassified

00:29:39.600 before they could be

00:29:40.600 discoverable

00:29:41.600 right?

00:29:42.620 So

00:29:42.920 if you're going to

00:29:44.420 make a case criminal

00:29:45.180 you have to work

00:29:46.840 through declassifying

00:29:47.680 everything in the investigation

00:29:48.960 to make sure

00:29:50.100 because you're going to

00:29:50.560 have to give it

00:29:50.940 to some defense attorney

00:29:51.840 right?

00:29:52.680 He don't have a clearance

00:29:53.500 it's going to go to a judge

00:29:55.600 a lot of times

00:29:56.140 they don't have clearances

00:29:56.880 right?

00:29:58.020 Typically the only people

00:29:58.860 that have a clearance

00:29:59.540 in the investigation

00:30:00.600 is the case agent

00:30:01.980 sometimes the AUSA

00:30:03.800 right?

00:30:04.380 If it's a national security case

00:30:05.280 typically the AUSA

00:30:05.980 will have a clearance

00:30:06.480 but not all AUSAs

00:30:07.360 have clearances

00:30:07.900 the AUSA is the federal

00:30:08.960 prosecutor by the way guys

00:30:09.860 so

00:30:10.380 so the reason why

00:30:12.680 a lot of these like

00:30:13.500 CI cases or whatever

00:30:14.600 never see the light of day

00:30:15.540 in a courtroom

00:30:16.040 is because

00:30:17.200 it's classified

00:30:17.980 and classified material

00:30:18.840 can't go into

00:30:19.500 a criminal investigation

00:30:20.780 it's useless

00:30:22.220 right?

00:30:22.980 Which is why myself

00:30:23.760 I typically never use

00:30:24.820 classified information

00:30:25.600 I stayed away from it

00:30:26.520 I remember

00:30:27.160 I had one national security case

00:30:28.740 it was actually

00:30:29.880 right before I left

00:30:30.460 HSI

00:30:30.860 and it was a case

00:30:32.500 I was telling you about

00:30:33.020 with the Sri Lankans

00:30:33.680 I had a co-case agent

00:30:36.160 right?

00:30:36.860 So this is more advanced

00:30:37.880 stuff for y'all

00:30:38.360 but I'm going to give you

00:30:39.480 guys some sauce here

00:30:40.280 so whenever you have a case

00:30:41.980 that has a national security

00:30:42.860 nexus

00:30:43.160 you want a primary case agent

00:30:45.560 and then you want someone

00:30:46.340 who you call

00:30:47.000 a taint agent

00:30:48.160 okay?

00:30:49.200 And

00:30:49.520 the primary case agent

00:30:51.380 he's the one

00:30:52.620 that's doing everything

00:30:53.800 in the light

00:30:54.420 okay?

00:30:54.920 he's writing the reports

00:30:56.500 he's writing the affidavits

00:30:57.860 he's trying to stay away

00:30:59.480 from the classified

00:31:00.000 information etc

00:31:00.800 he's very transparent

00:31:01.700 he's the more transparent

00:31:02.920 one because the case

00:31:03.560 is going to have to see

00:31:04.220 the light of day

00:31:05.160 in the courtroom

00:31:05.500 right?

00:31:05.960 Right

00:31:06.120 then your co-case agent

00:31:07.740 or someone else

00:31:08.480 right?

00:31:09.060 in your squad

00:31:09.680 they'll go ahead

00:31:11.020 and they'll look at

00:31:11.960 all the classified stuff

00:31:13.120 right?

00:31:14.460 And

00:31:14.820 they'll also

00:31:16.060 help you

00:31:16.900 with the investigation

00:31:17.940 but the thing is

00:31:18.700 right?

00:31:19.560 Is that as the case agent

00:31:20.740 you don't want to know

00:31:21.780 the classified stuff

00:31:22.560 and I'll tell y'all why

00:31:23.420 here in a second

00:31:23.940 you want them to go

00:31:25.580 the co-case agent

00:31:26.340 to go figure out

00:31:27.000 all the classified stuff

00:31:27.780 for you

00:31:28.240 and kind of point you

00:31:29.240 in the direction of

00:31:29.840 hey maybe you want

00:31:30.360 to look here

00:31:30.700 blah blah blah

00:31:31.060 all that type of thing

00:31:31.760 and the reason why guys

00:31:33.200 is because if they put you

00:31:34.600 right on the stand

00:31:35.960 or whatever

00:31:37.300 and ask you questions

00:31:39.300 well you can't lie

00:31:40.260 okay?

00:31:41.540 So it's better for you

00:31:42.720 a lot of the times

00:31:43.300 from a liability standpoint

00:31:44.400 to just not know

00:31:45.520 right?

00:31:46.620 The classified information

00:31:47.580 because you can't

00:31:48.140 talk about it

00:31:48.760 right?

00:31:49.760 And if they call

00:31:50.280 the other agent in

00:31:51.200 hey I need you to testify

00:31:52.320 he can just go on there

00:31:53.160 and be like

00:31:53.380 well it's classified

00:31:53.900 I can't

00:31:54.280 sorry

00:31:54.700 can't disclose it

00:31:56.380 It's kind of like secrets

00:31:56.800 like the less

00:31:57.780 they have to be known

00:31:59.100 the more compromised

00:32:00.020 you can be

00:32:01.380 knowing them

00:32:02.140 Yeah

00:32:02.400 absolutely

00:32:03.140 so that's

00:32:05.100 one way to get around it

00:32:06.760 there's many other

00:32:07.320 investigative strategies

00:32:08.500 to do this guys

00:32:09.260 whenever you're doing

00:32:09.780 national security cases

00:32:10.480 or whatever

00:32:10.820 or the other route

00:32:12.840 is you can just

00:32:13.380 declassify everything

00:32:14.240 right?

00:32:14.660 You can go through

00:32:15.040 the process of actually

00:32:16.100 declassifying the information

00:32:17.340 so you can put it

00:32:18.280 in a courtroom

00:32:18.700 but sometimes

00:32:19.500 that's not feasible

00:32:20.180 so having a Tate agent

00:32:21.220 is another tactic

00:32:22.080 that you can use

00:32:22.780 and having Tate agents

00:32:24.740 is a tactic

00:32:25.540 that can be used

00:32:26.080 for cases like this

00:32:28.900 that have classified information

00:32:30.200 or in the Trump case

00:32:31.640 for example

00:32:32.180 cases that have

00:32:33.760 attorney privilege

00:32:35.500 information

00:32:37.060 and attorney client

00:32:38.380 privilege information

00:32:39.200 is like

00:32:40.320 any information

00:32:41.200 where the potential

00:32:42.640 defendant is talking

00:32:43.360 to their attorney

00:32:43.960 right?

00:32:44.240 so in that case

00:32:45.680 what they ended up doing

00:32:46.600 was they had

00:32:47.860 the case agent

00:32:49.240 and his squad

00:32:50.000 go in

00:32:50.920 and do the search

00:32:51.980 right?

00:32:52.980 and then

00:32:53.700 a Tate squad

00:32:54.800 went in

00:32:55.320 right?

00:32:55.880 that wasn't involved

00:32:56.680 in that investigation

00:32:57.520 necessarily

00:32:58.060 and anything

00:32:59.000 that was dealt with

00:32:59.960 that had attorney

00:33:00.800 client privilege

00:33:01.400 they dealt with that

00:33:02.260 and they went through

00:33:03.200 and filtered

00:33:03.620 what was attorney

00:33:04.240 client privilege

00:33:04.720 and what was not

00:33:05.360 and then they gave

00:33:06.180 the stuff that was not

00:33:07.020 over to the case agent

00:33:08.040 and the reason

00:33:08.760 why they do that

00:33:09.460 is so that the case agent

00:33:10.660 isn't tainted

00:33:11.300 he doesn't see

00:33:12.160 any of that stuff

00:33:12.800 so if he's called

00:33:13.760 to the stand

00:33:14.240 or whatever

00:33:14.600 he doesn't know

00:33:15.520 okay?

00:33:16.600 and then

00:33:17.060 if they do need

00:33:18.500 to go ahead

00:33:18.980 and figure that stuff out

00:33:20.220 they can call

00:33:20.600 the agents

00:33:20.900 that were from

00:33:21.460 the Tate team

00:33:22.160 right?

00:33:23.080 that saw the

00:33:23.620 privilege information

00:33:24.340 and it can't be used

00:33:25.120 against Donald Trump

00:33:25.820 right?

00:33:26.820 in that case

00:33:27.520 same thing

00:33:28.120 with classified information

00:33:28.980 so Tate teams

00:33:30.080 is kind of a strategy

00:33:30.900 I'm getting in the weeds

00:33:31.600 here for y'all

00:33:32.020 but I'm explaining this

00:33:33.160 so you guys can

00:33:33.540 kind of understand

00:33:34.200 how these types

00:33:35.360 of sensitive investigations

00:33:36.260 where you got

00:33:36.660 attorney client privilege

00:33:37.620 or national security

00:33:38.540 information

00:33:39.060 or classified information

00:33:39.960 whatever it may be

00:33:40.640 how it typically works

00:33:41.820 right?

00:33:42.040 because I've done them

00:33:42.800 I know

00:33:43.260 right?

00:33:44.700 so

00:33:45.060 like the video

00:33:45.920 because you guys

00:33:46.960 aren't going to get

00:33:47.380 that level of detail

00:33:48.060 anywhere else

00:33:48.500 on the internet

00:33:48.960 and subscribe

00:33:50.580 of course

00:33:51.260 yeah subscribe

00:33:51.860 to the channel

00:33:52.280 as well

00:33:52.500 and then also

00:33:53.000 check out Angie

00:33:54.220 on Instagram

00:33:54.560 guys

00:33:54.840 soangelica

00:33:55.420 with two A's

00:33:56.060 at the end

00:33:56.560 right?

00:33:58.380 yeah

00:33:58.540 soangelica

00:33:59.600 with two A's

00:33:59.940 at the end

00:34:00.140 yeah it is

00:34:00.840 but please

00:34:01.760 don't send

00:34:03.000 dick pics

00:34:03.540 or weird comments

00:34:05.440 I've been receiving

00:34:06.400 like weird comments

00:34:07.700 okay

00:34:08.200 man

00:34:09.100 these people

00:34:10.140 fair enough

00:34:11.340 you guys better

00:34:12.240 not be simping

00:34:12.800 get that book

00:34:13.340 why women deserve less

00:34:14.200 you better not be simping

00:34:14.900 alright

00:34:15.940 I'm gonna roast you

00:34:16.840 alright let's get back

00:34:18.220 into it guys

00:34:18.680 reveal

00:34:19.700 some of our

00:34:21.140 methods that the

00:34:22.380 Cubans aren't

00:34:23.040 yet aware of

00:34:23.920 he said it for me

00:34:26.280 see it wasn't

00:34:27.000 the information

00:34:27.500 that was classified

00:34:28.060 in itself

00:34:28.600 it reveals

00:34:29.520 the methodologies

00:34:30.260 on how they

00:34:30.700 gathered it

00:34:31.420 some of the

00:34:35.440 methods

00:34:36.200 and systems

00:34:37.520 that the

00:34:38.140 DIA

00:34:38.480 employs

00:34:39.320 to collect

00:34:39.780 information

00:34:40.280 about other

00:34:40.960 countries

00:34:41.460 activities

00:34:42.100 are

00:34:43.060 so sophisticated

00:34:44.380 and that's why

00:34:45.340 espionage

00:34:46.040 is so dangerous

00:34:46.880 because

00:34:47.460 if you tell

00:34:48.580 other countries

00:34:50.040 hey the United

00:34:51.120 States is able

00:34:51.860 to do

00:34:52.340 this

00:34:52.980 they will then

00:34:54.900 guard

00:34:55.280 against that

00:34:56.200 and of course

00:34:57.300 that degrades

00:34:57.960 our ability

00:34:58.540 to collect

00:34:59.020 information

00:34:59.500 that our

00:35:00.020 war fighters

00:35:00.560 need

00:35:00.940 in the event

00:35:01.440 that they go

00:35:01.840 to war

00:35:02.220 with some

00:35:02.620 country

00:35:02.980 that's the

00:35:04.040 problem

00:35:04.400 for most of

00:35:06.300 the years

00:35:06.860 that I worked

00:35:07.440 for DIA

00:35:07.980 I was the

00:35:08.700 senior

00:35:08.960 counterintelligence

00:35:09.700 investigator

00:35:10.380 so if anybody

00:35:11.160 was engaging

00:35:12.080 in espionage

00:35:12.920 in the agency

00:35:14.060 on my watch

00:35:15.320 that was an

00:35:16.440 affront to me

00:35:17.280 I hate that

00:35:18.980 I think it's

00:35:20.180 the betrayal

00:35:20.800 that gets me

00:35:21.700 like how dare

00:35:22.840 you

00:35:23.180 one investigative

00:35:26.460 lead that the

00:35:27.320 FBI had

00:35:28.220 was that the

00:35:29.340 spying question

00:35:30.220 had traveled

00:35:31.220 to the naval

00:35:32.040 station at

00:35:32.860 Guantanamo Cuba

00:35:33.820 during a specific

00:35:35.580 time frame

00:35:36.200 that was the best

00:35:37.060 investigative lead

00:35:37.820 I knew that

00:35:39.600 people who travel

00:35:40.320 to Gitmo

00:35:40.860 require permission

00:35:41.760 to do so

00:35:42.400 and they

00:35:43.360 submit the request

00:35:44.500 for permission

00:35:45.060 by message

00:35:45.760 all right real quick

00:35:47.300 guys just so you

00:35:48.380 guys know what

00:35:48.880 Guantanamo Bay is

00:35:49.880 because some of you

00:35:50.340 guys might be like

00:35:50.980 what the hell

00:35:51.340 is Guantanamo Bay

00:35:52.200 Guantanamo Bay

00:35:54.620 and they've been

00:35:54.940 talking about

00:35:55.360 closing this place

00:35:56.080 down forever

00:35:57.260 and it's still open

00:35:59.000 I remember Obama

00:35:59.780 campaigned saying

00:36:01.380 that but here's

00:36:02.100 Guantanamo Bay

00:36:02.680 guys the Guantanamo

00:36:03.440 Bay detention camp

00:36:04.320 is the United States

00:36:05.240 military prison

00:36:05.940 located within

00:36:06.500 Guantanamo Bay

00:36:07.140 naval base

00:36:07.700 also referred to

00:36:08.420 as Guantanamo

00:36:09.960 Gitmo

00:36:10.720 and Gitmo

00:36:11.960 on the coast

00:36:12.540 of Guantanamo Bay

00:36:13.280 in Cuba

00:36:13.800 of the roughly

00:36:14.620 780 people

00:36:15.480 detained there

00:36:16.000 since January

00:36:16.520 2002

00:36:17.080 when the military

00:36:17.620 prison first

00:36:18.240 opened after

00:36:18.800 the September

00:36:19.180 11th attacks

00:36:19.860 737 have been

00:36:21.340 transferred elsewhere

00:36:22.120 34 remain there

00:36:23.220 and 9 have died

00:36:23.920 while in custody

00:36:24.940 okay this is a

00:36:25.900 very controversial

00:36:26.520 prison 60 minutes

00:36:27.540 Australia did a

00:36:28.200 whole take on

00:36:29.680 Guantanamo Bay

00:36:31.140 but they don't

00:36:32.440 want to say it bro

00:36:33.020 but this is where

00:36:33.520 they basically hold

00:36:34.020 terrorists all right

00:36:34.560 straight out this is

00:36:35.100 what they this is

00:36:36.000 where they hold

00:36:36.340 terrorists the guy

00:36:37.940 that orchestrated

00:36:38.720 the 9-11 attacks

00:36:40.180 KSM Khalid Sheikh

00:36:43.120 Mohammed this guy

00:36:43.980 right here

00:36:46.520 okay and I'm at

00:36:49.200 this point 9-11

00:36:49.900 is burned into my

00:36:50.540 head because I did

00:36:51.000 so much research

00:36:51.560 for it and I'm

00:36:53.180 aware of the

00:36:53.760 obviously the

00:36:54.420 official story

00:36:55.000 and the unofficial

00:36:55.600 story but this

00:36:56.420 guy right here

00:36:56.800 Khalid Sheikh Mohammed

00:36:57.500 also known as

00:36:58.300 as about 50 other

00:36:59.580 pseudonyms

00:36:59.980 Sheikh Sheikh Mohammed

00:37:01.420 yep is a

00:37:02.060 Pakistani Islamist

00:37:02.900 militant held by

00:37:04.100 the United States

00:37:04.600 at the Guantanamo

00:37:05.200 Bay detention camp

00:37:06.040 under terrorism

00:37:06.800 charges he was

00:37:08.200 named as the

00:37:08.920 principal architect

00:37:09.500 of 9-11 attacks

00:37:10.260 in the 9-11

00:37:10.720 commission report

00:37:11.380 he's often referred

00:37:12.340 to by his

00:37:13.620 initials KSM

00:37:15.220 and also

00:37:16.220 speaking of him

00:37:17.820 this is his

00:37:18.660 nephew right here

00:37:19.540 Ramsey Youssef

00:37:21.380 okay who was

00:37:23.140 responsible for the

00:37:24.060 1993 World

00:37:25.460 Trade Center

00:37:25.820 bombings okay

00:37:26.620 and this is his

00:37:27.440 nephew

00:37:27.720 oh I remember

00:37:28.660 that case

00:37:29.240 oh you remember

00:37:29.780 this one

00:37:30.060 yeah

00:37:30.200 you can do

00:37:30.560 that

00:37:30.880 so I already

00:37:31.880 did it

00:37:32.220 oh you did

00:37:32.680 it

00:37:32.800 I did this

00:37:33.240 one yeah

00:37:33.560 so it was a

00:37:35.360 good case though

00:37:35.900 very interesting

00:37:36.600 case

00:37:36.900 so it was

00:37:38.040 very good

00:37:38.500 it's really good

00:37:39.200 yeah and don't

00:37:40.360 worry guys I know

00:37:41.040 some of y'all are

00:37:41.460 like well 9-11

00:37:42.280 was an inside job

00:37:43.280 blah blah blah

00:37:43.760 I will say this

00:37:45.080 I've watched

00:37:45.740 Dawson's take on it

00:37:46.860 and he has a more

00:37:48.400 holistic view on it

00:37:49.500 because a lot of

00:37:50.000 these other conspiracy

00:37:50.800 theorists

00:37:51.280 9-11 people

00:37:53.140 didn't cover a very

00:37:54.900 big part

00:37:55.640 of 9-11

00:37:56.800 and all I'm gonna say

00:37:58.840 is

00:37:59.220 them boys definitely

00:38:01.300 had some involvement

00:38:02.040 but

00:38:02.660 as well as these

00:38:04.720 terrorists as well

00:38:05.460 but we're

00:38:06.280 I will do that

00:38:07.240 probably on rumble

00:38:08.200 with him

00:38:09.380 and we're gonna

00:38:09.880 cover 9-11

00:38:10.620 from top to bottom

00:38:12.700 guys

00:38:13.000 top to bottom

00:38:13.580 and I obviously

00:38:14.100 I'm very aware

00:38:14.760 of the official

00:38:15.900 narrative

00:38:16.220 and the unofficial

00:38:16.980 narrative

00:38:17.400 and I know

00:38:18.680 Ryan Dawson's

00:38:20.060 perspective as well

00:38:20.860 which I think

00:38:21.360 is probably

00:38:21.900 one of the best

00:38:23.160 ones because

00:38:23.600 he covers

00:38:24.180 everything

00:38:24.840 you know

00:38:25.160 to include

00:38:25.620 you know

00:38:26.420 from the terrorism

00:38:27.020 side

00:38:27.440 to the

00:38:28.000 controlled demolition

00:38:28.920 side

00:38:29.380 to

00:38:29.980 that side

00:38:32.760 if you know

00:38:33.160 what I'm saying

00:38:33.560 we're on YouTube

00:38:34.000 I can't say it

00:38:34.940 Angie you know

00:38:35.820 what I'm talking

00:38:36.180 about though

00:38:36.540 so yeah

00:38:37.880 but that's what

00:38:40.160 Guantanamo Bay

00:38:40.660 is guys

00:38:41.060 and it's

00:38:42.320 searchable by

00:38:42.980 keyword

00:38:43.440 episode coming

00:38:44.580 soon on rumble

00:38:45.400 with Ryan Dawson

00:38:46.500 we're organizing

00:38:47.160 it right now

00:38:47.600 we're gonna cover

00:38:48.000 everything for y'all

00:38:48.580 from JFK

00:38:50.000 to nuclear

00:38:51.400 secrets being

00:38:51.980 stolen by

00:38:52.760 and then

00:38:55.120 also 9-11

00:38:56.660 it only took

00:38:59.120 me

00:38:59.240 yeah we probably

00:38:59.620 should do

00:38:59.980 on rumble

00:39:00.680 at some point

00:39:01.200 moments to

00:39:02.240 submit my query

00:39:03.320 and the

00:39:05.100 system produced

00:39:06.280 a hit file

00:39:07.240 a list of

00:39:08.140 messages

00:39:08.620 about a hundred

00:39:09.820 of them

00:39:10.560 that matched

00:39:11.400 parameters of

00:39:12.340 my search

00:39:12.800 and so I

00:39:13.780 started hitting

00:39:14.320 my function

00:39:14.860 key very

00:39:15.360 quickly

00:39:15.980 just to see

00:39:16.700 if I would

00:39:17.080 recognize names

00:39:18.120 and the

00:39:19.400 20th one

00:39:20.280 it was

00:39:28.460 I don't want

00:39:30.080 this on

00:39:30.540 it was

00:39:31.640 very very

00:39:32.320 emotional

00:39:32.900 the moment

00:39:40.760 I saw

00:39:41.180 her name

00:39:41.620 I knew

00:39:42.920 now I

00:39:50.020 know some

00:39:50.300 of you guys

00:39:50.540 are probably

00:39:50.780 like well why

00:39:51.200 is he crying

00:39:51.620 like why does

00:39:52.060 he care blah blah

00:39:52.560 blah a lot

00:39:53.160 of the times

00:39:53.500 guys when

00:39:54.060 you work

00:39:55.340 in the

00:39:55.620 government

00:39:55.900 you really

00:39:56.340 start to

00:39:56.760 build really

00:39:57.320 strong bonds

00:39:58.160 and formations

00:39:58.740 with the people

00:39:59.680 that you work

00:40:00.260 with you get

00:40:01.160 to know

00:40:01.340 their families

00:40:01.920 you get to

00:40:03.000 know them

00:40:03.520 you get to

00:40:04.500 know what

00:40:05.640 they do in

00:40:05.940 their personal

00:40:06.360 time

00:40:06.820 so anytime

00:40:08.300 like a

00:40:08.800 government

00:40:09.080 employee

00:40:09.600 that you

00:40:10.260 right is

00:40:10.980 suspected of

00:40:11.680 some kind

00:40:12.100 of misconduct

00:40:12.840 or wrong

00:40:13.300 going or in

00:40:13.780 this case

00:40:14.220 the worst

00:40:15.100 of crimes

00:40:15.700 treason

00:40:16.120 selling secrets

00:40:16.820 to an

00:40:17.420 enemy

00:40:17.660 right which

00:40:18.680 is what

00:40:18.940 she's about

00:40:19.340 to be

00:40:19.540 suspected of

00:40:20.020 you guys

00:40:20.220 are going

00:40:20.360 to see

00:40:20.560 here in

00:40:20.860 a second

00:40:21.180 everyone

00:40:22.320 is in

00:40:22.640 shock

00:40:22.940 right and

00:40:23.780 it's like

00:40:24.340 oh man

00:40:25.380 wow

00:40:25.800 so

00:40:26.760 that is

00:40:28.400 quite shocking

00:40:29.140 what was that

00:40:30.260 it's quite shocking

00:40:30.900 though because

00:40:31.500 on the documentary

00:40:32.760 that I was

00:40:33.280 watching on the

00:40:33.740 way here

00:40:34.180 they said

00:40:35.500 that this

00:40:36.100 guy said

00:40:36.780 that

00:40:37.100 Anna Montez

00:40:38.120 was very

00:40:38.560 reserved

00:40:39.140 she was very

00:40:40.360 like

00:40:40.700 to work

00:40:41.940 and that's

00:40:42.420 it

00:40:42.580 yeah

00:40:42.860 she was

00:40:43.280 a good

00:40:43.460 worker

00:40:43.720 yeah

00:40:44.220 she was

00:40:44.620 and that's

00:40:44.980 why

00:40:45.180 another reason

00:40:45.700 why

00:40:45.940 it shocks

00:40:47.300 people

00:40:47.500 and I'll

00:40:47.920 tell you guys

00:40:48.300 this

00:40:48.440 I knew

00:40:48.920 I know

00:40:49.380 agents

00:40:49.740 that got

00:40:50.060 arrested

00:40:50.340 for like

00:40:50.740 misconduct

00:40:51.160 and you

00:40:51.600 never see

00:40:51.960 it coming

00:40:52.240 dude

00:40:52.440 you never

00:40:53.200 see it

00:40:53.540 coming

00:40:53.760 right

00:40:54.600 you never

00:40:55.060 see it

00:40:55.360 happening

00:40:55.600 like

00:40:55.820 I worked

00:40:56.300 with a

00:40:56.540 guy

00:40:56.780 in Laredo

00:40:57.840 wow

00:40:58.180 I worked

00:41:02.800 with a guy

00:41:03.160 in Laredo

00:41:03.600 who's a

00:41:03.940 good guy

00:41:04.340 man

00:41:04.680 you can

00:41:05.300 actually

00:41:05.600 yeah

00:41:06.680 I won't

00:41:07.540 say his

00:41:07.840 name for

00:41:08.180 now

00:41:08.380 but

00:41:08.640 but either

00:41:10.160 way

00:41:10.400 he ended

00:41:10.800 up getting

00:41:11.140 arrested

00:41:11.480 later on

00:41:11.880 it's all

00:41:12.200 public

00:41:12.480 information

00:41:12.880 you can

00:41:13.140 literally

00:41:13.380 look it

00:41:13.720 up

00:41:13.920 he ended

00:41:14.400 up getting

00:41:14.680 arrested

00:41:14.980 for stealing

00:41:15.620 people's

00:41:15.980 identities

00:41:16.380 to gamble

00:41:16.900 he had

00:41:17.140 a gambling

00:41:17.440 problem

00:41:17.880 and I

00:41:19.160 was shocked

00:41:19.800 yeah

00:41:20.180 yeah

00:41:21.200 the guy

00:41:21.600 was

00:41:21.860 he had

00:41:23.200 a gambling

00:41:23.520 problem

00:41:23.920 yeah

00:41:24.580 yeah

00:41:25.620 so the

00:41:26.260 guy was

00:41:26.520 former

00:41:26.740 board patrol

00:41:27.240 worked for

00:41:29.300 North Carolina

00:41:30.540 Sheriff's

00:41:31.060 Office

00:41:31.380 right

00:41:31.780 in North

00:41:33.780 Carolina

00:41:34.200 he ended

00:41:35.560 up becoming

00:41:35.920 an HSI

00:41:36.380 special agent

00:41:37.020 right

00:41:37.740 so he had

00:41:38.080 been in law

00:41:38.460 enforcement

00:41:38.680 for like 10

00:41:39.240 or 15

00:41:39.620 years

00:41:39.900 got on the

00:41:40.320 job with

00:41:40.640 us

00:41:40.940 and

00:41:41.860 next thing

00:41:43.100 I know

00:41:43.540 right

00:41:43.920 when I'm

00:41:44.220 here in

00:41:44.440 Miami

00:41:44.740 as an

00:41:45.540 agent

00:41:45.800 I find

00:41:46.340 out

00:41:46.580 that he

00:41:47.180 gets

00:41:47.380 arrested

00:41:47.700 by the

00:41:48.220 FBI

00:41:48.540 for

00:41:49.540 like stealing

00:41:50.740 dead

00:41:51.040 people's

00:41:51.340 identities

00:41:51.760 and he

00:41:52.440 dead

00:41:52.680 people

00:41:53.140 dead

00:41:53.480 people's

00:41:53.820 identities

00:41:54.100 yeah

00:41:54.380 and the

00:41:56.540 reason why

00:41:56.860 he did

00:41:57.160 that

00:41:57.460 was so

00:41:58.040 that he

00:41:58.300 can open

00:41:59.400 credit lines

00:42:00.200 on their

00:42:00.760 names

00:42:01.120 to get

00:42:01.720 money to

00:42:02.060 gamble

00:42:02.320 yeah

00:42:03.620 crazy

00:42:04.760 crazy

00:42:06.000 I was

00:42:06.860 literally

00:42:07.380 shocked

00:42:07.840 I was

00:42:08.120 like what

00:42:08.440 I spent

00:42:08.980 hours with

00:42:10.000 this dude

00:42:10.360 we used to

00:42:11.000 pause

00:42:11.340 he used to

00:42:12.640 help me

00:42:12.820 with my

00:42:13.060 cases

00:42:13.420 I remember

00:42:14.100 we used

00:42:14.380 to go

00:42:14.560 and respond

00:42:15.060 at 2

00:42:16.420 3 o'clock

00:42:16.860 in the

00:42:17.080 morning

00:42:17.280 anytime

00:42:17.600 there was

00:42:17.900 a case

00:42:18.280 you know

00:42:19.640 he helped

00:42:19.980 me with

00:42:20.340 he helped

00:42:21.120 me with

00:42:21.420 like

00:42:21.640 because

00:42:21.960 I was

00:42:22.400 he helped

00:42:23.020 me with

00:42:23.240 writing

00:42:23.400 reports

00:42:23.840 that was

00:42:24.120 like when

00:42:24.360 I was

00:42:24.560 a brand

00:42:24.840 new agent

00:42:25.280 he taught

00:42:27.200 me a lot

00:42:28.160 so

00:42:28.420 right

00:42:30.000 because he

00:42:31.500 was a

00:42:31.720 task force

00:42:32.100 officer at

00:42:32.580 the time

00:42:32.860 and then

00:42:33.440 he ended

00:42:33.660 up becoming

00:42:33.980 a special

00:42:34.360 agent

00:42:34.560 after I

00:42:35.120 went to

00:42:35.480 Miami

00:42:35.760 so it

00:42:37.000 was

00:42:37.140 yeah

00:42:38.000 because he

00:42:38.440 was a

00:42:38.580 task force

00:42:38.920 officer

00:42:39.160 working for

00:42:40.100 HSI

00:42:40.580 then he

00:42:41.100 became an

00:42:41.520 agent

00:42:41.820 when I

00:42:42.400 went to

00:42:42.660 Miami

00:42:42.920 and then

00:42:43.280 I heard

00:42:43.860 that he

00:42:44.060 got jammed

00:42:44.520 up

00:42:44.700 like 4

00:42:45.700 years later

00:42:46.180 after

00:42:46.480 like 2

00:42:48.340 or 3

00:42:48.600 years after

00:42:48.980 I left

00:42:49.380 so

00:42:50.180 that's

00:42:50.500 crazy

00:42:50.840 what a

00:42:51.240 coincidence

00:42:51.480 and people

00:42:51.980 will say

00:42:52.560 that this

00:42:53.000 girl

00:42:53.260 was the

00:42:54.000 same

00:42:54.280 like nobody

00:42:54.840 will imagine

00:42:55.640 that she

00:42:56.160 was a

00:42:56.480 spy

00:42:56.660 yeah

00:42:57.020 and I

00:42:57.900 know

00:42:58.040 because

00:42:58.240 like some

00:42:58.540 people might

00:42:58.800 say like

00:42:59.140 oh yeah

00:42:59.480 this is all

00:43:00.440 for a show

00:43:00.860 or whatever

00:43:01.160 no guys

00:43:01.560 it really

00:43:01.840 does hit

00:43:02.180 deep

00:43:02.420 sometimes

00:43:02.900 like you

00:43:03.380 think you

00:43:03.800 know someone

00:43:04.440 and then

00:43:05.560 you spend

00:43:06.180 hours with

00:43:06.560 this individual

00:43:07.000 you meet

00:43:07.260 their family

00:43:07.680 you go to

00:43:07.940 the barbecues

00:43:08.500 you hang

00:43:09.080 out with

00:43:09.380 them

00:43:09.560 you get

00:43:10.000 to know

00:43:10.320 them

00:43:10.540 you know

00:43:10.780 their children

00:43:11.260 your kids

00:43:11.620 go to

00:43:11.840 school

00:43:12.000 together

00:43:12.360 you know

00:43:12.960 what I

00:43:13.100 mean

00:43:13.240 like

00:43:13.540 you build

00:43:15.060 these formations

00:43:15.620 then you

00:43:15.920 find out

00:43:16.240 that they're

00:43:16.540 a criminal

00:43:16.860 or you

00:43:17.140 find out

00:43:17.460 something

00:43:17.640 it's

00:43:17.900 that you

00:43:18.200 don't

00:43:18.660 believe

00:43:18.920 it sends

00:43:19.580 shockwaves

00:43:20.080 throughout the

00:43:20.460 entire agency

00:43:20.980 everyone is

00:43:21.580 talking

00:43:21.840 right

00:43:22.760 that's crazy

00:43:23.380 they wear

00:43:23.720 Hannah Montana

00:43:24.180 all the time

00:43:24.840 like double life

00:43:25.800 and everything

00:43:26.300 exactly

00:43:26.800 and that's

00:43:27.340 that's what it

00:43:27.720 is like

00:43:27.960 the shock

00:43:28.340 and the betrayal

00:43:28.800 is really

00:43:29.160 like the biggest

00:43:29.700 thing

00:43:29.940 so of course

00:43:30.660 so and I

00:43:31.920 felt that

00:43:32.400 so I

00:43:32.820 understand where

00:43:34.180 he's coming

00:43:34.580 from with

00:43:35.240 with like the

00:43:35.800 shock

00:43:36.120 and then to

00:43:38.060 be suspected

00:43:38.700 of a crime

00:43:39.160 like treason

00:43:39.700 holy

00:43:40.180 that second

00:43:48.240 I saw her

00:43:48.920 and this

00:43:49.480 woman was a

00:43:50.080 hard worker

00:43:50.460 you guys are

00:43:50.800 going to see

00:43:51.040 here in a

00:43:51.340 second which

00:43:51.740 is what

00:43:52.000 caused even

00:43:52.420 more shock

00:43:52.920 she wasn't

00:43:53.320 like a bum

00:43:53.860 you know

00:43:54.300 what I mean

00:43:54.480 she wasn't

00:43:54.800 a slug

00:43:55.200 I said

00:43:58.280 oh shit

00:44:00.200 because I

00:44:01.800 knew that

00:44:02.280 Anna at

00:44:02.940 that time

00:44:03.440 was the

00:44:03.840 queen of

00:44:04.140 Cuba

00:44:04.380 she was

00:44:04.880 the senior

00:44:05.800 Cuba

00:44:06.180 analyst

00:44:06.580 in the

00:44:06.860 entire

00:44:07.160 US

00:44:07.680 intelligence

00:44:08.100 community

00:44:08.640 so she

00:44:12.120 had

00:44:12.520 access

00:44:13.300 to a lot

00:44:14.420 of

00:44:14.560 information

00:44:15.280 Anna

00:44:16.760 Montes

00:44:17.160 had

00:44:17.480 probably

00:44:18.040 more

00:44:18.440 time

00:44:19.060 invested

00:44:19.600 in

00:44:20.140 the

00:44:20.540 study

00:44:20.860 of

00:44:21.080 political

00:44:21.420 military

00:44:21.880 affairs

00:44:22.420 regarding

00:44:22.840 Cuba

00:44:23.220 than

00:44:23.640 anybody

00:44:23.960 else

00:44:24.360 Anna's

00:44:24.980 security

00:44:25.580 clearance

00:44:25.960 was

00:44:26.360 top

00:44:26.920 secret

00:44:27.280 with

00:44:28.260 access

00:44:28.660 to

00:44:29.000 special

00:44:29.340 intelligence

00:44:29.880 this

00:44:30.680 stuff

00:44:30.920 is

00:44:31.080 so

00:44:31.260 extraordinarily

00:44:31.840 sensitive

00:44:32.440 that

00:44:32.680 only

00:44:32.880 handful

00:44:33.280 of

00:44:33.480 people

00:44:33.680 would

00:44:33.880 be

00:44:34.120 given

00:44:34.400 access

00:44:34.740 to

00:44:35.040 yeah

00:44:35.900 guys

00:44:36.120 so

00:44:36.280 she

00:44:36.560 had

00:44:37.020 a

00:44:38.660 clearance

00:44:39.040 that

00:44:39.580 is

00:44:40.460 pretty

00:44:41.120 much

00:44:41.580 at

00:44:42.720 top

00:44:43.060 level

00:44:43.280 stuff

00:44:43.640 like

00:44:44.360 literally

00:44:44.680 top

00:44:45.000 level

00:44:45.200 stuff

00:44:45.500 we're

00:44:45.720 talking

00:44:45.940 about

00:44:46.220 only

00:44:46.660 a

00:44:47.220 handful

00:44:47.500 of

00:44:47.700 people

00:44:48.040 right

00:44:48.560 like

00:44:48.760 he's

00:44:48.960 saying

00:44:49.100 right

00:44:49.260 now

00:44:49.480 have

00:44:50.140 access

00:44:50.460 to

00:44:50.700 it

00:44:50.880 and

00:44:51.300 even

00:44:51.580 more

00:44:51.840 so

00:44:52.120 you

00:44:52.620 need

00:44:52.840 like

00:44:53.060 an

00:44:53.240 extreme

00:44:53.760 need

00:44:54.340 to

00:44:54.500 know

00:44:54.720 to

00:44:54.880 be

00:44:55.020 able

00:44:55.140 to

00:44:55.320 even

00:44:55.860 get

00:44:56.100 read

00:44:56.400 into

00:44:56.600 this

00:44:56.780 type

00:44:56.960 of

00:44:57.120 information

00:44:57.600 someone

00:45:01.520 in

00:45:01.720 honest

00:45:02.020 position

00:45:02.520 could

00:45:03.160 cause

00:45:03.680 exceptionally

00:45:04.600 grave

00:45:05.460 damage

00:45:06.320 to our

00:45:06.760 collective

00:45:07.060 security

00:45:07.580 and she

00:45:08.020 could do

00:45:08.420 that

00:45:08.780 in a

00:45:09.280 moment

00:45:09.620 which

00:45:10.660 means

00:45:11.100 a greater

00:45:12.020 possibility

00:45:12.620 that our

00:45:13.260 war fighters

00:45:13.920 who are

00:45:14.940 our

00:45:15.460 boys and

00:45:16.540 girls

00:45:16.980 will die

00:45:17.840 that's why

00:45:19.580 this is not

00:45:20.060 a game

00:45:20.520 I

00:45:22.620 actually

00:45:22.980 went

00:45:23.200 in

00:45:23.400 shock

00:45:24.180 and

00:45:25.600 remember

00:45:26.460 guys

00:45:26.880 DIA

00:45:27.320 is

00:45:27.640 responsible

00:45:28.160 for

00:45:28.500 military

00:45:29.160 intelligence

00:45:29.740 so

00:45:30.740 he's not

00:45:31.620 kidding

00:45:31.780 around

00:45:32.020 when he

00:45:32.240 says

00:45:32.440 that

00:45:32.700 there's

00:45:33.380 grave

00:45:33.680 consequences

00:45:34.400 when you're

00:45:35.160 releasing

00:45:35.460 information

00:45:36.020 like this

00:45:36.500 because it

00:45:36.980 literally

00:45:37.260 releases

00:45:37.840 where

00:45:38.640 positions

00:45:40.540 might be

00:45:41.020 held

00:45:41.280 where

00:45:41.640 bases

00:45:41.980 might

00:45:42.220 be

00:45:42.520 covert

00:45:43.080 operations

00:45:43.620 that are

00:45:43.880 occurring

00:45:44.220 like

00:45:44.700 this is

00:45:45.120 very

00:45:45.680 bad

00:45:46.200 okay

00:45:46.940 very

00:45:47.780 very

00:45:48.340 bad

00:45:48.800 and it

00:45:49.360 compromises

00:45:49.920 U.S.

00:45:50.440 soldiers

00:45:50.740 abroad

00:45:51.240 that

00:45:52.120 woman

00:45:52.500 I

00:45:53.200 realized

00:45:53.880 I'm

00:45:54.740 the only

00:45:55.060 guy

00:45:55.540 outside

00:45:56.300 of

00:45:56.500 Havana

00:45:56.940 who

00:45:58.380 knew

00:45:58.580 that

00:45:58.800 Ana

00:45:59.060 Montes

00:45:59.560 was

00:45:59.880 a

00:46:00.360 major

00:46:00.600 spot

00:46:01.080 now

00:46:07.040 this

00:46:07.460 was

00:46:07.740 not

00:46:07.980 the

00:46:08.200 first

00:46:08.420 time

00:46:08.760 that

00:46:08.980 I

00:46:09.080 had

00:46:09.200 seen

00:46:09.400 Ana

00:46:09.640 Montes

00:46:10.040 his

00:46:10.240 name

00:46:10.540 I

00:46:11.400 had

00:46:11.560 other

00:46:11.820 interactions

00:46:12.320 with

00:46:12.640 Ana

00:46:12.920 and

00:46:13.920 during

00:46:14.180 the

00:46:14.360 course

00:46:14.620 of

00:46:14.780 those

00:46:14.980 interactions

00:46:15.460 with

00:46:15.760 her

00:46:15.920 I

00:46:16.160 developed

00:46:16.500 a gut

00:46:16.900 feeling

00:46:17.340 that

00:46:18.100 there

00:46:18.260 was

00:46:18.420 something

00:46:18.820 wrong

00:46:19.540 and

00:46:20.040 suspicious

00:46:20.500 about

00:46:21.120 this

00:46:21.340 woman

00:46:21.640 and so

00:46:22.260 when I

00:46:22.580 saw her

00:46:22.980 name

00:46:23.240 again

00:46:23.740 I

00:46:25.300 knew

00:46:25.560 that

00:46:26.740 she

00:46:27.040 was

00:46:27.380 the

00:46:27.560 spy

00:46:27.860 that

00:46:28.160 they

00:46:28.280 were

00:46:28.420 looking

00:46:28.640 for

00:46:29.000 four

00:46:31.000 years

00:46:31.340 earlier

00:46:31.680 in

00:46:31.860 April

00:46:32.100 1996

00:46:32.880 one

00:46:33.480 of our

00:46:33.720 employees

00:46:34.200 Reg

00:46:34.560 Brown

00:46:34.960 came

00:46:35.940 to me

00:46:36.360 expressing

00:46:37.260 concerns

00:46:37.840 about

00:46:38.120 Ana

00:46:38.360 he

00:46:38.780 said

00:46:39.160 her

00:46:39.920 actions

00:46:40.460 during

00:46:40.800 a

00:46:40.940 specific

00:46:41.300 incident

00:46:41.760 caused

00:46:42.160 me

00:46:42.300 great

00:46:42.540 concern

00:46:43.140 give

00:46:43.880 me

00:46:43.960 three

00:46:44.860 two

00:46:45.080 one

00:46:45.380 okay

00:46:45.900 ladies

00:46:48.020 and gentlemen

00:46:48.360 I have

00:46:48.720 just been

00:46:49.200 briefed

00:46:50.940 that

00:46:51.620 Clinton

00:46:51.920 era

00:46:52.180 if you

00:46:52.400 guys

00:46:52.580 know

00:46:52.700 what I'm

00:46:52.880 saying

00:46:53.140 good old

00:46:54.760 days

00:46:55.100 I did

00:46:55.760 not have

00:46:56.240 sex

00:46:56.540 with that

00:46:56.880 woman

00:46:57.240 by the

00:46:58.120 national security

00:46:58.840 advisor

00:46:59.280 on the

00:47:00.260 shooting

00:47:00.520 down

00:47:00.900 today

00:47:01.500 two

00:47:02.560 American

00:47:02.980 civilian

00:47:03.440 airplanes

00:47:03.940 by Cuban

00:47:04.640 military

00:47:05.260 aircraft

00:47:05.880 on the

00:47:06.800 24th of

00:47:07.380 February

00:47:07.860 1996

00:47:08.760 the Cuban

00:47:10.100 military

00:47:10.720 shot down

00:47:11.640 two

00:47:11.960 aircraft

00:47:12.600 operated

00:47:13.160 by a

00:47:13.740 Cuban

00:47:13.960 emigrant

00:47:14.340 group

00:47:14.800 it's called

00:47:15.280 Brothers

00:47:15.660 to the

00:47:16.020 Rescue

00:47:16.360 two

00:47:17.780 civilian

00:47:18.180 aircraft

00:47:18.720 piloted

00:47:19.420 by a

00:47:20.320 total

00:47:20.540 of three

00:47:20.900 American

00:47:21.200 citizens

00:47:21.800 were shot

00:47:22.480 down

00:47:22.780 in

00:47:22.960 international

00:47:23.580 airspace

00:47:24.240 by Cuban

00:47:24.800 mates

00:47:25.240 that was

00:47:31.280 the murder

00:47:31.660 of

00:47:32.020 three

00:47:33.060 American

00:47:33.340 citizens

00:47:33.860 now

00:47:35.760 in

00:47:36.400 response

00:47:36.860 to the

00:47:37.200 shoot

00:47:37.440 down

00:47:37.780 the

00:47:38.020 United

00:47:38.240 States

00:47:38.460 government

00:47:38.900 scrambled

00:47:39.440 to

00:47:39.860 figure

00:47:40.180 out

00:47:40.440 what

00:47:40.620 had

00:47:40.740 happened

00:47:41.080 and

00:47:41.320 how

00:47:41.500 we

00:47:41.700 might

00:47:41.920 respond

00:47:42.420 one

00:47:43.280 of

00:47:43.380 the

00:47:43.440 first

00:47:43.620 people

00:47:43.960 that

00:47:44.140 the

00:47:44.260 Pentagon

00:47:44.520 called

00:47:45.100 in

00:47:45.280 as

00:47:45.500 an

00:47:45.660 expert

00:47:46.000 to

00:47:46.280 advise

00:47:46.700 them

00:47:46.960 was

00:47:47.540 Anamontis

00:47:48.960 well that's not good

00:47:53.480 you're about to have a spy

00:47:54.820 brief

00:47:55.500 the president

00:47:56.440 is hot brass

00:47:57.180 in that circumstance

00:48:03.460 when the Pentagon

00:48:04.400 calls you

00:48:05.420 in

00:48:05.860 you must

00:48:06.440 stay in place

00:48:07.500 until you

00:48:08.340 are dismissed

00:48:09.000 doesn't matter how long

00:48:10.240 if you're in there for two months

00:48:11.640 you stay there

00:48:12.740 until our senior military leaders

00:48:15.740 no longer have a need for your expertise

00:48:18.640 Reg Brown called the Pentagon

00:48:20.840 shortly after 8pm that night

00:48:23.120 just to ask Ana a question

00:48:24.800 but she left

00:48:26.560 and he thought

00:48:27.760 that's odd

00:48:28.560 Reg thought that her actions

00:48:32.720 in leaving the Pentagon early

00:48:34.400 was suspicious

00:48:35.640 she ran out of there

00:48:38.660 and gave those secrets

00:48:39.440 right to the Cubans

00:48:40.280 guys

00:48:40.580 that's how deep

00:48:41.720 espionage can run

00:48:42.600 sometimes guys

00:48:43.160 and that's why

00:48:43.680 there's such

00:48:44.620 serious punishments

00:48:45.920 for it

00:48:46.460 literally this woman

00:48:47.440 is briefing people

00:48:48.420 that could influence

00:48:49.960 world wars

00:48:51.320 the president

00:48:52.580 his

00:48:52.900 you know

00:48:53.320 his team

00:48:53.820 terrible

00:48:54.860 and these are some

00:48:58.360 of the reach

00:48:59.200 the level of reach

00:49:00.700 and circumstances

00:49:01.800 that could come into play

00:49:02.760 when you're dealing

00:49:03.480 with a spy

00:49:03.860 that has a lot of access

00:49:05.080 and a high security clearance

00:49:06.140 and is a subject matter expert

00:49:08.340 in the place

00:49:09.440 that they're stationed in

00:49:10.500 and

00:49:11.020 selling secrets

00:49:12.700 from

00:49:13.200 so the first thing I did

00:49:19.620 is I took a look

00:49:20.300 at our own records

00:49:21.200 everybody at DIA

00:49:22.680 has a personnel file

00:49:23.760 everybody has a security file

00:49:25.680 I reviewed

00:49:27.300 our files

00:49:28.380 on Ana Montes

00:49:29.220 and what I found

00:49:30.040 was

00:49:30.380 an absolutely

00:49:31.060 model employee

00:49:32.260 Ana

00:49:34.540 she had been working

00:49:35.460 at DIA

00:49:36.160 since 1985

00:49:37.400 and

00:49:38.320 she'd never committed

00:49:39.100 a security violation

00:49:39.860 she rose to the ranks

00:49:41.120 very quickly

00:49:41.920 lived very much

00:49:43.180 modestly

00:49:43.660 she was the kind

00:49:44.860 of employee

00:49:45.460 that supervisors

00:49:47.100 hold up

00:49:47.700 for others to emulate

00:49:48.780 so

00:49:49.700 the assessment

00:49:50.580 that Ana might be a spy

00:49:52.240 just didn't make

00:49:54.440 a lot of sense

00:49:55.220 yeah

00:49:56.360 when you're a good worker

00:49:57.200 that's when it hits

00:49:57.880 really deep

00:49:58.360 nevertheless

00:50:01.540 I decided to

00:50:03.440 interview her

00:50:04.220 and

00:50:05.560 Ana gave me

00:50:06.560 great answers

00:50:07.540 to most of my questions

00:50:09.000 but then when I started

00:50:10.600 questioning her about

00:50:11.600 so guys

00:50:12.320 just so you know

00:50:12.760 more than likely

00:50:13.320 this interview

00:50:13.880 was one of these

00:50:14.500 like administrative

00:50:15.180 voluntary interviews

00:50:16.160 which honestly

00:50:17.660 happens quite a bit

00:50:19.180 anytime like there's

00:50:20.080 some potential misconduct

00:50:21.020 and it's their way

00:50:21.680 of kind of like

00:50:22.080 fishing for information

00:50:22.820 before like opening

00:50:23.560 a full-fledged

00:50:24.800 criminal investigation

00:50:25.620 which is where

00:50:26.160 the FBI came in

00:50:27.040 just going home

00:50:29.660 and did anybody see you

00:50:31.860 her entire demeanor

00:50:33.640 changed

00:50:34.220 one minute

00:50:38.300 we're joking and laughing

00:50:39.560 and having a good time

00:50:40.500 and the next minute

00:50:41.460 she is scared to death

00:50:43.320 that I know something

00:50:44.580 that she did

00:50:45.380 and I had no idea

00:50:47.280 what it was

00:50:48.000 I didn't know

00:50:49.200 what was going on

00:50:50.080 but I walked away

00:50:51.200 from that situation

00:50:52.120 with a gut feeling

00:50:53.380 that she was hiding

00:50:55.040 something from me

00:50:55.980 that was very important

00:50:57.060 to her

00:50:57.460 and that gut feeling

00:50:58.640 played a major role

00:51:00.400 four years later

00:51:01.780 in September of 2000

00:51:03.860 when her name

00:51:04.640 popped up

00:51:05.140 on that screen

00:51:05.840 and so I contacted

00:51:09.920 the FBI

00:51:10.460 I met with them

00:51:11.820 I told them

00:51:12.620 look I've got an employee

00:51:13.680 who I think is your suspect

00:51:14.920 the FBI had yet

00:51:16.620 additional data

00:51:17.980 that they were employing

00:51:19.540 to measure suspects

00:51:20.880 new information

00:51:21.900 which I had not

00:51:23.260 previously possessed

00:51:24.620 and I refer to it

00:51:26.500 as a template

00:51:27.120 Onomatis did not match up

00:51:29.520 against that template

00:51:30.680 at all

00:51:31.300 the FBI told me

00:51:33.000 that well on the basis

00:51:33.800 of this information alone

00:51:34.960 I can eliminate your employee

00:51:36.100 as a suspect

00:51:36.640 in this case

00:51:37.340 and they obviously

00:51:38.720 had a lot of confidence

00:51:39.780 in the validity

00:51:40.520 of this new information

00:51:41.920 they used it

00:51:43.220 as a trump card on me

00:51:44.460 from the time

00:51:50.600 I left the meeting

00:51:52.060 until the time

00:51:53.240 I took the elevator ride

00:51:54.360 downstairs

00:51:54.940 and I found myself

00:51:56.060 literally out on the curb

00:51:57.540 I knew that

00:51:58.940 Anna was at work

00:51:59.900 three miles south

00:52:01.020 in our headquarters building

00:52:02.220 I could just

00:52:04.940 picture her

00:52:05.480 in my mind's eye

00:52:06.380 because that woman

00:52:07.920 was in my building

00:52:09.380 pulling this crap

00:52:10.640 on my watch

00:52:11.860 placing our entire

00:52:13.040 nation's future

00:52:14.000 yeah as an OIG guy

00:52:15.600 like it's kind of

00:52:16.280 embarrassing to have

00:52:17.120 someone in the building

00:52:18.960 that's kind of like

00:52:19.600 under your jurisdiction

00:52:20.320 for any type of

00:52:21.620 administrative

00:52:22.080 or even criminal conduct

00:52:23.120 doing this stuff

00:52:24.540 at risk

00:52:26.080 she was going to get

00:52:27.180 the hell out of there

00:52:28.000 now I needed the FBI

00:52:30.120 to be able to make

00:52:31.180 that happen

00:52:31.660 so I did

00:52:32.800 and the reason

00:52:34.100 for that guys

00:52:34.660 because the FBI

00:52:35.280 is the lead agency

00:52:36.000 when it comes to

00:52:36.540 terrorism and

00:52:36.960 counterintelligence

00:52:37.560 if he tried to

00:52:38.480 bring this case

00:52:38.960 over to the

00:52:39.440 U.S. Attorney's Office

00:52:40.260 aka the federal

00:52:40.940 prosecutors

00:52:41.320 they would probably

00:52:42.300 tell him

00:52:42.600 why isn't the FBI

00:52:43.360 on this

00:52:43.700 and they probably

00:52:44.080 wouldn't take

00:52:44.360 his case seriously

00:52:44.940 because OIG's

00:52:46.120 guys typically

00:52:46.720 9 out of 10 times

00:52:47.720 do admin

00:52:48.680 or very low level

00:52:49.840 criminal type

00:52:50.360 investigations on

00:52:51.020 employees

00:52:51.400 you know

00:52:51.980 your basic

00:52:52.440 false statements

00:52:53.240 you get a DUI

00:52:55.200 and they gotta jam you up

00:52:56.060 with like 30 days

00:52:56.700 on a beach or something

00:52:57.400 but very rarely

00:52:58.640 do they do any type

00:52:59.460 of sexy criminal

00:53:00.460 cases on their own

00:53:01.400 they almost always

00:53:02.560 have to include

00:53:03.100 another agency

00:53:03.720 because their

00:53:04.480 authorities are very

00:53:05.080 limited

00:53:05.360 we are going to

00:53:06.900 persuade the FBI

00:53:07.900 that Ana Montes

00:53:09.120 was

00:53:09.420 and a lot of the

00:53:10.260 time the AUSA

00:53:11.460 won't even take

00:53:11.940 a case from you

00:53:12.580 if it's something

00:53:13.680 that's like

00:53:14.180 another agency's

00:53:15.480 main mission

00:53:16.720 if that makes sense

00:53:17.460 so U.S. Attorney's

00:53:18.980 Office doesn't take

00:53:19.520 OIG seriously

00:53:20.180 because they don't

00:53:20.580 bring that many

00:53:21.000 cases a year

00:53:21.940 in general

00:53:22.340 the spy

00:53:23.540 that they were

00:53:24.080 looking for

00:53:24.660 and I realized

00:53:26.120 that I had to

00:53:26.860 attack the Trump

00:53:27.840 car

00:53:28.100 the next morning

00:53:39.280 on a Saturday

00:53:40.060 the 14th of October

00:53:41.260 of 2000

00:53:42.240 I got up

00:53:43.540 I couldn't sleep

00:53:44.980 very well

00:53:45.440 I was so upset

00:53:47.020 about the Trump

00:53:48.520 card

00:53:48.860 because

00:53:49.740 what I knew

00:53:50.740 about Ana

00:53:51.200 did not match up

00:53:52.060 against that

00:53:52.680 new information

00:53:53.840 at all

00:53:54.660 but

00:53:55.320 I knew

00:53:56.240 that she was

00:53:57.360 the agent

00:53:58.020 they were

00:53:58.320 looking for

00:53:58.920 it was her

00:53:59.860 I never doubted

00:54:01.020 my intuition

00:54:01.680 the next day

00:54:08.160 I spent most

00:54:09.320 of the day

00:54:09.960 examining their

00:54:10.880 Trump card

00:54:11.400 and I discovered

00:54:13.560 something

00:54:14.080 I discovered

00:54:17.920 a pattern

00:54:18.420 that I recognized

00:54:20.240 from something

00:54:22.280 that I learned

00:54:23.060 in an 8th grade

00:54:23.900 statistics

00:54:24.760 math class

00:54:25.880 and my math

00:54:27.260 instructor told us

00:54:28.340 if you ever

00:54:29.280 see this pattern

00:54:30.180 you need to

00:54:31.940 understand that

00:54:32.680 the fix is in

00:54:33.600 somebody is

00:54:35.140 manipulating the data

00:54:36.320 in order to get

00:54:36.900 the outcome

00:54:37.360 that you're looking at

00:54:38.240 and I saw a pattern

00:54:40.180 which I knew

00:54:41.200 could never occur

00:54:42.540 in a random world

00:54:43.680 can't happen

00:54:45.060 it had to be

00:54:45.820 the Cubans

00:54:46.360 the FBI

00:54:47.820 was using

00:54:48.300 a trump card

00:54:49.000 that was

00:54:49.620 being manipulated

00:54:51.120 they didn't know it

00:54:53.540 and so

00:54:56.440 at that moment

00:54:57.200 I realized

00:54:58.620 that I had

00:54:59.380 cracked the trump card

00:55:00.420 I wrote up

00:55:03.380 an 8 page memo

00:55:04.900 and the next morning

00:55:06.600 I faxed the 8 page

00:55:07.920 memo to the FBI

00:55:09.240 about an hour later

00:55:11.200 the FBI case agent

00:55:12.560 Steve McCoy

00:55:13.260 called me

00:55:14.000 and the first thing

00:55:15.660 he said

00:55:16.160 was

00:55:16.900 Scott I think

00:55:18.320 we've gotten off

00:55:18.960 on the wrong foot

00:55:19.740 talk about a change

00:55:22.860 of heart

00:55:23.240 and FBI does that

00:55:25.460 all the time man

00:55:26.180 unless you can help them

00:55:27.080 they don't mess with you man

00:55:27.960 you know they're very

00:55:29.020 dismissive to other agencies

00:55:30.200 a lot of

00:55:30.620 you know superiority

00:55:31.920 superiority complex

00:55:33.600 with them

00:55:34.000 I think we're going to be

00:55:36.040 working together

00:55:36.620 for a while

00:55:37.280 and I was relieved

00:55:39.180 the only way

00:55:40.360 we were going to be

00:55:41.000 successful

00:55:41.500 is to work together

00:55:42.820 and it was at that moment

00:55:44.260 I knew

00:55:46.380 we were going to be okay

00:55:48.080 one of the things

00:55:52.420 that the FBI

00:55:53.160 did

00:55:54.000 was to

00:55:54.780 assign

00:55:55.600 a co-case agent

00:55:56.880 by the name of

00:55:57.500 Pete Lapp

00:55:58.080 so the first time

00:56:01.360 I heard the name

00:56:01.960 Adam Montez

00:56:02.580 was at our squad

00:56:03.460 Christmas party

00:56:04.180 in 2000

00:56:04.680 I knew

00:56:05.800 the FBI

00:56:06.440 had gotten a name

00:56:08.060 of suspect

00:56:08.640 someone who may have

00:56:09.880 matched one of these

00:56:10.800 unsub cases

00:56:11.820 as we call them

00:56:12.640 so I talked to

00:56:13.980 Steve McCoy

00:56:14.580 the senior case agent

00:56:15.740 and I said

00:56:16.180 hey I hear you're

00:56:16.780 working this neat case

00:56:17.820 and you have a name

00:56:18.660 you know

00:56:19.420 I'd love to

00:56:20.300 work with you on this

00:56:21.600 so he said

00:56:22.780 yeah sure

00:56:23.160 I'd really appreciate

00:56:24.080 your help

00:56:24.620 and from there

00:56:25.880 we worked the entire

00:56:27.000 case together

00:56:27.840 with Scott

00:56:28.460 it's important

00:56:32.800 to keep in mind

00:56:33.360 that the FBI

00:56:33.860 has to prove

00:56:34.820 these cases

00:56:35.420 you know

00:56:35.760 we're the lead

00:56:36.480 counterintelligence

00:56:37.520 agency for the United States

00:56:38.700 the Bureau

00:56:40.140 is going to be

00:56:40.700 the organization

00:56:41.400 that brings charges

00:56:42.540 against someone

00:56:43.140 for espionage

00:56:43.800 so there's a lot

00:56:44.360 of pressure on us

00:56:45.460 to get it right

00:56:46.700 knowing someone

00:56:48.200 is guilty

00:56:49.140 of espionage

00:56:50.000 is fundamentally

00:56:51.160 different than

00:56:51.940 proving

00:56:52.520 that someone's

00:56:53.920 guilty of espionage

00:56:54.960 so

00:56:56.260 and that's

00:56:57.440 absolute fact

00:56:58.140 guys

00:56:58.340 remember

00:56:58.600 it's not what

00:56:59.060 you know

00:56:59.300 it's what

00:56:59.600 you can prove

00:57:00.140 and when it

00:57:00.500 comes to espionage

00:57:01.180 and the stakes

00:57:01.580 are high

00:57:01.940 the police

00:57:02.780 have to cross

00:57:03.300 every T

00:57:03.900 dot every I

00:57:04.920 because there's

00:57:05.460 serious time in this

00:57:06.200 and

00:57:06.700 the feds don't

00:57:08.060 lose

00:57:08.280 you know

00:57:08.520 AUSAs are very

00:57:09.160 picky on what

00:57:09.600 they take

00:57:09.980 let's validate

00:57:18.500 Scott's claim

00:57:19.900 that she's

00:57:20.840 an agent

00:57:21.840 of a foreign

00:57:22.380 power

00:57:22.740 and in fact

00:57:23.460 who we're

00:57:23.960 looking for

00:57:24.640 and then

00:57:25.960 let's try

00:57:26.820 or catch her

00:57:27.380 in the act

00:57:27.980 of committing

00:57:28.580 espionage

00:57:29.240 national security

00:57:34.140 letters

00:57:34.440 are hugely

00:57:35.240 important tools

00:57:36.200 for the FBI

00:57:36.880 so a national

00:57:37.840 security letter

00:57:38.540 is a letter

00:57:39.060 that's issued

00:57:39.620 by the FBI

00:57:40.500 that compels

00:57:41.720 financial institutions

00:57:43.160 credit institutions

00:57:44.580 telephone companies

00:57:45.880 to relinquish

00:57:47.140 critical information

00:57:48.080 and once

00:57:49.320 Montez is

00:57:49.900 identified as

00:57:50.700 a suspect

00:57:51.180 we opened

00:57:52.100 a full

00:57:52.400 investigation

00:57:52.880 on her

00:57:53.500 it allowed us

00:57:54.500 the opportunity

00:57:55.060 to use

00:57:55.480 national security

00:57:56.180 letters

00:57:56.540 we had

00:57:58.140 very sensitive

00:57:58.860 intelligence

00:57:59.440 that told us

00:58:00.760 that the

00:58:01.200 unknown subject

00:58:02.240 had purchased

00:58:02.980 a specific

00:58:04.440 brand

00:58:05.120 make

00:58:05.660 and model

00:58:06.320 computer

00:58:06.840 at a specific

00:58:07.760 period of time

00:58:08.520 in 1996

00:58:09.360 from a store

00:58:10.340 in Alexandria

00:58:11.080 no further

00:58:12.360 information

00:58:12.960 through national

00:58:14.460 security letters

00:58:15.400 I identified

00:58:16.720 Ana's line

00:58:17.740 of credit

00:58:18.140 and from that

00:58:19.600 we knew

00:58:20.120 that Ana

00:58:20.640 had made a

00:58:21.240 purchase

00:58:21.500 to Comp USA

00:58:22.260 back in

00:58:22.960 October of

00:58:23.440 1996

00:58:23.960 this is insane

00:58:26.400 so in April

00:58:31.740 2001

00:58:32.400 we served

00:58:34.320 a national

00:58:34.720 security letter

00:58:35.400 at Comp USA

00:58:36.300 and asked them

00:58:37.740 could we identify

00:58:38.980 a specific

00:58:39.640 purchase made

00:58:40.580 here in

00:58:41.280 October of

00:58:42.000 1996

00:58:42.780 and they

00:58:44.920 said we

00:58:45.240 keep records

00:58:46.100 that far

00:58:47.000 back

00:58:47.380 behind the

00:58:48.060 store

00:58:48.320 and we

00:58:48.660 only keep

00:58:49.060 them for

00:58:49.420 about five

00:58:50.000 years

00:58:50.320 this was

00:58:51.080 April

00:58:51.460 2001

00:58:52.320 the records

00:58:52.960 were almost

00:58:53.480 destroyed

00:58:53.940 so we

00:58:57.140 pulled out

00:58:57.640 boxes

00:58:58.100 and about

00:58:58.900 20 minutes

00:58:59.540 after we

00:59:00.000 started

00:59:00.340 the system

00:59:00.980 manager

00:59:01.340 for Comp USA

00:59:02.140 said

00:59:02.620 is this

00:59:03.540 what you're

00:59:03.860 looking for

00:59:04.380 and in

00:59:06.000 fact

00:59:06.360 it was

00:59:07.180 the purchase

00:59:08.360 that Ana

00:59:08.860 made in

00:59:09.520 true name

00:59:09.980 for the

00:59:10.520 computer

00:59:10.840 that we

00:59:11.260 could prove

00:59:11.880 that the

00:59:12.760 Cubans

00:59:13.160 tasked her

00:59:13.740 to purchase

00:59:14.220 back in

00:59:14.720 October

00:59:15.040 of 1996

00:59:15.780 this sales

00:59:19.500 receipt

00:59:19.860 for this

00:59:20.260 computer

00:59:20.580 purchase

00:59:20.960 proved

00:59:21.580 that she

00:59:22.820 was in

00:59:23.240 fact

00:59:23.580 the

00:59:24.040 spy

00:59:24.340 so

00:59:25.960 from April

00:59:26.980 2001

00:59:27.620 I had no

00:59:28.280 doubts

00:59:28.600 that she

00:59:28.920 was a

00:59:29.400 Cuban

00:59:29.660 spy

00:59:30.000 the

00:59:30.560 question

00:59:30.840 was

00:59:31.100 was she

00:59:31.420 currently

00:59:31.940 spying

00:59:32.380 and could

00:59:33.620 we catch

00:59:34.040 her in

00:59:34.280 the act

00:59:34.780 of committing

00:59:35.340 espionage

00:59:35.980 this sales

00:59:47.580 receipt for

00:59:48.180 this

00:59:48.360 computer

00:59:48.680 purchase

00:59:49.060 proved

00:59:49.660 that she

00:59:50.920 was in

00:59:51.320 fact

00:59:51.680 the

00:59:52.120 spy

00:59:52.500 Ana

00:59:53.940 Montez

00:59:54.420 officially

00:59:54.980 became

00:59:55.580 the prime

00:59:56.420 suspect

00:59:56.860 of the

00:59:57.580 unknown

00:59:58.000 subject

00:59:58.500 investigation

00:59:59.260 now it's

01:00:00.360 just a matter

01:00:00.880 of proving

01:00:01.960 her

01:00:02.380 catching

01:00:03.420 her

01:00:03.640 in

01:00:03.820 the

01:00:03.980 act

01:00:04.500 of committing

01:00:05.500 espionage

01:00:06.120 we need

01:00:07.300 to get

01:00:07.480 her on

01:00:07.720 film

01:00:08.020 meeting

01:00:08.580 someone

01:00:08.980 uploading

01:00:09.960 intelligence

01:00:10.840 secrets

01:00:11.380 passing

01:00:11.800 encrypted

01:00:12.140 thumb

01:00:12.440 drive

01:00:12.780 that's

01:00:13.500 the

01:00:13.600 ultimate

01:00:13.820 threshold

01:00:14.320 court

01:00:14.800 worthy

01:00:15.080 evidence

01:00:15.560 that

01:00:15.740 will

01:00:15.860 convict

01:00:16.300 a

01:00:16.540 spy

01:00:16.900 at

01:00:20.760 this

01:00:20.940 point

01:00:21.120 guys

01:00:21.340 they're

01:00:21.480 doing

01:00:21.680 24-7

01:00:22.340 surveillance

01:00:22.860 wiretapping

01:00:23.440 all her

01:00:23.720 stuff

01:00:23.880 this is

01:00:24.220 a

01:00:24.420 huge

01:00:24.920 effort

01:00:25.340 and if

01:00:26.460 you

01:00:26.560 guys

01:00:26.740 have

01:00:26.880 covered

01:00:27.100 some

01:00:27.280 of

01:00:27.360 my

01:00:27.420 other

01:00:27.700 espionage

01:00:28.240 type

01:00:28.480 cases

01:00:28.920 breakdowns

01:00:29.460 as soon

01:00:30.620 as they

01:00:30.820 figure out

01:00:31.160 who the

01:00:31.360 person

01:00:31.600 is

01:00:31.920 is

01:00:32.540 24-7

01:00:33.240 everything's

01:00:33.980 tapped

01:00:34.200 you need

01:00:34.560 like

01:00:34.820 literally

01:00:35.320 round-the-clock

01:00:35.840 agents

01:00:36.200 and doing

01:00:36.620 24-7

01:00:37.200 surveillance

01:00:37.580 guys

01:00:37.840 is extremely

01:00:38.440 time-consuming

01:00:39.800 labor-intensive

01:00:41.160 and quite

01:00:42.300 frankly you

01:00:42.780 need

01:00:43.080 to do

01:00:44.220 an effective

01:00:45.140 24-hour

01:00:45.680 surveillance

01:00:45.980 on someone

01:00:46.440 to this

01:00:46.900 level

01:00:47.200 you probably

01:00:47.900 need at

01:00:48.200 least

01:00:48.360 20-30

01:00:48.840 guys

01:00:49.200 on the

01:00:49.600 team

01:00:49.840 rotating

01:00:50.520 in like

01:00:50.860 8-hour

01:00:51.180 shifts

01:00:51.520 so

01:00:52.460 it ain't

01:00:53.160 no joke

01:00:53.560 when you're

01:00:53.820 following

01:00:54.000 someone

01:00:54.180 around

01:00:54.360 that

01:00:54.520 much

01:00:54.860 so

01:00:56.780 one of

01:00:57.320 the

01:00:57.420 especially

01:00:58.360 someone like

01:00:59.140 this

01:00:59.320 you guys

01:00:59.640 gonna see

01:01:00.000 why it's

01:01:00.300 hard

01:01:00.440 in a

01:01:00.640 second

01:01:00.860 first things

01:01:01.540 we did

01:01:01.860 was request

01:01:02.540 physical

01:01:03.500 surveillance

01:01:03.960 resources

01:01:04.720 on her

01:01:05.240 we had

01:01:05.860 a lot

01:01:06.280 to do

01:01:06.760 you know

01:01:07.180 and physical

01:01:08.220 surveillance

01:01:08.860 guys is your

01:01:09.360 traditional

01:01:09.740 you know

01:01:10.100 sitting outside

01:01:11.000 the house

01:01:11.680 following her

01:01:12.920 into a mall

01:01:13.420 in like

01:01:13.960 plain clothes

01:01:14.600 like that's

01:01:15.280 like standard

01:01:15.740 physical

01:01:16.060 surveillance

01:01:16.420 old-fashioned

01:01:17.240 police work

01:01:17.860 FBI

01:01:18.680 put cameras

01:01:19.560 in her

01:01:20.240 cubicle

01:01:20.800 and microphones

01:01:21.760 and tapper

01:01:22.300 phones

01:01:22.760 and all that

01:01:23.580 sort of

01:01:23.840 then electronic

01:01:24.600 surveillance

01:01:25.060 is anything

01:01:25.540 with phones

01:01:26.880 wiretaps

01:01:27.620 email

01:01:28.340 pen

01:01:29.500 all that

01:01:30.180 stuff

01:01:30.440 is electronic

01:01:31.120 remember

01:01:32.120 this is 2001

01:01:32.960 so they're

01:01:33.380 using some

01:01:33.760 pretty sophisticated

01:01:34.320 equipment

01:01:34.880 for back

01:01:36.120 then

01:01:36.400 thank

01:01:37.440 we started

01:01:40.440 doing significant

01:01:41.400 physical

01:01:41.860 surveillance

01:01:42.460 on Montez

01:01:43.300 identifying

01:01:44.100 her patterns

01:01:44.960 of behavior

01:01:45.660 what was

01:01:46.220 her routine

01:01:47.020 so watching

01:01:49.200 Anna Montez

01:01:50.060 we saw that

01:01:51.160 for example

01:01:51.640 she would leave

01:01:52.300 her home

01:01:53.360 on Sundays

01:01:53.900 at a precise time

01:01:54.980 go to the local

01:01:56.380 metro

01:01:56.760 get on

01:01:57.380 go several stops

01:01:58.500 get off

01:01:59.520 walk

01:02:00.500 stop at

01:02:01.840 locations

01:02:02.620 wait 60 seconds

01:02:03.740 go somewhere else

01:02:04.540 wait 90 seconds

01:02:05.580 very methodical

01:02:06.940 things that

01:02:07.780 a normal person

01:02:08.660 doesn't

01:02:09.380 so from

01:02:09.960 a tradecraft

01:02:10.840 standpoint

01:02:11.240 you knew

01:02:11.740 something was

01:02:12.360 afoot

01:02:12.940 when her shoe

01:02:14.740 seemingly came untied

01:02:15.720 and she stopped

01:02:16.260 and tied it

01:02:16.780 was she really

01:02:17.880 tying her shoe

01:02:18.560 or was she doing

01:02:19.880 counter surveillance

01:02:20.620 or signaling someone

01:02:21.500 over the next

01:02:24.100 several months

01:02:24.900 the surveillance team

01:02:26.020 told us

01:02:26.560 we've got a pattern

01:02:27.720 now she's leaving

01:02:28.440 work at particular

01:02:29.660 times

01:02:30.060 she's following

01:02:30.900 a route

01:02:31.520 here's the route

01:02:32.600 she's going

01:02:33.560 in the drugstores

01:02:34.480 but she doesn't

01:02:36.400 come out with a bag

01:02:37.220 so what's she doing

01:02:38.480 in the stores

01:02:39.040 turns out

01:02:41.760 she was using

01:02:42.800 the pay phones

01:02:43.380 not too long

01:02:48.460 ago we had

01:02:48.860 pay phones

01:02:49.320 everywhere

01:02:49.680 and using

01:02:50.160 pay phones

01:02:50.580 was not

01:02:51.080 in and of itself

01:02:51.760 suspicious

01:02:52.260 but when you

01:02:52.800 have a cell phone

01:02:54.580 you have a home

01:02:56.400 phone

01:02:56.760 and when you

01:02:57.080 have phones

01:02:57.700 at your office

01:02:58.480 the fact that

01:02:59.200 you go a couple

01:03:00.260 blocks off

01:03:00.940 your normal route

01:03:01.760 to and from

01:03:02.600 home

01:03:02.960 to use a pay phone

01:03:04.040 that is suspicious

01:03:05.480 once we did

01:03:08.460 the legal paperwork

01:03:09.280 to get the records

01:03:10.280 from the pay phone

01:03:11.260 we saw that

01:03:12.240 she was calling

01:03:12.960 pagers in New York City

01:03:14.440 and those

01:03:15.940 particular numbers

01:03:17.040 we knew were

01:03:17.860 associated with

01:03:18.620 Cuban espionage

01:03:20.060 and our suspicions

01:03:25.420 were that

01:03:25.880 she was punching

01:03:26.500 in codes

01:03:27.400 and this is very

01:03:28.920 interesting how

01:03:29.340 they did this

01:03:29.920 three or four digits

01:03:31.400 so we knew

01:03:32.480 she was communicating

01:03:33.260 with a pager

01:03:34.100 she was sending signals

01:03:35.740 that told us

01:03:37.520 she was still active

01:03:38.380 so we saw her

01:03:41.780 making all these

01:03:42.480 pay phone calls

01:03:43.520 the timing of which

01:03:44.680 corresponded with

01:03:45.880 encrypted

01:03:46.400 high frequency

01:03:47.220 messages being

01:03:47.980 transmitted to the

01:03:48.880 DC area

01:03:49.540 from Cuba

01:03:50.780 even before

01:03:54.420 Montez was

01:03:54.980 identified as a

01:03:55.820 suspect

01:03:56.120 we knew that

01:03:57.460 the Cubans

01:03:57.980 were communicating

01:03:58.700 to their agents

01:03:59.880 via high frequency

01:04:01.520 messages that

01:04:02.380 would have been

01:04:02.900 picked up

01:04:03.480 using a shortwave

01:04:04.640 radio

01:04:05.120 the Cubans

01:04:12.060 would send a message

01:04:12.800 on a Tuesday

01:04:13.520 repeated again

01:04:14.680 twice on Thursday

01:04:15.760 twice on Saturday

01:04:17.200 we knew that

01:04:18.420 communicating to the

01:04:19.480 Cubans via the

01:04:20.320 high frequency

01:04:20.960 messages

01:04:21.480 required encryption

01:04:23.320 and decryption

01:04:24.300 disks

01:04:25.000 so it's not like

01:04:27.400 they were sending

01:04:28.440 the messages

01:04:29.200 out in the

01:04:30.120 open air

01:04:30.820 they were

01:04:31.840 encrypted

01:04:32.560 messages that

01:04:33.900 no one else

01:04:34.400 could read

01:04:34.880 unless you had

01:04:35.540 the matching

01:04:36.240 decryption software

01:04:38.200 that the Cubans

01:04:39.060 gave to their

01:04:40.280 agents

01:04:40.720 in order to

01:04:41.800 catch her in

01:04:42.460 the act

01:04:42.940 we knew we

01:04:44.220 needed to get

01:04:44.860 into her home

01:04:45.880 because we knew

01:04:47.680 we were trying

01:04:48.180 to find

01:04:48.580 these disks

01:04:49.260 she lived

01:04:51.500 in a 30

01:04:52.520 tenant

01:04:53.180 ownership

01:04:54.000 building

01:04:54.540 so a huge

01:04:55.360 challenge for us

01:04:56.020 to try and get

01:04:56.500 into her apartment

01:04:57.080 without getting

01:04:57.760 detected

01:04:58.220 our surveillance

01:05:01.640 of her

01:05:02.160 taught us

01:05:02.880 that she had

01:05:03.320 a boyfriend

01:05:03.760 and her boyfriend

01:05:04.360 lived out of town

01:05:05.440 in Florida

01:05:05.920 and her

01:05:08.060 traveling to

01:05:08.800 visit her

01:05:09.240 boyfriend

01:05:09.640 Memorial Day

01:05:10.400 weekend

01:05:10.840 gave us

01:05:12.720 a long

01:05:13.380 opportunity

01:05:13.820 to get

01:05:14.460 into her

01:05:14.920 apartment

01:05:15.340 covertly

01:05:16.200 to do

01:05:16.600 a physical

01:05:17.040 search

01:05:17.580 so when

01:05:23.780 we went

01:05:24.240 into her

01:05:24.640 apartment

01:05:25.060 I was

01:05:25.960 absolutely

01:05:26.660 nervous

01:05:27.340 it was hot

01:05:29.380 there was

01:05:30.180 no air

01:05:30.500 conditioning

01:05:30.880 and although

01:05:31.800 it was a

01:05:32.160 small

01:05:32.580 two-bedroom

01:05:33.600 apartment

01:05:34.000 there was

01:05:34.380 a lot

01:05:34.800 to look

01:05:35.260 through

01:05:35.620 the risk

01:05:36.520 of getting

01:05:36.860 caught

01:05:37.140 doing this

01:05:37.680 is tremendous

01:05:38.220 and that's

01:05:38.880 the last

01:05:39.200 thing you

01:05:39.480 want to

01:05:39.740 do

01:05:39.920 is compromise

01:05:40.740 the investigation

01:05:41.620 by someone

01:05:42.620 coming home

01:05:43.160 too early

01:05:43.660 or someone

01:05:44.420 watering the

01:05:45.700 plants

01:05:46.080 when you

01:05:46.440 didn't plan

01:05:46.940 on them

01:05:47.260 doing that

01:05:47.940 we started

01:05:51.160 searching her

01:05:52.360 apartment

01:05:52.780 and first

01:05:54.500 thing we

01:05:54.840 found was

01:05:55.440 the Sony

01:05:55.920 shortwave

01:05:56.420 radio

01:05:56.900 in its

01:05:57.520 box

01:05:57.980 out in

01:05:58.720 the open

01:05:59.100 underneath

01:05:59.880 an open

01:06:00.280 window

01:06:00.740 and then

01:06:04.320 we found

01:06:05.100 the

01:06:05.460 Toshiba

01:06:05.920 laptop

01:06:06.340 computer

01:06:07.000 that the

01:06:08.340 Cubans

01:06:08.680 had tasked

01:06:09.200 her to

01:06:09.480 purchase

01:06:09.880 holy

01:06:10.620 so our

01:06:11.760 computer

01:06:12.180 experts

01:06:12.740 made a

01:06:13.320 computer

01:06:13.840 a hard

01:06:15.820 drive

01:06:16.200 so that

01:06:16.660 we could

01:06:17.020 forensically

01:06:17.680 analyze it

01:06:18.640 and see

01:06:19.020 what was on

01:06:19.520 she wasn't

01:06:23.420 that

01:06:23.600 careful

01:06:23.960 though

01:06:24.300 so

01:06:24.920 Anna

01:06:25.180 Montez

01:06:25.680 you know

01:06:26.140 as she

01:06:26.640 had

01:06:26.760 received

01:06:29.140 and sent

01:06:29.540 reports

01:06:29.960 out

01:06:30.280 to the

01:06:30.700 Cubans

01:06:31.100 had

01:06:31.760 tried

01:06:32.160 to

01:06:32.800 delete

01:06:33.460 what was

01:06:34.540 on her

01:06:34.840 computer

01:06:35.280 but

01:06:35.780 in the

01:06:36.980 deleted

01:06:37.240 space

01:06:37.640 of her

01:06:37.940 computer

01:06:38.360 we

01:06:39.120 found

01:06:39.580 almost

01:06:40.520 11 pages

01:06:41.380 of

01:06:42.000 single

01:06:42.560 spaced

01:06:42.980 text

01:06:43.940 in

01:06:45.200 English

01:06:46.000 and Spanish

01:06:46.700 and in

01:06:47.360 that text

01:06:47.900 we found

01:06:48.740 national defense

01:06:49.540 information

01:06:50.120 that Montez

01:06:50.900 gave to

01:06:51.420 the Cubans

01:06:52.040 that was

01:06:52.520 classified

01:06:53.200 that was a

01:06:57.340 hugely successful

01:06:58.400 covert search

01:06:59.780 but we had not

01:07:00.880 found the

01:07:01.400 disks

01:07:01.720 we could find

01:07:03.120 the disks

01:07:03.640 that the Cubans

01:07:04.260 had given her

01:07:04.920 we'd be able

01:07:05.520 to read her

01:07:06.080 encrypted messages

01:07:07.140 while she was

01:07:08.140 getting them

01:07:08.760 and hopefully

01:07:09.460 then know

01:07:10.240 what the

01:07:10.620 messages

01:07:10.940 were between

01:07:12.200 her

01:07:12.440 and that

01:07:13.300 guys

01:07:13.560 requires

01:07:13.920 something

01:07:14.140 called

01:07:14.400 a

01:07:14.560 title

01:07:14.800 three

01:07:15.060 intercept

01:07:15.460 to get

01:07:15.940 anything

01:07:16.260 real time

01:07:16.840 this is

01:07:17.200 when you're

01:07:17.480 wiretapping

01:07:18.060 phones

01:07:18.520 when you're

01:07:18.840 putting

01:07:19.000 bugs in

01:07:19.420 houses

01:07:19.780 it requires

01:07:21.180 quite a bit

01:07:21.780 of probable

01:07:22.160 cause

01:07:22.560 you have to

01:07:22.960 outline

01:07:23.400 you know

01:07:24.500 in specific

01:07:25.360 detail

01:07:25.780 why you need

01:07:26.480 to actively

01:07:27.220 monitor

01:07:27.780 whatever

01:07:28.480 their

01:07:28.700 communication

01:07:29.240 or bugging

01:07:30.020 their home

01:07:30.440 real time

01:07:31.260 and you know

01:07:32.120 a lot of times

01:07:32.540 they're going to

01:07:32.780 say well

01:07:33.040 evidence

01:07:33.260 could get

01:07:33.560 destroyed

01:07:34.000 for me

01:07:34.360 to get

01:07:34.620 intimate

01:07:34.940 information

01:07:35.340 like this

01:07:35.740 I need

01:07:35.980 to be able

01:07:36.360 to bug

01:07:36.940 their home

01:07:37.340 so title

01:07:38.180 three

01:07:38.380 affidavits

01:07:42.200 about 75

01:07:42.780 pages

01:07:43.200 you need

01:07:43.960 more probable

01:07:44.400 cause

01:07:44.820 to get

01:07:45.560 a title

01:07:45.840 three

01:07:46.080 on someone

01:07:46.580 than to

01:07:47.000 actually

01:07:47.280 arrest

01:07:47.580 them

01:07:47.720 it's insane

01:07:48.420 at least

01:07:49.400 on the

01:07:49.640 federal level

01:07:50.180 we had

01:08:02.020 made a copy

01:08:03.160 and found

01:08:04.040 the communication

01:08:05.140 between her

01:08:05.680 and the Cubans

01:08:06.120 on the computer

01:08:06.720 we found

01:08:07.540 the short

01:08:07.980 radio

01:08:08.420 we saw

01:08:09.560 her making

01:08:10.060 all these

01:08:10.460 pay phone

01:08:11.000 calls

01:08:11.480 and we knew

01:08:11.840 we had a

01:08:12.120 strong

01:08:12.380 case

01:08:13.040 but we felt

01:08:14.360 that we had

01:08:15.160 to find

01:08:15.580 these discs

01:08:16.260 we really

01:08:19.060 needed that

01:08:19.580 concrete proof

01:08:20.960 that took away

01:08:22.280 any shadow

01:08:22.880 of doubt

01:08:23.240 from anybody

01:08:23.880 that Montez

01:08:24.740 is guilty

01:08:25.320 of espionage

01:08:26.160 the FBI

01:08:29.820 speculated

01:08:30.740 that perhaps

01:08:31.740 she was keeping

01:08:32.360 this data

01:08:33.280 on her person

01:08:34.300 and the reason

01:08:35.280 they couldn't

01:08:35.540 find it

01:08:35.920 is because

01:08:36.160 she was carrying

01:08:36.740 it around

01:08:37.060 with her

01:08:37.340 all the time

01:08:37.900 perhaps

01:08:38.520 in her purse

01:08:39.180 the objective

01:08:42.800 was to get

01:08:43.520 to her purse

01:08:44.260 search it

01:08:45.200 and get that

01:08:46.060 purse back

01:08:46.680 without either

01:08:47.380 Anna or

01:08:48.300 any of her

01:08:48.780 co-workers

01:08:49.420 having even

01:08:50.320 a suspicion

01:08:50.940 that something

01:08:51.540 unusual had

01:08:52.260 occurred

01:08:52.660 so we came up

01:08:53.820 with a plan

01:08:54.300 to separate

01:08:54.980 her from

01:08:56.180 the purse

01:08:56.660 we had

01:08:59.480 insider access

01:09:00.200 to Anna

01:09:01.120 Montez's

01:09:01.640 daily life

01:09:02.280 so what

01:09:02.960 occurred to us

01:09:03.640 is we could

01:09:04.760 create a fake

01:09:05.400 meeting

01:09:05.780 that she

01:09:06.940 would have

01:09:07.540 to attend

01:09:08.420 we gave

01:09:10.780 her a major

01:09:11.740 speaking assignment

01:09:12.800 which meant

01:09:13.460 that she

01:09:13.880 would be

01:09:14.220 visible to

01:09:14.780 everybody

01:09:15.180 and psychologically

01:09:16.640 it just

01:09:17.160 wouldn't look

01:09:17.800 good for her

01:09:18.340 to have a

01:09:18.680 purse sitting

01:09:19.140 on top

01:09:19.520 of her

01:09:19.780 materials

01:09:20.240 so we

01:09:20.940 scheduled

01:09:21.220 that briefing

01:09:22.220 for 9 o'clock

01:09:23.680 in the morning

01:09:24.180 because we

01:09:25.220 wanted to make

01:09:25.620 sure that Anna

01:09:26.260 had time

01:09:27.120 to settle

01:09:27.600 in at work

01:09:28.240 by 8 o'clock

01:09:29.020 to put her

01:09:29.820 purse into a

01:09:30.720 drawer so she

01:09:31.420 would just

01:09:31.700 secure it

01:09:32.260 and you guys

01:09:33.980 will notice

01:09:34.380 this is actually

01:09:35.020 a very common

01:09:35.580 tactic in

01:09:36.060 counter espionage

01:09:36.720 investigations

01:09:37.760 where they'll

01:09:38.960 get the

01:09:39.260 employee and

01:09:39.980 they'll either

01:09:40.400 promote them

01:09:41.040 to some

01:09:41.360 fake position

01:09:42.120 or they'll

01:09:43.160 make a

01:09:43.520 fake meeting

01:09:44.240 or they'll

01:09:45.360 bug their

01:09:45.800 office

01:09:46.460 or put like

01:09:47.420 you know

01:09:47.780 try to get

01:09:48.280 them to do

01:09:48.660 certain things

01:09:49.240 while in the

01:09:50.080 workspace

01:09:50.420 to allow

01:09:52.100 opportunities

01:09:52.840 for investigative

01:09:53.860 furtherance

01:09:54.840 so this is

01:09:56.120 another one

01:09:56.540 of those

01:09:56.840 situations

01:09:57.360 because

01:09:57.720 fortunately

01:09:58.400 for them

01:09:58.860 when she's

01:09:59.360 at work

01:09:59.700 you can

01:10:00.020 kind of

01:10:00.300 control

01:10:00.560 the scenarios

01:10:01.240 and she

01:10:02.560 did

01:10:02.860 all the

01:10:08.140 attendees

01:10:08.400 were at

01:10:08.740 the meeting

01:10:09.140 prepared to

01:10:09.960 do a good

01:10:11.100 hour hour

01:10:11.860 and a half

01:10:12.140 discussion

01:10:12.660 of this

01:10:13.520 very important

01:10:14.140 issue

01:10:14.460 once the

01:10:15.340 door was

01:10:15.660 closed

01:10:16.000 the FBI

01:10:16.840 technical team

01:10:17.960 under the

01:10:18.640 guise of being

01:10:19.200 a maintenance

01:10:19.660 crew

01:10:20.060 went into

01:10:21.240 her cubicle

01:10:22.260 in the

01:10:22.520 surrounding

01:10:22.740 area to

01:10:23.240 do

01:10:23.540 routine

01:10:24.420 maintenance

01:10:24.880 on the

01:10:25.320 facilities

01:10:25.800 and had

01:10:27.500 access to

01:10:27.940 her purse

01:10:28.420 so while

01:10:32.060 she was

01:10:32.320 at the

01:10:32.560 meeting

01:10:32.820 we had

01:10:33.100 a very

01:10:33.400 short

01:10:33.680 period

01:10:33.940 of time

01:10:34.400 to go

01:10:35.040 through

01:10:35.240 her purse

01:10:35.840 you know

01:10:36.720 looking for

01:10:37.080 the discs

01:10:37.580 it was a

01:10:43.560 typical woman's

01:10:44.320 purse

01:10:44.640 had cosmetics

01:10:45.480 and wallets

01:10:46.700 and just had

01:10:47.580 a lot of

01:10:48.000 purse type

01:10:49.080 stuff in

01:10:49.580 there

01:10:49.780 uh

01:10:51.100 misogony

01:10:52.940 that's why

01:10:53.240 women deserve

01:10:53.700 less guys

01:10:54.360 what

01:10:55.280 so we

01:10:56.420 looked and

01:10:57.240 searched in

01:10:57.780 and couldn't

01:10:58.460 find the

01:10:58.860 discs there

01:10:59.640 so we

01:11:03.340 couldn't find

01:11:04.000 exactly what

01:11:04.620 we were

01:11:04.840 looking for

01:11:05.340 but we

01:11:06.080 did find

01:11:06.860 something

01:11:07.400 inside

01:11:09.240 Anna's

01:11:09.600 purse

01:11:09.920 the FBI

01:11:10.880 found

01:11:11.640 a sheet

01:11:13.140 with a

01:11:13.640 matrix

01:11:14.140 which was

01:11:14.900 a crypto

01:11:15.440 material

01:11:16.080 which

01:11:16.400 Anna employed

01:11:17.120 when she

01:11:18.000 communicated

01:11:18.400 with the

01:11:18.740 cubans

01:11:19.120 via

01:11:19.660 pagers

01:11:20.160 and that

01:11:23.820 was exactly

01:11:24.360 what we

01:11:24.700 were looking

01:11:24.980 for

01:11:25.240 to determine

01:11:26.220 what the

01:11:26.820 message was

01:11:27.520 between her

01:11:28.160 and cuban

01:11:28.560 intelligence

01:11:29.000 once we

01:11:34.180 had her

01:11:34.560 brevity

01:11:34.840 codes

01:11:35.280 it was

01:11:35.880 simply

01:11:36.200 a matter

01:11:36.740 of going

01:11:37.040 to a

01:11:37.400 phone

01:11:37.800 punching

01:11:38.960 in the

01:11:39.300 exact

01:11:39.560 same

01:11:39.820 codes

01:11:40.280 and then

01:11:41.020 we'd

01:11:41.200 just

01:11:41.360 match

01:11:41.620 it

01:11:41.740 against

01:11:42.060 the

01:11:42.780 messages

01:11:43.140 that

01:11:43.380 had

01:11:43.460 been

01:11:43.600 sent

01:11:43.840 and

01:11:44.020 would

01:11:44.180 be

01:11:44.300 sent

01:11:44.500 in

01:11:44.580 the

01:11:44.660 future

01:11:44.960 and

01:11:45.580 know

01:11:45.740 exactly

01:11:46.160 what

01:11:46.400 she

01:11:46.620 was

01:11:46.760 telling

01:11:47.000 New York

01:11:47.500 it

01:11:48.640 told us

01:11:49.000 at the

01:11:49.240 time

01:11:49.500 that

01:11:49.680 she

01:11:49.920 did

01:11:50.200 not

01:11:50.380 perceive

01:11:50.680 herself

01:11:50.980 in

01:11:51.180 danger

01:11:51.620 and

01:11:52.680 it

01:11:52.780 was

01:11:52.900 setting

01:11:53.160 up

01:11:53.420 the future

01:11:54.320 meetings

01:11:54.660 to

01:11:54.960 meet

01:11:55.160 with

01:11:55.320 her

01:11:55.460 case

01:11:55.740 officer

01:11:56.160 or

01:11:56.820 spy

01:11:57.080 handler

01:11:57.360 which

01:11:58.120 was

01:11:58.640 every

01:11:58.860 second

01:11:59.160 week

01:11:59.520 if

01:12:00.140 we

01:12:00.240 could

01:12:00.380 get

01:12:00.600 her

01:12:00.840 meeting

01:12:01.340 with

01:12:01.600 a

01:12:01.720 spy

01:12:01.960 handler

01:12:02.260 we

01:12:03.040 know

01:12:03.220 we

01:12:03.400 would

01:12:03.700 get

01:12:03.880 her

01:12:04.020 convicted

01:12:04.420 and

01:12:05.600 put

01:12:05.980 her

01:12:06.120 in

01:12:06.280 prison

01:12:06.600 she

01:12:07.760 had

01:12:07.920 the

01:12:08.020 potential

01:12:08.320 to

01:12:08.460 be

01:12:08.580 one

01:12:08.780 of

01:12:08.920 America's

01:12:09.760 most

01:12:10.180 dangerous

01:12:10.580 spies

01:12:11.060 and

01:12:18.280 then

01:12:18.440 this

01:12:18.640 happened

01:12:24.320 I

01:12:27.240 was

01:12:27.420 sitting

01:12:27.680 in

01:12:27.880 my

01:12:28.140 boss's

01:12:29.060 office

01:12:29.400 I

01:12:29.620 think

01:12:29.940 in

01:12:30.160 a

01:12:30.360 commercial

01:12:30.660 office

01:12:31.000 building

01:12:31.340 in

01:12:31.540 northern

01:12:31.860 Virginia

01:12:32.280 about

01:12:32.500 a mile

01:12:32.820 up

01:12:32.960 from

01:12:33.080 the

01:12:33.180 Pentagon

01:12:33.480 when

01:12:34.540 9-11

01:12:35.000 occurred

01:12:35.440 I

01:12:37.560 was 11

01:12:40.880 years old

01:12:41.420 when

01:12:41.640 9-11

01:12:41.940 happened

01:12:42.320 so

01:12:43.120 and

01:12:43.300 just

01:12:43.580 you

01:12:43.760 guys

01:12:43.940 are

01:12:44.060 wondering

01:12:44.280 I

01:12:44.520 have

01:12:44.680 a

01:12:44.780 whole

01:12:44.940 playlist

01:12:45.300 on

01:12:45.520 9-11

01:12:45.880 if

01:12:46.080 you

01:12:46.180 guys

01:12:46.340 want

01:12:46.480 to

01:12:46.580 go

01:12:46.700 ahead

01:12:46.860 and

01:12:46.960 check

01:12:47.140 it

01:12:47.240 out

01:12:47.440 I

01:12:48.280 cover

01:12:48.540 the

01:12:48.840 excuse

01:12:50.660 me

01:12:50.840 I

01:12:50.960 go

01:12:51.100 over

01:12:51.260 the

01:12:51.380 official

01:12:51.660 story

01:12:52.000 I

01:12:52.140 talk

01:12:52.300 about

01:12:52.520 how

01:12:52.700 the

01:12:52.820 FBI

01:12:53.320 conducted

01:12:53.760 their

01:12:53.980 investigation

01:12:54.340 and

01:12:54.800 I

01:12:54.940 go

01:12:55.120 over

01:12:55.480 the

01:12:55.940 conspiracy

01:12:56.320 theories

01:12:56.720 as

01:12:56.920 well

01:12:57.160 with

01:12:58.260 the

01:12:58.660 new

01:12:58.800 Pearl

01:12:58.980 Harbor

01:12:59.180 which

01:12:59.380 was

01:12:59.480 a

01:12:59.620 very

01:12:59.780 well

01:13:00.040 done

01:13:00.340 documentary

01:13:01.660 even

01:13:01.920 though

01:13:02.100 they

01:13:02.200 were

01:13:02.280 missing

01:13:02.500 one

01:13:02.740 element

01:13:03.040 from

01:13:03.240 them

01:13:03.420 boys

01:13:03.780 but

01:13:04.880 we

01:13:05.340 will

01:13:05.480 complete

01:13:05.820 the

01:13:05.960 9-11

01:13:06.400 situation

01:13:07.640 once

01:13:08.020 we

01:13:08.180 bring

01:13:08.440 Ryan

01:13:09.420 Dawson

01:13:09.840 in

01:13:09.980 because

01:13:10.240 there's

01:13:10.900 no

01:13:11.060 doubt

01:13:11.340 that

01:13:11.660 terrorists

01:13:12.020 were

01:13:12.260 involved

01:13:12.620 in

01:13:12.820 the

01:13:12.920 attack

01:13:13.300 right

01:13:13.600 but

01:13:14.340 there

01:13:15.180 were

01:13:15.320 some

01:13:15.500 other

01:13:15.740 situations

01:13:16.300 as

01:13:16.620 well

01:13:16.900 that

01:13:17.740 I

01:13:18.600 won't

01:13:18.800 discuss

01:13:19.100 right

01:13:19.300 now

01:13:19.460 on

01:13:19.580 this

01:13:19.740 podcast

01:13:20.280 but

01:13:21.020 we

01:13:21.160 are

01:13:21.280 definitely

01:13:21.580 going

01:13:21.740 to

01:13:21.820 go

01:13:21.980 into

01:13:22.300 deep

01:13:23.320 detail

01:13:23.820 with

01:13:24.060 y'all

01:13:24.360 and

01:13:25.180 it's

01:13:25.680 going

01:13:25.780 to

01:13:25.800 be

01:13:25.920 pretty

01:13:26.100 eye

01:13:26.280 opening

01:13:26.480 guys

01:13:26.840 we're

01:13:27.340 based

01:13:27.580 on

01:13:27.720 this

01:13:27.840 side

01:13:28.000 of

01:13:28.080 the

01:13:28.140 internet

01:13:28.240 if

01:13:28.400 you

01:13:28.460 know

01:13:28.540 what

01:13:28.620 I'm

01:13:28.700 saying

01:13:28.920 and

01:13:31.960 we

01:13:32.160 riveted

01:13:32.640 to

01:13:32.900 the

01:13:33.200 television

01:13:33.680 screen

01:13:34.180 we

01:13:34.860 understood

01:13:35.260 that

01:13:35.680 this

01:13:35.920 was

01:13:36.080 a

01:13:36.220 terrorist

01:13:36.520 attack

01:13:37.020 and

01:13:37.600 that

01:13:37.820 it

01:13:37.940 was

01:13:38.100 significant

01:13:38.700 I

01:13:41.020 sat

01:13:41.280 in

01:13:41.440 there

01:13:41.580 for

01:13:41.720 another

01:13:42.040 20

01:13:42.800 minutes

01:13:43.060 or so

01:13:43.480 and

01:13:44.140 I

01:13:44.280 saw

01:13:44.540 a

01:13:44.800 puff

01:13:44.960 of

01:13:45.120 smoke

01:13:45.480 to

01:13:45.900 my

01:13:46.100 right

01:13:46.460 and

01:13:47.100 the

01:13:47.520 puff

01:13:47.700 of

01:13:47.820 smoke

01:13:48.100 persisted

01:13:48.860 and

01:13:49.000 it

01:13:49.160 turned

01:13:49.380 gray

01:13:49.760 and

01:13:49.980 began

01:13:50.260 to

01:13:50.440 billow

01:13:50.840 and

01:13:51.460 then

01:13:51.680 news

01:13:52.020 coverage

01:13:52.320 came

01:13:52.580 on

01:13:52.800 about

01:13:53.000 the

01:13:53.160 aircraft

01:13:53.540 hitting

01:13:53.780 the

01:13:53.980 Pentagon

01:13:54.260 I

01:13:55.300 didn't

01:13:55.480 see

01:13:55.660 the

01:13:55.820 impact

01:13:56.180 but

01:13:56.400 I

01:13:56.540 knew

01:13:56.680 what

01:13:56.960 was

01:13:57.100 happening

01:13:57.480 we

01:13:59.360 had

01:13:59.560 just

01:13:59.840 crossed

01:14:00.400 a

01:14:00.580 threshold

01:14:01.060 and

01:14:02.480 that

01:14:02.860 the

01:14:03.040 United

01:14:03.280 States

01:14:03.560 of

01:14:03.760 America

01:14:04.160 was

01:14:05.360 going

01:14:05.660 to

01:14:05.940 formulate

01:14:06.920 some

01:14:07.260 sort

01:14:07.460 of

01:14:07.580 a

01:14:07.700 response

01:14:08.220 that

01:14:08.720 would

01:14:08.920 require

01:14:09.440 the

01:14:09.680 assistance

01:14:10.080 and

01:14:10.460 support

01:14:10.880 of

01:14:11.100 the

01:14:11.200 Defense

01:14:11.460 Intelligence

01:14:11.940 Agency

01:14:12.440 In the

01:14:13.800 aftermath

01:14:14.060 of

01:14:14.320 9-11

01:14:14.820 DIA

01:14:15.380 assembled

01:14:15.940 a

01:14:16.800 task

01:14:17.060 force

01:14:17.260 to

01:14:17.420 support

01:14:17.680 the

01:14:17.820 Pentagon's

01:14:18.400 forthcoming

01:14:18.900 operations

01:14:19.500 in

01:14:19.980 Afghanistan

01:14:20.400 and

01:14:21.460 Amontes

01:14:22.020 was

01:14:22.300 among

01:14:22.540 those

01:14:22.760 to be

01:14:23.020 chosen

01:14:23.320 for

01:14:23.620 the

01:14:23.780 task

01:14:24.040 force

01:14:24.360 on

01:14:30.780 Saturday

01:14:31.180 the

01:14:31.420 22nd

01:14:31.980 September

01:14:32.480 Ana

01:14:33.040 was

01:14:33.200 going

01:14:33.380 to

01:14:33.480 be

01:14:33.620 bereaved

01:14:33.980 on

01:14:34.320 the

01:14:34.720 war

01:14:34.940 plan

01:14:35.220 for

01:14:35.400 Operation

01:14:35.920 Enduring

01:14:36.320 Freedom

01:14:36.720 the

01:14:37.320 effort

01:14:37.540 to

01:14:37.760 remove

01:14:38.100 the

01:14:38.300 Taliban

01:14:38.660 from

01:14:39.700 Afghanistan

01:14:40.500 if

01:14:41.340 Ana

01:14:41.660 Mantis

01:14:42.240 gained

01:14:43.180 access

01:14:43.540 to

01:14:43.800 information

01:14:44.240 about

01:14:44.480 our

01:14:44.660 war

01:14:44.840 plans

01:14:45.240 she

01:14:46.500 could

01:14:46.780 give

01:14:47.000 it

01:14:47.100 to

01:14:47.220 the

01:14:47.340 Cubans

01:14:47.780 who

01:14:48.060 in

01:14:48.320 turn

01:14:48.660 would

01:14:49.460 be

01:14:50.000 happy

01:14:50.300 to

01:14:50.580 trade

01:14:50.900 that

01:14:51.080 information

01:14:51.560 or

01:14:51.820 to

01:14:51.980 simply

01:14:52.300 share

01:14:52.800 that

01:14:53.020 information

01:14:53.560 with

01:14:54.400 our

01:14:54.600 adversaries

01:14:55.260 possibly

01:14:56.240 including

01:14:56.740 the

01:14:56.940 Taliban

01:14:57.400 that

01:14:58.680 event

01:14:59.060 all of

01:14:59.500 our

01:14:59.640 plans

01:15:00.100 that

01:15:00.300 we

01:15:00.460 executed

01:15:01.060 during

01:15:01.700 Operation

01:15:02.260 Enduring

01:15:02.660 Freedom

01:15:03.000 would have

01:15:03.440 been

01:15:03.580 known

01:15:03.800 to

01:15:03.980 the

01:15:04.120 enemy

01:15:04.400 I

01:15:06.820 knew

01:15:07.080 that

01:15:07.300 our

01:15:07.500 investigation

01:15:08.020 with

01:15:08.580 Ana

01:15:09.020 was coming

01:15:09.740 to an

01:15:10.080 end

01:15:10.300 we

01:15:11.840 really

01:15:12.440 wanted

01:15:12.900 to

01:15:13.080 catch

01:15:13.380 her

01:15:13.500 in

01:15:13.620 the

01:15:13.740 act

01:15:14.000 of

01:15:14.140 committing

01:15:14.360 espionage

01:15:14.940 with

01:15:15.440 her

01:15:15.740 handler

01:15:16.200 who

01:15:16.660 was

01:15:16.840 handling

01:15:17.300 and

01:15:17.700 receiving

01:15:18.160 the

01:15:18.380 classified

01:15:18.820 information

01:15:19.540 but

01:15:20.000 we

01:15:20.160 knew

01:15:20.400 that

01:15:20.680 it

01:15:21.280 was

01:15:21.440 just

01:15:21.600 too

01:15:21.840 much

01:15:22.080 risk

01:15:22.600 potential

01:15:23.300 damage

01:15:23.800 to

01:15:24.420 keep

01:15:24.820 her

01:15:25.020 at

01:15:25.260 DIA

01:15:25.740 at

01:15:26.000 such

01:15:26.140 a

01:15:26.280 sensitive

01:15:26.540 time

01:15:26.980 when

01:15:27.160 we

01:15:27.340 were

01:15:27.540 launching

01:15:28.240 a war

01:15:28.700 it was

01:15:29.740 time

01:15:30.280 to

01:15:30.700 arrest

01:15:31.340 Montez

01:15:32.040 for

01:15:32.220 a

01:15:32.360 conspiracy

01:15:32.780 to

01:15:33.000 commit

01:15:33.200 espionage

01:15:33.760 they

01:15:34.200 they

01:15:34.220 they

01:15:34.240 could

01:15:34.560 have

01:15:34.640 kept

01:15:34.800 the

01:15:34.940 case

01:15:35.140 going

01:15:35.500 if

01:15:37.360 9-11

01:15:37.760 didn't

01:15:38.040 happen

01:15:38.320 but

01:15:38.600 yeah

01:15:38.800 it would

01:15:39.200 have

01:15:39.280 been

01:15:39.360 awesome

01:15:39.600 for her

01:15:39.840 to

01:15:39.920 catch

01:15:40.160 her

01:15:40.260 with

01:15:40.420 the

01:15:40.520 handler

01:15:40.780 but

01:15:41.140 it

01:15:41.620 is

01:15:42.420 what

01:15:42.560 it

01:15:42.660 is

01:15:43.720 it

01:15:44.320 happens

01:15:44.760 yeah

01:15:45.220 when

01:15:46.520 9-11

01:15:46.860 happened

01:15:47.300 we knew

01:15:47.720 we had

01:15:48.140 days

01:15:48.500 left

01:15:48.820 in the

01:15:49.180 investigation

01:15:49.740 also

01:15:52.680 keep

01:15:52.940 in mind

01:15:53.200 guys

01:15:53.540 the

01:15:53.760 entire

01:15:54.020 FBI

01:15:54.360 was

01:15:54.560 working

01:15:54.800 9-11

01:15:55.220 so

01:15:55.540 they

01:15:56.060 really

01:15:56.340 had

01:15:56.560 to

01:15:56.700 get

01:15:56.840 this

01:15:57.020 thing

01:15:57.220 wrapped

01:15:57.500 up

01:15:57.780 to

01:15:58.120 focus

01:15:58.620 on

01:15:59.040 the

01:15:59.520 9-11

01:15:59.880 situation

01:16:00.500 versus

01:16:01.440 you know

01:16:01.880 everything

01:16:02.520 got diverted

01:16:03.040 to counterterrorism

01:16:03.740 at that

01:16:04.000 point

01:16:04.200 we

01:16:05.400 really

01:16:06.000 wanted

01:16:06.460 to

01:16:06.640 catch

01:16:06.940 her

01:16:07.060 in

01:16:07.180 the

01:16:07.300 act

01:16:07.560 of

01:16:07.700 committing

01:16:07.920 espionage

01:16:08.520 but

01:16:09.160 it

01:16:09.380 was

01:16:09.520 just

01:16:09.700 too

01:16:09.920 much

01:16:10.180 risk

01:16:10.700 to

01:16:11.280 keep

01:16:11.660 her

01:16:11.860 at

01:16:12.100 DIA

01:16:12.600 at

01:16:12.840 such

01:16:12.980 a

01:16:13.120 sensitive

01:16:13.400 time

01:16:13.840 when

01:16:14.000 we

01:16:14.160 were

01:16:14.380 launching

01:16:15.080 a

01:16:15.280 war

01:16:15.540 it

01:16:19.740 The FBI

01:16:25.080 decided

01:16:25.600 they'd

01:16:25.920 like

01:16:26.080 to

01:16:26.220 effect

01:16:26.520 the

01:16:26.720 arrest

01:16:27.120 over

01:16:27.740 in

01:16:28.300 our

01:16:28.520 building

01:16:28.860 we

01:16:29.680 decided

01:16:30.400 to

01:16:30.820 bring

01:16:31.380 her

01:16:31.480 down

01:16:31.720 into

01:16:31.940 the

01:16:32.100 offices

01:16:32.420 of

01:16:32.600 the

01:16:32.700 inspector

01:16:33.120 general

01:16:33.540 so

01:16:34.960 we

01:16:35.660 were

01:16:35.780 going

01:16:35.900 to

01:16:35.980 arrest

01:16:36.160 her

01:16:36.280 at

01:16:36.400 work

01:16:36.620 but

01:16:37.020 we

01:16:37.120 still

01:16:37.320 wanted

01:16:37.520 to

01:16:37.680 try

01:16:38.000 and

01:16:38.360 get

01:16:38.600 her

01:16:39.040 to

01:16:39.200 make

01:16:39.380 some

01:16:39.560 incriminating

01:16:40.040 statements

01:16:40.580 if

01:16:41.140 we

01:16:41.340 could

01:16:41.540 get

01:16:41.800 her

01:16:42.080 to

01:16:42.580 say

01:16:43.300 things

01:16:43.940 about

01:16:44.500 her

01:16:44.680 espionage

01:16:45.280 in

01:16:45.400 an

01:16:45.560 interview

01:16:45.920 before

01:16:46.400 she's

01:16:46.620 arrested

01:16:46.980 that'd

01:16:47.680 be

01:16:47.760 a

01:16:47.920 good

01:16:48.100 thing

01:16:48.360 for

01:16:48.500 the

01:16:48.620 prosecution

01:16:49.260 we

01:16:52.860 started

01:16:53.220 our

01:16:53.440 interview

01:16:53.800 talked

01:16:54.680 to

01:16:54.840 her

01:16:55.020 about

01:16:55.400 the

01:16:56.580 scenario

01:16:57.100 that

01:16:57.680 wasn't

01:16:57.980 true

01:16:58.360 that

01:16:59.180 there

01:16:59.380 was

01:16:59.580 a

01:16:59.940 defector

01:17:00.880 that

01:17:01.060 came

01:17:01.340 out

01:17:01.600 from

01:17:01.800 the

01:17:01.940 Cuban

01:17:02.180 intelligence

01:17:02.620 service

01:17:03.120 and

01:17:03.320 he

01:17:03.440 talked

01:17:03.720 about

01:17:03.960 a

01:17:04.100 penetration

01:17:04.540 of

01:17:04.800 the

01:17:04.900 U.S.

01:17:05.220 government

01:17:05.560 and

01:17:06.060 quickly

01:17:06.440 into

01:17:06.800 this

01:17:07.140 pretext

01:17:07.840 Ana

01:17:08.440 had

01:17:08.880 this

01:17:09.220 interesting

01:17:09.980 physiological

01:17:11.140 reaction

01:17:12.240 and

01:17:17.820 it

01:17:17.900 was

01:17:18.000 this

01:17:18.180 rash

01:17:18.660 that

01:17:18.940 immediately

01:17:19.760 broke

01:17:20.260 out

01:17:20.600 and

01:17:20.960 they

01:17:21.100 were

01:17:21.260 on

01:17:21.560 the

01:17:21.860 side

01:17:22.080 of

01:17:22.180 her

01:17:22.300 neck

01:17:22.520 that

01:17:22.680 was

01:17:22.820 facing

01:17:23.160 me

01:17:23.540 I

01:17:23.880 could

01:17:24.060 only

01:17:24.260 see

01:17:24.580 them

01:17:24.900 you know

01:17:25.520 I had

01:17:25.820 to

01:17:25.920 kind

01:17:26.040 of

01:17:26.120 control

01:17:26.420 myself

01:17:26.840 and

01:17:27.060 not

01:17:27.260 go

01:17:27.540 look at

01:17:28.720 that

01:17:28.940 she

01:17:29.220 has

01:17:29.880 this

01:17:30.060 rash

01:17:30.400 breaking

01:17:30.800 out

01:17:31.120 so

01:17:34.260 she

01:17:34.820 knows

01:17:35.160 what

01:17:35.360 time

01:17:35.660 it

01:17:35.780 is

01:17:35.920 man

01:17:36.240 oh

01:17:37.280 she

01:17:39.720 got

01:17:39.920 him

01:17:40.020 under

01:17:40.200 control

01:17:40.620 and

01:17:40.820 she

01:17:40.940 was

01:17:41.100 very

01:17:41.440 focused

01:17:41.940 and

01:17:42.160 very

01:17:42.400 firm

01:17:42.860 getting

01:17:43.840 through

01:17:44.120 this

01:17:44.380 story

01:17:44.900 Montez

01:17:46.060 kind

01:17:46.380 of

01:17:46.500 wised

01:17:46.800 up

01:17:47.040 to

01:17:47.240 it

01:17:47.420 and

01:17:47.880 asked

01:17:48.160 if

01:17:48.280 she

01:17:48.420 was

01:17:48.560 under

01:17:48.760 investigation

01:17:49.260 and

01:17:49.780 at

01:17:50.340 that

01:17:50.500 point

01:17:50.700 in

01:17:50.840 time

01:17:51.000 we

01:17:51.180 told

01:17:51.400 her

01:17:51.500 she

01:17:51.660 was

01:17:51.820 under

01:17:52.040 arrest

01:17:52.400 for

01:17:52.760 conspiracy

01:17:53.460 to

01:17:53.720 commit

01:17:53.940 espionage

01:17:54.520 handcuffed

01:17:55.640 her

01:18:01.120 Pete

01:18:08.300 came

01:18:08.640 out

01:18:08.860 of

01:18:08.960 the

01:18:09.080 conference

01:18:09.460 room

01:18:09.680 with

01:18:09.880 Anna

01:18:10.120 she

01:18:10.360 was

01:18:10.560 in

01:18:10.680 handcuffs

01:18:11.200 and

01:18:11.360 I

01:18:11.500 saw

01:18:11.720 them

01:18:11.900 walking

01:18:12.200 down

01:18:12.620 the

01:18:13.360 corridor

01:18:13.660 if you

01:18:14.000 will

01:18:14.220 towards

01:18:14.620 me

01:18:14.900 she

01:18:17.080 was

01:18:17.280 almost

01:18:17.620 standing

01:18:17.880 in front

01:18:18.300 of me

01:18:18.520 and

01:18:18.960 she

01:18:19.080 never

01:18:19.280 looked

01:18:19.540 at

01:18:19.700 me

01:18:19.900 I

01:18:21.340 doubt

01:18:21.660 that

01:18:21.880 she

01:18:22.060 had

01:18:22.480 any

01:18:23.220 real

01:18:23.660 idea

01:18:24.180 as

01:18:24.800 to

01:18:25.040 what

01:18:25.340 role

01:18:25.660 I

01:18:25.820 might

01:18:26.000 have

01:18:26.120 played

01:18:26.380 in

01:18:26.520 her

01:18:26.700 capture

01:18:27.120 yeah

01:18:28.180 he

01:18:28.340 was

01:18:28.480 the

01:18:28.580 one

01:18:28.700 that

01:18:28.820 actually

01:18:29.080 brought

01:18:29.300 the

01:18:29.440 focus

01:18:29.720 back

01:18:29.980 on

01:18:30.200 her

01:18:30.320 so

01:18:30.640 shout

01:18:31.120 out

01:18:31.220 to

01:18:31.320 him

01:18:31.700 FBI

01:18:32.800 doubted

01:18:33.180 him

01:18:33.240 but

01:18:33.340 he

01:18:33.440 got

01:18:33.660 it

01:18:33.880 we're

01:18:35.760 pleased

01:18:36.060 to

01:18:36.220 announce

01:18:36.520 this

01:18:36.800 morning

01:18:37.120 that

01:18:39.080 45

01:18:39.460 year

01:18:39.780 old

01:18:40.080 Anna

01:18:40.560 Belen

01:18:41.200 Montez

01:18:41.800 pled

01:18:42.280 guilty

01:18:42.640 a

01:18:42.940 one

01:18:43.120 count

01:18:43.300 indictment

01:18:43.760 charging

01:18:44.140 her

01:18:44.320 with

01:18:44.520 conspiracy

01:18:45.100 to

01:18:45.320 commit

01:18:45.540 espionage

01:18:46.260 today's

01:18:46.840 guilty

01:18:47.100 plea

01:18:47.360 is a

01:18:47.660 result

01:18:47.920 of a

01:18:48.280 plea

01:18:48.440 agreement

01:18:48.780 between

01:18:49.140 Ms.

01:18:49.460 Montez

01:18:49.940 and

01:18:50.140 the

01:18:50.240 United

01:18:50.460 States

01:18:50.880 that

01:18:51.480 will

01:18:51.660 require

01:18:52.120 Ms.

01:18:52.380 Montez

01:18:52.780 to

01:18:52.960 fully

01:18:53.220 cooperate

01:18:53.680 with

01:18:53.940 law

01:18:54.140 enforcement

01:18:54.560 by

01:18:55.080 providing

01:18:55.480 information

01:18:56.000 relating

01:18:56.440 to all

01:18:56.880 criminal

01:19:00.640 as part

01:19:01.840 of the

01:19:02.040 plea

01:19:02.240 agreement

01:19:02.640 she

01:19:02.900 got

01:19:03.040 25

01:19:03.400 years

01:19:03.820 for

01:19:04.000 espionage

01:19:04.520 and

01:19:05.660 in

01:19:06.220 exchange

01:19:07.220 for that

01:19:07.720 she

01:19:07.940 agreed

01:19:08.240 to be

01:19:08.520 fully

01:19:08.740 debriefed

01:19:09.420 by

01:19:09.840 the

01:19:10.420 FBI

01:19:10.780 and the

01:19:11.120 rest

01:19:11.260 of the

01:19:11.440 intelligence

01:19:11.760 community

01:19:12.240 so that

01:19:13.120 means

01:19:13.320 the CIA

01:19:13.800 came in

01:19:14.280 there

01:19:14.440 DIA

01:19:14.880 people

01:19:15.220 came in

01:19:15.680 there

01:19:15.820 everybody

01:19:16.100 came in

01:19:16.640 there

01:19:16.740 to ask

01:19:17.200 questions

01:19:17.760 so

01:19:18.080 you know

01:19:18.880 because

01:19:19.320 normally

01:19:19.660 guys

01:19:19.980 for a

01:19:20.280 charge

01:19:20.480 like

01:19:20.640 this

01:19:20.800 you

01:19:20.880 can

01:19:20.980 get

01:19:21.120 life

01:19:21.400 and

01:19:21.760 or

01:19:21.920 death

01:19:22.240 right

01:19:22.960 a

01:19:23.120 life

01:19:23.280 sentence

01:19:23.520 and

01:19:23.760 or

01:19:23.880 like

01:19:24.060 the

01:19:24.160 death

01:19:24.320 penalty

01:19:24.560 so

01:19:24.880 for

01:19:25.660 her

01:19:25.760 to

01:19:25.860 get

01:19:25.980 25

01:19:26.320 years

01:19:26.860 was

01:19:27.440 pretty

01:19:28.240 good

01:19:28.540 given

01:19:29.020 the

01:19:29.560 crime

01:19:29.820 she

01:19:33.540 was

01:19:33.780 debriefed

01:19:34.400 for

01:19:34.540 about

01:19:34.780 seven

01:19:35.100 months

01:19:35.520 seven

01:19:36.600 months

01:19:37.220 exhaustively

01:19:38.300 probably

01:19:38.780 three times

01:19:39.900 a week

01:19:40.260 five or

01:19:40.720 six

01:19:40.920 hours

01:19:41.380 that

01:19:41.760 goes

01:19:42.000 to

01:19:42.140 show

01:19:42.340 how

01:19:42.600 much

01:19:42.900 information

01:19:43.440 she

01:19:43.680 really

01:19:43.920 had

01:19:44.280 a

01:19:44.660 day

01:19:44.960 during

01:19:45.580 honest

01:19:45.940 debriefing

01:19:46.520 they

01:19:47.220 took

01:19:47.480 her

01:19:47.580 from

01:19:47.760 the

01:19:47.960 earlier

01:19:48.300 days

01:19:49.000 in

01:19:50.160 1985

01:19:50.900 when

01:19:51.420 she

01:19:51.540 started

01:19:51.940 holy

01:19:53.020 bro

01:19:54.220 she

01:19:55.540 was

01:19:55.800 going

01:19:56.040 way

01:19:56.360 back

01:19:56.700 in

01:19:56.880 time

01:19:57.220 she

01:19:59.540 was

01:19:59.760 selling

01:20:00.000 secrets

01:20:00.580 since

01:20:01.320 Scarface

01:20:01.960 all the

01:20:04.980 way up

01:20:05.220 to the

01:20:05.420 day of

01:20:05.660 arrest

01:20:06.060 what

01:20:06.840 did

01:20:06.980 you

01:20:07.080 learn

01:20:07.400 we

01:20:08.100 learned

01:20:08.260 she

01:20:08.400 betrayed

01:20:08.820 us

01:20:09.100 in

01:20:09.260 El

01:20:09.440 Salvador

01:20:09.740 compromised

01:20:10.580 all of

01:20:11.220 our

01:20:11.320 military

01:20:11.620 operations

01:20:12.880 in

01:20:13.860 Central

01:20:14.100 America

01:20:14.580 throughout

01:20:15.240 five years

01:20:16.000 of the

01:20:16.240 secret

01:20:16.460 war

01:20:16.780 during

01:20:17.160 the

01:20:17.300 1980s

01:20:18.100 and

01:20:22.200 think

01:20:22.420 here

01:20:22.640 was a

01:20:23.040 woman

01:20:23.340 that

01:20:24.040 would

01:20:24.240 literally

01:20:24.560 sit

01:20:24.880 across

01:20:25.140 the

01:20:25.320 table

01:20:25.580 from

01:20:25.960 special

01:20:26.300 forces

01:20:26.600 teams

01:20:26.920 going

01:20:27.180 down

01:20:27.400 range

01:20:27.760 and

01:20:29.020 pretend

01:20:29.300 to be

01:20:29.600 their

01:20:29.760 friend

01:20:30.100 and

01:20:30.380 then

01:20:30.500 as soon

01:20:30.780 as

01:20:30.920 the

01:20:31.020 meeting

01:20:31.200 is

01:20:31.420 over

01:20:31.680 contact

01:20:32.640 her

01:20:32.900 Cuban

01:20:33.140 handlers

01:20:33.540 and

01:20:33.700 say

01:20:33.960 you

01:20:34.720 have

01:20:34.880 another

01:20:35.120 special

01:20:35.460 forces

01:20:35.780 team

01:20:36.080 going

01:20:36.360 on

01:20:36.760 to

01:20:37.420 El

01:20:37.560 Salvador

01:20:37.860 they'll

01:20:38.540 be

01:20:38.660 at

01:20:38.780 this

01:20:38.940 location

01:20:39.380 on

01:20:39.860 these

01:20:40.060 dates

01:20:40.440 good

01:20:41.080 luck

01:20:41.380 happy

01:20:41.960 hunting

01:20:42.260 that's

01:20:43.160 crazy

01:20:43.920 bro

01:20:44.380 that's

01:20:45.620 crazy

01:20:46.160 imagine

01:20:46.560 how many

01:20:46.920 people

01:20:47.200 probably

01:20:47.740 died

01:20:48.220 because

01:20:49.120 of the

01:20:49.620 information

01:20:50.040 that she

01:20:50.360 provided

01:20:53.340 willfully

01:20:55.060 and

01:20:55.220 intentionally

01:20:55.660 took

01:20:57.120 every

01:20:57.360 action

01:20:57.620 she

01:20:57.820 could

01:20:58.060 to get

01:20:58.280 Americans

01:20:58.620 killed

01:20:58.880 in

01:20:59.040 combat

01:20:59.320 it

01:20:59.980 should

01:21:00.120 make

01:21:00.300 us

01:21:00.460 all

01:21:00.920 enraged

01:21:01.700 people

01:21:05.320 from the

01:21:05.660 intelligence

01:21:06.120 community

01:21:06.520 I know

01:21:06.940 some of you

01:21:07.320 guys hate

01:21:07.720 the government

01:21:08.100 and don't

01:21:08.500 trust the

01:21:08.820 government

01:21:09.040 and everything

01:21:09.440 like that

01:21:09.820 and that's

01:21:10.080 cool

01:21:10.240 that's

01:21:10.520 nothing

01:21:10.720 wrong

01:21:10.940 with not

01:21:11.300 trusting

01:21:11.580 the

01:21:11.700 government

01:21:11.860 I get

01:21:12.120 it

01:21:12.200 you should

01:21:12.400 be

01:21:12.540 you should

01:21:12.880 question

01:21:13.160 everything

01:21:13.580 what I

01:21:14.460 will

01:21:14.660 say

01:21:14.880 is

01:21:15.160 I

01:21:16.320 don't

01:21:16.440 want

01:21:16.580 our

01:21:16.720 soldiers

01:21:16.980 dying

01:21:17.260 okay

01:21:17.900 you

01:21:18.300 don't

01:21:18.460 have

01:21:18.640 to

01:21:18.740 like

01:21:18.860 the

01:21:19.000 government

01:21:19.260 but hey

01:21:19.740 I don't

01:21:20.280 want our

01:21:20.680 soldiers

01:21:21.020 dying

01:21:21.300 so

01:21:22.200 to me

01:21:23.020 I look

01:21:23.720 at it

01:21:23.980 like

01:21:24.200 this is

01:21:24.520 unacceptable

01:21:24.980 and this

01:21:25.380 is why

01:21:25.700 I have

01:21:26.300 such a

01:21:27.200 personal

01:21:27.480 issue

01:21:27.900 with

01:21:28.740 espionage

01:21:30.500 treason

01:21:31.000 people that

01:21:31.520 sell

01:21:31.720 secrets

01:21:32.100 right

01:21:32.280 I know

01:21:32.480 people

01:21:32.740 are like

01:21:32.980 oh well

01:21:33.340 Snowden

01:21:33.620 did the

01:21:33.900 right

01:21:34.080 thing

01:21:34.380 he's

01:21:34.980 providing

01:21:35.300 information

01:21:35.960 you know

01:21:37.400 to the

01:21:37.680 people

01:21:37.880 he's a

01:21:38.120 whistleblower

01:21:38.540 etc

01:21:38.840 okay

01:21:39.900 I get

01:21:40.420 that

01:21:40.640 and then

01:21:40.820 people

01:21:40.980 like

01:21:41.160 oh

01:21:41.360 Assange

01:21:41.800 he's

01:21:42.560 a truth

01:21:43.260 speaker

01:21:43.600 blah blah

01:21:43.920 blah

01:21:44.060 he's

01:21:44.260 talking

01:21:44.560 about

01:21:44.760 injustices

01:21:45.660 okay

01:21:46.100 understandable

01:21:49.000 from the

01:21:49.380 perspective

01:21:49.760 of our

01:21:50.580 soldiers

01:21:50.880 I'm always

01:21:51.280 pro-soldiers

01:21:51.860 first

01:21:52.200 so

01:21:52.780 if

01:21:53.620 soldiers

01:21:53.980 die

01:21:54.440 because

01:21:55.240 guys

01:21:55.500 want to

01:21:55.720 be

01:21:55.820 whistleblowers

01:21:56.420 I say

01:21:58.620 fuck the

01:21:58.920 whistleblowers

01:21:59.320 you guys

01:21:59.640 might not

01:22:00.200 like me

01:22:00.460 saying that

01:22:00.800 but

01:22:01.000 I don't

01:22:01.660 want

01:22:01.820 guys

01:22:02.220 right

01:22:02.560 that

01:22:03.520 enlisted

01:22:03.780 in the

01:22:03.960 military

01:22:04.340 that

01:22:04.940 go out

01:22:05.440 to

01:22:06.200 fight

01:22:07.020 and protect

01:22:07.940 your rights

01:22:08.680 and mine

01:22:09.200 dying

01:22:10.320 I don't

01:22:11.040 want a

01:22:11.280 kid

01:22:11.420 that's

01:22:11.660 18

01:22:11.960 years

01:22:12.180 old

01:22:12.380 that

01:22:12.540 loves

01:22:12.720 his

01:22:12.840 country

01:22:13.020 serving

01:22:13.300 his

01:22:13.460 country

01:22:13.700 to

01:22:14.240 die

01:22:14.720 because

01:22:15.420 some

01:22:15.680 dude

01:22:16.040 wants

01:22:16.700 to

01:22:16.840 increase

01:22:17.220 his

01:22:17.680 Wikileaks

01:22:18.140 page

01:22:18.500 call

01:22:19.660 that

01:22:19.820 controversial

01:22:20.300 whatever

01:22:20.620 it may

01:22:20.880 be

01:22:21.120 but

01:22:21.360 I'm

01:22:21.540 pro-soldier

01:22:22.000 first

01:22:22.400 every

01:22:25.300 individual

01:22:25.880 that she

01:22:26.280 met

01:22:26.540 from

01:22:26.800 the

01:22:26.960 US

01:22:27.220 government

01:22:27.580 if

01:22:28.320 they

01:22:28.440 were

01:22:28.580 going

01:22:28.980 to

01:22:29.260 Cuba

01:22:29.540 covertly

01:22:30.340 she

01:22:31.160 identified

01:22:31.580 who

01:22:31.980 they

01:22:32.180 were

01:22:32.500 and

01:22:32.840 what

01:22:33.280 their

01:22:33.500 true

01:22:34.060 mission

01:22:34.440 was

01:22:34.820 versus

01:22:35.140 what

01:22:35.440 their

01:22:35.620 stated

01:22:35.980 mission

01:22:36.320 was

01:22:36.740 a lot

01:22:37.480 of the

01:22:37.660 information

01:22:38.020 she

01:22:38.320 shared

01:22:38.800 will

01:22:39.600 remain

01:22:39.900 classified

01:22:40.300 to the

01:22:40.660 American

01:22:40.920 public

01:22:41.380 and

01:22:41.940 isn't

01:22:42.180 that

01:22:42.340 ironic

01:22:42.700 that

01:22:42.940 information

01:22:43.400 that

01:22:43.700 you

01:22:44.640 cannot

01:22:45.240 read

01:22:45.760 was read

01:22:46.540 in

01:22:46.840 Beijing

01:22:47.760 Moscow

01:22:49.140 Tehran

01:22:50.220 Cuba

01:22:51.140 there's

01:22:52.500 no way

01:22:52.840 even

01:22:53.060 in

01:22:53.220 six

01:22:53.460 months

01:22:53.720 of

01:22:53.960 daily

01:22:54.540 all-day

01:22:55.360 interrogations

01:22:56.140 you're

01:22:57.520 not going

01:22:57.780 to get

01:22:58.040 everything

01:22:58.480 that a

01:22:58.900 career

01:22:59.100 spy

01:22:59.360 did

01:22:59.640 in

01:23:00.000 16

01:23:00.340 years

01:23:00.680 we

01:23:01.300 will

01:23:01.480 never

01:23:01.780 fully

01:23:02.180 know

01:23:02.520 the

01:23:02.900 damage

01:23:03.280 that

01:23:03.480 she

01:23:03.760 did

01:23:04.080 to

01:23:04.560 the

01:23:05.040 United

01:23:05.480 States

01:23:05.980 during

01:23:09.640 the time

01:23:10.620 we were

01:23:10.860 debriefing

01:23:11.460 her

01:23:11.680 we learned

01:23:12.440 a lot

01:23:12.880 about

01:23:13.380 her

01:23:13.800 motivation

01:23:14.380 for being

01:23:15.200 the

01:23:15.440 Cuban

01:23:15.640 spy

01:23:15.940 okay

01:23:16.440 here

01:23:16.720 you go

01:23:17.140 Angie

01:23:17.820 you're

01:23:18.120 gonna

01:23:18.200 get

01:23:18.340 this

01:23:19.300 what you

01:23:19.560 want

01:23:19.700 to find

01:23:19.980 out

01:23:20.180 yeah

01:23:20.540 why

01:23:21.500 she

01:23:21.720 did

01:23:21.960 it

01:23:22.280 so

01:23:24.320 in

01:23:24.920 1984

01:23:25.680 1985

01:23:26.500 Montez

01:23:27.500 was working

01:23:27.960 on her

01:23:28.340 master's

01:23:28.840 degree

01:23:29.120 in

01:23:29.500 international

01:23:29.980 relations

01:23:30.600 at Johns

01:23:31.200 Hopkins

01:23:31.480 University

01:23:32.140 and her

01:23:33.520 mutual

01:23:34.040 friend

01:23:34.600 saw her

01:23:35.640 in class

01:23:36.320 knew her

01:23:36.880 opinions

01:23:37.480 knew that

01:23:38.100 she was

01:23:38.620 diametrically

01:23:39.920 opposed

01:23:40.620 to US

01:23:41.340 foreign

01:23:41.640 policy

01:23:42.060 and what

01:23:42.360 we were

01:23:42.680 doing

01:23:42.940 in that

01:23:43.300 time

01:23:43.620 period

01:23:43.880 which

01:23:44.080 was

01:23:44.240 1984

01:23:44.920 1985

01:23:46.300 Anna

01:23:47.020 felt

01:23:47.520 that

01:23:48.080 the United

01:23:48.600 States

01:23:48.800 didn't

01:23:49.040 have a

01:23:49.360 right

01:23:49.640 to

01:23:50.140 impose

01:23:50.820 their

01:23:51.200 will

01:23:51.540 on

01:23:52.520 other

01:23:52.800 countries

01:23:53.220 especially

01:23:53.640 in

01:23:54.060 Central

01:23:54.680 and South

01:23:55.400 America

01:23:55.900 and let me

01:23:57.040 make this

01:23:57.360 clear

01:23:57.560 there's nothing

01:23:58.000 wrong with

01:23:58.460 having that

01:23:58.880 viewpoint

01:23:59.260 right

01:23:59.700 if you

01:24:00.360 don't like

01:24:01.660 US foreign

01:24:02.640 policy

01:24:03.260 that's within

01:24:04.620 your right

01:24:05.160 as an

01:24:05.660 American

01:24:06.000 to have

01:24:07.120 right

01:24:07.400 that's the

01:24:07.820 right

01:24:08.060 that we

01:24:08.780 enjoy as

01:24:09.220 Americans

01:24:09.560 however

01:24:10.260 getting into

01:24:11.780 a trusted

01:24:12.160 position

01:24:12.620 where you

01:24:13.100 have

01:24:13.380 classified

01:24:13.780 information

01:24:14.380 that you

01:24:15.340 took an

01:24:15.680 oath to

01:24:16.000 protect

01:24:16.340 by the

01:24:16.680 way

01:24:16.920 right

01:24:17.320 all of

01:24:17.680 us

01:24:17.800 had a

01:24:18.040 clearance

01:24:18.260 I remember

01:24:18.600 when I

01:24:18.820 took my

01:24:19.140 oath

01:24:19.260 I'd never

01:24:19.620 get that

01:24:19.960 day

01:24:20.080 August 24th

01:24:21.240 2014

01:24:21.860 right

01:24:23.040 when you

01:24:24.240 take that

01:24:24.620 oath

01:24:24.880 you say

01:24:26.420 in it

01:24:26.800 whether

01:24:27.300 you're

01:24:27.540 law

01:24:27.740 enforcement

01:24:28.160 for

01:24:28.860 homeland

01:24:29.260 security

01:24:29.760 the FBI

01:24:30.900 DEA

01:24:31.740 it doesn't

01:24:32.160 matter

01:24:32.400 you say

01:24:33.120 you will

01:24:33.300 protect

01:24:33.580 the US

01:24:33.860 constitution

01:24:34.260 against

01:24:34.640 all

01:24:35.060 threats

01:24:35.400 foreign

01:24:35.960 and

01:24:36.260 domestic

01:24:36.660 so you

01:24:37.880 took that

01:24:38.260 oath

01:24:38.520 and you

01:24:39.300 went ahead

01:24:39.760 and you

01:24:40.420 gave those

01:24:40.960 secrets

01:24:41.420 to people

01:24:42.800 that want

01:24:43.780 to hurt

01:24:44.140 the United

01:24:44.480 States

01:24:44.740 as much

01:24:45.000 as you

01:24:45.200 hate

01:24:45.440 the United

01:24:45.740 States

01:24:46.080 if you

01:24:46.340 some of

01:24:46.620 you guys

01:24:46.780 might say

01:24:47.100 oh well

01:24:47.480 government

01:24:47.740 I can't

01:24:48.080 trust it

01:24:48.500 or blah

01:24:48.800 blah

01:24:48.880 blah

01:24:49.060 all this

01:24:49.260 other

01:24:49.420 stuff

01:24:49.660 she took

01:24:50.460 an oath

01:24:50.920 to protect

01:24:51.840 the United

01:24:52.500 States

01:24:52.920 you don't like

01:24:53.760 US foreign

01:24:54.160 policy

01:24:54.440 that's fine

01:24:54.960 that's one

01:24:55.680 of the

01:24:55.900 beauties

01:24:56.200 of this

01:24:56.480 country

01:24:56.740 you can

01:24:57.420 disagree

01:24:57.920 with the

01:24:58.880 government

01:24:59.220 and be

01:24:59.800 able to

01:25:00.140 say it

01:25:00.520 without

01:25:01.100 being

01:25:01.900 attacked

01:25:02.380 or killed

01:25:02.900 or put

01:25:03.280 in jail

01:25:03.660 however

01:25:04.440 for you

01:25:05.300 to

01:25:05.480 have

01:25:06.020 that

01:25:06.220 viewpoint

01:25:06.620 go into

01:25:07.560 public

01:25:07.860 service

01:25:08.340 taking out

01:25:09.160 that you're

01:25:09.420 going to

01:25:09.600 protect

01:25:09.900 the United

01:25:10.220 States

01:25:10.520 and then

01:25:10.960 do the

01:25:11.340 exact

01:25:11.640 opposite

01:25:12.100 well

01:25:13.020 we know

01:25:13.860 what happens

01:25:14.400 FBI

01:25:15.760 open up

01:25:16.480 and then

01:25:16.760 you end

01:25:16.980 up in

01:25:17.260 jail

01:25:17.800 or dead

01:25:20.660 or dead

01:25:21.520 disagreed

01:25:23.960 with US

01:25:24.320 foreign

01:25:24.580 policy

01:25:25.000 at the

01:25:25.240 time

01:25:25.500 so

01:25:26.160 her

01:25:26.560 friend

01:25:27.080 sensed

01:25:27.740 that she

01:25:28.080 had

01:25:28.360 this

01:25:28.660 passion

01:25:29.280 that the

01:25:29.840 Cubans

01:25:30.240 would be

01:25:31.000 interested

01:25:31.360 in

01:25:31.720 she's

01:25:33.460 introduced

01:25:33.740 to the

01:25:34.040 Cubans

01:25:34.500 via

01:25:35.300 a

01:25:35.760 diplomat

01:25:36.460 who was

01:25:37.320 there

01:25:37.660 undercover

01:25:38.140 he

01:25:38.600 recognized

01:25:39.060 that she

01:25:39.540 had

01:25:39.740 this

01:25:39.920 visceral

01:25:40.440 empathy

01:25:40.920 for

01:25:41.920 the

01:25:42.120 Cuban

01:25:42.500 plight

01:25:43.540 for

01:25:44.080 the

01:25:44.380 Cuban

01:25:44.660 cause

01:25:45.260 and

01:25:45.840 that's

01:25:46.480 folks

01:25:46.940 who

01:25:47.100 they

01:25:47.280 really

01:25:47.760 reach out

01:25:49.020 to

01:25:49.340 and

01:25:49.740 ultimately

01:25:50.140 trust

01:25:50.580 to be

01:25:50.920 their

01:25:51.120 agents

01:25:51.540 Honest

01:25:55.500 Cubicle

01:25:55.880 was actually

01:25:56.700 devoid

01:25:57.860 of anything

01:25:58.780 personal

01:25:59.700 it was all

01:26:01.000 devoted to

01:26:01.500 business

01:26:01.940 but

01:26:02.800 on Honest

01:26:03.400 Cubicle

01:26:03.760 wall

01:26:04.140 posted

01:26:04.580 right next

01:26:05.140 to her

01:26:05.500 computer

01:26:05.880 monitor

01:26:06.340 was a

01:26:07.200 piece

01:26:07.380 of paper

01:26:07.840 it was

01:26:08.620 lined

01:26:09.020 and written

01:26:09.680 in script

01:26:10.420 the king

01:26:11.340 hath note

01:26:11.900 of all

01:26:12.340 that they

01:26:12.660 intend

01:26:13.080 by

01:26:14.120 interceptions

01:26:14.720 which they

01:26:15.400 dream not

01:26:16.080 of

01:26:16.440 Fidel

01:26:17.120 Castro

01:26:17.500 was aware

01:26:17.960 of all

01:26:18.240 of their

01:26:18.460 plans

01:26:18.920 by some

01:26:19.820 secret

01:26:20.240 means

01:26:20.680 they

01:26:21.040 can't

01:26:21.380 even

01:26:21.540 imagine

01:26:22.000 this

01:26:23.060 was an

01:26:23.460 inspirational

01:26:23.960 quote

01:26:24.460 that she

01:26:24.860 had posted

01:26:25.360 to her

01:26:25.800 wall

01:26:26.120 so that

01:26:26.440 every time

01:26:26.940 that she

01:26:27.200 was down

01:26:27.580 at her

01:26:27.900 computer

01:26:28.380 she could

01:26:30.600 see it

01:26:31.040 and motivate

01:26:31.840 herself

01:26:32.420 as a

01:26:33.040 spy

01:26:33.480 you

01:26:36.320 you

01:26:36.380 know

01:26:36.480 people

01:26:36.880 who

01:26:37.040 commit

01:26:37.280 espionage

01:26:38.020 are

01:26:39.060 placing

01:26:39.540 our

01:26:39.780 collective

01:26:40.120 security

01:26:40.680 at risk

01:26:41.200 our

01:26:42.260 boys

01:26:42.520 and

01:26:42.700 girls

01:26:42.940 in

01:26:43.160 uniform

01:26:43.520 who

01:26:43.840 are

01:26:43.900 fighting

01:26:44.280 battles

01:26:44.760 for us

01:26:45.220 are

01:26:45.660 going to

01:26:45.920 die

01:26:46.240 because

01:26:46.560 somebody

01:26:46.840 stabbed

01:26:47.280 in the

01:26:47.640 neck

01:26:47.920 that's

01:26:49.820 what

01:26:49.960 espionage

01:26:50.480 is

01:26:50.800 death

01:26:51.500 and

01:26:53.600 that's

01:26:53.880 why

01:26:54.200 guys

01:26:55.540 like

01:26:55.760 me

01:26:56.100 work

01:26:56.960 so

01:26:57.160 hard

01:26:57.420 to

01:26:57.600 find

01:26:57.820 these

01:26:58.040 people

01:26:58.360 I've

01:27:01.320 told

01:27:01.540 people

01:27:01.880 that

01:27:02.240 honey

01:27:02.800 for

01:27:03.020 spies

01:27:03.560 is

01:27:04.100 like

01:27:04.340 trying

01:27:04.600 to

01:27:04.780 find

01:27:05.140 a

01:27:05.280 ghost

01:27:05.540 in

01:27:05.740 the

01:27:05.880 fog

01:27:06.160 and

01:27:07.160 you've

01:27:08.600 got to

01:27:08.960 believe

01:27:09.260 first of

01:27:09.820 all

01:27:10.000 that

01:27:10.180 they're

01:27:10.360 there

01:27:10.660 and

01:27:11.880 then

01:27:11.980 you

01:27:12.080 have

01:27:12.240 to

01:27:12.320 have

01:27:12.440 enough

01:27:12.640 drive

01:27:13.160 to

01:27:13.420 keep

01:27:13.640 looking

01:27:13.980 all

01:27:17.260 right

01:27:17.500 so

01:27:18.220 pretty

01:27:20.420 interesting

01:27:20.760 documentary

01:27:21.240 there

01:27:21.560 she

01:27:21.840 definitely

01:27:22.340 won

01:27:22.800 the

01:27:23.120 cuban

01:27:23.820 nationality

01:27:25.180 so

01:27:27.260 yeah

01:27:27.480 this is

01:27:27.880 her

01:27:28.180 guys

01:27:28.500 right

01:27:28.780 like

01:27:29.200 you

01:27:29.340 said

01:27:29.480 this

01:27:29.720 is

01:27:29.840 the

01:27:29.960 FBI

01:27:30.240 press

01:27:30.520 release

01:27:30.760 10

01:27:30.940 days

01:27:31.080 after

01:27:31.260 9-11

01:27:31.680 attacks

01:27:31.980 the

01:27:32.100 FBI

01:27:32.380 rest of

01:27:32.940 the

01:27:33.020 43

01:27:33.300 woman

01:27:33.800 named

01:27:34.100 Anna

01:27:34.380 Belen

01:27:34.680 Montez

01:27:35.200 she

01:27:36.180 didn't

01:27:36.360 have

01:27:36.580 anything

01:27:36.780 to do

01:27:37.040 it

01:27:37.140 as

01:27:37.280 you

01:27:37.400 guys

01:27:37.580 know

01:27:37.740 we

01:27:37.880 covered

01:27:38.060 in

01:27:38.180 the

01:27:38.240 documentary

01:27:38.580 but

01:27:38.780 this

01:27:38.940 was

01:27:39.120 the

01:27:39.420 FBI

01:27:41.480 press

01:27:41.760 release

01:27:41.980 here's

01:27:42.660 the

01:27:42.760 affidavit

01:27:43.260 guys

01:27:43.680 right

01:27:44.040 from

01:27:44.260 Stephen

01:27:44.540 McCoy

01:27:44.820 the

01:27:44.960 case

01:27:51.240 but

01:27:51.780 this

01:27:52.520 right

01:27:52.700 here

01:27:52.860 the

01:27:53.000 first

01:27:53.160 paragraph

01:27:53.480 I

01:27:53.640 tell

01:27:53.760 you

01:27:53.840 guys

01:27:54.000 this

01:27:54.120 all

01:27:54.280 the

01:27:54.380 time

01:27:54.560 this

01:27:54.720 is

01:27:54.860 like

01:27:55.020 where

01:27:55.140 they

01:27:55.260 talk

01:27:55.460 about

01:27:55.620 their

01:27:55.740 training

01:27:56.000 experience

01:27:56.520 he

01:27:56.660 goes

01:27:56.800 on

01:27:56.900 special

01:27:57.140 FBI

01:27:57.660 and

01:27:57.900 have

01:27:58.060 been

01:27:58.220 so

01:27:58.380 employed

01:27:58.620 for

01:27:58.760 20

01:27:59.060 years

01:27:59.340 this

01:27:59.520 guy

01:27:59.660 was

01:27:59.780 veteran

01:28:00.040 more than

01:28:00.720 likely

01:28:00.940 the

01:28:01.100 reason

01:28:01.260 why

01:28:01.480 is

01:28:01.560 because

01:28:01.660 he

01:28:01.760 was

01:28:01.860 he

01:28:02.480 couldn't

01:28:02.740 find

01:28:02.980 him

01:28:03.120 because

01:28:03.780 at

01:28:04.020 this

01:28:04.180 point

01:28:04.380 in

01:28:04.520 2001

01:28:06.080 he

01:28:06.480 had

01:28:06.580 already

01:28:06.740 been

01:28:06.900 on

01:28:07.040 the

01:28:07.160 job

01:28:07.340 for

01:28:07.480 20

01:28:07.660 years

01:28:07.900 I

01:28:08.900 I'm

01:28:21.240 well

01:28:21.400 as

01:28:21.920 resolved

01:28:22.180 my

01:28:22.360 experience

01:28:22.660 of

01:28:22.780 counter

01:28:22.940 intelligence

01:28:23.260 investigations

01:28:23.660 and

01:28:23.840 foreign

01:28:24.000 counter

01:28:24.280 intelligence

01:28:24.600 training

01:28:24.980 I'm

01:28:25.160 familiar

01:28:25.340 with

01:28:25.500 strategy

01:28:25.860 tactics

01:28:26.340 methods

01:28:27.080 trade

01:28:27.300 craft

01:28:27.540 and

01:28:27.700 techniques

01:28:28.020 of

01:28:28.200 the

01:28:28.320 Cuban

01:28:28.480 foreign

01:28:28.780 intelligence

01:28:29.140 services

01:28:29.560 and

01:28:29.800 its

01:28:29.940 agents

01:28:30.320 and

01:28:30.880 then

01:28:30.980 he

01:28:31.080 goes

01:28:31.300 into

01:28:31.540 what

01:28:33.180 he

01:28:33.300 wants

01:28:33.500 to

01:28:33.660 search

01:28:34.040 right

01:28:34.780 then

01:28:34.920 he

01:28:35.020 gives

01:28:35.180 the

01:28:35.300 background

01:28:35.700 in

01:28:35.920 Germany

01:28:38.180 and

01:28:39.540 then

01:28:39.680 he

01:28:39.820 goes

01:28:40.080 into

01:28:40.340 all

01:28:40.740 the

01:28:41.260 facts

01:28:41.720 here

01:28:42.060 okay

01:28:42.500 and

01:28:44.080 right

01:28:45.460 and

01:28:45.580 this

01:28:45.720 is

01:28:45.840 all

01:28:45.980 the

01:28:46.100 probable

01:28:46.400 cause

01:28:46.740 which

01:28:46.900 you

01:28:47.020 guys

01:28:47.180 kind

01:28:47.400 of

01:28:47.480 heard

01:28:47.660 throughout

01:28:48.020 the

01:28:48.180 documentary

01:28:48.580 so

01:28:48.780 I

01:28:48.880 won't bore

01:28:49.240 you

01:28:49.380 with

01:28:49.540 the

01:28:49.920 details

01:28:50.620 but

01:28:51.560 this

01:28:51.700 is

01:28:51.780 what

01:28:51.880 a

01:28:51.980 criminal

01:28:52.140 complaint

01:28:52.460 looks

01:28:52.680 like

01:28:52.880 and

01:28:52.980 a

01:28:53.080 criminal

01:28:53.240 complaint

01:28:53.560 guys

01:28:53.820 you

01:28:54.160 filed

01:28:54.500 affidavit

01:28:55.160 right

01:28:55.800 which

01:28:56.360 this

01:28:56.600 is

01:28:56.700 what

01:28:56.820 the

01:28:56.920 affidavit

01:28:57.360 is

01:28:57.600 and

01:28:58.100 then

01:28:58.300 this

01:28:58.880 is

01:28:59.060 in

01:28:59.160 this

01:29:01.000 case

01:29:01.200 an

01:29:01.320 arrest

01:29:01.560 warrant

01:29:01.740 and search

01:29:02.060 warrant

01:29:02.280 right

01:29:02.460 this

01:29:02.640 is

01:29:02.780 like

01:29:02.940 the

01:29:03.140 meat

01:29:03.420 of

01:29:03.600 your

01:29:03.760 your

01:29:05.200 case

01:29:07.080 right

01:29:07.560 this

01:29:07.720 is

01:29:07.760 where

01:29:07.860 all

01:29:07.960 the

01:29:16.100 right

01:29:16.200 wondering

01:29:16.380 where

01:29:16.580 is

01:29:16.660 she

01:29:16.740 now

01:29:17.040 Anna

01:29:17.980 Montez

01:29:18.260 former

01:29:18.520 top

01:29:18.760 spy

01:29:18.940 says

01:29:19.140 she

01:29:19.260 will

01:29:19.380 live

01:29:19.600 in

01:29:19.780 Puerto

01:29:19.960 Rico

01:29:20.260 and

01:29:20.640 just

01:29:20.880 so

01:29:21.000 you

01:29:21.060 guys

01:29:21.240 know

01:29:21.420 she

01:29:21.560 got

01:29:21.720 released

01:29:22.260 January

01:29:23.120 8

01:29:24.160 she was

01:29:25.120 released

01:29:25.320 on

01:29:25.460 January

01:29:25.720 6

01:29:26.080 2023

01:29:26.500 having

01:29:27.400 been

01:29:27.560 released

01:29:27.840 she

01:29:27.960 will

01:29:28.020 be

01:29:28.140 monitoring

01:29:28.440 including

01:29:28.780 her

01:29:29.000 internet

01:29:29.280 usage

01:29:29.580 for

01:29:29.740 five

01:29:30.020 years

01:29:30.220 Montez

01:29:30.520 will

01:29:30.660 not

01:29:30.780 be

01:29:30.900 allowed

01:29:31.100 to

01:29:31.260 contact

01:29:31.620 foreign

01:29:31.940 agents

01:29:32.240 or

01:29:32.400 work

01:29:32.620 for

01:29:32.760 the

01:29:32.840 U.S.

01:29:33.100 government

01:29:33.280 without

01:29:33.900 permission

01:29:34.380 she's

01:29:35.520 currently

01:29:35.720 living in

01:29:36.020 Puerto

01:29:36.160 Rico

01:29:36.380 continues

01:29:36.860 to speak

01:29:37.560 out

01:29:37.700 against

01:29:37.940 U.S.

01:29:38.220 sanctions

01:29:38.540 against

01:29:38.980 Cuba

01:29:39.340 so

01:29:40.080 yeah

01:29:40.440 very

01:29:41.180 passionate

01:29:41.600 yeah

01:29:42.120 and that

01:29:43.940 passion

01:29:44.300 got her

01:29:45.340 put in

01:29:45.760 jail

01:29:45.940 for two

01:29:46.320 decades

01:29:46.700 now

01:29:47.340 look at

01:29:47.620 her

01:29:47.940 holy

01:29:48.400 god damn

01:29:49.480 does she

01:29:49.840 have any

01:29:50.280 remorse

01:29:50.740 though

01:29:51.080 probably

01:29:53.380 not

01:29:53.740 probably

01:29:55.240 not

01:29:55.640 she said

01:29:56.260 that she

01:29:56.660 owned it

01:29:57.120 to the

01:29:57.380 people

01:29:57.620 of Cuba

01:29:58.220 did she

01:29:59.660 did she

01:29:59.920 say that

01:30:00.380 yeah

01:30:00.780 apparently

01:30:01.260 I heard

01:30:01.880 in the

01:30:02.200 other

01:30:02.480 documentary

01:30:03.280 that I

01:30:03.740 was

01:30:04.060 watching

01:30:04.420 so

01:30:05.680 crazy

01:30:06.140 though

01:30:06.420 you know

01:30:07.680 I went

01:30:08.080 to Cuba

01:30:08.460 in 2010

01:30:09.300 oh did

01:30:10.060 you

01:30:10.240 okay

01:30:10.640 well how

01:30:11.820 was that

01:30:12.200 they hate

01:30:13.660 us over

01:30:13.900 there don't

01:30:14.160 they

01:30:14.480 not really

01:30:16.720 like Cuban

01:30:17.760 people

01:30:18.300 I mean

01:30:19.680 the government

01:30:20.120 well

01:30:20.640 yeah the

01:30:21.880 government

01:30:22.140 of course

01:30:22.560 people

01:30:23.340 hate

01:30:23.980 their

01:30:24.500 government

01:30:24.860 there

01:30:25.180 honestly

01:30:26.000 well you

01:30:26.420 see a

01:30:26.840 lot of

01:30:27.040 Cubans

01:30:27.320 here

01:30:27.600 love

01:30:28.400 America

01:30:28.820 yeah

01:30:29.180 you know

01:30:29.480 what I've

01:30:29.700 noticed

01:30:29.960 the Cubans

01:30:31.300 that hate

01:30:31.760 America

01:30:32.260 a lot of

01:30:32.700 the time

01:30:32.980 or sorry

01:30:33.320 that love

01:30:34.160 America

01:30:34.540 are like

01:30:35.120 capitalists

01:30:35.680 like they

01:30:36.000 were like

01:30:36.280 entrepreneurs

01:30:36.820 and high

01:30:37.200 earners

01:30:37.600 in Cuba

01:30:38.140 and they

01:30:38.840 came here

01:30:39.420 so that they

01:30:40.200 can like

01:30:40.560 pursue the

01:30:41.120 dream

01:30:41.440 but like a

01:30:42.020 lot of

01:30:42.200 people that

01:30:42.620 love Cuba

01:30:43.080 because there's

01:30:43.400 a good amount

01:30:43.740 of people

01:30:43.960 that actually

01:30:44.320 love Cuba

01:30:44.800 right we

01:30:45.460 in America

01:30:45.940 we kind of

01:30:46.380 like put a lot

01:30:46.860 of propaganda

01:30:47.340 like Cuba

01:30:47.780 is a terrible

01:30:48.180 country and

01:30:48.840 people hate

01:30:49.280 Cuba and

01:30:49.780 it's they're

01:30:50.360 so poor

01:30:51.700 and terrible

01:30:52.180 Cuba guys

01:30:53.300 I don't know

01:30:54.420 if y'all

01:30:54.600 noticed they

01:30:54.960 have one of

01:30:55.360 the best

01:30:56.120 medical care

01:30:57.420 in the world

01:30:58.020 yeah

01:30:58.280 I didn't know

01:30:58.960 that yeah

01:30:59.460 I actually like

01:31:00.180 went and looked

01:31:00.540 it up and I

01:31:00.860 was like wow

01:31:01.220 like they

01:31:01.540 have some

01:31:01.820 of the best

01:31:02.200 facilities

01:31:02.660 and they

01:31:03.780 have universal

01:31:04.280 health care

01:31:04.640 which is like

01:31:05.100 rare you look

01:31:05.620 at like a

01:31:05.960 country like

01:31:06.360 Canada

01:31:06.680 their health

01:31:07.420 care is

01:31:07.700 trash

01:31:07.880 doctors as

01:31:08.720 well you

01:31:09.220 know a lot

01:31:09.760 of doctors

01:31:10.240 Cuban doctors

01:31:11.540 in Venezuela

01:31:12.080 loads yeah

01:31:13.260 yeah they

01:31:14.300 have the best

01:31:14.880 medicine yeah

01:31:15.580 for sure

01:31:15.920 and it's one

01:31:16.400 of yeah

01:31:16.620 definitely one

01:31:17.240 of the best

01:31:17.660 like it's

01:31:18.180 comparable to

01:31:18.860 American health

01:31:19.480 care guys

01:31:19.960 you know

01:31:20.340 but what I've

01:31:22.140 noticed with Cuba

01:31:22.920 right especially

01:31:23.400 being here in

01:31:23.860 Miami you might

01:31:24.400 not know this

01:31:24.940 like being in

01:31:25.480 other places in

01:31:26.060 the country

01:31:26.400 but with Cuba

01:31:28.020 Cuba is big

01:31:28.640 here it's of

01:31:29.860 course yeah a lot

01:31:30.380 of them out

01:31:30.800 here

01:31:31.020 with Cuba

01:31:32.340 like what I

01:31:33.140 noticed is like

01:31:33.660 the people that

01:31:34.120 were super

01:31:34.540 successful that

01:31:35.160 made a lot of

01:31:35.620 money in Cuba

01:31:36.120 they didn't

01:31:36.580 like Cuba

01:31:37.000 because the

01:31:37.540 government took

01:31:38.120 everything from

01:31:38.620 them but the

01:31:39.420 people that were

01:31:39.940 like middle

01:31:40.340 class lower

01:31:40.960 class etc

01:31:41.580 they like it

01:31:42.540 it's like okay

01:31:43.140 I could chill

01:31:43.780 the government

01:31:44.180 takes care of

01:31:44.760 us it's all

01:31:45.280 good hey

01:31:45.880 you know so

01:31:47.200 yeah it's

01:31:47.800 hey Pablo it's

01:31:48.420 gonna be all

01:31:48.760 good kind of

01:31:49.480 like Venezuela

01:31:50.140 yeah but yeah

01:31:51.740 y'all are much

01:31:53.480 worse yeah of

01:31:55.060 course but it is

01:31:56.300 well your government

01:31:56.820 just steals from you

01:31:57.540 guys like all day

01:31:58.320 and they don't even

01:31:58.740 care I don't know

01:31:59.940 comment but yeah

01:32:00.860 um yeah they're

01:32:03.500 very similar and

01:32:04.440 they hate most of

01:32:05.540 them hate the

01:32:06.280 government yeah

01:32:07.360 that's what I

01:32:07.940 noticed going there

01:32:09.080 it is a lot of

01:32:10.340 Santeria too and

01:32:11.520 yeah Cuba is

01:32:12.620 crazy it's like um

01:32:13.920 the first thing and

01:32:15.160 the main thing that I

01:32:15.960 noticed is that it's

01:32:17.080 it's like the whole

01:32:18.640 country was is

01:32:20.360 stuck in the 80s

01:32:22.240 like the buildings

01:32:23.460 yeah you'll see the

01:32:24.540 buildings the cars

01:32:25.680 everything

01:32:26.140 do they do that for

01:32:26.800 like historical value

01:32:27.740 though no I think

01:32:29.120 it's just like they

01:32:30.080 never like I don't

01:32:31.880 know what to say

01:32:32.560 they just never

01:32:33.120 progressed yeah okay

01:32:34.340 because like Miami

01:32:35.260 right like you know

01:32:35.980 how we have a bunch

01:32:36.600 of these like stupid

01:32:37.220 rules where like they

01:32:37.900 can't knock down

01:32:38.480 certain buildings like

01:32:39.660 these old buildings

01:32:40.360 on Miami Beach like

01:32:41.180 they got to keep it

01:32:41.840 no matter how crappy

01:32:42.660 they are and Miami

01:32:43.600 yeah downtown Miami

01:32:44.940 has a lot like

01:32:45.860 they're trying to

01:32:46.240 preserve the historical

01:32:46.920 value is that like

01:32:47.720 what it is in Cuba or

01:32:48.440 they just don't want

01:32:48.860 to do it I think

01:32:50.580 they just can't

01:32:51.340 because of the

01:32:52.380 of the economy

01:32:53.080 economy and

01:32:54.660 economic situation

01:32:56.420 yeah fair enough

01:32:57.400 fair enough

01:32:58.200 yeah that's one thing

01:32:59.200 I noticed about Cuba

01:33:00.040 is like the

01:33:00.460 entrepreneurs the

01:33:01.020 guys that like

01:33:01.440 were high earners

01:33:02.080 there they're like

01:33:02.620 get me the hell

01:33:03.020 out of here but

01:33:03.420 the people that

01:33:03.780 are like middle

01:33:04.140 class lower

01:33:04.560 class they're

01:33:05.100 just chilling

01:33:07.140 yeah so but

01:33:08.980 yeah what were

01:33:10.020 your thoughts on

01:33:10.360 the documentary

01:33:10.800 what are your

01:33:11.360 final thoughts on

01:33:12.160 this Angie

01:33:12.800 man I just really

01:33:13.660 wanted to know

01:33:14.240 why she did it

01:33:15.140 it's crazy because

01:33:16.380 I will think that

01:33:17.600 she was Cuban

01:33:18.460 and she fell out

01:33:19.220 because she owned

01:33:19.860 it to the country

01:33:20.700 that she was

01:33:21.480 born in and

01:33:22.320 whatever but she

01:33:23.020 was not and

01:33:23.780 it's like it was

01:33:24.940 all merely for

01:33:25.880 passion and yeah

01:33:27.260 just making me

01:33:27.860 think like people

01:33:28.640 like how much

01:33:29.440 money she made

01:33:30.000 which is kind

01:33:30.540 of strange

01:33:31.120 she might we

01:33:32.380 might we might

01:33:33.020 get in another

01:33:33.820 documentary or

01:33:34.840 something if we

01:33:35.500 like research

01:33:36.080 I'm gonna search

01:33:37.300 it real fast

01:33:37.740 give me one

01:33:38.140 second right

01:33:38.780 I'm gonna search

01:33:39.360 how much like

01:33:40.180 it is kind of

01:33:41.060 weird how I

01:33:42.760 just want to say

01:33:43.320 that people like

01:33:43.940 this that are very

01:33:44.740 passionate about

01:33:45.460 their I don't

01:33:46.900 know motives and

01:33:47.780 whatever patients

01:33:48.840 they are very

01:33:50.420 dangerous if you

01:33:51.840 think yeah because

01:33:52.920 I've known people

01:33:53.580 like this in my

01:33:54.300 country that will

01:33:55.420 like hate the

01:33:56.420 government all that

01:33:57.160 stuff most of us

01:33:58.260 hate the government

01:33:58.940 of course for like

01:34:00.120 very obvious

01:34:01.580 reasons but you'll

01:34:03.320 you'll meet a lot

01:34:04.160 of people like that

01:34:05.360 they are very

01:34:06.340 passionate about

01:34:07.020 the hate or or

01:34:09.600 like on another I

01:34:11.100 don't know man

01:34:11.640 it's like crazy it's

01:34:13.500 like they're dangerous

01:34:14.500 very dangerous because

01:34:15.720 they can get to do

01:34:16.540 things like this and

01:34:18.320 they can get killed

01:34:20.180 a lot of people just

01:34:21.100 because of fucking

01:34:22.340 information it's

01:34:23.160 insane yeah I can't

01:34:24.620 even find it how

01:34:25.640 much she made I

01:34:27.160 don't think she

01:34:27.720 had to god pay

01:34:28.400 something that must

01:34:29.680 be classified as

01:34:30.520 well yeah yeah that

01:34:31.080 might be yeah I

01:34:31.740 guess so but yeah I

01:34:33.400 can't find it

01:34:34.040 anywhere but I

01:34:35.420 mean all the other

01:34:36.060 spies I know how

01:34:36.660 much they made so

01:34:37.460 this is she might

01:34:38.160 have not made that

01:34:38.660 much you might just

01:34:40.160 really been doing

01:34:40.800 this because she

01:34:41.300 like stupid but

01:34:42.420 whatever she was just

01:34:43.200 getting it from Cuba I

01:34:44.400 don't think she made

01:34:45.060 that much when you

01:34:46.120 mentioned that I was

01:34:46.860 like did she really

01:34:48.280 make that pay you

01:34:49.460 big bucks they gave

01:34:50.160 her a commission for

01:34:50.860 selling it to the

01:34:51.440 Russians I don't

01:34:52.900 think she was even

01:34:53.600 getting paid like in

01:34:54.680 dollars or whatever I

01:34:55.980 don't think so I

01:34:57.000 think she just did it

01:34:58.400 for like fashion fair

01:35:00.040 enough well anyway guys

01:35:02.280 make sure to like the

01:35:04.100 video subscribe to

01:35:04.860 the channel check out

01:35:05.500 Angie on her

01:35:06.400 Instagram so Angelica

01:35:07.620 and yeah you want to

01:35:09.520 tell people last word

01:35:10.840 to you yeah you guys

01:35:12.840 keep asking for Chris

01:35:13.800 Dorner we're finding a

01:35:16.360 good documentary for

01:35:17.080 you guys first the

01:35:18.200 one we watched wasn't

01:35:18.920 that good the green

01:35:20.140 river killer although

01:35:23.480 there are some cases

01:35:24.320 that I want to like

01:35:25.080 research a little bit

01:35:26.400 more because I have

01:35:27.300 some cases that I

01:35:28.600 have studied from the

01:35:29.580 past we should do a

01:35:30.320 green river next you

01:35:31.880 think for them yeah

01:35:32.860 we can do that a lot

01:35:35.400 of people have been

01:35:36.040 asking for Lorena

01:35:37.040 Bobbitt John Bobbitt

01:35:38.680 I don't know much

01:35:40.720 about that case so I'll

01:35:41.700 have to research it and

01:35:43.420 yeah man there are a

01:35:44.260 lot of cases someone

01:35:45.260 asked her to do a

01:35:46.300 follow-up on totally

01:35:47.300 Tony Tori Lane is

01:35:49.200 oh Tori Lane's okay

01:35:50.600 with the lawyer somebody

01:35:52.420 okay there must be some

01:35:53.540 new development I

01:35:54.160 haven't kept up with it

01:35:54.940 I'll be honest with y'all

01:35:55.980 so yeah we could

01:35:57.200 definitely do the Tori

01:35:58.360 Lane's thing yeah and

01:35:59.400 alien weird news oh a

01:36:01.020 lot of people are asking

01:36:02.340 for alien weird news oh

01:36:03.300 because we mentioned

01:36:03.940 her on the last pod okay

01:36:05.160 that makes sense yeah she

01:36:06.340 was the first American

01:36:07.300 serial killer that was a

01:36:08.280 female so yeah we could do

01:36:10.200 we could definitely do that

01:36:10.920 one next uh but anyway

01:36:12.340 guys hope you guys

01:36:13.560 enjoyed that like I said

01:36:14.540 before like the video

01:36:15.480 subscribe to the channel

01:36:16.120 check out Angie on

01:36:17.020 Instagram and I'll catch

01:36:18.260 you guys on the next one

01:36:19.260 don't forget to get the

01:36:20.200 book why women deserve

01:36:22.260 less it's live right now

01:36:24.020 Amazon bestseller by the

01:36:25.640 way we're number one in

01:36:26.380 feminist theory which is

01:36:27.280 absolutely hilarious that's

01:36:30.340 the category we're number

01:36:31.160 one in and we're uh top in

01:36:32.800 the top 10 pretty much for

01:36:33.980 self-help and for at least

01:36:36.060 at the time of recording

01:36:36.740 this for self-help and all

01:36:38.240 books on Amazon right now

01:36:39.700 I think we're like number

01:36:40.440 12 right now for all

01:36:41.260 books number eight for

01:36:42.420 self-help and number one

01:36:43.500 in feminist theory so go

01:36:44.560 ahead and get the book

01:36:45.100 guys it's on Kindle and

01:36:46.460 it's also hardcover

01:36:47.780 paperback um it's kind of

01:36:49.380 surprising that you actually

01:36:50.580 like beat Jordan Peterson

01:36:52.540 I know it is kind of crazy

01:36:54.140 I was shocked I beat him

01:36:54.980 and David Goggins man so

01:36:56.040 Don DeMarco for that one

01:36:57.040 Don DeMarco all right man

01:36:59.960 love y'all we'll catch you

01:37:00.900 guys on the next one peace

01:37:02.100 I was a special agent with

01:37:05.940 Homeland Security

01:37:06.340 Investigation

01:37:06.660 interesting

01:37:08.240 you

The Debrief With MyronGainesX - March 05, 2023

This ＂Queen Of Cuba＂ Spied For Fidel Castro： Ana Montes

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