The Tucker Carlson Show - Covid Whistleblower： Predicting Pandemics & Exposing the CIA and Peter Daszak’s Alliance With China

00:00:00.000 So, I think most people have concluded that the creation of COVID was probably not what

00:00:08.040 they told us.

00:00:08.640 It probably didn't evolve naturally out of a pangolin in a seafood market, and that the

00:00:14.260 Wuhan Institute of Virology probably played a role, the US government played a role, but

00:00:18.400 it is impossible to find anyone, or it has been for us anyway, to find anyone who has

00:00:24.280 kind of like direct connection to any of the main players here.

00:00:27.300 None of them will do an interview.

00:00:29.260 None.

00:00:30.800 You were the vice president of the EcoHealth Alliance.

00:00:34.800 You're a former military guy, ties to the intel world.

00:00:37.980 You worked at a federal nuclear lab in New Mexico for years, and then you wind up, and you're

00:00:44.940 a scientist, PhD, and then you wind up working for EcoHealth Alliance in New York City.

00:00:51.880 You think it's like this World Wildlife Fund operation designed to like track diseases among

00:00:58.640 wildlife globally and protect the wildlife, protect the people.

00:01:02.100 It's like kind of a crunchy outfit.

00:01:04.180 It's do-gooders, basically.

00:01:06.180 You show up there.

00:01:07.440 You help them raise a bunch of money from the feds, and you become the vice president, and

00:01:12.480 then you discover it's not what you thought.

00:01:14.140 So that's the story that you told me at breakfast, which was an amazing story.

00:01:18.320 Thank you again for coming.

00:01:19.880 I'm going to bow out now and let you continue the story from there, assuming I've been faithful

00:01:24.620 in my rendition of it so far.

00:01:26.440 That's perfectly accurate.

00:01:27.600 And thank you for having me.

00:01:28.480 This is sort of like a dream of mine.

00:01:30.380 Oh, well, I'm so excited you're here, and because this has been gnawing at me, you know, where

00:01:36.380 did COVID come from, and how was the U.S. government implicated?

00:01:39.200 It clearly was, but you never meet anyone who can say that they know the players, but

00:01:43.140 you do.

00:01:43.440 So with that, you show up there.

00:02:06.420 You become VP of EcoHealth Alliance, the now famous EcoHealth Alliance.

00:02:09.920 And when did you start to realize this wasn't the World Wildlife Fund?

00:02:15.760 Shortly after I was working there.

00:02:16.680 So I was hired as a senior scientist to take over a, well, I learned after the fact, I sort

00:02:21.200 of lied to, but it was a failing department that was doing predictive forecasting and analytics.

00:02:27.140 And after I brought in all that money from the Department of Defense, I actually sort of

00:02:30.440 saved EcoHealth Alliance.

00:02:31.580 It was financially on the rocks.

00:02:33.160 That $4 million really transformed the organization.

00:02:36.660 And with that, and my expertise in technology, I was actually improving the systems and technology

00:02:42.460 company-wide.

00:02:44.160 Peter Daszak, who is the president or CEO of EcoHealth Alliance, liked everything that I

00:02:50.220 was doing.

00:02:50.760 He was very impressed.

00:02:51.180 Peter Daszak is like a figure out of history now.

00:02:53.080 I mean, Peter Daszak is like at the very center of COVID.

00:02:55.500 Oh, absolutely.

00:02:56.400 And we'll get to that.

00:02:57.660 But so Peter promotes me to vice president, and then I started attending executive meetings

00:03:04.520 and I get involved in all the different other aspects of the company, or at least visibility

00:03:07.620 to what's going on.

00:03:09.180 The main driver of funding of EcoHealth Alliance was from this program called PREDICT.

00:03:14.120 And PREDICT was funded by USAID to go out and conduct global surveillance of infectious

00:03:20.960 diseases to predict and forecast emerging pandemics.

00:03:23.840 At least that's what they were telling everyone they were going to do.

00:03:26.880 It seems like a virtuous thing to do, by the way.

00:03:29.220 No, and it seemed completely virtuous.

00:03:30.680 And I had actually been doing that type of research my entire career, at least as a scientist

00:03:35.700 and engineer.

00:03:37.160 And I was doing that type of work at the National Laboratory.

00:03:39.840 I continued that work funded by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency when I was at EcoHealth

00:03:43.840 Alliance.

00:03:44.080 That's where the first big check comes from for $4.6 million.

00:03:47.600 And once I'm promoted and I'm looking at this USAID PREDICT program, I decided to go dig

00:03:53.880 into the literature and all the technical reports to see what this is and how it actually works.

00:03:59.960 And I read through this phone book of material and I assess that it's a giant boondoggle.

00:04:07.720 There's no way that they're going to be able to predict or forecast infectious diseases.

00:04:12.400 They weren't collecting enough samples globally or in the countries where they were collecting

00:04:17.800 them, they weren't collecting the data on a systematic and routine basis, which is one

00:04:23.020 of the fundamental core concepts in biosurveillance.

00:04:26.320 And you start to ask the question, well, what...

00:04:28.120 So this is your area, I should just say, like you've done a lot of research into how do you

00:04:33.120 model this out?

00:04:33.760 Like how do you collect the data?

00:04:35.060 How do you analyze it?

00:04:36.520 I make the bold claim that I'm probably one of the world's leading experts in the area.

00:04:40.300 I'm one of the few people to actually predict and forecast infectious diseases before

00:04:44.240 they've occurred.

00:04:45.160 And I've done it in peer-reviewed literature and I was actually so bold when I built my

00:04:50.540 models and tested them.

00:04:51.460 I actually had this published in, I think it was the Guardian newspaper, the New York

00:04:55.300 Post, before the outbreak hit.

00:04:57.460 And this was the Zika, remember Zika virus?

00:04:59.780 Very well, yeah.

00:05:00.280 I was working at Eco-Auth Alliance when the models that I developed actually forecasted the

00:05:05.580 amount of Zika virus that we'd received in the United States and where specifically.

00:05:09.640 And I published that before it happened.

00:05:10.980 So you were very familiar with the technical details of a study of this kind, of monitoring

00:05:16.880 of this.

00:05:17.220 Like how big is the sample have to be in order to do this?

00:05:21.360 Well, so the devil's always in the details.

00:05:25.480 It depends on the characteristics of the infectious disease agent.

00:05:28.520 Of course.

00:05:28.820 They're talking about the population, where that population is located, the type of infrastructure.

00:05:33.640 There's a lot of technical nuance because it's how healthy is the population?

00:05:36.860 What is the probability that they'll be exposed to something?

00:05:39.200 Right.

00:05:39.400 And then what are the likely transmission dynamics within that population?

00:05:46.000 And does it have the ability to go from a small isolated outbreak to an epidemic to

00:05:50.880 a pandemic?

00:05:51.880 So, but because this is your specific area, you look at the details of what Eco-Health Alliance,

00:05:56.600 your new employer, is now doing.

00:05:58.360 And it's immediately obvious to you, like instantly obvious that this is not real.

00:06:03.820 It wasn't real.

00:06:05.320 And the real crazy aspect of here is that once I'm promoted, I'm going to all these

00:06:09.860 different meetings with the funders of the program.

00:06:13.540 So Dr. Dennis Carroll, who is the program manager, program director at USAID, who had a very

00:06:18.780 close relationship with Dr. Peter Daszak.

00:06:21.000 And these fundraising events we're doing where we're telling everyone that we're going to

00:06:24.480 go, we're going to forecast and predict these emerging infectious diseases that can cause

00:06:30.780 pandemics.

00:06:31.240 And I'm sitting in the audience and I'm watching my boss and these other people telling everyone

00:06:34.680 that they're doing this.

00:06:37.040 And like I mentioned, if you look at the technical reports, it's just very clear that this is

00:06:40.940 not technically possible.

00:06:42.600 So it begs the question, you know, as me being an ethical person and a good scientist, an

00:06:48.980 engineer, what are we doing here?

00:06:51.260 Right.

00:06:51.720 Because we're not doing the thing we said we were doing.

00:06:53.800 Exactly.

00:06:54.900 And, you know, it gets sort of darker than that real quick.

00:06:57.440 So once I'm sitting in these executive meetings, one of the first meetings that I sit in is a

00:07:02.840 fudget, fudget, a budget, a budget, a budget forecasting meeting.

00:07:07.220 Budget though, that's perfect.

00:07:08.040 Yeah, it's fudget, maybe a good Freudian slip, a budget forecasting meeting for the company.

00:07:12.600 And each vice president in charge of the area is going around talking about our budget,

00:07:16.260 how our employees are doing, you know, operations types of things, typical corporate stuff.

00:07:21.220 And, you know, I asked the question because I'm, you know, well, how much money are we

00:07:24.320 spending on wildlife conservation?

00:07:27.040 And because when I interviewed at the company and all our branding and marketing messaging

00:07:31.280 was that we're doing infectious disease research to protect wildlife and engage in

00:07:37.480 conservation activities or something to that effect.

00:07:39.980 And the room goes quiet.

00:07:41.460 And, you know, I'm looking at everyone and why is everyone sort of staring into space or

00:07:45.080 staring at me?

00:07:46.240 And eventually Peter Daszak looks at me and with sort of a maniacal laugh says,

00:07:51.400 we're not doing, we're not doing any conservation work.

00:07:57.120 This is like a nightmare.

00:07:58.840 Yeah, and I'm just, I'm just shocked.

00:08:03.880 And, you know, I came directly from the national laboratory system, San Diego National Laboratories,

00:08:10.720 and I was trying to get away from that type of work.

00:08:13.840 I was actually excited to go work at a crunchy granola nonprofit organization where I was

00:08:18.820 protecting wildlife.

00:08:19.460 You thought it was the Autobahn Society.

00:08:21.140 Yeah, and as we were discussing earlier, we're both avid outdoorsmen.

00:08:24.920 We love nature, that kind of thing.

00:08:26.020 And I thought I was going to get into more of that.

00:08:27.840 I was excited, like, hey, maybe I'll get a chance to have a trip out to the woods or

00:08:30.940 the jungle and go protect some wildlife.

00:08:33.320 And I hear this and I'm like, okay.

00:08:35.800 And, you know, I digested.

00:08:38.440 Of course, I don't say anything.

00:08:39.480 It's my boss, my other, the other executives.

00:08:41.080 And then it drives more questions.

00:08:45.180 You know, what are we doing here?

00:08:46.980 And so I sat in more executive meetings.

00:08:50.040 I learned more.

00:08:50.640 And I quickly, you know, learned that we were sort of functioning as a Beltway Bandit type

00:08:55.620 of operation, meaning that we're trying to get large contracts and grants in our area,

00:09:00.500 which is, in theory, predicting and forecasting infectious diseases.

00:09:05.800 But really what we were doing was the simplest way of explaining is that we were running around

00:09:11.000 the planet collecting infectious disease samples to build a bank or a library of infectious

00:09:16.600 diseases, which was odd.

00:09:22.260 I'm sorry to keep laughing.

00:09:23.720 It's so, this is so dark.

00:09:25.300 I don't, it's a, I can't help it.

00:09:26.680 Well, it was odd from the standpoint, I was still looking at this as a scientist trying

00:09:29.920 to figure out what we were doing.

00:09:31.340 And there's not a ton of publication value in cataloging infectious diseases.

00:09:38.020 You can get one simple publication from identifying a new or novel pathogen in a species, but

00:09:43.360 it's sort of a one and done thing.

00:09:44.440 It doesn't really drive future research, right?

00:09:48.360 So if you, you find, you discover something, it's great.

00:09:50.660 You found it, it's a publication, but that's not going to drive your next cycle of funding

00:09:53.500 because typically you want to be very strategic about this.

00:09:56.280 Well, then if you start to look at the other portfolio of research at EcoAuth Alliance and

00:10:00.680 what some of my peers, other vice presidents and their areas of research, what they're up to

00:10:04.700 and the places where our employees had joint employment or co-employment with and the work

00:10:11.080 that they were doing, it became apparently obvious.

00:10:14.140 We're engaging in gain-of-function research and viral discovery to make new novel pathogens.

00:10:23.540 And I wanted nothing to do with it.

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00:13:22.180 So you're, rather than like predicting the threat to human and wildlife populations,

00:13:27.920 you're actually just creating new deadly viruses.

00:13:30.940 Exactly.

00:13:31.900 And the-

00:13:33.320 This is not what they advertised on LinkedIn.

00:13:35.380 No, this is, well, it wasn't even LinkedIn.

00:13:36.980 It was actually off their website, but, uh, you get it.

00:13:41.180 The, the, the, the funny part is if you look at the gain of function work and how they

00:13:46.440 were even spinning, it was that they were trying to even make the argument scientifically

00:13:52.100 in the peer reviewed literature that this gain of function work that they were doing,

00:13:56.360 and this was through Dr.

00:13:57.380 Ralph Baric's laboratory at the University of North Carolina, uh, that they could model

00:14:02.580 and simulate pandemic potential from the gain of function work.

00:14:06.860 And that in itself is a scientific fraud, in my opinion.

00:14:12.500 It's not really possible to predict how a disease will spread in the community, um, either

00:14:17.900 animals, humans, uh, wildlife from looking at the genetics and doing gain of function work.

00:14:22.740 But that's what the, the argument that they were effectively making back to the U.S.

00:14:27.200 government and other sponsors of our research portfolio, um, in my book, I discussed this,

00:14:34.220 but, you know, Dr.

00:14:35.380 Anthony Fauci gets a lot of the blame, um, for this gain of function work.

00:14:39.560 And I, I wrote numerous, uh, whistleblower complaints.

00:14:42.880 I think I wrote a whistleblower complaints to every U.S.

00:14:45.880 agency involved, DOD, DHS, USDA, fish and wildlife.

00:14:51.100 Um, it's a long list, the CIA, which we can get to, uh, in a little bit.

00:14:54.800 So it's very clear that the research that we're doing had an earlier origin than Dr.

00:15:02.880 Anthony Fauci.

00:15:03.960 And that's really USAID and maybe the State Department formulating a relationship with

00:15:11.860 the Chinese at the Wuhan Institute of Virology.

00:15:15.000 And if you follow the proposals or scientific proposals and technical proposals, which were

00:15:20.100 submitted to the U.S.

00:15:20.900 government and trace that back.

00:15:22.780 And I have all the original documents to prove this.

00:15:24.940 It looks like the path for developing the gain of function partnership with the Chinese

00:15:31.080 bioweapons lab, uh, began around 2010 or 11.

00:15:38.600 What was the purpose of that relationship?

00:15:41.540 Well, at the time I had no idea.

00:15:44.360 And this is specifically, um, I'm talking like 2015, 2016.

00:15:51.580 Right.

00:15:51.980 Um, fast forward to today, I have much more information where I can sort of, you know,

00:15:57.320 I've thought about this in great detail and had, I've had a number of other interviews.

00:16:01.440 And I came to the conclusion that, uh, the purpose, real purpose actually of EcoHealth Alliance

00:16:06.480 doing this gain of function research with the Wuhan Institute of Virology was for us to collect

00:16:12.580 intelligence on the Chinese bioweapons lab.

00:16:15.480 And, you know, I had this very interesting moment when I worked at EcoHealth Alliance

00:16:20.700 where, um, it was, it was around the holidays.

00:16:24.480 I think it was in late 2015.

00:16:25.940 Um, I was working late to finish our project and Dr. Daszak, I was working late on our project.

00:16:31.920 And actually as a coworker, um, working with Dr. Peter Daszak was fantastic.

00:16:38.160 He was a extremely hard worker, very diligent.

00:16:41.520 Um, he knew, knew the publication game.

00:16:43.860 He knew how to woo the people, the program sponsors that were, uh, funding our work.

00:16:49.140 So professionally, I, I loved working with him in that aspect.

00:16:53.300 Very well, I would say cunning.

00:16:56.580 Yeah.

00:16:57.180 I don't think he was much of a scientist.

00:16:58.940 Actually, I think he's very weak as a scientist and engineer, but, uh, in terms of a project

00:17:02.880 manager and a program manager, uh, he was very, very strong.

00:17:06.740 Yes.

00:17:08.200 So we're leaving, we're locking up the office.

00:17:10.340 We're in the vestibule up in the 15th floor of our building in New York city.

00:17:13.620 And he goes, Andrew, do you mind if I ask you a question?

00:17:18.580 It's my boss.

00:17:20.760 Sure.

00:17:21.420 Peter, go ahead.

00:17:22.740 Well, somebody from the CIA approached me and they're interested in the places we're working,

00:17:28.260 the people we're working with in the data that we're collecting.

00:17:32.500 Do you think it's a good idea that, that I, that I speak with them?

00:17:37.800 And he just said a lot of things, which just set off all my alarms because

00:17:41.600 I came from the, you know, I'm a product of, you know, the so-called deep state of the national

00:17:46.880 security complex.

00:17:48.020 I held a top secret clearance and here's my boss telling me that he had a side conversation

00:17:53.620 with the CIA and I have all these immediate thoughts.

00:17:55.520 Does, was he really talking to someone from the CIA?

00:17:57.500 Was it someone pretending to be from the CIA?

00:18:00.020 Exactly.

00:18:00.840 Because I'm like, does this guy know what he's dealing with?

00:18:03.020 Exactly.

00:18:04.400 Um, you know, I had, had to say something.

00:18:06.100 I said, Peter, it never hurts to speak with them.

00:18:08.480 There could be money in it.

00:18:09.280 Um, and it was, I think a very honest, direct assessment of what he had just told me.

00:18:14.620 We made small talk.

00:18:15.780 We went down, uh, the elevator and we went our separate ways.

00:18:19.740 I walked home to my, my place up on the 40, 45th, uh, street and that was the end of it.

00:18:24.980 Well, over the next, you know, several weeks, uh, in between meetings at the coffee cooler,

00:18:30.840 I had to ask Peter, I'm like, Hey, how's that thing with the CIA going?

00:18:33.340 And, you know, you know, he wouldn't say much, but, you know, the, you know, sort of indicated

00:18:37.220 that it was progressing.

00:18:38.980 And about the third time I asked him, he was mum about it.

00:18:41.440 He didn't want to, he didn't want to talk about it anymore.

00:18:44.160 And so I don't know if he was trying to tell me what he was actually up to because I was

00:18:48.940 from that world.

00:18:49.680 Or, um, if he just really wanted my honest opinion, I, I have no idea, but now fast forward

00:18:57.820 to SARS-CoV-2 COVID and everything that's happened.

00:19:03.800 It's very clear to me that Peter Daszak was probably used as a CIA asset to, uh, obtain

00:19:11.120 access to that laboratory in the way that we obtained access to that laboratory.

00:19:15.600 Because mind you, it was well known in my circles, going all the way back to when I was

00:19:19.880 a PhD student, that this laboratory in Wuhan was essentially the Chinese, uh, military's

00:19:26.940 bioweapons laboratory.

00:19:28.540 So how would you get access to it, right?

00:19:30.460 They're not going to allow Westerners to just come in and where Senator Rand Paul and a number

00:19:35.780 of other congressmen have been completely wrong about this in opinion.

00:19:38.900 And I've told them so in writing is that this wasn't, uh, the U S government giving

00:19:46.120 the Chinese $400,000 to, to conduct gain of function research.

00:19:52.440 I mean, just think about how preposterous this is.

00:19:54.940 Yeah.

00:19:54.980 They don't, they don't need the money.

00:19:56.120 They don't need the money.

00:19:57.100 Right.

00:19:57.380 So, so what do they need?

00:19:59.380 What do you think?

00:20:00.540 Technical expertise, I would think.

00:20:02.140 And what else?

00:20:04.200 The actual technology.

00:20:05.820 Yeah.

00:20:06.040 So the technical expertise and the technology.

00:20:08.600 So the trade that was made is that we were actually transferring advanced biotechnology

00:20:12.640 from Dr.

00:20:13.720 uh, Ralph Baric's laboratory to the Chinese for access to the laboratory.

00:20:18.320 So we could collect intelligence on it.

00:20:20.080 And some of that might, you know, fall under the, the umbrella of scientific diplomacy, which

00:20:24.920 I'm actually a huge proponent of, but not with the Chinese. 0.81

00:20:28.700 And that's where I.

00:20:29.820 So I don't know.

00:20:30.520 I have no, you know, I have no way to evaluate what you're saying, but except against things I've

00:20:35.520 seen in other areas, and that is exactly how the world works.

00:20:38.900 What you just said, that, that is, that's how things really are.

00:20:43.420 Right.

00:20:43.980 Is the U S government makes deals with people that they not really on their, you know, whoever

00:20:47.980 it is, Gaddafi, Maduro.

00:20:50.560 I mean, there's longstanding and ongoing relationships with a lot of people.

00:20:54.660 I think the public would be shocked to know we're in relationship with, but the motive is

00:20:58.680 always the same.

00:20:59.300 The closer I get, the more intel I can gather.

00:21:02.660 I think your, your, your assessment of the, the global scheme of which, how the U S government

00:21:09.160 operates in it and formulates relationships is accurate.

00:21:11.920 Oh, I've seen it.

00:21:12.680 And I think a lot of that is doctrine.

00:21:14.280 You know, they want to try to obtain close relationships with the highest ranking government

00:21:17.960 officials possible.

00:21:19.120 And sometimes the, the methods and how they do that are questionable.

00:21:25.480 But it's always the same.

00:21:27.200 I mean, you'll be, this literally happened to me the other day.

00:21:29.120 You're talking to, you know, a well-informed person and they're like, oh yeah, yeah.

00:21:32.800 I knew so-and-so.

00:21:33.580 It's like, what, what, how in the world were you connected to that person who's bad?

00:21:39.280 You're kind of the human equivalent of the Wuhan Institute of Virology.

00:21:42.220 And it's like, well, because like that person is someone who has a lot of information that

00:21:46.220 we want.

00:21:46.660 Oh, absolutely.

00:21:47.620 And, and I've, I've met a number of Intel agents from various agencies that, that showed

00:21:53.040 me pictures of the very high profile evil people that they're working with.

00:21:56.940 Of course.

00:21:57.920 And I, I, I actually have no problem with that.

00:22:01.220 Omar Gaddafi was working with Mossad and CIA.

00:22:04.380 Yeah.

00:22:05.040 Right.

00:22:05.500 So of course, and I'm not even attacking anybody at all.

00:22:08.380 I'm just saying that is the actual truth of the world that I have seen personally.

00:22:13.200 So, and, and I, I, I agree with your truth.

00:22:18.160 And I think the, the more questionable part is why are we giving advanced technology to

00:22:23.100 our enemies?

00:22:23.520 And where this really gets strange is that back when I did work at Eco's Alliance, I

00:22:28.040 did object to working with the Chinese. 0.76

00:22:30.640 So the next phase of predict funding is coming along, predict two.

00:22:35.280 Okay.

00:22:35.420 Okay.

00:22:35.600 So predict is the program that you described earlier that supposedly monitors global wildlife

00:22:41.060 populations to get a headstart on preparing for a pandemic.

00:22:45.240 Well, it's to predict and forecast it.

00:22:46.720 Predict and forecast.

00:22:47.340 So maybe, maybe get a headstart could be a more accurate framing or at least have an assessment

00:22:51.320 of what circuit area.

00:22:52.520 And that's probably a fair characterization, but predict two, they're basically going to

00:22:56.600 continue this boondoggle operation and expand the portfolio research with China.

00:23:02.020 And once I was promoted to vice president, they put me onto the predict program at my

00:23:05.820 own request, because it was sort of the sexy thing that Equal Health Alliance was doing. 1.00

00:23:09.400 And I wanted to be a part of it because you get my name on more publications, more notoriety.

00:23:12.900 And they wanted to make me a country coordinator.

00:23:16.700 And I ended up being the, one of the country coordinators for Sudan, and then also Jordan,

00:23:22.840 and then Peter Dasik floated that I help him with China.

00:23:27.760 And I, when that came up in the meeting, I said, I want nothing to do with this.

00:23:31.380 I'm, you know, it's still my top secret clearance is a good standing.

00:23:34.440 I object to us doing the work with China. 0.99

00:23:36.880 And I actually said in the meeting, I'm like, aren't you the slightest bit concerned that

00:23:39.340 the Chinese are going to do something nefarious, like they're going to steal our intellectual 1.00

00:23:43.880 property. 0.99

00:23:45.820 They're, you know, the Chinese have a pattern of lie, cheat, and steal. 1.00

00:23:48.820 So why, why do we want to do this work with China? 0.96

00:23:51.080 And I said that in the executive meeting, and I was trying to protect the company, more

00:23:55.420 so even just the national security risk side of it.

00:23:57.840 I was trying to protect the company.

00:23:59.600 And, you know, Peter gave a very political response that, you know, the, the work with

00:24:04.400 China is very important.

00:24:05.320 And this, this relationship that we have with the Chinese is very important.

00:24:09.780 Really, I think the, the only thing that was important to Peter is the fact that this Chinese 1.00

00:24:13.540 at least cut out of the bigger contract was a lot of money.

00:24:17.400 And, you know, he had already been sort of flipped as a Intel asset to collect the Chinese 0.68

00:24:24.420 in the lab.

00:24:25.000 And this wasn't going away.

00:24:26.000 And this was all the, the window dressing to make it look legitimate.

00:24:29.100 We're sorry to say it, but this is not a very safe country.

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00:28:05.000 Yeah, again, I don't have any background information, so you could tell me anything, but everything you're saying sounds right to me, just based on what I have seen.

00:28:17.040 Can I just back up a tiny bit and ask some practical questions about what EcoHealth Alliance was doing?

00:28:21.260 So you said before you got to the portion where they were acting as an Intel asset, which sounds right, you said they were compiling, collecting a library of viruses from around the world.

00:28:33.160 How does that work?

00:28:34.940 How do you collect a virus in Sudan, for example, any country?

00:28:38.420 How do you do that?

00:28:39.600 Sure.

00:28:39.980 So it's a, I guess in my mind, it's very straightforward, but typically first you form a relationship with the diplomatic mission.

00:28:47.800 So the embassy, the consul for the United States, they might refer you to either hospitals, professors, other academics or company in country.

00:28:56.080 Or maybe you already have those relationships from past work that you've done.

00:28:59.720 You then go on a trip to that country and you go and sort of do an assessment of their laboratories.

00:29:06.940 You collect sort of information, try to gauge these people have the capability.

00:29:10.080 Do you know what they're doing?

00:29:11.200 Are they going to spend our money wisely?

00:29:13.140 So it's a business trip and it's very business focused and you're assessing their capabilities.

00:29:17.980 Then once you have a good feeling with their capabilities, you begin the contracting process with that foreign entity.

00:29:25.000 And if you're doing everything by the book, you run these people through U.S. government systems to make sure that they're not terrorists or evil people.

00:29:31.040 Right.

00:29:31.240 So we're not giving money to terrorists.

00:29:32.560 That didn't happen at Equal Health Alliance.

00:29:34.060 It did not happen.

00:29:34.520 It did not happen.

00:29:35.760 I found out about that after the fact as well.

00:29:37.980 But we try to figure out who these people are and then if they're capable, oftentimes it's universities, either the ag school or at a foreign university, the veterinary school or human medical center.

00:29:50.980 Then we formulate the contract, we send them the cash, and then they would either go out and collect the samples or we would travel or have our personnel travel to go collect the samples.

00:29:59.720 So if we're talking about bats, it depends what species you're dealing with.

00:30:03.480 But if you're dealing with bats, you set nets or traps in a bat cave, for example.

00:30:10.000 You catch the bat in the net and then you go out there in your personal protective equipment and you take fecal swabs, blood, saliva from the animal.

00:30:19.880 And then you then package that so that the DNA will not be degrade and transport back to the laboratory.

00:30:29.100 And then depending...

00:30:30.500 Where's the laboratory?

00:30:31.320 Well, it depends on what country you're working in.

00:30:32.940 So every country we had different agreements with contractually about who owned the samples, who would store the samples.

00:30:41.040 And the other thing that's happening in the background here is that technology is advancing.

00:30:45.900 Yes.

00:30:46.060 Okay, so at one time in this type of research, you actually had to have the physical sample.

00:30:53.720 Today, we're at a point, you no longer have to have the physical sample.

00:30:57.780 You can actually send the DNA or RNA code digitally to somebody else and they can recreate it.

00:31:03.500 So this field has advanced tremendously over 10 years.

00:31:07.520 And this is taking place as advancement while we're doing this work.

00:31:10.400 Oftentimes, the samples then were physically transported back to the United States or mailed or shipped.

00:31:17.860 You can mail a deadly bat virus from a third world country to the U.S.? 0.99

00:31:22.560 Well, there's a manual from the CDC and USDA and HHS of how to transport samples.

00:31:29.480 So yes, there are rules and process of how you can...

00:31:31.500 So almost all of that mail goes on commercial airliners.

00:31:37.700 Typically.

00:31:38.380 And there's really not a whole lot of risk from a collected sample.

00:31:42.440 First of all, you don't even know at this point whether there's a new deadly virus present in the sample.

00:31:47.320 In the batshit or saliva.

00:31:48.620 Yeah, in the batshit or saliva.

00:31:49.940 Yeah.

00:31:50.220 You have no clue.

00:31:50.740 So once it gets back to the United States, then it goes to, at least at Equal Alliance, it would go to Ian Lipkin's laboratory at Columbia University, where he was a specialist in...

00:32:02.360 He's a pretty well-known viral epidemiologist with really good lab chops.

00:32:06.860 And another doctor who worked with us named Simon Anthony would work with him to isolate and...

00:32:12.860 Well, at first, identify and isolate new viruses or novel viruses.

00:32:16.600 So that's where it typically took place.

00:32:18.060 Then the mechanics of this or operations of this, that information or sample would be sent to another laboratory like Ralph Baric's laboratory, where he would continue the work...

00:32:28.080 Down at Chapel Hill.

00:32:28.740 Chapel Hill and do the gain-of-function work.

00:32:30.600 It's just...

00:32:31.260 Can I just approach this from an autistic perspective?

00:32:33.800 So what you're saying is there are like people around the world in bat caves in some faraway country sending potentially novel and dangerous viruses to New York City... 0.51

00:32:48.060 Like all the time and people are not even aware of this.

00:32:50.440 There's a huge...

00:32:51.500 I wouldn't say huge, but I mean, a non-trivial amount of these types of samples being shipped around the world globally.

00:32:59.480 And if they're properly contained and packaged, it's really not that much of a risk.

00:33:04.900 And actually, Dr. Ralph Baric developed some of these methods of how to send what's called a chimeric virus on a sheet of paper and envelope, which is low risk.

00:33:11.480 Like, the bigger risk becomes when you start to clone or replicate that agent at scale.

00:33:20.160 You know, human medicine, public health, epidemiology, transmission risk, and how you look at this, you have to have a substantial quantity of a virus, which is a substance, mixed in the air or be exposed to it to become infected with it.

00:33:32.740 Because you have an immune system that works, okay?

00:33:34.980 And sometimes you get exposed to these things and you don't even know it because your immune system fights it off, right?

00:33:39.840 So, I think sometimes the risk is overblown and the fear around transporting samples.

00:33:45.100 I think most of the time that's actually pretty low risk.

00:33:47.220 There's been a series of transporting accidents, which occurred from 2008 to 2012 or 14, I want to say, which actually led to the ban or partial ban on gain of function research.

00:34:02.300 What kind of accidents?

00:34:03.020 One of the high-profile ones was that, I think it was Bacillus anthracis was being shipped from one of our U.S. government BSL for laboratories under CDC control to another laboratory.

00:34:16.320 And it went missing and they found it sitting in the corner.

00:34:20.900 Some porch pirate stole it.

00:34:22.640 No, it wasn't a porch pirate, but they found it someplace and it wasn't properly secured or completely off the...

00:34:27.560 Yeah, I mean, we live in a world with like Chernobyl and misdiagnoses and, I mean, I believe in...

00:34:33.120 I think there are a lot of, you know, rigorous, responsible scientists, but, you know, people make mistakes.

00:34:39.760 I mean, and over time and with scale, like mistakes will happen, right?

00:34:43.360 Well, and we actually dealt with this type of low probability, high consequence threat risk analysis all the time at San Diego National Laboratories.

00:34:50.840 And the big issue is what you just brought up, the human in the loop.

00:34:54.980 Usually the engineered systems, you can engineer those precisely to account for whatever probability or consequence or risk.

00:35:01.760 But it's always the human making a decision or behavior or action involved in the system that makes a mistake, which causes some kind of catastrophic failure.

00:35:10.360 Well, yeah.

00:35:11.000 Yeah.

00:35:11.320 I mean, yeah.

00:35:12.900 So, okay, I just was just interested.

00:35:15.460 So then you say that the EcoHealth Alliance was compiling a library of these viruses?

00:35:22.160 They'd be stored in one place?

00:35:23.960 Well, yes, they had a digital library at EcoHealth Alliance.

00:35:27.240 And then there's other systems that the U.S., or I should say, not only the United States, but the global virologist community maintain of genetic information on viruses.

00:35:40.900 But the actual viruses, the living organisms, were they stored anywhere?

00:35:45.240 Typically, we were buying negative ADC centigrade freezers as fast as we could, or as many as we could afford, and storing those at Columbia University and other laboratories where these things go in the freezer and they set.

00:35:58.280 And the one nice thing is if the freezer does fail, it usually destroys all the sample on the inside because they do have to be maintained cold.

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00:39:20.980 You're going to dig it.

00:39:22.100 We definitely, plus they're good looking, I will say.

00:39:25.000 What's the security like at a lab like that?

00:39:28.000 I, in my opinion, I tend to think that it's laughable.

00:39:31.160 And I've actually.

00:39:31.700 Laughable?

00:39:32.040 Laughable at most university laboratories.

00:39:34.680 If you were to do a red team or penetration test and me coming on the national security,

00:39:38.420 being a biosecurity, biosafety expert, you could get into most university laboratories.

00:39:43.760 They would, I heard arguments from other scientists who worked in these laboratories.

00:39:48.220 Well, you know, we have good physical security, we have card scanners, we have this.

00:39:52.960 Good physical.

00:39:53.680 I'd love to know what that actually, what those guys actually look like.

00:39:56.580 Who, the scientists?

00:39:57.500 Good physical security.

00:39:58.860 Oh, I mean, if you are a motivated attacker and you're well-trained,

00:40:04.180 you can get into one of these laboratories.

00:40:05.740 It would not be overly difficult.

00:40:09.240 Now, has this improved and has this changed?

00:40:12.360 Are all the laboratories the same?

00:40:13.720 I mean, I think many of the BSL three or four, which are the higher level or highest level

00:40:18.820 laboratories in the United States now have pretty good or strong physical security.

00:40:24.220 But when you look at what's actually happened in terms of accidents and lab leaks throughout

00:40:30.660 history and recent history, I mean, speaking of this, you know, Ralph Baric and his laboratory,

00:40:35.480 he's had a series of leaks at his laboratory over years, you know, where people, their employees

00:40:40.820 have gotten sick.

00:40:41.260 And typically it's one of the people working in the laboratory is accidentally exposed and

00:40:44.900 because it's a virus that you can't see.

00:40:48.020 And the way that disease incubates inside a person and how the bio event timeline, as

00:40:55.460 we call it, the amount of time it takes for a person to become sick, they leave the lab

00:40:58.760 and then they become sick at home.

00:41:00.020 And then that's when the disease becomes a transmission risk to the community.

00:41:03.560 So that's just the very nature of how people behave, how people work in the laboratory, how human

00:41:09.200 biology and physiology works.

00:41:10.420 I mean, this is the nature of the beast.

00:41:12.360 And it's very difficult to prevent those types of risks, I guess, to the community and the

00:41:19.720 greater population.

00:41:20.420 No, this is why we have Lyme disease.

00:41:22.240 Yeah.

00:41:22.580 Which I got.

00:41:23.380 So yes, no, I'm very aware of that.

00:41:25.260 And I think everyone's aware of that.

00:41:26.780 So with that in mind, gain of function is inherently dangerous.

00:41:31.120 Correct?

00:41:32.480 I've always been against it.

00:41:33.620 It actually divides the scientific community or used to pre-COVID.

00:41:38.040 I think there's probably more scientists and experts against gain of function.

00:41:41.840 It seems like certainly the general population is against it.

00:41:45.300 Not all gain of function technology is bad.

00:41:47.500 And for example, insulin is made from a form of gain of function.

00:41:51.920 And there are many diabetic people and they require insulin.

00:41:54.960 Now, if we're talking about gain of function research on pathogens which have pandemic potential,

00:42:01.440 it's a no-brainer. 1.00

00:42:03.240 It's a stupid idea. 1.00

00:42:04.600 And this is why it splits the scientific community. 1.00

00:42:06.560 So one camp says, there's no use to this.

00:42:09.880 I don't understand why we're doing it in the first place.

00:42:13.680 Therefore, we shouldn't do it.

00:42:15.000 The other camp argues, well, if we can predict how these viruses will mutate,

00:42:21.000 then we can develop countermeasures, vaccines, or drugs to counter the threat before it emerges.

00:42:27.300 And that opinion, and I've always held this belief, that the people who have that opinion are wrong.

00:42:35.120 And the reason why they're wrong is that you have to be like God.

00:42:37.760 And you have to know and be able to predict how something will genetically evolve over time.

00:42:42.700 And if you look back through human history, it's always humans trying to correct nature, which have failed.

00:42:47.940 The introduction of the brown snake in Guam.

00:42:51.100 I mean, there's all these things where they've, that was a hitchhiker scenario,

00:42:53.840 but where they try to introduce some kind of predator to eliminate some kind of bad pest.

00:42:58.000 You see this repeatedly throughout history that we can correct a complex system, which is nature.

00:43:03.500 Of course, that's what geoengineering is.

00:43:05.300 And that's why it's like destroying our forests because they're spraying, you know,

00:43:09.300 particulate matter into the air to counteract global warming.

00:43:13.040 And they're not God, so they're not doing it right.

00:43:15.700 And it's...

00:43:16.300 Well, that's interesting that you bring that up.

00:43:17.600 So I used to work with the geoengineers.

00:43:19.200 And I wonder how much scale it's actually occurring.

00:43:24.720 So, and, you know, people talk about contrails and, you know, that being geoengineering, it's not.

00:43:30.700 And most of these stations are ground-based, but it's very expensive.

00:43:34.900 From a scientific and engineering perspective, if you were going to launch a large-scale geoengineering project that was Earth-based,

00:43:46.560 it takes a lot of material and that material costs a lot of money.

00:43:49.580 So I don't think it's happening at a larger scale that people believe.

00:43:53.380 The more effective geoengineering technology exists are actually satellite-deployed systems which act as solar shades.

00:43:59.680 And I don't think any of that exists, but we are putting more things into space all the time.

00:44:03.120 And a lot of this is either not classified or secret, but it's not exactly visible either.

00:44:09.600 So, you know, who knows what people are shooting out of the space.

00:44:11.520 Exactly.

00:44:12.140 And there's a massive disinformation campaign against anyone who asks questions about it, which tells you it is real.

00:44:16.800 Yes.

00:44:17.580 Like QAPs. 1.00

00:44:18.340 But anyway, without getting into all of that stuff.

00:44:21.120 So you are asked like, hey, Dr. Huff, would you like to go to China?

00:44:28.200 And you say no.

00:44:29.460 I say no.

00:44:30.080 And two reasons.

00:44:31.480 One, to protect the company.

00:44:32.640 And also because I wanted to maintain my security clearance and good standing.

00:44:36.640 And it's not that you can't have foreign relationships, but it becomes more complicated for your reinvestigation in the future if you have relationships with a country like China.

00:44:46.280 And I've, you know, from a national security perspective, I've always been against what the Chinese have been doing. 1.00

00:44:53.480 And that's lying, cheating, and stealing from us.

00:44:55.940 And we never get anything out of the relationship, it seems.

00:44:58.500 It's been a very abusive one-way relationship from the Chinese. 0.99

00:45:02.440 And I knew this going back to my military days.

00:45:04.800 And I had actually been invited to do other collaborative work with the Chinese at other institutions and places I've worked, sort of tied to national security.

00:45:13.660 And I always stayed away from it because I never saw any benefit to it.

00:45:17.100 And, well, if the government wants to, if the U.S. government wants to fund this or this entity wants to fund it, that's fine.

00:45:22.540 I can protest by just not being a part of it.

00:45:24.540 So, you leave EcoHealth Alliance after a few years, then COVID happens.

00:45:33.760 Yes.

00:45:34.580 And when it happens, everyone thinks I'm sort of the crazy one.

00:45:38.680 And how this actually transpires is I was working at Juul Labs e-cigarette company as a senior director of population health, living in the Bay Area.

00:45:47.880 And because of what I did for a living and my expertise, you know, I catch wind of this virus spreading around the planet.

00:45:55.900 It was very obvious that people on the West Coast were becoming sick in, I want to say, late November, December 2019.

00:46:05.840 You know, another really weird thing happens.

00:46:07.980 So, I'm making more money than I've ever made in my life at this company.

00:46:12.680 And I was very grateful for that.

00:46:13.980 I was able to pay off all my debt.

00:46:15.060 But I received a phone call from a woman by the name of Dr. Amy Jenkins, who works at ARPA-H now.

00:46:20.260 I think she's the assistant director there, or deputy director.

00:46:23.860 I can't remember what her title is.

00:46:25.560 But I know Amy from years back.

00:46:27.700 I actually met her while I was a PhD student at the University of Minnesota at a DH, Department of Homeland Security, Center of Excellence.

00:46:35.000 She had shown up to a few meetings of ours.

00:46:36.680 She was working with the Department of Defense at that time and the intelligence services.

00:46:40.320 And she's a great, you know, scientist and very friendly relationship with her.

00:46:48.660 And she contacts me and she informs me that she's now working with DARPA and offers me a position as a program manager in the biological programs directorate.

00:47:01.060 And, you know, I thought it was sort of odd that she had contacted me on my brand new San Francisco area phone, cell phone.

00:47:10.020 So, I had a new phone number because I relocated and I wanted San Francisco area code.

00:47:14.060 I didn't think too much of it.

00:47:16.000 And I couldn't figure out why she wanted me to come be the director of this biological program.

00:47:21.020 I had been trying to get away from national security intelligence type work for several years and I kept on getting dragged back into it, it seemed.

00:47:31.180 And I said, you know, thanks, Amy.

00:47:33.700 I'm not really interested in this right now.

00:47:35.480 I'm making a lot of money.

00:47:36.620 This pays far more than what, you know, DARPA can pay me.

00:47:39.620 I want to keep what I'm doing.

00:47:40.680 She's like, well, you know, go home and speak with your wife, Emily.

00:47:43.860 If you change your mind, we'd like to both bring you on.

00:47:47.280 We'll find a home for Emily, too, because she's a scientist.

00:47:49.020 And that's very, you know, common in the scientific community, the two-body problem.

00:47:53.160 And go home, talk, speak with Emily about it and, you know, give me a call back tomorrow and let me know what you think.

00:47:58.660 I said, okay, Amy, I'll do that.

00:47:59.780 So, went home and had a conversation with my wife.

00:48:01.980 Hey, do you want to move back to the Beltway or move to D.C.?

00:48:04.860 Have, you know, Fed jobs and go work in that environment.

00:48:07.940 And my wife had previously worked at USDA and she didn't want to go back to it. 1.00

00:48:12.240 And I like, call up Amy and say, you know, thank you, you know, for contacting me.

00:48:17.200 At one point, this was in my career, this was actually my dream job to be running a, have a blank check from the Department of Defense to go develop all the coolest biotechnology world.

00:48:26.340 I mean, seriously, I had dreamed of that job at one point in my life.

00:48:29.080 I didn't want it.

00:48:30.280 Yeah.

00:48:30.380 And so, I told her no.

00:48:32.600 And she's like, well, you know, if you change your mind in the next few weeks, we'd really like to have you.

00:48:37.720 You can call me anytime.

00:48:40.840 And that was it.

00:48:42.640 Well, okay, that phone call took place late September, early October 2019.

00:48:50.220 Fast forward today with what we know is that DARPA had held a contest or I want to say not so much a contest, but put out a RFP, a request for proposals related to something called PREEMPT, which was preventing emerging infectious disease threats.

00:49:11.100 And one of the proposals was something called DEFUSE from my former employer called EcoHealth Alliance, which was basically the recipe for SARS-CoV-2, which was done in partnership with the Wuhan Institute of Virology.

00:49:27.340 So, you know, I'm sort of hopping around here, but the reason why this is important is now I believe that DARPA was actually trying to recruit me back into the program.

00:49:37.560 So, I wouldn't have done any of the things that I've done over the last four years, essentially.

00:49:44.580 Which is tell the truth in public.

00:49:47.460 Tell the truth in public about what the origin of SARS-CoV-2 is.

00:49:51.440 But going back on your timeline here, so I had limited information back then and I knew a pandemic was coming.

00:49:58.400 So, I told my wife, we need to get the heck out of the Bay Area as fast as possible.

00:50:02.480 This could go off the rails.

00:50:03.660 I actually believed the information I was seeing, which I think was a psyop potentially targeted at me, that this disease would be much more severe than it was.

00:50:12.620 I'm not saying that it wasn't a severe disease.

00:50:14.900 I mean, it wasn't as bad as they're making it seem.

00:50:17.220 Oh, I believed it too.

00:50:18.580 Oh, absolutely.

00:50:19.200 Well, they had portrayed it, though, that something that an epidemic...

00:50:21.820 You mean in like January, February of 2020?

00:50:24.880 Correct.

00:50:25.340 Oh, yeah.

00:50:26.160 So, they're painting a portrayal and scientifically, in epidemiology, we have something called the case fatality rate.

00:50:33.020 So, of how many people get sick, how many die?

00:50:35.060 Like, this thing is going to kill everyone.

00:50:36.440 Like, 80, 90% of the population could die from this disease.

00:50:39.420 That's how they were portraying this.

00:50:41.000 Right.

00:50:41.200 It turns out that that number was much lower and somewhere in the, you know, in the percentage category, not the 70, 80, or 90%.

00:50:49.800 So, I went real quick from thinking that this was going to be the thing that could, you know, cripple society to being, I'm not wearing a mask in public.

00:50:59.540 Right.

00:50:59.940 But my behavior in action in early 2020, the first weeks, I started looking for a place in a remote area.

00:51:05.200 So, I'm considering Alaska, Maine, Northern Maine, Western Wyoming, or the UP of Michigan.

00:51:13.700 My search criteria based on what I knew as an expert, you want to have access to an airport, transportation, high-speed internet, an hour drive from a major city center that's not too populated.

00:51:24.640 Because if it's going to end the planet, it's going to kill everyone.

00:51:28.060 You want distance from other people to break transmission cycles.

00:51:32.340 At least you can isolate yourself.

00:51:33.500 So, I bought a year's supply worth of MREs.

00:51:38.280 I started stockpiling other things, you know, some ammunition, make a plan.

00:51:42.140 And my wife and I land in the UP of Michigan.

00:51:46.100 Everyone, you know, sort of thought I was crazy for doing this.

00:51:48.680 And next thing you know, everybody wants to come visit me during the lockdowns.

00:51:51.160 They said you were right about everything.

00:51:53.200 I know.

00:51:53.760 And, you know.

00:51:54.680 I live this too.

00:51:55.880 Yes.

00:51:56.180 In the back of my mind, though, I'm thinking about constantly that, and I know that EcoHealth Alliance had been engaged in this gain-of-function work at EcoHealth, or excuse me, at the Wuhan Institute of Virology.

00:52:12.500 And I'm like, a bat coronavirus emerging in Wuhan?

00:52:16.620 And, you know, I'm watching the news and the TV through 2020, and they're like, oh, it was a pangolin, or it was the wet market.

00:52:24.940 And I'm arguing on social media that that's just not possible, that it doesn't make sense from an emerging infectious disease standpoint.

00:52:31.020 Because a wet market, and the specific wet market in China, is a seafood market.

00:52:36.680 That's why it's called a wet market.

00:52:37.580 Yes.

00:52:38.120 But, you know, Western Americans are—

00:52:40.040 It's not for mammals.

00:52:41.020 It's for creatures from the sea.

00:52:43.560 Yeah.

00:52:43.680 People in the United States have a very myopic view of, you know, the world typically.

00:52:48.300 Oh, I know.

00:52:49.560 I'm sitting here arguing.

00:52:50.620 I'm like, this is a fish market.

00:52:52.280 And, in fact, I'm looking at the pictures of it, and my assessment is, I'm like, this is the kind of place I'd go buy groceries.

00:52:57.420 You know, other than New York City, a very nice place.

00:53:01.200 So, I'm like, none of this is adding up.

00:53:03.140 And, you know, you're watching the story evolve.

00:53:05.300 And next thing you know, my former boss, Dr. Peter Dasik, has put on the committee that's sent over by the World Health Organization to go investigate the origin of the disease.

00:53:16.700 And this is getting weirder and weirder and weirder.

00:53:19.400 And I know all the players involved.

00:53:21.040 I mean, I had met and worked with not Dr. Anthony Fauci himself, but his deputy, Dr. Moritz.

00:53:26.720 I had been out to dinner with him.

00:53:28.520 I mean, I knew all the players in this big thing.

00:53:30.420 I mean, I had been groomed since I was a Ph.D. student to be a Dr. Anthony Fauci replacement or that type of person.

00:53:36.200 So, I mean, I knew all the people in the system and working on these things and the program managers, the officers, the different branches of the government.

00:53:43.440 So, I'm watching this all play out, and I just can't believe it.

00:53:46.600 And it's the kind of thing where I'm yelling at my computer screen in private. 0.96

00:53:49.980 Like, they put, you know, they put fucking Dr. Dasik in charge of, like, investigating the origin. 0.98

00:53:54.140 He's probably the one that caused it. 0.98

00:53:55.220 And little did I know that this was all part of the psychological operation and cover-up.

00:54:01.620 And I just started becoming more callous, entrenched about really going on.

00:54:05.920 So, can you explain that a little bit?

00:54:08.120 What does that mean?

00:54:09.920 Well...

00:54:10.520 Why would putting the guy who had a hand in the creation of the virus in charge of investigating the origin of the virus be part of a PSYOP?

00:54:17.500 To give the perception that it's an independent person that's well-trusted within the wildlife community and the scientific community that we know what you're doing and can trust what we're saying.

00:54:30.420 Because if you look at how the psychological operation was waged, and I'm not just saying the U.S. government, but multiple entities.

00:54:38.400 The pharmaceutical industry, the big companies that back all these different things, special interests just generally.

00:54:45.840 You take the guy who's responsible, you put him in charge in the investigation.

00:54:49.320 You know that he's not going to tie it back to himself, but he's already been branding himself for years and decades as being a person that cares, you know, a crunchy NGO person.

00:54:58.340 And he has the relationships in wealthy communities on the West Coast and East Coast, the elite, to convince them that this is, you know, a naturally emerging disease from the wet market.

00:55:08.460 So, you know, he's already the point man. 0.89

00:55:10.960 He's already sold everyone all this bullshit related to we're going to go and forecast pandemics. 0.94

00:55:16.120 And really, he's the guy who caused one. 0.84

00:55:17.860 It's really, yeah, thank you for saying, I just wanted you to explain that a little more fully.

00:55:24.400 I've, again, lived this, seen it, and it is effective because it's so shocking that someone would do that.

00:55:32.820 It's so brazen, the chutzpah required to do something like that.

00:55:35.900 You take not just like some random guy, but the guy who's responsible and you start telling everyone he's the savior.

00:55:42.940 If you're, wow, man, that the human brain, a normal person is bewildered by that, is thrown off balance by that.

00:55:50.140 Well, at least in my life, and we were discussing this a little bit at breakfast, the more of you see of this trickery, the more that you're exposed.

00:55:57.040 And then they actually talk about this in the psychological research.

00:56:00.060 Oftentimes, the more aware you become of a phenomenon, the more you see it.

00:56:04.300 And then once you start seeing it, you can't stop seeing it.

00:56:06.180 Oh, I know.

00:56:06.560 And that's how they say, you know, people become conspiracy theorists because they see the conspiracy theorists.

00:56:11.520 Well, that's why very few young people, I think this is changing fast, but my whole life, like young people always bought the story.

00:56:18.620 And then you meet guys in their 70s, particularly people who'd work for the government.

00:56:23.060 And I've known a lot of those who would get more conspiracy minded as they aged.

00:56:28.520 Have you ever noticed this?

00:56:29.540 Oh, absolutely.

00:56:30.540 Yeah.

00:56:30.980 And that's just-

00:56:31.920 Why is that?

00:56:32.640 Well, experience.

00:56:34.120 Exactly.

00:56:34.520 Experience and living life.

00:56:36.340 And I do that now, I'm 43, and you see someone in their 20s or 19, they have a very idealistic,

00:56:41.520 a view of the world.

00:56:42.180 And I used to be one of those people.

00:56:43.140 Oh, yeah.

00:56:43.620 Oh, tell me about it.

00:56:45.580 I made it to my late 30s with that, you know, but mid 30s.

00:56:49.640 But anyway, wow, that's wild.

00:56:52.400 So you're sitting up at the UP with your scientist wife watching this stuff on CNN going, 0.93

00:56:57.400 you must be like going bonkers watching this.

00:57:00.280 Well, internally, and I was working on a startup company and I was distracted by other things.

00:57:07.000 And, you know, because I was in the UP, this was only via social media or the news.

00:57:12.360 So I'm pretty detached from it.

00:57:15.080 What happens is in late 2021, the operation turns focused towards me because now I'm being,

00:57:23.600 I think, viewed as a threat based on some of the things I put on LinkedIn at the time

00:57:27.880 and other social media posts that I needed to be contained in some way.

00:57:33.440 And what sort of things were you saying?

00:57:35.960 So it was really Dr. Malone and I and a few other people who were trying to remain anonymous.

00:57:39.940 I know who they are.

00:57:40.760 We're just telling the truth.

00:57:42.100 So first of all, around the disease that this is not a naturally emerging pathogen.

00:57:50.440 And I could tell that it was not based on a number of facts, based on how this disease

00:57:55.500 was spreading, the type of agent it was, the coincidence that we had been funding this

00:58:00.780 exact type of work and I had the original documents at this laboratory.

00:58:04.600 It was just that their story and how the people involved were saying things about the disease,

00:58:14.700 just which weren't true.

00:58:16.860 And how, specifically how this type of disease would emerge.

00:58:20.000 I mean, that's what my PhD is in.

00:58:21.760 I mean, I've worked in this field.

00:58:22.760 And I knew that these people knew that they were lying because these people were qualified

00:58:28.280 experts as well.

00:58:30.180 So why are these people lying about how this disease would emerge?

00:58:34.580 Great question.

00:58:34.920 And so it drives more questions, right?

00:58:38.060 Every time you have something that's weird, it doesn't fit the pattern or isn't the thing

00:58:41.400 that it's supposed to be, you ask more questions.

00:58:43.080 And as this, you know, the timeline of COVID is happening or occurring, you know, so we're

00:58:52.260 going through the lockdowns.

00:58:53.460 They're trying to get the vaccine operation warp speed.

00:58:55.580 They're trying to do all these things.

00:58:57.680 That's all distracting everyone from the origin question.

00:59:01.260 And the people involved in the origin discussions and the psychological operation of it was that,

00:59:07.700 in my opinion, is that they were actually trying to get society bogged down in the technical

00:59:11.900 details of very sophisticated scientific jargon, which very few people were qualified to understand

00:59:19.660 or argue or debate, and then label it as those people were the only people who were qualified

00:59:24.040 experts to be able to debate.

00:59:25.440 So therefore, there was no debate allowed. 0.99

00:59:28.980 And I wasn't buying, I wasn't fucking having it. 0.99

00:59:32.240 It was driving me nuts. 0.98

00:59:33.640 Because you were a qualified expert, so you didn't have to buy it.

00:59:35.900 Well, and I'm highly competitive in those so-called qualified experts.

00:59:38.540 I thought I was better than them.

00:59:39.920 Yeah.

00:59:40.100 And I look at where we're sitting today.

00:59:42.280 I'm sitting here in this chair, speaking with you, telling you the truth.

00:59:45.120 And I think my argument, the psychological operation I waged back against the population

00:59:50.440 via social media and other channels and how I did has been completely successful.

00:59:54.320 I was, I mean, from day one, I had been saying that this was a laboratory leak.

00:59:58.820 And you look at most of the population today, everyone, I think globally, believes that it

01:00:04.260 came out of the laboratory.

01:00:05.400 I think the people that are tied to it, you know, are still trying to make the pangolin or

01:00:08.600 natural emergency.

01:00:09.280 It's funny, I went on the EcoHealth, I think EcoHealth Alliance is gone or sort of gone

01:00:13.600 now.

01:00:14.120 It's defunct, yeah.

01:00:14.840 It's defunct, yeah.

01:00:15.840 But on their website, which still exists, I looked at it last night, they have an attack

01:00:20.380 on you, of course.

01:00:22.300 Lacking all specifics, you're familiar with all this.

01:00:24.120 But on it, they say, you know, Dr. Huff makes the totally unsubstantiated claim that this

01:00:30.640 virus escaped from a lab when we know in the scientific consensus states that it emerged

01:00:36.880 naturally out of an animal population.

01:00:39.800 Well, the...

01:00:40.960 So when they wrote that, they knew that wasn't true.

01:00:42.520 Oh, absolutely.

01:00:43.220 And they put out other weird smear tactics and they had worked with the media to smear me,

01:00:48.220 the best, my favorite smear.

01:00:50.280 So the day that my publication came out, there was a story, I think that ran in the New York

01:00:55.240 Post, and it claimed that I was wrong, that I had never worked in the Wuhan lab.

01:01:04.440 Well, that was attribution error.

01:01:06.280 I never had claimed that I worked...

01:01:08.920 No, in fact, you just explained that you didn't want to work in China.

01:01:11.120 Correct.

01:01:11.680 But that's how they were trying to scope the argument that I was a liar.

01:01:15.780 The New York Post.

01:01:16.400 That would not surprise me.

01:01:17.100 And I just want to say for the record, the New York Post is one of the most dishonest

01:01:20.320 publications in the world and is very often used by the intel agencies and other bad actors

01:01:25.660 to lie to the public.

01:01:27.380 It's also hilarious.

01:01:29.220 It's a great newspaper in certain ways.

01:01:31.500 And so it's the...

01:01:32.160 And same with Daily Mail, exactly the same.

01:01:34.820 And they sort of lull you into believing them because they've got a sense of humor and they

01:01:38.600 cover great stories and they're sort of vaguely right wing.

01:01:41.400 But actually, it's a vector for disinformation and for lying on behalf of the intel agencies.

01:01:48.540 That's just what it is.

01:01:50.200 That's most mainstream media, I think.

01:01:51.900 It is.

01:01:52.340 It is.

01:01:52.740 But I think the New York Post and Daily Mail are...

01:01:56.460 Wall Street Journal, also Fox News for sure.

01:01:58.600 But they're more sinister because people believe them.

01:02:02.120 Because, hey, it's Fox News.

01:02:03.400 It's the Daily Mail.

01:02:04.740 It's the New York Post.

01:02:06.000 Especially the New York Post.

01:02:07.180 Like, everyone...

01:02:08.000 Headless body and topless bar, man. 0.86

01:02:09.480 It's the coolest paper in the world.

01:02:11.440 They wouldn't do that.

01:02:12.320 They do it constantly.

01:02:15.240 I agree.

01:02:17.380 I mean, what do you do about it when you're a little man?

01:02:19.440 I don't know.

01:02:19.500 You tell the truth about it.

01:02:20.860 That's all you can do.

01:02:22.620 But...

01:02:23.020 And they'll...

01:02:23.680 I mean, all those companies are failing and they'll all be gone soon.

01:02:26.980 And I won't lament their passing.

01:02:29.120 But anyway, so tell me what they did to contain control and punish you once you started telling

01:02:34.520 the truth.

01:02:35.180 So in late...

01:02:36.940 Well, the timeline's starting to get a little foggy.

01:02:38.520 It's, you know, this has been an ongoing saga.

01:02:41.320 I think it was in late 2021 or mid to late 2021.

01:02:44.520 I was contacted by some journalists.

01:02:46.960 So journalists are trying to contact me and ask me questions because they figure they're

01:02:51.060 probably wondering, who's the tough guy?

01:02:52.300 Doesn't even know what he's talking about. 0.75

01:02:53.220 They're probably trying to frame me as a crazy...

01:02:55.760 Miranda Devine contacts me, a pretty prominent journalist, and asks me on the telephone where

01:03:02.600 she should look for more records related to the scan of function research.

01:03:05.260 And because I had worked in this field for a year and knew all the players, I'm like, I don't

01:03:09.700 know.

01:03:10.160 You know, my gut tells me I'd go look at DARPA.

01:03:12.020 And I believe that conversation was being listened into.

01:03:17.360 I think I believe they were already watching me, obviously, going back into October 2019.

01:03:23.980 And that's when it triggers something within the intel community where I had found out now

01:03:30.800 secondhand that there was a false allegation that someone had leaked classified information

01:03:36.380 to me.

01:03:37.220 Nobody's ever leaked classified information to me because, one, they don't typically target

01:03:41.980 the person that was leaked to.

01:03:43.260 They target the leaker.

01:03:44.640 Okay.

01:03:44.940 And I would be arrested and be in jail if any of that were true.

01:03:49.940 And when I told that to Miranda Devine, this is based on my expert opinion.

01:03:54.220 I knew the people who were funding the work, the preempt, all these different things.

01:03:58.060 I knew the players.

01:03:59.140 So you go look at the funding sources to identify proposals and things that had been submitted.

01:04:06.100 And I don't know if this is related or not, but a week or two after I had that conversation,

01:04:10.060 Major Murphy from the U.S. Marine Corps puts out a whistleblower disclosure that there's

01:04:18.900 this thing called the Diffuse Proposal, which is basically the recipe of how to make SARS-CoV-2.

01:04:23.920 And it was done in partnership with the Chinese and a number of scientists in the U.S.

01:04:28.660 And the primary sponsor, the primary company engaging this work was EcoHealth Alliance.

01:04:33.820 So every name on the Diffuse Proposal, I know those people or I know of them and what work

01:04:41.580 they were doing.

01:04:42.380 And everyone discredited this Diffuse Proposal because this is not a real proposal.

01:04:46.580 This looks like a joke.

01:04:47.480 It's two pages.

01:04:49.040 It looks very haphazard.

01:04:51.360 And I started making the argument to people, no, this is very real.

01:04:55.780 DARPA does business differently than other government agencies.

01:04:58.660 They use this thing called Heilmeier's Catechism.

01:05:01.300 You have to answer a series of questions, proposals.

01:05:03.480 They only want a page or two.

01:05:04.640 They don't want a big NIH proposal, which is very technical.

01:05:07.760 It could be full length of 100, 200 pages of material.

01:05:11.520 They only typically want a one or two page proposal.

01:05:13.560 And I tell people, I think this is how DARPA does business.

01:05:15.820 But since nobody in the real world knows how the business works in these areas.

01:05:21.180 Not a lot of people you run into at Starbucks have done business with DARPA.

01:05:24.460 Exactly.

01:05:25.660 And that's how they then start the psychological operation around the Diffuse Proposal.

01:05:29.820 I ask you to pause for those who aren't familiar.

01:05:31.940 Or will you just tell viewers what DARPA is?

01:05:35.000 Yeah.

01:05:35.200 So DARPA is the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency.

01:05:38.500 It used to be ARPA before they added the D before.

01:05:41.400 It's an Advanced Research Projects Agency.

01:05:44.080 It's actually made most of the coolest technology that we have.

01:05:47.680 Or one of the companies or entities that's federally funded that has the internet.

01:05:51.460 So everything on the internet was developed by ARPA then, ARPANET.

01:05:55.880 And if you are a tech nerd like me and you start digging down the DNS queries of how you search for information, you dig down, you start pulling up the tables of information.

01:06:03.460 Eventually you get to something that says ARPANET in every communication that we do.

01:06:07.640 So they make the most sophisticated stuff in the world.

01:06:11.400 So it's a Pentagon-funded research lab, basically.

01:06:14.900 Yes.

01:06:15.440 Well, not necessarily just a research lab.

01:06:18.260 I'd call it more of it covers a program area or series of program areas where some of the research is done by private contractors, FFRDCs, basically anybody who can do the work.

01:06:28.860 And they fund high-risk, high-value scientific R&D on short timelines.

01:06:35.960 So you don't receive 10 years of funding.

01:06:39.680 The Department of Defense, rightfully so, is what capability will this give us within a year or two?

01:06:44.980 Yeah.

01:06:45.260 Three years.

01:06:45.700 They have a short horizon.

01:06:47.640 It's no nonsense.

01:06:49.280 And they want results.

01:06:51.060 And they achieve them.

01:06:53.760 Interesting.

01:06:54.680 That's a great description from someone who's worked with them.

01:06:58.360 So anyway, you have this conversation with Miranda Devine, and you now believe that conversation was monitored.

01:07:06.040 And what happens next?

01:07:07.820 Well, then I start, because my profile is increasing, and I'm starting to be actually followed by people out in the UP when I go to the grocery store.

01:07:18.060 Very strange, right?

01:07:19.900 The UP is the Upper Peninsula of Michigan.

01:07:23.160 It's not actually near the state of Michigan, really.

01:07:25.600 It's a geographic anomaly, but it is very lightly populated and extremely rural.

01:07:31.320 It's one of the most rural places east of the Mississippi, if this is a fair description.

01:07:36.300 Yes.

01:07:36.540 It's actually the most rural place in the lower 48.

01:07:40.080 In the lower 48.

01:07:41.300 Yes.

01:07:41.640 By population density.

01:07:43.600 So when you're getting followed in the UP, you know it.

01:07:45.960 Oh, absolutely.

01:07:47.040 I mean, so the house, the pandemic, you know, prepper house that we purchased, it's 180 acres.

01:07:53.560 It's completely off-grid.

01:07:55.220 Our driveway is a mile long, and it's basically like a moat.

01:07:58.980 There's a natural dense swamp on all four sides, because the driveway is an old railroad grade.

01:08:05.280 Oh, cool.

01:08:05.960 Yeah, so it's very isolated.

01:08:08.120 I joke, I could throw a hand grenade off my step, and nobody would notice, and because

01:08:11.280 there are mines in the air, there's blasting and stuff going on, nobody would care.

01:08:15.860 So that's where I live.

01:08:17.660 So when you go to the gas station, or you go into town, you know, a 40-minute drive, and

01:08:22.100 you have someone follow you, you have a couple of vehicles follow you, it's very strange.

01:08:25.340 And I get on, it was Twitter then before X, and my profile's becoming elevated.

01:08:32.000 So one of the first people to get in contact with me was Brett Weinstein, Dr. Brett Weinstein.

01:08:37.360 Another person, Jan Yaklik, they start reaching out to me.

01:08:40.120 So the people who were outspoken and skeptics around all the things start contacting me,

01:08:45.480 and I have a four-hour conversation with Brett Weinstein, and I walk him through the

01:08:50.000 whole thing, even through the vaccine technology, and I think how it'll cause cancer, and look

01:08:55.060 today where we are, these mRNA vaccines are causing cancer.

01:08:58.840 So anyways, I have this great conversation, and all of a sudden, I feel that I can sense

01:09:05.280 the pressure, you know, being applied and mounting, you know, from being followed, you

01:09:09.400 know, as weird as that is, and because I'm a former top-secret clearance holder, I decided

01:09:13.360 to go report this to the FBI.

01:09:14.920 So I go to my local FBI field office, and I say, you know, I'm Dr. Andrew Huff, I'm a

01:09:20.000 former top-secret clearance holder that worked at this environment, I'm being tailed, because

01:09:23.380 you're supposed to, you sign documents saying that, you know, if you report any, if you

01:09:27.480 have any strange behavior the rest of your life of being tailed or, you know, hacking

01:09:31.500 surveillance, report it to the FBI.

01:09:34.280 So I did.

01:09:35.660 My wife and I go in there, they seem like they're taking it very seriously, and I then

01:09:42.500 actually hire a private investigator to then cross-check what the FBI is doing, and there's

01:09:50.540 a vehicle that's following me, and I report it to the FBI, and the FBI tells me it's

01:09:54.520 nothing, the private eye tells me that vehicle is registered to the Secretary of State in

01:09:58.700 Michigan, and that's how they have undercover vehicles.

01:10:02.640 What?

01:10:03.280 Yes.

01:10:05.020 So?

01:10:05.800 That's how the FBI is undercover vehicles?

01:10:07.880 That or any other undercover entity, so some federal entity.

01:10:11.720 Like government agency.

01:10:12.240 Government agency, it could be either the state police, the sheriff's department.

01:10:16.820 I now know for a fact that it was the state police, my sheriff's department in Marquette

01:10:21.200 County, and the FBI all working together in hindsight, and probably also with the Department

01:10:27.620 of Defense and the CIA, which is more difficult to prove, but you can sort of see ties and tendrils

01:10:31.540 into that.

01:10:32.540 But so that aside, so I'm being followed, they're listening to my communications, all

01:10:40.340 of this is sort of easy to detect.

01:10:42.100 If you're a person who worked in intelligence and defense, you know how they operate, and

01:10:46.740 so I just started collecting evidence of all the terrible crap, and my devices were getting

01:10:51.260 hacked weekly.

01:10:52.280 I mean, I'd have to wipe the operating systems, reinstall, and it's this cat and mouse game

01:10:56.300 as technology is involving, and I'm an engineer, so I just start increasing my security all the

01:11:01.000 time, and the sad reality is with consumer-grade electronics that you buy from, you know, Amazon

01:11:10.200 or wherever you get them these days, it's difficult to defend against that advanced persistent

01:11:15.700 threat.

01:11:16.180 So you're, basically, I spend a lot of time doing network engineering and restoring programs

01:11:20.880 and software, because once I get to the point where I'm writing my book, the hacks intensify,

01:11:25.760 and it's definitely coming from the government and probably the pharmaceutical industry or other,

01:11:29.580 you know, entities and organizations, and I try to investigate myself, the source of those

01:11:36.860 hacks, and I actually know, you follow the IP addresses of their VPN that they backdoor 1.00

01:11:40.880 in your system, and you can find out who the attacker is.

01:11:42.580 So I do this, and I sit on it, and it's gotten to the point where I'm ready to file a large

01:11:47.440 federal lawsuit against the federal government, Cash Patel, who's supposedly my ally for $50 million,

01:11:52.340 because I've identified the FBI agents and everyone involved all the way to the top.

01:11:58.400 I basically ran a counterintelligence operation back against the U.S. government with my training

01:12:02.760 and collected the evidence to prove it.

01:12:04.400 I even have fingerprints that I was obtained in my house of people who broke into my house.

01:12:09.240 They tased my dog.

01:12:10.860 What?

01:12:11.280 Yeah, they tased my dog during one of the break-ins.

01:12:14.260 What else did they do?

01:12:15.240 Actually?

01:12:15.980 Yeah, actually.

01:12:16.400 How do you know that?

01:12:17.120 I mean, it leaves a big mark and a burn on the dog's neck.

01:12:21.300 It was hiding, cowering in the counter.

01:12:23.000 It changed one of my bird dogs.

01:12:25.060 So this dog was actually one of the more-

01:12:26.460 German Shorthair Pointer?

01:12:27.360 Yes, a large female, about 70 pounds, large for that breed. 0.99

01:12:31.440 They attacked your dog.

01:12:33.120 Yeah.

01:12:33.260 Okay, that's when-

01:12:34.260 Yeah, they tased the dog, and it changed her behavior. 1.00

01:12:37.500 She became more timid.

01:12:38.280 She actually used to be sort of aggressive for a GSP. 1.00

01:12:41.020 And so anyways, yeah, they tased my dog.

01:12:44.460 They tampered with my vehicles on numerous occasions.

01:12:47.000 And this just didn't happen in the UP.

01:12:48.340 This would happen when I go other places.

01:12:50.140 So if I travel for work, say I'd go to, you know, Wisconsin, Green Bay, California,

01:12:53.980 they'd tamper with my vehicles there and do, you know, really silly stuff, like psychologically.

01:12:59.820 So they might just, like, buckle your seatbelt before you-

01:13:03.500 So you leave the car, and then you come back to your car, and everything's all skewed,

01:13:06.860 and they mess with stuff in it.

01:13:07.800 So, I mean, it was more of a psychological operation, not, like, trying to kill me, you know?

01:13:13.020 But they were trying to apply all the pressure that they could to make my life miserable.

01:13:18.460 I have times, periods where my credit cards might not work.

01:13:22.340 You show up to a gas station, try to run it to the pump, it won't be at work.

01:13:25.280 So I was at the bank screwing with me, the payment system.

01:13:29.080 I had the controls on my vehicle on, I don't want to say what type of car I have on your show,

01:13:34.720 but a newer vehicle that has, like, automated driving, like, assisted driving capabilities,

01:13:40.920 that had been taken over at low speed, where I couldn't control it.

01:13:45.420 And now I'm sort of, of the mindset, I'm like, oh, gee, should we have self-driving cars?

01:13:50.520 And they would actually, it always-

01:13:51.640 Let me answer that question.

01:13:52.740 No.

01:13:53.140 Yeah.

01:13:54.420 It's the end of human autonomy, right?

01:13:56.180 And so-

01:13:57.040 You should have 1987 Chevrolet Silverados with the five-speed manual transmission.

01:14:01.440 You'll have to take me for a ride later.

01:14:02.520 That's what I drive.

01:14:03.240 Okay.

01:14:03.680 Sorry.

01:14:04.940 No, and I've thought about that.

01:14:06.360 And so it's always this battle whether or not we should have these technologies.

01:14:08.780 And here's the thing I want to point out.

01:14:09.980 They didn't do these things when I was driving at high speed.

01:14:12.680 It happened at the same place in my driveway, systematically, where they were doing it to

01:14:17.820 mess with me at a low speed.

01:14:20.420 And I actually brought one of the vehicles into the manufacturer to have it looked at.

01:14:25.940 And they took a look at it.

01:14:27.020 Their corporate mechanic came in.

01:14:29.880 And corporate mechanics are special mechanics that look for, I guess, manufacturing errors in

01:14:38.220 the production of the vehicle so that the corporation can correct the either software or physical

01:14:43.520 problem with the vehicle.

01:14:45.180 And they gave me free repairs based on what they found.

01:14:49.260 And they wouldn't tell me exactly what they found.

01:14:50.780 Well, this is all pretty distressing.

01:14:55.120 And to think that you're a patriotic American, served your country, fought and was wounded

01:15:00.060 in Iraq, you know, and for your government to be doing this to you because you're telling

01:15:06.320 the truth is really kind of like the end.

01:15:12.160 I mean, that that could happen.

01:15:13.160 Yeah, well, I took the attitude of I can beat these guys and I'm I'm better than they are

01:15:19.720 and I'm smarter than they are.

01:15:22.260 So it just became a game to me.

01:15:23.880 And I just went, played the game and I played the game and I outsmarted them every step of

01:15:28.720 the way because their ultimate goal was to prevent me from this story getting out to

01:15:33.860 the global audience.

01:15:36.080 And I knew that's what their objective was. 0.78

01:15:37.940 And their other objective was to skew me as a crazy, right?

01:15:40.580 So we're going to paint this person as a crazy and we're going to prevent them.

01:15:44.460 So at least my word or my voice has no impact.

01:15:47.080 And they failed on both accounts because the main thing is I had I had documented everything

01:15:53.100 that was happening.

01:15:53.900 The license plates, the people following me, the fingerprints in my house.

01:15:56.680 They're not my fingerprints.

01:15:57.440 And the best part is I brought those fingerprints to the Marquette County Sheriff's Department,

01:16:02.600 brought them to the FBI.

01:16:05.260 And I even had a referral from Sandia National Laboratories, Counterintelligence, eventually,

01:16:09.760 to the FBI, telling them to investigate this.

01:16:13.720 And they refused to run the prints.

01:16:17.020 Have they ever run the prints?

01:16:18.380 No.

01:16:18.940 And this is where it gets really interesting.

01:16:20.940 So to this day, to this day, and I still have them.

01:16:24.620 Why?

01:16:26.080 I mean, I guess it's probably someone from law enforcement.

01:16:30.480 That's that's what it's probably a Sheriff's Department employee. 0.77

01:16:34.420 It could be someone politically that they used in the operation.

01:16:39.740 I mean, if you look at how when they want to target someone or individual, and I'm not

01:16:43.960 the first U.S. government scientist to go through this.

01:16:46.420 It's well documented that the person they blamed for the bacillus anthracis attacks after

01:16:52.500 9-11.

01:16:52.980 So you remember the anthrax mailings?

01:16:55.040 Do I remember?

01:16:55.720 Yeah.

01:16:56.040 Yeah.

01:16:56.260 So they pinned that to a guy by the name of Dr. Bruce Ivins.

01:16:59.080 Well, first it was Dr. Stephen Hatfield.

01:17:00.760 Yes.

01:17:01.700 Yeah.

01:17:01.920 And then it was Dr. Bruce Ivins.

01:17:04.780 And they ran a operation on him, which was like COINTELPRO to make him crack.

01:17:12.060 And eventually he kills himself.

01:17:13.620 He can't handle the pressure.

01:17:15.020 Well, they ran the same type of operation on me.

01:17:17.920 I didn't crack.

01:17:19.700 I hate to go far afield because this is an amazing story, but you brought it up.

01:17:24.000 So I'm going to have to ask you, give me the Cliff Notes version of what those anthrax 0.58

01:17:30.120 attacks actually were, which for people who were not around then, killed a number of

01:17:35.020 people, media employees, anthrax-packed envelopes were sent to the newsrooms of a bunch of media

01:17:43.020 organizations.

01:17:43.740 I actually got one at my house.

01:17:45.760 So it was a big deal.

01:17:47.120 This was right after that.

01:17:48.280 So, yes.

01:17:49.360 So someone who had access to the USAMRID laboratory.

01:17:53.360 Which laboratory?

01:17:54.040 USAMRID.

01:17:54.920 I forget what the acronym stands for.

01:17:57.780 It's the Bioweapons Laboratory or Biodefense Laboratory. 0.72

01:18:00.380 In Maryland.

01:18:00.860 Correct.

01:18:01.500 Yeah.

01:18:01.700 And so Dr. Bruce Ivan worked in that laboratory.

01:18:06.400 He worked on vaccine technology and the spores, which are weaponized, to be dispersed.

01:18:16.520 And...

01:18:17.080 The anthrax spores.

01:18:17.980 Correct.

01:18:18.560 And what's unique about these spores is that when they're weaponized, they go through a process

01:18:24.440 called tinning.

01:18:25.600 And what that tinning does, it makes them so that they stay aerosolized.

01:18:28.560 Because if you have bacillus anthracis, it's too big of an agent.

01:18:32.400 It just...

01:18:32.800 It falls to the ground.

01:18:33.500 It sits.

01:18:34.060 So to weaponize it, you want to make it so it stays dispersed and...

01:18:36.860 Light and fluffy.

01:18:37.660 Exactly.

01:18:39.120 And so Dr. Bruce Ivins was a specialist in that.

01:18:43.100 Okay.

01:18:43.420 Making these things stay aerosolized.

01:18:45.320 And then also developing the countermeasures to it.

01:18:47.160 So if you're a real conspiracy theorist, you'd say that someone engaged in the false flagging

01:18:52.440 of the anthrax attacks to promote the anthrax vaccine.

01:18:59.280 Potentially.

01:19:00.460 I mean, that's...

01:19:01.100 Just potentially.

01:19:02.320 That's one theory that's out there.

01:19:03.960 I personally believe from analyzing all the different evidence that Dr. Bruce Ivins is

01:19:08.100 not the person that did it.

01:19:11.560 From my professional network, I know several people that work directly with him.

01:19:16.840 He's very much a very soft, loving kind of person.

01:19:20.140 I don't see this person all of a sudden taking the spores out of his laboratory and then mailing

01:19:24.040 them to people.

01:19:25.900 This could have been done to continue the biodefense program around bacillus anthracis

01:19:32.360 as one possible scenario.

01:19:34.300 So anyways, I mean, we're sort of off track here, but...

01:19:37.860 So there is no...

01:19:39.860 Because no one was ever charged with it.

01:19:42.160 And he...

01:19:43.400 As I remember, or was he charged?

01:19:45.120 I think they were in the process of charging him.

01:19:46.940 Well, certainly no one was convicted of it.

01:19:48.240 Yes.

01:19:48.640 Right. 0.72

01:19:49.040 And he killed himself.

01:19:50.580 Well, they say he killed himself. 0.57

01:19:52.380 He's dead in any case.

01:19:53.920 But has any other, like, meaningful suspect ever emerged that you're aware of?

01:20:00.060 Well, I have my opinions of who was likely involved, and I don't want to defame those

01:20:06.300 people, so I'll keep those...

01:20:06.920 No, no, and I hope you won't use names, but can you just give it...

01:20:09.940 Can you characterize who these people were and what their motive might have been in your

01:20:12.780 view?

01:20:13.020 In my opinion, they're likely associated with the biodefense complex, and their motive could

01:20:25.080 have been to create more fear, hostility after 9-11 in the population.

01:20:30.440 It could have been financial.

01:20:32.020 Those are probably the two leading motives as to why that happened, my expert opinion.

01:20:37.860 And actually, you know, in private, afterward, they'll tell you, you know, who I think probably

01:20:42.040 is involved, but maybe being an expert in biodefense, I mean, this is something of one of the first

01:20:47.300 things I did deep dives on.

01:20:48.740 Even, in fact, in my PhD coursework, it was taught by Dr. Mike Osterholm, who and I, he

01:20:54.600 and I do not see eye to eye in a lot of things.

01:20:57.300 He taught this in his course.

01:20:58.580 This was a case study around biodefense.

01:21:02.220 There's a, yeah, there are a lot of bio labs outside this country, I've noticed, run by

01:21:06.640 the U.S. government or...

01:21:07.940 Well, they're not really run by the U.S. government, so there's this thing called the

01:21:10.480 Cooperative Biological Engagement Program, CBEP, and there's a few other programs.

01:21:15.500 And the idea is we engage in scientific diplomacy with foreign laboratories so our enemies do 0.94

01:21:20.340 not become allied with them.

01:21:22.280 So, for example, the Ukraine labs.

01:21:25.460 I actually was involved in writing some of the proposals for those laboratories, and I

01:21:29.000 can't say with who I'm under NDA, but here's the issue.

01:21:35.040 If we don't engage in those cooperative biological engagement programs with a laboratory like

01:21:40.020 in Ukraine, there's a very real possibility that the Chinese will or the Russians will.

01:21:44.980 I get it.

01:21:45.320 I get it.

01:21:45.740 So, it's better that we're working with them.

01:21:48.520 I understand.

01:21:49.180 Yeah.

01:21:49.300 No, I don't, but that's not crazy.

01:21:51.020 Yeah.

01:21:51.300 I don't think it's, or certainly I understand how people talk themselves into that, and I

01:21:54.980 don't, it's not prima facie insane or evil.

01:21:57.160 What I find obviously insane and evil is the lying about it.

01:22:03.680 And so, you know, the Undersecretary of State said in a Senate hearing a few years ago after

01:22:09.840 the Ukraine war broke out on camera under oath, this is Victoria Nuland, architect of

01:22:16.700 the current disaster in Ukraine, that she was worried about the biolabs there. 1.00

01:22:21.900 So, she said that on camera.

01:22:23.200 So, okay, all right, you said it, honey.

01:22:25.700 And I played the tape and was immediately attacked by everybody, all the other, you 0.76

01:22:31.240 know, CNN and all the other Intel community controlled news outlets as like a conspiracy

01:22:36.840 wacko.

01:22:37.660 And there are no, there are no biolabs in Ukraine. 1.00

01:22:40.020 What are you talking about?

01:22:42.580 Same.

01:22:43.400 What is that?

01:22:45.580 I don't understand how the Biden administration handled the messaging and the communications

01:22:50.080 around that.

01:22:51.160 So, I don't know why Ms. Nuland actually said the things or said the things the way that 0.58

01:22:56.280 she did. 1.00

01:22:56.800 She's stupid. 1.00

01:22:57.720 That's one of her deepest secrets. 1.00

01:22:59.360 She's an idiot. 1.00

01:23:00.060 It would have been so much easier just to come on and tell the truth. 1.00

01:23:02.100 We have this thing called the Chemical Biological Engagement Program, and we had a relationship

01:23:05.720 with these laboratories in Ukraine.

01:23:07.300 And actually, this is published information by the Department of Defense and other, the State

01:23:11.740 Department, other agencies involved.

01:23:12.860 And you can go look at CBET maps and see where we have these, this, this information, or you

01:23:17.760 can play the game where you go look at awarded proposals, which are not classified.

01:23:21.180 So, there's ways to find this, this information.

01:23:23.680 It's, it's not secret.

01:23:24.780 And they're using private companies to, and universities to have these relationships with

01:23:32.160 these different laboratories.

01:23:33.020 And that's, that's what scientific diplomacy is about.

01:23:35.500 Why would you lie about it?

01:23:36.900 And why would news organizations collaborate in those lies?

01:23:41.560 Like, to me, as a non-scientist, but a student of human nature, that's a tell that something's

01:23:46.960 bad going on.

01:23:47.540 Like, why would you lie about that?

01:23:48.860 Well, I think the Biden administration was completely incompetent in all these areas.

01:23:52.540 And I think it was looking at Ms. Newland specifically.

01:23:55.920 I believe that she didn't know what she didn't know.

01:23:58.140 It was a case of that.

01:23:59.840 And so, so there, there, there, there, there, there, there, there, there, there, there, 0.99

01:24:01.240 That is one of the huge problems of being dumb. 1.00

01:24:03.340 Yeah. 1.00

01:24:03.880 Is you don't know what you don't know, right?

01:24:06.040 And so, she probably couldn't articulate anything other, that would be the truth without putting herself

01:24:11.120 And risks of, uh, risk of being, uh, perjuring herself.

01:24:14.420 Right.

01:24:14.680 So, the, I think she gave the answer to not perjure herself, not knowing what she didn't know. 0.99

01:24:20.580 Stupidity is often, often the real explanation for a lot of things. 0.98

01:24:25.040 Well, the truthful answer could have been, well, uh, Senator so-and-so, um, I don't know. 0.98

01:24:29.620 But my office will look into that and we'll give you a written response within a week.

01:24:34.160 And that's how they trained us.

01:24:36.280 Yeah, of course.

01:24:36.840 Well, that's what honest people do is just tell the truth.

01:24:39.180 But I just thought it was interesting that the media cooperated with the cover-up in that's,

01:24:45.020 and many, a million others, of course.

01:24:47.180 But like, why, what is that?

01:24:50.100 Well, that was all part of the psychological operation.

01:24:52.740 Because remember this, this didn't happen in a vacuum.

01:24:54.640 They probably didn't want to undermine the public perception of the government related to the COVID origin story.

01:25:00.500 So, more of the, these conspiracy theories that turn out to be true,

01:25:03.480 it undermines the credibility of the main narrative that they're trying to set,

01:25:06.900 which was COVID emerged from the web market. 0.95

01:25:10.240 Can I ask you, like, an even bigger and dumber question,

01:25:12.160 which is, like, why would the U.S. government have an interest in lying about that? 0.94

01:25:16.500 Why not?

01:25:17.100 China is our rival on many levels, economic and military primarily. 0.95

01:25:21.360 And we're often told that, you know, we're in a war against China,

01:25:26.760 a fight with China, a race against China.

01:25:28.860 Why would the same people telling us that go out of their way to cover up the fact

01:25:32.840 that the virus came from a Chinese bioweapons lab? 0.94

01:25:35.820 Well, the government's people, first of all.

01:25:38.800 You know, we always refer to it as the government.

01:25:40.420 But you work in Washington, D.C. and in this space,

01:25:43.580 and any program area that a person could be affiliated with has people running it.

01:25:48.280 Those people don't want to be held accountable.

01:25:49.780 No, that's right.

01:25:50.220 And they obviously are living in a state of fear of what could happen

01:25:55.820 if they were held accountable.

01:25:58.880 So they make decisions to protect themselves out of their self-interest,

01:26:03.700 and they happen to hold some power or leverage or have relationships

01:26:06.520 to execute on that operation plan.

01:26:10.800 That's totally right.

01:26:12.360 Yeah.

01:26:13.240 I mean, clearly true.

01:26:14.760 So you start telling the truth.

01:26:17.920 They start tailing you, tased your dog, trying to drive you insane.

01:26:23.420 All of that is very, very familiar to me.

01:26:27.300 You don't feel like they're going to want to kill you,

01:26:29.160 but they want you to shut up or at least become a fringe figure that nobody pays attention to.

01:26:33.580 Yes, absolutely.

01:26:34.780 And here's just a quick story, and maybe I'll cut this in differently.

01:26:38.560 But one of the funny things that they did was that it had been a sort of really stressful summer

01:26:44.500 of working on my book, writing it.

01:26:46.800 Because of the hacks, and I had deadlines, and I'm not able to meet the deadlines

01:26:51.520 because of the hacking, being tailed, all these different things.

01:26:55.280 Well, my wife and I decided to go to a music festival in Chicago.

01:26:58.980 And it's a decent drive, you know, six, seven hours down to Chicago.

01:27:03.960 And while we're staying at the hotel, someone is hovering a drone outside the window of our hotel room.

01:27:11.240 Yeah.

01:27:12.340 And the funny thing is, you know.

01:27:15.020 I hope you flashed them.

01:27:17.440 I walk around probably naked all the time.

01:27:19.320 That's a swear.

01:27:19.780 Because I'm, you know, a former Army infantryman.

01:27:21.940 I don't care who sees me naked.

01:27:23.080 Yeah.

01:27:23.460 So, and I live out in the middle of nowhere, so I'll just go outside naked sometimes.

01:27:26.500 But anyways, we're in Chicago.

01:27:29.740 And, you know, the thing is, the FBI or these federal agents or maybe state agents operating illegally

01:27:35.940 weren't very smart.

01:27:37.060 So, our room faced an alley in Chicago, and there was a tall glass building next to us.

01:27:42.320 So, I look at the glass building across from us, and I can see the people operating the drone in the room above us.

01:27:50.540 No way.

01:27:51.640 Yes. 0.99

01:27:51.960 So, what I do, I actually put on my pants, go upstairs, and I pound on the door, and come out of this fucking room, I caught you. 0.98

01:27:59.840 And I'm screaming this in the hotel room in Chicago, and I'm excited, you know, because this is the first time where I've actually been able to, you know, confront these people. 0.97

01:28:07.020 And the room goes dead silent.

01:28:08.020 So, what do I do?

01:28:10.460 I go over to the fire door, which is right next to this hotel room, it was up against the stairwell, and we're on the third floor, they're on the fourth.

01:28:19.400 And I make a quick decision to sort of trick these guys.

01:28:24.300 So, I open up this door, this heavy fire door, and I allow it to slam, and I make the noise with my feet that I'm going down the stairs.

01:28:31.480 Actually, I went upstairs quietly and above the room to the fifth floor, and I'm standing there listening to the floor, and I hear cases closing, things snapping, and, you know, which way are they going to exit?

01:28:43.280 They're obviously not going to go down the fire escape or at the end of the building.

01:28:45.700 The only other way they go, they're going to go down the hallway to the next stairway or elevator.

01:28:49.000 So, I start running down the fifth floor ahead of these guys, and I hear footsteps and cases and things.

01:28:56.360 Well, I heard the case of closing, and I hear the footsteps coming down the hallway, and I get to the next stairway, and I open up the door, and they pop out right in front of me.

01:29:06.640 No way!

01:29:07.240 But I'm up on the fifth floor, and they're coming out on the fourth, and I'm looking down at them, and they go running down the stairs to the first floor, and I'm laughing.

01:29:15.180 So, I go over to the elevator, I go down the elevator casually, I come in the lobby like there's nothing wrong, and the two guys are sitting in chairs.

01:29:22.900 And I walk over to them and say, hey, guys, did you see two guys come running down the stairs?

01:29:29.980 And they have, like, wristbands on from drinking at the music festival or bars or wherever they were following us around all day.

01:29:40.140 And they said, no, we haven't seen anyone there.

01:29:42.840 You know, they look sort of like they're sweating.

01:29:45.080 And I go over to them, I start laughing, I go over to the desk of the lobby and say, hey, what's your name?

01:29:50.060 Can I get your phone number?

01:29:50.740 I'm going to have my attorneys call you, we're going to get a copy of the surveillance footage of these guys.

01:29:55.960 And I'm like, I'm going to come back and I'm going to buy you dinner next year.

01:29:59.640 And she said, okay, she gave me my information.

01:30:01.100 She's like, why?

01:30:01.580 I'm like, oh, it's not a big deal.

01:30:03.380 So anyways, that happens.

01:30:06.240 A week goes by, the next week we're back at home.

01:30:08.860 And I had trespassers on my property.

01:30:10.560 And sometimes the state police and federal agents would come onto my property and just, like, run around the bushes around my house, you know, to, like, you know, freak me out.

01:30:21.300 And, or thinking that they were freaking me out, I laughed at most of this.

01:30:24.720 So I called 911 to report the trespassers.

01:30:27.700 And I'm working in my garage on some, you know, project.

01:30:30.300 And they're playing music and sounds from their phones, like, trying to, like, get me to come out and, like, run after them or something.

01:30:40.420 So anyways, 45 minutes go by, the police haven't arrived.

01:30:45.800 And sometimes that's not uncommon, probably, for a trespassing claim in the UP of Michigan.

01:30:49.740 So I call back, and the dispatcher, or the 911 operator, gives me the phone number of the state police officer that is responding to the call that I'm supposed to call on the cell phone.

01:31:01.740 Well, I go call the phone number on my cell phone, and the phone rings in the bushes.

01:31:07.860 No way.

01:31:08.620 I'm not kidding.

01:31:10.240 And I start laughing.

01:31:11.700 And they know, because you could hear it, like, it gets shut off real quick.

01:31:14.680 And I'm just like, I just caught these guys.

01:31:17.320 Like, this is concrete evidence you can obtain from the location of the person's cell phone when the phone call's made.

01:31:23.520 I mean, I know.

01:31:24.440 Were any of these people ever punished?

01:31:25.620 The drone operators, the state cop?

01:31:27.760 No.

01:31:28.620 So these people haven't been published.

01:31:30.940 The state cop, his name is Deputy Bray.

01:31:33.080 I know who he is.

01:31:33.920 And he has actually a family in Iron Mountain, Michigan.

01:31:38.420 So I don't know to what extent.

01:31:40.040 There was another person.

01:31:40.740 And I actually witnessed one of the state police officers in my house through a black, through a plate glass window.

01:31:50.240 I was out working on the property.

01:31:52.160 He was on my computer trying to destroy evidence, I think.

01:31:55.900 He lives in the town on the road.

01:31:57.460 So much of this came from the state police, which is the Governor Whitmer administration.

01:32:02.540 Totally corrupt history of working with the FBI to harass.

01:32:05.540 Totally corrupt person, yes.

01:32:07.220 And so, I don't know if they've ever been held accountable.

01:32:11.360 I know for a fact that the FBI office in the state of Michigan had been spreading rumors with state and local law enforcement, excuse me, county and local law enforcement that I was dangerous.

01:32:24.740 That's...

01:32:25.420 I mean, this is...

01:32:26.440 And no one was ever held accountable.

01:32:27.760 What about your former co-workers at Eagle Health Alliance?

01:32:30.000 Where are they now?

01:32:31.800 I haven't checked in a while.

01:32:32.940 So, Dr. Billy Koresh, who I actually really liked, he was the executive vice president.

01:32:39.520 He was second to Peter.

01:32:40.740 He wound up at the Aspen Institute.

01:32:45.220 Good.

01:32:46.240 That's the most perfect thing I've ever heard.

01:32:47.980 Okay.

01:32:48.640 It was either that of the Atlantic Council or Georgetown University.

01:32:51.140 I knew it was one of the three.

01:32:52.680 Okay.

01:32:53.320 Funny.

01:32:54.720 So, the other vice presidents, Dr. Epstein or Dr. Oval, I'm not sure where they are.

01:33:01.440 I know Dr. Daszak's trying to get something new going, which is basically, it sounds like sort of the same thing.

01:33:06.680 And, you know, I understand why there have been a series...

01:33:09.160 Has Dr. Daszak ever faced any penalty at all for participating in this?

01:33:12.640 No, and the best part is that what's crazy about all of this, I should say, is that I attended a number of the hearings in the COVID Select Committee in person.

01:33:20.580 And I was there for Dr. Daszak's grilling.

01:33:24.440 And they have the part where they go through where basically he's denying that any of this is gain of function, his involvement, and he's fighting back.

01:33:31.780 And then, you know, it gets to the end of the congressional hearings where counsel for both the Democrats and Republicans get the chance to examine the witness.

01:33:39.760 And during that questioning, they actually asked,

01:33:42.640 Dr. Daszak, whether or not he is working with the intelligence community.

01:33:46.200 And at first, he lies.

01:33:47.280 He says no, that he wasn't.

01:33:49.920 And then they had actually obtained records that he was, which was apparent.

01:33:53.720 I didn't know that at the time.

01:33:55.280 And they pushed him on it.

01:33:57.080 And then he came clean that he was.

01:33:59.080 So, it's not...

01:34:00.200 It's on the official record that he was working with the intelligence community.

01:34:02.980 That's craziness.

01:34:04.440 And nobody talks about that.

01:34:05.720 You know, this is...

01:34:06.620 That wasn't in the news.

01:34:07.520 But that came out at the end of the hearing.

01:34:09.400 Like, I guess you would have no way to know whether CIA ever gathered meaningful intelligence

01:34:16.020 from the Wuhan Institute of Virology.

01:34:20.280 In my opinion, probably not.

01:34:21.660 Probably not.

01:34:22.100 So, it...

01:34:22.940 That's so often the case.

01:34:23.760 And I get this question.

01:34:24.620 It's like when I worked at the National Laboratory.

01:34:26.040 If we had anyone who was foreign to the lab, and I mean anyone external to Sandia come to 1.00

01:34:30.720 the laboratory, we would give them what I call the special tour.

01:34:35.160 So, they would have their Sandia minder.

01:34:37.560 And we'd take them to an area which we had bug swept before.

01:34:40.500 And then, you know, we'd show them whenever we wanted to show the dog and pony show.

01:34:44.040 And the second we left, that area would be bug checked before or after they left.

01:34:49.140 And so, if that's what we do in the United States, and that's our standard protocol for

01:34:54.320 top secret, secret environments, we don't think the Chinese are doing the same thing. 0.97

01:34:58.660 So, you have all these U.S. government officials and Dr. Dasik visiting that laboratory.

01:35:04.680 They, you know, would just take them around and be like, oh, this is our microbiology laboratory.

01:35:08.580 This is our, you know, this is our ventilation hood where we do sample work.

01:35:13.180 I mean, just looking at the equipment in a laboratory sometimes doesn't actually tell you

01:35:17.480 what they're working on either because, you know, you're dealing with viruses.

01:35:20.220 You can't see these things or bacteria or pathogens.

01:35:21.880 Right.

01:35:22.140 I can see someone's kitchen stove.

01:35:23.980 I don't know what they're making for dinner.

01:35:25.240 Exactly.

01:35:26.380 So, you've told a remarkable story.

01:35:29.080 And you know it's remarkable because of the lengths they went to keep you from telling it.

01:35:34.920 But with the benefit of several years, five years really, of hindsight and thinking about

01:35:40.580 this, what do you think this was?

01:35:44.280 Was this an accidental leak from the Wuhan lab?

01:35:47.480 And then they sort of backfilled after that.

01:35:50.100 Was this something else?

01:35:52.000 Like, what's your view?

01:35:53.620 So, the way that I'm trained and the way that I've worked in this type of intelligence

01:35:58.900 aspect of science is you look at scenarios.

01:36:01.560 So, you come up with every possible scenario.

01:36:03.840 And then you use hypothesis testing evidence to eliminate hypothesis or scenarios.

01:36:08.620 So, we're now at the stage where this could be a few different things.

01:36:12.980 One, it could have been a pure accident, accidental release from the Wuhan laboratory.

01:36:20.540 And if it's that scenario, it looks like it was a laboratory employee, potentially a graduate

01:36:24.760 student who had been working in that laboratory.

01:36:28.380 It could have been...

01:36:29.540 Who became infected and then spread it unknowingly.

01:36:31.820 Correct.

01:36:32.340 To the world.

01:36:32.880 So, that is, I think, the scenario which has the most favor publicly and among experts who

01:36:38.920 are now committed to the fact that this is a laboratory leak.

01:36:41.820 It could have been an intentional release.

01:36:44.960 That still hasn't been eliminated.

01:36:48.480 One or multiple groups could have intentionally released the agent.

01:36:53.260 There's one troubling aspect of this is that there are types of studies or scientific studies

01:37:01.700 which we could have ran to conclusively identify the origin of the disease in space and time.

01:37:09.660 And this is a classic epidemiological method.

01:37:13.620 There are blood banks and historical records of disease through blood donation programs globally.

01:37:21.520 That's right.

01:37:21.720 So, what we do is we go to those blood banks, look at old samples, or we look at other tissues

01:37:25.720 or samples that have been collected over time.

01:37:27.300 As they did with HIV.

01:37:28.080 And then you look through, okay, is it in this location here?

01:37:31.300 What time?

01:37:31.920 When?

01:37:32.120 And then now with modern technology, you can actually use more genetic applications to look

01:37:37.540 at the, so because SARS-CoV-2 evolves so rapidly, you can actually look at the phylogenetic tree

01:37:45.340 to see, you know, where in time was the sample.

01:37:49.760 And you'd follow that back.

01:37:51.600 Then with the location information you're obtaining of positive hits where the sample,

01:37:56.820 positive samples were found to eventually trace you back to the origin.

01:38:01.280 And that study has never been done at scale, and I don't know why.

01:38:05.720 It's another one of those questions, like, why haven't we done this?

01:38:08.340 And there's a number of organizations and the U.S. military that could look at their own

01:38:15.200 genetic blood bank samples to sort of figure out where this came from and when.

01:38:21.320 Maybe they've already done that, right?

01:38:22.560 Because that would happen behind closed doors, and the Department of Defense or the Defense

01:38:25.840 Medical agencies would do that.

01:38:28.860 So these are questions that could be answered, and they haven't been answered.

01:38:35.180 And I have more thoughts and opinions to what has transpired related to the origin of this

01:38:44.480 disease.

01:38:45.400 And I'm now at the position of that if this investigation were to take place, because the

01:38:53.060 world is in such a tenuous position in terms of a potential for World War III, that should 1.00

01:38:58.460 happen in a classified setting.

01:39:00.880 And that investigation should be in the form of using the UCMJ process with the Department

01:39:06.320 of Defense, because Dr. Anthony Fauci, Dr. Daszak, Ralph Baric, all these people are essentially

01:39:13.300 working on a defense program.

01:39:15.560 They're working with DOD.

01:39:16.860 It falls under UCMJ authority legally.

01:39:19.920 Not many people know that.

01:39:20.740 It's not just people.

01:39:21.600 Uniform-coded military justice.

01:39:22.740 Yes.

01:39:23.400 So people who are working with the DOD, whether they're a civilian or government employee

01:39:27.340 on a project, Project Diffuse, are subject to UCMJ.

01:39:31.900 That's where the investigation should happen.

01:39:33.820 It shouldn't happen at the Department of Justice.

01:39:36.380 I believe that Secretary Hegseth has the leadership to execute this properly.

01:39:40.920 And if the investigation warrants, then criminal charges could be brought under UCMJ in a classified

01:39:49.940 setting.

01:39:50.380 So basically a classified trial, which exists.

01:39:53.320 Then set a time period of five to ten years to release the results of that criminal trial

01:39:59.620 publicly.

01:40:00.480 Obviously, if someone's found guilty and they're imprisoned, you'll know that there are some

01:40:03.660 wrongdoing, but I don't think that we're, my greatest concern is that if there were more

01:40:10.360 nefarious components of this, now is not the time to really release that information

01:40:16.720 publicly.

01:40:17.420 Because the world sits on the cusp of a global war.

01:40:20.160 Exactly.

01:40:20.820 And I'm actually sort of following our leaders here.

01:40:26.560 There have been a series of-

01:40:27.060 That is a very balanced view, let me just say.

01:40:30.040 Well, thank you.

01:40:30.720 For those who would dismiss you as a wacko, I don't know what I think of that.

01:40:35.200 I haven't thought of it until you said it, but that, I think that's kind of a window into

01:40:39.940 the way that you think, which is in a restrained and responsible way.

01:40:44.040 Well, thank you.

01:40:44.500 And that opinion or that belief and that process sort of just came to me in the last week.

01:40:53.480 And that's from looking at the Director of National Intelligence, Tulsi Gabbard, in her

01:40:59.220 office, declining some FOIA requests from several groups related to the origin of COVID in the

01:41:05.980 story.

01:41:06.920 And I firmly believe that Director Gabbard is on the right side of humanity and history.

01:41:12.900 I'm a huge fan of hers and I've had some conversation with her back and forth on social media, direct

01:41:18.500 conversations, like direct messages.

01:41:19.960 And we have some friends that are, you know, friends of a friend kind of thing.

01:41:23.380 So I believe her heart's in the right place.

01:41:26.000 I can verify that through, you know, a decade of knowing her well.

01:41:32.540 And she's one of the only famous people I've ever met, maybe the only famous person I've

01:41:36.460 ever met who not only didn't get, doesn't own a home because she's never made any money

01:41:40.840 at all because that's the last thing on her mind.

01:41:44.320 So who else can you say that about?

01:41:45.780 Not many people.

01:41:47.900 That's right.

01:41:48.400 And so looking at her leadership right now and her office's leadership and their response

01:41:54.840 to these FOIA requests and their, the nature of these FOIA requests would actually get at

01:42:01.400 some of these root issues and they're objecting to them and they're not releasing the information.

01:42:06.940 She's in the position now where she knows a lot more about what happened or what really

01:42:10.780 happened than she did before President Trump was elected and she was nominated into that

01:42:14.680 position and eventually became the director.

01:42:17.480 So looking at that, I think they're making the same kind of assessment that I am.

01:42:23.940 Yeah.

01:42:26.820 That, of course it was a lab leak.

01:42:29.080 I mean, I don't really, when you said the portion of the scientific community so-called

01:42:33.520 that ascribes to the lab leak theory, that suggests that there are people who are still

01:42:38.620 pushing the pangulum lie?

01:42:41.000 Absolutely.

01:42:41.680 Are there?

01:42:42.040 Yes.

01:42:42.600 Well, if you go over to the other Twitter, blue, whatever it's called, blue sky, or I

01:42:47.180 think, I can't remember the name of it, but on social media, there are other groups of

01:42:51.460 scientists in publicly saying that this was still a laboratory leak.

01:42:56.500 In fact, they haven't retracted.

01:42:58.840 That it was not a laboratory leak.

01:42:59.940 That it was not a laboratory leak.

01:43:01.960 They still haven't retracted the Proximal Origins paper, which is a complete fraud.

01:43:05.780 Are you serious?

01:43:06.860 No.

01:43:08.280 And Dr. Ebright from Rutgers University, who I admire and respect, he's fighting this,

01:43:14.280 the good fight every day on social media as an old, old seasoned professor should.

01:43:18.500 So, the whole complex of either the pharmaceutical industry, the scientific community that works

01:43:28.580 tightly with the pharmaceutical industry, or are funded by the agencies involved in this,

01:43:37.640 are all opposing the natural, or excuse me, they're all opposing the lab leak.

01:43:43.700 The vaccine manufacturers are opposed.

01:43:46.720 I would believe so.

01:43:47.600 Well, not them directly, because they're not making public statements on this, but if you

01:43:50.520 look at, you know, you follow the money.

01:43:52.260 So, if you look at the scientists, okay, and where they get their money from, many of the

01:43:55.280 people who are involved in mRNA technology development associated with SARS-CoV-2 vaccines

01:44:02.660 are in the camp of this was a naturally emerging disease.

01:44:05.480 And I'm using air quotes around the word doctor, but Dr. Peter Hotez, for example, a vax pusher

01:44:14.000 of longstanding, is he, just to name one name, is he pushing the penguin lie still?

01:44:21.260 I don't know if he's pushing it still, but I mean, he was.

01:44:22.920 He was pushing the natural emergency theory quite profoundly everywhere he went for a period

01:44:29.320 of time.

01:44:29.760 Why would, that's such an interesting nexus, why would people who are promoting vaccines

01:44:38.100 want to lie about the origin of COVID?

01:44:40.700 Well, Dr. Hotez is actually a more interesting, specific person that you name, because he actually

01:44:45.500 has connections to the Wuhan Institute of Virology as well.

01:44:48.080 So, he's more directly linked back to the origin story than other scientists in the vaccine.

01:44:53.560 Really?

01:44:53.900 Yes.

01:44:55.280 In what way?

01:44:56.440 I forget that he has some kind of either publication record with scientists there or collaboration

01:45:03.640 of research, I believe.

01:45:05.960 Yeah.

01:45:06.560 Well, he's, he, yeah, it, it's interesting.

01:45:09.840 You really feel like you don't know your country very well when, I mean, I knew people who believed

01:45:13.980 Dr. Peter Hotez and I thought to myself, how could this, I mean, this is so clearly, you

01:45:20.420 know, not true.

01:45:21.260 I don't know how you could believe that.

01:45:22.620 It was really a divisive time in the country or a revealing time and those, the truth led

01:45:29.100 to division, I guess maybe it's a better way to put it.

01:45:30.800 But anyway, but why in general, leaving Hotez out of it, why would a vax pusher not want 0.98

01:45:37.660 to tell the truth about the origin of the virus?

01:45:39.460 Simply that gain of function technology is used for virology and vaccine development and

01:45:45.880 MRNA is a huge portfolio of new vaccine technology development.

01:45:51.820 And...

01:45:52.260 Thank you.

01:45:52.740 Okay.

01:45:53.260 That's the answer.

01:45:54.060 And there's, the funny thing is if you look at MRNA technology and its future, a lot of

01:45:59.460 corporations have banked in the pharmaceutical or biotech industry on MRNA being the future

01:46:03.300 vaccine technology.

01:46:04.200 And I think if you look at the rise in cancers associated with MRNA technology in the SARS-CoV-2

01:46:09.700 vaccine, and there's a new study, a recent study that came out in Korea, which is a massive

01:46:13.640 cohort study with a large, large, has much, has a lot of statistical power, found five

01:46:21.340 or six cancers that were associated with the vaccine.

01:46:25.900 Okay.

01:46:26.140 And then many of these other studies looked at one type of cancer, for example, lymphoma

01:46:30.520 in Sweden, they didn't find an association, but this Korean study looked at all types of

01:46:34.480 cancers and they're now finding these associations.

01:46:37.480 So the writing's on the wall for MRNA technology.

01:46:40.480 I do not think that it's going to be the future vaccine technology.

01:46:44.240 And frankly, I'm not so concerned anymore with the old way of thinking that the emerging

01:46:52.140 infectious disease threat that we should be concerned about are old world diseases.

01:46:59.020 So bacillus anthracis being weaponized, for example, a coronavirus being weaponized.

01:47:05.200 This gain-of-function technology has evolved within the last two to three years at such

01:47:11.320 a rapid pace.

01:47:12.380 The future threat we need to be mitigating against and protecting against is actually

01:47:15.940 synthetic pathogens and synthetic life.

01:47:19.480 And I don't think, and I know for a fact that most of the world isn't aware that we've

01:47:23.340 actually already created single cell life.

01:47:25.780 It exists.

01:47:26.660 Um, the paper, the seminal paper on it came out three years ago.

01:47:30.780 So we now have fully functioning synthetic cells, which are created, uh, with nanotechnology

01:47:35.540 and some of those.

01:47:36.380 And I could get in the weeds on what that nanotechnology is, which I can self-replicate.

01:47:41.060 And so what this means, if you sit back and what this means.

01:47:43.080 Wait, so man has created life?

01:47:45.600 Technically synthetic, yes.

01:47:47.780 And by synthetic, what is it, so, but if it's, if it behaves independently and it's self-replicating,

01:47:54.060 then aren't those the criteria for life?

01:47:57.300 Well, that's a whole philosophical debate.

01:47:59.860 And yeah, I don't want to believe it.

01:48:02.260 So I'm happy to have the definition readjusted, but that would be the obvious definition of it,

01:48:08.300 right?

01:48:08.560 And there's also a synthetic cloning now.

01:48:10.560 So you can have an agent if you know exactly a pathogen or a cell.

01:48:15.640 And some of this isn't, isn't, isn't advanced.

01:48:19.320 So if it's more complicated cell type, for example, you might not be able to replicate that,

01:48:23.140 but you can now synthetically generate a virus to match the virus.

01:48:31.120 And you, so what that means is you don't have to have the actual virus.

01:48:34.840 You don't have to collect a sample anymore.

01:48:36.400 You can just have the code and you can generate it.

01:48:38.560 That's where we are now.

01:48:39.680 Right.

01:48:40.260 And that's, that's for viruses.

01:48:41.540 Now, if we're talking-

01:48:42.280 Text me the code and I can make the virus.

01:48:44.540 And I believe we'll be there in the near future with bacteria.

01:48:47.180 And with synthetic life though, you can generate very radical things because what this means is

01:48:53.900 we can make what would be defined as a single cell synthetic organism,

01:49:00.040 which does different things that don't exist.

01:49:02.740 And it has massive potential good uses and bad uses.

01:49:09.800 The good uses, you could use this, and I could see this being popular, popular among scientists

01:49:15.460 funded by the Borlaug program at USDA, where they use this for pest control.

01:49:20.380 And you could, you could target, make it.

01:49:23.280 So it was very specific, the synthetic cell or organism or bacteria to target something like a pest,

01:49:30.820 like a grasshopper, for example.

01:49:32.760 Or white people. 0.53

01:49:34.780 Well, we're going to get to the other side of this.

01:49:38.360 That would only target a specific species defined to a geographic region.

01:49:43.900 So you might not worry of it spilling over into some other insect population, in theory.

01:49:48.200 Okay.

01:49:48.320 This is, this is, this is sort of on the, what I'm talking about here is the, the emerging future trend of this.

01:49:55.380 Now on the nefarious side of this, how is it going to be used?

01:50:01.020 We're no longer talking about what living things.

01:50:03.760 So you can engineer a synthetic pathogen to attack equipment.

01:50:09.940 So you can have it, have that synthetic organism produce an acid that would eat metal. 0.90

01:50:16.660 You could have it produce a biofilm, which would attack metal underwater, like a submarine.

01:50:25.560 This technology is being developed right now at a handful of places.

01:50:29.100 Some of it's in the United States.

01:50:30.340 Much of it is.

01:50:30.960 Some of it is not.

01:50:32.140 Most of the places it's being developed are friendly to the United States or our allies.

01:50:37.540 But this synthetic threat is rapidly emerging.

01:50:42.260 That, so that's the biotechnology side.

01:50:45.220 Now, if you take a look at, and I know I've been watching your show, recent episodes, AI has been a big hot topic and there's tons of investment going into it.

01:50:54.240 We're going to see a fusion between this synthetic biology technology and AI.

01:51:00.440 And it's probably on the four to five year horizon.

01:51:06.360 And the AI will be programmed into the micro circuits systems of the nanotechnology.

01:51:17.360 It's a fact.

01:51:18.200 I mean, like you're going to use the best software, the best programs that you can get onto a, basically a nano computer within that cell, which does the programming.

01:51:26.540 This might sound like crazy science fiction to a lot of people.

01:51:30.300 People would say that's not possible.

01:51:32.000 I don't think anyone would say that's not possible.

01:51:33.900 I can point to a peer-reviewed publication where they're doing all the components of this.

01:51:38.240 And it's just a matter of time before someone gets wise and assembles it.

01:51:41.140 And there's going to be plenty of financial motive to do this.

01:51:46.240 So there's no stopping it.

01:51:48.520 And that's what I'm saying.

01:51:49.560 There's no stopping where this is headed.

01:51:50.940 And the reason why I say that, the Trump administration did some great work with Russia trying to negotiate a new biological treaty.

01:52:01.000 I just want to apologize in public for every moment I've defended our economic system.

01:52:04.980 Because any system that allows something like this is a bad system.

01:52:10.420 Well, all technology is dual use, right?

01:52:13.400 It's like firearms is a classic example.

01:52:15.180 A firearm in a good person's hand is a tool to defend and protect yourself, your family, against tyranny.

01:52:21.720 In an evil person's hand, it's a...

01:52:23.040 Yeah, nuclear power, nuclear bombs, I get it.

01:52:25.280 Yeah.

01:52:25.580 But, you know, you just have to assess the downside risk realistically as compared to the upside benefit.

01:52:33.660 And I think with the technology, well, nuclear technology, I believe this, and it's certainly true with everything you're describing.

01:52:39.620 I think downside risk way, far outweighs any potential gain.

01:52:44.620 You live to 110, okay.

01:52:47.160 So I'd argue this.

01:52:48.640 I can completely agree with the upside and downside risk of this.

01:52:53.760 Mm-hmm.

01:52:54.980 But what I'm saying is there's no stopping it.

01:52:57.220 No, I'm...

01:52:57.920 And this is why the, what I was going to say related to President Trump and the Trump administration negotiating a new biological treaty with the international community.

01:53:11.120 Well, one, looking at history back to the 70s, I don't think it's going to be effective.

01:53:15.860 So the existing biological weapons convention we have is outdated.

01:53:18.820 It focuses on select agents, basically, that which can be weaponized through gain-of-function technology.

01:53:25.520 They baked a loophole into it to develop countermeasures.

01:53:28.400 That's vaccine technologies and other prophylactics.

01:53:31.180 And you can engage in the gain-of-function technology, bioweapon development, if you're developing the countermeasure.

01:53:36.660 And they couldn't get anyone to go further past that with having inspections.

01:53:40.620 And I don't see that posture, especially today in today's climate, changing.

01:53:47.360 So...

01:53:47.620 We blew up the Nord Stream pipeline.

01:53:48.780 There's no, I mean, the basis of international treaty, of course, is trust.

01:53:54.420 And there's none.

01:53:55.720 So, like, no more international treaties.

01:53:58.900 Well, I hope...

01:54:00.960 I hope I'm wrong, too.

01:54:01.960 I hope you're wrong.

01:54:02.240 But I just don't see it right now.

01:54:04.500 Well, I think that there's a path forward.

01:54:07.060 And the path forward to...

01:54:08.620 Wait, before we get to the path forward, can we just get to a broader description, more precise description of what the marriage of nanotechnology to AI means?

01:54:17.700 Like, what does that mean?

01:54:18.800 Sure.

01:54:19.500 So, the marriage of nanotechnology to AI means that the AI, or excuse me, the nanotechnology will have swarm-like capabilities.

01:54:29.960 So, people or the general world is probably more familiar with swarm technology around drones.

01:54:35.740 They're using this, and they're testing this, and they're trying to field these rapid swarm technologies.

01:54:40.380 And if you watch these large displays of drone shows that you see commonly in China, that's really them just openly testing drone swarm technology.

01:54:48.900 Yep.

01:54:49.020 And that's the civilian, you know, this is cool tech application, but there's actually a much more sinister application of that same technology for defense, dual-use technology.

01:55:00.220 So, imagine that these pathogens are like these drones, and you see them operate.

01:55:07.040 AI will control the swarm technology around the synthetic pathogens so that they can control their behavior.

01:55:12.380 And then also that the machine inside the synthetic cell can adapt to its environment without any human construction or code or decision-making.

01:55:25.180 So, what would that look like?

01:55:27.540 In terms of...

01:55:28.660 Well, I don't know.

01:55:29.020 If I can imagine a drone swarm, I've seen one, what would that mean?

01:55:34.720 So, you have synthetic cells that are controlled by a computer, and then they do what?

01:55:40.520 Well, they would...

01:55:42.140 Use cases always help define what that is.

01:55:44.360 So, in a weaponization scenario...

01:55:46.080 Yes.

01:55:46.760 You could use this to deploy a container.

01:55:52.040 Maybe it looks like a bomb into an ocean marine or a submarine is.

01:55:54.740 The synthetic life could be magnetic and attract to the hull of a submarine.

01:56:02.700 It would attach itself, and then it would make decisions about where it should collect on the surface of the submarine independently to create a biofilm and self-replicate to basically cause the sensors or to disable the submarine in some way.

01:56:17.160 In space, use a similar type of...

01:56:20.800 I'm not so sure what the delivery vehicle is, but say that you were to get this onto a satellite.

01:56:25.880 You could use it then to eat and corrode the silicon and magnesium and the structure of that.

01:56:34.540 You could use it to basically disable the systems on board of the physical structure of the vessel or the satellite.

01:56:47.040 And that's just...

01:56:48.260 I mean, what's really so striking about this is this technology we'll be able to use to attack objects, but it's a synthetic living thing.

01:56:58.640 There's also the life.

01:57:00.800 So, there's a new fork here.

01:57:02.620 You can use it to attack objects, or you can use it to attack life itself.

01:57:06.980 And that's more what people would be familiar with.

01:57:11.300 You could use it to attack specific genetic populations, for example.

01:57:18.120 So, if a certain population had a genetic trait, you can make the synthetic pathogen specifically target...

01:57:26.420 Name your niche of race or population of genetically related, close related families.

01:57:33.280 How about the ones who were given fentanyl and denied jobs?

01:57:36.980 In the United States.

01:57:40.580 So, no, I'm just being super dark, but honest.

01:57:44.080 More difficult, probably.

01:57:45.220 Well, unless they had some kind of specific marker.

01:57:47.600 No, I'm half kidding, sort of.

01:57:49.700 But you...

01:57:51.120 So, I remember Bobby Kennedy got into a great deal of trouble because he said at some event, of course, the New York Post led the charge against him, of course.

01:57:58.460 But that COVID could be tailored or, in fact, for whatever reason, COVID had disparate effects on populations.

01:58:07.000 That's absolutely true.

01:58:07.720 I mean, that's scientifically true.

01:58:08.780 And I was quite familiar with that literature when he made that...

01:58:11.740 What does that mean?

01:58:13.320 Which populations suffered most from COVID?

01:58:16.320 There was a finding in a scientific publication that two different populations of...

01:58:21.640 Well, two different populations of people of Jewish ancestry, depending which line they're from, where one was more heavily impacted than the other.

01:58:33.820 And that was...

01:58:34.940 Sephardic Ashkenazi, basically.

01:58:36.060 Yes.

01:58:36.500 And that was the finding.

01:58:38.600 And I think the point that he was trying to make or maybe didn't articulate well is that the agent can be tailored to have that effect.

01:58:44.940 And that's absolutely true.

01:58:45.980 And that's through old game of function technology.

01:58:48.800 And with synthetic, full synthetics, what I'm saying is you can make this so specific is that if I get your DNA, like off of, you know, say that you threw a cup, I can tailor an agent just to you.

01:59:01.460 And this is how it's changing.

01:59:02.520 And if you're using AI behind that, I could then...

01:59:05.560 And I say that I got a DNA sample from a couple of your relatives so I knew what your family tree partially looked like.

01:59:11.740 Machine learning is very good at actually random forest and tree decision-making.

01:59:16.880 You do a lot of complex AI behind this to figure out and make predictions that AI could about what your family tree looked like and have the disease travel through your family line.

01:59:24.760 And this is...

01:59:25.360 Now, this is...

01:59:27.200 Nobody has ever asked me that question.

01:59:28.520 I just generated that answer based on what I know.

01:59:31.240 But I think that that is a very real possibility use or application of this type of technology.

01:59:36.900 It also could be used on the flip side of it.

01:59:38.640 You could use it to target specific and rare cancers.

01:59:42.820 And it could be used to eliminate those cancers cleanly and self-deactivate and decompose in a way that didn't harm your body.

01:59:53.540 So this technology is going to go...

01:59:56.060 Could go two different ways, but it's coming.

01:59:58.040 Because the medical applications and healthcare applications of it are there.

02:00:02.960 And they're going to be...

02:00:03.760 They will be extremely profitable.

02:00:05.420 Imagine that you said, like, you know, you have cancer.

02:00:07.500 I don't have to give you a drug.

02:00:08.660 I have to inject you with this synthetic, which will seek out the cancer, the tumor in your body. 0.86

02:00:18.760 And contain it, kill it with no other harmful effects to your body, in theory.

02:00:23.500 And like I say, in theory, because things always have side effects, right? 0.96

02:00:27.620 Of course.

02:00:28.420 And I just say in general, I would much rather live in a world where I risked dying of tetanus and the common cold than live in a world with this technology.

02:00:36.760 It's not even close.

02:00:37.480 I have a million more questions to ask you.

02:00:42.040 But that's what you just said is so upsetting that I think you've broken my spirit, Dr. Huff.

02:00:46.500 Oh, I think there's a better solution.

02:00:48.440 Let me give you the upside of this, though.

02:00:50.040 So the solution to these problems is typically better biosurveillance.

02:00:56.100 And this is what EcoHealth was trying to do.

02:00:59.480 And the part of it that actually works is you can't really understand what's circulating in the world in terms of pathogens, life, unless scientists and engineers are measuring it or trying to identify and look.

02:01:12.340 You can't find what you're not looking for.

02:01:14.800 And it would be great to see an international team of scientists working on the technology to detect synthetic life when it emerges.

02:01:22.980 Because if we all think it's a threat, we don't have to put our head in the sand an ostrich.

02:01:31.000 If we're all just looking for it and we can identify it, early warnings of threats save lives, livestock, animals.

02:01:40.420 The early warning signal is the most important aspect of defending against future emerging threats.

02:01:47.560 And if we develop that technology, we'll be safer.

02:01:51.200 Yeah, what you really need, though, to be safe is good people.

02:01:56.420 Ethical people.

02:01:57.240 And that's a huge problem in science.

02:01:58.340 I mean, I could talk forever about that.

02:02:00.340 They're not teaching ethics to people like me.

02:02:01.980 They haven't been to the doctor in five years as a result.

02:02:04.060 I mean, as corrupt as every other institution.

02:02:07.420 Wow, what a heavy conversation that was.

02:02:10.460 Thank you.

02:02:10.860 Where can people, if people are interested in finding out more, people with a stronger stomach and stouter heart than I have, want to know more about the last 10 minutes of our conversation?

02:02:21.980 Do you write about this?

02:02:23.980 Well, I've started to.

02:02:25.000 And I'm not sure how it's been received.

02:02:26.940 I've published it on Substack.

02:02:28.720 I've done it, published a little bit on X and then also on LinkedIn.

02:02:33.220 And it's not very, I don't think people are catching on.

02:02:37.220 Actually, I just solicited proposals to DARPA and a few other places saying, hey, we should be looking at this.

02:02:43.360 And I already know for a fact that they've been thinking at it and they've been dabbling and they've put a little money into it.

02:02:48.360 So, I'm working, I'm actually actively working on this.

02:02:52.420 If you want to, for the little, the limited time that I, or the few things that I do publish about this, I put it on X and AG Huff is my Twitter account.

02:03:02.380 But other than that, this is all very much evolving and it's a work in progress.

02:03:06.520 It's amazing when you said gain-of-function research has changed so much.

02:03:11.340 And I'm thinking, what time frame is he going to lay out here?

02:03:14.620 Because I think most normal people would assume after COVID, there would be a dramatic reduction in gain-of-function research considering that's what gave us COVID and wrecked our country.

02:03:25.380 But you said in the last two or three years.

02:03:28.880 It's now the building.

02:03:30.060 So, if you're in biomedical research in microbiology or virology or bioengineering, it's something that you get trained on and you learn to now advance to.

02:03:42.740 It's a building block to learn about synthetic biology.

02:03:45.860 So, there's going to be more research professors at leading universities within the next five years teaching this to P8. 0.99

02:03:54.300 And it's a trickle down.

02:03:55.300 I always knew science was bad.

02:03:56.780 I just want to brag.

02:03:57.500 I just want to lay my marker down.

02:03:58.840 I just want to say I've always been opposed to science.

02:04:01.100 I've always been opposed to technology. 0.97

02:04:03.500 Not stupid, but I am convinced of that. 0.98

02:04:06.100 I have been my whole life. 0.98

02:04:07.560 So, I think I'm being vindicated in real time.

02:04:10.700 Well, maybe I can cheer you up a bit.

02:04:12.740 But it's not all evil.

02:04:16.280 And to your point earlier, it's the people behind it.

02:04:19.180 Well, that's it.

02:04:20.000 And maybe we need to do a better, my community, the scientific community needs to do a better job of training our students not to be evil.

02:04:25.740 And that comes through how we select our students, how we mentor them, and how we show them or teach them what the ultimate goals in life are.

02:04:35.240 And that comes through mentorship.

02:04:36.060 And that has really fallen off, at least during my academic and scientific career, where everything is money-driven, financially-driven.

02:04:43.800 And then on top of it, you have a lot of predatory professors and academics and scientists preying on their students.

02:04:49.720 And it's a vicious cycle.

02:04:51.760 And I mean, what do I mean by preying on them?

02:04:53.840 Well...

02:04:54.140 Yeah, not just sexually.

02:04:55.160 Not sexually, but in terms of...

02:04:56.680 No, that's the least of the problems.

02:04:57.640 In the PhD world, it's very common that research professors basically steal their students' work and have them take credit for their work.

02:05:08.140 And the students aren't taught about ethics in science and research on top of it.

02:05:13.180 I mean, it's not like it's required coursework.

02:05:14.840 Most scientists don't train their students in ethics.

02:05:18.680 So, how do we become better as a community of creating better people as scientists so they're not just out chasing money?

02:05:29.880 And it's mentorship and we have to break the cycle.

02:05:33.420 I mean, we have to break the cycle.

02:05:35.620 It's going to take a radical religious revival to do that.

02:05:38.500 Nothing short of that is going to work.

02:05:40.080 That's my view.

02:05:41.260 That's what I'm hoping for because I feel like we are on the cusp of true darkness.

02:05:47.040 I agree.

02:05:49.080 And I think about these things a lot.

02:05:51.720 And, you know, scientists, we have...

02:05:53.240 People ask me what I do.

02:05:54.120 I'm sitting there staring out the window.

02:05:55.400 And I'm like, I'm working.

02:05:56.460 And they're like, you know what?

02:05:57.040 I'm thinking through problems.

02:05:58.880 And people often wonder, well, what do PhDs do?

02:06:01.200 And we sit there and we think about these things.

02:06:02.460 And we try to cope with answers.

02:06:03.700 And we try not to waste any of our brain power on things that don't matter.

02:06:07.720 And I don't know if it's with a full religious, if it's a fully religious aspect, at least within the scientific community.

02:06:20.920 Because I'm being real here that I know many of these scientists are atheists.

02:06:25.140 And I know that many of these scientists who are atheists are...

02:06:28.860 Some of them, I should say, are great and fantastic people.

02:06:32.640 At least at a minimum, for them to view themselves in the greater context of what it all means.

02:06:40.660 And try to have positive, I guess, a positive force on the world through what they're doing.

02:06:47.680 But there's no positive or negative for an atheist.

02:06:49.700 I mean, it doesn't...

02:06:50.380 There's no hierarchy of value that rooted anything other than preference.

02:06:54.100 So none of that's real.

02:06:55.760 How can you say something's bad if you don't believe that there's a power higher than you?

02:06:59.880 It's a great question.

02:07:01.080 You can't, is the answer.

02:07:02.400 So you should never allow atheists to have this kind of power. 1.00

02:07:07.420 Not because they're evil.

02:07:08.420 A lot of them are great people.

02:07:09.620 I really like a lot of atheists.

02:07:10.860 It's nothing personal.

02:07:11.680 It's just that there's no check at all on the power if you think that you're God.

02:07:17.160 You know, so that can't be allowed.

02:07:20.060 Dr. Huff, thank you.

02:07:21.840 Amazing conversation.

02:07:22.900 Pleasure to meet you.

02:07:23.220 It's going to affect my sleep.

02:07:24.560 Thank you.

02:07:32.480 We've got a new website we hope you will visit.

02:07:34.740 It's called newcommissionnow.com.

02:07:38.040 And it refers to a new 9-11 commission.

02:07:41.840 So we spent months putting together our 9-11 documentary series.

02:07:45.840 And if there's one thing we learned, it's that, in fact, there was foreknowledge of the attacks.

02:07:52.500 People knew.

02:07:53.600 The American public deserves to know.

02:07:55.880 We're shocked, actually, to learn that, to have that confirmed, but it's true. 1.00

02:07:58.760 The evidence is overwhelming.

02:08:00.100 The CIA, for example, knew the hijackers were here in the United States.

02:08:03.420 They knew they were planning an act of terror.

02:08:05.620 In his passport is a visa to go to the United States of America.

02:08:10.020 A foreign national was caught celebrating as the World Trade Center fell and later said he was in New York, quote, to document the event.

02:08:18.020 I didn't know there would be an event to document in the first place because he had foreknowledge.

02:08:21.560 And maybe most amazingly, somebody, an unknown investor, shorted American Airlines and United Airlines, the companies whose planes the attackers used on 9-11, as well as the banks that were inside the Twin Towers just before the attacks.

02:08:35.800 They made money on the 9-11 attacks because they knew they were coming.

02:08:40.680 Who did that? 0.91

02:08:41.760 You have to look at the evidence.

02:08:43.560 The U.S. government learned the name of that investor, but never released it.

02:08:50.180 Maybe there's an instant explanation for all this, but there isn't, actually.

02:08:54.280 And by the way, it doesn't matter whether there is or not.

02:08:56.680 The public deserves to know what the hell that was.

02:09:00.220 How did people know ahead of time why was no one ever punished for it?

02:09:03.860 9-11 Commission, the original one, was a fraud.

02:09:07.260 It was fake.

02:09:08.460 Its conclusions were written before the investigation.

02:09:11.580 That's true.

02:09:12.560 And it's outrageous.

02:09:14.320 This country needs a new 9-11 Commission, one that actually tells the truth, that tries to get to the bottom of the story.

02:09:21.200 We can't just move on like nothing happened.

02:09:23.800 9-11 Commission is a cover.

02:09:26.640 Something did happen.

02:09:28.560 We need to force a new investigation into 9-11 almost 25 years later.

02:09:34.100 Sorry, justice demands it.

02:09:35.960 And if you want that, go to newcommissionnow.com to add your name to our petition.

02:09:41.980 We're not getting paid for this.

02:09:43.020 We're doing this because we really mean it.

02:09:45.140 Newcommissionnow.com.

The Tucker Carlson Show - October 20, 2025

Covid Whistleblower： Predicting Pandemics & Exposing the CIA and Peter Daszak’s Alliance With China

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