The Podcast of the Lotus Eaters

00:00:00.000 Hello, and welcome to the podcast of the Lotus Eaters, number 931, if you can believe that.

00:00:08.320 It is the 6th of June in the year 2024, which is exactly 80 years since the Allies invaded

00:00:17.220 Europe, Bastion Europe, towards the end of World War II.

00:00:21.980 And so today, the podcast is going to be a bit different, just a two-man job, and we're

00:00:27.000 not going to have three different segments, we're just going to talk all about D-Day for

00:00:30.600 the whole thing, so it's something a little bit different.

00:00:33.020 And I am joined by Tim Davies.

00:00:35.080 How are you, sir?

00:00:35.700 Yeah, good.

00:00:36.020 Thank you.

00:00:36.560 Brilliant.

00:00:37.180 For anyone who doesn't know, which I can't believe they couldn't, you have got a history in the

00:00:41.120 services.

00:00:42.200 Yes.

00:00:42.820 Yes.

00:00:43.240 20 years, I was a Naval officer, five years, and then an Air Force officer for 15, doing

00:00:47.640 as a fast jet pilot on Tornado Geo 4, based out of Lossy Mouth, and then I instructed for

00:00:52.380 about 10 years on various types of Hawk aircraft.

00:00:55.240 And you have been in combat situations.

00:00:58.760 Well, yeah, no one ever shot at me that I know about, and I never shot at anyone else,

00:01:02.000 hopefully, but yeah, I did two tours of Iraq and a tour of Afghanistan, yeah.

00:01:06.380 Right.

00:01:06.960 Okay, so it's a real pleasure, an honour and a pleasure, as always, to have you on.

00:01:10.660 Yeah.

00:01:10.820 But today, I thought it was particularly apt to speak to somebody with a history in the

00:01:16.340 services, because we're going to talk about one of the most intense days of the 20th century,

00:01:22.640 certainly as far as the Western Allies were concerned.

00:01:26.560 So DJ, the Earth has gone round the sun 80 times since that day, that longest of days.

00:01:33.600 So I just want to talk all about, hopefully, everyone out there won't mind it being a completely

00:01:38.300 different format to usual.

00:01:39.680 But, you know, if we're going to commemorate something, I thought maybe let's do it properly.

00:01:46.200 So I wanted to talk all about sort of the run-up to it, the preparation, the long wait, and

00:01:51.040 the day itself, not really too much after what happened on D-Day.

00:01:54.640 So there's so much to say, I say this on Epoch's a fair bit, there's so much you could

00:01:59.700 say, there's so many books written about it, that even given an hour and 20-odd, we'll

00:02:05.300 miss out a whole bit.

00:02:06.080 So if there's someone out there that is particularly interested in this particular gun emplacement

00:02:10.340 and action that happened there, and I don't even mention it, well, I can only apologise,

00:02:14.320 because there's so much to get through.

00:02:16.040 So let's just dive straight in.

00:02:18.180 No shilling or anything today.

00:02:19.520 Anyway, so by summer of 1944, everyone knew an Allied invasion was coming.

00:02:27.300 In fact, the leaders of the Allies, Churchill and Roosevelt, had been promising Stalin for

00:02:33.060 ages they're going to do it.

00:02:35.400 It's what Stalin wanted more than anything.

00:02:37.000 He was dying for the Allies to invade, to take pressure off the Eastern Front.

00:02:41.600 And so, what, back in Casablanca, Churchill had met with them at Casablanca and at Tehran

00:02:47.440 in 1943, and we'd always promised old Joe, Uncle Joe, that we was going to invade.

00:02:53.100 But the timing of it, this is the first thing I wanted to talk about, the timing of it had

00:02:57.440 to be really quite specific, because if we went too early, we're taking pressure off of

00:03:01.760 Stalin unnecessarily.

00:03:03.380 Because, of course, even though the Soviets were our allies, we want the Soviets and the

00:03:08.340 Nazis to wear each other down as much as possible.

00:03:12.200 So we don't want to go too early, but we can't go too late, because Stalin will end up

00:03:15.580 with Stalin in Paris, right?

00:03:17.760 So the timing of it had to be just so.

00:03:20.840 And anyway, the summer of 1944 was when it was going to happen.

00:03:24.100 But the actual specific timing of the day, when it was going to happen, was dictated largely

00:03:31.300 by the weather.

00:03:33.140 Yeah.

00:03:33.960 Yeah, it will be.

00:03:35.240 Always.

00:03:35.620 So the biggest sort of things to take into account was that the RAF wanted a dark night

00:03:43.240 for the airborne troops, but for a bright moon to come up during that night, so that when

00:03:51.080 the carriers and the gliders, the horses, dropped the men, it was dark.

00:03:55.140 But once they were down, they had some moonlight.

00:03:57.220 And it also needed to be a low tide for the landing crafts and things.

00:04:00.920 And so there was only two, three, four days a month when you would get those conditions.

00:04:08.820 And so in June of 1944, it was going to be the 5th, the 6th or the 7th of June were the

00:04:15.100 only days when you would get that.

00:04:17.840 Otherwise, you'd have to wait until July.

00:04:20.780 But there was really bad storms, some of the worst weather for 20 years in the channel at

00:04:25.520 that point.

00:04:26.100 So it was suboptimal.

00:04:29.360 But you being fast jet pilot, you know how weather is the be or an end all, right?

00:04:34.320 Weather is everything, yeah.

00:04:35.120 Right, yeah.

00:04:36.300 Yeah, I would have gone anywhere because it's a GR4 pilot, that's what we do.

00:04:40.020 But no, you're absolutely right.

00:04:40.920 There was a group captain called Stag, I believe, who was the guy eventually that turned around

00:04:45.380 and said, it's supposed to be on the 5th, of course.

00:04:48.080 He turned around and went, can't go today because there's, I think there was storms lashing

00:04:52.500 the beaches.

00:04:53.480 The sea state was up.

00:04:54.480 The sea state was still up, actually, on the morning of the invasion anyway, because

00:04:57.180 a lot of the duplex drive tanks, the funnies that they put in, a lot of them sank on Omaha

00:05:01.560 Beach, never reached the beach because it was six-foot waves and they were only conditioned

00:05:04.500 to one-foot waves.

00:05:05.680 So yeah, it's a hell of a call that you've got this group captain there that turns around

00:05:08.840 and Montgomery was livid with it, absolutely livid.

00:05:12.400 And it took the other commanders to go, calm down, let's list the load there.

00:05:16.300 But yeah, he wanted to go.

00:05:17.400 And it just shows, I think, personally, the power of the individuals all the way through D-Day

00:05:22.060 is about the individuals.

00:05:23.320 That actually have enough weight to make tangible effects.

00:05:26.980 And so he said, we've got a delay of the day.

00:05:28.180 And they did.

00:05:28.840 Remember, the Air Force was actually airborne at the very end of the 5th anyway, from about

00:05:32.100 10 o'clock, because they did all the weather, the exploratory weather stuff.

00:05:35.580 So they went in and looked at the medium level, high level cloud.

00:05:38.060 They looked at the moon state, make sure that we could have those moons and everything.

00:05:41.380 And then they came back and they were flying across the channel the whole time.

00:05:44.480 And I think when the minesweep was already out at that time, on the 5th, they were already

00:05:49.960 out and they got brought back again.

00:05:51.840 So yeah, absolutely.

00:05:52.760 Everything was about the weather.

00:05:54.240 Just before we carry on with D-Day, just a slight, quick, couldn't a GR4 fly through

00:05:58.460 almost any weather within reason?

00:05:59.940 If there was an electrical storm, you'd still just, it's fine.

00:06:03.360 We'd just go.

00:06:04.040 Yeah, I'll get hit by lightning over northern Iraq.

00:06:05.680 Yeah, it does damage to the airplane.

00:06:07.000 It really does.

00:06:07.540 If you get hit by lightning.

00:06:08.380 But yeah, I mean, there's obviously some weather that you wouldn't want to be involved in.

00:06:12.200 Not only because it moves the aircraft around, don't get me wrong, in the back in those days,

00:06:16.740 of course, weapon-earing, you'd want as much stable airflow as you possibly could.

00:06:19.960 Of course, you need to be in sight at the surface in those days.

00:06:22.360 And in the GR4, again, we could drop on GPS munitions, things like this, but you still,

00:06:27.400 ideally, especially doing close air support, which there was elementary close air support

00:06:31.320 on Normandy itself on those days, a lot of it was quite basic insofar as passing messages

00:06:39.100 to aircraft to relay back to other aircraft.

00:06:40.900 It was very sort of elementary.

00:06:42.380 But yeah, the GR4 was an all-weather airplane, most definitely.

00:06:46.220 In fact, we prefer to go in inclement weather because if I can't see them, they can't see me

00:06:50.120 and therefore they can't target me necessarily in the same way they would do traditionally.

00:06:54.140 Yeah, so it was very different in the 40s where a lot of the gliders are, it's fabric.

00:06:59.660 Madness.

00:07:00.620 Yeah, canvas wing, canvas wing glider.

00:07:03.340 I mean, the horse, I think six of those went into Pegasus Bridge, wasn't it?

00:07:06.960 Other gliders, there's a bigger glider, the glider that carried tanks, like it's an eight-ton glider

00:07:12.280 that carried an eight-ton tank.

00:07:13.700 Who came up with that?

00:07:14.500 You can imagine the design.

00:07:15.360 So you've got, what idea is this, mate?

00:07:16.740 I've got this eight-ton glider, no, glider, eight-ton, it's just incredible.

00:07:21.040 Yeah, absolutely.

00:07:21.640 So you need that, that weather needs, especially for those pilots.

00:07:25.300 They were, those pilots, you don't realise how good the glider pilots were.

00:07:28.620 They were army glider pilots trained by the Royal Air Force.

00:07:30.600 And these guys were known to be like the top, and even then, some of the stories of the

00:07:34.740 glider pilots, just, you've got no choice, have you?

00:07:37.480 We're going to land here, and then we're going to fight our way out of it.

00:07:40.200 Madness.

00:07:40.640 Most of the glider landings are just crash landings.

00:07:43.900 Nearly all of them.

00:07:44.780 All landings are crash landings, but yeah, if you can walk away from, but no, there, they

00:07:47.820 were, and a lot of the glider, a lot of the glider crews were killed.

00:07:51.360 I can't remember which glider it was, but I do remember reading about, someone in the chat

00:07:54.760 will be able to tell us here, they had this issue where sometimes the gliders would land

00:07:58.400 and the heavy kit on the back would go through the cockpit and kill all the pilots, because

00:08:02.400 it would just smash through.

00:08:03.940 And so they put a cable on the back of, on the glider, that lifted the cockpit, I think

00:08:07.300 it was the larger glider, lifted the cockpit out of the way.

00:08:09.580 So that did happen, and the actual vehicle went to the front, the cockpit was lifted up

00:08:13.320 and it missed the cruise.

00:08:14.680 But that was the thing, you were going to hit trees.

00:08:16.280 So many gliders smashed into trees, a lot of people were killed on landing.

00:08:19.740 It's an incredible.

00:08:20.920 Those are people on D-Day, and Operation Market Garden, which is later in the year,

00:08:24.380 which is too far in Holland.

00:08:25.520 Yeah, there'll be like an artillery piece, or part of an artillery piece, or a jeep or

00:08:29.820 something at the back.

00:08:30.760 It crash lands and crashes everyone in it.

00:08:32.980 Yeah, it's sort of really bad.

00:08:34.900 But okay, so talking about the D-Day should have been on the 5th of June, and I could said

00:08:42.780 go, and the giant armada, the giant biggest invasion fleet ever assembled, was within less

00:08:52.260 than 40 metres from the Normandy shoreline.

00:08:55.060 The minesweepers at the very, very front were about 38 miles from Normandy when Ike made

00:09:01.360 the call, no, the weather's too bad.

00:09:04.600 Storms, really.

00:09:05.560 June storms.

00:09:06.520 Turn it all around, which they did.

00:09:09.340 And so really, D-Day was originally slated for the 5th of June.

00:09:13.360 Now, that's a big decision, isn't it, to, like a massive, massive leadership call to

00:09:18.460 turn it round.

00:09:19.240 Because as most people know, once you get sort of a head of steam going, and once the

00:09:24.740 sort of momentum is going, for the biggest invasion at that point known, to turn it round

00:09:29.960 is no small thing.

00:09:31.980 I quite often think of an account from the first Gulf War.

00:09:36.720 There's Bravo 2-0, Bravo 1-0, and Bravo 3-0.

00:09:39.620 One of those, they landed in the Iraqi desert, and the leader of the gang, of SAS guys,

00:09:47.420 just took one look around and said, no, no, this is stupid and suicidal.

00:09:51.980 We're going straight back.

00:09:53.160 Yeah, absolutely.

00:09:54.020 And people said, that's not cowardly.

00:09:56.720 That's one of the bravest decisions we've ever heard of.

00:10:00.260 Yeah, people don't understand that at all.

00:10:01.460 But you're absolutely right.

00:10:02.560 Well, look what happened to Bravo 2-0.

00:10:03.640 Right, exactly.

00:10:04.700 It was the right call to do.

00:10:06.080 It was.

00:10:06.200 And the bravery, because I said this on a podcast the other day, was like, integrity

00:10:10.080 is doing the right thing even when no one's looking.

00:10:12.360 And someone corrected me, and they said, I'll stop you there.

00:10:14.080 It's also doing the right thing when everyone's looking.

00:10:16.760 And that's the sort of thing you don't really consider.

00:10:18.740 That's what leadership's about, is going, I'm going to do the right thing, and it's

00:10:21.800 going to be humiliating.

00:10:23.120 Like, it's going to tear me apart, but it's the right thing.

00:10:25.700 And I think that was a great quote.

00:10:27.700 And you're absolutely right.

00:10:28.260 Get out there and go, I've got the mission.

00:10:30.120 Especially when you know the other patrols probably have gone.

00:10:33.280 That's the thing.

00:10:33.880 And you've gone, yeah, we're not going to go.

00:10:35.620 Because everyone in that team is probably, well, they all default to the boss and go,

00:10:39.040 yeah, all right, boss.

00:10:39.600 But they're all probably thinking, let's get in there, you know.

00:10:42.060 So to stop something that size, 170,000 men or something, crazy numbers.

00:10:46.800 Yeah, 5,000, 4,500 or 5,000 ships.

00:10:49.400 Imagine that weather guy.

00:10:50.480 So Stag stood up there in front of everyone going, okay.

00:10:53.960 Well, I've got a few quick, oh, sorry.

00:10:55.460 No, I'm just saying Montgomery's shouting at him and everything, you know what I mean?

00:10:57.660 It's like, you know, what's going on?

00:10:59.360 Crazy.

00:10:59.680 Yeah, you mentioned Stag.

00:11:00.520 I'll mention him in a bit.

00:11:01.720 I've got a few quotes here from the book by Cornelius Ryan, The Longest Day.

00:11:08.280 There's also a film, a black and white film with John Wayne, Robert Mitchum's in it,

00:11:12.540 a whole bunch of people out there, Richard Burton, loads of people.

00:11:16.780 The film was really good.

00:11:18.400 But the book, the original book by Cornelius Ryan, in my opinion,

00:11:21.180 I think a lot of people would agree, is sort of the gold standard for a history of D-Day.

00:11:25.620 There's been loads of books written.

00:11:27.060 Anthony Beaver's got a great one.

00:11:32.360 Stephen E. Ambrose, who did Band of Brothers, did Pegasus Courage.

00:11:36.440 James Holland.

00:11:37.260 There's so many books.

00:11:39.160 But I think most people would agree.

00:11:40.280 I'm not really going out on a limb to say that Cornelius Ryan's The Longest Day is one of the best ones.

00:11:45.460 And I've read it a couple of times and listened to it on audio book a whole bunch of times.

00:11:50.380 It's superb.

00:11:51.140 That and A Bridge Too Far are just great.

00:11:54.020 I sort of keep returning to them all the time.

00:11:56.140 Anyway, so I've got a few quotes from that book.

00:12:00.520 So first of all, I wanted to draw us back to a moment in time earlier in the year,

00:12:06.460 in about mid-April 1944.

00:12:09.020 And we'll take a look at the Germans' side of the equation.

00:12:14.620 Now, they knew it was coming.

00:12:16.640 It was sort of inevitable.

00:12:18.460 And you can't build up in Britain, as we did, millions of Americans,

00:12:23.240 thousands and thousands of aircraft, thousands of ships,

00:12:26.640 just filling the south of England with ammo dumps and stuff.

00:12:29.980 You can't keep that secret from the Germans.

00:12:32.660 So they knew it was coming.

00:12:34.200 They just didn't know exactly where I went.

00:12:36.000 And they disagreed over what the strategy should be.

00:12:43.280 So in Germany, the overall commander of the West, OB West, was Gert von Rundstedt.

00:12:50.760 And I talked about him in my four-part series I did with Josh,

00:12:54.060 all about Operation Market Garden on Epochs.

00:12:56.020 Check that out.

00:12:57.500 Talked all about him.

00:12:58.660 So he was the overall commander of the West.

00:13:01.780 But he was an old Wehrmacht guy.

00:13:07.300 He wasn't even particularly Nazi.

00:13:08.660 He didn't like Hitler.

00:13:09.760 He was always rude about Hitler.

00:13:11.100 He'd call him that Bavarian corporal and stuff.

00:13:14.620 And he was dismissive of him.

00:13:17.560 There's a picture of von Rundstedt.

00:13:20.200 And so he's the overall guy.

00:13:21.380 But he was sort of old and wasn't really gung-ho enough for Hitler's taste.

00:13:29.040 So he'd said back in 1943, he'd said, I need loads more divisions.

00:13:35.760 It turns out on D-Day, Hitler had something in the order of 60, 65 divisions.

00:13:39.800 Not necessarily brilliant ones.

00:13:41.420 Someone like pressed Polish guys and stuff.

00:13:43.620 Anyway, he had many, many divisions in the West.

00:13:46.820 But von Rundstedt had wanted more.

00:13:49.260 And Hitler, instead of giving him more, sent him Erwin Rommel.

00:13:53.320 He made Erwin Rommel a field marshal.

00:13:58.300 Von Rundstedt is a field marshal.

00:14:00.300 He made Rommel a field marshal and put him as second in command, effectively, under von Rundstedt.

00:14:06.000 Put him in charge of Army Group B.

00:14:09.920 So he's inferior in rank to von Rundstedt.

00:14:13.680 But he basically got to make all the calls.

00:14:18.120 Because whenever his ideas clashed with Rundstedt, Rommel would just say, well, I've got the ear of Hitler.

00:14:27.240 And Hitler gave me completely elastic orders to do whatever I want.

00:14:30.820 You can take it up with Hitler if you don't like what I'm doing.

00:14:32.660 Yeah, brilliant.

00:14:32.960 And Rundstedt never did.

00:14:34.620 Right.

00:14:35.000 Because he was, in his mind, the way he operated was always, I might hate the political overlords and not even really be on board with sort of the National Socialist Programme.

00:14:46.080 But they are the rulers and the leaders.

00:14:48.500 And I'm a military officer, albeit an extremely senior one.

00:14:51.660 Whatever they tell me to do, I've got to do.

00:14:53.640 I'm obliged by duty to do.

00:14:55.620 So if Hitler wants Rommel, my inferior, to actually be calling the strategic and tactical shots, I just sort of let it happen.

00:15:02.420 So in other words, long story short, Rommel's really in command in the West.

00:15:07.640 Although Rommel is above him.

00:15:09.940 Now there's two big, I've mentioned Army Group B, there are two big armies, the 15th Army and the 7th Army.

00:15:15.960 Because in theory, we could have invaded anywhere from Holland, all the way down through Belgium, the whole French coast, all the way down to the Pyrenees.

00:15:24.880 Yes, we could.

00:15:25.380 We could have.

00:15:26.100 Yes.

00:15:27.160 But everyone thought we were going to invade at Calais, the Tardes Calais.

00:15:30.300 And so the Germans had put their best, strongest army, the 15th Army, there.

00:15:36.380 And the 7th Army was defending Normandy.

00:15:40.120 And so they're the guys that actually do get it, the 7th Army.

00:15:42.040 So, I mean, just to say about that, we went through massive, massive amounts of deception.

00:15:50.540 We did.

00:15:51.020 To make them think we were going to attack at Calais.

00:15:53.080 Yeah, it was bodyguard, it was not fortitude.

00:15:54.520 And that really led to the success from a guy who was codenamed Garbo, which was Juan Garcia, Pajul Cazir, I think it was, which is a Spanish national who decided one morning to walk into the British Embassy, I think in London, and say, I want to be a spy.

00:16:13.300 And they told him he was mad as a stick to go away.

00:16:15.500 So he went back to Spain and he walked into the German sort of consulate in Madrid, I believe.

00:16:20.400 I can't remember exactly where it was.

00:16:21.440 It was in Spain.

00:16:22.100 He said, I want to spy for you guys.

00:16:24.560 And he was sick, of course, of the whole Spanish Civil War and everything else.

00:16:27.020 So he really wanted to help out the British primarily.

00:16:30.640 And the Germans went, all right, we'll go and make, if I remember correctly, they said, go and tell us all the dispositions of all the Royal Air Force aircraft and squadrons.

00:16:37.920 So he went, all right, then.

00:16:38.940 So he actually left, he went down to the coast.

00:16:41.640 He didn't get on a boat at all.

00:16:42.600 And he sat, he got a job in a library and he just read loads of books and he made up loads of stuff.

00:16:47.100 He just made up loads of stuff.

00:16:48.000 The guy's mind was incredible.

00:16:49.180 And he just made up loads of dispositions and he took it back to the Germans and they went, oh, that's pretty good.

00:16:53.760 And so he took that.

00:16:54.440 Now he's working with the Germans.

00:16:55.440 He went then back to the British and went, I've got all this information.

00:16:57.920 And the British went, crikey.

00:16:59.080 And he became a double agent and worked for the British.

00:17:01.320 And Op Fortitude, a lot of Op Fortitude was him making up stories about all these people he had around the UK, feeding him information about troop movements.

00:17:08.160 He was making up like landing craft on Windermere that didn't exist, like testing landing craft.

00:17:13.060 Like, how did he even know about Windermere?

00:17:14.280 This guy was incredible.

00:17:15.040 So, and he passed this stuff to the Germans and said, the Germans felt that there was a massive buildup in clay.

00:17:19.740 Of course, we had all the blow up tanks, didn't we?

00:17:21.880 We found how we could use rubber in America, I think it was.

00:17:25.420 Brought it back, blew up these tanks, people carrying tanks down the road.

00:17:28.000 And these things were really realistic, weren't they?

00:17:29.460 All the trucks.

00:17:30.440 And so it looked as if we were amassing down there.

00:17:32.520 And there was also, remember the, I think like the daily, well, newspapers, Daily Express something was writing stuff in there about movements,

00:17:37.820 about, wasn't it that they brought, I don't know, I might be wrong here because I don't know this,

00:17:41.840 but didn't they bring Patton in or something?

00:17:43.600 That's it, yeah.

00:17:44.220 They pretended that Patton was going to be running like this operation from like Dover, basically.

00:17:49.900 Yeah.

00:17:50.140 And the Germans thought, well, if, you know, they're bringing someone as important as him in,

00:17:53.240 it must be coming out of Dover.

00:17:55.100 Yeah.

00:17:55.520 Incredible stuff.

00:17:56.160 That, I mean, that Garbo guy is fascinating.

00:17:59.220 It's a classic sort of espionage thing, sort of double, double agent, just, yeah, fascinating guy.

00:18:05.920 Anyway, we were just feeding the Germans all kind of misinformation.

00:18:09.380 Yeah.

00:18:09.500 Apparently, in Cornelius Ryan, he says that something along the lines of every German agent from Norway to Istanbul

00:18:19.180 had been fed a different time and place that we were going to attack.

00:18:23.680 Because we did largely catch them off guard, incredibly.

00:18:28.480 And, but yeah, so we made out that there's like this whole invasion, expeditionary forces under Patton.

00:18:34.100 It was massing at Dover with sort of massive tank divisions.

00:18:39.260 And we'd been sort of fairly openly talking about it where we knew it'd get intercepted by the Germans.

00:18:45.020 And yeah, like you say, loads of these sort of blow up tanks and trucks and all sorts of things.

00:18:51.880 We had like a whole sort of small team of people just working on that perception.

00:18:57.300 We did.

00:18:57.580 And they did tank tracks and everything.

00:18:59.460 So it looked as if these things are real.

00:19:01.120 It's incredible from the air.

00:19:02.120 And also, I mean, as you said, I think one of the major parts is that communication thing as well,

00:19:07.820 to think that we're coming out of somewhere else.

00:19:09.600 But the other thing people don't realize is how we, because I didn't fully realize this,

00:19:12.240 how do you hide the main invasion going out of the South Coast?

00:19:15.760 How do you hide this stuff?

00:19:16.920 And a lot of it was just done in buildings and under camouflage

00:19:19.840 and just hiding this massive force that was gathering.

00:19:23.080 That's what I find incredible.

00:19:24.220 Not so much the blow up tanks.

00:19:25.320 How do you hide the main force?

00:19:26.420 Yeah.

00:19:26.900 Amazing.

00:19:27.860 I mean, they were thinking that it's, yeah,

00:19:30.960 because every port along the South Coast was filled.

00:19:33.720 Yeah, yeah.

00:19:34.240 Germans mainly thought, yeah, it's going to amass at some point at Dover and jump across to Calais.

00:19:40.240 And we've been sort of saturation bombing Calais and the environs around Calais for days and days and days.

00:19:46.460 Again, to give the impression that that's what we're, we're peppering it up because that's where we're going to attack.

00:19:50.720 We're doing South of Normandy as well, but you couldn't just do, to cut the MSRs, the main supply routes coming into Normandy.

00:19:56.000 We've been hammering that because we also had to hammer South of Calais as well to make it look as if we're trying to isolate that.

00:20:02.140 Because you couldn't not cut off those supply routes.

00:20:04.400 You had to do that.

00:20:05.200 But yes, absolutely.

00:20:06.000 You had to do Calais as well.

00:20:07.040 And it seems like they bought it.

00:20:09.480 Certainly, well, von Rundstedt, Rommel and Hitler all thought that it would be Calais.

00:20:18.180 In fact, there's one bit of information that long before it actually happened, Hitler was one of the few people who thought it would be Normandy.

00:20:24.660 And over the months was convinced that, no, it must be Calais.

00:20:27.380 Anyway, so, but Rommel was wrong.

00:20:29.280 But I want to take us to a moment back in April of 44, where Rommel is looking out over the beaches with his assistant and adjutant, Lang, Captain Lang.

00:20:43.060 And he said this, this is Rommel's words.

00:20:46.720 He said, quote, the war will be won or lost on the beaches.

00:20:50.220 We'll have only one chance to stop the enemy.

00:20:52.760 And that's while he's in the water struggling to get ashore.

00:20:55.040 Reserves will never get up to the point of attack, and it's foolish even to consider them.

00:20:59.600 The main line of resistance will be here.

00:21:01.840 Everything we have must be on the coast.

00:21:04.240 Believe me, Lang, the first 24 hours of the invasion will be decisive.

00:21:07.900 For the Allies, as well as Germany, it will be the longest day.

00:21:12.660 Yeah.

00:21:13.680 So I mentioned that they had a disagreement over strategy.

00:21:17.260 So von Rundstedt thought that if you keep massed armies, or even army groups and things, right on the coast, the Allies will just keep peppering them from the air, because we had largely air superiority by this point.

00:21:32.560 And the combined Royal Navy and American Navy, when they attack their sort of naval batteries, they'll be able to just annihilate everything if we keep it on the coast.

00:21:42.540 What we should do is sort of effectively allow them to get bridgeheads, and then we'll counterattack.

00:21:49.380 That's the best way.

00:21:50.620 That's the most efficient way to do it.

00:21:52.860 We can't stop them if they push and try hard enough.

00:21:56.280 We can't stop them from gaining bridgeheads.

00:21:59.260 So effectively concede that, and we'll have the actual battles just a little inland to begin with.

00:22:06.000 That was his thinking.

00:22:07.160 Rommel said, as he said there, no, no, we've got to shoot them up whilst they're wading through the water.

00:22:12.540 That's the time.

00:22:14.080 That's the best place.

00:22:15.100 Obviously, Rommel, I guess, was right, wasn't he?

00:22:17.380 Well, Hitler agreed with Rommel, and he probably was right.

00:22:20.080 Yeah.

00:22:20.320 I mean, I'm not an expert on that at all, but yeah, it sounds pretty legit, doesn't it?

00:22:23.400 The thing is, though, so Hitler had this concept of the Atlantic Wall.

00:22:27.620 That's right.

00:22:28.340 From Norway all the way down, wasn't it?

00:22:29.580 Yeah.

00:22:30.020 We're going to build this idea of Bastion Europe.

00:22:32.140 That's right.

00:22:32.520 Apparently, he was, and quote, obsessed with the concept.

00:22:37.860 But the thing is, it doesn't really work.

00:22:39.900 If you look at the Maginot line or something, with defenses like that, one, you can either

00:22:45.160 go round it at some point.

00:22:47.080 Yeah.

00:22:47.680 Or, if you push hard enough and break through, well, then that's the whole ballgame again.

00:22:52.880 So you could spend years and untold amounts of treasure and energy to build something like

00:22:57.340 the Maginot line or the Atlantic Wall.

00:22:58.800 But once it's breached, that's it.

00:23:03.220 All that effort and money is...

00:23:04.960 It was like the walls of Carthage, wasn't it?

00:23:06.320 Same thing, going through those walls, wasn't it?

00:23:08.140 And before, when you get in, then you...

00:23:09.520 Yeah, I guess so.

00:23:10.260 I guess that must be it.

00:23:10.900 But you can understand his thinking.

00:23:13.220 And, of course, we think of it as a legitimate wall.

00:23:15.820 But when you look at what the wall was, especially, it's not a wall as such.

00:23:18.440 It's just these points.

00:23:19.640 I think on Omaha, there were five exits, weren't there?

00:23:21.680 If I remember, and I might be wrong, five points you can get off that beach.

00:23:24.700 They were called the exits.

00:23:25.640 And, of course, how do you bridge these?

00:23:27.900 These are natural gullies.

00:23:28.560 You know what I mean?

00:23:29.040 So you can't build a wall around the whole of Europe.

00:23:32.220 But it's a fortified area, isn't it?

00:23:34.700 So if people do get through, then you've got these pockets where you can attack them, I guess.

00:23:39.460 Just to be clear, the Atlantic Wall is nothing like a continuous Great Wall of China.

00:23:44.420 Not at all.

00:23:45.120 No, no, no, no, no, no.

00:23:46.040 Just a string of defensive points and all sorts of concrete bunkers and all sorts of things.

00:23:50.360 But it's not a wall.

00:23:52.860 The word wall is used metaphorically there.

00:23:55.820 But when Rommel was sent there in late 1943, the German propaganda that Rommel himself had believed was that the Atlantic Wall was already built.

00:24:05.820 And it was sort of impregnable.

00:24:08.720 And Rommel gets them.

00:24:09.960 It's like, it's half done.

00:24:11.100 Yeah.

00:24:11.420 In places it's really not.

00:24:12.980 I need loads more guns and mines.

00:24:15.700 Rommel was also obsessed, and that's a quote, with the concept of mines as a defensive weapon.

00:24:20.780 By the time of June, 1944, there was in the order of maybe three million mines, land and sea mines.

00:24:28.660 But he wanted 60 million if he'd got his way.

00:24:31.900 Crazy.

00:24:32.200 So, yeah, so Rommel and Voronstadt disagreed on exactly how to do it, but Rommel sort of would always get his way.

00:24:41.260 Yeah, so another quick thing to say then about sort of the state of the war from the German point of view at this point.

00:24:48.980 So Rome falls on the 5th of June.

00:24:53.880 Allied troops get into Rome on that day.

00:24:57.400 It's actually quiet over these, if you can believe that.

00:25:00.480 On the eastern front with the Russians, it's sort of all quiet.

00:25:03.320 There was a late thaw, apparently.

00:25:04.800 The Soviets are in Poland by this point.

00:25:07.040 They're already in Poland.

00:25:08.740 There was a late thaw in 1944.

00:25:11.560 And so the summer offensive, the Soviet summer offensive of 1944 hadn't kicked off yet.

00:25:15.640 So it's actually all a bit quiet on the eastern front.

00:25:18.260 But in Italy, it's done sort of thing.

00:25:23.360 And then this happens.

00:25:24.360 Now, the Germans really didn't think Ike would attack on the 6th or the 5th or the 6th because the weather was so bad.

00:25:34.560 It was storms.

00:25:35.380 It was stormy.

00:25:36.480 He delayed it for a day because the weather was so bad.

00:25:38.460 But on the 6th, it wasn't much better.

00:25:39.620 But he had to go, or he felt he had, because otherwise you'd have to put it back to July and then the cat really would be out of the bag.

00:25:51.160 You'd have to keep hundreds of thousands of men on boats that whole time.

00:25:56.240 It's not really doable, not really practicable to do that.

00:25:59.980 So he sort of felt that he had to go on the 6th.

00:26:05.840 I've got a fairly long couple of paragraphs here, again, from the longest day, talking about the run-up to it and possible leaks.

00:26:12.420 And also, a little bit of an insight into Ike, Dwight D. Eisenhower, the Supreme Commander, if anyone might not know, goes on to be President of the United States in the 50s.

00:26:24.440 So I'm interested in Ike.

00:26:26.840 I think most people that are interested in World War II, you know, you read a little bit about Stalin and Hitler and Churchill and Roosevelt.

00:26:34.500 And then you go down to sort of the next most important people, someone like Ike.

00:26:39.740 So I'm always sort of fascinated by him and his character and what he's really like.

00:26:44.100 Anyway, I've got a couple of paragraphs here.

00:26:46.500 It might take a few minutes to read out, but I think it's one of the best sort of segments in The Longest Day.

00:26:51.140 So Cornelius Ryan wrote this.

00:26:52.600 And now on this 10th Sunday, June the 4th, because June the 6th was a Tuesday.

00:26:59.320 So on the 4th, a 10th Sunday, Supreme Headquarters was stunned by the news that there had been yet another leak.

00:27:06.200 Earlier in the book, he talked about the odd general here or there who at Claridge's had let something slip.

00:27:12.020 It's sort of impossible to keep secrets for very long when maybe thousands of people, only a handful of people knew the exact time and date.

00:27:21.380 But lots and lots of people knew it was coming.

00:27:23.960 And anyway, to keep something a secret like that is near impossible.

00:27:28.340 So, yeah, Ike, here's of yet another leak.

00:27:31.260 Far worse than any that had occurred before.

00:27:33.320 During the night, an AP teletype operator had been practicing on an idle machine in an effort to improve her speed.

00:27:39.540 By error, the perforated type carrying her practice flash somehow preceded the usual nightly Russian communique.

00:27:45.720 It was corrected after only 30 seconds, but the word was out.

00:27:49.120 The bulletin that reached the U.S. read,

00:27:53.080 Urgent Press Associates NYK Flash Eisenhower's HQ announced Allied landings in France.

00:28:00.380 Grave as the consequences of the message might prove to be, it was much too late to do anything about it now.

00:28:05.780 The gigantic machinery of the invasion had moved into high gear.

00:28:09.160 Now, as the hours slipped by and the weather steadily worsened, the greatest airborne and amphibious force ever assembled waited for General Eisenhower's decision.

00:28:17.580 Would Ike confirm June the 6th as D-Day or would he be compelled, because of channel weather, the worst in 20 years, to postpone the invasion once again?

00:28:27.200 In a rain-lashed wood 20 miles from the naval headquarters at Southwick House, which is in Hampshire, north of Portsmouth, about five miles north of Portsmouth.

00:28:36.240 Very nice place, actually.

00:28:39.120 At Southwick House, the American had to make that decision, wrestled with the problem

00:28:45.520 and tried to relax in his sparsely furnished three-and-a-half-ton trailer.

00:28:51.240 Although he could have moved into more comfortable quarters at the big, sprawling Southwick House, Eisenhower had decided against it.

00:28:58.080 He wanted to be as close as possible to the ports where his troops were loading.

00:29:02.020 Several days before, he had ordered a small, compact battle headquarters set-up,

00:29:06.240 a few tents for his immediate staff and several trailers,

00:29:09.980 among them his own, which he had long ago named his Circus Wagon.

00:29:13.540 Eisenhower's trailer, a long, low caravan, somewhat resembling a moving van,

00:29:18.420 had three small compartments, serving as a bedroom, living room and study.

00:29:22.500 Besides these, neatly fitted into the trailer's length, was a tiny galley, a miniature switchboard,

00:29:28.180 a chemical toilet, and at one end, a glass-enclosed observation deck.

00:29:32.820 But the Supreme Commander was rarely around long enough to make full use of the trailer.

00:29:38.560 He hardly ever made use of the living room or the study.

00:29:40.760 When staff conferences were called, he generally held them in a tent next to the trailer.

00:29:45.960 Only his bedroom had a lived-in look.

00:29:47.920 It was definitely his.

00:29:49.140 There was a large pile of Western paperbacks, like Western cowboy novels.

00:29:55.500 Ike loved cowboy novels.

00:29:56.600 So there was a stack of those on a table near his bunk.

00:30:03.440 And here, too, were the only pictures, photographs of his wife, Mamie,

00:30:07.100 and his 21-year-old son, John, in the uniform of a West Point cadet.

00:30:10.940 From this trailer, Eisenhower commanded almost three million Allied troops.

00:30:15.820 More than half of this immense command were American,

00:30:18.740 roughly 1.7 million soldiers, sailors, airmen and Coast Guard men.

00:30:22.320 British and Canadian forces together totaled around one million,

00:30:26.200 and in addition, they were fighting French, Polish, Czech, Belgian, Norwegian and Dutch contingents.

00:30:32.720 Never before had an American commanded so many men from so many nations,

00:30:37.600 or shouldered such an awesome burden of responsibility.

00:30:40.500 Yet despite the magnitude of his assignment and his vast powers,

00:30:43.940 there was little about this tall, sunburnt Midwesterner

00:30:46.680 with the infectious grin to indicate that he was the Supreme Commander.

00:30:50.220 Unlike many other famous Allied commanders who were instantly recognisable

00:30:54.360 by some visible trademark, such as an eccentric headgear

00:30:57.900 or garish uniforms layered shoulder-high with decorations,

00:31:02.600 everything about Eisenhower was restrained.

00:31:05.040 Apart from the four stars of his rank,

00:31:06.920 a single ribbon of decoration above his breast pocket,

00:31:10.280 and a flaming sword shoulder patch of Schaaf,

00:31:12.880 Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force,

00:31:15.300 Eisenhower shunned all distinguishing marks.

00:31:17.140 Even in the trailer, there was little evidence of his authority.

00:31:21.160 No flags, maps, framed directives or signed photographs

00:31:24.520 of the great or near-great who often visited him.

00:31:27.660 But in his bedroom, close to his bunk,

00:31:29.580 were three small important telephones, each a different colour.

00:31:33.280 The red was for scrambled calls to Washington,

00:31:37.160 the green was a direct line to Winston Churchill's residence

00:31:39.820 at No. 10 Downing Street, London,

00:31:41.260 and the black connected him to his brilliant chief of staff,

00:31:44.800 Major General Walter Bedell-Smith.

00:31:46.600 He'll come up again.

00:31:47.720 Later went on to be head of the CIA before Alan Dulles,

00:31:51.040 one of his closest confidants.

00:31:54.020 Yeah, Walter Bedell-Smith,

00:31:55.480 the immediate headquarters and other senior members

00:31:57.680 of the high command on this black telephone.

00:32:01.160 It was on the black phone,

00:32:03.000 to add to all his other worries,

00:32:04.320 that Eisenhower heard of the erroneous flash

00:32:06.340 concerning the landings.

00:32:07.940 He said nothing when he was told the news.

00:32:09.740 His naval aide, Captain Harry C. Butcher,

00:32:12.540 recalls that the Supreme Commander

00:32:14.440 merely grunted an acknowledgement,

00:32:16.740 what was there to say or do now.

00:32:18.860 Four months before,

00:32:20.100 in the directive appointing him Supreme Commander,

00:32:22.560 the combined chiefs of staff in Washington

00:32:24.280 had spelled out his assignment in one precise paragraph.

00:32:27.840 It read,

00:32:28.980 You will enter the continent of Europe

00:32:30.520 and in conjunction with the other allied nations

00:32:33.160 undertake operations aimed at the heart of Germany

00:32:36.540 and the destruction of her armed forces.

00:32:38.620 There, in one sentence,

00:32:40.540 was the aim and purpose of the assault.

00:32:42.640 End quote.

00:32:44.500 So, a lot said there.

00:32:45.980 Sorry, quite a long quote.

00:32:47.280 But, a little bit of an insight,

00:32:49.740 you know, painting a picture of Ike

00:32:51.880 and his trailer

00:32:52.880 that he liked to use at this point in the war anyway.

00:32:56.740 And that he was modest.

00:32:57.800 He was sort of quite modest.

00:32:59.520 Yeah, I suppose some of the best leaders are.

00:33:02.460 Didn't we think that a lot of leaks had happened

00:33:04.500 from when the practice landings had happened

00:33:06.660 down in Devon

00:33:07.480 and they'd been targeted and they'd buy U-boats

00:33:09.860 and they worried that some of the men there

00:33:11.340 had been picked up in the U-boats

00:33:12.920 and they thought they may well have given

00:33:14.240 the intentions away

00:33:16.840 but then they went,

00:33:17.500 hang on, we can't run on that anyway

00:33:19.680 so let's just disregard it.

00:33:21.240 But yeah, that was always a worry, wasn't it?

00:33:22.800 It's funny that from the German side,

00:33:24.880 they, it seems to me

00:33:26.760 they just got fixated with the idea

00:33:28.720 that it had to be Calais.

00:33:32.060 Yeah, and I don't know,

00:33:32.960 I mean, this is the thing,

00:33:33.840 there's better, I mean,

00:33:34.540 crikey, I think Anthony Beaver

00:33:35.380 writes some of this, doesn't he?

00:33:36.140 Doesn't he?

00:33:36.560 But it's, if you look at it,

00:33:38.820 it would make more sense.

00:33:40.240 Oh yeah.

00:33:40.540 Because it, I mean,

00:33:41.740 you look at the distance of the channel,

00:33:43.460 150 miles, is it?

00:33:45.220 And then you're going to put swimming tanks in

00:33:46.620 and they're going to swim ashore.

00:33:47.960 It's like, I'll stop you there.

00:33:48.720 What about tanks swimming?

00:33:49.920 Yeah, no, I've got this great idea.

00:33:51.000 Swimming tanks are going to swim ashore.

00:33:53.100 And of course, a lot of them sank, didn't they?

00:33:54.380 But yeah, I mean, it's,

00:33:56.460 the easier thing would be

00:33:57.320 to nip across to Calais.

00:33:59.640 So the German thinking was,

00:34:01.480 it will be at Calais

00:34:02.600 and it will be in good weather.

00:34:03.980 Yeah.

00:34:04.360 The Allies never really,

00:34:05.900 in North Africa and Sicily and Italy,

00:34:07.800 we'd always wait for good weather,

00:34:09.360 pretty much always.

00:34:09.980 Yeah.

00:34:10.380 Particularly because of the aircraft.

00:34:13.060 You need clear skies.

00:34:14.580 So the German thinking was,

00:34:16.500 so it's going to be at Calais

00:34:17.340 and it's going to be during good weather.

00:34:19.100 Apparently a lot of May

00:34:20.320 had been very good weather.

00:34:22.340 And because we didn't attack in May,

00:34:25.380 they thought,

00:34:26.460 oh, they're not going to attack now

00:34:27.640 in storms.

00:34:29.080 And they're not going to do it

00:34:29.940 at Normandy.

00:34:31.900 So really,

00:34:33.660 we did catch them off guard a bit,

00:34:35.600 both in the timing

00:34:37.360 and the place.

00:34:38.300 Yeah, a lot of forces

00:34:39.180 had been moved away,

00:34:40.020 hadn't they,

00:34:40.260 from the area,

00:34:40.900 back over towards Germany,

00:34:42.800 I believe.

00:34:43.240 Although there were some

00:34:43.840 SS Panzer divisions in depth,

00:34:45.420 weren't there?

00:34:46.060 There were seven divisions

00:34:46.780 of heavy tanks there

00:34:47.880 or something outside Kahn.

00:34:49.680 Yeah,

00:34:49.820 and the 15th Army

00:34:50.840 had a couple of

00:34:51.960 Panzer divisions

00:34:52.960 and when it all went down

00:34:55.020 on the 6th,

00:34:55.640 the 7th Army asked for them

00:34:57.180 and they don't get them.

00:34:58.900 No, they don't.

00:34:59.460 But I'll go into the detail of that

00:35:00.920 when we come up to you.

00:35:01.520 Yeah,

00:35:01.700 they couldn't be resupplied either,

00:35:02.740 could they?

00:35:02.980 That's one of the things

00:35:03.520 the Air Force did

00:35:03.960 was hit in depth

00:35:04.760 to really hit any kind of supply

00:35:06.620 that was coming up

00:35:07.300 towards that area.

00:35:08.460 I think that's one of the things

00:35:09.500 that really stalled it.

00:35:10.380 But yeah,

00:35:10.580 fascinating stuff.

00:35:12.720 So I've got another

00:35:13.800 sort of long quote here

00:35:15.420 and I've got a few more quotes

00:35:17.040 but it's the last one

00:35:17.840 that's very long.

00:35:19.300 But I wanted to read it out

00:35:20.240 because it's sort of

00:35:21.080 everything that,

00:35:24.040 again,

00:35:24.260 Cornelius Ryan's very good

00:35:25.140 at sort of

00:35:26.140 painting a picture

00:35:26.800 and making it about

00:35:27.520 the humans

00:35:28.280 and giving you a scene.

00:35:31.060 No wonder

00:35:31.360 some of his books

00:35:32.320 were made into movies

00:35:33.180 because they're quite cinematic.

00:35:34.460 Right.

00:35:34.760 And it's about

00:35:35.740 the final decision

00:35:37.280 to pull the trigger

00:35:40.360 and do it.

00:35:42.000 And we get to see,

00:35:43.240 you mentioned Stagg in there

00:35:44.660 and we get to see

00:35:45.600 Monty as well

00:35:47.000 in this quote.

00:35:49.080 So I'll read it out.

00:35:51.400 Cornelius Ryan says,

00:35:52.700 quote,

00:35:53.140 shortly before 9.30

00:35:54.460 that night,

00:35:55.380 oh sorry,

00:35:55.800 the night of the 5th,

00:35:57.540 Eisenhower's senior commanders

00:35:59.060 and their chiefs of staff

00:36:00.360 gathered in the library

00:36:01.520 of Southwick House.

00:36:02.980 It was a large,

00:36:04.000 comfortable room

00:36:04.860 with a table

00:36:05.720 covered by a green

00:36:06.900 baize cloth,

00:36:08.320 several easy chairs

00:36:09.180 and two sofas,

00:36:10.680 dark oak woodcases

00:36:11.900 lined at three of the walls,

00:36:14.240 but there were a few,

00:36:15.060 but there were a few books

00:36:16.220 on the shelves

00:36:16.860 and the room

00:36:17.580 had a bare look.

00:36:19.040 Heavy double blackout curtains

00:36:20.480 hung at the windows

00:36:21.340 and on this night

00:36:22.440 they muffled

00:36:22.940 the drumming

00:36:23.400 of the rain

00:36:23.980 and the flat buckling

00:36:25.880 sound of the wind.

00:36:27.580 Standing about

00:36:28.220 in the room

00:36:28.720 in little groups,

00:36:29.440 the staff officers

00:36:30.700 talked quietly.

00:36:32.320 Near the fireplace,

00:36:33.320 Eisenhower's chief of staff,

00:36:34.800 Major General Walter Bedell Smith,

00:36:36.720 conversed with the pipe-smoking

00:36:38.420 deputy supreme commander,

00:36:40.560 Air Chief Marshal Tedder.

00:36:42.540 Seated to one side

00:36:43.500 was the fiery

00:36:44.440 Allied naval commander,

00:36:46.120 Admiral Ramsey,

00:36:47.460 and close by,

00:36:48.500 the Allied air commander,

00:36:49.680 Air Chief Marshal Lee Mallory.

00:36:52.000 Only one other officer

00:36:53.320 was dressed informally,

00:36:55.600 General Smith recalls.

00:36:57.220 The peppery Montgomery,

00:36:58.600 who would be in charge

00:36:59.940 of the D-Day assault,

00:37:01.540 wore his usual

00:37:02.240 corduroy slacks

00:37:03.240 and roll-neck sweater.

00:37:05.420 These were the men

00:37:06.180 who would translate

00:37:07.080 the order to attack

00:37:07.980 when Eisenhower

00:37:08.700 gave the word to go.

00:37:10.380 Now they

00:37:10.920 and their staff officers,

00:37:12.300 altogether there were

00:37:13.040 twelve senior officers

00:37:13.980 in the room,

00:37:14.860 awaited the arrival

00:37:15.720 of the Supreme Commander

00:37:16.840 and the decisive conference

00:37:18.380 that would begin

00:37:19.220 at 9.30.

00:37:21.020 At that time,

00:37:22.240 they would hear

00:37:22.640 the latest forecasts

00:37:23.700 of the meteorologists.

00:37:25.560 At exactly 9.30,

00:37:26.760 the door opened

00:37:27.500 and Eisenhower,

00:37:29.020 neat in his dark green

00:37:30.220 battle dress,

00:37:31.080 strode in.

00:37:32.120 There was just

00:37:32.600 the faintest flicker

00:37:33.560 of the old Eisenhower grin

00:37:35.000 as he greeted

00:37:35.900 his old friends,

00:37:36.920 but the mask of worry

00:37:38.000 quickly returned

00:37:38.760 to his face

00:37:39.420 as he opened the conference.

00:37:41.320 There was no need

00:37:41.960 for a preamble.

00:37:43.220 Everyone knew

00:37:43.800 the seriousness

00:37:44.300 of the decision

00:37:45.540 that had to be made.

00:37:46.740 So almost immediately,

00:37:48.180 the three senior

00:37:48.840 overlord meteorologists,

00:37:50.340 overlord is the codename

00:37:51.460 for the,

00:37:52.120 if anyone doesn't know,

00:37:52.940 for the actual,

00:37:53.800 overlord's the actual attack

00:37:55.180 and Neptune

00:37:55.740 was the naval element

00:37:57.360 of it.

00:37:58.940 So the three senior

00:37:59.900 overlord meteorologists

00:38:01.680 came in,

00:38:02.700 led by their chief,

00:38:04.180 group captain,

00:38:04.920 J.M. Stagg

00:38:05.740 of the Royal Air Force,

00:38:07.740 came into the room.

00:38:10.360 There was a hushed silence

00:38:11.580 as Stagg opened

00:38:12.660 the briefing.

00:38:13.640 Quickly,

00:38:14.020 he sketched

00:38:14.560 the weather picture

00:38:15.180 of the previous 24 hours

00:38:16.580 and then he quietly said,

00:38:18.580 gentlemen,

00:38:19.360 there have been

00:38:19.760 some rapid

00:38:20.260 and unexpected developments

00:38:21.460 in the situation.

00:38:22.860 All eyes were on Stagg now

00:38:24.300 as he presented

00:38:25.600 the anxious-faced Eisenhower

00:38:27.320 and his commanders

00:38:28.640 with a slender ray of hope.

00:38:30.760 A new weather front

00:38:31.460 had been spotted

00:38:32.160 which he said

00:38:32.860 would move up the channel

00:38:33.800 within the next few hours

00:38:35.020 and cause a gradual clearing

00:38:36.660 over the assault areas.

00:38:38.260 These improving conditions

00:38:39.340 would last

00:38:40.080 throughout the next day

00:38:40.940 and would continue

00:38:41.940 up to the morning

00:38:42.700 of June the 6th.

00:38:43.540 After that,

00:38:44.660 the weather would continue

00:38:45.460 to deteriorate again.

00:38:47.260 During this promised period

00:38:48.280 of fair weather,

00:38:49.420 the winds would drop appreciably

00:38:50.840 and the skies would clear,

00:38:52.480 enough at least

00:38:53.000 for bombers to operate

00:38:54.140 on the night of the 5th

00:38:55.320 and throughout the morning

00:38:56.240 of the 6th.

00:38:57.380 By noon,

00:38:57.960 the cloud layer

00:38:58.920 would thicken

00:38:59.520 and the skies

00:39:00.220 would become overcast again.

00:39:02.360 In short,

00:39:02.820 Eisenhower was being told

00:39:04.060 that there was a barely

00:39:05.100 tolerable period

00:39:06.040 of conditions

00:39:06.700 far below

00:39:07.740 the minimal requirements

00:39:09.020 and these conditions

00:39:12.080 would prevail

00:39:12.780 for just little more

00:39:14.060 than 24 hours.

00:39:16.280 The moment Stagg

00:39:17.200 had finished,

00:39:19.040 he and the other

00:39:20.080 two meteorologists

00:39:21.600 were subjected

00:39:23.080 to a barrage of questions.

00:39:25.060 Were all of them

00:39:25.640 confident about the accuracy

00:39:26.880 of their predictions?

00:39:27.960 Could their forecasts

00:39:28.760 be wrong?

00:39:29.620 Had they checked

00:39:30.180 their reports

00:39:30.720 with every available source?

00:39:32.560 Was there any chance

00:39:33.380 of the weather

00:39:33.760 continuing to improve

00:39:34.980 in the few days

00:39:35.640 immediately after the 6th?

00:39:37.200 Some of the questions

00:39:38.060 were impossible

00:39:38.580 for the weathermen

00:39:39.300 to answer.

00:39:40.400 Their report had been

00:39:41.140 checked and double-checked

00:39:42.160 and they were as optimistic

00:39:43.480 as they could be

00:39:44.200 about the forecast

00:39:45.060 but there was always

00:39:45.940 the chance

00:39:46.540 that the vagaries

00:39:47.400 of the weather

00:39:48.100 might prove them wrong.

00:39:49.500 They answered

00:39:49.880 as best they could

00:39:50.660 then they withdrew.

00:39:52.100 For the next 15 minutes

00:39:53.020 Eisenhower and his

00:39:53.980 commanders deliberated.

00:39:55.520 The urgency

00:39:56.060 of making a decision

00:39:57.940 was stressed

00:39:58.820 by Admiral Ramsey.

00:40:01.060 The American task force

00:40:02.060 of Omaha and Utah beaches

00:40:03.500 under the command

00:40:04.540 of Rear Admiral A.G. Kirk

00:40:05.900 would have to get

00:40:07.000 the order

00:40:07.420 within the next

00:40:08.120 half an hour

00:40:08.800 if Overlord

00:40:09.780 was to take place

00:40:10.680 on Tuesday.

00:40:11.680 Ramsey's concern

00:40:12.480 was prompted

00:40:13.020 by the refuelling problem.

00:40:14.860 If these forces

00:40:15.540 sailed later

00:40:16.580 and were then recalled

00:40:17.800 it would be impossible

00:40:18.800 to get them ready again

00:40:19.880 for a possible attack

00:40:20.820 on Wednesday the 7th.

00:40:22.260 Eisenhower now

00:40:23.300 polled his commanders

00:40:24.260 one by one.

00:40:25.400 General Smith

00:40:25.940 thought the attack

00:40:26.720 should go in

00:40:27.500 on the 6th.

00:40:28.420 It was a gamble

00:40:29.080 but one that should be taken.

00:40:30.840 Tedder and Lee Mallory

00:40:31.920 were both fearful

00:40:32.940 that even the predicted

00:40:33.980 cloud cover

00:40:34.620 would prove too much

00:40:35.520 for the air forces

00:40:36.140 to operate effectively.

00:40:37.760 It might mean

00:40:38.380 that the assault

00:40:38.980 would have to take place

00:40:39.980 without adequate air support.

00:40:41.900 They thought it was

00:40:42.720 going to be chancy.

00:40:44.260 Montgomery stuck

00:40:45.160 to the decision

00:40:45.880 he had made

00:40:46.500 the night before

00:40:47.220 when the June the 5th

00:40:49.160 D-Day had been postponed.

00:40:50.920 I would say go

00:40:51.740 he said.

00:40:53.280 It was now up to Ike.

00:40:54.900 The moment had come

00:40:55.900 when only he could

00:40:56.860 make the decision.

00:40:58.400 There was a long silence

00:40:59.460 as Eisenhower

00:41:00.180 weighed all the possibilities.

00:41:02.220 General Smith

00:41:02.780 watching

00:41:03.200 was struck

00:41:04.120 by the isolation

00:41:05.320 and loneliness

00:41:06.040 of the Supreme Commander

00:41:07.540 as he sat

00:41:08.680 hands clasped

00:41:09.620 before him

00:41:10.240 looking down

00:41:10.960 at the table.

00:41:12.040 The minutes ticked by

00:41:12.980 some say as many

00:41:14.220 as two minutes passed

00:41:15.240 some say as many

00:41:16.300 as five.

00:41:17.360 Then Eisenhower

00:41:18.140 his face strained

00:41:19.320 looked up

00:41:20.340 and announced

00:41:20.860 his decision.

00:41:22.100 Slowly he said

00:41:22.780 I'm quite positive

00:41:24.140 we must give the order

00:41:25.300 I don't like it

00:41:26.420 but there it is

00:41:27.360 I don't see

00:41:28.260 how we can do

00:41:28.840 anything else.

00:41:30.020 End quote.

00:41:30.680 Yeah.

00:41:31.500 So sorry

00:41:32.600 to subject you

00:41:33.320 to quite a long

00:41:33.940 paragraph there.

00:41:34.540 That sort of

00:41:36.840 history turns on

00:41:39.100 moments like that

00:41:40.900 decisions like that

00:41:41.760 a handful of guys

00:41:42.500 a dozen guys

00:41:43.060 sitting round

00:41:43.700 are we doing this

00:41:46.060 yes or no

00:41:47.020 and history goes

00:41:48.900 and so it goes.

00:41:49.960 Yeah there's always

00:41:50.520 going to be that

00:41:51.220 everyone's going to

00:41:52.680 come in with their opinion

00:41:53.660 you can see what

00:41:54.660 they're doing to the

00:41:55.140 Met guys

00:41:55.640 like are you sure

00:41:56.940 it's like

00:41:57.980 I'm as sure as

00:41:59.020 the reports I've got

00:42:00.200 from everyone that's

00:42:00.780 made them

00:42:01.120 and I've reviewed them

00:42:01.740 with all the

00:42:02.100 experience and history

00:42:03.260 that I've got

00:42:03.860 not any more

00:42:05.160 sure than that

00:42:05.680 well could it be

00:42:06.240 that you're

00:42:06.640 it's like

00:42:07.180 yeah

00:42:07.760 could be that

00:42:08.880 I'm completely wrong

00:42:09.540 but everything we know

00:42:11.700 says there's going to be

00:42:12.560 a weather window

00:42:13.020 tomorrow morning

00:42:13.700 else you've got to

00:42:15.320 wait another day

00:42:16.000 I love this stuff

00:42:17.260 it's fascinating

00:42:17.800 with this isn't it

00:42:18.280 where the only

00:42:18.660 individual sits there

00:42:19.700 and if you think

00:42:20.120 about it

00:42:20.420 all he's doing

00:42:21.080 all Eisenhower's

00:42:22.180 doing there

00:42:22.540 is working on

00:42:23.120 his own

00:42:23.640 experiences

00:42:24.840 that's all he's got

00:42:25.520 so everything

00:42:25.960 and that's why

00:42:26.500 you have that

00:42:26.860 two minutes of

00:42:27.320 deliberation

00:42:27.780 sat there

00:42:28.300 just

00:42:28.840 it's not even

00:42:29.900 you're thinking

00:42:30.240 about different things

00:42:30.900 you've heard

00:42:31.240 everything

00:42:31.640 you're just

00:42:32.420 sitting there

00:42:33.100 I always talk

00:42:34.780 about the coin toss

00:42:35.520 you flick a coin

00:42:37.660 and you say to yourself

00:42:39.060 when it comes down

00:42:39.580 you go right

00:42:40.280 if it's tails

00:42:41.720 I'm going to go

00:42:42.200 if it's heads

00:42:43.420 I'm not going to go

00:42:43.980 and you look at it

00:42:45.240 and it makes you feel

00:42:46.400 a certain way

00:42:46.980 doesn't it

00:42:47.320 you're like

00:42:47.680 oh

00:42:48.260 yeah

00:42:48.500 I wish it wasn't that one

00:42:50.480 it lets you know

00:42:51.060 what you really

00:42:51.520 yeah

00:42:51.620 that's it

00:42:52.180 makes you really think

00:42:53.100 and so you sat there

00:42:53.920 for two minutes

00:42:54.520 and at the end of the day

00:42:56.640 it's like Thomas Sowell

00:42:58.260 says

00:42:58.560 there's

00:42:58.880 politics

00:42:59.800 there's no

00:43:00.280 right or wrong answer

00:43:01.420 there's only compromises

00:43:02.340 he knows he's going to get

00:43:03.520 people killed

00:43:04.160 is there going to be more

00:43:06.380 dying tomorrow morning

00:43:07.880 or is there going to be

00:43:08.400 more dying the next day

00:43:09.420 that's what it's got to be

00:43:10.340 so how do we

00:43:11.060 you know we've got all

00:43:12.100 the information now

00:43:12.800 everyone's ready to go

00:43:13.940 everything really kind of

00:43:15.160 weighs as far as I'm concerned

00:43:16.380 on that positive decision

00:43:17.480 that you're making at the moment

00:43:18.280 there's impact there

00:43:19.820 there's

00:43:20.300 there's progress

00:43:21.820 everything's ready to go

00:43:23.000 all you delay

00:43:24.020 you get that slump

00:43:24.860 now we need more

00:43:25.980 so I think

00:43:26.720 you know

00:43:26.980 I can understand

00:43:27.760 why that

00:43:28.080 why that came out

00:43:29.160 with a positive

00:43:29.640 go

00:43:30.580 yeah

00:43:31.280 I mean

00:43:32.120 it's a truism

00:43:33.940 that politics

00:43:34.600 is the art of compromise

00:43:36.240 gotta be

00:43:37.060 and I guess war planning

00:43:38.440 is as well

00:43:39.120 on some level

00:43:40.560 yep gotta be

00:43:41.140 yep

00:43:41.440 but as you said earlier

00:43:42.620 with that Bravo

00:43:43.480 3-0 wasn't it

00:43:44.660 when they got out

00:43:45.180 and they went

00:43:45.460 no

00:43:47.080 and also remember

00:43:47.680 this is worked out

00:43:48.460 beforehand a lot of this stuff

00:43:49.380 we call what ifs

00:43:50.200 what if this happens

00:43:50.980 what if you land on the ground

00:43:52.840 you can't see

00:43:53.380 well we get back in the

00:43:54.600 helicopter and we fly home again

00:43:55.880 you know

00:43:56.200 it's that stuff

00:43:56.860 so when you get out

00:43:57.820 hopefully most stuff

00:43:58.700 is ready to go

00:44:00.220 so

00:44:00.600 but yeah

00:44:01.140 I mean the weight of that decision

00:44:02.120 really when you think about it

00:44:03.100 it's incredible

00:44:03.460 but that's

00:44:03.900 that's why he's paid the big money

00:44:05.080 hashtag he's not paid the big money

00:44:06.340 yeah

00:44:07.340 yeah the weight of that

00:44:09.360 the weight of that decision

00:44:11.480 and others like it

00:44:13.540 sort of incredible

00:44:15.080 yeah

00:44:15.960 take a stronger man than me

00:44:17.520 to be able to sort of

00:44:19.120 yeah there is

00:44:19.620 not be crushed by it right

00:44:21.260 well

00:44:21.780 yes

00:44:23.080 I think you're right

00:44:23.800 but

00:44:23.980 in the same vein

00:44:25.720 a lot of people are going to die

00:44:27.660 from that decision

00:44:28.300 insofar as the bombers aren't going to be able to accurately bomb

00:44:30.580 and we do see this as well

00:44:32.060 especially around the town of Karn

00:44:33.460 where a lot of civilians were killed

00:44:35.040 by the Royal Air Force

00:44:36.800 I think primarily

00:44:37.420 and then the United States Air Force bombing

00:44:39.920 where they didn't bomb

00:44:41.400 they tried to bomb the targets

00:44:43.440 but they just couldn't see enough

00:44:44.900 and they actually bombed a lot of the town

00:44:46.220 so far

00:44:47.560 I think seven days after they went into Normandy

00:44:49.260 and actually got to Karn

00:44:50.280 which is one of their objectives

00:44:51.140 they didn't hit it for another six or seven days

00:44:52.600 they couldn't move through the rubble

00:44:55.020 and the destruction quick enough

00:44:56.260 to sort of take the enemy positions

00:44:58.100 because it had been bombed so heavily by us

00:44:59.940 and it hadn't bombed those positions we needed to take

00:45:02.160 it bombed the town itself

00:45:03.100 so

00:45:03.340 you know

00:45:04.440 it's that

00:45:04.820 it's that problem

00:45:05.620 it's yeah we can go

00:45:06.460 but there's always going to be a compromise

00:45:07.380 so yeah we can probably get troops on the beach

00:45:09.020 yeah we probably get some initial

00:45:10.860 air cover on the beaches

00:45:12.180 most definitely

00:45:12.800 minesweepers

00:45:14.280 all that kind of stuff

00:45:14.960 we can get ships in

00:45:15.740 we can get

00:45:16.240 the little swimming tanks

00:45:17.420 we can do all that stuff

00:45:18.040 we can get troops

00:45:18.420 but you know what

00:45:19.200 we're going to really compromise ourselves

00:45:21.000 on that close air support element

00:45:23.260 it wasn't necessarily called that back then

00:45:25.540 but the close air support element

00:45:26.560 the troop support element of aviation

00:45:28.240 because of the cloud cover

00:45:29.160 it's going to make it

00:45:29.880 very hard

00:45:31.060 yeah

00:45:31.700 we would often

00:45:33.220 bomb and strafe

00:45:35.120 areas just before we went into them

00:45:37.320 with lots of civilian casualties

00:45:39.980 from our side of the

00:45:41.700 allies

00:45:42.460 that was just the way

00:45:43.960 it was done then

00:45:45.120 that was just the calculation

00:45:46.920 nothing's going to stop our infantry

00:45:49.380 and tank divisions

00:45:50.800 getting where they need to go

00:45:52.560 if we end up strafing

00:45:54.240 a civilian train to bits

00:45:56.380 it's a total war isn't it

00:45:57.800 yeah right

00:45:58.340 that's just the way it's got to be

00:45:59.580 yeah

00:46:01.760 did it all sorts of times

00:46:03.640 but like

00:46:04.920 in your experience

00:46:06.220 did you ever

00:46:06.900 were you ever sort of

00:46:07.920 asked given orders

00:46:08.980 to do a particular sortie

00:46:10.300 whether it's training

00:46:11.240 or the real thing

00:46:12.040 and you think

00:46:13.300 this is 50-50

00:46:14.780 this is Chansey

00:46:15.580 dicey as hell

00:46:16.440 but we're going to do it anyway

00:46:19.100 we've sort of got to do it anyway

00:46:20.640 yeah I'd say that

00:46:22.100 for me

00:46:22.760 a lot of the stuff that you do

00:46:24.160 when I was in Iraq

00:46:25.080 it was quite benign

00:46:25.960 it wasn't as kinetic

00:46:26.840 as say some of the squadrons

00:46:28.720 came out after me

00:46:29.660 who did have more

00:46:30.720 of a close air support role

00:46:31.880 in certain areas

00:46:32.720 but when you do exercise

00:46:33.880 like red flag

00:46:34.660 things like this

00:46:35.540 I remember walking out

00:46:36.240 to the jet

00:46:36.660 and my weapons officer

00:46:38.300 I wrote an essay about it

00:46:39.820 you know

00:46:40.120 are we going to die today

00:46:41.200 type thing

00:46:41.660 and he was absolutely right

00:46:42.600 it's about positive thinking

00:46:43.800 it's like

00:46:44.420 are we going to die again tonight

00:46:45.240 because I was doing nights

00:46:46.100 and it just is

00:46:47.200 red flag

00:46:47.760 takes it to a level

00:46:49.140 that's why you do it

00:46:50.500 so this isn't a shock to you

00:46:51.660 takes it to a level

00:46:52.700 where sometimes

00:46:53.340 how do we come back from that

00:46:54.920 and they do have losses

00:46:55.620 on these big exercises

00:46:56.820 they do have fatalities

00:46:57.840 sometimes you come back

00:46:59.220 I remember one

00:46:59.900 where a friend of mine

00:47:01.920 called

00:47:02.240 Pikey

00:47:03.980 called Pixel

00:47:04.440 in fact Pikey

00:47:05.280 I called him Pixel

00:47:05.620 he went to fly for the Australians

00:47:07.060 in the end

00:47:07.480 for a bit

00:47:08.040 and the Americans as well

00:47:09.160 we went out to do

00:47:10.300 a night vision workup

00:47:11.400 we need to stay on topic

00:47:12.540 night vision goggle

00:47:13.360 we thought we were

00:47:14.000 two years on flying tornado

00:47:15.860 we were the bad men

00:47:16.560 we're going to do

00:47:16.960 a night vision workout

00:47:17.580 and the boss was like

00:47:18.760 no no you're not experienced

00:47:19.520 not experienced

00:47:19.940 we're like we're experienced

00:47:20.620 and eventually he went

00:47:21.900 right go and do it

00:47:22.500 and after the first night

00:47:23.560 we came back

00:47:24.060 in horrendous conditions

00:47:25.080 like weather

00:47:25.740 dark as anything

00:47:27.000 we both came back

00:47:27.880 and as we both walked in

00:47:28.820 he's in one jet

00:47:29.440 I'm in the other

00:47:29.880 we both walked in

00:47:31.640 and I said

00:47:32.040 how was that

00:47:32.500 and he was like

00:47:32.880 I never want to do that again

00:47:33.840 and so the boss

00:47:34.880 was absolutely right

00:47:35.880 you know

00:47:36.120 you need experience

00:47:36.860 and you need that

00:47:37.840 and so yeah

00:47:38.400 sometimes you do go

00:47:39.680 and you think

00:47:40.120 I don't know how

00:47:41.400 either

00:47:41.600 I don't know how

00:47:42.200 we're coming back

00:47:42.620 from this

00:47:42.940 and if you look

00:47:44.600 at the stories

00:47:45.380 of some of the aircrew

00:47:46.200 very young

00:47:46.800 taken off from Tangmere

00:47:48.620 Thorny Island

00:47:49.520 some of the south

00:47:50.180 southern airfields

00:47:51.740 they were sick

00:47:52.800 before they got

00:47:53.200 on the aeroplanes

00:47:53.820 you know

00:47:54.520 some of them

00:47:54.900 were physically sick

00:47:55.820 and they never came back

00:47:57.680 and they knew

00:47:58.920 they were never coming back

00:47:59.720 you know

00:47:59.900 on some of these

00:48:00.500 some of these raids

00:48:01.260 I just guess

00:48:03.420 you know

00:48:03.700 I kind of wish

00:48:04.640 we still had some of this

00:48:06.040 and I guess we do

00:48:07.320 in the country

00:48:07.740 but what I mean is

00:48:08.540 that kind of fortitude

00:48:10.420 that kind of perseverance

00:48:11.840 that kind of thing

00:48:13.360 where you're doing something

00:48:14.260 for something else

00:48:15.480 that you may never see again

00:48:16.500 that you're planting a tree

00:48:17.680 for your kid

00:48:18.140 you're going to plant a tree

00:48:18.780 and you're going to die

00:48:19.300 that tree will grow up

00:48:20.040 and your kids will benefit from it

00:48:21.000 these men that went across that channel

00:48:23.080 and I think they were all men

00:48:24.140 I think there was

00:48:24.600 Ernest Hemingway's wife

00:48:26.000 stowed aboard as a journalist

00:48:27.620 and she has a stretcher bearer

00:48:29.280 and was on the beaches

00:48:30.060 but everyone was men there

00:48:31.500 but these men that did this

00:48:32.600 knowing that they probably

00:48:33.220 weren't going to come back

00:48:34.000 did it for a reason

00:48:34.680 and it was something bigger

00:48:35.740 than themselves

00:48:36.280 and I don't know

00:48:36.920 whether we still have that now

00:48:37.820 but I'd like to think

00:48:38.620 somewhere we still do

00:48:39.660 incredible really

00:48:40.820 God you've mentioned

00:48:42.000 at least half a dozen things there

00:48:43.340 I'd like to bounce off

00:48:44.200 and talk more about

00:48:44.960 unfortunately already

00:48:46.500 this is sort of 50 minutes in

00:48:47.960 no no no

00:48:48.840 let's keep going

00:48:49.220 not you

00:48:49.640 I've been telling the story

00:48:50.860 too slowly

00:48:51.340 but just super quick to say

00:48:53.240 yeah there was quite a lot

00:48:54.060 of journalists

00:48:54.380 like an NBC reporter

00:48:56.300 in the first wave

00:48:57.900 at Omaha Beach

00:48:58.840 that's right

00:48:59.340 I read something like

00:49:00.040 was it NBC or was it

00:49:00.760 I think it was NBC

00:49:01.600 yeah

00:49:01.840 there was loads of reporters

00:49:02.960 like in the flotilla

00:49:04.260 there's a picture I've got

00:49:06.520 oh there's Ike's trailer

00:49:07.720 that's Ike

00:49:08.920 and his trailer

00:49:09.760 there

00:49:10.280 there's another picture

00:49:12.060 Jack have you got it

00:49:12.800 it said Southwick House

00:49:14.160 with Walter Cronkite

00:49:15.160 I lived about a mile away

00:49:16.280 from the Southwick House

00:49:17.320 actually because

00:49:18.020 my mum still lives

00:49:19.800 in Waterlooville

00:49:20.300 North Portsmouth

00:49:21.580 and this is where

00:49:22.860 the whole thing

00:49:23.740 was being set up

00:49:24.440 was there

00:49:25.100 it's a fascinating place

00:49:26.620 to go

00:49:26.860 it's near Denmead

00:49:27.500 my father actually led

00:49:28.960 military vehicles out

00:49:30.380 I was on the 40th anniversary

00:49:31.780 the 4-0

00:49:32.480 40th anniversary of D-Day

00:49:33.960 when I was 10

00:49:34.580 back in 84

00:49:36.060 and my dad

00:49:36.980 was head of

00:49:37.920 well general secretary

00:49:38.760 of something called

00:49:39.240 the Military Vehicle Conservation Group

00:49:40.640 that became the Military Vehicle Trust

00:49:41.980 some of the

00:49:42.880 your watchers will know this

00:49:44.140 of course

00:49:44.460 and he took out

00:49:45.560 he had a BSM-20 motorcycle

00:49:46.780 he was a Royal Marine

00:49:47.700 and he got his motorcycle

00:49:49.620 from Malta

00:49:50.140 and rebuilt it

00:49:50.880 in my youth

00:49:51.400 and he had this bike

00:49:51.980 used to

00:49:52.240 yeah yeah

00:49:53.140 I'll send you some pictures down

00:49:54.080 and he took

00:49:54.860 he took all tanks

00:49:56.780 half tracks

00:49:57.420 you know

00:49:57.920 all sorts

00:49:58.520 into Germany

00:49:59.140 into sort of

00:50:00.180 northern France

00:50:00.720 Normandy

00:50:01.120 and he went round

00:50:01.820 St. Meriglis Khan

00:50:02.880 all those

00:50:03.980 all those areas

00:50:05.600 that were

00:50:06.280 and I was 10

00:50:07.060 so I was riding

00:50:07.660 I was riding on tanks

00:50:08.740 and everything at the time

00:50:09.960 it's fascinating

00:50:10.540 when you think about it

00:50:11.220 and the tanks

00:50:11.820 that you see now

00:50:12.720 my sister is out there

00:50:14.080 at the moment

00:50:14.500 on the tour

00:50:15.460 with veterans

00:50:16.060 she's a young police officer

00:50:17.960 from Hampshire

00:50:18.520 and she

00:50:19.160 the tank

00:50:19.940 there's tanks there

00:50:20.600 that my father

00:50:21.200 put on the plinths

00:50:22.620 on Normandy

00:50:23.620 on the coastline there

00:50:24.540 to sort of commemorate

00:50:26.580 the events

00:50:26.980 and everything

00:50:27.380 so yeah

00:50:28.340 the family is quite involved

00:50:29.400 in this

00:50:29.980 in fact the D-Day Museum

00:50:31.160 in Portsmouth

00:50:31.680 a lot of the memorabilia

00:50:32.940 there is from my father

00:50:33.840 and his guys in the group

00:50:35.260 and they actually put the tank there

00:50:36.380 they put everything else there

00:50:37.260 so if anyone goes to the D-Day Museum

00:50:39.080 my dad put a lot of stuff there

00:50:40.520 cool yeah

00:50:41.560 really cool

00:50:42.020 keeping it alive

00:50:42.640 and there's lots going on

00:50:43.600 out there right now

00:50:44.600 there is yeah

00:50:45.100 fascinating yeah

00:50:45.920 so there's a picture

00:50:47.580 that's from the 50s

00:50:49.000 that's much later

00:50:49.740 you can see Ike's a bit older

00:50:51.500 than

00:50:52.080 that's from the 50s

00:50:53.620 and that's actually

00:50:54.940 the map room

00:50:56.580 at Southwick House

00:50:57.260 that's Walter Cronkite there

00:50:58.600 famous

00:50:59.340 20th century American

00:51:00.840 correspondent

00:51:02.600 he's actually

00:51:03.480 he actually dropped

00:51:04.280 in Operation Market Garden

00:51:05.320 did he

00:51:05.740 he actually jumped out

00:51:06.700 of an aeroplane

00:51:07.380 for Market Garden

00:51:08.580 quick

00:51:09.580 very very quick

00:51:11.000 side note there

00:51:11.600 when his

00:51:12.460 glider

00:51:13.260 oh no that was it

00:51:13.840 he was in a glider

00:51:14.400 and it crashed

00:51:14.980 crash landed

00:51:15.580 split open

00:51:16.260 and his

00:51:18.160 helmet went flying

00:51:19.440 as nearly everyone's did

00:51:20.460 and he picked up the closest

00:51:21.680 and there was under fire

00:51:22.480 immediately on the landing zone

00:51:23.540 he picked up another helmet

00:51:24.660 and put it on

00:51:25.160 started crawling away

00:51:26.160 but he picked up the helmet

00:51:27.560 of a lieutenant

00:51:28.240 with like two stripes

00:51:29.660 down the back of it

00:51:30.360 and he's crawling away

00:51:31.460 with his typewriter

00:51:32.460 and he found that

00:51:33.760 there was loads of other guys

00:51:34.620 following him

00:51:35.160 oh pretty

00:51:35.620 he didn't know where he was going

00:51:36.560 or what he was doing

00:51:37.140 but they thought he was a lieutenant

00:51:38.820 anyway that's what

00:51:39.640 that's excellent

00:51:40.420 that's great

00:51:40.820 okay so god

00:51:42.420 there's so many

00:51:42.980 there's so many elements

00:51:44.020 to detail

00:51:44.340 yeah we haven't started yet

00:51:45.140 we haven't even landed on the beaches

00:51:46.100 okay so I'll just crack on

00:51:47.600 with another big bit

00:51:48.480 go on then

00:51:48.780 where the Germans

00:51:50.020 because of the weather

00:51:51.100 and because we hadn't yet

00:51:53.220 attacked in May

00:51:54.020 and because of the deceptions

00:51:55.400 and all sorts of things

00:51:56.280 they were largely convinced

00:51:58.620 we weren't going to attack

00:51:59.520 on the 5th or the 6th of June

00:52:00.680 to the point where

00:52:02.040 Rommel goes home

00:52:03.340 he drives back to Germany

00:52:05.020 he's convinced

00:52:07.000 that if we didn't attack

00:52:08.220 on the 4th or the 5th

00:52:09.140 it's not going to happen

00:52:10.420 on the 6th

00:52:11.000 boss

00:52:11.360 so and there was also

00:52:13.520 a big war games thing

00:52:17.400 arranged

00:52:19.300 what they called it

00:52:20.300 a Kriegspiel

00:52:21.460 is the German

00:52:22.200 Kriegspiel

00:52:23.060 now he's going to have

00:52:23.560 a big war games

00:52:24.340 and loads of the

00:52:25.120 senior commanders

00:52:25.800 were meant to go to

00:52:26.680 another place in France

00:52:27.960 Rennes

00:52:28.440 to take part in that

00:52:30.780 and so anyway

00:52:31.840 on the 6th

00:52:32.900 loads of the senior commanders

00:52:35.220 just weren't

00:52:36.180 where they should be

00:52:37.780 like to a sort of

00:52:39.900 a crazy degree

00:52:40.700 I've got a paragraph here

00:52:42.860 I'll read it

00:52:43.500 it says

00:52:44.020 quote

00:52:44.380 and so it was

00:52:45.680 that one by one

00:52:46.340 senior officers

00:52:47.020 from Rommel down

00:52:47.860 had left the front

00:52:48.640 on the very eve

00:52:49.300 of the battle

00:52:49.840 all of them had reasons

00:52:51.760 but it was almost as though

00:52:53.060 a capricious fate

00:52:53.960 had manipulated

00:52:54.820 their departure

00:52:55.560 Rommel was in Germany

00:52:56.880 it was his wife's birthday

00:52:58.060 he'd got some

00:52:58.820 suede

00:52:59.460 handmade suede shoes

00:53:00.800 brilliant

00:53:01.200 he was almost

00:53:03.880 he was almost dying

00:53:04.800 of exhaustion

00:53:05.360 and he was well overdue

00:53:06.600 some leave

00:53:07.140 but

00:53:07.500 he took it at the wrong time

00:53:09.540 yeah

00:53:10.640 Rommel was in Germany

00:53:11.600 as was Army Group B's

00:53:14.020 Operation Officer

00:53:14.880 von Tempelhoff

00:53:15.780 Admiral Theodor Krenker

00:53:17.740 the naval commander

00:53:18.740 in the west

00:53:19.200 after informing

00:53:20.200 von Rundstedt

00:53:21.000 that patrol boats

00:53:22.500 were unable to leave

00:53:23.540 harbour because of

00:53:24.260 rough seas

00:53:24.820 set out for Bordeaux

00:53:26.260 in the south of France

00:53:27.400 Lieutenant General

00:53:29.460 Heinz Helmich

00:53:30.360 commander of the

00:53:31.660 243rd Division

00:53:32.920 which was holding

00:53:34.040 one side of the

00:53:34.920 Cherbourg Peninsula

00:53:35.920 i.e. right where

00:53:36.820 Utah and Omaha

00:53:37.520 beach are

00:53:38.080 had departed for rent

00:53:40.280 on this

00:53:40.800 this war gaming thing

00:53:42.940 so did Lieutenant Colonel

00:53:44.680 Carl von Schlieben

00:53:46.060 of the 709th Division

00:53:47.680 Major General Wilhelm

00:53:49.380 Farley

00:53:49.920 of the tough

00:53:50.740 91st Air Landing Division

00:53:52.020 which had just moved

00:53:53.040 into Normandy

00:53:53.760 prepared to go

00:53:54.860 Colonel Wilhelm

00:53:56.040 Mayor Dietring

00:53:56.920 Rundstedt's intelligence

00:53:58.120 officer was on leave

00:53:59.600 and the chief of staff

00:54:01.200 of one division

00:54:01.940 could not be reached

00:54:03.000 at all

00:54:03.420 he was off hunting

00:54:04.420 with his French mistress

00:54:05.380 after D-Day

00:54:06.740 the coincidences

00:54:07.420 of these multiple

00:54:08.180 departures

00:54:08.800 from the invasion front

00:54:09.980 struck Hitler so

00:54:10.900 forcibly

00:54:11.380 that there was actually

00:54:12.480 talk of an investigation

00:54:13.360 to see whether

00:54:14.480 the British service

00:54:15.320 could have been

00:54:15.980 intelligence services

00:54:17.120 could have possibly

00:54:18.460 had anything to do

00:54:19.280 with it

00:54:19.540 they weren't

00:54:20.000 it was just

00:54:20.360 dumb luck on our

00:54:21.060 part

00:54:21.720 the fact was

00:54:23.240 Hitler himself

00:54:24.240 was no more prepared

00:54:25.140 for the great day

00:54:26.060 than his generals

00:54:26.780 the Fuhrer was

00:54:27.840 at his

00:54:28.260 Burtz's Garden

00:54:28.920 retreat in Bavaria

00:54:30.040 so let's talk about that

00:54:32.280 Wolf's Lair isn't it

00:54:33.160 that one

00:54:33.560 no the Wolf's Lair

00:54:34.580 is his

00:54:35.340 oh god I should

00:54:36.720 isn't the Wolf's Lair

00:54:37.780 his eastern front

00:54:38.920 Wolf's Lair was in Bavaria

00:54:40.720 I can

00:54:41.060 I'm pretty sure

00:54:42.700 I went there

00:54:42.960 but either way

00:54:43.360 yeah he was

00:54:43.840 is it the eagle's

00:54:44.860 the eagle's nest

00:54:46.240 yeah

00:54:46.520 could be that one

00:54:47.280 that's his garden

00:54:47.820 I think Wolf's Lair

00:54:48.720 is his thing

00:54:49.200 yeah he could be right

00:54:49.980 but he was

00:54:50.820 he at that time

00:54:52.840 he was medicating

00:54:53.740 to get to sleep

00:54:54.520 so and apparently

00:54:56.420 they were

00:54:56.960 he was pontificating

00:54:58.240 in that night

00:55:00.000 and telling about

00:55:01.140 politics and everything else

00:55:02.020 and everyone stayed awake

00:55:02.860 I think

00:55:03.180 and I think some

00:55:04.820 couple went to bed

00:55:05.840 quite early

00:55:06.240 but he stayed up

00:55:06.720 to about three in the morning

00:55:07.520 and then he took some

00:55:09.040 medication to get to sleep

00:55:10.020 so he went to bed very late

00:55:11.280 so no one woke him up

00:55:12.000 did they

00:55:12.300 no one woke up

00:55:13.420 I think it was Albert Speer

00:55:14.380 eventually came in

00:55:15.040 said the next day

00:55:15.940 go and wake him up

00:55:16.760 you know what I mean

00:55:17.200 this is ridiculous

00:55:18.100 there's been an evasion

00:55:18.820 but no one woke him up

00:55:19.600 yeah

00:55:19.800 yeah Hitler loved

00:55:21.560 to stay up late

00:55:23.280 and go to

00:55:23.680 and get up late

00:55:24.600 yeah

00:55:24.860 so he'd quite often

00:55:26.220 go to bed

00:55:27.620 at three or four in the morning

00:55:28.720 and sleep till like noon

00:55:29.980 yeah

00:55:30.420 or something

00:55:30.820 that was his routine

00:55:31.700 that's how he lived

00:55:33.220 and yeah he'd been up

00:55:34.920 till three or four

00:55:35.460 the night before

00:55:36.000 listening to music

00:55:36.940 and then

00:55:39.020 yeah Dr. Morrell

00:55:40.160 had given him

00:55:40.980 a sleeping draft

00:55:42.540 nice

00:55:43.720 some sort of cocktail

00:55:45.380 of drugs

00:55:45.840 to knock him out basically

00:55:46.740 yeah apparently Hitler

00:55:47.660 could barely sleep

00:55:48.320 without it

00:55:48.820 at this point

00:55:49.360 yeah

00:55:49.640 by this point

00:55:50.760 Hitler was something

00:55:51.580 of a drug addict

00:55:53.300 was that what it was

00:55:54.460 Morrell made him one

00:55:56.200 it was

00:55:56.440 oh I see

00:55:56.920 so it was the medication

00:55:57.620 stuff wasn't it

00:55:58.160 that's what I mean

00:55:58.800 it was that constant

00:55:59.420 medication

00:55:59.900 yeah

00:56:00.680 yeah Morrell was giving him

00:56:02.420 up and down

00:56:02.960 all the time

00:56:03.580 so

00:56:05.360 yeah

00:56:06.460 okay so

00:56:09.520 there's just a whole bunch

00:56:11.460 here I'm going to have to

00:56:12.000 cut out unfortunately

00:56:12.760 a word then

00:56:14.020 on the Armada

00:56:14.740 so it's the biggest

00:56:16.380 it is the biggest

00:56:17.280 up to that point

00:56:18.020 or ever

00:56:18.480 sort of amphibious

00:56:19.680 20,000 ships

00:56:20.580 something like that

00:56:21.020 wasn't it

00:56:21.440 5,000

00:56:22.360 5,000 ships

00:56:23.000 how many landing craft

00:56:23.880 were there

00:56:24.080 1,400 or something

00:56:24.640 that was quite as massive

00:56:25.460 yeah 1,400 or 1,500

00:56:26.100 and thousands of

00:56:28.200 aeroplanes

00:56:29.280 20,000 aeroplanes

00:56:30.120 that's right yeah

00:56:30.900 tens of thousands

00:56:31.840 of guys

00:56:32.440 yeah

00:56:33.120 so

00:56:34.520 Cornelius Ryan

00:56:37.880 is good at painting

00:56:38.520 a picture

00:56:38.880 so I'll quickly

00:56:39.320 read this paragraph

00:56:40.000 he says quote

00:56:41.460 off the French coast

00:56:42.700 a little before 9pm

00:56:44.100 a dozen small ships

00:56:45.000 appeared

00:56:45.380 they moved quietly

00:56:46.360 along the horizon

00:56:47.180 so close that their

00:56:48.260 crews could clearly

00:56:49.020 see the houses

00:56:50.120 of Normandy

00:56:50.700 the ships went

00:56:52.080 unnoticed

00:56:52.660 they finished their job

00:56:53.680 and then moved back

00:56:54.480 they were British

00:56:55.920 minesweepers

00:56:56.680 the vanguard

00:56:57.440 of the mightiest

00:56:58.080 fleet ever assembled

00:56:59.000 for now

00:57:00.500 back in the channel

00:57:01.360 ploughing through

00:57:01.980 the choppy grey waters

00:57:03.020 a phalanx of ships

00:57:04.120 bore down on Hitler's Europe

00:57:05.260 the might and fury

00:57:06.600 of the free world

00:57:07.460 unleashed at last

00:57:08.340 they came rank

00:57:09.460 after relentless rank

00:57:10.520 10 lanes wide

00:57:11.980 20 miles across

00:57:13.240 5,000 ships

00:57:14.460 of every description

00:57:15.220 there were fast

00:57:16.700 new attack transports

00:57:18.220 slow

00:57:18.740 rust scarred freighters

00:57:20.300 small ocean liners

00:57:21.660 channel steamers

00:57:22.680 hospital ships

00:57:23.620 weather-beaten tankers

00:57:25.040 coasters

00:57:25.520 and swarms

00:57:26.540 of fussing tugs

00:57:27.500 there were endless

00:57:28.660 columns

00:57:29.180 of shallow

00:57:30.360 draft

00:57:32.440 landing ships

00:57:33.540 great wallowing

00:57:34.660 vessels

00:57:35.080 some of them

00:57:35.900 almost 350 feet long

00:57:37.440 many of these

00:57:38.500 and other heavier

00:57:39.380 transports

00:57:40.080 carried smaller

00:57:40.640 landing craft

00:57:41.420 for the actual

00:57:42.280 beach assault

00:57:42.840 more than 1,500

00:57:43.740 of them

00:57:44.320 ahead of the convoys

00:57:45.560 were processions

00:57:46.560 of minesweepers

00:57:47.520 coast guard cutters

00:57:48.780 buoy layers

00:57:50.160 and motor

00:57:51.260 launchers

00:57:51.860 barrage balloons

00:57:53.920 flew above

00:57:54.660 flew above the

00:57:55.760 ships

00:57:56.080 squadrons of

00:57:57.180 fighter planes

00:57:57.840 weaved below

00:57:58.440 the clouds

00:57:59.020 and surrounding

00:57:59.840 this fantastic

00:58:00.560 cavalcade of

00:58:01.240 ships

00:58:01.580 packed with men

00:58:02.520 guns

00:58:03.120 tanks

00:58:03.720 motor vehicles

00:58:04.460 and suppliers

00:58:05.060 was a formidable

00:58:06.140 array of 702

00:58:07.920 warships

00:58:08.620 there was all

00:58:09.920 sorts of

00:58:10.380 battleships

00:58:11.320 there was the

00:58:12.080 um

00:58:12.480 uss augusta

00:58:14.160 uh

00:58:15.440 hms nelson

00:58:16.700 ramillies

00:58:17.480 war spiked

00:58:18.460 hms ajax

00:58:19.680 who was involved

00:58:20.340 in taking out

00:58:21.060 the grafsh bay

00:58:21.820 right

00:58:22.140 um

00:58:22.960 the uss texas

00:58:24.200 arkansas

00:58:24.760 and nevada

00:58:25.540 if anyone knows

00:58:26.480 this stuff

00:58:26.940 nevada was

00:58:27.840 hit

00:58:28.500 badly

00:58:29.380 at pearl

00:58:29.780 harbor

00:58:30.140 my goodness

00:58:31.020 the japanese

00:58:31.560 had written it

00:58:32.160 off

00:58:32.400 didn't know that

00:58:33.120 and the americans

00:58:34.080 had repaired it

00:58:34.820 and it was at

00:58:35.360 d-day

00:58:35.760 legends

00:58:36.320 now just to give

00:58:38.400 it some perspective

00:58:39.140 the germans

00:58:40.520 were able to

00:58:41.260 launch three

00:58:42.080 torpedo boats

00:58:43.080 yeah e-boats

00:58:44.740 yeah

00:58:45.620 uh and actually

00:58:46.580 they fired 18

00:58:47.660 torpedoes

00:58:48.220 remember correctly

00:58:48.600 and they did

00:58:49.080 sink one

00:58:49.900 norwegian

00:58:50.720 frigate

00:58:51.500 called the

00:58:51.980 svena

00:58:52.340 that was the

00:58:53.280 only losses

00:58:53.800 and then they

00:58:54.680 got hit

00:58:55.460 didn't they

00:58:55.980 they ran away

00:58:56.360 because basically

00:58:56.860 every ship

00:58:57.180 turned on them

00:58:57.620 and a big

00:58:58.840 shout out

00:58:59.300 quickly before

00:58:59.720 we can

00:59:00.000 to coastal

00:59:00.400 command

00:59:00.840 um

00:59:01.920 those guys

00:59:02.680 flying the

00:59:03.180 catalinas in

00:59:03.760 the sunderlands

00:59:04.240 which were one

00:59:04.760 of the much

00:59:05.100 one of which

00:59:05.560 was my

00:59:05.860 grandfather

00:59:06.280 who died

00:59:06.700 recently

00:59:06.980 at the age

00:59:07.300 of about

00:59:07.520 99

00:59:07.920 uh

00:59:09.100 they cleared

00:59:09.660 out the

00:59:09.940 whole u-boat

00:59:10.400 threat from

00:59:10.780 the channel

00:59:11.120 they were so

00:59:11.880 successful that

00:59:12.740 they don't

00:59:13.060 they get

00:59:13.260 overlooked now

00:59:13.820 when we talk

00:59:14.180 about this

00:59:14.560 because they

00:59:15.160 didn't take

00:59:15.540 part in it

00:59:15.880 they didn't

00:59:16.020 need to

00:59:16.260 they'd done

00:59:16.540 everything

00:59:16.780 they cleared

00:59:17.120 it all out

00:59:17.520 so the reason

00:59:18.300 that there

00:59:18.620 weren't the

00:59:18.900 u-boats out

00:59:19.480 there the

00:59:19.820 reason that

00:59:20.380 the fleet

00:59:21.220 wasn't hit

00:59:21.760 hard at all

00:59:22.340 by anything

00:59:22.740 really i mean

00:59:23.360 one loss

00:59:23.920 really that

00:59:24.640 was it

00:59:24.900 was because

00:59:25.800 coastal command

00:59:26.380 was so

00:59:26.820 effective

00:59:27.280 in the uh

00:59:28.800 in these in

00:59:29.480 hunting down

00:59:30.220 these these

00:59:31.420 submarines and

00:59:31.820 everything yeah

00:59:32.200 we had two

00:59:33.200 what they call

00:59:33.700 midget subs

00:59:34.420 out there the

00:59:34.920 x-20 and

00:59:35.600 the x-23

00:59:36.320 right just

00:59:37.140 sitting just

00:59:37.740 off of normandy

00:59:38.380 for like ever

00:59:39.040 since the

00:59:39.420 fourth the night

00:59:43.060 unmolested by

00:59:43.640 there was no

00:59:44.060 german uh

00:59:45.300 submarine

00:59:45.740 no it wasn't

00:59:46.800 nothing at all

00:59:47.640 no crazy

00:59:48.180 they had it to

00:59:48.880 themselves and

00:59:50.020 yeah so there's

00:59:50.860 a guy called

00:59:51.240 hoffman i think

00:59:51.820 was the uh

00:59:52.660 german commander

00:59:53.940 he had three

00:59:54.700 sort of torpedo

00:59:55.840 boats right

00:59:56.480 and when the

00:59:57.600 invasion comes

00:59:58.520 let's have a go

00:59:59.060 yeah i love that

01:00:00.740 attitude let's have

01:00:01.400 a go let's do

01:00:01.980 it come on

01:00:02.640 it's like you

01:00:03.260 just come over

01:00:03.600 the rise you're

01:00:04.060 like what are you

01:00:04.920 doing again yeah

01:00:05.600 how many ships is

01:00:06.180 that just just get

01:00:07.220 the torpedoes out

01:00:07.840 and we're going

01:00:08.140 mate you know

01:00:08.520 i mean

01:00:08.800 it would have been

01:00:10.640 unbelievable right

01:00:11.520 oh it'd be

01:00:11.860 ridiculous

01:00:12.220 you spread right

01:00:13.580 all the torpedoes

01:00:14.600 going that way

01:00:15.560 and they all missed

01:00:16.180 apart from one

01:00:16.820 that's the thing

01:00:17.380 and it took out uh

01:00:18.500 this newegian

01:00:19.120 this newegian steamer

01:00:20.400 but yeah i mean

01:00:20.940 incredible you just

01:00:21.820 what we doing here

01:00:22.980 again just this is

01:00:23.960 a little bit outnumbered

01:00:24.920 yeah

01:00:25.180 he said because no

01:00:26.520 one had ever seen

01:00:27.020 anything like it

01:00:27.580 again it was

01:00:28.400 unprecedented this

01:00:29.280 invasion fleet

01:00:30.340 and there was a

01:00:31.360 smoke screen by the

01:00:32.220 time he'd he'd

01:00:33.040 sort of uh

01:00:33.840 scrambled his

01:00:35.160 three torpedo boats

01:00:36.300 he said he's

01:00:37.160 going out of the

01:00:37.720 water he goes

01:00:38.720 through this smoke

01:00:39.320 screen he said

01:00:40.080 it's like oh

01:00:41.200 i'm in a bad

01:00:41.680 place horizon to

01:00:42.700 horizon yeah

01:00:43.420 like 700 warships

01:00:44.860 all the guns going

01:00:45.600 and he said he felt

01:00:49.180 like he was in like

01:00:50.280 he said he felt like

01:00:51.200 he was in a rowboat

01:00:51.880 or a tiny dinghy

01:00:52.660 i didn't realize

01:00:53.340 i didn't realize

01:00:54.120 he'd written about it

01:00:54.820 i have to have a look

01:00:55.320 at that

01:00:55.560 yeah seriously

01:00:57.120 so he just goes

01:00:58.120 right fire fire

01:00:59.100 everything we've got

01:00:59.640 18 torpedoes and

01:01:00.860 let's get out of here

01:01:01.800 oh what a legend

01:01:02.820 i mean

01:01:03.500 legend

01:01:03.900 yeah

01:01:04.300 obviously for the

01:01:04.940 wrong reasons but

01:01:05.420 yeah

01:01:05.580 yeah

01:01:05.920 um

01:01:07.060 so again

01:01:08.320 there's so many

01:01:09.120 books there's so

01:01:09.620 much you could just

01:01:10.120 say just about the

01:01:11.100 naval side of things

01:01:12.180 oh yeah absolutely

01:01:12.840 yeah

01:01:13.100 uh but we've got to

01:01:14.220 move on unfortunately

01:01:15.180 because time's already

01:01:16.120 ticking on

01:01:16.760 so again another thing

01:01:18.020 we've got to talk about

01:01:18.660 before we get on to the

01:01:19.480 actual beaches

01:01:20.000 is the airborne element

01:01:21.940 of it

01:01:22.280 yeah

01:01:22.600 now operation market

01:01:23.880 garden late in

01:01:25.140 september october

01:01:26.040 44

01:01:26.440 was was the biggest

01:01:28.180 ever airborne thing

01:01:29.200 but before that

01:01:30.940 this was the biggest

01:01:31.800 ever airborne thing

01:01:32.860 ever attempted

01:01:33.380 something like 17 18

01:01:35.100 or thousand

01:01:35.800 paratroopers

01:01:36.640 right

01:01:37.000 dropped the night

01:01:38.820 of the sick

01:01:39.440 the morning of the

01:01:40.360 sick

01:01:40.620 um so at like

01:01:42.120 bang on midnight

01:01:43.180 they drop in the

01:01:44.440 pathfinders

01:01:45.360 in the wrong place

01:01:46.420 uh largely in the

01:01:47.500 wrong place

01:01:48.220 now if anyone doesn't

01:01:49.300 know who the

01:01:49.540 pathfinders are

01:01:50.180 they're paratroopers

01:01:51.040 you go in there

01:01:51.700 and they're supposed

01:01:52.120 to keep quiet

01:01:53.240 and not really

01:01:53.580 getting any fights

01:01:54.240 and just light the

01:01:55.460 way for the main

01:01:56.500 paratroops to land

01:01:58.640 yeah

01:01:59.020 and they were

01:01:59.840 it was almost an

01:02:01.080 impossible task

01:02:01.660 yeah it was yeah

01:02:02.120 it's ridiculous yeah

01:02:02.720 and so but still

01:02:05.440 that's super ballsy

01:02:06.540 yeah i feel like

01:02:07.520 being a pathfinder

01:02:08.300 it's like being an

01:02:09.220 SAS dude

01:02:09.840 yeah behind enemy

01:02:11.720 lines almost on

01:02:12.680 your own

01:02:13.200 that's right j tax

01:02:14.000 same thing yeah

01:02:14.680 exactly the same

01:02:15.200 thing sort of

01:02:15.860 crazily ballsy

01:02:16.940 yeah

01:02:17.300 sort of good

01:02:18.880 chance it's a

01:02:19.560 one-way ticket

01:02:20.280 probably not right

01:02:21.260 there so yeah be a

01:02:22.140 pathfinder off you

01:02:22.700 go yeah and it was

01:02:23.620 all volunteers the

01:02:24.700 pathfinders can you

01:02:25.640 believe that just

01:02:26.560 volunteers guy go

01:02:28.120 yeah well there was

01:02:29.600 an episode where the

01:02:30.440 um the british army

01:02:31.140 were using the same

01:02:31.720 color flares i think

01:02:33.160 that the americans

01:02:33.880 were using so the

01:02:34.580 british army

01:02:35.280 pathfinders were

01:02:36.060 using the same

01:02:36.500 flares they're

01:02:36.920 saying these are

01:02:37.260 yellow flares

01:02:37.820 bomb the yellow

01:02:38.840 flares they didn't

01:02:39.340 realize that the

01:02:39.860 us army were using

01:02:40.680 those yellow

01:02:41.080 flares to to get

01:02:42.300 people to drop on

01:02:42.960 them so a lot of

01:02:43.560 um i think a lot of

01:02:44.600 british were killed

01:02:45.220 uh through bobbing

01:02:46.700 raids on their own

01:02:47.480 on their own

01:02:48.300 unfortunately by

01:02:49.460 their own side so

01:02:50.120 that was a mix-up

01:02:50.720 you know those mix-ups

01:02:51.340 do happen but yeah

01:02:52.420 they were dropped

01:02:52.840 all over the place

01:02:53.480 and then uh of course

01:02:54.540 same thing happened

01:02:55.200 with the paratroops

01:02:55.720 when they came in

01:02:56.200 the problem is with

01:02:57.860 dropping uh parachute

01:02:59.340 born soldiers is that

01:03:01.840 um it's not an exact

01:03:03.020 science uh and it

01:03:04.560 certainly wasn't in

01:03:05.400 the 40s so it's almost

01:03:07.620 a new concept almost i

01:03:09.360 mean the germans used

01:03:10.280 it earlier in the war

01:03:11.240 uh but it wasn't it

01:03:12.920 wasn't a tried and

01:03:13.640 tested concept and so

01:03:15.140 anyway especially in the

01:03:16.200 dark a lot of them so

01:03:18.640 there's the british uh

01:03:19.960 the british airborne

01:03:20.780 divisions red devils

01:03:22.360 there was the 101st

01:03:24.420 US screaming eagles

01:03:26.820 and the 82nd ebb

01:03:28.040 now it was the first

01:03:29.740 101st the first time

01:03:30.940 they'd dropped into

01:03:31.500 combat the 82nd had

01:03:33.020 been used in sicily and

01:03:34.880 italy so this wasn't

01:03:35.960 their first party

01:03:36.880 right um but

01:03:38.280 nonetheless so there's

01:03:39.800 so much to say i mean

01:03:40.600 even just about san

01:03:41.520 meriglis yeah that's

01:03:42.480 right um all sorts of

01:03:44.220 fighting going on

01:03:44.980 very contested wasn't

01:03:45.840 it was uh wasn't it

01:03:47.020 like a junction wasn't

01:03:48.300 it san meriglis when i

01:03:49.420 was 10 i went to san

01:03:50.060 meriglis and there's

01:03:50.720 they always every year

01:03:51.380 they put um a

01:03:52.260 parachutist on the

01:03:53.120 steeple of the church

01:03:54.040 it was a it was a

01:03:55.000 guy called steel in

01:03:56.120 fact i remember his

01:03:56.760 surname and uh the

01:03:57.900 germans he played dead

01:03:59.140 when the germans swept

01:03:59.900 through the town he

01:04:00.520 couldn't get down and

01:04:01.720 uh he played dead the

01:04:02.780 germans still shot at

01:04:03.440 him and shot his heel

01:04:04.040 off and so he sat

01:04:05.600 there i'm doing dead

01:04:06.240 but yeah he actually

01:04:07.080 they obviously put

01:04:07.880 someone on but

01:04:08.440 remember they they

01:04:09.240 put um they put uh

01:04:10.980 paratroopers in that

01:04:11.760 were like dummies as

01:04:12.900 well yeah called oscars

01:04:14.500 and uh ruperts and so

01:04:16.480 they after the officers

01:04:17.320 and they they threw

01:04:17.860 these dummies out there

01:04:18.580 as well i mean the

01:04:19.440 whole thing is this is

01:04:20.840 staggering

01:04:21.380 how all this comes

01:04:22.520 together and then of

01:04:23.820 course these paratroopers

01:04:24.620 that are spread all over

01:04:25.440 the place form up units

01:04:26.840 and then they get

01:04:27.380 fighting is as um as

01:04:29.180 these different units of

01:04:30.140 different people must be

01:04:31.640 pretty incredible when you

01:04:32.340 think about it yeah

01:04:33.280 crazy so they had a

01:04:35.000 number of things they

01:04:35.980 needed to do the two

01:04:37.560 main things was try and

01:04:39.320 um capture key points

01:04:40.940 so there's particular

01:04:41.860 towns yeah just behind

01:04:43.540 the beaches yes you need

01:04:44.820 to take yes um so

01:04:46.480 there's that particular

01:04:47.540 gun emplacements that

01:04:48.640 we look down on over the

01:04:49.700 beaches take those but

01:04:51.380 also one of the main

01:04:52.720 sort of again on

01:04:53.480 strategic level was to

01:04:55.200 take and hold the

01:04:56.460 flanks of yeah all the

01:04:58.580 way at utah and all the

01:04:59.820 way at saul stop coming

01:05:01.000 in to yeah so when the

01:05:02.160 when the germans

01:05:02.940 counter-attack to just

01:05:03.940 hold that up yeah or

01:05:05.360 frustrate that in any

01:05:06.340 possible way yeah and so

01:05:07.960 they had it was sort of

01:05:08.940 really really key

01:05:09.720 importance and there's so

01:05:11.460 many stories in the book

01:05:12.800 the longest day and in

01:05:13.760 anthony beaver they took

01:05:15.100 loads about all the

01:05:16.320 different stories of all the

01:05:18.460 paratroopers if anyone's

01:05:19.500 ever seen band of

01:05:20.140 brothers um yeah you

01:05:21.920 found you ended up with

01:05:23.220 101st guys linking up

01:05:24.920 with 82nd guys and just

01:05:26.040 randomly making a lot of

01:05:28.240 guys fell in there was a

01:05:29.120 really marshy area

01:05:30.140 flooded fields near the

01:05:31.560 the deeve river and

01:05:33.460 loads of guys drowned

01:05:34.360 yeah if you accidentally

01:05:35.280 dropped jumped too late

01:05:36.600 or dropped too late and

01:05:37.260 fell in the sea you're

01:05:37.960 going to drown yeah

01:05:38.680 you're just going to

01:05:39.560 sink to the bottom

01:05:40.120 before you can take your

01:05:41.200 stuff off and you're

01:05:41.760 going to drown and

01:05:42.180 quite a few guys drowned

01:05:43.400 there um my grandfather

01:05:46.240 actually my dad's dad was

01:05:47.560 in the 101st he was one

01:05:49.960 of the guys that wouldn't

01:05:51.980 hardly ever talk about

01:05:52.840 it you know some combat

01:05:53.860 vets they love talking

01:05:55.220 about the greatest thing

01:05:57.200 that ever happened to

01:05:57.920 them they love talking

01:05:58.580 about it um other people

01:06:00.280 like they don't really

01:06:01.300 ever talk about anyway my

01:06:02.240 granddad who i only ever

01:06:03.320 met once was one of those

01:06:04.420 guys one of the only

01:06:05.920 things apparently that the

01:06:07.200 family ever sort of got

01:06:08.100 out of him was that he

01:06:09.740 said on d he dropped

01:06:11.460 into france in 44 and he

01:06:13.800 said um he remembers

01:06:15.460 seeing trees full of dead

01:06:16.840 paratroopers that might

01:06:19.420 have been san meriglees

01:06:20.560 i'm not sure because

01:06:21.240 there's all sorts of

01:06:21.980 accounts of that yeah

01:06:23.140 where when when san

01:06:24.500 meriglees was being

01:06:25.240 relieved a lot of the

01:06:27.360 trees around that in and

01:06:28.480 around that area were

01:06:29.420 full of dead uh mainly

01:06:31.760 101st guys i think

01:06:32.960 yeah certainly

01:06:33.380 paratroopers yeah

01:06:34.300 anyway um yeah you're

01:06:36.780 a sitting duck when

01:06:37.460 you're coming down on

01:06:38.080 your parachute you're

01:06:38.800 sort of a sitting duck

01:06:39.500 yeah that's right they

01:06:40.200 were yeah there's only

01:06:41.040 35 second drop as well

01:06:42.440 a lot of it's a 40

01:06:43.300 second drop they're out

01:06:44.740 the door and that's um

01:06:45.560 it's not much and

01:06:46.640 those 40s parachutes

01:06:47.800 don't slow you down as

01:06:48.860 much as a modern

01:06:49.380 parachute you still hit

01:06:50.160 the ground bloody

01:06:50.720 hard especially when you

01:06:51.300 hang stuff off them and

01:06:52.400 yeah incredible um so

01:06:54.200 there's god there's so

01:06:55.000 many stories about all

01:06:56.640 of that stuff so a lot

01:06:58.500 of historians argue

01:06:59.280 whether it was a

01:07:00.200 complete shambles and

01:07:01.860 um just an exercise in

01:07:03.660 getting it all wrong or

01:07:05.040 whether they actually did

01:07:05.980 really well considering

01:07:07.960 um um cornelius ryan says

01:07:13.840 that they actually do

01:07:14.760 really quite well

01:07:15.680 considering to be to

01:07:17.520 actually hold the flanks

01:07:18.760 by the morning by day

01:07:20.080 break yeah they'd sort of

01:07:21.960 take it even though a lot

01:07:23.220 of the gunning placements

01:07:23.980 overlooking particularly

01:07:24.880 omaha beach hadn't been

01:07:26.520 taken um but a fair amount

01:07:29.580 of them had and the flanks

01:07:30.840 were at least disrupted um

01:07:33.680 so in that sense um that they

01:07:36.820 did well very quick like

01:07:38.480 this literally two or three

01:07:39.620 lines here um we're told

01:07:41.900 quote it was nearly dawn

01:07:43.640 the dawn that nearly 18,000

01:07:45.640 paratroopers had been

01:07:46.640 fighting towards in less

01:07:48.020 than five hours they had

01:07:49.720 more than fulfilled the

01:07:50.540 expectations of general

01:07:51.860 eisenhower and his

01:07:52.700 commanders the airborne

01:07:53.840 armies had confused the

01:07:55.380 enemy and disrupted his

01:07:56.520 communications and now

01:07:58.100 holding the flanks at

01:07:59.300 either end of the

01:08:00.000 normandy invasion area

01:08:01.040 they had to a great

01:08:03.000 extent blocked the

01:08:04.180 movement of enemy

01:08:04.900 reinforcements

01:08:05.700 so remarkable so i guess

01:08:08.380 we'll have to move on to

01:08:10.080 um the actual

01:08:11.540 god i'm gonna have to

01:08:14.000 miss that so much

01:08:14.660 unfortunately uh the

01:08:15.980 actual thing well a quick

01:08:16.860 note about hitler and

01:08:17.740 yodel so once once they

01:08:20.140 uh once the news got

01:08:21.480 through that things that

01:08:23.440 there is a big invasion

01:08:24.260 happening on the normandy

01:08:25.100 beaches the guys of the

01:08:26.920 seventh army group and uh

01:08:29.140 um of the seventh army or

01:08:31.800 uh army group b uh they

01:08:34.100 phoned through to yodel in

01:08:37.440 bavaria uh in hitler's

01:08:39.940 command and uh he said

01:08:42.200 is it like 100 100% clear

01:08:45.340 that's the main invasion

01:08:46.260 they're like well we don't

01:08:47.260 know but it looks it looks

01:08:48.420 to be it's almost certainly

01:08:49.260 is yeah and he's like okay

01:08:50.760 thanks hung up didn't wake

01:08:53.060 hitler up

01:08:53.620 didn't didn't didn't no one

01:08:56.300 really knew from runch that

01:08:57.320 knew but beyond that hardly

01:08:58.220 anyone knew that rommel wasn't

01:09:00.360 even at his post

01:09:01.380 you know like yodel thought

01:09:03.860 rommel was there conducting the

01:09:05.220 battle

01:09:05.540 anyway um yeah so i didn't

01:09:09.500 know that rommel uh yodel speaks

01:09:11.560 to another guy called uh put

01:09:13.800 karma

01:09:14.200 an admiral an admiral put karma

01:09:18.080 and they talk about it between

01:09:19.520 themselves should we wake up

01:09:20.380 hitler should we because the

01:09:23.120 seventh army and von runch that

01:09:24.660 ask for a couple of panzer

01:09:26.400 divisions to be released from

01:09:27.660 the part of calais region from

01:09:28.780 the paris region there's the

01:09:29.960 12th panzer division and the

01:09:31.720 leer panzer division but hitler

01:09:33.580 was in charge of those

01:09:34.280 divisions yeah they were under

01:09:35.240 okw in other words under yeah

01:09:37.020 his control only his control

01:09:38.520 that's right and it should have

01:09:40.160 been the protocol that okay

01:09:41.840 they're under his command but

01:09:42.980 however but if we if the

01:09:44.440 allies are invading just take

01:09:46.340 them and use them yeah that was

01:09:47.820 the protocol so they ring up

01:09:49.420 von runch that sent an order

01:09:50.740 just for paper yeah just for a

01:09:52.680 paper uh trail to say i have in

01:09:55.240 fact asked okw but when he did

01:09:57.600 they said no they said no you

01:09:59.780 can't have them and we're not

01:10:01.300 going to wake hitler up

01:10:02.100 i guess they were still crazy

01:10:04.420 trying to work out whether the

01:10:05.340 main invasion was going to be in

01:10:06.340 calais weren't they well a lot

01:10:07.480 of them said you're wrong it

01:10:08.480 can't be happening at normandy

01:10:09.580 it's going to happen at calais

01:10:10.800 i'll also remember that wrong

01:10:12.020 op glimmer had dropped a lot of

01:10:14.020 um this what we call chaff now

01:10:16.180 but a lot of uh deception into

01:10:17.700 that channel to make it look

01:10:18.700 like there were seaborne

01:10:19.720 elements moving from dover into

01:10:21.120 calais so the radar returns

01:10:22.800 would have shown you a lot of

01:10:23.960 returns coming into calais at the

01:10:25.200 time on the on the 6th and the

01:10:26.620 previous preceding day so they

01:10:27.880 may well have been thinking

01:10:28.620 actually there is a massive

01:10:29.520 force coming up where is the

01:10:31.820 time gone i only got about

01:10:32.860 another 15 minutes or so if we

01:10:33.980 have to get to everything i was

01:10:35.360 going to talk about the armada

01:10:36.420 more and more descriptions of

01:10:37.580 this giant this giant thing or

01:10:39.560 the lists of different ships no

01:10:41.260 we can't do it so we'll have to

01:10:43.360 talk about the actual beaches

01:10:44.480 then the actual invasion h-hour at

01:10:47.160 least for the more easterly

01:10:48.680 beaches of utah and omaha was

01:10:50.260 half past six in the morning

01:10:51.200 yeah very didn't it half past

01:10:52.260 seven for the gold the

01:10:53.860 canadians were attacking at

01:10:54.820 juno beach golden sword were

01:10:56.540 british but omaha and utah were

01:10:58.380 american beaches and if anyone

01:11:01.420 knows the the the biggest amount

01:11:03.900 of of fatalities went down at

01:11:06.860 omaha beach bloody omaha yeah

01:11:08.660 not that the other beaches were

01:11:10.980 cakewalk but omaha and they broke

01:11:14.220 omaha into a few different

01:11:15.320 segments dog green and fox green

01:11:18.380 were where it was it was a real

01:11:20.560 hell where sometimes they were

01:11:22.240 close to or 100 casualties in the

01:11:24.400 first waves just mung down

01:11:26.220 completely um because apparently

01:11:28.720 the bluffs or the the cliffs

01:11:30.740 looking you know the germans were

01:11:32.300 just looking straight down on them

01:11:33.900 it was like shooting fish in a

01:11:35.920 barrel so particularly fox green

01:11:37.760 and dog green but all of omaha

01:11:39.060 beach was no joke um to the point

01:11:41.400 where after like the third or

01:11:42.620 fourth ways um omar bradley who was

01:11:46.280 the commander of the american

01:11:47.900 the americans in that but was on

01:11:50.060 ship thinking maybe let's just pull

01:11:52.480 out there and just redirect

01:11:54.700 everything to utah

01:11:55.940 no no they kept going until they

01:11:57.880 took it all um two and a half

01:12:00.340 thousand casualties that's right

01:12:01.520 two and a half thousand yeah yeah i

01:12:03.900 mean in the scheme of things on the

01:12:05.420 eastern front it's small potatoes

01:12:07.360 those but to have been there it

01:12:09.700 would have been hell well it's

01:12:10.900 forcing you back into the sea

01:12:11.880 isn't it yeah that's what they're

01:12:13.040 trying to do it's forcing you back

01:12:14.060 into the sea yeah and the men and

01:12:15.980 i'm not blaming them they stalled on

01:12:17.800 the beaches and a lot of this stuff

01:12:19.940 is all about momentum it's easy for

01:12:21.320 me to sit here talking and say it's

01:12:23.800 all about momentum you've got to be

01:12:25.100 pushing but sometimes there was a few

01:12:28.460 examples of you guys senior officers

01:12:30.040 just standing up in a hail of

01:12:31.640 bullets and men saying i don't know

01:12:32.800 how he stood up and not didn't get

01:12:34.440 shot some people just standing up

01:12:36.140 and saying come on men there's one

01:12:38.280 quote where he said the only people

01:12:39.420 standing on this beach are dead

01:12:40.480 people or people about to die yeah

01:12:42.160 so you've got to push forward that's

01:12:43.860 right um i won't even have time to

01:12:46.080 talk about yeah yeah no exactly but a

01:12:48.660 lot of the the armor that was coming

01:12:49.800 behind them and they didn't actually

01:12:50.720 reach the beach a lot of the landing

01:12:52.500 craft as well hit sandbars instead and

01:12:54.660 were were quite out on the water they

01:12:56.760 couldn't actually get into the beach a

01:12:58.180 lot of guys drowned trying to get out

01:12:59.900 yeah i'm looking at you you mentioned

01:13:03.140 right in the beginning they had loads

01:13:04.340 of amphibious tanks

01:13:05.560 yeah and dds and the funnies

01:13:08.540 741st tank battalion 60 plus tanks

01:13:12.320 um they were supposed to float the

01:13:14.560 last little bit and straight away 27

01:13:16.680 of them just sunk 27 out of i think it

01:13:18.900 was 32 and actually the first guys

01:13:20.480 radioed back and said don't come yeah

01:13:22.620 you know but the thing about it is the

01:13:24.400 six foot waves there they thought was

01:13:25.560 gonna be one foot way they've been

01:13:26.400 tested and if you ever look at these

01:13:27.420 weird things they had this canvas thing

01:13:29.380 around them you think that's never

01:13:30.780 going to work apparently did you could

01:13:32.040 float tanks who knew you could float

01:13:33.180 tanks but um had all the hatches open

01:13:35.140 and actually only five guys out of all

01:13:36.440 those 20 odd tanks that were killed

01:13:37.880 the other guys came out of hatches and

01:13:39.480 swam away and went this is ridiculous

01:13:40.520 but they dropped the tanks three miles

01:13:42.040 out 15 000 feet out a lot of the

01:13:43.840 tanks were dropped three miles they're

01:13:45.280 never supposed to do about half a mile

01:13:46.420 they're dropping three miles out you're

01:13:47.560 like this is going to be you'd be on

01:13:49.340 the side wouldn't you give us all that

01:13:50.480 madness yeah loads of accounts of

01:13:53.740 seasickness loads yeah yeah um loads of

01:13:56.180 accounts of the landing crafts almost

01:13:57.620 sinking and people bailing out with

01:13:59.180 their helmets as for dear life um yeah i'm

01:14:03.220 going to do another quote here uh

01:14:04.880 because again it paints a picture so

01:14:06.300 well of particularly omaha beach um we

01:14:10.100 had a giant amount of flak going in both

01:14:13.480 from the ships or the battleships and the

01:14:16.580 air cover and it people thought we've

01:14:19.640 pounded those beaches so hard no way

01:14:21.780 anything can live nearly everything did

01:14:23.880 yeah nearly everything did um bug in that's

01:14:28.260 right yeah um can you try to say now the

01:14:32.340 deadly uh martial music of the bombardment

01:14:35.260 seem to grow and swell as the thin wavy line

01:14:37.920 of assault crafts closed in on omaha beach

01:14:40.260 landing ships laying about a thousand

01:14:42.360 yards offshore joined in the shelling and

01:14:45.140 then thousands of flashing rockets whooshed

01:14:47.020 over the heads of the soldiers uh for the

01:14:49.940 troops it seemed inconceivable that anything

01:14:52.000 could survive the weight of firepower that

01:14:54.120 flayed the german defenses the beach was

01:14:56.220 wreathed in a haze and plumes of uh smoke

01:14:59.600 from grass fires drifted lazily down from

01:15:01.900 the bluffs still the german guns remained

01:15:03.960 silent the boats bored in in in the

01:15:06.660 thrashing surf and running back up the

01:15:09.700 beach men could now see the lethal jungles

01:15:12.200 of steel and concrete obstacles they were

01:15:14.440 strewn everywhere draped with barbed wire

01:15:16.760 and capped with mines they were as cruel and

01:15:19.140 as ugly as the men had expected a bit further

01:15:21.380 down we're told through the din and clamor

01:15:23.480 one sound was nearer deadlier than all the

01:15:25.700 rest the sound of machine gun bullets

01:15:27.680 clanging across the steel snow like noses of

01:15:30.840 the boats artillery roared mortar shells

01:15:33.500 rained down all along the four miles of

01:15:35.580 omaha beach german guns flayed the

01:15:37.640 assault craft it was hauer they came ashore on

01:15:40.600 omaha beach the slogging unglamorous men that

01:15:43.660 no one envied no battle ensigns flew for them

01:15:46.600 no horns or bugles sounded but they had

01:15:49.900 history on their side they came from

01:15:52.560 regiments that had bivouacked at places

01:15:54.460 like valley forge stony creek antietam

01:15:57.160 gettysburg and had fought in the argon and

01:16:00.360 had crossed the beaches of north africa

01:16:02.160 sicily and salerno now they had one more

01:16:04.500 beach to cross and they would call this one

01:16:06.900 bloody omaha so yeah a lot of them were

01:16:09.940 cut down i mentioned point du coq very

01:16:11.440 briefly there uh it's where a bunch of

01:16:13.720 rangers 220 odd rangers were tasked with

01:16:17.120 scaling this almost sheer cliff known

01:16:20.180 stories higher just with grappling hooks

01:16:22.140 and ladders or just their bare hands

01:16:23.740 because there was a gun in placement at

01:16:25.180 the top that they had to take out by the

01:16:27.380 end of the day only 90 of them were left

01:16:29.100 and when they got up there the guns

01:16:31.620 weren't even there the germans hadn't even

01:16:33.940 put the guns in place they were just

01:16:35.440 killed on the beach trying to attempt to

01:16:37.200 climb that cliff loads of them yeah yeah a

01:16:40.020 lot of the actual guns were abandoned well i

01:16:41.580 say a lot i mean criker what does that

01:16:42.660 quantify quantify i mean it doesn't at all

01:16:44.380 does it but um when they did get to some

01:16:46.860 artillery pieces and everything they were

01:16:48.040 they'd been abandoned right i mean well

01:16:52.880 okay so i mean it depends where you were

01:16:55.240 so for example on is it on gold beach when

01:16:58.360 the british beaches like the hampshires

01:17:00.960 got uh did their beach storming and got

01:17:05.580 ripped up something fearsome massive

01:17:08.340 casualties and like the dorsets or either

01:17:12.220 side of them was more or less fine hardly

01:17:14.240 any casualties there's one bit on gold

01:17:16.240 beach where uh the account of one of the

01:17:19.040 padres was that he had nothing to do they

01:17:21.460 had no resistance no casualties the

01:17:23.960 padres spent all day helping unload crates

01:17:26.180 of ammo yeah and then one mile away it's

01:17:29.280 hell yeah so it was a lottery on d-day so

01:17:33.300 utah beach um that it accidentally they

01:17:37.440 didn't land where they'd meant to they

01:17:39.180 landed a thousand or two thousand odd

01:17:41.600 meters further east just because of the

01:17:44.480 confusion of war and because the tide was

01:17:46.320 yeah uh it was just taking them that way

01:17:48.340 and so they landed not exactly where they

01:17:50.160 meant to but it was fortuitous because if

01:17:52.960 they'd landed where they're meant to the

01:17:54.020 germans had something for them right where

01:17:55.760 they did land they only had they had like

01:17:58.000 under 20 casualties or something in the

01:17:59.760 first instance they had to decide had to

01:18:02.760 decide whether to use that one beachhead and

01:18:06.740 the one road leading back into mainland and

01:18:09.620 ferry everything through that or try and

01:18:12.020 take the part they meant to which was

01:18:14.160 heavily defended they decided not to and it

01:18:16.860 sounded like that was a good decision it

01:18:18.960 saved a lot of lives just isolate move on

01:18:21.200 yeah um so i can't i wanted to really talk

01:18:24.560 about the actual beach stuff a lot more but

01:18:26.340 we just simply haven't got time unfortunately

01:18:28.500 maybe i can do an epochs going into crazy

01:18:30.600 detail about yeah what happened uh almost

01:18:33.680 minute by minute so a lot of the beaches

01:18:35.840 like gold and sword and juno in places

01:18:37.860 anyway they were off the beaches within 45

01:18:40.180 minutes an hour that's right um parts of

01:18:43.900 there was part of uh i think juno beach

01:18:46.100 they were still fighting for like five

01:18:47.820 hours uh homo high like eight hours later

01:18:51.380 still struggling to get off the beach well

01:18:53.700 they had traffic jams on some of the

01:18:54.740 beaches they couldn't get off i mean the

01:18:56.120 traffic was so jammed up they couldn't

01:18:57.840 move it so that's why you get marshals

01:18:59.980 get military police that's my father

01:19:01.280 when he's on his motorcycle he was a

01:19:02.980 military police officer that was their

01:19:04.080 job there was to get people moving off

01:19:06.020 the beach so they could accommodate

01:19:07.020 supplies coming in behind uh and the

01:19:09.460 military police there had all the signs

01:19:10.980 up you saw some of the signs in the

01:19:12.180 videos you know the company this way

01:19:14.140 type thing that was their job to marshal

01:19:16.020 people out from the actual landing area

01:19:17.440 to clear it for the rest of the guys

01:19:18.560 coming in yeah because one of the worst

01:19:20.140 nightmare situation is there's just a

01:19:21.640 everyone's blocked on the beach get

01:19:23.280 killed yeah and that's that's a

01:19:25.620 catastrophe we didn't know that they

01:19:26.940 weren't going to get bombed by the

01:19:28.140 Luftwaffe as well they didn't realize

01:19:29.400 that a lot of the aircraft weren't

01:19:30.320 there at the time so that's another

01:19:32.140 thing just quickly talk about that did

01:19:33.820 you in the whole of the in the whole of

01:19:36.740 the western europe the Luftwaffe had

01:19:38.580 something in the order of apparently

01:19:39.900 it's called in uh to the historians it's

01:19:42.640 completely disputed there's all sorts of

01:19:44.180 different sources but they had something

01:19:45.840 in the order of 180 odd fighter

01:19:47.860 airplanes which is hardly anything to

01:19:49.820 begin with then they decided a couple of

01:19:51.800 days before this to move nearly all of

01:19:55.080 them back to nearly the german border to

01:19:57.120 defend against almost daily bombing

01:19:59.000 attacks on germany so in the normandy

01:20:01.240 area they had two fighter planes the

01:20:04.460 germans one commanded by uh joseph pips

01:20:08.360 priller and him and his wingman did fly

01:20:11.140 their two planes into combat legends and

01:20:15.060 strafed the beaches i think one of the

01:20:17.180 british beaches i mean incredible you

01:20:18.900 think about it yeah just you and your

01:20:21.080 mate what are you doing today not much

01:20:22.440 mate apparently there's an invasion

01:20:23.620 going on you're up for it let's go and

01:20:25.020 do some madness chance of getting

01:20:27.740 chance of coming back from that is

01:20:28.940 non-existent isn't it the skies are

01:20:31.780 filled with the british and german

01:20:34.200 british and american fighter planes and

01:20:36.880 there's two of you yeah and you do it

01:20:38.760 anyway well the interesting thing about

01:20:40.260 the the the allied planes going across

01:20:42.100 they painted the stripes on them the

01:20:43.220 normandy invasion stripes because of the

01:20:44.540 confusion at sicily where a lot of the

01:20:46.480 friendly fire was directed at them and

01:20:47.960 those stripes on the planes were

01:20:49.660 literally painted i think on the third

01:20:51.520 of june like literally before the

01:20:53.020 invasion some of the paint was still

01:20:54.160 wet on the aircraft when they got

01:20:55.220 airborne because they literally like

01:20:56.500 paint the jets up to go you'll paint

01:20:57.740 the aircraft up paint them paint them

01:20:58.920 paint them off you go so it's yeah a

01:21:01.260 real last minute thing so that's pips

01:21:03.260 priller um so god one last thing to

01:21:05.560 say there so they had like no you no

01:21:07.440 u-boat to speak of they had essentially

01:21:10.560 no aircraft and no air force to speak

01:21:12.560 of yeah very limited um and and they had

01:21:15.620 very little armor and the two panzer

01:21:17.260 divisions they did have weren't

01:21:20.160 dispatched until very very late in the

01:21:22.160 day and wouldn't get to the normandy

01:21:23.580 region to the next day which was a

01:21:26.120 game changer a massive massive game

01:21:27.380 changer and loads of their senior

01:21:28.900 staff including rommel himself weren't

01:21:30.260 even there so we got lucky in all sorts

01:21:32.360 of ways it could have gone a lot lot

01:21:33.900 worse was about from our point of view

01:21:35.980 about luck could have gone a lot worse

01:21:37.900 so just to say then when hitler does

01:21:39.840 finally get up and hears about it he

01:21:41.360 throws a bit of a strop and i thought

01:21:44.440 he was all right about it i thought he

01:21:45.520 was like sorry yeah no sorry i thought

01:21:47.980 he was didn't he then kind of go well

01:21:49.820 at least that's done now now i can

01:21:50.820 concentrate on the eastern front then

01:21:52.780 he kind of wasn't that kind of his

01:21:53.720 attitude like i'm kind of all right

01:21:55.200 with it well he's not all right with

01:21:56.460 it right yeah well to begin with well

01:21:58.900 when he was first told he apparently

01:22:01.340 had a strop for about five minutes and

01:22:03.060 walked out did he walked out there was

01:22:04.760 keitel was there i think keitel and

01:22:06.340 yodel told him okay and uh he like

01:22:09.160 apparently was just shouting his head

01:22:10.640 off for about five minutes brilliant and

01:22:12.220 walked out saying is it or isn't the

01:22:14.080 invasion is it or is it not the

01:22:15.700 invasion and stormed off and came back

01:22:17.800 minutes later and then then started

01:22:19.300 talking about what they actually do

01:22:20.460 and i think by the end of the day or

01:22:22.000 the next day his thinking obviously

01:22:24.060 still pretty far off the mark his

01:22:26.020 thinking was well at least it's over

01:22:27.480 now at least like that tension yeah we

01:22:30.080 can actually start moving divisions

01:22:31.720 around and try and contain them and do

01:22:33.260 everything so he was all he was of the

01:22:35.420 mind of bring it on yeah she's crazy

01:22:38.760 um but yeah they were just um the back

01:22:41.600 and forth uh between ob west i.e the

01:22:45.920 german forces in the in the west and

01:22:48.720 okw hitler's command to release these

01:22:51.840 panzer divisions it's just this back and

01:22:53.280 forth going surely you're not gonna not

01:22:56.340 allow us to move surely you're not

01:22:57.880 gonna and they just kept saying no you

01:22:59.520 need a word from hitler and he hasn't

01:23:01.000 given it so no um so from the german

01:23:03.580 point of view it's just sort of crazy

01:23:06.100 just sort of in depth around around

01:23:08.180 khan and beyond they did have a lot of

01:23:10.320 tank divisions in that ss tank panzer

01:23:12.900 divisions down there and heavy armor

01:23:14.320 in depth but they just didn't move up

01:23:16.120 to the front yeah well not i suppose not

01:23:17.760 in the way they thought it was going to

01:23:18.740 i think it was the 21st panzer division

01:23:20.420 was sort of yeah in and around that

01:23:22.260 region yeah they weren't moved up quick

01:23:24.200 enough um people weren't making the

01:23:26.220 decisions yeah loads of the senior guys

01:23:28.220 all the way through the sixth just kept

01:23:30.260 insisting amongst themselves that this

01:23:33.000 is a diversion it's still coming at

01:23:34.460 yeah that's right well a lot of it was

01:23:36.920 encircled so they went around the armor

01:23:38.560 and then they trapped up any supplies

01:23:40.140 of the armor they didn't necessarily

01:23:41.040 deal with the armor in the way that

01:23:42.240 they thought they were going to have

01:23:43.060 to they just isolated it and moved on

01:23:44.520 which

01:23:46.060 unfortunately we've got to start just

01:23:50.700 talking about comments now oh okay

01:23:52.520 well cool comments this is your uh

01:23:53.900 these people are awesome so i like

01:23:55.120 talking about i think i'm going to

01:23:56.060 have to do an epochs okay doing it in

01:23:58.420 in uh in much yeah you should do

01:24:00.660 because there's a lot of stuff that

01:24:01.600 you come out with i learned so much

01:24:02.980 when you when you dig deep into this

01:24:04.420 stuff i watch them all

01:24:05.300 um okay so some comments nice

01:24:08.400 comments please because i've had a

01:24:09.440 hard time this week

01:24:10.180 okay uh bleach demon says bo brilliant

01:24:14.040 changing format on this auspicious day

01:24:15.840 thank you

01:24:16.360 uh cringe lord commander says great to

01:24:19.320 see tim back one of the best guests

01:24:21.140 ever

01:24:21.500 yeah yes you're not wrong loving his

01:24:24.160 man

01:24:24.440 tad mcgage says oh very neat idea to

01:24:27.520 have a historical day stream yeah thanks

01:24:30.280 yes nice um no vera says oh now this

01:24:33.880 is quite something what a way to

01:24:35.520 commemorate the most important of dates

01:24:37.620 we we will remember them

01:24:39.480 maureen peter says every year on the

01:24:42.180 anniversary of d-day french citizens

01:24:43.800 take sand from omaha beach which looks

01:24:46.540 almost golden take it to the normandy

01:24:48.380 american cemetery uh and memorial in

01:24:52.080 coloville samir and rub it on the

01:24:54.740 gravestones of the fallen soldiers on the

01:24:56.660 names to give the names a golden shine

01:24:58.960 they do this for all the soldiers

01:25:00.840 buried there that's nice

01:25:01.840 school children are asked to join as

01:25:03.560 well to make sure it stays a tradition

01:25:05.480 george hap says i appreciate honoring

01:25:07.840 the anniversary of d-day while the

01:25:09.580 generals get the spotlight it's the

01:25:11.320 nameless soldiers who have to

01:25:13.020 sacrifice the most yeah absolutely

01:25:14.400 yeah these poor guys some of the first

01:25:16.720 waves that uh well a bloody omaha

01:25:19.620 were just nearly 100 casualties yeah

01:25:23.400 it's like yeah you're just all getting

01:25:26.380 moaned down crazy crazy you can't

01:25:29.960 really you can't really you can just

01:25:32.380 say those words right but you can't

01:25:33.820 really ever appreciate what that really

01:25:35.620 is even watching saving private ryan or

01:25:38.200 whatever you still can't what would

01:25:40.800 it have been i don't know how you do

01:25:42.140 that i think it's really weird because

01:25:44.040 someone was saying that it's not really

01:25:45.100 taught in school and you could argue

01:25:46.820 well how much of this do we teach in

01:25:48.000 school but you got to teach enough in

01:25:49.540 school that you realize there are

01:25:50.660 sacrifices made so that you don't have

01:25:52.120 to do those things because that tells

01:25:53.780 you then when you're a young person

01:25:54.920 that you might also have to make those

01:25:56.120 sacrifices in future whether we agree

01:25:57.660 with governments and what they're

01:25:58.680 doing today or not the fact is if you

01:26:01.260 want to be an englishman or you want

01:26:02.360 to be a british person you have to make

01:26:03.660 those sacrifices so that those coming

01:26:05.040 behind you you can also live it just

01:26:07.240 has to be that way we've all got you

01:26:08.980 know i'm only kids but i've got nephews

01:26:10.280 and nieces and some you know i joined

01:26:12.100 the military for 20 years to make those

01:26:13.100 sacrifices so that they don't have to

01:26:14.600 i'm lucky i'm lucky you know salia but

01:26:16.780 you're right whoever's saying that we

01:26:18.800 need to remember those individual soldiers

01:26:20.180 not just the generals yeah definitely

01:26:22.100 um yeah some of the stories of some of

01:26:25.120 the paratroopers essentially behind

01:26:27.260 enemy lines as the day breaks taking

01:26:29.560 out various gunning places absolutely

01:26:31.340 crazy actions yeah yeah yeah well

01:26:33.540 pegasus bridge was one of them wasn't

01:26:34.540 it they'd stormed pegasus and they're

01:26:35.720 like there's no one here the bridge

01:26:37.400 bridge wasn't even um uh the charges

01:26:39.540 when we need me laid on the bridge so

01:26:40.800 they went to the cafe had a few glasses

01:26:42.020 of champagne and went we're still doing

01:26:43.560 this war thing yeah yeah we are then

01:26:45.140 they went off to do the fighting but

01:26:46.980 of course they went there to try and

01:26:48.120 blow lots of bridges to stop the

01:26:49.400 supply lines to keep other bridges

01:26:50.620 open and i mean the fighting was just

01:26:53.160 ridiculous i mean an open ground as well

01:26:55.260 they're landing an open ground you know

01:26:56.740 you're just landing in a parachute and

01:26:58.060 then everyone's flying weapons at you

01:26:59.960 ah it's ridiculous and i mean the glider

01:27:02.880 pilots as well they're landing in the

01:27:04.560 dark in areas that they really can't see

01:27:06.680 into trees with heavy machinery behind

01:27:08.840 them you know carrying 30 troops as well

01:27:11.160 i mean ridiculous just it's like who came

01:27:14.160 up with that idea it's just it's like

01:27:16.680 well you're a glider pilot mate oh

01:27:18.220 brilliant what do i do oh you're gonna

01:27:19.540 slam yourself into trees and hopefully

01:27:21.900 you know you get out and then they had

01:27:23.160 to fight of course it's well actually

01:27:24.400 what actually happened the glider pilots

01:27:25.440 i'll stop um the glider pilots were

01:27:27.400 expected to fight with the units but

01:27:28.580 they were so rare these glider pilots

01:27:29.980 that actually a lot of them were shipped

01:27:31.080 back to the front like straight away get

01:27:32.440 back to the beaches show your chip get

01:27:34.660 on the boats get back there because we

01:27:36.040 need you to bring more gliders in so a

01:27:38.160 glider pilots have to make their own

01:27:39.180 way back to the beaches how are you

01:27:41.440 doing that like hold a hand of someone

01:27:42.940 at least you know i mean what walking

01:27:44.280 through lanes by yourself like you know

01:27:45.820 what i mean hope you don't come across

01:27:46.880 an ss panzer division madness to get

01:27:49.520 back to the beach where everyone's

01:27:50.460 trying to shoot people coming that way

01:27:51.720 here's my chip nowadays we think of

01:27:54.740 someone that would drop behind enemy

01:27:56.060 lines to be that's sort of purely a

01:27:58.000 special forces sort of role to have to

01:27:59.900 be the best of the best the hardest of

01:28:01.280 the hard yeah it's like no you're just

01:28:03.340 a just you're a glider pilot but you're

01:28:06.620 going to be doing something ridiculously

01:28:08.440 dangerous yeah ridiculously you've done

01:28:10.720 that bit yeah and then you then you're

01:28:13.120 just in an escape and invasion

01:28:14.220 situation yeah off you go and then if

01:28:17.340 you survive and come back we'll make you

01:28:18.460 do it straight away again thanks for that

01:28:20.100 yeah yeah i get all the girls so not i do

01:28:24.040 you know it's ridiculous when you say if

01:28:26.940 if it was world war ii would you rather

01:28:28.540 be a tanker an infantry burn a

01:28:30.760 submariner on a battleship one of the

01:28:33.260 things i wouldn't want to do is be a

01:28:34.600 glider pilot yeah can i not do that

01:28:36.980 is there any option to do something

01:28:38.360 other than that yeah that's really

01:28:39.680 valid yeah

01:28:40.360 absolutely okay so sean487 for ten

01:28:44.900 dollars super chat says my grandfather

01:28:46.360 died over flanders

01:28:47.460 um in sackville uh canada a few years

01:28:52.720 ago mount allison arts university

01:28:55.700 students spray-painted nazi symbols over

01:28:57.720 the memorials yes we're weird young

01:29:00.080 people in it

01:29:00.760 um i've got quite a lot of comments

01:29:03.520 here obviously won't get through them

01:29:04.680 all i'm afraid

01:29:05.340 um uh well okay so alex ogle says

01:29:09.720 regarding innocence being caught up in

01:29:11.960 the battles i vaguely recall hearing

01:29:13.480 about a woman's silent prayer to the

01:29:15.480 bombers as they flew up flew over her

01:29:17.520 house in europe bomb me if it kills the

01:29:19.760 nazis and frees our lands let your

01:29:21.840 bombs fall on me

01:29:22.680 after four years of brutal rule and a

01:29:25.840 command economy rapacious stealing from

01:29:28.000 everyone else to prop up their own

01:29:29.560 failed ideals uh as is true with all

01:29:32.000 socialist endeavors the european people

01:29:33.940 were ready for invasion and would

01:29:36.940 accept the risks in order to grab up

01:29:38.860 freedom

01:29:39.240 northern zoomer says my my great

01:29:42.900 granddad landed on sword with the

01:29:44.940 scottish commandos

01:29:45.800 no really um i remember him telling me

01:29:48.060 about his vivid memories of the of the

01:29:50.700 mad bagpiper yeah there's lots of

01:29:52.380 accounts of yeah particularly british and

01:29:54.180 canadian guys singing yeah you can

01:29:55.860 imagine someone with bagpipes stay away

01:29:58.620 from that guy

01:29:59.180 when the germans hear that that guy's

01:30:01.800 in trouble you know what i'm saying

01:30:02.620 yeah yeah no matter where you are no

01:30:06.360 matter where in history if you hear um

01:30:08.480 like the bagpipes battle bagpipes

01:30:10.800 yeah you're probably going to be in

01:30:12.120 for a bad day

01:30:12.780 yeah yeah you're not it's a bad thing

01:30:14.380 for you yeah you don't want to be

01:30:15.600 what's that noise yeah you don't want to

01:30:17.120 be hearing that

01:30:17.620 what a legend that's great though that

01:30:19.840 that zoomer there and he says he

01:30:21.360 calls himself a zoomer

01:30:22.160 still connected

01:30:23.200 with those people that went and did

01:30:24.920 that so that's the thing you know we

01:30:26.560 look at the younger generation i don't

01:30:27.840 personally i've got a lot of time for

01:30:28.840 them but a lot of people don't have a

01:30:30.400 lot of time for the younger generation

01:30:31.380 and yet that that young person there is

01:30:33.060 still talking about grandfather you

01:30:34.860 know that's amazing to me that's yeah

01:30:36.480 it goes on to say about the matter after

01:30:38.520 the mad bagpiper and from from which

01:30:40.980 lord love it exercised his writers

01:30:43.400 chief of clan fraser to have a personal

01:30:45.820 piper accompany them on sword beach um and

01:30:49.600 i naively asked about d-day when i was a

01:30:51.440 child there's another account of a guy

01:30:53.520 roosevelt brigadier general theodore

01:30:56.200 roosevelt he was the old theodore

01:30:57.800 roosevelt's son

01:30:58.940 um and he was on the beach he was a

01:31:01.100 gent brigadier general but he landed he

01:31:02.580 insisted on landing on the beach in the

01:31:04.360 first wave i think he was on utah he was

01:31:06.420 on utah

01:31:06.880 um and there's like mortars going off all

01:31:09.220 around him and he's just smoking a pipe

01:31:11.280 and looking at a map you know one of

01:31:13.480 those people absolute sang-froid um

01:31:15.480 and um he actually died he completely

01:31:19.280 survived unscratched and then died of a

01:31:21.420 heart attack a couple of days later no

01:31:23.100 i remember this yeah absolutely i read

01:31:24.300 this before he did didn't he yeah got

01:31:26.120 through the beaches he was one of those

01:31:27.440 great guys that was insanely brave just

01:31:28.980 not caring that there's machine guns

01:31:30.320 firing all around him

01:31:31.260 mortars going off all around him just

01:31:32.960 carrying on like it's not happening

01:31:34.280 probably the way to go when you think

01:31:36.260 about it you can crawl around and get

01:31:37.440 killed or you can

01:31:38.120 walk and get killed but maybe a little

01:31:40.300 bit of cover would be beneficial that's

01:31:41.920 why a lot of the armor when it came on

01:31:43.220 they're all behind the armor trying to

01:31:44.680 help the armor get up the beach with the

01:31:47.140 the mine tanks and everything the flail

01:31:48.480 tanks that came through all the funny

01:31:49.620 tanks they built

01:31:50.280 yeah yeah there's there's so much here

01:31:53.700 i'm gonna have to i'd have dug a little

01:31:55.020 shell scrape probably and just hid

01:31:56.220 there for a while a couple of days you

01:31:57.640 know yeah wake me up when it's all gone

01:31:59.260 covered myself with sand you know that

01:32:01.220 was one of the things on every beach

01:32:02.340 they expected the beaches to be filled

01:32:04.260 with craters

01:32:05.040 because they'd just seen it get yeah

01:32:07.140 that's right smashed yeah a few hours

01:32:08.960 yeah at least the beach is going to

01:32:10.660 have lots of craters on hiding hardly

01:32:13.360 any yeah weird i think particularly on

01:32:15.520 omaha they were like i thought there'd

01:32:17.920 be loads of cover they've been

01:32:19.480 shelling they've been shelling that

01:32:20.640 they thought the fortifications

01:32:21.840 they've been hammering those i think

01:32:23.440 5 000 tons of bombs or something

01:32:25.340 ludicrous because a lot of them have

01:32:27.060 been a bit in depth they hadn't

01:32:28.360 actually hit the the sort of place

01:32:29.940 they should have hit because the

01:32:30.600 cloud cover and stuff so seems like

01:32:32.080 one of them from one of the german

01:32:33.180 accounts we took out a lot of the

01:32:35.280 observation posts right not the

01:32:37.460 gunning placements right okay we

01:32:38.740 thought the observation posts were

01:32:40.520 gunning placements that's

01:32:41.100 interesting i didn't know so on

01:32:42.520 omaha beach at least um i had a great

01:32:44.860 paragraph here uh this is no time to

01:32:47.020 read it it lists all them all the

01:32:49.880 mortars and rockets and heavy gun

01:32:51.820 emplacements and like 80 machine gun

01:32:54.520 nests really and uh out of 22 heavy

01:32:57.660 guns all of them were still active when

01:33:00.280 the first wave landed all of them

01:33:02.420 crazy miraculously crazy um so yeah i

01:33:07.400 keep saying it but really

01:33:08.300 unfortunately i've run out of time i

01:33:10.680 had loads more quotes and things i

01:33:12.020 wanted to say but um i have to save

01:33:13.940 it for an epoch i suppose well i hope

01:33:16.040 we've done the topic some justice i hope

01:33:19.440 we've talked about a couple of things

01:33:20.700 at least that you won't get on your

01:33:22.240 average documentary yeah hopefully um

01:33:25.940 yeah um so well we'll have to leave

01:33:29.000 there thanks tim for your time if you

01:33:30.280 want to uh quickly say where people can

01:33:31.980 find you oh no you know they want to

01:33:33.300 find me i'm normally getting shouted out

01:33:34.800 on twitter or something by someone

01:33:35.880 doesn't like one putting out

01:33:36.740 or fast shit performance on youtube of

01:33:38.620 course yeah fast shit performance check it

01:33:40.380 out um okay so well we'll leave it there

01:33:43.600 so until next time guys take care

01:33:45.940 you

The Podcast of the Lotus Eaters #931

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