The Debrief With MyronGainesX - March 05, 2023


This "Queen Of Cuba" Spied For Fidel Castro: Ana Montes


Episode Stats

Length

1 hour and 37 minutes

Words per Minute

169.7344

Word Count

16,488

Sentence Count

457

Misogynist Sentences

37

Hate Speech Sentences

41


Summary

Ana Montez is a Cuban spy who got caught up in the middle of one of the biggest drug busts in New Orleans history. She was caught with documents and evidence that could have led to the arrest of a high-level Cuban spy.


Transcript

00:00:00.820 And we are live. What's up, guys? Welcome to FedIt. Today, we're going to be covering the Ana Montez case, Cuban espionage, man.
00:00:07.380 I know you guys like these spy cases. Let's get right into it.
00:00:12.680 I was a special agent with Homeland Security Investigations, okay, guys? HSI.
00:00:16.040 The cases that I did mostly were human smuggling and drug trafficking.
00:00:21.200 No one else has these documents, by the way.
00:00:23.440 Here's what FedIt covers.
00:00:24.560 Dr. Lafredo confirmed lacerations due to stepping on glass.
00:00:31.400 Murder Investigations.
00:00:32.400 You see him reaching in his jacket. You don't know.
00:00:34.660 And he's positioning.
00:00:35.320 Been on February 13, 2019.
00:00:37.000 You're facing two counts of two meditative murder.
00:00:40.180 Bracketeering and Rico conspiracies.
00:00:41.900 Young Slime Life here and after referred to as YSL.
00:00:44.540 This is 6ix9ine, and then this is Billy Seiko right here.
00:00:48.020 Now, when they first started, guys, 6ix9ine ran with me.
00:00:50.640 I'm a Fed. I'm watching this music video.
00:00:52.860 You know, I'm Bobby Mahala.
00:00:54.080 Hey, this shit lit.
00:00:54.980 But at the same time, I'm pausing.
00:00:56.460 Oh, wait, who this?
00:00:57.700 Right?
00:00:58.120 Oh, who's that in the back?
00:01:00.320 Firearms and violent crime.
00:01:01.640 A.K.A. Bush Icy violated.
00:01:03.500 In order to stay away from the victim.
00:01:05.220 Robert Bush Icy arrested after shooting at King of Diamonds.
00:01:07.540 Miami strip club injured one person.
00:01:09.200 This is the one that's going to fuck him up because this gun is not tracing me.
00:01:12.720 Well, it happened at the gun range.
00:01:13.920 Here's your boy, 42 Doug, right here on the left.
00:01:16.140 Okay.
00:01:16.500 Sex trafficking and sex crimes.
00:01:17.900 They can effectively link him to paying an underage girl.
00:01:21.040 I'm going to lock my 50-11 right.
00:01:22.540 And the first bomb went off right here.
00:01:25.660 Suspect to set down a backstack on the site of the second explosion inspired by Al-Qaeda.
00:01:30.780 Two terrorists, his brothers, the Zokar Sarnev and Tamerlan Sarnev.
00:01:35.360 When the cartels shipped drugs into the country.
00:01:37.380 This guy got arrested for espionage, okay?
00:01:40.080 Trading secrets with the Russians for monetary compensation.
00:01:43.760 The largest corrupt police bust in New Orleans history.
00:01:48.340 The days of the police are gone.
00:01:49.980 So he was in this bad boy.
00:01:51.500 We're going to go over his past, the gang guys, so that this all makes sense.
00:02:01.800 All right.
00:02:02.480 And we are back.
00:02:03.160 What's up, guys?
00:02:03.640 Welcome to Fetit Man.
00:02:04.520 I got my special guest with me.
00:02:05.600 You guys have come to learn and love her at this point.
00:02:08.120 Hello.
00:02:09.000 It's me again.
00:02:09.720 Your favorite Venezuelan that can't speak English.
00:02:11.580 I hate that nickname, by the way.
00:02:14.860 Hi, guys.
00:02:16.520 As I've been saying before, I've been reading your comments on the latest videos.
00:02:22.340 So keep it up with the cases.
00:02:25.020 We are going to do Ana Montes tonight, which is a Cuban spy.
00:02:31.580 And yeah, I don't know which one we're going to do next, but I'll be keeping it up with your comments to see like which one is the best case for the next episode.
00:02:40.740 Okay.
00:02:41.580 Sorry, guys.
00:02:42.240 I re-plugged in my soundboard because Chris's soundboard sucks.
00:02:45.920 But yeah, man.
00:02:46.700 Long story short, guys, we're going to cover Ana Montes.
00:02:48.680 This is a Cuban espionage case.
00:02:50.480 I kind of sprung this one up on Angelica here.
00:02:53.860 So she's like her specialization is like, you know, serial killers and weirdos that like kill boyfriends.
00:03:00.120 People with psychological problems, mostly.
00:03:02.600 There you go.
00:03:04.060 This lady might have.
00:03:05.020 Well, you know what?
00:03:05.900 Well, you'll see right now in a second with this documentary.
00:03:08.460 We're going to be reacting, guys, to a documentary in this thing.
00:03:11.200 But before I get into that, real quick, I want to let you all know why women deserve less is in stores right now.
00:03:17.060 Okay.
00:03:17.740 Go ahead and get the book.
00:03:19.680 Here's a hard copy version, the author's version.
00:03:21.520 Happy Valentine's Day for everybody.
00:03:23.000 Yeah, actually, yeah, we're recording this on Valentine's Day.
00:03:26.140 Yeah, that's how we're spending our our Valentine's.
00:03:28.560 But yeah, guys, get the book, man.
00:03:29.900 It's out right now.
00:03:30.560 It's doing pretty well.
00:03:31.680 Number one bestselling feminist theory.
00:03:33.760 And on top of that, it's number nine in self-help and number 12 in books worldwide.
00:03:39.980 So it hit 10 earlier, but I guess I just lost two spots.
00:03:43.720 But yeah, for self-help, I'm right behind.
00:03:46.200 Let's see here.
00:03:47.320 I beat out David Goggins and Robert Greene.
00:03:50.640 And I think I beat out Jordan Peterson.
00:03:53.260 Yeah, I beat out Jordan Peterson, too.
00:03:54.460 Oh, I was going to buy that book.
00:03:56.360 Which one?
00:03:56.820 12 Rules for Life?
00:03:57.740 Yes.
00:03:58.280 Yeah.
00:03:58.680 I love Jordan Peterson.
00:03:59.900 Yeah.
00:04:00.080 Shout out to him.
00:04:00.740 He's a G.
00:04:01.680 But yeah, as you guys can see here, pretty much these are the books that are ahead.
00:04:05.360 I'm trying to get back into that top 10.
00:04:08.200 Well, this is for self-help, but this is for the self-help thing.
00:04:10.840 But let's go back to top, like, these are the bestseller books, period, right?
00:04:17.300 So I'm number 12 right now.
00:04:18.800 And that's not bad for first book ever and not really, you know, having that much of an author background.
00:04:25.060 But yeah, beat out a couple of other well-known books.
00:04:28.000 But yeah, these are the top books right now as of technically it's January 15th at 2 in the morning.
00:04:33.940 So, well, wait.
00:04:35.680 No, 2.25 a.m.
00:04:37.000 So yeah, guys, we're working.
00:04:38.180 Burn that midnight oil for y'all.
00:04:39.520 Yeah.
00:04:40.320 And then let's see here.
00:04:42.040 And then, yeah, and then obviously number one in Feminist Theory, which is hilarious because, oh, I got number one and number two.
00:04:48.140 Okay, Donna Murphy and myself.
00:04:51.500 I didn't even realize that.
00:04:53.100 And then this book right here, Ho Tactics, I guess this is like my antagonist right here.
00:04:57.700 You know, I'm teaching now women deserve less than over here.
00:04:59.680 They're teaching you how to be a 304 and get the most out of guys.
00:05:02.500 So look, it's a battle of the sexes, man.
00:05:04.440 But we're winning.
00:05:04.860 Yeah, this book, I think, teaches you how to, yes, it's how to mind.
00:05:07.560 No way.
00:05:07.920 Mind F a guy into whatever.
00:05:10.280 So, yeah, it is what it is.
00:05:11.940 But, yeah, guys, book is in stores now, man.
00:05:13.780 Get it on Kindle and paperback.
00:05:16.540 And then also I'm going to be releasing it on Audible very soon, probably next week while I'm in Dubai.
00:05:21.440 We'll try to get it out there and Audible for you guys because Mo's editing it right now as we speak.
00:05:25.660 And what else?
00:05:27.440 And then I'll do a hardcover copy version of it soon.
00:05:30.920 And then I'm also going to do signed ones with the hardcover.
00:05:33.460 Okay, guys?
00:05:34.020 So stay tuned for that.
00:05:35.080 I got a bunch of messages from you guys saying, yo, I want a hardcover version.
00:05:37.480 So that's going to come very soon.
00:05:38.680 And I'll sign a couple of those.
00:05:40.380 Do you think people have already, like, read it?
00:05:42.880 Yeah, a bunch of people have read it already.
00:05:44.340 Already?
00:05:44.800 Yeah.
00:05:45.080 That quick?
00:05:45.620 I mean, you know.
00:05:46.300 It's 86 pages.
00:05:47.760 It's short because women is service, right?
00:05:49.740 Exactly.
00:05:50.360 Yeah.
00:05:50.600 I know.
00:05:51.100 So, yeah.
00:05:53.540 And it got some good reviews.
00:05:54.740 I got some haters, of course, right?
00:05:56.200 You're always going to have haters.
00:05:57.600 But for the most part, 84 ratings, man.
00:05:59.520 And it's at a 4.8 out of 5.
00:06:04.060 So, yeah, man.
00:06:04.620 It's doing pretty well.
00:06:06.080 Anyway.
00:06:06.720 But, guys, yeah.
00:06:08.320 Don't forget to like the video.
00:06:09.400 Subscribe to the channel.
00:06:10.300 Now, let's get into the documentary, right?
00:06:12.520 With Anna Montez.
00:06:13.420 Guys, this is Declassified.
00:06:14.440 This is a pretty good show.
00:06:16.940 Yeah.
00:06:18.260 Angie, anything you want to say before we get into it?
00:06:20.560 Not really.
00:06:22.220 I'm just kind of like a little out of my sound of comfort here.
00:06:27.900 It's time to get out of that comfort zone.
00:06:29.800 Yeah.
00:06:30.420 We're not going to talk about crazies.
00:06:31.780 We're going to talk about traitors now.
00:06:33.680 Yeah.
00:06:34.060 You got to be diversified.
00:06:35.340 I keep it up.
00:06:37.160 All right, guys.
00:06:38.160 We're going to get into it right now with this documentary.
00:06:41.300 Actually, real quick, before I even do the documentary,
00:06:44.640 I'll give you guys a little bit of background.
00:06:46.080 Here is Anna Montez right here, okay?
00:06:51.360 Anna Berlin Montez, born February 28th to 1957,
00:06:54.680 is a former American senior analyst at the Defense Intelligence Agency
00:06:57.560 in the United States who spied on behalf of the Cuban government for 17 years, okay?
00:07:01.840 So who is the DIA?
00:07:03.400 This is who they are, guys.
00:07:04.420 The Defense Intelligence Agency, a.k.a.
00:07:06.240 the DIA is an intelligence agency and combat support agency
00:07:10.480 of the United States Department of Defense,
00:07:11.780 specializing in defense and military intelligence.
00:07:13.700 A component of the DOD and intelligence community IC,
00:07:17.600 DIA informs national, civilian, and defense policymakers
00:07:20.040 about the military intentions and capabilities of foreign governments
00:07:22.800 and non-state actors.
00:07:24.240 It also provides intelligence assistance, integration, and coordination
00:07:27.020 across uniform military service intelligence components,
00:07:30.220 which remain structurally separate from the DIA.
00:07:33.400 The agency's role encompasses the collection and analysis
00:07:35.780 of military-related foreign political economic industrial geographic
00:07:39.280 and medical and health intelligence.
00:07:42.100 DIA produces approximately one quarter of all intelligence content
00:07:45.040 that goes into the president's daily brief.
00:07:47.540 So, guys, these dudes are pretty important, and they're pretty big.
00:07:51.460 They comprise, there's 13-plus intelligence agencies, right?
00:07:56.740 And these guys comprise of 25%.
00:07:58.880 So these guys are right next to the big boys of NSA and CIA, okay?
00:08:03.980 And they specialize on the military side.
00:08:06.220 So now that you guys know what the DIA is and who Anna Montez is
00:08:10.260 from a bird's-eye view, let's get into the documentary.
00:08:16.480 There was a Cuban agent with access to classified information
00:08:21.520 placing our entire nation's future at risk.
00:08:24.260 The spy was almost certainly in our building.
00:08:26.940 I think it's the betrayal that gets me.
00:08:29.280 Like, how dare you?
00:08:30.740 It's a sensitive time because we were launching a war.
00:08:33.840 Our boys and girls in uniform are going to die
00:08:36.620 because she stabbed him in the back.
00:08:46.940 I'm going to skip this intro.
00:08:51.520 And the thing I like about this, guys, is these are cases
00:08:53.520 that were typically, like, classified
00:08:54.940 or had some kind of secret components to them.
00:08:57.760 And then, you know, with this documentary,
00:08:59.840 because it's relatively new, I think this is, what, from, like, 2021?
00:09:03.160 Or they declassify some of the content
00:09:05.760 so that we can, like, you know, get a more insider look
00:09:07.760 into how the investigation was done.
00:09:09.320 So this is one thing I like about this show.
00:09:13.820 Almost every nation in the world spies.
00:09:19.060 That's a fact.
00:09:19.900 And when it comes to our biggest threats, guys,
00:09:22.540 it's the Chinese, the Russians, the Cubans,
00:09:26.560 and surprisingly, guys, the Mossad as well.
00:09:30.840 And I learned that from Andrew Busamante.
00:09:32.800 I think, guys, go back and watch the interview
00:09:34.300 that I did with him on Fresh and Fit.
00:09:37.000 He was a former CIA officer.
00:09:38.720 And we talked about different intelligence capabilities
00:09:40.340 of the different agencies.
00:09:41.640 And he was of the different nations, excuse me.
00:09:44.360 And he was saying how the Mossad is extremely underrated
00:09:46.820 and will do whatever it takes to get ahead,
00:09:50.020 which all I'm going to say is John F. Kennedy and them boys,
00:09:55.060 which I'm going to bring Ryan Dawson on,
00:09:56.880 and we're going to talk about that, okay?
00:09:58.240 And also, speaking of them boys,
00:10:01.340 stealing nuclear secrets.
00:10:03.180 All documented fact, by the way.
00:10:04.880 We're going to talk about that with Ryan Dawson as well.
00:10:07.420 I look forward to that.
00:10:08.600 It's going to be really cool, guys.
00:10:11.600 But anyway, but without me getting into that,
00:10:13.500 and then also France has a very capable intelligence agency.
00:10:17.420 And this is kind of how the world works, guys.
00:10:19.040 After World War II, you've got to understand
00:10:20.700 that it's been a battle of proxy wars,
00:10:23.340 intelligence agencies stealing secrets,
00:10:25.520 stealing nuclear secrets,
00:10:26.760 stealing proliferation secrets,
00:10:28.080 and just getting an edge on other countries
00:10:30.760 because waging all-out war
00:10:32.240 isn't really something that's done in today's day and age.
00:10:36.040 Now, of course, you've got the Iraq war
00:10:38.260 and what's going on in Ukraine, whatever.
00:10:39.420 But these aren't full-fledged wars
00:10:41.240 like World War I and World War II, okay?
00:10:44.520 The wars nowadays are far more covert.
00:10:48.820 Most nations in the world spy against the United States.
00:10:51.900 We are the number one target.
00:10:55.080 There are at least 70, give or take 10,
00:10:59.120 nations spying on the U.S.
00:11:01.720 If you were to believe there are probably
00:11:06.020 in excess of 100,000 foreign agents
00:11:08.200 working in this country,
00:11:10.320 that's not paranoia.
00:11:11.840 That's a good guess.
00:11:15.980 My name's Chris Simmons.
00:11:17.720 I was a career intelligence officer
00:11:19.180 with the Defense Intelligence Agency
00:11:21.000 where I headed counterintelligence analysis
00:11:23.540 for the Americas team.
00:11:25.500 The Defense Intelligence Agency
00:11:26.740 is the Pentagon's intelligence apparatus.
00:11:29.260 DIA is focused on the national security structure
00:11:32.380 of every nation in the world.
00:11:34.320 And, guys, the Pentagon,
00:11:35.200 for all my foreign guys out there
00:11:36.460 that might not know,
00:11:37.520 the Pentagon is the head of,
00:11:39.400 is where basically the Department of Defense,
00:11:41.180 a.k.a. the U.S. military,
00:11:42.860 is headquartered at in the United States
00:11:44.320 out of Washington, D.C.
00:11:46.040 It's got a lot of secrets, right?
00:11:47.840 What was that?
00:11:48.400 It's got, like, a lot of nation secrets
00:11:50.200 in there, right?
00:11:51.080 Oh, yeah, of course.
00:11:51.800 Yeah, yeah, yeah.
00:11:52.100 I mean, we're definitely going to have,
00:11:53.280 you know, classified information
00:11:54.440 that, you know, they went and gathered
00:11:56.440 on foreign nations to, you know, maintain the edge.
00:11:58.340 That's what intelligence is,
00:11:59.200 is basically just knowing more
00:12:00.420 than the other places
00:12:02.000 to put yourself in a good position
00:12:03.400 for, you know, an advantage.
00:12:06.800 The way we became engaged with this case,
00:12:10.460 a woman who led part of the FBI investigation
00:12:13.520 took the initiative to set up the meeting.
00:12:16.080 The FBI explained.
00:12:17.220 Okay, FBI, guys.
00:12:18.660 The FBI is the agency
00:12:19.720 that is predominantly tasked
00:12:21.360 with investigating
00:12:22.720 any type of counterintelligence
00:12:26.520 or espionage, okay?
00:12:28.340 So they do the criminal investigation portion
00:12:31.460 anytime there's some type of espionage,
00:12:34.260 treason, selling secrets,
00:12:35.380 any of this stuff,
00:12:36.500 FBI takes lead on that.
00:12:37.720 It's actually, I think their main programmatic areas,
00:12:40.800 guys, is number one is obviously terrorism,
00:12:43.520 number two is counterintelligence slash espionage,
00:12:46.260 and then number three is public corruption.
00:12:47.840 Those are the three main things
00:12:49.120 that the FBI focuses on mostly.
00:12:51.320 And then after that, pretty much, you know,
00:12:52.700 it switches every year, right?
00:12:53.860 Child exploitation, bank robberies,
00:12:56.460 organized crime, et cetera.
00:12:58.180 But ever since 9-11,
00:12:59.620 terrorism has been number one,
00:13:01.000 with counterintelligence very close behind.
00:13:04.300 And that we've heard you and your team
00:13:07.840 are the best there are on Cuban intelligence,
00:13:10.040 and we are part of an FBI spy case
00:13:13.020 that involved Cuba,
00:13:14.860 which had been dragging on for three years,
00:13:16.940 and we're frustrated.
00:13:18.040 Can you help us?
00:13:21.100 I was so concerned about the damage
00:13:23.460 that this mole could have already inflicted
00:13:25.300 and will continue to inflict.
00:13:26.680 That I immediately called Scott Carmichael.
00:13:29.420 Scott Carmichael was head
00:13:31.580 of our investigation side.
00:13:34.580 I love being a spy hunter.
00:13:37.060 I love the chase.
00:13:39.140 Nothing would make me happier
00:13:40.340 than for somebody to say...
00:13:42.640 Okay, so you guys can see here,
00:13:44.300 Scott Carmichael,
00:13:45.380 it says criminal investigator here
00:13:46.320 at Defense Intelligence Agency, retired.
00:13:48.120 More than likely, what he was
00:13:49.700 was something called
00:13:50.440 Office of Inspector General, guys, or OIG.
00:13:53.300 So he's not an FBI agent.
00:13:55.260 He is a special agent
00:13:56.520 that works under DIA
00:13:58.780 that does more internal investigations.
00:14:00.900 However, the FBI, guys, okay,
00:14:04.120 is the main agency,
00:14:05.600 and I'm going to go ahead
00:14:06.240 and share a screen with y'all
00:14:07.540 real quick here.
00:14:09.980 Well, Scott...
00:14:11.540 So you guys can
00:14:13.080 kind of get an idea here
00:14:15.800 because we got a lot of foreign people here
00:14:17.340 that may or may not know.
00:14:19.120 All right, so the FBI
00:14:20.560 is the Domestic Intelligence Security Service
00:14:23.380 of the United States
00:14:23.920 and its principal law enforcement agency, okay,
00:14:26.040 operating under the jurisdiction
00:14:27.220 of the United States Department of Justice,
00:14:29.280 oh, hold on.
00:14:29.940 Is this not showing on screen?
00:14:32.680 Oh, hold on.
00:14:33.820 My bad, guys.
00:14:34.940 If it's, for some odd reason,
00:14:36.340 it's, like, really, really enlarged.
00:14:39.420 Why is it not?
00:14:41.740 Oh, my bad.
00:14:42.920 I'm looking at the wrong thing.
00:14:44.020 Sorry, guys.
00:14:44.580 Had a mind, a brain fart right there.
00:14:46.780 Okay.
00:14:48.960 Okay.
00:14:51.840 Operating under the jurisdiction
00:14:52.920 of the U.S. Department of Justice,
00:14:54.340 the FBI is also a member
00:14:55.440 of the U.S. Intelligence Community
00:14:56.480 and reports both
00:14:57.280 to both the Attorney General
00:14:59.020 and the Director of National Intelligence
00:15:00.340 as a leading U.S.
00:15:01.660 counterterrorism,
00:15:02.320 counterintelligence,
00:15:03.080 and criminal investigative organization.
00:15:05.880 FBI has jurisdiction over
00:15:06.900 violations of more than
00:15:08.240 200 categories of federal crime.
00:15:09.500 So, guys,
00:15:09.840 the FBI is the United States'
00:15:11.500 biggest federal law enforcement agency,
00:15:13.180 and they have two hats that they wear.
00:15:16.540 They are a law enforcement agency,
00:15:17.980 but they're also an intelligence agency.
00:15:19.680 So, let me explain the difference here
00:15:20.640 because people always get this confused.
00:15:22.900 A law enforcement agency, guys,
00:15:24.680 is tasked with enforcing, right,
00:15:27.860 violations of the U.S. code, right,
00:15:30.380 U.S.C., United States code.
00:15:31.780 They're charged with enforcing
00:15:33.200 the federal laws, okay?
00:15:34.540 And they go after you
00:15:37.500 for violating said laws.
00:15:39.580 The intelligence agencies, right,
00:15:41.840 their job is to gather intelligence,
00:15:44.120 not necessarily to arrest people,
00:15:46.140 but to gather intelligence
00:15:47.260 to give the United States
00:15:48.220 an edge against adversaries
00:15:50.640 of foreign governments, okay?
00:15:52.620 Typically, most intelligence agencies,
00:15:54.780 right, especially like the CIA,
00:15:56.820 the DIA, NSA, et cetera,
00:15:58.580 their job is to collect information,
00:16:00.720 typically on foreign nationals, okay?
00:16:03.100 The FBI's mission
00:16:05.360 is to collect intelligence
00:16:06.820 on domestic individuals, okay?
00:16:09.600 Whenever something is occurring
00:16:11.020 in the United States.
00:16:12.280 So, if something happens, right,
00:16:13.660 of national security concern
00:16:14.820 in the United States,
00:16:16.140 it goes to the FBI.
00:16:18.080 If it's international,
00:16:19.160 it goes over to the CIA.
00:16:21.020 And this is why the two agencies
00:16:22.160 have been fighting for a while
00:16:23.280 and why there were issues with 9-11
00:16:24.980 where some of the, you know,
00:16:26.400 the terrorists were found
00:16:27.740 in the United States.
00:16:29.200 The CIA knew about it,
00:16:30.360 but they didn't share the information
00:16:31.120 with the FBI, et cetera, et cetera.
00:16:32.820 And there wasn't a lot of communication,
00:16:34.600 which is what led to, you know,
00:16:35.540 the formation of Department of Homeland Security
00:16:37.400 and everything else that happened
00:16:38.460 after 9-11, which is a whole other story.
00:16:40.480 But the main thing to take away here
00:16:43.060 is that intelligence agencies
00:16:45.240 and law enforcement agencies
00:16:46.320 are two different animals.
00:16:48.840 However, the FBI has a very unique situation
00:16:51.220 where they are both an intelligence agency
00:16:53.440 as well as a law enforcement agency,
00:16:55.120 which ends up hurting them a little bit
00:16:56.960 because there are FBI agents,
00:16:59.360 and I know this from my personal experience
00:17:00.560 working with them,
00:17:01.140 that have never made a criminal arrest
00:17:02.520 in their career.
00:17:03.960 Yes, I said that.
00:17:05.400 There are FBI agents
00:17:06.700 that have been on the job
00:17:07.880 for 10 to 20 years
00:17:09.260 that have never made a criminal arrest
00:17:10.780 where they were the case agent
00:17:11.860 and actually ran the case.
00:17:13.560 Why?
00:17:14.000 Because a lot of times
00:17:14.800 when you do intelligence,
00:17:15.740 well, you're just gathering information
00:17:17.100 and, you know,
00:17:17.900 trying to prevent stuff,
00:17:18.940 and, you know,
00:17:19.780 your job is to kind of collect information.
00:17:21.440 That's it.
00:17:21.820 Like, you're not necessarily
00:17:22.520 arresting people.
00:17:23.540 However, when you're doing
00:17:24.780 criminal investigations,
00:17:25.820 yeah, you're going out there
00:17:26.740 and arresting people.
00:17:27.380 So I'll give you an example
00:17:28.520 of what I mean by this.
00:17:29.780 The FBI has something called squads, okay?
00:17:31.880 And the reason why I know this so well
00:17:32.860 is because a very good friend of mine
00:17:33.760 is an FBI agent.
00:17:34.480 So, you know,
00:17:36.260 I worked with them quite a bit.
00:17:37.260 I understand how their agency works.
00:17:38.900 They work a lot differently
00:17:39.900 than Homeland Security,
00:17:40.780 but once you start doing
00:17:42.420 certain types of cases,
00:17:43.260 I had a gang case
00:17:44.120 with Lion King's one time,
00:17:45.280 and I also did another case
00:17:46.540 that dealt with some,
00:17:47.540 how do I say this without,
00:17:50.760 I'm just going to say
00:17:51.360 some Sri Lankans
00:17:52.060 and some national security, right?
00:17:53.360 And then you guys can go ahead
00:17:54.460 and deduct whatever you want
00:17:55.800 from that.
00:17:56.460 But, and I was working
00:17:57.540 with FBI on that.
00:17:59.060 So, what was I going to say?
00:18:02.100 Oh, okay.
00:18:02.660 So you'll get like an FBI agent
00:18:03.860 that let's say does like
00:18:04.860 counterintelligence, right?
00:18:06.800 And then you'll get another FBI agent
00:18:08.260 that does, let's say, bank robberies.
00:18:09.820 That agent that does bank robberies
00:18:11.580 will probably make several arrests
00:18:13.200 that year
00:18:13.660 because the banks are calling
00:18:15.100 all the time.
00:18:15.640 Hey, we got robbed.
00:18:16.420 Hey, we got robbed again.
00:18:17.300 Hey, we got robbed, blah, blah, blah.
00:18:18.440 Which I know some of you guys
00:18:19.540 are like, what the hell?
00:18:20.440 Yes, bank robberies
00:18:21.140 are fairly common, guys.
00:18:22.220 I know.
00:18:22.380 I don't know why people
00:18:23.880 do them today.
00:18:24.600 Yeah, yeah, they still are.
00:18:26.060 I was surprised by that too
00:18:27.280 because I asked my friend
00:18:28.320 about this.
00:18:28.740 I was like, wait,
00:18:29.340 because he was telling me,
00:18:30.040 oh, bro, I got to go
00:18:30.800 respond to a bank robbery.
00:18:32.180 And I was like, bro,
00:18:33.300 you're like in a,
00:18:34.100 in like a gang squad.
00:18:35.560 Why are you going to
00:18:36.120 respond to a bank robbery?
00:18:37.220 He was like, yeah,
00:18:37.940 they need help, blah, blah, blah.
00:18:39.100 This is like the fifth bank robbery
00:18:40.440 of the week or some wild like that.
00:18:41.940 And this was, yeah,
00:18:42.840 this was when I was
00:18:43.940 in Laredo, Texas.
00:18:44.780 He was out of San Antonio.
00:18:46.180 Right.
00:18:46.740 And I mean, San Antonio,
00:18:48.280 it's kind of dangerous, right?
00:18:50.060 There's a lot of crime
00:18:52.380 like, bro, like people still
00:18:53.420 rob banks like that.
00:18:54.580 And this is back in like 2017.
00:18:56.640 He's like, yeah, bro,
00:18:57.280 it's actually very common still.
00:18:58.560 And I was like, wow.
00:18:59.520 Like I didn't realize.
00:19:00.480 How with all the technology
00:19:01.520 and like all the stuff
00:19:02.440 in the banks?
00:19:03.060 You know, that's a good question.
00:19:04.160 That's what I thought too.
00:19:05.140 But like people,
00:19:06.000 they pass a no,
00:19:06.980 like they just go in there,
00:19:08.040 run, get the money out
00:19:08.900 and then leave.
00:19:09.600 They don't take the marked bills.
00:19:11.140 Like, right.
00:19:12.400 You know, they got like
00:19:13.160 a getaway card that like
00:19:14.160 doesn't have plates
00:19:14.900 or is like stolen
00:19:15.900 or something like that.
00:19:16.680 So yeah, it's still very common.
00:19:19.560 But going back to what I was saying
00:19:20.700 to bring this all back
00:19:21.440 full circle for you.
00:19:22.100 I don't want to go
00:19:22.480 on a random rant,
00:19:23.260 but I really want you guys
00:19:24.560 to understand how the FBI
00:19:25.380 works here because
00:19:26.380 what you see on TV isn't true.
00:19:27.980 So that bank,
00:19:29.500 that agent that's
00:19:30.220 in the bank robbery squad,
00:19:31.380 he's going to be making
00:19:32.500 a lot of arrests
00:19:32.980 because that's what I would
00:19:33.760 consider like a response group.
00:19:35.600 So they're getting called out
00:19:36.780 at two in the morning,
00:19:37.720 you know, whatever
00:19:38.220 bank robbery happened
00:19:39.240 or, you know,
00:19:40.340 during banking hours,
00:19:41.380 whatever happens.
00:19:42.600 And they're doing
00:19:43.240 those investigations.
00:19:43.900 They're arresting people,
00:19:44.760 right?
00:19:45.620 Whereas someone,
00:19:46.700 an agent that works
00:19:47.500 in counterintelligence,
00:19:49.200 right?
00:19:49.500 Or even terrorism,
00:19:52.580 right?
00:19:52.780 A JTTF joint terrorism
00:19:53.880 task force squad guy.
00:19:55.940 They're might making arrests
00:19:57.240 once every five to 10 years
00:19:59.120 and once every 20 years,
00:20:00.380 right?
00:20:01.160 Because your mission
00:20:03.060 when you're doing
00:20:03.620 counterintelligence,
00:20:04.540 when you're doing
00:20:05.160 terrorism, whatever,
00:20:06.340 you're there to prevent it.
00:20:08.000 You don't want it to happen.
00:20:09.460 Okay?
00:20:09.960 When a terrorist attack
00:20:10.980 is successful,
00:20:12.060 that's bad, guys.
00:20:13.280 We're talking about
00:20:14.000 the economy getting hurt,
00:20:15.760 you know,
00:20:15.980 stock market going wild.
00:20:17.100 Like, it's not good
00:20:18.320 for anybody.
00:20:19.300 So their job is to kind of
00:20:20.420 thwart attacks a lot
00:20:21.420 of the times.
00:20:22.300 So you're not making arrests,
00:20:24.120 right?
00:20:24.640 And a lot of times
00:20:25.440 when you're thwarting attacks,
00:20:26.540 I'll be honest,
00:20:27.120 they'll bring guys in like me.
00:20:28.220 They used to work
00:20:28.620 for Homeland Security.
00:20:30.480 Hey, this guy,
00:20:31.400 we can't prove that he's doing
00:20:32.700 material support to terrorists,
00:20:34.000 but, you know,
00:20:35.100 we know he's here on a visa.
00:20:36.280 Okay.
00:20:37.120 Guys like me come in?
00:20:38.140 All right, motherfucker.
00:20:38.760 We know, you know,
00:20:39.900 you're involved in some stuff.
00:20:40.920 Maybe you do an interview.
00:20:42.100 He doesn't want to confess.
00:20:42.880 He doesn't want to say anything.
00:20:43.980 He doesn't want to cooperate.
00:20:44.740 Cool.
00:20:44.940 Just deport his ass.
00:20:45.700 Bam.
00:20:46.140 You know what I mean?
00:20:46.520 Get him out of here.
00:20:47.520 All right?
00:20:48.360 And that's how a lot of
00:20:49.740 terrorism cases
00:20:50.440 are actually conducted
00:20:51.340 and stopped, guys,
00:20:52.200 is a Homeland Security
00:20:53.600 Special Agent
00:20:54.100 will come in, right?
00:20:55.440 Use that immigration authority,
00:20:56.840 right?
00:20:57.640 Do an interview.
00:20:58.900 Bring him in
00:20:59.480 under immigration pretenses.
00:21:01.280 Do an interview.
00:21:02.240 They don't want to talk.
00:21:02.900 They don't want to cooperate.
00:21:03.800 Identify other individuals.
00:21:05.180 Kick him out.
00:21:05.680 Bam.
00:21:06.940 Give him with the big
00:21:07.840 and crisis averted.
00:21:10.460 Man, I'm getting kind of nervous.
00:21:12.300 Yeah.
00:21:12.760 Why is that?
00:21:13.720 Yeah, they're going to kick you out, too.
00:21:15.740 Just kidding.
00:21:17.760 She's legally here, guys,
00:21:18.700 before you guys make all jokes.
00:21:19.680 Yeah, I am.
00:21:20.320 Yeah, she's here legally.
00:21:21.320 But anyway, what was I going to say?
00:21:23.240 So, yeah.
00:21:23.720 So, and I say that, guys,
00:21:25.020 to show you the vast difference,
00:21:28.140 okay,
00:21:28.980 in different types of FBI agents
00:21:31.060 within the same agency.
00:21:32.180 You got one guy
00:21:33.060 kicking in doors
00:21:33.840 and arresting people
00:21:34.540 that are robbing banks,
00:21:35.340 and then you got another guy
00:21:36.380 that might not make an arrest
00:21:37.360 for years.
00:21:38.180 So, this goes to kind of,
00:21:40.060 that's kind of a microcosm
00:21:41.220 of the bigger situation here
00:21:42.520 where the FBI
00:21:43.300 is a criminal investigative agency
00:21:46.040 while simultaneously
00:21:46.820 being an intelligence agency,
00:21:48.140 but both missions
00:21:50.060 are very different,
00:21:51.640 which is why
00:21:52.280 the FBI can be fairly
00:21:53.560 discombobulated at times, right?
00:21:55.240 They're a big agency,
00:21:56.720 but they have
00:21:58.240 two different missions,
00:21:59.180 and having two different missions
00:22:00.420 a lot of times
00:22:01.000 dilutes the focus
00:22:02.580 of the agency's
00:22:04.280 overall mission,
00:22:05.560 okay?
00:22:06.720 So, and yes,
00:22:08.780 the CIA does not do
00:22:09.780 criminal investigations, guys.
00:22:10.800 That is the FBI
00:22:12.400 that does that.
00:22:13.240 The CIA does stuff overseas.
00:22:15.260 You know, the waterboarding
00:22:16.040 and all that fun stuff,
00:22:16.940 they ain't doing that here, okay?
00:22:18.240 Well, at least not to my knowledge.
00:22:20.780 All right.
00:22:21.760 All right.
00:22:22.260 Let's get back to
00:22:23.220 the documentary,
00:22:25.880 but that was an overview
00:22:27.520 of how the Bureau
00:22:29.100 really works.
00:22:31.340 Like the video, by the way.
00:22:32.680 You guys are not going to get
00:22:33.800 detailed information like that
00:22:35.020 anywhere else,
00:22:35.560 because, quite frankly,
00:22:36.480 none of these YouTubers
00:22:37.080 have ever done a criminal case,
00:22:38.480 let alone done a criminal case
00:22:39.740 alongside the Bureau
00:22:40.960 knows how they work.
00:22:42.560 No espionage is occurring.
00:22:44.040 We've got these few tidbits
00:22:45.000 of information.
00:22:45.860 Can you help us out?
00:22:47.080 You bet.
00:22:48.000 I especially love
00:22:49.240 what are termed
00:22:50.060 unsub investigations,
00:22:51.300 unknown subject investigations.
00:22:53.340 And those are investigations
00:22:54.680 where you have good reason
00:22:56.220 to believe that espionage
00:22:57.360 is occurring.
00:22:58.440 You have absolutely no idea
00:22:59.900 who might be doing it.
00:23:00.900 FBI was trying to identify
00:23:06.180 a Cuban spy who was possibly
00:23:07.580 in the D.C. area,
00:23:08.640 and they knew a few tidbits
00:23:09.720 of information about the spy,
00:23:11.420 but they had no idea
00:23:13.000 who this person was,
00:23:14.680 where this person worked.
00:23:15.880 Well, that's a problem,
00:23:17.700 because what they were talking
00:23:18.980 about is the possibility
00:23:19.980 that there was a Cuban agent
00:23:21.120 with access to classified information.
00:23:22.960 And this is a problem, guys,
00:23:28.760 because Cuba is a huge ally
00:23:30.240 of who?
00:23:31.280 Mother Russia.
00:23:32.640 And as you guys know,
00:23:34.200 we've had, you know,
00:23:35.140 issues with Russia
00:23:35.880 for a very long time.
00:23:37.260 I mean, most of the spies
00:23:38.140 that we catch,
00:23:38.760 a lot of the times,
00:23:39.440 are typically from Russia
00:23:40.660 or China,
00:23:41.380 at least the most prolific ones.
00:23:43.200 And vice versa,
00:23:44.160 a lot of our spies
00:23:45.340 get caught in their countries.
00:23:47.740 Cuba does not pose
00:23:49.180 a credible military threat
00:23:50.720 to the United States.
00:23:51.660 The real danger
00:23:52.700 of Cuban intelligence operations
00:23:54.040 is that the intelligence take
00:23:56.000 is shared by Cuba
00:23:57.500 with other countries.
00:23:59.460 He shares information
00:24:00.380 with Iran, China, Russia,
00:24:03.560 even Venezuela, North Korea.
00:24:06.080 Oh, your people.
00:24:08.040 I knew it.
00:24:09.240 Your people.
00:24:09.960 I knew it.
00:24:11.440 What makes Cuba important
00:24:15.080 is that it's the world's
00:24:17.160 biggest intelligence trafficker.
00:24:20.340 And I say that
00:24:21.380 in the context of
00:24:22.320 the sale or barter
00:24:23.820 of U.S. secrets
00:24:24.660 is now one of the central engines
00:24:27.220 of the Cuban economy.
00:24:29.580 Whether it's political secrets,
00:24:31.500 economic secrets,
00:24:32.880 military secrets,
00:24:34.140 every country
00:24:34.980 has interest
00:24:36.100 in the United States
00:24:37.040 and Cuba.
00:24:38.340 And that's a good point
00:24:39.240 because Cuba
00:24:39.780 is in a very good
00:24:40.980 geographic location,
00:24:42.980 right,
00:24:43.720 to extract information
00:24:45.200 from the United States,
00:24:47.080 surreptitiously,
00:24:47.600 of course,
00:24:48.280 and then sell it
00:24:49.460 to the United States' enemies.
00:24:51.740 So you guys can see
00:24:52.440 how much of a threat
00:24:53.140 Cuba really is
00:24:53.860 to the United States.
00:24:55.200 Their ability
00:24:55.980 to steal secrets,
00:24:57.480 they outperform
00:24:58.340 almost every nation
00:24:59.380 in the world.
00:25:03.840 The Cubans are so good
00:25:05.040 for several reasons.
00:25:06.720 At the start
00:25:07.620 of the Cold War,
00:25:08.780 the Russians
00:25:09.320 and all the Warsaw Pact allies
00:25:11.100 saw the Cubans
00:25:12.180 as useful partners
00:25:13.640 that would not draw attention
00:25:15.560 like they would.
00:25:17.200 The Russians,
00:25:18.620 the Poles,
00:25:19.660 every service in the world
00:25:21.040 trained the Cubans.
00:25:24.860 Cuba exploited the perception
00:25:26.900 that they're not a threat
00:25:28.040 because it lowers
00:25:29.140 their cost of espionage
00:25:30.280 and it gets them more clients
00:25:31.860 because situations
00:25:33.080 that would be hard
00:25:33.720 for the Chinese
00:25:34.240 or Russians to do,
00:25:35.920 Cuban agents
00:25:36.440 can do easily.
00:25:37.200 Building a non-sub case
00:25:44.520 is like putting
00:25:46.060 a puzzle together.
00:25:47.520 The challenge is
00:25:48.700 you don't know
00:25:49.660 what the puzzle looks like
00:25:51.320 and you don't know
00:25:52.120 how many pieces there are.
00:25:54.060 The FBI's case,
00:25:55.240 they had three
00:25:55.820 very distinct
00:25:57.000 pieces of the puzzle
00:25:59.140 as they shared
00:26:00.420 their puzzle pieces.
00:26:02.100 Turns out
00:26:02.900 I had the fourth puzzle piece.
00:26:07.200 That one piece
00:26:09.660 of information
00:26:11.080 fit perfectly
00:26:13.100 into
00:26:13.640 what they had just shared
00:26:15.840 and when
00:26:16.820 we put it all together
00:26:17.920 I told them
00:26:18.960 that the FBI
00:26:20.020 is looking in the wrong place
00:26:21.400 because the unsub
00:26:24.100 doing the three things
00:26:24.940 you just shared
00:26:25.600 coupled with the
00:26:26.620 fourth piece of the puzzle
00:26:27.800 there are probably
00:26:29.680 40 or 50 people
00:26:31.560 that could do
00:26:32.440 what your unsub
00:26:33.480 can do
00:26:34.000 and in all likelihood
00:26:35.400 is working.
00:26:36.080 Okay, that's good.
00:26:37.300 So they narrowed down
00:26:38.260 the pool
00:26:38.920 of potential suspects
00:26:40.200 which is huge guys
00:26:41.080 in an unsub case.
00:26:42.520 You're talking about
00:26:43.560 how many people
00:26:44.600 have classified information
00:26:45.720 literally hundreds.
00:26:47.740 How many have
00:26:48.720 information that can
00:26:50.480 compromise the United States?
00:26:51.720 So whenever you're able
00:26:53.960 to whittle down the list
00:26:55.040 that's half the game
00:26:56.000 when you do these types
00:26:56.760 of unsub cases
00:26:57.840 which is typically
00:26:58.340 how most espionage cases
00:26:59.740 begin.
00:27:01.480 Within the confines
00:27:02.560 of the Defense Intelligence Agency
00:27:04.120 even more narrowly
00:27:05.780 the spy was almost
00:27:06.800 certainly in our building.
00:27:12.220 What was the information
00:27:13.680 that the FBI had?
00:27:15.680 What did they show you?
00:27:18.080 The information
00:27:18.960 that our colleagues
00:27:19.800 shared with us
00:27:21.180 remains classified
00:27:22.680 to this day.
00:27:23.900 I knew
00:27:27.100 that was going to happen.
00:27:28.700 Guys, let me tell y'all something.
00:27:30.000 As a former government guy
00:27:31.060 that used to work
00:27:31.600 with the FBI
00:27:32.080 and these intelligence agencies
00:27:33.200 fairly often
00:27:34.400 these guys
00:27:35.520 classify everything, right?
00:27:37.120 When in doubt
00:27:37.660 it's classified, okay?
00:27:39.460 Because you know
00:27:40.320 that you ain't going
00:27:41.120 to get in trouble
00:27:41.700 if you just classify it.
00:27:43.000 And the other thing too
00:27:43.640 I want to make very clear
00:27:44.680 to y'all
00:27:45.060 a lot of the time
00:27:46.400 classified information
00:27:47.960 isn't classified
00:27:48.940 because the information
00:27:50.000 is actually
00:27:51.080 like secret.
00:27:53.120 It's classified
00:27:54.000 because the way
00:27:54.920 it was gathered
00:27:55.920 is secret.
00:27:56.940 Let me make that distinction
00:27:57.800 one more time.
00:28:00.820 A lot of the time guys
00:28:02.000 when information
00:28:02.620 is classified
00:28:03.560 right?
00:28:04.280 Whether it's secret
00:28:04.880 confidential
00:28:05.480 top secret
00:28:06.140 SCI
00:28:06.480 whatever it is
00:28:07.160 it's not that
00:28:08.460 the information
00:28:09.080 in itself
00:28:10.220 is secret
00:28:11.440 most of the time
00:28:12.860 not all the time
00:28:13.600 but most of the time
00:28:15.000 it's because
00:28:15.960 the way
00:28:16.740 it was gathered
00:28:17.780 reveals techniques
00:28:19.020 and is going
00:28:20.140 to compromise
00:28:20.940 typically
00:28:21.660 some source
00:28:23.200 or some type
00:28:24.040 of asset
00:28:24.620 that we have
00:28:25.400 because that information
00:28:26.580 is so
00:28:27.800 narrowly given
00:28:29.460 or so hard
00:28:30.420 to come by
00:28:31.200 or it is so tightly
00:28:32.720 tied to someone
00:28:34.620 that
00:28:35.580 if it gets out
00:28:37.140 it would immediately
00:28:37.780 divulge who the source is
00:28:39.020 or how it was gathered
00:28:40.140 which would hurt us.
00:28:41.220 So the methodologies
00:28:42.120 of how it was gathered
00:28:43.020 is what they're trying
00:28:44.100 to protect a lot of times
00:28:45.020 not the information
00:28:46.300 in and of itself.
00:28:48.620 Okay?
00:28:49.480 So
00:28:49.700 I want to make that
00:28:51.880 distinction for you guys
00:28:52.620 as well
00:28:53.040 because a lot of people
00:28:55.220 don't know that
00:28:55.680 they think
00:28:55.960 oh my god
00:28:56.440 this is like
00:28:56.900 really secret stuff
00:28:57.640 I mean guys
00:28:58.520 I've seen stuff
00:28:59.720 that's considered
00:29:00.220 oh my god
00:29:00.760 this is classified
00:29:01.260 whatever
00:29:01.520 and you're looking at it
00:29:02.260 and you're like
00:29:02.440 bro this is public knowledge
00:29:03.460 what the hell
00:29:03.980 but you know
00:29:05.440 but it's because
00:29:06.120 it was gathered
00:29:07.100 a certain way
00:29:07.760 that they had to
00:29:08.500 keep it that way
00:29:09.060 right?
00:29:10.840 Because
00:29:11.160 it would
00:29:12.320 and the other thing
00:29:13.180 too I want to say
00:29:13.740 for y'all too
00:29:14.160 is a guy that did
00:29:14.900 criminal investigations
00:29:16.100 versus like doing
00:29:16.940 counterintelligence
00:29:19.240 or these types
00:29:19.720 of classified cases
00:29:20.920 they're very overrated
00:29:22.240 right?
00:29:22.480 I don't want to be
00:29:22.920 a jerk or anything
00:29:24.120 or a party pooper
00:29:24.820 but the reality is
00:29:25.640 you can't use
00:29:26.860 classified information
00:29:28.340 in criminal investigations
00:29:30.220 you can't
00:29:31.520 okay?
00:29:32.140 Because anything
00:29:32.800 that goes into
00:29:33.720 a criminal case
00:29:34.580 is discoverable
00:29:35.780 and things that are
00:29:36.680 discoverable
00:29:37.340 guess what?
00:29:38.380 They need to be
00:29:38.920 declassified
00:29:39.600 before they could be
00:29:40.600 discoverable
00:29:41.600 right?
00:29:42.620 So
00:29:42.920 if you're going to
00:29:44.420 make a case criminal
00:29:45.180 you have to work
00:29:46.840 through declassifying
00:29:47.680 everything in the investigation
00:29:48.960 to make sure
00:29:50.100 because you're going to
00:29:50.560 have to give it
00:29:50.940 to some defense attorney
00:29:51.840 right?
00:29:52.680 He don't have a clearance
00:29:53.500 it's going to go to a judge
00:29:55.600 a lot of times
00:29:56.140 they don't have clearances
00:29:56.880 right?
00:29:58.020 Typically the only people
00:29:58.860 that have a clearance
00:29:59.540 in the investigation
00:30:00.600 is the case agent
00:30:01.980 sometimes the AUSA
00:30:03.800 right?
00:30:04.380 If it's a national security case
00:30:05.280 typically the AUSA
00:30:05.980 will have a clearance
00:30:06.480 but not all AUSAs
00:30:07.360 have clearances
00:30:07.900 the AUSA is the federal
00:30:08.960 prosecutor by the way guys
00:30:09.860 so
00:30:10.380 so the reason why
00:30:12.680 a lot of these like
00:30:13.500 CI cases or whatever
00:30:14.600 never see the light of day
00:30:15.540 in a courtroom
00:30:16.040 is because
00:30:17.200 it's classified
00:30:17.980 and classified material
00:30:18.840 can't go into
00:30:19.500 a criminal investigation
00:30:20.780 it's useless
00:30:22.220 right?
00:30:22.980 Which is why myself
00:30:23.760 I typically never use
00:30:24.820 classified information
00:30:25.600 I stayed away from it
00:30:26.520 I remember
00:30:27.160 I had one national security case
00:30:28.740 it was actually
00:30:29.880 right before I left
00:30:30.460 HSI
00:30:30.860 and it was a case
00:30:32.500 I was telling you about
00:30:33.020 with the Sri Lankans
00:30:33.680 I had a co-case agent
00:30:36.160 right?
00:30:36.860 So this is more advanced
00:30:37.880 stuff for y'all
00:30:38.360 but I'm going to give you
00:30:39.480 guys some sauce here
00:30:40.280 so whenever you have a case
00:30:41.980 that has a national security
00:30:42.860 nexus
00:30:43.160 you want a primary case agent
00:30:45.560 and then you want someone
00:30:46.340 who you call
00:30:47.000 a taint agent
00:30:48.160 okay?
00:30:49.200 And
00:30:49.520 the primary case agent
00:30:51.380 he's the one
00:30:52.620 that's doing everything
00:30:53.800 in the light
00:30:54.420 okay?
00:30:54.920 he's writing the reports
00:30:56.500 he's writing the affidavits
00:30:57.860 he's trying to stay away
00:30:59.480 from the classified
00:31:00.000 information etc
00:31:00.800 he's very transparent
00:31:01.700 he's the more transparent
00:31:02.920 one because the case
00:31:03.560 is going to have to see
00:31:04.220 the light of day
00:31:05.160 in the courtroom
00:31:05.500 right?
00:31:05.960 Right
00:31:06.120 then your co-case agent
00:31:07.740 or someone else
00:31:08.480 right?
00:31:09.060 in your squad
00:31:09.680 they'll go ahead
00:31:11.020 and they'll look at
00:31:11.960 all the classified stuff
00:31:13.120 right?
00:31:14.460 And
00:31:14.820 they'll also
00:31:16.060 help you
00:31:16.900 with the investigation
00:31:17.940 but the thing is
00:31:18.700 right?
00:31:19.560 Is that as the case agent
00:31:20.740 you don't want to know
00:31:21.780 the classified stuff
00:31:22.560 and I'll tell y'all why
00:31:23.420 here in a second
00:31:23.940 you want them to go
00:31:25.580 the co-case agent
00:31:26.340 to go figure out
00:31:27.000 all the classified stuff
00:31:27.780 for you
00:31:28.240 and kind of point you
00:31:29.240 in the direction of
00:31:29.840 hey maybe you want
00:31:30.360 to look here
00:31:30.700 blah blah blah
00:31:31.060 all that type of thing
00:31:31.760 and the reason why guys
00:31:33.200 is because if they put you
00:31:34.600 right on the stand
00:31:35.960 or whatever
00:31:37.300 and ask you questions
00:31:39.300 well you can't lie
00:31:40.260 okay?
00:31:41.540 So it's better for you
00:31:42.720 a lot of the times
00:31:43.300 from a liability standpoint
00:31:44.400 to just not know
00:31:45.520 right?
00:31:46.620 The classified information
00:31:47.580 because you can't
00:31:48.140 talk about it
00:31:48.760 right?
00:31:49.760 And if they call
00:31:50.280 the other agent in
00:31:51.200 hey I need you to testify
00:31:52.320 he can just go on there
00:31:53.160 and be like
00:31:53.380 well it's classified
00:31:53.900 I can't
00:31:54.280 sorry
00:31:54.700 can't disclose it
00:31:56.380 It's kind of like secrets
00:31:56.800 like the less
00:31:57.780 they have to be known
00:31:59.100 the more compromised
00:32:00.020 you can be
00:32:01.380 knowing them
00:32:02.140 Yeah
00:32:02.400 absolutely
00:32:03.140 so that's
00:32:05.100 one way to get around it
00:32:06.760 there's many other
00:32:07.320 investigative strategies
00:32:08.500 to do this guys
00:32:09.260 whenever you're doing
00:32:09.780 national security cases
00:32:10.480 or whatever
00:32:10.820 or the other route
00:32:12.840 is you can just
00:32:13.380 declassify everything
00:32:14.240 right?
00:32:14.660 You can go through
00:32:15.040 the process of actually
00:32:16.100 declassifying the information
00:32:17.340 so you can put it
00:32:18.280 in a courtroom
00:32:18.700 but sometimes
00:32:19.500 that's not feasible
00:32:20.180 so having a Tate agent
00:32:21.220 is another tactic
00:32:22.080 that you can use
00:32:22.780 and having Tate agents
00:32:24.740 is a tactic
00:32:25.540 that can be used
00:32:26.080 for cases like this
00:32:28.900 that have classified information
00:32:30.200 or in the Trump case
00:32:31.640 for example
00:32:32.180 cases that have
00:32:33.760 attorney privilege
00:32:35.500 information
00:32:37.060 and attorney client
00:32:38.380 privilege information
00:32:39.200 is like
00:32:40.320 any information
00:32:41.200 where the potential
00:32:42.640 defendant is talking
00:32:43.360 to their attorney
00:32:43.960 right?
00:32:44.240 so in that case
00:32:45.680 what they ended up doing
00:32:46.600 was they had
00:32:47.860 the case agent
00:32:49.240 and his squad
00:32:50.000 go in
00:32:50.920 and do the search
00:32:51.980 right?
00:32:52.980 and then
00:32:53.700 a Tate squad
00:32:54.800 went in
00:32:55.320 right?
00:32:55.880 that wasn't involved
00:32:56.680 in that investigation
00:32:57.520 necessarily
00:32:58.060 and anything
00:32:59.000 that was dealt with
00:32:59.960 that had attorney
00:33:00.800 client privilege
00:33:01.400 they dealt with that
00:33:02.260 and they went through
00:33:03.200 and filtered
00:33:03.620 what was attorney
00:33:04.240 client privilege
00:33:04.720 and what was not
00:33:05.360 and then they gave
00:33:06.180 the stuff that was not
00:33:07.020 over to the case agent
00:33:08.040 and the reason
00:33:08.760 why they do that
00:33:09.460 is so that the case agent
00:33:10.660 isn't tainted
00:33:11.300 he doesn't see
00:33:12.160 any of that stuff
00:33:12.800 so if he's called
00:33:13.760 to the stand
00:33:14.240 or whatever
00:33:14.600 he doesn't know
00:33:15.520 okay?
00:33:16.600 and then
00:33:17.060 if they do need
00:33:18.500 to go ahead
00:33:18.980 and figure that stuff out
00:33:20.220 they can call
00:33:20.600 the agents
00:33:20.900 that were from
00:33:21.460 the Tate team
00:33:22.160 right?
00:33:23.080 that saw the
00:33:23.620 privilege information
00:33:24.340 and it can't be used
00:33:25.120 against Donald Trump
00:33:25.820 right?
00:33:26.820 in that case
00:33:27.520 same thing
00:33:28.120 with classified information
00:33:28.980 so Tate teams
00:33:30.080 is kind of a strategy
00:33:30.900 I'm getting in the weeds
00:33:31.600 here for y'all
00:33:32.020 but I'm explaining this
00:33:33.160 so you guys can
00:33:33.540 kind of understand
00:33:34.200 how these types
00:33:35.360 of sensitive investigations
00:33:36.260 where you got
00:33:36.660 attorney client privilege
00:33:37.620 or national security
00:33:38.540 information
00:33:39.060 or classified information
00:33:39.960 whatever it may be
00:33:40.640 how it typically works
00:33:41.820 right?
00:33:42.040 because I've done them
00:33:42.800 I know
00:33:43.260 right?
00:33:44.700 so
00:33:45.060 like the video
00:33:45.920 because you guys
00:33:46.960 aren't going to get
00:33:47.380 that level of detail
00:33:48.060 anywhere else
00:33:48.500 on the internet
00:33:48.960 and subscribe
00:33:50.580 of course
00:33:51.260 yeah subscribe
00:33:51.860 to the channel
00:33:52.280 as well
00:33:52.500 and then also
00:33:53.000 check out Angie
00:33:54.220 on Instagram
00:33:54.560 guys
00:33:54.840 soangelica
00:33:55.420 with two A's
00:33:56.060 at the end
00:33:56.560 right?
00:33:58.380 yeah
00:33:58.540 soangelica
00:33:59.600 with two A's
00:33:59.940 at the end
00:34:00.140 yeah it is
00:34:00.840 but please
00:34:01.760 don't send
00:34:03.000 dick pics
00:34:03.540 or weird comments
00:34:05.440 I've been receiving
00:34:06.400 like weird comments
00:34:07.700 okay
00:34:08.200 man
00:34:09.100 these people
00:34:10.140 fair enough
00:34:11.340 you guys better
00:34:12.240 not be simping
00:34:12.800 get that book
00:34:13.340 why women deserve less
00:34:14.200 you better not be simping
00:34:14.900 alright
00:34:15.940 I'm gonna roast you
00:34:16.840 alright let's get back
00:34:18.220 into it guys
00:34:18.680 reveal
00:34:19.700 some of our
00:34:21.140 methods that the
00:34:22.380 Cubans aren't
00:34:23.040 yet aware of
00:34:23.920 he said it for me
00:34:26.280 see it wasn't
00:34:27.000 the information
00:34:27.500 that was classified
00:34:28.060 in itself
00:34:28.600 it reveals
00:34:29.520 the methodologies
00:34:30.260 on how they
00:34:30.700 gathered it
00:34:31.420 some of the
00:34:35.440 methods
00:34:36.200 and systems
00:34:37.520 that the
00:34:38.140 DIA
00:34:38.480 employs
00:34:39.320 to collect
00:34:39.780 information
00:34:40.280 about other
00:34:40.960 countries
00:34:41.460 activities
00:34:42.100 are
00:34:43.060 so sophisticated
00:34:44.380 and that's why
00:34:45.340 espionage
00:34:46.040 is so dangerous
00:34:46.880 because
00:34:47.460 if you tell
00:34:48.580 other countries
00:34:50.040 hey the United
00:34:51.120 States is able
00:34:51.860 to do
00:34:52.340 this
00:34:52.980 they will then
00:34:54.900 guard
00:34:55.280 against that
00:34:56.200 and of course
00:34:57.300 that degrades
00:34:57.960 our ability
00:34:58.540 to collect
00:34:59.020 information
00:34:59.500 that our
00:35:00.020 war fighters
00:35:00.560 need
00:35:00.940 in the event
00:35:01.440 that they go
00:35:01.840 to war
00:35:02.220 with some
00:35:02.620 country
00:35:02.980 that's the
00:35:04.040 problem
00:35:04.400 for most of
00:35:06.300 the years
00:35:06.860 that I worked
00:35:07.440 for DIA
00:35:07.980 I was the
00:35:08.700 senior
00:35:08.960 counterintelligence
00:35:09.700 investigator
00:35:10.380 so if anybody
00:35:11.160 was engaging
00:35:12.080 in espionage
00:35:12.920 in the agency
00:35:14.060 on my watch
00:35:15.320 that was an
00:35:16.440 affront to me
00:35:17.280 I hate that
00:35:18.980 I think it's
00:35:20.180 the betrayal
00:35:20.800 that gets me
00:35:21.700 like how dare
00:35:22.840 you
00:35:23.180 one investigative
00:35:26.460 lead that the
00:35:27.320 FBI had
00:35:28.220 was that the
00:35:29.340 spying question
00:35:30.220 had traveled
00:35:31.220 to the naval
00:35:32.040 station at
00:35:32.860 Guantanamo Cuba
00:35:33.820 during a specific
00:35:35.580 time frame
00:35:36.200 that was the best
00:35:37.060 investigative lead
00:35:37.820 I knew that
00:35:39.600 people who travel
00:35:40.320 to Gitmo
00:35:40.860 require permission
00:35:41.760 to do so
00:35:42.400 and they
00:35:43.360 submit the request
00:35:44.500 for permission
00:35:45.060 by message
00:35:45.760 all right real quick
00:35:47.300 guys just so you
00:35:48.380 guys know what
00:35:48.880 Guantanamo Bay is
00:35:49.880 because some of you
00:35:50.340 guys might be like
00:35:50.980 what the hell
00:35:51.340 is Guantanamo Bay
00:35:52.200 Guantanamo Bay
00:35:54.620 and they've been
00:35:54.940 talking about
00:35:55.360 closing this place
00:35:56.080 down forever
00:35:57.260 and it's still open
00:35:59.000 I remember Obama
00:35:59.780 campaigned saying
00:36:01.380 that but here's
00:36:02.100 Guantanamo Bay
00:36:02.680 guys the Guantanamo
00:36:03.440 Bay detention camp
00:36:04.320 is the United States
00:36:05.240 military prison
00:36:05.940 located within
00:36:06.500 Guantanamo Bay
00:36:07.140 naval base
00:36:07.700 also referred to
00:36:08.420 as Guantanamo
00:36:09.960 Gitmo
00:36:10.720 and Gitmo
00:36:11.960 on the coast
00:36:12.540 of Guantanamo Bay
00:36:13.280 in Cuba
00:36:13.800 of the roughly
00:36:14.620 780 people
00:36:15.480 detained there
00:36:16.000 since January
00:36:16.520 2002
00:36:17.080 when the military
00:36:17.620 prison first
00:36:18.240 opened after
00:36:18.800 the September
00:36:19.180 11th attacks
00:36:19.860 737 have been
00:36:21.340 transferred elsewhere
00:36:22.120 34 remain there
00:36:23.220 and 9 have died
00:36:23.920 while in custody
00:36:24.940 okay this is a
00:36:25.900 very controversial
00:36:26.520 prison 60 minutes
00:36:27.540 Australia did a
00:36:28.200 whole take on
00:36:29.680 Guantanamo Bay
00:36:31.140 but they don't
00:36:32.440 want to say it bro
00:36:33.020 but this is where
00:36:33.520 they basically hold
00:36:34.020 terrorists all right
00:36:34.560 straight out this is
00:36:35.100 what they this is
00:36:36.000 where they hold
00:36:36.340 terrorists the guy
00:36:37.940 that orchestrated
00:36:38.720 the 9-11 attacks
00:36:40.180 KSM Khalid Sheikh
00:36:43.120 Mohammed this guy
00:36:43.980 right here
00:36:46.520 okay and I'm at
00:36:49.200 this point 9-11
00:36:49.900 is burned into my
00:36:50.540 head because I did
00:36:51.000 so much research
00:36:51.560 for it and I'm
00:36:53.180 aware of the
00:36:53.760 obviously the
00:36:54.420 official story
00:36:55.000 and the unofficial
00:36:55.600 story but this
00:36:56.420 guy right here
00:36:56.800 Khalid Sheikh Mohammed
00:36:57.500 also known as
00:36:58.300 as about 50 other
00:36:59.580 pseudonyms
00:36:59.980 Sheikh Sheikh Mohammed
00:37:01.420 yep is a
00:37:02.060 Pakistani Islamist
00:37:02.900 militant held by
00:37:04.100 the United States
00:37:04.600 at the Guantanamo
00:37:05.200 Bay detention camp
00:37:06.040 under terrorism
00:37:06.800 charges he was
00:37:08.200 named as the
00:37:08.920 principal architect
00:37:09.500 of 9-11 attacks
00:37:10.260 in the 9-11
00:37:10.720 commission report
00:37:11.380 he's often referred
00:37:12.340 to by his
00:37:13.620 initials KSM
00:37:15.220 and also
00:37:16.220 speaking of him
00:37:17.820 this is his
00:37:18.660 nephew right here
00:37:19.540 Ramsey Youssef
00:37:21.380 okay who was
00:37:23.140 responsible for the
00:37:24.060 1993 World
00:37:25.460 Trade Center
00:37:25.820 bombings okay
00:37:26.620 and this is his
00:37:27.440 nephew
00:37:27.720 oh I remember
00:37:28.660 that case
00:37:29.240 oh you remember
00:37:29.780 this one
00:37:30.060 yeah
00:37:30.200 you can do
00:37:30.560 that
00:37:30.880 so I already
00:37:31.880 did it
00:37:32.220 oh you did
00:37:32.680 it
00:37:32.800 I did this
00:37:33.240 one yeah
00:37:33.560 so it was a
00:37:35.360 good case though
00:37:35.900 very interesting
00:37:36.600 case
00:37:36.900 so it was
00:37:38.040 very good
00:37:38.500 it's really good
00:37:39.200 yeah and don't
00:37:40.360 worry guys I know
00:37:41.040 some of y'all are
00:37:41.460 like well 9-11
00:37:42.280 was an inside job
00:37:43.280 blah blah blah
00:37:43.760 I will say this
00:37:45.080 I've watched
00:37:45.740 Dawson's take on it
00:37:46.860 and he has a more
00:37:48.400 holistic view on it
00:37:49.500 because a lot of
00:37:50.000 these other conspiracy
00:37:50.800 theorists
00:37:51.280 9-11 people
00:37:53.140 didn't cover a very
00:37:54.900 big part
00:37:55.640 of 9-11
00:37:56.800 and all I'm gonna say
00:37:58.840 is
00:37:59.220 them boys definitely
00:38:01.300 had some involvement
00:38:02.040 but
00:38:02.660 as well as these
00:38:04.720 terrorists as well
00:38:05.460 but we're
00:38:06.280 I will do that
00:38:07.240 probably on rumble
00:38:08.200 with him
00:38:09.380 and we're gonna
00:38:09.880 cover 9-11
00:38:10.620 from top to bottom
00:38:12.700 guys
00:38:13.000 top to bottom
00:38:13.580 and I obviously
00:38:14.100 I'm very aware
00:38:14.760 of the official
00:38:15.900 narrative
00:38:16.220 and the unofficial
00:38:16.980 narrative
00:38:17.400 and I know
00:38:18.680 Ryan Dawson's
00:38:20.060 perspective as well
00:38:20.860 which I think
00:38:21.360 is probably
00:38:21.900 one of the best
00:38:23.160 ones because
00:38:23.600 he covers
00:38:24.180 everything
00:38:24.840 you know
00:38:25.160 to include
00:38:25.620 you know
00:38:26.420 from the terrorism
00:38:27.020 side
00:38:27.440 to the
00:38:28.000 controlled demolition
00:38:28.920 side
00:38:29.380 to
00:38:29.980 that side
00:38:32.760 if you know
00:38:33.160 what I'm saying
00:38:33.560 we're on YouTube
00:38:34.000 I can't say it
00:38:34.940 Angie you know
00:38:35.820 what I'm talking
00:38:36.180 about though
00:38:36.540 so yeah
00:38:37.880 but that's what
00:38:40.160 Guantanamo Bay
00:38:40.660 is guys
00:38:41.060 and it's
00:38:42.320 searchable by
00:38:42.980 keyword
00:38:43.440 episode coming
00:38:44.580 soon on rumble
00:38:45.400 with Ryan Dawson
00:38:46.500 we're organizing
00:38:47.160 it right now
00:38:47.600 we're gonna cover
00:38:48.000 everything for y'all
00:38:48.580 from JFK
00:38:50.000 to nuclear
00:38:51.400 secrets being
00:38:51.980 stolen by
00:38:52.760 and then
00:38:55.120 also 9-11
00:38:56.660 it only took
00:38:59.120 me
00:38:59.240 yeah we probably
00:38:59.620 should do
00:38:59.980 on rumble
00:39:00.680 at some point
00:39:01.200 moments to
00:39:02.240 submit my query
00:39:03.320 and the
00:39:05.100 system produced
00:39:06.280 a hit file
00:39:07.240 a list of
00:39:08.140 messages
00:39:08.620 about a hundred
00:39:09.820 of them
00:39:10.560 that matched
00:39:11.400 parameters of
00:39:12.340 my search
00:39:12.800 and so I
00:39:13.780 started hitting
00:39:14.320 my function
00:39:14.860 key very
00:39:15.360 quickly
00:39:15.980 just to see
00:39:16.700 if I would
00:39:17.080 recognize names
00:39:18.120 and the
00:39:19.400 20th one
00:39:20.280 it was
00:39:28.460 I don't want
00:39:30.080 this on
00:39:30.540 it was
00:39:31.640 very very
00:39:32.320 emotional
00:39:32.900 the moment
00:39:40.760 I saw
00:39:41.180 her name
00:39:41.620 I knew
00:39:42.920 now I
00:39:50.020 know some
00:39:50.300 of you guys
00:39:50.540 are probably
00:39:50.780 like well why
00:39:51.200 is he crying
00:39:51.620 like why does
00:39:52.060 he care blah blah
00:39:52.560 blah a lot
00:39:53.160 of the times
00:39:53.500 guys when
00:39:54.060 you work
00:39:55.340 in the
00:39:55.620 government
00:39:55.900 you really
00:39:56.340 start to
00:39:56.760 build really
00:39:57.320 strong bonds
00:39:58.160 and formations
00:39:58.740 with the people
00:39:59.680 that you work
00:40:00.260 with you get
00:40:01.160 to know
00:40:01.340 their families
00:40:01.920 you get to
00:40:03.000 know them
00:40:03.520 you get to
00:40:04.500 know what
00:40:05.640 they do in
00:40:05.940 their personal
00:40:06.360 time
00:40:06.820 so anytime
00:40:08.300 like a
00:40:08.800 government
00:40:09.080 employee
00:40:09.600 that you
00:40:10.260 right is
00:40:10.980 suspected of
00:40:11.680 some kind
00:40:12.100 of misconduct
00:40:12.840 or wrong
00:40:13.300 going or in
00:40:13.780 this case
00:40:14.220 the worst
00:40:15.100 of crimes
00:40:15.700 treason
00:40:16.120 selling secrets
00:40:16.820 to an
00:40:17.420 enemy
00:40:17.660 right which
00:40:18.680 is what
00:40:18.940 she's about
00:40:19.340 to be
00:40:19.540 suspected of
00:40:20.020 you guys
00:40:20.220 are going
00:40:20.360 to see
00:40:20.560 here in
00:40:20.860 a second
00:40:21.180 everyone
00:40:22.320 is in
00:40:22.640 shock
00:40:22.940 right and
00:40:23.780 it's like
00:40:24.340 oh man
00:40:25.380 wow
00:40:25.800 so
00:40:26.760 that is
00:40:28.400 quite shocking
00:40:29.140 what was that
00:40:30.260 it's quite shocking
00:40:30.900 though because
00:40:31.500 on the documentary
00:40:32.760 that I was
00:40:33.280 watching on the
00:40:33.740 way here
00:40:34.180 they said
00:40:35.500 that this
00:40:36.100 guy said
00:40:36.780 that
00:40:37.100 Anna Montez
00:40:38.120 was very
00:40:38.560 reserved
00:40:39.140 she was very
00:40:40.360 like
00:40:40.700 to work
00:40:41.940 and that's
00:40:42.420 it
00:40:42.580 yeah
00:40:42.860 she was
00:40:43.280 a good
00:40:43.460 worker
00:40:43.720 yeah
00:40:44.220 she was
00:40:44.620 and that's
00:40:44.980 why
00:40:45.180 another reason
00:40:45.700 why
00:40:45.940 it shocks
00:40:47.300 people
00:40:47.500 and I'll
00:40:47.920 tell you guys
00:40:48.300 this
00:40:48.440 I knew
00:40:48.920 I know
00:40:49.380 agents
00:40:49.740 that got
00:40:50.060 arrested
00:40:50.340 for like
00:40:50.740 misconduct
00:40:51.160 and you
00:40:51.600 never see
00:40:51.960 it coming
00:40:52.240 dude
00:40:52.440 you never
00:40:53.200 see it
00:40:53.540 coming
00:40:53.760 right
00:40:54.600 you never
00:40:55.060 see it
00:40:55.360 happening
00:40:55.600 like
00:40:55.820 I worked
00:40:56.300 with a
00:40:56.540 guy
00:40:56.780 in Laredo
00:40:57.840 wow
00:40:58.180 I worked
00:41:02.800 with a guy
00:41:03.160 in Laredo
00:41:03.600 who's a
00:41:03.940 good guy
00:41:04.340 man
00:41:04.680 you can
00:41:05.300 actually
00:41:05.600 yeah
00:41:06.680 I won't
00:41:07.540 say his
00:41:07.840 name for
00:41:08.180 now
00:41:08.380 but
00:41:08.640 but either
00:41:10.160 way
00:41:10.400 he ended
00:41:10.800 up getting
00:41:11.140 arrested
00:41:11.480 later on
00:41:11.880 it's all
00:41:12.200 public
00:41:12.480 information
00:41:12.880 you can
00:41:13.140 literally
00:41:13.380 look it
00:41:13.720 up
00:41:13.920 he ended
00:41:14.400 up getting
00:41:14.680 arrested
00:41:14.980 for stealing
00:41:15.620 people's
00:41:15.980 identities
00:41:16.380 to gamble
00:41:16.900 he had
00:41:17.140 a gambling
00:41:17.440 problem
00:41:17.880 and I
00:41:19.160 was shocked
00:41:19.800 yeah
00:41:20.180 yeah
00:41:21.200 the guy
00:41:21.600 was
00:41:21.860 he had
00:41:23.200 a gambling
00:41:23.520 problem
00:41:23.920 yeah
00:41:24.580 yeah
00:41:25.620 so the
00:41:26.260 guy was
00:41:26.520 former
00:41:26.740 board patrol
00:41:27.240 worked for
00:41:29.300 North Carolina
00:41:30.540 Sheriff's
00:41:31.060 Office
00:41:31.380 right
00:41:31.780 in North
00:41:33.780 Carolina
00:41:34.200 he ended
00:41:35.560 up becoming
00:41:35.920 an HSI
00:41:36.380 special agent
00:41:37.020 right
00:41:37.740 so he had
00:41:38.080 been in law
00:41:38.460 enforcement
00:41:38.680 for like 10
00:41:39.240 or 15
00:41:39.620 years
00:41:39.900 got on the
00:41:40.320 job with
00:41:40.640 us
00:41:40.940 and
00:41:41.860 next thing
00:41:43.100 I know
00:41:43.540 right
00:41:43.920 when I'm
00:41:44.220 here in
00:41:44.440 Miami
00:41:44.740 as an
00:41:45.540 agent
00:41:45.800 I find
00:41:46.340 out
00:41:46.580 that he
00:41:47.180 gets
00:41:47.380 arrested
00:41:47.700 by the
00:41:48.220 FBI
00:41:48.540 for
00:41:49.540 like stealing
00:41:50.740 dead
00:41:51.040 people's
00:41:51.340 identities
00:41:51.760 and he
00:41:52.440 dead
00:41:52.680 people
00:41:53.140 dead
00:41:53.480 people's
00:41:53.820 identities
00:41:54.100 yeah
00:41:54.380 and the
00:41:56.540 reason why
00:41:56.860 he did
00:41:57.160 that
00:41:57.460 was so
00:41:58.040 that he
00:41:58.300 can open
00:41:59.400 credit lines
00:42:00.200 on their
00:42:00.760 names
00:42:01.120 to get
00:42:01.720 money to
00:42:02.060 gamble
00:42:02.320 yeah
00:42:03.620 crazy
00:42:04.760 crazy
00:42:06.000 I was
00:42:06.860 literally
00:42:07.380 shocked
00:42:07.840 I was
00:42:08.120 like what
00:42:08.440 I spent
00:42:08.980 hours with
00:42:10.000 this dude
00:42:10.360 we used to
00:42:11.000 pause
00:42:11.340 he used to
00:42:12.640 help me
00:42:12.820 with my
00:42:13.060 cases
00:42:13.420 I remember
00:42:14.100 we used
00:42:14.380 to go
00:42:14.560 and respond
00:42:15.060 at 2
00:42:16.420 3 o'clock
00:42:16.860 in the
00:42:17.080 morning
00:42:17.280 anytime
00:42:17.600 there was
00:42:17.900 a case
00:42:18.280 you know
00:42:19.640 he helped
00:42:19.980 me with
00:42:20.340 he helped
00:42:21.120 me with
00:42:21.420 like
00:42:21.640 because
00:42:21.960 I was
00:42:22.400 he helped
00:42:23.020 me with
00:42:23.240 writing
00:42:23.400 reports
00:42:23.840 that was
00:42:24.120 like when
00:42:24.360 I was
00:42:24.560 a brand
00:42:24.840 new agent
00:42:25.280 he taught
00:42:27.200 me a lot
00:42:28.160 so
00:42:28.420 right
00:42:30.000 because he
00:42:31.500 was a
00:42:31.720 task force
00:42:32.100 officer at
00:42:32.580 the time
00:42:32.860 and then
00:42:33.440 he ended
00:42:33.660 up becoming
00:42:33.980 a special
00:42:34.360 agent
00:42:34.560 after I
00:42:35.120 went to
00:42:35.480 Miami
00:42:35.760 so it
00:42:37.000 was
00:42:37.140 yeah
00:42:38.000 because he
00:42:38.440 was a
00:42:38.580 task force
00:42:38.920 officer
00:42:39.160 working for
00:42:40.100 HSI
00:42:40.580 then he
00:42:41.100 became an
00:42:41.520 agent
00:42:41.820 when I
00:42:42.400 went to
00:42:42.660 Miami
00:42:42.920 and then
00:42:43.280 I heard
00:42:43.860 that he
00:42:44.060 got jammed
00:42:44.520 up
00:42:44.700 like 4
00:42:45.700 years later
00:42:46.180 after
00:42:46.480 like 2
00:42:48.340 or 3
00:42:48.600 years after
00:42:48.980 I left
00:42:49.380 so
00:42:50.180 that's
00:42:50.500 crazy
00:42:50.840 what a
00:42:51.240 coincidence
00:42:51.480 and people
00:42:51.980 will say
00:42:52.560 that this
00:42:53.000 girl
00:42:53.260 was the
00:42:54.000 same
00:42:54.280 like nobody
00:42:54.840 will imagine
00:42:55.640 that she
00:42:56.160 was a
00:42:56.480 spy
00:42:56.660 yeah
00:42:57.020 and I
00:42:57.900 know
00:42:58.040 because
00:42:58.240 like some
00:42:58.540 people might
00:42:58.800 say like
00:42:59.140 oh yeah
00:42:59.480 this is all
00:43:00.440 for a show
00:43:00.860 or whatever
00:43:01.160 no guys
00:43:01.560 it really
00:43:01.840 does hit
00:43:02.180 deep
00:43:02.420 sometimes
00:43:02.900 like you
00:43:03.380 think you
00:43:03.800 know someone
00:43:04.440 and then
00:43:05.560 you spend
00:43:06.180 hours with
00:43:06.560 this individual
00:43:07.000 you meet
00:43:07.260 their family
00:43:07.680 you go to
00:43:07.940 the barbecues
00:43:08.500 you hang
00:43:09.080 out with
00:43:09.380 them
00:43:09.560 you get
00:43:10.000 to know
00:43:10.320 them
00:43:10.540 you know
00:43:10.780 their children
00:43:11.260 your kids
00:43:11.620 go to
00:43:11.840 school
00:43:12.000 together
00:43:12.360 you know
00:43:12.960 what I
00:43:13.100 mean
00:43:13.240 like
00:43:13.540 you build
00:43:15.060 these formations
00:43:15.620 then you
00:43:15.920 find out
00:43:16.240 that they're
00:43:16.540 a criminal
00:43:16.860 or you
00:43:17.140 find out
00:43:17.460 something
00:43:17.640 it's
00:43:17.900 that you
00:43:18.200 don't
00:43:18.660 believe
00:43:18.920 it sends
00:43:19.580 shockwaves
00:43:20.080 throughout the
00:43:20.460 entire agency
00:43:20.980 everyone is
00:43:21.580 talking
00:43:21.840 right
00:43:22.760 that's crazy
00:43:23.380 they wear
00:43:23.720 Hannah Montana
00:43:24.180 all the time
00:43:24.840 like double life
00:43:25.800 and everything
00:43:26.300 exactly
00:43:26.800 and that's
00:43:27.340 that's what it
00:43:27.720 is like
00:43:27.960 the shock
00:43:28.340 and the betrayal
00:43:28.800 is really
00:43:29.160 like the biggest
00:43:29.700 thing
00:43:29.940 so of course
00:43:30.660 so and I
00:43:31.920 felt that
00:43:32.400 so I
00:43:32.820 understand where
00:43:34.180 he's coming
00:43:34.580 from with
00:43:35.240 with like the
00:43:35.800 shock
00:43:36.120 and then to
00:43:38.060 be suspected
00:43:38.700 of a crime
00:43:39.160 like treason
00:43:39.700 holy
00:43:40.180 that second
00:43:48.240 I saw her
00:43:48.920 and this
00:43:49.480 woman was a
00:43:50.080 hard worker
00:43:50.460 you guys are
00:43:50.800 going to see
00:43:51.040 here in a
00:43:51.340 second which
00:43:51.740 is what
00:43:52.000 caused even
00:43:52.420 more shock
00:43:52.920 she wasn't
00:43:53.320 like a bum
00:43:53.860 you know
00:43:54.300 what I mean
00:43:54.480 she wasn't
00:43:54.800 a slug
00:43:55.200 I said
00:43:58.280 oh shit
00:44:00.200 because I
00:44:01.800 knew that
00:44:02.280 Anna at
00:44:02.940 that time
00:44:03.440 was the
00:44:03.840 queen of
00:44:04.140 Cuba
00:44:04.380 she was
00:44:04.880 the senior
00:44:05.800 Cuba
00:44:06.180 analyst
00:44:06.580 in the
00:44:06.860 entire
00:44:07.160 US
00:44:07.680 intelligence
00:44:08.100 community
00:44:08.640 so she
00:44:12.120 had
00:44:12.520 access
00:44:13.300 to a lot
00:44:14.420 of
00:44:14.560 information
00:44:15.280 Anna
00:44:16.760 Montes
00:44:17.160 had
00:44:17.480 probably
00:44:18.040 more
00:44:18.440 time
00:44:19.060 invested
00:44:19.600 in
00:44:20.140 the
00:44:20.540 study
00:44:20.860 of
00:44:21.080 political
00:44:21.420 military
00:44:21.880 affairs
00:44:22.420 regarding
00:44:22.840 Cuba
00:44:23.220 than
00:44:23.640 anybody
00:44:23.960 else
00:44:24.360 Anna's
00:44:24.980 security
00:44:25.580 clearance
00:44:25.960 was
00:44:26.360 top
00:44:26.920 secret
00:44:27.280 with
00:44:28.260 access
00:44:28.660 to
00:44:29.000 special
00:44:29.340 intelligence
00:44:29.880 this
00:44:30.680 stuff
00:44:30.920 is
00:44:31.080 so
00:44:31.260 extraordinarily
00:44:31.840 sensitive
00:44:32.440 that
00:44:32.680 only
00:44:32.880 handful
00:44:33.280 of
00:44:33.480 people
00:44:33.680 would
00:44:33.880 be
00:44:34.120 given
00:44:34.400 access
00:44:34.740 to
00:44:35.040 yeah
00:44:35.900 guys
00:44:36.120 so
00:44:36.280 she
00:44:36.560 had
00:44:37.020 a
00:44:38.660 clearance
00:44:39.040 that
00:44:39.580 is
00:44:40.460 pretty
00:44:41.120 much
00:44:41.580 at
00:44:42.720 top
00:44:43.060 level
00:44:43.280 stuff
00:44:43.640 like
00:44:44.360 literally
00:44:44.680 top
00:44:45.000 level
00:44:45.200 stuff
00:44:45.500 we're
00:44:45.720 talking
00:44:45.940 about
00:44:46.220 only
00:44:46.660 a
00:44:47.220 handful
00:44:47.500 of
00:44:47.700 people
00:44:48.040 right
00:44:48.560 like
00:44:48.760 he's
00:44:48.960 saying
00:44:49.100 right
00:44:49.260 now
00:44:49.480 have
00:44:50.140 access
00:44:50.460 to
00:44:50.700 it
00:44:50.880 and
00:44:51.300 even
00:44:51.580 more
00:44:51.840 so
00:44:52.120 you
00:44:52.620 need
00:44:52.840 like
00:44:53.060 an
00:44:53.240 extreme
00:44:53.760 need
00:44:54.340 to
00:44:54.500 know
00:44:54.720 to
00:44:54.880 be
00:44:55.020 able
00:44:55.140 to
00:44:55.320 even
00:44:55.860 get
00:44:56.100 read
00:44:56.400 into
00:44:56.600 this
00:44:56.780 type
00:44:56.960 of
00:44:57.120 information
00:44:57.600 someone
00:45:01.520 in
00:45:01.720 honest
00:45:02.020 position
00:45:02.520 could
00:45:03.160 cause
00:45:03.680 exceptionally
00:45:04.600 grave
00:45:05.460 damage
00:45:06.320 to our
00:45:06.760 collective
00:45:07.060 security
00:45:07.580 and she
00:45:08.020 could do
00:45:08.420 that
00:45:08.780 in a
00:45:09.280 moment
00:45:09.620 which
00:45:10.660 means
00:45:11.100 a greater
00:45:12.020 possibility
00:45:12.620 that our
00:45:13.260 war fighters
00:45:13.920 who are
00:45:14.940 our
00:45:15.460 boys and
00:45:16.540 girls
00:45:16.980 will die
00:45:17.840 that's why
00:45:19.580 this is not
00:45:20.060 a game
00:45:20.520 I
00:45:22.620 actually
00:45:22.980 went
00:45:23.200 in
00:45:23.400 shock
00:45:24.180 and
00:45:25.600 remember
00:45:26.460 guys
00:45:26.880 DIA
00:45:27.320 is
00:45:27.640 responsible
00:45:28.160 for
00:45:28.500 military
00:45:29.160 intelligence
00:45:29.740 so
00:45:30.740 he's not
00:45:31.620 kidding
00:45:31.780 around
00:45:32.020 when he
00:45:32.240 says
00:45:32.440 that
00:45:32.700 there's
00:45:33.380 grave
00:45:33.680 consequences
00:45:34.400 when you're
00:45:35.160 releasing
00:45:35.460 information
00:45:36.020 like this
00:45:36.500 because it
00:45:36.980 literally
00:45:37.260 releases
00:45:37.840 where
00:45:38.640 positions
00:45:40.540 might be
00:45:41.020 held
00:45:41.280 where
00:45:41.640 bases
00:45:41.980 might
00:45:42.220 be
00:45:42.520 covert
00:45:43.080 operations
00:45:43.620 that are
00:45:43.880 occurring
00:45:44.220 like
00:45:44.700 this is
00:45:45.120 very
00:45:45.680 bad
00:45:46.200 okay
00:45:46.940 very
00:45:47.780 very
00:45:48.340 bad
00:45:48.800 and it
00:45:49.360 compromises
00:45:49.920 U.S.
00:45:50.440 soldiers
00:45:50.740 abroad
00:45:51.240 that
00:45:52.120 woman
00:45:52.500 I
00:45:53.200 realized
00:45:53.880 I'm
00:45:54.740 the only
00:45:55.060 guy
00:45:55.540 outside
00:45:56.300 of
00:45:56.500 Havana
00:45:56.940 who
00:45:58.380 knew
00:45:58.580 that
00:45:58.800 Ana
00:45:59.060 Montes
00:45:59.560 was
00:45:59.880 a
00:46:00.360 major
00:46:00.600 spot
00:46:01.080 now
00:46:07.040 this
00:46:07.460 was
00:46:07.740 not
00:46:07.980 the
00:46:08.200 first
00:46:08.420 time
00:46:08.760 that
00:46:08.980 I
00:46:09.080 had
00:46:09.200 seen
00:46:09.400 Ana
00:46:09.640 Montes
00:46:10.040 his
00:46:10.240 name
00:46:10.540 I
00:46:11.400 had
00:46:11.560 other
00:46:11.820 interactions
00:46:12.320 with
00:46:12.640 Ana
00:46:12.920 and
00:46:13.920 during
00:46:14.180 the
00:46:14.360 course
00:46:14.620 of
00:46:14.780 those
00:46:14.980 interactions
00:46:15.460 with
00:46:15.760 her
00:46:15.920 I
00:46:16.160 developed
00:46:16.500 a gut
00:46:16.900 feeling
00:46:17.340 that
00:46:18.100 there
00:46:18.260 was
00:46:18.420 something
00:46:18.820 wrong
00:46:19.540 and
00:46:20.040 suspicious
00:46:20.500 about
00:46:21.120 this
00:46:21.340 woman
00:46:21.640 and so
00:46:22.260 when I
00:46:22.580 saw her
00:46:22.980 name
00:46:23.240 again
00:46:23.740 I
00:46:25.300 knew
00:46:25.560 that
00:46:26.740 she
00:46:27.040 was
00:46:27.380 the
00:46:27.560 spy
00:46:27.860 that
00:46:28.160 they
00:46:28.280 were
00:46:28.420 looking
00:46:28.640 for
00:46:29.000 four
00:46:31.000 years
00:46:31.340 earlier
00:46:31.680 in
00:46:31.860 April
00:46:32.100 1996
00:46:32.880 one
00:46:33.480 of our
00:46:33.720 employees
00:46:34.200 Reg
00:46:34.560 Brown
00:46:34.960 came
00:46:35.940 to me
00:46:36.360 expressing
00:46:37.260 concerns
00:46:37.840 about
00:46:38.120 Ana
00:46:38.360 he
00:46:38.780 said
00:46:39.160 her
00:46:39.920 actions
00:46:40.460 during
00:46:40.800 a
00:46:40.940 specific
00:46:41.300 incident
00:46:41.760 caused
00:46:42.160 me
00:46:42.300 great
00:46:42.540 concern
00:46:43.140 give
00:46:43.880 me
00:46:43.960 three
00:46:44.860 two
00:46:45.080 one
00:46:45.380 okay
00:46:45.900 ladies
00:46:48.020 and gentlemen
00:46:48.360 I have
00:46:48.720 just been
00:46:49.200 briefed
00:46:50.940 that
00:46:51.620 Clinton
00:46:51.920 era
00:46:52.180 if you
00:46:52.400 guys
00:46:52.580 know
00:46:52.700 what I'm
00:46:52.880 saying
00:46:53.140 good old
00:46:54.760 days
00:46:55.100 I did
00:46:55.760 not have
00:46:56.240 sex
00:46:56.540 with that
00:46:56.880 woman
00:46:57.240 by the
00:46:58.120 national security
00:46:58.840 advisor
00:46:59.280 on the
00:47:00.260 shooting
00:47:00.520 down
00:47:00.900 today
00:47:01.500 two
00:47:02.560 American
00:47:02.980 civilian
00:47:03.440 airplanes
00:47:03.940 by Cuban
00:47:04.640 military
00:47:05.260 aircraft
00:47:05.880 on the
00:47:06.800 24th of
00:47:07.380 February
00:47:07.860 1996
00:47:08.760 the Cuban
00:47:10.100 military
00:47:10.720 shot down
00:47:11.640 two
00:47:11.960 aircraft
00:47:12.600 operated
00:47:13.160 by a
00:47:13.740 Cuban
00:47:13.960 emigrant
00:47:14.340 group
00:47:14.800 it's called
00:47:15.280 Brothers
00:47:15.660 to the
00:47:16.020 Rescue
00:47:16.360 two
00:47:17.780 civilian
00:47:18.180 aircraft
00:47:18.720 piloted
00:47:19.420 by a
00:47:20.320 total
00:47:20.540 of three
00:47:20.900 American
00:47:21.200 citizens
00:47:21.800 were shot
00:47:22.480 down
00:47:22.780 in
00:47:22.960 international
00:47:23.580 airspace
00:47:24.240 by Cuban
00:47:24.800 mates
00:47:25.240 that was
00:47:31.280 the murder
00:47:31.660 of
00:47:32.020 three
00:47:33.060 American
00:47:33.340 citizens
00:47:33.860 now
00:47:35.760 in
00:47:36.400 response
00:47:36.860 to the
00:47:37.200 shoot
00:47:37.440 down
00:47:37.780 the
00:47:38.020 United
00:47:38.240 States
00:47:38.460 government
00:47:38.900 scrambled
00:47:39.440 to
00:47:39.860 figure
00:47:40.180 out
00:47:40.440 what
00:47:40.620 had
00:47:40.740 happened
00:47:41.080 and
00:47:41.320 how
00:47:41.500 we
00:47:41.700 might
00:47:41.920 respond
00:47:42.420 one
00:47:43.280 of
00:47:43.380 the
00:47:43.440 first
00:47:43.620 people
00:47:43.960 that
00:47:44.140 the
00:47:44.260 Pentagon
00:47:44.520 called
00:47:45.100 in
00:47:45.280 as
00:47:45.500 an
00:47:45.660 expert
00:47:46.000 to
00:47:46.280 advise
00:47:46.700 them
00:47:46.960 was
00:47:47.540 Anamontis
00:47:48.960 well that's not good
00:47:53.480 you're about to have a spy
00:47:54.820 brief
00:47:55.500 the president
00:47:56.440 is hot brass
00:47:57.180 in that circumstance
00:48:03.460 when the Pentagon
00:48:04.400 calls you
00:48:05.420 in
00:48:05.860 you must
00:48:06.440 stay in place
00:48:07.500 until you
00:48:08.340 are dismissed
00:48:09.000 doesn't matter how long
00:48:10.240 if you're in there for two months
00:48:11.640 you stay there
00:48:12.740 until our senior military leaders
00:48:15.740 no longer have a need for your expertise
00:48:18.640 Reg Brown called the Pentagon
00:48:20.840 shortly after 8pm that night
00:48:23.120 just to ask Ana a question
00:48:24.800 but she left
00:48:26.560 and he thought
00:48:27.760 that's odd
00:48:28.560 Reg thought that her actions
00:48:32.720 in leaving the Pentagon early
00:48:34.400 was suspicious
00:48:35.640 she ran out of there
00:48:38.660 and gave those secrets
00:48:39.440 right to the Cubans
00:48:40.280 guys
00:48:40.580 that's how deep
00:48:41.720 espionage can run
00:48:42.600 sometimes guys
00:48:43.160 and that's why
00:48:43.680 there's such
00:48:44.620 serious punishments
00:48:45.920 for it
00:48:46.460 literally this woman
00:48:47.440 is briefing people
00:48:48.420 that could influence
00:48:49.960 world wars
00:48:51.320 the president
00:48:52.580 his
00:48:52.900 you know
00:48:53.320 his team
00:48:53.820 terrible
00:48:54.860 and these are some
00:48:58.360 of the reach
00:48:59.200 the level of reach
00:49:00.700 and circumstances
00:49:01.800 that could come into play
00:49:02.760 when you're dealing
00:49:03.480 with a spy
00:49:03.860 that has a lot of access
00:49:05.080 and a high security clearance
00:49:06.140 and is a subject matter expert
00:49:08.340 in the place
00:49:09.440 that they're stationed in
00:49:10.500 and
00:49:11.020 selling secrets
00:49:12.700 from
00:49:13.200 so the first thing I did
00:49:19.620 is I took a look
00:49:20.300 at our own records
00:49:21.200 everybody at DIA
00:49:22.680 has a personnel file
00:49:23.760 everybody has a security file
00:49:25.680 I reviewed
00:49:27.300 our files
00:49:28.380 on Ana Montes
00:49:29.220 and what I found
00:49:30.040 was
00:49:30.380 an absolutely
00:49:31.060 model employee
00:49:32.260 Ana
00:49:34.540 she had been working
00:49:35.460 at DIA
00:49:36.160 since 1985
00:49:37.400 and
00:49:38.320 she'd never committed
00:49:39.100 a security violation
00:49:39.860 she rose to the ranks
00:49:41.120 very quickly
00:49:41.920 lived very much
00:49:43.180 modestly
00:49:43.660 she was the kind
00:49:44.860 of employee
00:49:45.460 that supervisors
00:49:47.100 hold up
00:49:47.700 for others to emulate
00:49:48.780 so
00:49:49.700 the assessment
00:49:50.580 that Ana might be a spy
00:49:52.240 just didn't make
00:49:54.440 a lot of sense
00:49:55.220 yeah
00:49:56.360 when you're a good worker
00:49:57.200 that's when it hits
00:49:57.880 really deep
00:49:58.360 nevertheless
00:50:01.540 I decided to
00:50:03.440 interview her
00:50:04.220 and
00:50:05.560 Ana gave me
00:50:06.560 great answers
00:50:07.540 to most of my questions
00:50:09.000 but then when I started
00:50:10.600 questioning her about
00:50:11.600 so guys
00:50:12.320 just so you know
00:50:12.760 more than likely
00:50:13.320 this interview
00:50:13.880 was one of these
00:50:14.500 like administrative
00:50:15.180 voluntary interviews
00:50:16.160 which honestly
00:50:17.660 happens quite a bit
00:50:19.180 anytime like there's
00:50:20.080 some potential misconduct
00:50:21.020 and it's their way
00:50:21.680 of kind of like
00:50:22.080 fishing for information
00:50:22.820 before like opening
00:50:23.560 a full-fledged
00:50:24.800 criminal investigation
00:50:25.620 which is where
00:50:26.160 the FBI came in
00:50:27.040 just going home
00:50:29.660 and did anybody see you
00:50:31.860 her entire demeanor
00:50:33.640 changed
00:50:34.220 one minute
00:50:38.300 we're joking and laughing
00:50:39.560 and having a good time
00:50:40.500 and the next minute
00:50:41.460 she is scared to death
00:50:43.320 that I know something
00:50:44.580 that she did
00:50:45.380 and I had no idea
00:50:47.280 what it was
00:50:48.000 I didn't know
00:50:49.200 what was going on
00:50:50.080 but I walked away
00:50:51.200 from that situation
00:50:52.120 with a gut feeling
00:50:53.380 that she was hiding
00:50:55.040 something from me
00:50:55.980 that was very important
00:50:57.060 to her
00:50:57.460 and that gut feeling
00:50:58.640 played a major role
00:51:00.400 four years later
00:51:01.780 in September of 2000
00:51:03.860 when her name
00:51:04.640 popped up
00:51:05.140 on that screen
00:51:05.840 and so I contacted
00:51:09.920 the FBI
00:51:10.460 I met with them
00:51:11.820 I told them
00:51:12.620 look I've got an employee
00:51:13.680 who I think is your suspect
00:51:14.920 the FBI had yet
00:51:16.620 additional data
00:51:17.980 that they were employing
00:51:19.540 to measure suspects
00:51:20.880 new information
00:51:21.900 which I had not
00:51:23.260 previously possessed
00:51:24.620 and I refer to it
00:51:26.500 as a template
00:51:27.120 Onomatis did not match up
00:51:29.520 against that template
00:51:30.680 at all
00:51:31.300 the FBI told me
00:51:33.000 that well on the basis
00:51:33.800 of this information alone
00:51:34.960 I can eliminate your employee
00:51:36.100 as a suspect
00:51:36.640 in this case
00:51:37.340 and they obviously
00:51:38.720 had a lot of confidence
00:51:39.780 in the validity
00:51:40.520 of this new information
00:51:41.920 they used it
00:51:43.220 as a trump card on me
00:51:44.460 from the time
00:51:50.600 I left the meeting
00:51:52.060 until the time
00:51:53.240 I took the elevator ride
00:51:54.360 downstairs
00:51:54.940 and I found myself
00:51:56.060 literally out on the curb
00:51:57.540 I knew that
00:51:58.940 Anna was at work
00:51:59.900 three miles south
00:52:01.020 in our headquarters building
00:52:02.220 I could just
00:52:04.940 picture her
00:52:05.480 in my mind's eye
00:52:06.380 because that woman
00:52:07.920 was in my building
00:52:09.380 pulling this crap
00:52:10.640 on my watch
00:52:11.860 placing our entire
00:52:13.040 nation's future
00:52:14.000 yeah as an OIG guy
00:52:15.600 like it's kind of
00:52:16.280 embarrassing to have
00:52:17.120 someone in the building
00:52:18.960 that's kind of like
00:52:19.600 under your jurisdiction
00:52:20.320 for any type of
00:52:21.620 administrative
00:52:22.080 or even criminal conduct
00:52:23.120 doing this stuff
00:52:24.540 at risk
00:52:26.080 she was going to get
00:52:27.180 the hell out of there
00:52:28.000 now I needed the FBI
00:52:30.120 to be able to make
00:52:31.180 that happen
00:52:31.660 so I did
00:52:32.800 and the reason
00:52:34.100 for that guys
00:52:34.660 because the FBI
00:52:35.280 is the lead agency
00:52:36.000 when it comes to
00:52:36.540 terrorism and
00:52:36.960 counterintelligence
00:52:37.560 if he tried to
00:52:38.480 bring this case
00:52:38.960 over to the
00:52:39.440 U.S. Attorney's Office
00:52:40.260 aka the federal
00:52:40.940 prosecutors
00:52:41.320 they would probably
00:52:42.300 tell him
00:52:42.600 why isn't the FBI
00:52:43.360 on this
00:52:43.700 and they probably
00:52:44.080 wouldn't take
00:52:44.360 his case seriously
00:52:44.940 because OIG's
00:52:46.120 guys typically
00:52:46.720 9 out of 10 times
00:52:47.720 do admin
00:52:48.680 or very low level
00:52:49.840 criminal type
00:52:50.360 investigations on
00:52:51.020 employees
00:52:51.400 you know
00:52:51.980 your basic
00:52:52.440 false statements
00:52:53.240 you get a DUI
00:52:55.200 and they gotta jam you up
00:52:56.060 with like 30 days
00:52:56.700 on a beach or something
00:52:57.400 but very rarely
00:52:58.640 do they do any type
00:52:59.460 of sexy criminal
00:53:00.460 cases on their own
00:53:01.400 they almost always
00:53:02.560 have to include
00:53:03.100 another agency
00:53:03.720 because their
00:53:04.480 authorities are very
00:53:05.080 limited
00:53:05.360 we are going to
00:53:06.900 persuade the FBI
00:53:07.900 that Ana Montes
00:53:09.120 was
00:53:09.420 and a lot of the
00:53:10.260 time the AUSA
00:53:11.460 won't even take
00:53:11.940 a case from you
00:53:12.580 if it's something
00:53:13.680 that's like
00:53:14.180 another agency's
00:53:15.480 main mission
00:53:16.720 if that makes sense
00:53:17.460 so U.S. Attorney's
00:53:18.980 Office doesn't take
00:53:19.520 OIG seriously
00:53:20.180 because they don't
00:53:20.580 bring that many
00:53:21.000 cases a year
00:53:21.940 in general
00:53:22.340 the spy
00:53:23.540 that they were
00:53:24.080 looking for
00:53:24.660 and I realized
00:53:26.120 that I had to
00:53:26.860 attack the Trump
00:53:27.840 car
00:53:28.100 the next morning
00:53:39.280 on a Saturday
00:53:40.060 the 14th of October
00:53:41.260 of 2000
00:53:42.240 I got up
00:53:43.540 I couldn't sleep
00:53:44.980 very well
00:53:45.440 I was so upset
00:53:47.020 about the Trump
00:53:48.520 card
00:53:48.860 because
00:53:49.740 what I knew
00:53:50.740 about Ana
00:53:51.200 did not match up
00:53:52.060 against that
00:53:52.680 new information
00:53:53.840 at all
00:53:54.660 but
00:53:55.320 I knew
00:53:56.240 that she was
00:53:57.360 the agent
00:53:58.020 they were
00:53:58.320 looking for
00:53:58.920 it was her
00:53:59.860 I never doubted
00:54:01.020 my intuition
00:54:01.680 the next day
00:54:08.160 I spent most
00:54:09.320 of the day
00:54:09.960 examining their
00:54:10.880 Trump card
00:54:11.400 and I discovered
00:54:13.560 something
00:54:14.080 I discovered
00:54:17.920 a pattern
00:54:18.420 that I recognized
00:54:20.240 from something
00:54:22.280 that I learned
00:54:23.060 in an 8th grade
00:54:23.900 statistics
00:54:24.760 math class
00:54:25.880 and my math
00:54:27.260 instructor told us
00:54:28.340 if you ever
00:54:29.280 see this pattern
00:54:30.180 you need to
00:54:31.940 understand that
00:54:32.680 the fix is in
00:54:33.600 somebody is
00:54:35.140 manipulating the data
00:54:36.320 in order to get
00:54:36.900 the outcome
00:54:37.360 that you're looking at
00:54:38.240 and I saw a pattern
00:54:40.180 which I knew
00:54:41.200 could never occur
00:54:42.540 in a random world
00:54:43.680 can't happen
00:54:45.060 it had to be
00:54:45.820 the Cubans
00:54:46.360 the FBI
00:54:47.820 was using
00:54:48.300 a trump card
00:54:49.000 that was
00:54:49.620 being manipulated
00:54:51.120 they didn't know it
00:54:53.540 and so
00:54:56.440 at that moment
00:54:57.200 I realized
00:54:58.620 that I had
00:54:59.380 cracked the trump card
00:55:00.420 I wrote up
00:55:03.380 an 8 page memo
00:55:04.900 and the next morning
00:55:06.600 I faxed the 8 page
00:55:07.920 memo to the FBI
00:55:09.240 about an hour later
00:55:11.200 the FBI case agent
00:55:12.560 Steve McCoy
00:55:13.260 called me
00:55:14.000 and the first thing
00:55:15.660 he said
00:55:16.160 was
00:55:16.900 Scott I think
00:55:18.320 we've gotten off
00:55:18.960 on the wrong foot
00:55:19.740 talk about a change
00:55:22.860 of heart
00:55:23.240 and FBI does that
00:55:25.460 all the time man
00:55:26.180 unless you can help them
00:55:27.080 they don't mess with you man
00:55:27.960 you know they're very
00:55:29.020 dismissive to other agencies
00:55:30.200 a lot of
00:55:30.620 you know superiority
00:55:31.920 superiority complex
00:55:33.600 with them
00:55:34.000 I think we're going to be
00:55:36.040 working together
00:55:36.620 for a while
00:55:37.280 and I was relieved
00:55:39.180 the only way
00:55:40.360 we were going to be
00:55:41.000 successful
00:55:41.500 is to work together
00:55:42.820 and it was at that moment
00:55:44.260 I knew
00:55:46.380 we were going to be okay
00:55:48.080 one of the things
00:55:52.420 that the FBI
00:55:53.160 did
00:55:54.000 was to
00:55:54.780 assign
00:55:55.600 a co-case agent
00:55:56.880 by the name of
00:55:57.500 Pete Lapp
00:55:58.080 so the first time
00:56:01.360 I heard the name
00:56:01.960 Adam Montez
00:56:02.580 was at our squad
00:56:03.460 Christmas party
00:56:04.180 in 2000
00:56:04.680 I knew
00:56:05.800 the FBI
00:56:06.440 had gotten a name
00:56:08.060 of suspect
00:56:08.640 someone who may have
00:56:09.880 matched one of these
00:56:10.800 unsub cases
00:56:11.820 as we call them
00:56:12.640 so I talked to
00:56:13.980 Steve McCoy
00:56:14.580 the senior case agent
00:56:15.740 and I said
00:56:16.180 hey I hear you're
00:56:16.780 working this neat case
00:56:17.820 and you have a name
00:56:18.660 you know
00:56:19.420 I'd love to
00:56:20.300 work with you on this
00:56:21.600 so he said
00:56:22.780 yeah sure
00:56:23.160 I'd really appreciate
00:56:24.080 your help
00:56:24.620 and from there
00:56:25.880 we worked the entire
00:56:27.000 case together
00:56:27.840 with Scott
00:56:28.460 it's important
00:56:32.800 to keep in mind
00:56:33.360 that the FBI
00:56:33.860 has to prove
00:56:34.820 these cases
00:56:35.420 you know
00:56:35.760 we're the lead
00:56:36.480 counterintelligence
00:56:37.520 agency for the United States
00:56:38.700 the Bureau
00:56:40.140 is going to be
00:56:40.700 the organization
00:56:41.400 that brings charges
00:56:42.540 against someone
00:56:43.140 for espionage
00:56:43.800 so there's a lot
00:56:44.360 of pressure on us
00:56:45.460 to get it right
00:56:46.700 knowing someone
00:56:48.200 is guilty
00:56:49.140 of espionage
00:56:50.000 is fundamentally
00:56:51.160 different than
00:56:51.940 proving
00:56:52.520 that someone's
00:56:53.920 guilty of espionage
00:56:54.960 so
00:56:56.260 and that's
00:56:57.440 absolute fact
00:56:58.140 guys
00:56:58.340 remember
00:56:58.600 it's not what
00:56:59.060 you know
00:56:59.300 it's what
00:56:59.600 you can prove
00:57:00.140 and when it
00:57:00.500 comes to espionage
00:57:01.180 and the stakes
00:57:01.580 are high
00:57:01.940 the police
00:57:02.780 have to cross
00:57:03.300 every T
00:57:03.900 dot every I
00:57:04.920 because there's
00:57:05.460 serious time in this
00:57:06.200 and
00:57:06.700 the feds don't
00:57:08.060 lose
00:57:08.280 you know
00:57:08.520 AUSAs are very
00:57:09.160 picky on what
00:57:09.600 they take
00:57:09.980 let's validate
00:57:18.500 Scott's claim
00:57:19.900 that she's
00:57:20.840 an agent
00:57:21.840 of a foreign
00:57:22.380 power
00:57:22.740 and in fact
00:57:23.460 who we're
00:57:23.960 looking for
00:57:24.640 and then
00:57:25.960 let's try
00:57:26.820 or catch her
00:57:27.380 in the act
00:57:27.980 of committing
00:57:28.580 espionage
00:57:29.240 national security
00:57:34.140 letters
00:57:34.440 are hugely
00:57:35.240 important tools
00:57:36.200 for the FBI
00:57:36.880 so a national
00:57:37.840 security letter
00:57:38.540 is a letter
00:57:39.060 that's issued
00:57:39.620 by the FBI
00:57:40.500 that compels
00:57:41.720 financial institutions
00:57:43.160 credit institutions
00:57:44.580 telephone companies
00:57:45.880 to relinquish
00:57:47.140 critical information
00:57:48.080 and once
00:57:49.320 Montez is
00:57:49.900 identified as
00:57:50.700 a suspect
00:57:51.180 we opened
00:57:52.100 a full
00:57:52.400 investigation
00:57:52.880 on her
00:57:53.500 it allowed us
00:57:54.500 the opportunity
00:57:55.060 to use
00:57:55.480 national security
00:57:56.180 letters
00:57:56.540 we had
00:57:58.140 very sensitive
00:57:58.860 intelligence
00:57:59.440 that told us
00:58:00.760 that the
00:58:01.200 unknown subject
00:58:02.240 had purchased
00:58:02.980 a specific
00:58:04.440 brand
00:58:05.120 make
00:58:05.660 and model
00:58:06.320 computer
00:58:06.840 at a specific
00:58:07.760 period of time
00:58:08.520 in 1996
00:58:09.360 from a store
00:58:10.340 in Alexandria
00:58:11.080 no further
00:58:12.360 information
00:58:12.960 through national
00:58:14.460 security letters
00:58:15.400 I identified
00:58:16.720 Ana's line
00:58:17.740 of credit
00:58:18.140 and from that
00:58:19.600 we knew
00:58:20.120 that Ana
00:58:20.640 had made a
00:58:21.240 purchase
00:58:21.500 to Comp USA
00:58:22.260 back in
00:58:22.960 October of
00:58:23.440 1996
00:58:23.960 this is insane
00:58:26.400 so in April
00:58:31.740 2001
00:58:32.400 we served
00:58:34.320 a national
00:58:34.720 security letter
00:58:35.400 at Comp USA
00:58:36.300 and asked them
00:58:37.740 could we identify
00:58:38.980 a specific
00:58:39.640 purchase made
00:58:40.580 here in
00:58:41.280 October of
00:58:42.000 1996
00:58:42.780 and they
00:58:44.920 said we
00:58:45.240 keep records
00:58:46.100 that far
00:58:47.000 back
00:58:47.380 behind the
00:58:48.060 store
00:58:48.320 and we
00:58:48.660 only keep
00:58:49.060 them for
00:58:49.420 about five
00:58:50.000 years
00:58:50.320 this was
00:58:51.080 April
00:58:51.460 2001
00:58:52.320 the records
00:58:52.960 were almost
00:58:53.480 destroyed
00:58:53.940 so we
00:58:57.140 pulled out
00:58:57.640 boxes
00:58:58.100 and about
00:58:58.900 20 minutes
00:58:59.540 after we
00:59:00.000 started
00:59:00.340 the system
00:59:00.980 manager
00:59:01.340 for Comp USA
00:59:02.140 said
00:59:02.620 is this
00:59:03.540 what you're
00:59:03.860 looking for
00:59:04.380 and in
00:59:06.000 fact
00:59:06.360 it was
00:59:07.180 the purchase
00:59:08.360 that Ana
00:59:08.860 made in
00:59:09.520 true name
00:59:09.980 for the
00:59:10.520 computer
00:59:10.840 that we
00:59:11.260 could prove
00:59:11.880 that the
00:59:12.760 Cubans
00:59:13.160 tasked her
00:59:13.740 to purchase
00:59:14.220 back in
00:59:14.720 October
00:59:15.040 of 1996
00:59:15.780 this sales
00:59:19.500 receipt
00:59:19.860 for this
00:59:20.260 computer
00:59:20.580 purchase
00:59:20.960 proved
00:59:21.580 that she
00:59:22.820 was in
00:59:23.240 fact
00:59:23.580 the
00:59:24.040 spy
00:59:24.340 so
00:59:25.960 from April
00:59:26.980 2001
00:59:27.620 I had no
00:59:28.280 doubts
00:59:28.600 that she
00:59:28.920 was a
00:59:29.400 Cuban
00:59:29.660 spy
00:59:30.000 the
00:59:30.560 question
00:59:30.840 was
00:59:31.100 was she
00:59:31.420 currently
00:59:31.940 spying
00:59:32.380 and could
00:59:33.620 we catch
00:59:34.040 her in
00:59:34.280 the act
00:59:34.780 of committing
00:59:35.340 espionage
00:59:35.980 this sales
00:59:47.580 receipt for
00:59:48.180 this
00:59:48.360 computer
00:59:48.680 purchase
00:59:49.060 proved
00:59:49.660 that she
00:59:50.920 was in
00:59:51.320 fact
00:59:51.680 the
00:59:52.120 spy
00:59:52.500 Ana
00:59:53.940 Montez
00:59:54.420 officially
00:59:54.980 became
00:59:55.580 the prime
00:59:56.420 suspect
00:59:56.860 of the
00:59:57.580 unknown
00:59:58.000 subject
00:59:58.500 investigation
00:59:59.260 now it's
01:00:00.360 just a matter
01:00:00.880 of proving
01:00:01.960 her
01:00:02.380 catching
01:00:03.420 her
01:00:03.640 in
01:00:03.820 the
01:00:03.980 act
01:00:04.500 of committing
01:00:05.500 espionage
01:00:06.120 we need
01:00:07.300 to get
01:00:07.480 her on
01:00:07.720 film
01:00:08.020 meeting
01:00:08.580 someone
01:00:08.980 uploading
01:00:09.960 intelligence
01:00:10.840 secrets
01:00:11.380 passing
01:00:11.800 encrypted
01:00:12.140 thumb
01:00:12.440 drive
01:00:12.780 that's
01:00:13.500 the
01:00:13.600 ultimate
01:00:13.820 threshold
01:00:14.320 court
01:00:14.800 worthy
01:00:15.080 evidence
01:00:15.560 that
01:00:15.740 will
01:00:15.860 convict
01:00:16.300 a
01:00:16.540 spy
01:00:16.900 at
01:00:20.760 this
01:00:20.940 point
01:00:21.120 guys
01:00:21.340 they're
01:00:21.480 doing
01:00:21.680 24-7
01:00:22.340 surveillance
01:00:22.860 wiretapping
01:00:23.440 all her
01:00:23.720 stuff
01:00:23.880 this is
01:00:24.220 a
01:00:24.420 huge
01:00:24.920 effort
01:00:25.340 and if
01:00:26.460 you
01:00:26.560 guys
01:00:26.740 have
01:00:26.880 covered
01:00:27.100 some
01:00:27.280 of
01:00:27.360 my
01:00:27.420 other
01:00:27.700 espionage
01:00:28.240 type
01:00:28.480 cases
01:00:28.920 breakdowns
01:00:29.460 as soon
01:00:30.620 as they
01:00:30.820 figure out
01:00:31.160 who the
01:00:31.360 person
01:00:31.600 is
01:00:31.920 is
01:00:32.540 24-7
01:00:33.240 everything's
01:00:33.980 tapped
01:00:34.200 you need
01:00:34.560 like
01:00:34.820 literally
01:00:35.320 round-the-clock
01:00:35.840 agents
01:00:36.200 and doing
01:00:36.620 24-7
01:00:37.200 surveillance
01:00:37.580 guys
01:00:37.840 is extremely
01:00:38.440 time-consuming
01:00:39.800 labor-intensive
01:00:41.160 and quite
01:00:42.300 frankly you
01:00:42.780 need
01:00:43.080 to do
01:00:44.220 an effective
01:00:45.140 24-hour
01:00:45.680 surveillance
01:00:45.980 on someone
01:00:46.440 to this
01:00:46.900 level
01:00:47.200 you probably
01:00:47.900 need at
01:00:48.200 least
01:00:48.360 20-30
01:00:48.840 guys
01:00:49.200 on the
01:00:49.600 team
01:00:49.840 rotating
01:00:50.520 in like
01:00:50.860 8-hour
01:00:51.180 shifts
01:00:51.520 so
01:00:52.460 it ain't
01:00:53.160 no joke
01:00:53.560 when you're
01:00:53.820 following
01:00:54.000 someone
01:00:54.180 around
01:00:54.360 that
01:00:54.520 much
01:00:54.860 so
01:00:56.780 one of
01:00:57.320 the
01:00:57.420 especially
01:00:58.360 someone like
01:00:59.140 this
01:00:59.320 you guys
01:00:59.640 gonna see
01:01:00.000 why it's
01:01:00.300 hard
01:01:00.440 in a
01:01:00.640 second
01:01:00.860 first things
01:01:01.540 we did
01:01:01.860 was request
01:01:02.540 physical
01:01:03.500 surveillance
01:01:03.960 resources
01:01:04.720 on her
01:01:05.240 we had
01:01:05.860 a lot
01:01:06.280 to do
01:01:06.760 you know
01:01:07.180 and physical
01:01:08.220 surveillance
01:01:08.860 guys is your
01:01:09.360 traditional
01:01:09.740 you know
01:01:10.100 sitting outside
01:01:11.000 the house
01:01:11.680 following her
01:01:12.920 into a mall
01:01:13.420 in like
01:01:13.960 plain clothes
01:01:14.600 like that's
01:01:15.280 like standard
01:01:15.740 physical
01:01:16.060 surveillance
01:01:16.420 old-fashioned
01:01:17.240 police work
01:01:17.860 FBI
01:01:18.680 put cameras
01:01:19.560 in her
01:01:20.240 cubicle
01:01:20.800 and microphones
01:01:21.760 and tapper
01:01:22.300 phones
01:01:22.760 and all that
01:01:23.580 sort of
01:01:23.840 then electronic
01:01:24.600 surveillance
01:01:25.060 is anything
01:01:25.540 with phones
01:01:26.880 wiretaps
01:01:27.620 email
01:01:28.340 pen
01:01:29.500 all that
01:01:30.180 stuff
01:01:30.440 is electronic
01:01:31.120 remember
01:01:32.120 this is 2001
01:01:32.960 so they're
01:01:33.380 using some
01:01:33.760 pretty sophisticated
01:01:34.320 equipment
01:01:34.880 for back
01:01:36.120 then
01:01:36.400 thank
01:01:37.440 we started
01:01:40.440 doing significant
01:01:41.400 physical
01:01:41.860 surveillance
01:01:42.460 on Montez
01:01:43.300 identifying
01:01:44.100 her patterns
01:01:44.960 of behavior
01:01:45.660 what was
01:01:46.220 her routine
01:01:47.020 so watching
01:01:49.200 Anna Montez
01:01:50.060 we saw that
01:01:51.160 for example
01:01:51.640 she would leave
01:01:52.300 her home
01:01:53.360 on Sundays
01:01:53.900 at a precise time
01:01:54.980 go to the local
01:01:56.380 metro
01:01:56.760 get on
01:01:57.380 go several stops
01:01:58.500 get off
01:01:59.520 walk
01:02:00.500 stop at
01:02:01.840 locations
01:02:02.620 wait 60 seconds
01:02:03.740 go somewhere else
01:02:04.540 wait 90 seconds
01:02:05.580 very methodical
01:02:06.940 things that
01:02:07.780 a normal person
01:02:08.660 doesn't
01:02:09.380 so from
01:02:09.960 a tradecraft
01:02:10.840 standpoint
01:02:11.240 you knew
01:02:11.740 something was
01:02:12.360 afoot
01:02:12.940 when her shoe
01:02:14.740 seemingly came untied
01:02:15.720 and she stopped
01:02:16.260 and tied it
01:02:16.780 was she really
01:02:17.880 tying her shoe
01:02:18.560 or was she doing
01:02:19.880 counter surveillance
01:02:20.620 or signaling someone
01:02:21.500 over the next
01:02:24.100 several months
01:02:24.900 the surveillance team
01:02:26.020 told us
01:02:26.560 we've got a pattern
01:02:27.720 now she's leaving
01:02:28.440 work at particular
01:02:29.660 times
01:02:30.060 she's following
01:02:30.900 a route
01:02:31.520 here's the route
01:02:32.600 she's going
01:02:33.560 in the drugstores
01:02:34.480 but she doesn't
01:02:36.400 come out with a bag
01:02:37.220 so what's she doing
01:02:38.480 in the stores
01:02:39.040 turns out
01:02:41.760 she was using
01:02:42.800 the pay phones
01:02:43.380 not too long
01:02:48.460 ago we had
01:02:48.860 pay phones
01:02:49.320 everywhere
01:02:49.680 and using
01:02:50.160 pay phones
01:02:50.580 was not
01:02:51.080 in and of itself
01:02:51.760 suspicious
01:02:52.260 but when you
01:02:52.800 have a cell phone
01:02:54.580 you have a home
01:02:56.400 phone
01:02:56.760 and when you
01:02:57.080 have phones
01:02:57.700 at your office
01:02:58.480 the fact that
01:02:59.200 you go a couple
01:03:00.260 blocks off
01:03:00.940 your normal route
01:03:01.760 to and from
01:03:02.600 home
01:03:02.960 to use a pay phone
01:03:04.040 that is suspicious
01:03:05.480 once we did
01:03:08.460 the legal paperwork
01:03:09.280 to get the records
01:03:10.280 from the pay phone
01:03:11.260 we saw that
01:03:12.240 she was calling
01:03:12.960 pagers in New York City
01:03:14.440 and those
01:03:15.940 particular numbers
01:03:17.040 we knew were
01:03:17.860 associated with
01:03:18.620 Cuban espionage
01:03:20.060 and our suspicions
01:03:25.420 were that
01:03:25.880 she was punching
01:03:26.500 in codes
01:03:27.400 and this is very
01:03:28.920 interesting how
01:03:29.340 they did this
01:03:29.920 three or four digits
01:03:31.400 so we knew
01:03:32.480 she was communicating
01:03:33.260 with a pager
01:03:34.100 she was sending signals
01:03:35.740 that told us
01:03:37.520 she was still active
01:03:38.380 so we saw her
01:03:41.780 making all these
01:03:42.480 pay phone calls
01:03:43.520 the timing of which
01:03:44.680 corresponded with
01:03:45.880 encrypted
01:03:46.400 high frequency
01:03:47.220 messages being
01:03:47.980 transmitted to the
01:03:48.880 DC area
01:03:49.540 from Cuba
01:03:50.780 even before
01:03:54.420 Montez was
01:03:54.980 identified as a
01:03:55.820 suspect
01:03:56.120 we knew that
01:03:57.460 the Cubans
01:03:57.980 were communicating
01:03:58.700 to their agents
01:03:59.880 via high frequency
01:04:01.520 messages that
01:04:02.380 would have been
01:04:02.900 picked up
01:04:03.480 using a shortwave
01:04:04.640 radio
01:04:05.120 the Cubans
01:04:12.060 would send a message
01:04:12.800 on a Tuesday
01:04:13.520 repeated again
01:04:14.680 twice on Thursday
01:04:15.760 twice on Saturday
01:04:17.200 we knew that
01:04:18.420 communicating to the
01:04:19.480 Cubans via the
01:04:20.320 high frequency
01:04:20.960 messages
01:04:21.480 required encryption
01:04:23.320 and decryption
01:04:24.300 disks
01:04:25.000 so it's not like
01:04:27.400 they were sending
01:04:28.440 the messages
01:04:29.200 out in the
01:04:30.120 open air
01:04:30.820 they were
01:04:31.840 encrypted
01:04:32.560 messages that
01:04:33.900 no one else
01:04:34.400 could read
01:04:34.880 unless you had
01:04:35.540 the matching
01:04:36.240 decryption software
01:04:38.200 that the Cubans
01:04:39.060 gave to their
01:04:40.280 agents
01:04:40.720 in order to
01:04:41.800 catch her in
01:04:42.460 the act
01:04:42.940 we knew we
01:04:44.220 needed to get
01:04:44.860 into her home
01:04:45.880 because we knew
01:04:47.680 we were trying
01:04:48.180 to find
01:04:48.580 these disks
01:04:49.260 she lived
01:04:51.500 in a 30
01:04:52.520 tenant
01:04:53.180 ownership
01:04:54.000 building
01:04:54.540 so a huge
01:04:55.360 challenge for us
01:04:56.020 to try and get
01:04:56.500 into her apartment
01:04:57.080 without getting
01:04:57.760 detected
01:04:58.220 our surveillance
01:05:01.640 of her
01:05:02.160 taught us
01:05:02.880 that she had
01:05:03.320 a boyfriend
01:05:03.760 and her boyfriend
01:05:04.360 lived out of town
01:05:05.440 in Florida
01:05:05.920 and her
01:05:08.060 traveling to
01:05:08.800 visit her
01:05:09.240 boyfriend
01:05:09.640 Memorial Day
01:05:10.400 weekend
01:05:10.840 gave us
01:05:12.720 a long
01:05:13.380 opportunity
01:05:13.820 to get
01:05:14.460 into her
01:05:14.920 apartment
01:05:15.340 covertly
01:05:16.200 to do
01:05:16.600 a physical
01:05:17.040 search
01:05:17.580 so when
01:05:23.780 we went
01:05:24.240 into her
01:05:24.640 apartment
01:05:25.060 I was
01:05:25.960 absolutely
01:05:26.660 nervous
01:05:27.340 it was hot
01:05:29.380 there was
01:05:30.180 no air
01:05:30.500 conditioning
01:05:30.880 and although
01:05:31.800 it was a
01:05:32.160 small
01:05:32.580 two-bedroom
01:05:33.600 apartment
01:05:34.000 there was
01:05:34.380 a lot
01:05:34.800 to look
01:05:35.260 through
01:05:35.620 the risk
01:05:36.520 of getting
01:05:36.860 caught
01:05:37.140 doing this
01:05:37.680 is tremendous
01:05:38.220 and that's
01:05:38.880 the last
01:05:39.200 thing you
01:05:39.480 want to
01:05:39.740 do
01:05:39.920 is compromise
01:05:40.740 the investigation
01:05:41.620 by someone
01:05:42.620 coming home
01:05:43.160 too early
01:05:43.660 or someone
01:05:44.420 watering the
01:05:45.700 plants
01:05:46.080 when you
01:05:46.440 didn't plan
01:05:46.940 on them
01:05:47.260 doing that
01:05:47.940 we started
01:05:51.160 searching her
01:05:52.360 apartment
01:05:52.780 and first
01:05:54.500 thing we
01:05:54.840 found was
01:05:55.440 the Sony
01:05:55.920 shortwave
01:05:56.420 radio
01:05:56.900 in its
01:05:57.520 box
01:05:57.980 out in
01:05:58.720 the open
01:05:59.100 underneath
01:05:59.880 an open
01:06:00.280 window
01:06:00.740 and then
01:06:04.320 we found
01:06:05.100 the
01:06:05.460 Toshiba
01:06:05.920 laptop
01:06:06.340 computer
01:06:07.000 that the
01:06:08.340 Cubans
01:06:08.680 had tasked
01:06:09.200 her to
01:06:09.480 purchase
01:06:09.880 holy
01:06:10.620 so our
01:06:11.760 computer
01:06:12.180 experts
01:06:12.740 made a
01:06:13.320 computer
01:06:13.840 a hard
01:06:15.820 drive
01:06:16.200 so that
01:06:16.660 we could
01:06:17.020 forensically
01:06:17.680 analyze it
01:06:18.640 and see
01:06:19.020 what was on
01:06:19.520 she wasn't
01:06:23.420 that
01:06:23.600 careful
01:06:23.960 though
01:06:24.300 so
01:06:24.920 Anna
01:06:25.180 Montez
01:06:25.680 you know
01:06:26.140 as she
01:06:26.640 had
01:06:26.760 received
01:06:29.140 and sent
01:06:29.540 reports
01:06:29.960 out
01:06:30.280 to the
01:06:30.700 Cubans
01:06:31.100 had
01:06:31.760 tried
01:06:32.160 to
01:06:32.800 delete
01:06:33.460 what was
01:06:34.540 on her
01:06:34.840 computer
01:06:35.280 but
01:06:35.780 in the
01:06:36.980 deleted
01:06:37.240 space
01:06:37.640 of her
01:06:37.940 computer
01:06:38.360 we
01:06:39.120 found
01:06:39.580 almost
01:06:40.520 11 pages
01:06:41.380 of
01:06:42.000 single
01:06:42.560 spaced
01:06:42.980 text
01:06:43.940 in
01:06:45.200 English
01:06:46.000 and Spanish
01:06:46.700 and in
01:06:47.360 that text
01:06:47.900 we found
01:06:48.740 national defense
01:06:49.540 information
01:06:50.120 that Montez
01:06:50.900 gave to
01:06:51.420 the Cubans
01:06:52.040 that was
01:06:52.520 classified
01:06:53.200 that was a
01:06:57.340 hugely successful
01:06:58.400 covert search
01:06:59.780 but we had not
01:07:00.880 found the
01:07:01.400 disks
01:07:01.720 we could find
01:07:03.120 the disks
01:07:03.640 that the Cubans
01:07:04.260 had given her
01:07:04.920 we'd be able
01:07:05.520 to read her
01:07:06.080 encrypted messages
01:07:07.140 while she was
01:07:08.140 getting them
01:07:08.760 and hopefully
01:07:09.460 then know
01:07:10.240 what the
01:07:10.620 messages
01:07:10.940 were between
01:07:12.200 her
01:07:12.440 and that
01:07:13.300 guys
01:07:13.560 requires
01:07:13.920 something
01:07:14.140 called
01:07:14.400 a
01:07:14.560 title
01:07:14.800 three
01:07:15.060 intercept
01:07:15.460 to get
01:07:15.940 anything
01:07:16.260 real time
01:07:16.840 this is
01:07:17.200 when you're
01:07:17.480 wiretapping
01:07:18.060 phones
01:07:18.520 when you're
01:07:18.840 putting
01:07:19.000 bugs in
01:07:19.420 houses
01:07:19.780 it requires
01:07:21.180 quite a bit
01:07:21.780 of probable
01:07:22.160 cause
01:07:22.560 you have to
01:07:22.960 outline
01:07:23.400 you know
01:07:24.500 in specific
01:07:25.360 detail
01:07:25.780 why you need
01:07:26.480 to actively
01:07:27.220 monitor
01:07:27.780 whatever
01:07:28.480 their
01:07:28.700 communication
01:07:29.240 or bugging
01:07:30.020 their home
01:07:30.440 real time
01:07:31.260 and you know
01:07:32.120 a lot of times
01:07:32.540 they're going to
01:07:32.780 say well
01:07:33.040 evidence
01:07:33.260 could get
01:07:33.560 destroyed
01:07:34.000 for me
01:07:34.360 to get
01:07:34.620 intimate
01:07:34.940 information
01:07:35.340 like this
01:07:35.740 I need
01:07:35.980 to be able
01:07:36.360 to bug
01:07:36.940 their home
01:07:37.340 so title
01:07:38.180 three
01:07:38.380 affidavits
01:07:42.200 about 75
01:07:42.780 pages
01:07:43.200 you need
01:07:43.960 more probable
01:07:44.400 cause
01:07:44.820 to get
01:07:45.560 a title
01:07:45.840 three
01:07:46.080 on someone
01:07:46.580 than to
01:07:47.000 actually
01:07:47.280 arrest
01:07:47.580 them
01:07:47.720 it's insane
01:07:48.420 at least
01:07:49.400 on the
01:07:49.640 federal level
01:07:50.180 we had
01:08:02.020 made a copy
01:08:03.160 and found
01:08:04.040 the communication
01:08:05.140 between her
01:08:05.680 and the Cubans
01:08:06.120 on the computer
01:08:06.720 we found
01:08:07.540 the short
01:08:07.980 radio
01:08:08.420 we saw
01:08:09.560 her making
01:08:10.060 all these
01:08:10.460 pay phone
01:08:11.000 calls
01:08:11.480 and we knew
01:08:11.840 we had a
01:08:12.120 strong
01:08:12.380 case
01:08:13.040 but we felt
01:08:14.360 that we had
01:08:15.160 to find
01:08:15.580 these discs
01:08:16.260 we really
01:08:19.060 needed that
01:08:19.580 concrete proof
01:08:20.960 that took away
01:08:22.280 any shadow
01:08:22.880 of doubt
01:08:23.240 from anybody
01:08:23.880 that Montez
01:08:24.740 is guilty
01:08:25.320 of espionage
01:08:26.160 the FBI
01:08:29.820 speculated
01:08:30.740 that perhaps
01:08:31.740 she was keeping
01:08:32.360 this data
01:08:33.280 on her person
01:08:34.300 and the reason
01:08:35.280 they couldn't
01:08:35.540 find it
01:08:35.920 is because
01:08:36.160 she was carrying
01:08:36.740 it around
01:08:37.060 with her
01:08:37.340 all the time
01:08:37.900 perhaps
01:08:38.520 in her purse
01:08:39.180 the objective
01:08:42.800 was to get
01:08:43.520 to her purse
01:08:44.260 search it
01:08:45.200 and get that
01:08:46.060 purse back
01:08:46.680 without either
01:08:47.380 Anna or
01:08:48.300 any of her
01:08:48.780 co-workers
01:08:49.420 having even
01:08:50.320 a suspicion
01:08:50.940 that something
01:08:51.540 unusual had
01:08:52.260 occurred
01:08:52.660 so we came up
01:08:53.820 with a plan
01:08:54.300 to separate
01:08:54.980 her from
01:08:56.180 the purse
01:08:56.660 we had
01:08:59.480 insider access
01:09:00.200 to Anna
01:09:01.120 Montez's
01:09:01.640 daily life
01:09:02.280 so what
01:09:02.960 occurred to us
01:09:03.640 is we could
01:09:04.760 create a fake
01:09:05.400 meeting
01:09:05.780 that she
01:09:06.940 would have
01:09:07.540 to attend
01:09:08.420 we gave
01:09:10.780 her a major
01:09:11.740 speaking assignment
01:09:12.800 which meant
01:09:13.460 that she
01:09:13.880 would be
01:09:14.220 visible to
01:09:14.780 everybody
01:09:15.180 and psychologically
01:09:16.640 it just
01:09:17.160 wouldn't look
01:09:17.800 good for her
01:09:18.340 to have a
01:09:18.680 purse sitting
01:09:19.140 on top
01:09:19.520 of her
01:09:19.780 materials
01:09:20.240 so we
01:09:20.940 scheduled
01:09:21.220 that briefing
01:09:22.220 for 9 o'clock
01:09:23.680 in the morning
01:09:24.180 because we
01:09:25.220 wanted to make
01:09:25.620 sure that Anna
01:09:26.260 had time
01:09:27.120 to settle
01:09:27.600 in at work
01:09:28.240 by 8 o'clock
01:09:29.020 to put her
01:09:29.820 purse into a
01:09:30.720 drawer so she
01:09:31.420 would just
01:09:31.700 secure it
01:09:32.260 and you guys
01:09:33.980 will notice
01:09:34.380 this is actually
01:09:35.020 a very common
01:09:35.580 tactic in
01:09:36.060 counter espionage
01:09:36.720 investigations
01:09:37.760 where they'll
01:09:38.960 get the
01:09:39.260 employee and
01:09:39.980 they'll either
01:09:40.400 promote them
01:09:41.040 to some
01:09:41.360 fake position
01:09:42.120 or they'll
01:09:43.160 make a
01:09:43.520 fake meeting
01:09:44.240 or they'll
01:09:45.360 bug their
01:09:45.800 office
01:09:46.460 or put like
01:09:47.420 you know
01:09:47.780 try to get
01:09:48.280 them to do
01:09:48.660 certain things
01:09:49.240 while in the
01:09:50.080 workspace
01:09:50.420 to allow
01:09:52.100 opportunities
01:09:52.840 for investigative
01:09:53.860 furtherance
01:09:54.840 so this is
01:09:56.120 another one
01:09:56.540 of those
01:09:56.840 situations
01:09:57.360 because
01:09:57.720 fortunately
01:09:58.400 for them
01:09:58.860 when she's
01:09:59.360 at work
01:09:59.700 you can
01:10:00.020 kind of
01:10:00.300 control
01:10:00.560 the scenarios
01:10:01.240 and she
01:10:02.560 did
01:10:02.860 all the
01:10:08.140 attendees
01:10:08.400 were at
01:10:08.740 the meeting
01:10:09.140 prepared to
01:10:09.960 do a good
01:10:11.100 hour hour
01:10:11.860 and a half
01:10:12.140 discussion
01:10:12.660 of this
01:10:13.520 very important
01:10:14.140 issue
01:10:14.460 once the
01:10:15.340 door was
01:10:15.660 closed
01:10:16.000 the FBI
01:10:16.840 technical team
01:10:17.960 under the
01:10:18.640 guise of being
01:10:19.200 a maintenance
01:10:19.660 crew
01:10:20.060 went into
01:10:21.240 her cubicle
01:10:22.260 in the
01:10:22.520 surrounding
01:10:22.740 area to
01:10:23.240 do
01:10:23.540 routine
01:10:24.420 maintenance
01:10:24.880 on the
01:10:25.320 facilities
01:10:25.800 and had
01:10:27.500 access to
01:10:27.940 her purse
01:10:28.420 so while
01:10:32.060 she was
01:10:32.320 at the
01:10:32.560 meeting
01:10:32.820 we had
01:10:33.100 a very
01:10:33.400 short
01:10:33.680 period
01:10:33.940 of time
01:10:34.400 to go
01:10:35.040 through
01:10:35.240 her purse
01:10:35.840 you know
01:10:36.720 looking for
01:10:37.080 the discs
01:10:37.580 it was a
01:10:43.560 typical woman's
01:10:44.320 purse
01:10:44.640 had cosmetics
01:10:45.480 and wallets
01:10:46.700 and just had
01:10:47.580 a lot of
01:10:48.000 purse type
01:10:49.080 stuff in
01:10:49.580 there
01:10:49.780 uh
01:10:51.100 misogony
01:10:52.940 that's why
01:10:53.240 women deserve
01:10:53.700 less guys
01:10:54.360 what
01:10:55.280 so we
01:10:56.420 looked and
01:10:57.240 searched in
01:10:57.780 and couldn't
01:10:58.460 find the
01:10:58.860 discs there
01:10:59.640 so we
01:11:03.340 couldn't find
01:11:04.000 exactly what
01:11:04.620 we were
01:11:04.840 looking for
01:11:05.340 but we
01:11:06.080 did find
01:11:06.860 something
01:11:07.400 inside
01:11:09.240 Anna's
01:11:09.600 purse
01:11:09.920 the FBI
01:11:10.880 found
01:11:11.640 a sheet
01:11:13.140 with a
01:11:13.640 matrix
01:11:14.140 which was
01:11:14.900 a crypto
01:11:15.440 material
01:11:16.080 which
01:11:16.400 Anna employed
01:11:17.120 when she
01:11:18.000 communicated
01:11:18.400 with the
01:11:18.740 cubans
01:11:19.120 via
01:11:19.660 pagers
01:11:20.160 and that
01:11:23.820 was exactly
01:11:24.360 what we
01:11:24.700 were looking
01:11:24.980 for
01:11:25.240 to determine
01:11:26.220 what the
01:11:26.820 message was
01:11:27.520 between her
01:11:28.160 and cuban
01:11:28.560 intelligence
01:11:29.000 once we
01:11:34.180 had her
01:11:34.560 brevity
01:11:34.840 codes
01:11:35.280 it was
01:11:35.880 simply
01:11:36.200 a matter
01:11:36.740 of going
01:11:37.040 to a
01:11:37.400 phone
01:11:37.800 punching
01:11:38.960 in the
01:11:39.300 exact
01:11:39.560 same
01:11:39.820 codes
01:11:40.280 and then
01:11:41.020 we'd
01:11:41.200 just
01:11:41.360 match
01:11:41.620 it
01:11:41.740 against
01:11:42.060 the
01:11:42.780 messages
01:11:43.140 that
01:11:43.380 had
01:11:43.460 been
01:11:43.600 sent
01:11:43.840 and
01:11:44.020 would
01:11:44.180 be
01:11:44.300 sent
01:11:44.500 in
01:11:44.580 the
01:11:44.660 future
01:11:44.960 and
01:11:45.580 know
01:11:45.740 exactly
01:11:46.160 what
01:11:46.400 she
01:11:46.620 was
01:11:46.760 telling
01:11:47.000 New York
01:11:47.500 it
01:11:48.640 told us
01:11:49.000 at the
01:11:49.240 time
01:11:49.500 that
01:11:49.680 she
01:11:49.920 did
01:11:50.200 not
01:11:50.380 perceive
01:11:50.680 herself
01:11:50.980 in
01:11:51.180 danger
01:11:51.620 and
01:11:52.680 it
01:11:52.780 was
01:11:52.900 setting
01:11:53.160 up
01:11:53.420 the future
01:11:54.320 meetings
01:11:54.660 to
01:11:54.960 meet
01:11:55.160 with
01:11:55.320 her
01:11:55.460 case
01:11:55.740 officer
01:11:56.160 or
01:11:56.820 spy
01:11:57.080 handler
01:11:57.360 which
01:11:58.120 was
01:11:58.640 every
01:11:58.860 second
01:11:59.160 week
01:11:59.520 if
01:12:00.140 we
01:12:00.240 could
01:12:00.380 get
01:12:00.600 her
01:12:00.840 meeting
01:12:01.340 with
01:12:01.600 a
01:12:01.720 spy
01:12:01.960 handler
01:12:02.260 we
01:12:03.040 know
01:12:03.220 we
01:12:03.400 would
01:12:03.700 get
01:12:03.880 her
01:12:04.020 convicted
01:12:04.420 and
01:12:05.600 put
01:12:05.980 her
01:12:06.120 in
01:12:06.280 prison
01:12:06.600 she
01:12:07.760 had
01:12:07.920 the
01:12:08.020 potential
01:12:08.320 to
01:12:08.460 be
01:12:08.580 one
01:12:08.780 of
01:12:08.920 America's
01:12:09.760 most
01:12:10.180 dangerous
01:12:10.580 spies
01:12:11.060 and
01:12:18.280 then
01:12:18.440 this
01:12:18.640 happened
01:12:24.320 I
01:12:27.240 was
01:12:27.420 sitting
01:12:27.680 in
01:12:27.880 my
01:12:28.140 boss's
01:12:29.060 office
01:12:29.400 I
01:12:29.620 think
01:12:29.940 in
01:12:30.160 a
01:12:30.360 commercial
01:12:30.660 office
01:12:31.000 building
01:12:31.340 in
01:12:31.540 northern
01:12:31.860 Virginia
01:12:32.280 about
01:12:32.500 a mile
01:12:32.820 up
01:12:32.960 from
01:12:33.080 the
01:12:33.180 Pentagon
01:12:33.480 when
01:12:34.540 9-11
01:12:35.000 occurred
01:12:35.440 I
01:12:37.560 was 11
01:12:40.880 years old
01:12:41.420 when
01:12:41.640 9-11
01:12:41.940 happened
01:12:42.320 so
01:12:43.120 and
01:12:43.300 just
01:12:43.580 you
01:12:43.760 guys
01:12:43.940 are
01:12:44.060 wondering
01:12:44.280 I
01:12:44.520 have
01:12:44.680 a
01:12:44.780 whole
01:12:44.940 playlist
01:12:45.300 on
01:12:45.520 9-11
01:12:45.880 if
01:12:46.080 you
01:12:46.180 guys
01:12:46.340 want
01:12:46.480 to
01:12:46.580 go
01:12:46.700 ahead
01:12:46.860 and
01:12:46.960 check
01:12:47.140 it
01:12:47.240 out
01:12:47.440 I
01:12:48.280 cover
01:12:48.540 the
01:12:48.840 excuse
01:12:50.660 me
01:12:50.840 I
01:12:50.960 go
01:12:51.100 over
01:12:51.260 the
01:12:51.380 official
01:12:51.660 story
01:12:52.000 I
01:12:52.140 talk
01:12:52.300 about
01:12:52.520 how
01:12:52.700 the
01:12:52.820 FBI
01:12:53.320 conducted
01:12:53.760 their
01:12:53.980 investigation
01:12:54.340 and
01:12:54.800 I
01:12:54.940 go
01:12:55.120 over
01:12:55.480 the
01:12:55.940 conspiracy
01:12:56.320 theories
01:12:56.720 as
01:12:56.920 well
01:12:57.160 with
01:12:58.260 the
01:12:58.660 new
01:12:58.800 Pearl
01:12:58.980 Harbor
01:12:59.180 which
01:12:59.380 was
01:12:59.480 a
01:12:59.620 very
01:12:59.780 well
01:13:00.040 done
01:13:00.340 documentary
01:13:01.660 even
01:13:01.920 though
01:13:02.100 they
01:13:02.200 were
01:13:02.280 missing
01:13:02.500 one
01:13:02.740 element
01:13:03.040 from
01:13:03.240 them
01:13:03.420 boys
01:13:03.780 but
01:13:04.880 we
01:13:05.340 will
01:13:05.480 complete
01:13:05.820 the
01:13:05.960 9-11
01:13:06.400 situation
01:13:07.640 once
01:13:08.020 we
01:13:08.180 bring
01:13:08.440 Ryan
01:13:09.420 Dawson
01:13:09.840 in
01:13:09.980 because
01:13:10.240 there's
01:13:10.900 no
01:13:11.060 doubt
01:13:11.340 that
01:13:11.660 terrorists
01:13:12.020 were
01:13:12.260 involved
01:13:12.620 in
01:13:12.820 the
01:13:12.920 attack
01:13:13.300 right
01:13:13.600 but
01:13:14.340 there
01:13:15.180 were
01:13:15.320 some
01:13:15.500 other
01:13:15.740 situations
01:13:16.300 as
01:13:16.620 well
01:13:16.900 that
01:13:17.740 I
01:13:18.600 won't
01:13:18.800 discuss
01:13:19.100 right
01:13:19.300 now
01:13:19.460 on
01:13:19.580 this
01:13:19.740 podcast
01:13:20.280 but
01:13:21.020 we
01:13:21.160 are
01:13:21.280 definitely
01:13:21.580 going
01:13:21.740 to
01:13:21.820 go
01:13:21.980 into
01:13:22.300 deep
01:13:23.320 detail
01:13:23.820 with
01:13:24.060 y'all
01:13:24.360 and
01:13:25.180 it's
01:13:25.680 going
01:13:25.780 to
01:13:25.800 be
01:13:25.920 pretty
01:13:26.100 eye
01:13:26.280 opening
01:13:26.480 guys
01:13:26.840 we're
01:13:27.340 based
01:13:27.580 on
01:13:27.720 this
01:13:27.840 side
01:13:28.000 of
01:13:28.080 the
01:13:28.140 internet
01:13:28.240 if
01:13:28.400 you
01:13:28.460 know
01:13:28.540 what
01:13:28.620 I'm
01:13:28.700 saying
01:13:28.920 and
01:13:31.960 we
01:13:32.160 riveted
01:13:32.640 to
01:13:32.900 the
01:13:33.200 television
01:13:33.680 screen
01:13:34.180 we
01:13:34.860 understood
01:13:35.260 that
01:13:35.680 this
01:13:35.920 was
01:13:36.080 a
01:13:36.220 terrorist
01:13:36.520 attack
01:13:37.020 and
01:13:37.600 that
01:13:37.820 it
01:13:37.940 was
01:13:38.100 significant
01:13:38.700 I
01:13:41.020 sat
01:13:41.280 in
01:13:41.440 there
01:13:41.580 for
01:13:41.720 another
01:13:42.040 20
01:13:42.800 minutes
01:13:43.060 or so
01:13:43.480 and
01:13:44.140 I
01:13:44.280 saw
01:13:44.540 a
01:13:44.800 puff
01:13:44.960 of
01:13:45.120 smoke
01:13:45.480 to
01:13:45.900 my
01:13:46.100 right
01:13:46.460 and
01:13:47.100 the
01:13:47.520 puff
01:13:47.700 of
01:13:47.820 smoke
01:13:48.100 persisted
01:13:48.860 and
01:13:49.000 it
01:13:49.160 turned
01:13:49.380 gray
01:13:49.760 and
01:13:49.980 began
01:13:50.260 to
01:13:50.440 billow
01:13:50.840 and
01:13:51.460 then
01:13:51.680 news
01:13:52.020 coverage
01:13:52.320 came
01:13:52.580 on
01:13:52.800 about
01:13:53.000 the
01:13:53.160 aircraft
01:13:53.540 hitting
01:13:53.780 the
01:13:53.980 Pentagon
01:13:54.260 I
01:13:55.300 didn't
01:13:55.480 see
01:13:55.660 the
01:13:55.820 impact
01:13:56.180 but
01:13:56.400 I
01:13:56.540 knew
01:13:56.680 what
01:13:56.960 was
01:13:57.100 happening
01:13:57.480 we
01:13:59.360 had
01:13:59.560 just
01:13:59.840 crossed
01:14:00.400 a
01:14:00.580 threshold
01:14:01.060 and
01:14:02.480 that
01:14:02.860 the
01:14:03.040 United
01:14:03.280 States
01:14:03.560 of
01:14:03.760 America
01:14:04.160 was
01:14:05.360 going
01:14:05.660 to
01:14:05.940 formulate
01:14:06.920 some
01:14:07.260 sort
01:14:07.460 of
01:14:07.580 a
01:14:07.700 response
01:14:08.220 that
01:14:08.720 would
01:14:08.920 require
01:14:09.440 the
01:14:09.680 assistance
01:14:10.080 and
01:14:10.460 support
01:14:10.880 of
01:14:11.100 the
01:14:11.200 Defense
01:14:11.460 Intelligence
01:14:11.940 Agency
01:14:12.440 In the
01:14:13.800 aftermath
01:14:14.060 of
01:14:14.320 9-11
01:14:14.820 DIA
01:14:15.380 assembled
01:14:15.940 a
01:14:16.800 task
01:14:17.060 force
01:14:17.260 to
01:14:17.420 support
01:14:17.680 the
01:14:17.820 Pentagon's
01:14:18.400 forthcoming
01:14:18.900 operations
01:14:19.500 in
01:14:19.980 Afghanistan
01:14:20.400 and
01:14:21.460 Amontes
01:14:22.020 was
01:14:22.300 among
01:14:22.540 those
01:14:22.760 to be
01:14:23.020 chosen
01:14:23.320 for
01:14:23.620 the
01:14:23.780 task
01:14:24.040 force
01:14:24.360 on
01:14:30.780 Saturday
01:14:31.180 the
01:14:31.420 22nd
01:14:31.980 September
01:14:32.480 Ana
01:14:33.040 was
01:14:33.200 going
01:14:33.380 to
01:14:33.480 be
01:14:33.620 bereaved
01:14:33.980 on
01:14:34.320 the
01:14:34.720 war
01:14:34.940 plan
01:14:35.220 for
01:14:35.400 Operation
01:14:35.920 Enduring
01:14:36.320 Freedom
01:14:36.720 the
01:14:37.320 effort
01:14:37.540 to
01:14:37.760 remove
01:14:38.100 the
01:14:38.300 Taliban
01:14:38.660 from
01:14:39.700 Afghanistan
01:14:40.500 if
01:14:41.340 Ana
01:14:41.660 Mantis
01:14:42.240 gained
01:14:43.180 access
01:14:43.540 to
01:14:43.800 information
01:14:44.240 about
01:14:44.480 our
01:14:44.660 war
01:14:44.840 plans
01:14:45.240 she
01:14:46.500 could
01:14:46.780 give
01:14:47.000 it
01:14:47.100 to
01:14:47.220 the
01:14:47.340 Cubans
01:14:47.780 who
01:14:48.060 in
01:14:48.320 turn
01:14:48.660 would
01:14:49.460 be
01:14:50.000 happy
01:14:50.300 to
01:14:50.580 trade
01:14:50.900 that
01:14:51.080 information
01:14:51.560 or
01:14:51.820 to
01:14:51.980 simply
01:14:52.300 share
01:14:52.800 that
01:14:53.020 information
01:14:53.560 with
01:14:54.400 our
01:14:54.600 adversaries
01:14:55.260 possibly
01:14:56.240 including
01:14:56.740 the
01:14:56.940 Taliban
01:14:57.400 that
01:14:58.680 event
01:14:59.060 all of
01:14:59.500 our
01:14:59.640 plans
01:15:00.100 that
01:15:00.300 we
01:15:00.460 executed
01:15:01.060 during
01:15:01.700 Operation
01:15:02.260 Enduring
01:15:02.660 Freedom
01:15:03.000 would have
01:15:03.440 been
01:15:03.580 known
01:15:03.800 to
01:15:03.980 the
01:15:04.120 enemy
01:15:04.400 I
01:15:06.820 knew
01:15:07.080 that
01:15:07.300 our
01:15:07.500 investigation
01:15:08.020 with
01:15:08.580 Ana
01:15:09.020 was coming
01:15:09.740 to an
01:15:10.080 end
01:15:10.300 we
01:15:11.840 really
01:15:12.440 wanted
01:15:12.900 to
01:15:13.080 catch
01:15:13.380 her
01:15:13.500 in
01:15:13.620 the
01:15:13.740 act
01:15:14.000 of
01:15:14.140 committing
01:15:14.360 espionage
01:15:14.940 with
01:15:15.440 her
01:15:15.740 handler
01:15:16.200 who
01:15:16.660 was
01:15:16.840 handling
01:15:17.300 and
01:15:17.700 receiving
01:15:18.160 the
01:15:18.380 classified
01:15:18.820 information
01:15:19.540 but
01:15:20.000 we
01:15:20.160 knew
01:15:20.400 that
01:15:20.680 it
01:15:21.280 was
01:15:21.440 just
01:15:21.600 too
01:15:21.840 much
01:15:22.080 risk
01:15:22.600 potential
01:15:23.300 damage
01:15:23.800 to
01:15:24.420 keep
01:15:24.820 her
01:15:25.020 at
01:15:25.260 DIA
01:15:25.740 at
01:15:26.000 such
01:15:26.140 a
01:15:26.280 sensitive
01:15:26.540 time
01:15:26.980 when
01:15:27.160 we
01:15:27.340 were
01:15:27.540 launching
01:15:28.240 a war
01:15:28.700 it was
01:15:29.740 time
01:15:30.280 to
01:15:30.700 arrest
01:15:31.340 Montez
01:15:32.040 for
01:15:32.220 a
01:15:32.360 conspiracy
01:15:32.780 to
01:15:33.000 commit
01:15:33.200 espionage
01:15:33.760 they
01:15:34.200 they
01:15:34.220 they
01:15:34.240 could
01:15:34.560 have
01:15:34.640 kept
01:15:34.800 the
01:15:34.940 case
01:15:35.140 going
01:15:35.500 if
01:15:37.360 9-11
01:15:37.760 didn't
01:15:38.040 happen
01:15:38.320 but
01:15:38.600 yeah
01:15:38.800 it would
01:15:39.200 have
01:15:39.280 been
01:15:39.360 awesome
01:15:39.600 for her
01:15:39.840 to
01:15:39.920 catch
01:15:40.160 her
01:15:40.260 with
01:15:40.420 the
01:15:40.520 handler
01:15:40.780 but
01:15:41.140 it
01:15:41.620 is
01:15:42.420 what
01:15:42.560 it
01:15:42.660 is
01:15:43.720 it
01:15:44.320 happens
01:15:44.760 yeah
01:15:45.220 when
01:15:46.520 9-11
01:15:46.860 happened
01:15:47.300 we knew
01:15:47.720 we had
01:15:48.140 days
01:15:48.500 left
01:15:48.820 in the
01:15:49.180 investigation
01:15:49.740 also
01:15:52.680 keep
01:15:52.940 in mind
01:15:53.200 guys
01:15:53.540 the
01:15:53.760 entire
01:15:54.020 FBI
01:15:54.360 was
01:15:54.560 working
01:15:54.800 9-11
01:15:55.220 so
01:15:55.540 they
01:15:56.060 really
01:15:56.340 had
01:15:56.560 to
01:15:56.700 get
01:15:56.840 this
01:15:57.020 thing
01:15:57.220 wrapped
01:15:57.500 up
01:15:57.780 to
01:15:58.120 focus
01:15:58.620 on
01:15:59.040 the
01:15:59.520 9-11
01:15:59.880 situation
01:16:00.500 versus
01:16:01.440 you know
01:16:01.880 everything
01:16:02.520 got diverted
01:16:03.040 to counterterrorism
01:16:03.740 at that
01:16:04.000 point
01:16:04.200 we
01:16:05.400 really
01:16:06.000 wanted
01:16:06.460 to
01:16:06.640 catch
01:16:06.940 her
01:16:07.060 in
01:16:07.180 the
01:16:07.300 act
01:16:07.560 of
01:16:07.700 committing
01:16:07.920 espionage
01:16:08.520 but
01:16:09.160 it
01:16:09.380 was
01:16:09.520 just
01:16:09.700 too
01:16:09.920 much
01:16:10.180 risk
01:16:10.700 to
01:16:11.280 keep
01:16:11.660 her
01:16:11.860 at
01:16:12.100 DIA
01:16:12.600 at
01:16:12.840 such
01:16:12.980 a
01:16:13.120 sensitive
01:16:13.400 time
01:16:13.840 when
01:16:14.000 we
01:16:14.160 were
01:16:14.380 launching
01:16:15.080 a
01:16:15.280 war
01:16:15.540 it
01:16:19.740 The FBI
01:16:25.080 decided
01:16:25.600 they'd
01:16:25.920 like
01:16:26.080 to
01:16:26.220 effect
01:16:26.520 the
01:16:26.720 arrest
01:16:27.120 over
01:16:27.740 in
01:16:28.300 our
01:16:28.520 building
01:16:28.860 we
01:16:29.680 decided
01:16:30.400 to
01:16:30.820 bring
01:16:31.380 her
01:16:31.480 down
01:16:31.720 into
01:16:31.940 the
01:16:32.100 offices
01:16:32.420 of
01:16:32.600 the
01:16:32.700 inspector
01:16:33.120 general
01:16:33.540 so
01:16:34.960 we
01:16:35.660 were
01:16:35.780 going
01:16:35.900 to
01:16:35.980 arrest
01:16:36.160 her
01:16:36.280 at
01:16:36.400 work
01:16:36.620 but
01:16:37.020 we
01:16:37.120 still
01:16:37.320 wanted
01:16:37.520 to
01:16:37.680 try
01:16:38.000 and
01:16:38.360 get
01:16:38.600 her
01:16:39.040 to
01:16:39.200 make
01:16:39.380 some
01:16:39.560 incriminating
01:16:40.040 statements
01:16:40.580 if
01:16:41.140 we
01:16:41.340 could
01:16:41.540 get
01:16:41.800 her
01:16:42.080 to
01:16:42.580 say
01:16:43.300 things
01:16:43.940 about
01:16:44.500 her
01:16:44.680 espionage
01:16:45.280 in
01:16:45.400 an
01:16:45.560 interview
01:16:45.920 before
01:16:46.400 she's
01:16:46.620 arrested
01:16:46.980 that'd
01:16:47.680 be
01:16:47.760 a
01:16:47.920 good
01:16:48.100 thing
01:16:48.360 for
01:16:48.500 the
01:16:48.620 prosecution
01:16:49.260 we
01:16:52.860 started
01:16:53.220 our
01:16:53.440 interview
01:16:53.800 talked
01:16:54.680 to
01:16:54.840 her
01:16:55.020 about
01:16:55.400 the
01:16:56.580 scenario
01:16:57.100 that
01:16:57.680 wasn't
01:16:57.980 true
01:16:58.360 that
01:16:59.180 there
01:16:59.380 was
01:16:59.580 a
01:16:59.940 defector
01:17:00.880 that
01:17:01.060 came
01:17:01.340 out
01:17:01.600 from
01:17:01.800 the
01:17:01.940 Cuban
01:17:02.180 intelligence
01:17:02.620 service
01:17:03.120 and
01:17:03.320 he
01:17:03.440 talked
01:17:03.720 about
01:17:03.960 a
01:17:04.100 penetration
01:17:04.540 of
01:17:04.800 the
01:17:04.900 U.S.
01:17:05.220 government
01:17:05.560 and
01:17:06.060 quickly
01:17:06.440 into
01:17:06.800 this
01:17:07.140 pretext
01:17:07.840 Ana
01:17:08.440 had
01:17:08.880 this
01:17:09.220 interesting
01:17:09.980 physiological
01:17:11.140 reaction
01:17:12.240 and
01:17:17.820 it
01:17:17.900 was
01:17:18.000 this
01:17:18.180 rash
01:17:18.660 that
01:17:18.940 immediately
01:17:19.760 broke
01:17:20.260 out
01:17:20.600 and
01:17:20.960 they
01:17:21.100 were
01:17:21.260 on
01:17:21.560 the
01:17:21.860 side
01:17:22.080 of
01:17:22.180 her
01:17:22.300 neck
01:17:22.520 that
01:17:22.680 was
01:17:22.820 facing
01:17:23.160 me
01:17:23.540 I
01:17:23.880 could
01:17:24.060 only
01:17:24.260 see
01:17:24.580 them
01:17:24.900 you know
01:17:25.520 I had
01:17:25.820 to
01:17:25.920 kind
01:17:26.040 of
01:17:26.120 control
01:17:26.420 myself
01:17:26.840 and
01:17:27.060 not
01:17:27.260 go
01:17:27.540 look at
01:17:28.720 that
01:17:28.940 she
01:17:29.220 has
01:17:29.880 this
01:17:30.060 rash
01:17:30.400 breaking
01:17:30.800 out
01:17:31.120 so
01:17:34.260 she
01:17:34.820 knows
01:17:35.160 what
01:17:35.360 time
01:17:35.660 it
01:17:35.780 is
01:17:35.920 man
01:17:36.240 oh
01:17:37.280 she
01:17:39.720 got
01:17:39.920 him
01:17:40.020 under
01:17:40.200 control
01:17:40.620 and
01:17:40.820 she
01:17:40.940 was
01:17:41.100 very
01:17:41.440 focused
01:17:41.940 and
01:17:42.160 very
01:17:42.400 firm
01:17:42.860 getting
01:17:43.840 through
01:17:44.120 this
01:17:44.380 story
01:17:44.900 Montez
01:17:46.060 kind
01:17:46.380 of
01:17:46.500 wised
01:17:46.800 up
01:17:47.040 to
01:17:47.240 it
01:17:47.420 and
01:17:47.880 asked
01:17:48.160 if
01:17:48.280 she
01:17:48.420 was
01:17:48.560 under
01:17:48.760 investigation
01:17:49.260 and
01:17:49.780 at
01:17:50.340 that
01:17:50.500 point
01:17:50.700 in
01:17:50.840 time
01:17:51.000 we
01:17:51.180 told
01:17:51.400 her
01:17:51.500 she
01:17:51.660 was
01:17:51.820 under
01:17:52.040 arrest
01:17:52.400 for
01:17:52.760 conspiracy
01:17:53.460 to
01:17:53.720 commit
01:17:53.940 espionage
01:17:54.520 handcuffed
01:17:55.640 her
01:18:01.120 Pete
01:18:08.300 came
01:18:08.640 out
01:18:08.860 of
01:18:08.960 the
01:18:09.080 conference
01:18:09.460 room
01:18:09.680 with
01:18:09.880 Anna
01:18:10.120 she
01:18:10.360 was
01:18:10.560 in
01:18:10.680 handcuffs
01:18:11.200 and
01:18:11.360 I
01:18:11.500 saw
01:18:11.720 them
01:18:11.900 walking
01:18:12.200 down
01:18:12.620 the
01:18:13.360 corridor
01:18:13.660 if you
01:18:14.000 will
01:18:14.220 towards
01:18:14.620 me
01:18:14.900 she
01:18:17.080 was
01:18:17.280 almost
01:18:17.620 standing
01:18:17.880 in front
01:18:18.300 of me
01:18:18.520 and
01:18:18.960 she
01:18:19.080 never
01:18:19.280 looked
01:18:19.540 at
01:18:19.700 me
01:18:19.900 I
01:18:21.340 doubt
01:18:21.660 that
01:18:21.880 she
01:18:22.060 had
01:18:22.480 any
01:18:23.220 real
01:18:23.660 idea
01:18:24.180 as
01:18:24.800 to
01:18:25.040 what
01:18:25.340 role
01:18:25.660 I
01:18:25.820 might
01:18:26.000 have
01:18:26.120 played
01:18:26.380 in
01:18:26.520 her
01:18:26.700 capture
01:18:27.120 yeah
01:18:28.180 he
01:18:28.340 was
01:18:28.480 the
01:18:28.580 one
01:18:28.700 that
01:18:28.820 actually
01:18:29.080 brought
01:18:29.300 the
01:18:29.440 focus
01:18:29.720 back
01:18:29.980 on
01:18:30.200 her
01:18:30.320 so
01:18:30.640 shout
01:18:31.120 out
01:18:31.220 to
01:18:31.320 him
01:18:31.700 FBI
01:18:32.800 doubted
01:18:33.180 him
01:18:33.240 but
01:18:33.340 he
01:18:33.440 got
01:18:33.660 it
01:18:33.880 we're
01:18:35.760 pleased
01:18:36.060 to
01:18:36.220 announce
01:18:36.520 this
01:18:36.800 morning
01:18:37.120 that
01:18:39.080 45
01:18:39.460 year
01:18:39.780 old
01:18:40.080 Anna
01:18:40.560 Belen
01:18:41.200 Montez
01:18:41.800 pled
01:18:42.280 guilty
01:18:42.640 a
01:18:42.940 one
01:18:43.120 count
01:18:43.300 indictment
01:18:43.760 charging
01:18:44.140 her
01:18:44.320 with
01:18:44.520 conspiracy
01:18:45.100 to
01:18:45.320 commit
01:18:45.540 espionage
01:18:46.260 today's
01:18:46.840 guilty
01:18:47.100 plea
01:18:47.360 is a
01:18:47.660 result
01:18:47.920 of a
01:18:48.280 plea
01:18:48.440 agreement
01:18:48.780 between
01:18:49.140 Ms.
01:18:49.460 Montez
01:18:49.940 and
01:18:50.140 the
01:18:50.240 United
01:18:50.460 States
01:18:50.880 that
01:18:51.480 will
01:18:51.660 require
01:18:52.120 Ms.
01:18:52.380 Montez
01:18:52.780 to
01:18:52.960 fully
01:18:53.220 cooperate
01:18:53.680 with
01:18:53.940 law
01:18:54.140 enforcement
01:18:54.560 by
01:18:55.080 providing
01:18:55.480 information
01:18:56.000 relating
01:18:56.440 to all
01:18:56.880 criminal
01:19:00.640 as part
01:19:01.840 of the
01:19:02.040 plea
01:19:02.240 agreement
01:19:02.640 she
01:19:02.900 got
01:19:03.040 25
01:19:03.400 years
01:19:03.820 for
01:19:04.000 espionage
01:19:04.520 and
01:19:05.660 in
01:19:06.220 exchange
01:19:07.220 for that
01:19:07.720 she
01:19:07.940 agreed
01:19:08.240 to be
01:19:08.520 fully
01:19:08.740 debriefed
01:19:09.420 by
01:19:09.840 the
01:19:10.420 FBI
01:19:10.780 and the
01:19:11.120 rest
01:19:11.260 of the
01:19:11.440 intelligence
01:19:11.760 community
01:19:12.240 so that
01:19:13.120 means
01:19:13.320 the CIA
01:19:13.800 came in
01:19:14.280 there
01:19:14.440 DIA
01:19:14.880 people
01:19:15.220 came in
01:19:15.680 there
01:19:15.820 everybody
01:19:16.100 came in
01:19:16.640 there
01:19:16.740 to ask
01:19:17.200 questions
01:19:17.760 so
01:19:18.080 you know
01:19:18.880 because
01:19:19.320 normally
01:19:19.660 guys
01:19:19.980 for a
01:19:20.280 charge
01:19:20.480 like
01:19:20.640 this
01:19:20.800 you
01:19:20.880 can
01:19:20.980 get
01:19:21.120 life
01:19:21.400 and
01:19:21.760 or
01:19:21.920 death
01:19:22.240 right
01:19:22.960 a
01:19:23.120 life
01:19:23.280 sentence
01:19:23.520 and
01:19:23.760 or
01:19:23.880 like
01:19:24.060 the
01:19:24.160 death
01:19:24.320 penalty
01:19:24.560 so
01:19:24.880 for
01:19:25.660 her
01:19:25.760 to
01:19:25.860 get
01:19:25.980 25
01:19:26.320 years
01:19:26.860 was
01:19:27.440 pretty
01:19:28.240 good
01:19:28.540 given
01:19:29.020 the
01:19:29.560 crime
01:19:29.820 she
01:19:33.540 was
01:19:33.780 debriefed
01:19:34.400 for
01:19:34.540 about
01:19:34.780 seven
01:19:35.100 months
01:19:35.520 seven
01:19:36.600 months
01:19:37.220 exhaustively
01:19:38.300 probably
01:19:38.780 three times
01:19:39.900 a week
01:19:40.260 five or
01:19:40.720 six
01:19:40.920 hours
01:19:41.380 that
01:19:41.760 goes
01:19:42.000 to
01:19:42.140 show
01:19:42.340 how
01:19:42.600 much
01:19:42.900 information
01:19:43.440 she
01:19:43.680 really
01:19:43.920 had
01:19:44.280 a
01:19:44.660 day
01:19:44.960 during
01:19:45.580 honest
01:19:45.940 debriefing
01:19:46.520 they
01:19:47.220 took
01:19:47.480 her
01:19:47.580 from
01:19:47.760 the
01:19:47.960 earlier
01:19:48.300 days
01:19:49.000 in
01:19:50.160 1985
01:19:50.900 when
01:19:51.420 she
01:19:51.540 started
01:19:51.940 holy
01:19:53.020 bro
01:19:54.220 she
01:19:55.540 was
01:19:55.800 going
01:19:56.040 way
01:19:56.360 back
01:19:56.700 in
01:19:56.880 time
01:19:57.220 she
01:19:59.540 was
01:19:59.760 selling
01:20:00.000 secrets
01:20:00.580 since
01:20:01.320 Scarface
01:20:01.960 all the
01:20:04.980 way up
01:20:05.220 to the
01:20:05.420 day of
01:20:05.660 arrest
01:20:06.060 what
01:20:06.840 did
01:20:06.980 you
01:20:07.080 learn
01:20:07.400 we
01:20:08.100 learned
01:20:08.260 she
01:20:08.400 betrayed
01:20:08.820 us
01:20:09.100 in
01:20:09.260 El
01:20:09.440 Salvador
01:20:09.740 compromised
01:20:10.580 all of
01:20:11.220 our
01:20:11.320 military
01:20:11.620 operations
01:20:12.880 in
01:20:13.860 Central
01:20:14.100 America
01:20:14.580 throughout
01:20:15.240 five years
01:20:16.000 of the
01:20:16.240 secret
01:20:16.460 war
01:20:16.780 during
01:20:17.160 the
01:20:17.300 1980s
01:20:18.100 and
01:20:22.200 think
01:20:22.420 here
01:20:22.640 was a
01:20:23.040 woman
01:20:23.340 that
01:20:24.040 would
01:20:24.240 literally
01:20:24.560 sit
01:20:24.880 across
01:20:25.140 the
01:20:25.320 table
01:20:25.580 from
01:20:25.960 special
01:20:26.300 forces
01:20:26.600 teams
01:20:26.920 going
01:20:27.180 down
01:20:27.400 range
01:20:27.760 and
01:20:29.020 pretend
01:20:29.300 to be
01:20:29.600 their
01:20:29.760 friend
01:20:30.100 and
01:20:30.380 then
01:20:30.500 as soon
01:20:30.780 as
01:20:30.920 the
01:20:31.020 meeting
01:20:31.200 is
01:20:31.420 over
01:20:31.680 contact
01:20:32.640 her
01:20:32.900 Cuban
01:20:33.140 handlers
01:20:33.540 and
01:20:33.700 say
01:20:33.960 you
01:20:34.720 have
01:20:34.880 another
01:20:35.120 special
01:20:35.460 forces
01:20:35.780 team
01:20:36.080 going
01:20:36.360 on
01:20:36.760 to
01:20:37.420 El
01:20:37.560 Salvador
01:20:37.860 they'll
01:20:38.540 be
01:20:38.660 at
01:20:38.780 this
01:20:38.940 location
01:20:39.380 on
01:20:39.860 these
01:20:40.060 dates
01:20:40.440 good
01:20:41.080 luck
01:20:41.380 happy
01:20:41.960 hunting
01:20:42.260 that's
01:20:43.160 crazy
01:20:43.920 bro
01:20:44.380 that's
01:20:45.620 crazy
01:20:46.160 imagine
01:20:46.560 how many
01:20:46.920 people
01:20:47.200 probably
01:20:47.740 died
01:20:48.220 because
01:20:49.120 of the
01:20:49.620 information
01:20:50.040 that she
01:20:50.360 provided
01:20:53.340 willfully
01:20:55.060 and
01:20:55.220 intentionally
01:20:55.660 took
01:20:57.120 every
01:20:57.360 action
01:20:57.620 she
01:20:57.820 could
01:20:58.060 to get
01:20:58.280 Americans
01:20:58.620 killed
01:20:58.880 in
01:20:59.040 combat
01:20:59.320 it
01:20:59.980 should
01:21:00.120 make
01:21:00.300 us
01:21:00.460 all
01:21:00.920 enraged
01:21:01.700 people
01:21:05.320 from the
01:21:05.660 intelligence
01:21:06.120 community
01:21:06.520 I know
01:21:06.940 some of you
01:21:07.320 guys hate
01:21:07.720 the government
01:21:08.100 and don't
01:21:08.500 trust the
01:21:08.820 government
01:21:09.040 and everything
01:21:09.440 like that
01:21:09.820 and that's
01:21:10.080 cool
01:21:10.240 that's
01:21:10.520 nothing
01:21:10.720 wrong
01:21:10.940 with not
01:21:11.300 trusting
01:21:11.580 the
01:21:11.700 government
01:21:11.860 I get
01:21:12.120 it
01:21:12.200 you should
01:21:12.400 be
01:21:12.540 you should
01:21:12.880 question
01:21:13.160 everything
01:21:13.580 what I
01:21:14.460 will
01:21:14.660 say
01:21:14.880 is
01:21:15.160 I
01:21:16.320 don't
01:21:16.440 want
01:21:16.580 our
01:21:16.720 soldiers
01:21:16.980 dying
01:21:17.260 okay
01:21:17.900 you
01:21:18.300 don't
01:21:18.460 have
01:21:18.640 to
01:21:18.740 like
01:21:18.860 the
01:21:19.000 government
01:21:19.260 but hey
01:21:19.740 I don't
01:21:20.280 want our
01:21:20.680 soldiers
01:21:21.020 dying
01:21:21.300 so
01:21:22.200 to me
01:21:23.020 I look
01:21:23.720 at it
01:21:23.980 like
01:21:24.200 this is
01:21:24.520 unacceptable
01:21:24.980 and this
01:21:25.380 is why
01:21:25.700 I have
01:21:26.300 such a
01:21:27.200 personal
01:21:27.480 issue
01:21:27.900 with
01:21:28.740 espionage
01:21:30.500 treason
01:21:31.000 people that
01:21:31.520 sell
01:21:31.720 secrets
01:21:32.100 right
01:21:32.280 I know
01:21:32.480 people
01:21:32.740 are like
01:21:32.980 oh well
01:21:33.340 Snowden
01:21:33.620 did the
01:21:33.900 right
01:21:34.080 thing
01:21:34.380 he's
01:21:34.980 providing
01:21:35.300 information
01:21:35.960 you know
01:21:37.400 to the
01:21:37.680 people
01:21:37.880 he's a
01:21:38.120 whistleblower
01:21:38.540 etc
01:21:38.840 okay
01:21:39.900 I get
01:21:40.420 that
01:21:40.640 and then
01:21:40.820 people
01:21:40.980 like
01:21:41.160 oh
01:21:41.360 Assange
01:21:41.800 he's
01:21:42.560 a truth
01:21:43.260 speaker
01:21:43.600 blah blah
01:21:43.920 blah
01:21:44.060 he's
01:21:44.260 talking
01:21:44.560 about
01:21:44.760 injustices
01:21:45.660 okay
01:21:46.100 understandable
01:21:49.000 from the
01:21:49.380 perspective
01:21:49.760 of our
01:21:50.580 soldiers
01:21:50.880 I'm always
01:21:51.280 pro-soldiers
01:21:51.860 first
01:21:52.200 so
01:21:52.780 if
01:21:53.620 soldiers
01:21:53.980 die
01:21:54.440 because
01:21:55.240 guys
01:21:55.500 want to
01:21:55.720 be
01:21:55.820 whistleblowers
01:21:56.420 I say
01:21:58.620 fuck the
01:21:58.920 whistleblowers
01:21:59.320 you guys
01:21:59.640 might not
01:22:00.200 like me
01:22:00.460 saying that
01:22:00.800 but
01:22:01.000 I don't
01:22:01.660 want
01:22:01.820 guys
01:22:02.220 right
01:22:02.560 that
01:22:03.520 enlisted
01:22:03.780 in the
01:22:03.960 military
01:22:04.340 that
01:22:04.940 go out
01:22:05.440 to
01:22:06.200 fight
01:22:07.020 and protect
01:22:07.940 your rights
01:22:08.680 and mine
01:22:09.200 dying
01:22:10.320 I don't
01:22:11.040 want a
01:22:11.280 kid
01:22:11.420 that's
01:22:11.660 18
01:22:11.960 years
01:22:12.180 old
01:22:12.380 that
01:22:12.540 loves
01:22:12.720 his
01:22:12.840 country
01:22:13.020 serving
01:22:13.300 his
01:22:13.460 country
01:22:13.700 to
01:22:14.240 die
01:22:14.720 because
01:22:15.420 some
01:22:15.680 dude
01:22:16.040 wants
01:22:16.700 to
01:22:16.840 increase
01:22:17.220 his
01:22:17.680 Wikileaks
01:22:18.140 page
01:22:18.500 call
01:22:19.660 that
01:22:19.820 controversial
01:22:20.300 whatever
01:22:20.620 it may
01:22:20.880 be
01:22:21.120 but
01:22:21.360 I'm
01:22:21.540 pro-soldier
01:22:22.000 first
01:22:22.400 every
01:22:25.300 individual
01:22:25.880 that she
01:22:26.280 met
01:22:26.540 from
01:22:26.800 the
01:22:26.960 US
01:22:27.220 government
01:22:27.580 if
01:22:28.320 they
01:22:28.440 were
01:22:28.580 going
01:22:28.980 to
01:22:29.260 Cuba
01:22:29.540 covertly
01:22:30.340 she
01:22:31.160 identified
01:22:31.580 who
01:22:31.980 they
01:22:32.180 were
01:22:32.500 and
01:22:32.840 what
01:22:33.280 their
01:22:33.500 true
01:22:34.060 mission
01:22:34.440 was
01:22:34.820 versus
01:22:35.140 what
01:22:35.440 their
01:22:35.620 stated
01:22:35.980 mission
01:22:36.320 was
01:22:36.740 a lot
01:22:37.480 of the
01:22:37.660 information
01:22:38.020 she
01:22:38.320 shared
01:22:38.800 will
01:22:39.600 remain
01:22:39.900 classified
01:22:40.300 to the
01:22:40.660 American
01:22:40.920 public
01:22:41.380 and
01:22:41.940 isn't
01:22:42.180 that
01:22:42.340 ironic
01:22:42.700 that
01:22:42.940 information
01:22:43.400 that
01:22:43.700 you
01:22:44.640 cannot
01:22:45.240 read
01:22:45.760 was read
01:22:46.540 in
01:22:46.840 Beijing
01:22:47.760 Moscow
01:22:49.140 Tehran
01:22:50.220 Cuba
01:22:51.140 there's
01:22:52.500 no way
01:22:52.840 even
01:22:53.060 in
01:22:53.220 six
01:22:53.460 months
01:22:53.720 of
01:22:53.960 daily
01:22:54.540 all-day
01:22:55.360 interrogations
01:22:56.140 you're
01:22:57.520 not going
01:22:57.780 to get
01:22:58.040 everything
01:22:58.480 that a
01:22:58.900 career
01:22:59.100 spy
01:22:59.360 did
01:22:59.640 in
01:23:00.000 16
01:23:00.340 years
01:23:00.680 we
01:23:01.300 will
01:23:01.480 never
01:23:01.780 fully
01:23:02.180 know
01:23:02.520 the
01:23:02.900 damage
01:23:03.280 that
01:23:03.480 she
01:23:03.760 did
01:23:04.080 to
01:23:04.560 the
01:23:05.040 United
01:23:05.480 States
01:23:05.980 during
01:23:09.640 the time
01:23:10.620 we were
01:23:10.860 debriefing
01:23:11.460 her
01:23:11.680 we learned
01:23:12.440 a lot
01:23:12.880 about
01:23:13.380 her
01:23:13.800 motivation
01:23:14.380 for being
01:23:15.200 the
01:23:15.440 Cuban
01:23:15.640 spy
01:23:15.940 okay
01:23:16.440 here
01:23:16.720 you go
01:23:17.140 Angie
01:23:17.820 you're
01:23:18.120 gonna
01:23:18.200 get
01:23:18.340 this
01:23:19.300 what you
01:23:19.560 want
01:23:19.700 to find
01:23:19.980 out
01:23:20.180 yeah
01:23:20.540 why
01:23:21.500 she
01:23:21.720 did
01:23:21.960 it
01:23:22.280 so
01:23:24.320 in
01:23:24.920 1984
01:23:25.680 1985
01:23:26.500 Montez
01:23:27.500 was working
01:23:27.960 on her
01:23:28.340 master's
01:23:28.840 degree
01:23:29.120 in
01:23:29.500 international
01:23:29.980 relations
01:23:30.600 at Johns
01:23:31.200 Hopkins
01:23:31.480 University
01:23:32.140 and her
01:23:33.520 mutual
01:23:34.040 friend
01:23:34.600 saw her
01:23:35.640 in class
01:23:36.320 knew her
01:23:36.880 opinions
01:23:37.480 knew that
01:23:38.100 she was
01:23:38.620 diametrically
01:23:39.920 opposed
01:23:40.620 to US
01:23:41.340 foreign
01:23:41.640 policy
01:23:42.060 and what
01:23:42.360 we were
01:23:42.680 doing
01:23:42.940 in that
01:23:43.300 time
01:23:43.620 period
01:23:43.880 which
01:23:44.080 was
01:23:44.240 1984
01:23:44.920 1985
01:23:46.300 Anna
01:23:47.020 felt
01:23:47.520 that
01:23:48.080 the United
01:23:48.600 States
01:23:48.800 didn't
01:23:49.040 have a
01:23:49.360 right
01:23:49.640 to
01:23:50.140 impose
01:23:50.820 their
01:23:51.200 will
01:23:51.540 on
01:23:52.520 other
01:23:52.800 countries
01:23:53.220 especially
01:23:53.640 in
01:23:54.060 Central
01:23:54.680 and South
01:23:55.400 America
01:23:55.900 and let me
01:23:57.040 make this
01:23:57.360 clear
01:23:57.560 there's nothing
01:23:58.000 wrong with
01:23:58.460 having that
01:23:58.880 viewpoint
01:23:59.260 right
01:23:59.700 if you
01:24:00.360 don't like
01:24:01.660 US foreign
01:24:02.640 policy
01:24:03.260 that's within
01:24:04.620 your right
01:24:05.160 as an
01:24:05.660 American
01:24:06.000 to have
01:24:07.120 right
01:24:07.400 that's the
01:24:07.820 right
01:24:08.060 that we
01:24:08.780 enjoy as
01:24:09.220 Americans
01:24:09.560 however
01:24:10.260 getting into
01:24:11.780 a trusted
01:24:12.160 position
01:24:12.620 where you
01:24:13.100 have
01:24:13.380 classified
01:24:13.780 information
01:24:14.380 that you
01:24:15.340 took an
01:24:15.680 oath to
01:24:16.000 protect
01:24:16.340 by the
01:24:16.680 way
01:24:16.920 right
01:24:17.320 all of
01:24:17.680 us
01:24:17.800 had a
01:24:18.040 clearance
01:24:18.260 I remember
01:24:18.600 when I
01:24:18.820 took my
01:24:19.140 oath
01:24:19.260 I'd never
01:24:19.620 get that
01:24:19.960 day
01:24:20.080 August 24th
01:24:21.240 2014
01:24:21.860 right
01:24:23.040 when you
01:24:24.240 take that
01:24:24.620 oath
01:24:24.880 you say
01:24:26.420 in it
01:24:26.800 whether
01:24:27.300 you're
01:24:27.540 law
01:24:27.740 enforcement
01:24:28.160 for
01:24:28.860 homeland
01:24:29.260 security
01:24:29.760 the FBI
01:24:30.900 DEA
01:24:31.740 it doesn't
01:24:32.160 matter
01:24:32.400 you say
01:24:33.120 you will
01:24:33.300 protect
01:24:33.580 the US
01:24:33.860 constitution
01:24:34.260 against
01:24:34.640 all
01:24:35.060 threats
01:24:35.400 foreign
01:24:35.960 and
01:24:36.260 domestic
01:24:36.660 so you
01:24:37.880 took that
01:24:38.260 oath
01:24:38.520 and you
01:24:39.300 went ahead
01:24:39.760 and you
01:24:40.420 gave those
01:24:40.960 secrets
01:24:41.420 to people
01:24:42.800 that want
01:24:43.780 to hurt
01:24:44.140 the United
01:24:44.480 States
01:24:44.740 as much
01:24:45.000 as you
01:24:45.200 hate
01:24:45.440 the United
01:24:45.740 States
01:24:46.080 if you
01:24:46.340 some of
01:24:46.620 you guys
01:24:46.780 might say
01:24:47.100 oh well
01:24:47.480 government
01:24:47.740 I can't
01:24:48.080 trust it
01:24:48.500 or blah
01:24:48.800 blah
01:24:48.880 blah
01:24:49.060 all this
01:24:49.260 other
01:24:49.420 stuff
01:24:49.660 she took
01:24:50.460 an oath
01:24:50.920 to protect
01:24:51.840 the United
01:24:52.500 States
01:24:52.920 you don't like
01:24:53.760 US foreign
01:24:54.160 policy
01:24:54.440 that's fine
01:24:54.960 that's one
01:24:55.680 of the
01:24:55.900 beauties
01:24:56.200 of this
01:24:56.480 country
01:24:56.740 you can
01:24:57.420 disagree
01:24:57.920 with the
01:24:58.880 government
01:24:59.220 and be
01:24:59.800 able to
01:25:00.140 say it
01:25:00.520 without
01:25:01.100 being
01:25:01.900 attacked
01:25:02.380 or killed
01:25:02.900 or put
01:25:03.280 in jail
01:25:03.660 however
01:25:04.440 for you
01:25:05.300 to
01:25:05.480 have
01:25:06.020 that
01:25:06.220 viewpoint
01:25:06.620 go into
01:25:07.560 public
01:25:07.860 service
01:25:08.340 taking out
01:25:09.160 that you're
01:25:09.420 going to
01:25:09.600 protect
01:25:09.900 the United
01:25:10.220 States
01:25:10.520 and then
01:25:10.960 do the
01:25:11.340 exact
01:25:11.640 opposite
01:25:12.100 well
01:25:13.020 we know
01:25:13.860 what happens
01:25:14.400 FBI
01:25:15.760 open up
01:25:16.480 and then
01:25:16.760 you end
01:25:16.980 up in
01:25:17.260 jail
01:25:17.800 or dead
01:25:20.660 or dead
01:25:21.520 disagreed
01:25:23.960 with US
01:25:24.320 foreign
01:25:24.580 policy
01:25:25.000 at the
01:25:25.240 time
01:25:25.500 so
01:25:26.160 her
01:25:26.560 friend
01:25:27.080 sensed
01:25:27.740 that she
01:25:28.080 had
01:25:28.360 this
01:25:28.660 passion
01:25:29.280 that the
01:25:29.840 Cubans
01:25:30.240 would be
01:25:31.000 interested
01:25:31.360 in
01:25:31.720 she's
01:25:33.460 introduced
01:25:33.740 to the
01:25:34.040 Cubans
01:25:34.500 via
01:25:35.300 a
01:25:35.760 diplomat
01:25:36.460 who was
01:25:37.320 there
01:25:37.660 undercover
01:25:38.140 he
01:25:38.600 recognized
01:25:39.060 that she
01:25:39.540 had
01:25:39.740 this
01:25:39.920 visceral
01:25:40.440 empathy
01:25:40.920 for
01:25:41.920 the
01:25:42.120 Cuban
01:25:42.500 plight
01:25:43.540 for
01:25:44.080 the
01:25:44.380 Cuban
01:25:44.660 cause
01:25:45.260 and
01:25:45.840 that's
01:25:46.480 folks
01:25:46.940 who
01:25:47.100 they
01:25:47.280 really
01:25:47.760 reach out
01:25:49.020 to
01:25:49.340 and
01:25:49.740 ultimately
01:25:50.140 trust
01:25:50.580 to be
01:25:50.920 their
01:25:51.120 agents
01:25:51.540 Honest
01:25:55.500 Cubicle
01:25:55.880 was actually
01:25:56.700 devoid
01:25:57.860 of anything
01:25:58.780 personal
01:25:59.700 it was all
01:26:01.000 devoted to
01:26:01.500 business
01:26:01.940 but
01:26:02.800 on Honest
01:26:03.400 Cubicle
01:26:03.760 wall
01:26:04.140 posted
01:26:04.580 right next
01:26:05.140 to her
01:26:05.500 computer
01:26:05.880 monitor
01:26:06.340 was a
01:26:07.200 piece
01:26:07.380 of paper
01:26:07.840 it was
01:26:08.620 lined
01:26:09.020 and written
01:26:09.680 in script
01:26:10.420 the king
01:26:11.340 hath note
01:26:11.900 of all
01:26:12.340 that they
01:26:12.660 intend
01:26:13.080 by
01:26:14.120 interceptions
01:26:14.720 which they
01:26:15.400 dream not
01:26:16.080 of
01:26:16.440 Fidel
01:26:17.120 Castro
01:26:17.500 was aware
01:26:17.960 of all
01:26:18.240 of their
01:26:18.460 plans
01:26:18.920 by some
01:26:19.820 secret
01:26:20.240 means
01:26:20.680 they
01:26:21.040 can't
01:26:21.380 even
01:26:21.540 imagine
01:26:22.000 this
01:26:23.060 was an
01:26:23.460 inspirational
01:26:23.960 quote
01:26:24.460 that she
01:26:24.860 had posted
01:26:25.360 to her
01:26:25.800 wall
01:26:26.120 so that
01:26:26.440 every time
01:26:26.940 that she
01:26:27.200 was down
01:26:27.580 at her
01:26:27.900 computer
01:26:28.380 she could
01:26:30.600 see it
01:26:31.040 and motivate
01:26:31.840 herself
01:26:32.420 as a
01:26:33.040 spy
01:26:33.480 you
01:26:36.320 you
01:26:36.380 know
01:26:36.480 people
01:26:36.880 who
01:26:37.040 commit
01:26:37.280 espionage
01:26:38.020 are
01:26:39.060 placing
01:26:39.540 our
01:26:39.780 collective
01:26:40.120 security
01:26:40.680 at risk
01:26:41.200 our
01:26:42.260 boys
01:26:42.520 and
01:26:42.700 girls
01:26:42.940 in
01:26:43.160 uniform
01:26:43.520 who
01:26:43.840 are
01:26:43.900 fighting
01:26:44.280 battles
01:26:44.760 for us
01:26:45.220 are
01:26:45.660 going to
01:26:45.920 die
01:26:46.240 because
01:26:46.560 somebody
01:26:46.840 stabbed
01:26:47.280 in the
01:26:47.640 neck
01:26:47.920 that's
01:26:49.820 what
01:26:49.960 espionage
01:26:50.480 is
01:26:50.800 death
01:26:51.500 and
01:26:53.600 that's
01:26:53.880 why
01:26:54.200 guys
01:26:55.540 like
01:26:55.760 me
01:26:56.100 work
01:26:56.960 so
01:26:57.160 hard
01:26:57.420 to
01:26:57.600 find
01:26:57.820 these
01:26:58.040 people
01:26:58.360 I've
01:27:01.320 told
01:27:01.540 people
01:27:01.880 that
01:27:02.240 honey
01:27:02.800 for
01:27:03.020 spies
01:27:03.560 is
01:27:04.100 like
01:27:04.340 trying
01:27:04.600 to
01:27:04.780 find
01:27:05.140 a
01:27:05.280 ghost
01:27:05.540 in
01:27:05.740 the
01:27:05.880 fog
01:27:06.160 and
01:27:07.160 you've
01:27:08.600 got to
01:27:08.960 believe
01:27:09.260 first of
01:27:09.820 all
01:27:10.000 that
01:27:10.180 they're
01:27:10.360 there
01:27:10.660 and
01:27:11.880 then
01:27:11.980 you
01:27:12.080 have
01:27:12.240 to
01:27:12.320 have
01:27:12.440 enough
01:27:12.640 drive
01:27:13.160 to
01:27:13.420 keep
01:27:13.640 looking
01:27:13.980 all
01:27:17.260 right
01:27:17.500 so
01:27:18.220 pretty
01:27:20.420 interesting
01:27:20.760 documentary
01:27:21.240 there
01:27:21.560 she
01:27:21.840 definitely
01:27:22.340 won
01:27:22.800 the
01:27:23.120 cuban
01:27:23.820 nationality
01:27:25.180 so
01:27:27.260 yeah
01:27:27.480 this is
01:27:27.880 her
01:27:28.180 guys
01:27:28.500 right
01:27:28.780 like
01:27:29.200 you
01:27:29.340 said
01:27:29.480 this
01:27:29.720 is
01:27:29.840 the
01:27:29.960 FBI
01:27:30.240 press
01:27:30.520 release
01:27:30.760 10
01:27:30.940 days
01:27:31.080 after
01:27:31.260 9-11
01:27:31.680 attacks
01:27:31.980 the
01:27:32.100 FBI
01:27:32.380 rest of
01:27:32.940 the
01:27:33.020 43
01:27:33.300 woman
01:27:33.800 named
01:27:34.100 Anna
01:27:34.380 Belen
01:27:34.680 Montez
01:27:35.200 she
01:27:36.180 didn't
01:27:36.360 have
01:27:36.580 anything
01:27:36.780 to do
01:27:37.040 it
01:27:37.140 as
01:27:37.280 you
01:27:37.400 guys
01:27:37.580 know
01:27:37.740 we
01:27:37.880 covered
01:27:38.060 in
01:27:38.180 the
01:27:38.240 documentary
01:27:38.580 but
01:27:38.780 this
01:27:38.940 was
01:27:39.120 the
01:27:39.420 FBI
01:27:41.480 press
01:27:41.760 release
01:27:41.980 here's
01:27:42.660 the
01:27:42.760 affidavit
01:27:43.260 guys
01:27:43.680 right
01:27:44.040 from
01:27:44.260 Stephen
01:27:44.540 McCoy
01:27:44.820 the
01:27:44.960 case
01:27:51.240 but
01:27:51.780 this
01:27:52.520 right
01:27:52.700 here
01:27:52.860 the
01:27:53.000 first
01:27:53.160 paragraph
01:27:53.480 I
01:27:53.640 tell
01:27:53.760 you
01:27:53.840 guys
01:27:54.000 this
01:27:54.120 all
01:27:54.280 the
01:27:54.380 time
01:27:54.560 this
01:27:54.720 is
01:27:54.860 like
01:27:55.020 where
01:27:55.140 they
01:27:55.260 talk
01:27:55.460 about
01:27:55.620 their
01:27:55.740 training
01:27:56.000 experience
01:27:56.520 he
01:27:56.660 goes
01:27:56.800 on
01:27:56.900 special
01:27:57.140 FBI
01:27:57.660 and
01:27:57.900 have
01:27:58.060 been
01:27:58.220 so
01:27:58.380 employed
01:27:58.620 for
01:27:58.760 20
01:27:59.060 years
01:27:59.340 this
01:27:59.520 guy
01:27:59.660 was
01:27:59.780 veteran
01:28:00.040 more than
01:28:00.720 likely
01:28:00.940 the
01:28:01.100 reason
01:28:01.260 why
01:28:01.480 is
01:28:01.560 because
01:28:01.660 he
01:28:01.760 was
01:28:01.860 he
01:28:02.480 couldn't
01:28:02.740 find
01:28:02.980 him
01:28:03.120 because
01:28:03.780 at
01:28:04.020 this
01:28:04.180 point
01:28:04.380 in
01:28:04.520 2001
01:28:06.080 he
01:28:06.480 had
01:28:06.580 already
01:28:06.740 been
01:28:06.900 on
01:28:07.040 the
01:28:07.160 job
01:28:07.340 for
01:28:07.480 20
01:28:07.660 years
01:28:07.900 I
01:28:08.900 I'm
01:28:21.240 well
01:28:21.400 as
01:28:21.920 resolved
01:28:22.180 my
01:28:22.360 experience
01:28:22.660 of
01:28:22.780 counter
01:28:22.940 intelligence
01:28:23.260 investigations
01:28:23.660 and
01:28:23.840 foreign
01:28:24.000 counter
01:28:24.280 intelligence
01:28:24.600 training
01:28:24.980 I'm
01:28:25.160 familiar
01:28:25.340 with
01:28:25.500 strategy
01:28:25.860 tactics
01:28:26.340 methods
01:28:27.080 trade
01:28:27.300 craft
01:28:27.540 and
01:28:27.700 techniques
01:28:28.020 of
01:28:28.200 the
01:28:28.320 Cuban
01:28:28.480 foreign
01:28:28.780 intelligence
01:28:29.140 services
01:28:29.560 and
01:28:29.800 its
01:28:29.940 agents
01:28:30.320 and
01:28:30.880 then
01:28:30.980 he
01:28:31.080 goes
01:28:31.300 into
01:28:31.540 what
01:28:33.180 he
01:28:33.300 wants
01:28:33.500 to
01:28:33.660 search
01:28:34.040 right
01:28:34.780 then
01:28:34.920 he
01:28:35.020 gives
01:28:35.180 the
01:28:35.300 background
01:28:35.700 in
01:28:35.920 Germany
01:28:38.180 and
01:28:39.540 then
01:28:39.680 he
01:28:39.820 goes
01:28:40.080 into
01:28:40.340 all
01:28:40.740 the
01:28:41.260 facts
01:28:41.720 here
01:28:42.060 okay
01:28:42.500 and
01:28:44.080 right
01:28:45.460 and
01:28:45.580 this
01:28:45.720 is
01:28:45.840 all
01:28:45.980 the
01:28:46.100 probable
01:28:46.400 cause
01:28:46.740 which
01:28:46.900 you
01:28:47.020 guys
01:28:47.180 kind
01:28:47.400 of
01:28:47.480 heard
01:28:47.660 throughout
01:28:48.020 the
01:28:48.180 documentary
01:28:48.580 so
01:28:48.780 I
01:28:48.880 won't bore
01:28:49.240 you
01:28:49.380 with
01:28:49.540 the
01:28:49.920 details
01:28:50.620 but
01:28:51.560 this
01:28:51.700 is
01:28:51.780 what
01:28:51.880 a
01:28:51.980 criminal
01:28:52.140 complaint
01:28:52.460 looks
01:28:52.680 like
01:28:52.880 and
01:28:52.980 a
01:28:53.080 criminal
01:28:53.240 complaint
01:28:53.560 guys
01:28:53.820 you
01:28:54.160 filed
01:28:54.500 affidavit
01:28:55.160 right
01:28:55.800 which
01:28:56.360 this
01:28:56.600 is
01:28:56.700 what
01:28:56.820 the
01:28:56.920 affidavit
01:28:57.360 is
01:28:57.600 and
01:28:58.100 then
01:28:58.300 this
01:28:58.880 is
01:28:59.060 in
01:28:59.160 this
01:29:01.000 case
01:29:01.200 an
01:29:01.320 arrest
01:29:01.560 warrant
01:29:01.740 and search
01:29:02.060 warrant
01:29:02.280 right
01:29:02.460 this
01:29:02.640 is
01:29:02.780 like
01:29:02.940 the
01:29:03.140 meat
01:29:03.420 of
01:29:03.600 your
01:29:03.760 your
01:29:05.200 case
01:29:07.080 right
01:29:07.560 this
01:29:07.720 is
01:29:07.760 where
01:29:07.860 all
01:29:07.960 the
01:29:16.100 right
01:29:16.200 wondering
01:29:16.380 where
01:29:16.580 is
01:29:16.660 she
01:29:16.740 now
01:29:17.040 Anna
01:29:17.980 Montez
01:29:18.260 former
01:29:18.520 top
01:29:18.760 spy
01:29:18.940 says
01:29:19.140 she
01:29:19.260 will
01:29:19.380 live
01:29:19.600 in
01:29:19.780 Puerto
01:29:19.960 Rico
01:29:20.260 and
01:29:20.640 just
01:29:20.880 so
01:29:21.000 you
01:29:21.060 guys
01:29:21.240 know
01:29:21.420 she
01:29:21.560 got
01:29:21.720 released
01:29:22.260 January
01:29:23.120 8
01:29:24.160 she was
01:29:25.120 released
01:29:25.320 on
01:29:25.460 January
01:29:25.720 6
01:29:26.080 2023
01:29:26.500 having
01:29:27.400 been
01:29:27.560 released
01:29:27.840 she
01:29:27.960 will
01:29:28.020 be
01:29:28.140 monitoring
01:29:28.440 including
01:29:28.780 her
01:29:29.000 internet
01:29:29.280 usage
01:29:29.580 for
01:29:29.740 five
01:29:30.020 years
01:29:30.220 Montez
01:29:30.520 will
01:29:30.660 not
01:29:30.780 be
01:29:30.900 allowed
01:29:31.100 to
01:29:31.260 contact
01:29:31.620 foreign
01:29:31.940 agents
01:29:32.240 or
01:29:32.400 work
01:29:32.620 for
01:29:32.760 the
01:29:32.840 U.S.
01:29:33.100 government
01:29:33.280 without
01:29:33.900 permission
01:29:34.380 she's
01:29:35.520 currently
01:29:35.720 living in
01:29:36.020 Puerto
01:29:36.160 Rico
01:29:36.380 continues
01:29:36.860 to speak
01:29:37.560 out
01:29:37.700 against
01:29:37.940 U.S.
01:29:38.220 sanctions
01:29:38.540 against
01:29:38.980 Cuba
01:29:39.340 so
01:29:40.080 yeah
01:29:40.440 very
01:29:41.180 passionate
01:29:41.600 yeah
01:29:42.120 and that
01:29:43.940 passion
01:29:44.300 got her
01:29:45.340 put in
01:29:45.760 jail
01:29:45.940 for two
01:29:46.320 decades
01:29:46.700 now
01:29:47.340 look at
01:29:47.620 her
01:29:47.940 holy
01:29:48.400 god damn
01:29:49.480 does she
01:29:49.840 have any
01:29:50.280 remorse
01:29:50.740 though
01:29:51.080 probably
01:29:53.380 not
01:29:53.740 probably
01:29:55.240 not
01:29:55.640 she said
01:29:56.260 that she
01:29:56.660 owned it
01:29:57.120 to the
01:29:57.380 people
01:29:57.620 of Cuba
01:29:58.220 did she
01:29:59.660 did she
01:29:59.920 say that
01:30:00.380 yeah
01:30:00.780 apparently
01:30:01.260 I heard
01:30:01.880 in the
01:30:02.200 other
01:30:02.480 documentary
01:30:03.280 that I
01:30:03.740 was
01:30:04.060 watching
01:30:04.420 so
01:30:05.680 crazy
01:30:06.140 though
01:30:06.420 you know
01:30:07.680 I went
01:30:08.080 to Cuba
01:30:08.460 in 2010
01:30:09.300 oh did
01:30:10.060 you
01:30:10.240 okay
01:30:10.640 well how
01:30:11.820 was that
01:30:12.200 they hate
01:30:13.660 us over
01:30:13.900 there don't
01:30:14.160 they
01:30:14.480 not really
01:30:16.720 like Cuban
01:30:17.760 people
01:30:18.300 I mean
01:30:19.680 the government
01:30:20.120 well
01:30:20.640 yeah the
01:30:21.880 government
01:30:22.140 of course
01:30:22.560 people
01:30:23.340 hate
01:30:23.980 their
01:30:24.500 government
01:30:24.860 there
01:30:25.180 honestly
01:30:26.000 well you
01:30:26.420 see a
01:30:26.840 lot of
01:30:27.040 Cubans
01:30:27.320 here
01:30:27.600 love
01:30:28.400 America
01:30:28.820 yeah
01:30:29.180 you know
01:30:29.480 what I've
01:30:29.700 noticed
01:30:29.960 the Cubans
01:30:31.300 that hate
01:30:31.760 America
01:30:32.260 a lot of
01:30:32.700 the time
01:30:32.980 or sorry
01:30:33.320 that love
01:30:34.160 America
01:30:34.540 are like
01:30:35.120 capitalists
01:30:35.680 like they
01:30:36.000 were like
01:30:36.280 entrepreneurs
01:30:36.820 and high
01:30:37.200 earners
01:30:37.600 in Cuba
01:30:38.140 and they
01:30:38.840 came here
01:30:39.420 so that they
01:30:40.200 can like
01:30:40.560 pursue the
01:30:41.120 dream
01:30:41.440 but like a
01:30:42.020 lot of
01:30:42.200 people that
01:30:42.620 love Cuba
01:30:43.080 because there's
01:30:43.400 a good amount
01:30:43.740 of people
01:30:43.960 that actually
01:30:44.320 love Cuba
01:30:44.800 right we
01:30:45.460 in America
01:30:45.940 we kind of
01:30:46.380 like put a lot
01:30:46.860 of propaganda
01:30:47.340 like Cuba
01:30:47.780 is a terrible
01:30:48.180 country and
01:30:48.840 people hate
01:30:49.280 Cuba and
01:30:49.780 it's they're
01:30:50.360 so poor
01:30:51.700 and terrible
01:30:52.180 Cuba guys
01:30:53.300 I don't know
01:30:54.420 if y'all
01:30:54.600 noticed they
01:30:54.960 have one of
01:30:55.360 the best
01:30:56.120 medical care
01:30:57.420 in the world
01:30:58.020 yeah
01:30:58.280 I didn't know
01:30:58.960 that yeah
01:30:59.460 I actually like
01:31:00.180 went and looked
01:31:00.540 it up and I
01:31:00.860 was like wow
01:31:01.220 like they
01:31:01.540 have some
01:31:01.820 of the best
01:31:02.200 facilities
01:31:02.660 and they
01:31:03.780 have universal
01:31:04.280 health care
01:31:04.640 which is like
01:31:05.100 rare you look
01:31:05.620 at like a
01:31:05.960 country like
01:31:06.360 Canada
01:31:06.680 their health
01:31:07.420 care is
01:31:07.700 trash
01:31:07.880 doctors as
01:31:08.720 well you
01:31:09.220 know a lot
01:31:09.760 of doctors
01:31:10.240 Cuban doctors
01:31:11.540 in Venezuela
01:31:12.080 loads yeah
01:31:13.260 yeah they
01:31:14.300 have the best
01:31:14.880 medicine yeah
01:31:15.580 for sure
01:31:15.920 and it's one
01:31:16.400 of yeah
01:31:16.620 definitely one
01:31:17.240 of the best
01:31:17.660 like it's
01:31:18.180 comparable to
01:31:18.860 American health
01:31:19.480 care guys
01:31:19.960 you know
01:31:20.340 but what I've
01:31:22.140 noticed with Cuba
01:31:22.920 right especially
01:31:23.400 being here in
01:31:23.860 Miami you might
01:31:24.400 not know this
01:31:24.940 like being in
01:31:25.480 other places in
01:31:26.060 the country
01:31:26.400 but with Cuba
01:31:28.020 Cuba is big
01:31:28.640 here it's of
01:31:29.860 course yeah a lot
01:31:30.380 of them out
01:31:30.800 here
01:31:31.020 with Cuba
01:31:32.340 like what I
01:31:33.140 noticed is like
01:31:33.660 the people that
01:31:34.120 were super
01:31:34.540 successful that
01:31:35.160 made a lot of
01:31:35.620 money in Cuba
01:31:36.120 they didn't
01:31:36.580 like Cuba
01:31:37.000 because the
01:31:37.540 government took
01:31:38.120 everything from
01:31:38.620 them but the
01:31:39.420 people that were
01:31:39.940 like middle
01:31:40.340 class lower
01:31:40.960 class etc
01:31:41.580 they like it
01:31:42.540 it's like okay
01:31:43.140 I could chill
01:31:43.780 the government
01:31:44.180 takes care of
01:31:44.760 us it's all
01:31:45.280 good hey
01:31:45.880 you know so
01:31:47.200 yeah it's
01:31:47.800 hey Pablo it's
01:31:48.420 gonna be all
01:31:48.760 good kind of
01:31:49.480 like Venezuela
01:31:50.140 yeah but yeah
01:31:51.740 y'all are much
01:31:53.480 worse yeah of
01:31:55.060 course but it is
01:31:56.300 well your government
01:31:56.820 just steals from you
01:31:57.540 guys like all day
01:31:58.320 and they don't even
01:31:58.740 care I don't know
01:31:59.940 comment but yeah
01:32:00.860 um yeah they're
01:32:03.500 very similar and
01:32:04.440 they hate most of
01:32:05.540 them hate the
01:32:06.280 government yeah
01:32:07.360 that's what I
01:32:07.940 noticed going there
01:32:09.080 it is a lot of
01:32:10.340 Santeria too and
01:32:11.520 yeah Cuba is
01:32:12.620 crazy it's like um
01:32:13.920 the first thing and
01:32:15.160 the main thing that I
01:32:15.960 noticed is that it's
01:32:17.080 it's like the whole
01:32:18.640 country was is
01:32:20.360 stuck in the 80s
01:32:22.240 like the buildings
01:32:23.460 yeah you'll see the
01:32:24.540 buildings the cars
01:32:25.680 everything
01:32:26.140 do they do that for
01:32:26.800 like historical value
01:32:27.740 though no I think
01:32:29.120 it's just like they
01:32:30.080 never like I don't
01:32:31.880 know what to say
01:32:32.560 they just never
01:32:33.120 progressed yeah okay
01:32:34.340 because like Miami
01:32:35.260 right like you know
01:32:35.980 how we have a bunch
01:32:36.600 of these like stupid
01:32:37.220 rules where like they
01:32:37.900 can't knock down
01:32:38.480 certain buildings like
01:32:39.660 these old buildings
01:32:40.360 on Miami Beach like
01:32:41.180 they got to keep it
01:32:41.840 no matter how crappy
01:32:42.660 they are and Miami
01:32:43.600 yeah downtown Miami
01:32:44.940 has a lot like
01:32:45.860 they're trying to
01:32:46.240 preserve the historical
01:32:46.920 value is that like
01:32:47.720 what it is in Cuba or
01:32:48.440 they just don't want
01:32:48.860 to do it I think
01:32:50.580 they just can't
01:32:51.340 because of the
01:32:52.380 of the economy
01:32:53.080 economy and
01:32:54.660 economic situation
01:32:56.420 yeah fair enough
01:32:57.400 fair enough
01:32:58.200 yeah that's one thing
01:32:59.200 I noticed about Cuba
01:33:00.040 is like the
01:33:00.460 entrepreneurs the
01:33:01.020 guys that like
01:33:01.440 were high earners
01:33:02.080 there they're like
01:33:02.620 get me the hell
01:33:03.020 out of here but
01:33:03.420 the people that
01:33:03.780 are like middle
01:33:04.140 class lower
01:33:04.560 class they're
01:33:05.100 just chilling
01:33:07.140 yeah so but
01:33:08.980 yeah what were
01:33:10.020 your thoughts on
01:33:10.360 the documentary
01:33:10.800 what are your
01:33:11.360 final thoughts on
01:33:12.160 this Angie
01:33:12.800 man I just really
01:33:13.660 wanted to know
01:33:14.240 why she did it
01:33:15.140 it's crazy because
01:33:16.380 I will think that
01:33:17.600 she was Cuban
01:33:18.460 and she fell out
01:33:19.220 because she owned
01:33:19.860 it to the country
01:33:20.700 that she was
01:33:21.480 born in and
01:33:22.320 whatever but she
01:33:23.020 was not and
01:33:23.780 it's like it was
01:33:24.940 all merely for
01:33:25.880 passion and yeah
01:33:27.260 just making me
01:33:27.860 think like people
01:33:28.640 like how much
01:33:29.440 money she made
01:33:30.000 which is kind
01:33:30.540 of strange
01:33:31.120 she might we
01:33:32.380 might we might
01:33:33.020 get in another
01:33:33.820 documentary or
01:33:34.840 something if we
01:33:35.500 like research
01:33:36.080 I'm gonna search
01:33:37.300 it real fast
01:33:37.740 give me one
01:33:38.140 second right
01:33:38.780 I'm gonna search
01:33:39.360 how much like
01:33:40.180 it is kind of
01:33:41.060 weird how I
01:33:42.760 just want to say
01:33:43.320 that people like
01:33:43.940 this that are very
01:33:44.740 passionate about
01:33:45.460 their I don't
01:33:46.900 know motives and
01:33:47.780 whatever patients
01:33:48.840 they are very
01:33:50.420 dangerous if you
01:33:51.840 think yeah because
01:33:52.920 I've known people
01:33:53.580 like this in my
01:33:54.300 country that will
01:33:55.420 like hate the
01:33:56.420 government all that
01:33:57.160 stuff most of us
01:33:58.260 hate the government
01:33:58.940 of course for like
01:34:00.120 very obvious
01:34:01.580 reasons but you'll
01:34:03.320 you'll meet a lot
01:34:04.160 of people like that
01:34:05.360 they are very
01:34:06.340 passionate about
01:34:07.020 the hate or or
01:34:09.600 like on another I
01:34:11.100 don't know man
01:34:11.640 it's like crazy it's
01:34:13.500 like they're dangerous
01:34:14.500 very dangerous because
01:34:15.720 they can get to do
01:34:16.540 things like this and
01:34:18.320 they can get killed
01:34:20.180 a lot of people just
01:34:21.100 because of fucking
01:34:22.340 information it's
01:34:23.160 insane yeah I can't
01:34:24.620 even find it how
01:34:25.640 much she made I
01:34:27.160 don't think she
01:34:27.720 had to god pay
01:34:28.400 something that must
01:34:29.680 be classified as
01:34:30.520 well yeah yeah that
01:34:31.080 might be yeah I
01:34:31.740 guess so but yeah I
01:34:33.400 can't find it
01:34:34.040 anywhere but I
01:34:35.420 mean all the other
01:34:36.060 spies I know how
01:34:36.660 much they made so
01:34:37.460 this is she might
01:34:38.160 have not made that
01:34:38.660 much you might just
01:34:40.160 really been doing
01:34:40.800 this because she
01:34:41.300 like stupid but
01:34:42.420 whatever she was just
01:34:43.200 getting it from Cuba I
01:34:44.400 don't think she made
01:34:45.060 that much when you
01:34:46.120 mentioned that I was
01:34:46.860 like did she really
01:34:48.280 make that pay you
01:34:49.460 big bucks they gave
01:34:50.160 her a commission for
01:34:50.860 selling it to the
01:34:51.440 Russians I don't
01:34:52.900 think she was even
01:34:53.600 getting paid like in
01:34:54.680 dollars or whatever I
01:34:55.980 don't think so I
01:34:57.000 think she just did it
01:34:58.400 for like fashion fair
01:35:00.040 enough well anyway guys
01:35:02.280 make sure to like the
01:35:04.100 video subscribe to
01:35:04.860 the channel check out
01:35:05.500 Angie on her
01:35:06.400 Instagram so Angelica
01:35:07.620 and yeah you want to
01:35:09.520 tell people last word
01:35:10.840 to you yeah you guys
01:35:12.840 keep asking for Chris
01:35:13.800 Dorner we're finding a
01:35:16.360 good documentary for
01:35:17.080 you guys first the
01:35:18.200 one we watched wasn't
01:35:18.920 that good the green
01:35:20.140 river killer although
01:35:23.480 there are some cases
01:35:24.320 that I want to like
01:35:25.080 research a little bit
01:35:26.400 more because I have
01:35:27.300 some cases that I
01:35:28.600 have studied from the
01:35:29.580 past we should do a
01:35:30.320 green river next you
01:35:31.880 think for them yeah
01:35:32.860 we can do that a lot
01:35:35.400 of people have been
01:35:36.040 asking for Lorena
01:35:37.040 Bobbitt John Bobbitt
01:35:38.680 I don't know much
01:35:40.720 about that case so I'll
01:35:41.700 have to research it and
01:35:43.420 yeah man there are a
01:35:44.260 lot of cases someone
01:35:45.260 asked her to do a
01:35:46.300 follow-up on totally
01:35:47.300 Tony Tori Lane is
01:35:49.200 oh Tori Lane's okay
01:35:50.600 with the lawyer somebody
01:35:52.420 okay there must be some
01:35:53.540 new development I
01:35:54.160 haven't kept up with it
01:35:54.940 I'll be honest with y'all
01:35:55.980 so yeah we could
01:35:57.200 definitely do the Tori
01:35:58.360 Lane's thing yeah and
01:35:59.400 alien weird news oh a
01:36:01.020 lot of people are asking
01:36:02.340 for alien weird news oh
01:36:03.300 because we mentioned
01:36:03.940 her on the last pod okay
01:36:05.160 that makes sense yeah she
01:36:06.340 was the first American
01:36:07.300 serial killer that was a
01:36:08.280 female so yeah we could do
01:36:10.200 we could definitely do that
01:36:10.920 one next uh but anyway
01:36:12.340 guys hope you guys
01:36:13.560 enjoyed that like I said
01:36:14.540 before like the video
01:36:15.480 subscribe to the channel
01:36:16.120 check out Angie on
01:36:17.020 Instagram and I'll catch
01:36:18.260 you guys on the next one
01:36:19.260 don't forget to get the
01:36:20.200 book why women deserve
01:36:22.260 less it's live right now
01:36:24.020 Amazon bestseller by the
01:36:25.640 way we're number one in
01:36:26.380 feminist theory which is
01:36:27.280 absolutely hilarious that's
01:36:30.340 the category we're number
01:36:31.160 one in and we're uh top in
01:36:32.800 the top 10 pretty much for
01:36:33.980 self-help and for at least
01:36:36.060 at the time of recording
01:36:36.740 this for self-help and all
01:36:38.240 books on Amazon right now
01:36:39.700 I think we're like number
01:36:40.440 12 right now for all
01:36:41.260 books number eight for
01:36:42.420 self-help and number one
01:36:43.500 in feminist theory so go
01:36:44.560 ahead and get the book
01:36:45.100 guys it's on Kindle and
01:36:46.460 it's also hardcover
01:36:47.780 paperback um it's kind of
01:36:49.380 surprising that you actually
01:36:50.580 like beat Jordan Peterson
01:36:52.540 I know it is kind of crazy
01:36:54.140 I was shocked I beat him
01:36:54.980 and David Goggins man so
01:36:56.040 Don DeMarco for that one
01:36:57.040 Don DeMarco all right man
01:36:59.960 love y'all we'll catch you
01:37:00.900 guys on the next one peace
01:37:02.100 I was a special agent with
01:37:05.940 Homeland Security
01:37:06.340 Investigation
01:37:06.660 interesting
01:37:08.240 you