00:00:53.680Now, let's start with a sort of potentially slaughtering some sacred cows and
00:00:59.440keen for your insight on this. Is the so-called special relationship between Britain and America,
00:01:04.300and even Europe and America, an expensive illusion conjured to make us feel relevant in the world,
00:01:09.940but increasingly costing us dear? It is certainly an illusion, because if you look at the
00:01:16.100geopolitical interests of the countries involved, be it Britain and the United States, or Britain
00:01:21.940and the rest of Europe, or the United States and the rest of Europe, they're not the same interests.
00:01:26.840They are absolutely divergent interests.
00:01:30.160And within Europe, the interests diverge.
00:01:32.380So there is the problem of the EU, which assumes that the critical interests of Poland are the same as the critical interests of Spain, which is fundamentally delusional.
00:01:45.200There is the special relationship of the United States with Israel, which is the only real special relationship that the United States seems to have.
00:01:53.040But to be fair, there are more shared interests between Britain and the United States than with the rest, shall we say.
00:02:05.560Mainly because of the shared Atlantic Basin.
00:02:09.080At the end of the day, the United States and Britain need the Atlantic to be secured and to be controlled in a particular way.
00:02:17.780they have similarities in their political systems, deep similarities in their culture,
00:02:24.440that creates a level of alignment. But today, the United States is not really looking at that.
00:02:30.860And Britain has sort of subordinated her own interests completely to those of the United
00:02:37.140States. In AJP Taylor's book, which I've got here, and which I'm going to quote from,
00:02:44.120He's called the struggle for mastery in Europe.
00:02:47.200He is incredibly evocative about Europe's slide into relative insignificance
00:08:33.180Whereas the reality of it is that the United States set out to absolutely destroy the independence of Europe and the power of Europe with malice, with conviction.
00:08:46.820And the Suez was a great example of that because…
00:08:51.240Tell people what that involved and tell them if they're not aware.
00:08:54.140The Suez crisis basically, there was a bit of nastiness obviously on the part of the British and the French and the Israelis.
00:09:00.960And the three countries partnered together to take over the Suez Canal and make sure that it wasn't in the hands of Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser, who was working with the Soviets and was sort of closer to the Soviets at the time.
00:09:21.780The three cooked up a scheme to take over the Suez Canal, and they did.
00:09:27.000And the British took over the Suez Canal.
00:09:29.280And at that moment, the Americans, instead of siding with the Europeans, sided with the Egyptians and with the Soviet Union.
00:09:37.980And there were two communiques issued, one from Moscow, one from Washington, saying to France and Britain and Israel, you had better back down and give the Egyptians the Suez back, which was a huge humiliation.
00:09:52.700And it meant that the Americans were saying to Britain and France that even jointly, you could not pursue your geopolitical interests independently.
00:10:03.680And the importance of it is obviously the Suez.
00:10:06.140It's the main artery connecting the East and the West.
00:10:09.060And therefore, it's critical to French trade and to British trade.
00:10:12.540That's why the French and the British fought so much over the Suez.
00:10:14.920Yep. But when they were of the same mind to retake it together and keep it away from Abdel Nasser and his Russian allies, the Americans actually turned against them. So that was an enormous slap in the face.
00:10:29.160And also, I would say, just very quickly, extremely significant, given that we're talking here about, for people who don't know, about 1956.
00:10:48.760And so it's incredible that the Americans sided with the Soviets against the British, the French, and the Israelis that early on in the Cold War.
00:10:57.220And that puts to rest the idea that the Americans, when exercising power, leave any space for sentimentality about their relationship with Britain.
00:11:08.640But for British politicians, instead of facing that reality and saying that the answer has to be autonomous British power able to pursue its own interests regardless of what the Americans want, and a restoration of balance of power politics that would say, you know, Britain is looking to threats to her sovereignty, and that does include a united Europe, Russia dominating Europe, and America dominating Europe.
00:11:37.880their response was a lot more emotional.
00:11:42.140No, no, they really do love us and they really do care about us.
00:11:46.120And when you hear from people in D.C. in decision-making circles
00:11:49.440about how do the British behave as allies,
00:11:51.820the answer is they're the best allies in the world
00:11:53.640because all they ask the Americans is, what can we do to help?
00:11:58.500Yeah, and arguably the only post-war figure with any character,
00:12:03.940leading figure with any character in Europe on this point has been Charles de Gaulle,
00:12:08.080who was a little bit more, well, much more guarded of France's interests than I think any
00:12:14.620post-war British prime minister has been of Britain's. So the French took a completely
00:12:18.820different approach. The French did learn their lesson from Suez. And the reason the French have
00:12:26.060energy independence does come from that. The reason the French fight so fiercely when it comes to
00:12:32.720farm subsidies for the French is because they understood that the only way they can be an
00:12:38.260independent operator is to have energy autonomy, food security, and a fully autonomous military
00:12:46.300industrial chain, a vertically integrated military supply chain. And so France produces her own jets,
00:12:53.920France produces her own power, France has full food autonomy. They operate in a way that makes
00:13:02.400sure that they aren't dependent on anyone. And French strategic thinking has been far more
00:13:09.020realistic on that point than British strategic thinking. And it serves them well in every energy
00:13:16.060crisis. And it means that they still have some power projection capabilities. Their technology
00:13:22.400isn't that great. We saw French jets being defeated by Chinese jets in the Pakistan-India
00:13:29.660kerfuffle last year. The French aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle leaves a lot to be desired,
00:13:37.280but it does sail unlike some of the British ones. Right. How do you account for Britain's failure
00:13:43.780to be realistic and succumbing to sort of a kind of post-war sentimentality on the
00:13:51.240significance and depth of the special relationship? I think part of it has to do with the role of
00:13:56.580London as a financial center deeply intertwined with New York, which meant that there were
00:14:03.120special interests that didn't want some kind of political break because it would mean that these
00:14:08.420financial interests would be damaged. I think that's one part of it. The other part of it is
00:14:12.960pure emotion, as you say, that essentially the Americans are just British with a funny accent,
00:14:18.340Which, it is true in many ways, but that isn't how the United States is governed.
00:14:27.880The United States is not governed in a way that has a patrician's benevolent view of Europe.
00:14:38.700It is governed in a far more cutthroat way, in a far more ruthless way, with zero regard.
00:14:45.800If you were to take a Spanish monarch ruling over parts of Italy, he would have a far more
00:14:55.440benevolent view towards the Italians than the ruling classes of the United States have
00:15:00.800towards Britain or the rest of Europe.
00:15:03.860They entertain this special relationship myth, but every president has to be told, look,
00:15:10.260you've just got to say that there is a special relationship because you know, and it's really
00:15:15.000important for them, and the prime minister wouldn't be happy if you didn't. Yes. No, I think
00:15:19.140you're right that it has a lot to do with that sense of kinship, which is definitely real in
00:15:26.400historical and cultural terms. There's no question about that. But from our side, it's a little bit
00:15:31.380more, it has just a much higher emotional resonance. I mentioned Macmillan and Churchill
00:15:36.260earlier. Obviously, you have Churchill's famous speech in Fulton, Missouri, in which he's basically
00:15:41.140encouraging the Americans to pick up the baton of imperial leadership. And as I said earlier,
00:15:47.200there is this hope that the somewhat exhausted British spirit would get a new lease on life by
00:15:53.020entering this vigorous American hegemon post-war. And that's basically what Churchill wanted. It
00:15:57.760probably didn't help that he had an American mother. And then as for Harold McMillan, younger
00:16:02.520Harold McMillan in 1944, who obviously became prime minister later on, but in 1944, he was
00:16:08.780involved in the war effort, primarily in North Africa. And he noted to Richard Crossman famously
00:16:13.800in 1944, he was a classicist by training, Harold Macmillan, and he sort of brought that kind of
00:16:19.220British public schoolboy classicism to it. He said, we are Greeks to the Romans in this American
00:16:28.080empire. And it's vital that Britain acts as the base of operations for America's effort in Europe
00:16:33.500in the same way that the Greek slaves were made use of under the Emperor Claudius. And he literally
00:16:38.680He hilariously uses that analogy, and you think, go on, push that logic a little bit
00:16:43.540further, then relations between the Greeks and the Romans weren't always so easy.
00:22:08.480And I think part of the reality is the internal fighting within the administration between the people who believe the promises of Trump and the permanent state that seems to have taken control of the Trump administration.
00:22:24.020And you constantly see this issue with the United States.
00:22:26.780I wrote a piece a couple of years ago called President Irrelevant, with the argument being that you vote for Bush, Bush promising a more restrained foreign policy than Clinton, and you get Iraq and Afghanistan.
00:22:41.280You vote for Obama, no more super Middle Eastern wars, you get Libya and Syria.
00:22:45.640You vote for Trump, first four years, it goes well.
00:23:09.380And so there is this capacity on the part of the American state to just subdue elected officials.
00:23:19.620And when you see these contradictory signs between the national security strategy that came out in December 2025, which said Europe needs to hold its civilizational decline.
00:23:31.980We need a strong Europe, independent weapons manufacturing, independent capabilities, the capacity to stand up to Russia on its own, etc., etc., etc., anti-immigration, what have you.
00:23:43.780Then you get a Middle Eastern war that is all but guaranteed to trigger waves of additional immigration.
00:23:49.820Yeah, exactly. And just for extra context here, you also at the same time have Trump, first president in a while, talking about America again as an Anglo-Saxon commonwealth.
00:24:00.060He sounds like some, you know, he sounds like some, you know, senator with a top hat from the 1920s when speaking in those terms.
00:31:02.540There is a Greenland priority and an Iceland priority, which is securing the North Atlantic against both Russian and potential Chinese incursions.
00:31:12.100There is the need to maintain an alliance with the United States.
00:31:16.080As an Atlantic power, Britain is too small to go up against America.
00:33:28.060So the question I suppose I would like to ask is, despite the fact that we have left the European Union,
00:33:33.460how much of Britain's geostrategic interests this century do you see as overlapping with the fundamental interests of Europe as a civilization?
00:33:42.500Well, the fundamental interests of Europe as a civilization are to secure the Mediterranean
00:33:46.460and to have an accord with the Russians.
00:34:00.060These are both things that are priorities for Britain.
00:34:04.120These are both things that are extremely important for Britain.
00:34:08.160And so there is this level of alignment there
00:34:11.480but only with a sane and nationalist Europe.
00:34:14.020And within that framework, if you look at things like trade and weapons manufacturing and things of that sort, you have to respect the French model of autonomy.
00:34:26.820But you also have to look realistically and say, there isn't going to be a new Anglo-Franco war.
00:34:33.840There's not going to be another war with France in our lifetimes.
00:34:38.540There is room for military cooperation there.
00:34:41.400There is room for trade cooperation there.
00:34:44.020There is some room within Europe for the original conception of the European economic community.
00:34:51.200The problem is that how do you stop that thing from going insane?
00:34:55.460And becoming about, rather than sort of mutual recognition and getting along,
00:34:59.040it becomes a sort of like rationalist, attempt at harmonization across the board.
00:35:05.460And the rationalist instinct comes directly from their faithlessness.
00:35:08.980it's a direct result of the fact that these are people who don't believe in god and and second
00:35:15.000world war trauma which of course i imagine is linked which which is linked to it i mean one
00:35:19.940of the big consequences the big falsehoods of the narratives of the world war one and world war two
00:35:25.020um is is that this was christian europe no no this was europe setting aside christianity
00:35:33.920to the extent that in the second and third and fourth years
00:37:00.160And I have a question to you on this one.
00:37:01.900You are, of course, a Christian, and the West's Christian heritage may prove a pretty identifying marker in the clash of civilizations envisioned by Huntington, which is only likely to intensify in coming decades.
00:37:17.360But naturally, to compete in this world, which is multipolar now, will require ditching what John Mearsheimer calls liberal dreams in favor of something like Palmerstonian realism, eternal interests, not eternal allies, and all the rest of it.
00:37:31.900But this can sound a little bit amoral, and therefore, to some extent, anti-Christian.
00:37:37.480The secular liberal, of course, believes in human rights, but the traditional Christian
00:37:40.920probably holds to something like natural rights.
00:37:43.860Can the moral dimension, here's the question, of Christianity be married to the obvious
00:37:48.840need to pursue a pretty unsentimental and unflinching foreign policy realism this century?
00:37:54.880I don't think I was just reading Enoch Powell on precisely these kinds of questions.
00:47:23.080So I suppose if we had to sum it up, what you're saying Britain needs is sort of nationalism with respect to demographics, pragmatism with respect to energy resources, realism abroad, all tempered by a renewal of Christian charity.
00:47:39.760I would argue that Christianity is the starting condition to genuine restoration.
00:47:48.180Because what are you restoring Britain for?
00:47:53.520You're restoring it because you love your people.