Western Standard - November 26, 2024


HANNAFORD: Inching to Armageddon?

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The war between Russia and Ukraine seems to have risen to a new threshold of international concern. With the use of British and American-made missiles by Ukraine to reach targets deep in Russia, meanwhile the Russians are responding in kind and have also enlisted the help of North Korea, it looks like the whole thing is escalating out of control. What is it with me today? Professor Rob Hubert from the University of Calgary Center for Military and Strategic Studies, one of the leading centers of excellence in military and strategic studies in North America.

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00:00:00 good evening western standard viewers and welcome to hanaford a weekly politics show
00:00:22 the war between russia and ukraine seems to have risen to a new threshold of international pension
00:00:28 with the use of british and american-made missiles by ukraine to reach targets deep in russia meanwhile
00:00:36 the russians are responding in kind and they have also enlisted the north koreans it looks like the
00:00:42 whole thing is escalating out of control what is it with me today is professor rob hubert
00:00:50 from the university of calgary center for military and strategic studies one of the leading centers
00:00:55 of excellence in military and strategic studies in north america welcome rob hi nigel nice to see you
00:01:02 rob you're known internationally as an expert in the politics of the arctic and in maritime
00:01:08 and strategic studies and the latter i think is a polite way to describe a study among other
00:01:13 things of how nuclear war might be fought rob is the serious possibility of nuclear war
00:01:20 what we're really looking at in eastern europe now well it looks as if the dangers are increasing
00:01:28 um again everyone will always say it's low probability but the issue is in what direction
00:01:34 does that probability go we have three factors at heart that you've more or less outlined in
00:01:39 your introduction the first one is of course the type of weapons that we're talking about we've
00:01:44 seen a very continuous effort on the part of the russians and the chinese to build weapons that can
00:01:52 evade the american anti-missile defense so in fact we've got the hypersonics the new type of
00:01:58 poseidon the new delivery systems that are designed to basically evade the americans
00:02:04 this means they are incredibly fast and they're incredibly stealthy the second factor that we have
00:02:10 that shows an indication of the increase of the threat is that for the first time since the
00:02:17 end of the Cuban Missile Crisis, we have a Soviet slash Russian leader threatening to use nuclear
00:02:25 weapons. That type of rhetoric basically at the conclusion of the Cuban Missile Crisis when
00:02:30 Khrushchev and Kennedy both realized that they would be committing mutual suicide with the
00:02:34 weapons systems that they had at the time, if in fact nuclear weapons came to be utilized,
00:02:40 you just simply didn't see the Soviet leadership ever really threatening. I mean, there were one
00:02:44 or two sort of background threats, you know, at the 73 war, but nothing over where they're saying,
00:02:52 we will use nuclear weapons. And so the fact that Putin is very loudly and repeatedly saying it
00:03:01 is a very troubling sign. And the third point, as you so eloquently begin your introduction with,
00:03:07 is the fact that we are seeing an increasing use of the different types of delivery systems that
00:03:13 the russians have at their avail and so there's a certain degree of learning how to use these
00:03:18 weapon systems how they you know which ones can be shot down which ones cannot and so that we
00:03:23 see the russians probably trying to learn what works best which means that if the the situation
00:03:30 start continues to escalate as we are seeing it go so the russians are trying to figure out how
00:03:36 to do it and all of these three factors are combined are very troubling rob it seems that
00:03:42 this took off after president biden who had already uh seen his party defeated in the u.s
00:03:50 national election gave permission to ukraine to use american missiles that to that point had been
00:03:58 held back i guess the thought was that these were more sophisticated more likely to be effective
00:04:04 and, therefore, it would represent an escalation in the war
00:04:09 if those weapons were brought out and used.
00:04:13 Now, at this point, you have a president-elect sitting there.
00:04:20 He's not in favor of the war in Ukraine,
00:04:22 and at the same time you have, I'll have to say,
00:04:26 the lame duck president on the way out giving this authorization
00:04:30 to use these more sophisticated weapons and up the ante.
00:04:35 What was going on there?
00:04:37 Well, I would think that you actually have to take it even further back
00:04:41 because, I mean, again, Western leadership does not like to acknowledge it,
00:04:46 but the war actually starts in 2014.
00:04:48 It doesn't start in 2022.
00:04:50 And so many people are saying, well, how do we understand the escalatory processes
00:04:54 that you've just outlined in terms of Biden giving permission to fire the missiles into Russia?
00:05:00 if you look in terms of how the western states have tried to figure out how to support
00:05:05 the ukrainians after the russians invaded and seized a good proportion of their territory in 2014
00:05:12 we've seen this sort of okay how much of a of weapons can we have in canada of course
00:05:17 we had the whole debate between 2014 to 20 uh 2022 do we provide them with lethal aid or non-lethal
00:05:25 aid and that was a a very pointed debate within canadian circles the ultimate decision being
00:05:30 made not to provide lethal aid and we've seen this with the americans we've seen this and it
00:05:35 doesn't matter if it's republican or democrat how much can you provide to ensure that you have a
00:05:42 first and foremost an avoidance of a ukrainian defeat and then secondary from that a ukrainian
00:05:48 victory which has been put in terms of the return of the conquered territories and so the problem
00:05:54 that has occurred is that the russians have been able to maintain the pace of attack for i think a
00:06:00 lot longer time than people thought was going to be happening at the same time the ukrainian
00:06:05 resistance has been has been very dogged and so we have this almost world war one style you know
00:06:11 sort of in your face type battle but the question is well okay how do you actually apply enough force
00:06:18 to achieve your your objective victory depending on which side you're on and do so so that you
00:06:24 do not escalate it beyond the boundaries of the current conflict and so we've seen a continuation
00:06:31 of the improvement of the type of forces for example there was a huge debate should we be
00:06:36 providing the ukrainians from the west with air power and we know that that decision was actually
00:06:42 ultimately crossed and there are f-16s that ukrainians are now now training on and so the
00:06:47 decision to allow the ukrainians to use missiles to hit safe military zones where of course the
00:06:53 russians were staging much of their attack in ukraine is a logical progression in the nature 1.00
00:07:00 of the military battle and so i would think that no all western leaders that are serious about
00:07:06 providing assistance to ukraine are facing this escalation issue how much do you provide enough
00:07:14 since the russians have been able to maintain their attack and not go over the limit and and
00:07:20 this is a learning process for biden for trump uh for for any of the leaders that we see actively
00:07:27 providing assistance so this is a this is still then in the war fighting zone it's not yet in the
00:07:41 deterrence zone because if they were talking about deterrence they would do something dramatic to
00:07:47 make a point am i correct in that well we're past the for for the regional nature of the conflict
00:07:55 we're past the deterrent they're into the war fighting and one side or the other will ultimately
00:08:00 be able to achieve the majority of its objectives it means basically either the ukrainians are 0.97
00:08:06 successful in seeing the something that forces the russians out of the eastern ukraine and out 0.99
00:08:12 of Crimea and a cessation to battle, or on the Russian side where they're able to exhaust the
00:08:19 Ukrainians and basically hold on to that territory and presumably put in a puppet government in that
00:08:26 regard. And so we pass the ability to deter each of those two sides on the nature of this issue,
00:08:34 and so we're in war fighting. The question of deterrence then goes to what the great powers
00:08:40 are doing with their nuclear weapons and in that context we're still in deterrence in other words
00:08:44 we haven't seen the russians actually make good of any of their threats that they both have stated
00:08:49 and and the policy changes that they have for their nuclear doctrine which is to increase the
00:08:53 threshold of what or decrease the threshold for when they feel that they can utilize the weapons
00:08:59 that deterrence is still in play here the question is well what happens if this goes on even longer
00:09:06 and the Russians decide to escalate on their side. And then that's the question of, well,
00:09:12 does Putin make good on his threats in some capacity to use nuclear weapons? And at that point,
00:09:19 deterrence breaks down considerably. It doesn't go away. It could still be a situation
00:09:24 where the Americans, British, and French, who all have nuclear weapons, still deter from
00:09:30 utilizing them against the russians and the russians deter from utilizing it against the
00:09:37 the nato countries but again everything is in flux right now excuse me yes um it is in flux and
00:09:47 one other thing we haven't mentioned so far is the arrival reportedly of north korean troops
00:09:54 in theater the initial report was 10 000. i have seen other reports that i haven't seen confirmed
00:10:02 that it could be as many as 100 000. obviously that's a significant reinforcement to the uh to
00:10:09 the russian forces uh does this start to make if you've got the north koreans coming in on the
00:10:17 russian side and we know they've been feeding ammunition to the to the russians for some time
00:10:22 meanwhile you've got the united states and great britain and europe feeding russians into the
00:10:29 ukrainian side and authorizing their use it's starting to look like this is no longer a
00:10:36 struggle in eastern europe but something that you could almost call a world struggle not a war
00:10:42 because it's not happening in the far east yet or in in the rest of europe but i mean it's a
00:10:49 global implications here. Oh, absolutely. I mean, for your viewers that have a historical orientation,
00:10:57 shades of the Spanish Civil War come forward again. We start thinking in the context of,
00:11:03 of course, the Western support for the Republican forces, and we think of the German and Italian
00:11:13 support of the nationalist forces, and how ultimately we saw a similar escalation of weapons.
00:11:18 Remember, the Germans actually supplied direct bombers and fighters to the nationalist force
00:11:25 in their fight. So again, over time, we saw that escalatory in the internationalization.
00:11:31 I think to put it even further into contact, this internationalization that you talk about,
00:11:36 you even have to go back probably to 2008. And that is, of course, where we saw a very
00:11:40 messy situation in Georgia that gets tied into the discussions that NATO was having about whether or
00:11:46 not georgia and ukraine at that point should be joining nato and again there's all sorts of you
00:11:53 can have all sorts of debates in terms of how you are seeing the the the actual catalyst for
00:12:00 russian involvement but the net effect is that international nature of what happens in georgia
00:12:06 in 208 to a very large degree starts many of these processes in in going nato's talking about
00:12:13 allowing Georgia to come into membership. The Russians then find a reason to go in and use 0.97
00:12:20 military force to stop that discussion, which of course, it stopped at that point. And we fast
00:12:26 forward to 2014, when the same type of discussion starts happening, except in this case, you know,
00:12:32 and again, if you want to use a historical analogy, you think of the total lack of response that the
00:12:37 west had when the germ is of course intervened in austria to stop to basically integrate that
00:12:43 society and then the western realization at czechoslovakia had to do more but still not
00:12:48 being able to do it so you go 208 204 you think 19 i'm going to get my date slightly wrong i think
00:12:54 it's 36 37 and then of course you get up into poland and so this is the danger the the very
00:13:00 nature of that internationalization that you talk about so you know points to how serious this
00:13:06 conflict is in the scale that it is being played for and so again we start thinking the horrific
00:13:13 you know similarities to history may not be repeating exactly but you know somebody said
00:13:18 history may not repeat itself but it certainly rhymes with itself and so we see this escalation
00:13:24 continuing and it gets back to your very initial point about how dangerous this is becoming
00:13:29 obviously if you're in ukraine extremely dangerous but now that um british missiles have been used
00:13:37 uh i don't know whether american ones have but certainly the 0.70
00:13:40 anglo-french storm shadow missiles have been have been actually fired at targets i mean the
00:13:48 possibility of some kind of hostile gesture towards great britain and into france is is no
00:13:54 longer off the table. Two things I think we need to really talk about. One is if we're going to go
00:14:02 into the history of this, the czarist policy in the 19th century and the 18th century was to have
00:14:10 a string of essentially demilitarized states between themselves and Western Europe. In our
00:14:19 own time there are people i mean the french tried to invade russia did invade russia in 1812
00:14:27 there are people alive today in russia who would remember the german forces invading in 1941 42
00:14:34 it seems reasonable to imagine how the russians would feel more comfortable having a string of
00:14:44 neutral states between them and Germany, and they see parts of Ukraine as being that.
00:14:52 The Ukrainians hate that idea, but first of all, we've got to come to what's the Canadian
00:14:58 role in this, but is there any merit in believing that the Russians want to establish a zone
00:15:07 of neutrality and then they'll stop?
00:15:10 Well, the problem with that argumentation, and I've heard it, is, of course, the Western willingness to provide the Soviet-slash-Russians, when it's transitioning under Gorbachev, you know, very substantial assistance, both directly in terms of the demobilization of their nuclear forces, the ability to bring them in.
00:15:32 And so, for that argument to hold, and it tends to be the narrative that Russian observers
00:15:38 tend to provide, is that you have to illustrate that NATO actually intends to somehow invade
00:15:44 Russia, that it is going to be the aggressor to try to transform or change Russia itself. 0.54
00:15:50 The other part, if we're going to do the historical analysis, and this becomes the counter to
00:15:54 the point, is of course the history between the Ukrainians and the Russians is one of
00:15:59 terrorization to a very large degree.
00:16:01 We think of the starvation during the periods of the 1930s were very significant proportions.
00:16:07 And one that even goes back to the Civil War, where we know there were extreme acts of brutality
00:16:13 in 1919, 1920, after the First World War ends, but we start having the battles between the
00:16:18 Ukrainians and the Bolsheviks as they try to achieve either independence or control.
00:16:24 We go to the 1930s.
00:16:25 We go to the post-World War, Second World War treatment of the Ukrainians, which, again, until 1954, tends to be equally bad.
00:16:35 In 1954, it's when Khrushchev comes roughly within power, and we start seeing a little bit of a liberalization of their content.
00:16:43 And so rather than taking the Russian narrative that, in fact, they need this zone, because it always comes back to, well, zone against what?
00:16:50 I mean, there's been no indication of NATO that NATO represents a Napoleon or Hitler,
00:16:56 because that's where that argument has to stand.
00:16:59 With your saying, well, we have to focus in terms of the treatment of the Ukrainian people in particular,
00:17:05 that's where history is clearly that the type of defensive guarantees that Ukrainians start trying to seek,
00:17:13 roughly 2020, 2008 to 2014 in that era,
00:17:17 really after there's a change of government in Ukraine in 2014, then that, of course, very much changes.
00:17:23 Then you have an authoritative leadership trying to reimpose its, well, to be blunt, horrific treatments of a certain population.
00:17:32 And so once again, you can take the Napoleon and Hitler, but you have to find who is that person then within the NATO. 0.57
00:17:39 And of course, the answer is, well, there is no one.
00:17:41 But you can look at the suffering that has been bestowed upon the Ukrainians in the self-defense that they want.
00:17:48 And so that's where that argument, in my view, falls apart.
00:17:52 So if I were to pursue that argument further, I would say, well, from the Russian point of view,
00:17:56 having a hostile state right on its western border, that would be Ukraine,
00:18:02 isn't that a bit like having Russian missiles on Cuba in 1962?
00:18:09 No wonder the Americans reacted like a, you know, like a cat on a hot tin roof when that was starting to go.
00:18:17 Why would the Russians not feel anxious about having the Western-orientated, Western-armed, Western-supported, hostile Ukraine on their Western border?
00:18:31 Well, they weren't, I mean, they don't become Western-armed until the second phase of the war.
00:18:36 In other words, there's a huge reluctance to the West to provide any real meaningful munitions.
00:18:42 And remember, again, for that argument to stand, you'd have to say, OK, well, does Ukraine at any point represent a threat?
00:18:48 Remember, the Ukrainians get rid of their nuclear weapons. 0.69
00:18:52 When the Soviet Union dissolves, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kallostan all have nuclear weapons.
00:18:59 And as newly independent states, they are recognized to be able to have the right to contain it.
00:19:04 They voluntarily gave up those offensive weapons to demonstrate to the Russians that they posed no threat. 0.71
00:19:11 Russia chose to keep its nuclear weapons.
00:19:14 And so once again, in that equation, the Ukrainians did about as much as you could possibly do 0.99
00:19:19 to demonstrate that they were not going to retain the capability to really meaningful threaten the Russians.
00:19:25 They weren't getting America. 0.76
00:19:26 They weren't getting Western offensive weapon capabilities until 2022.
00:19:31 and they foresaw the nuclear weapons on the guarantee that Russia would never attack them.
00:19:39 And so the Russians broke that agreement, the Ukrainians, I think.
00:19:43 There are some observers who have said that there is a regret that they did not retain them
00:19:48 because that could have possibly been a form of deterrence that we were talking about earlier.
00:19:52 Too late for that, I'm afraid.
00:19:55 All of this is over there.
00:19:56 We are over here in Canada.
00:19:58 It's not our problem.
00:20:00 What do you say to that, Rob?
00:20:02 No, that's totally wrong.
00:20:04 Since the development of the Cold War, Canada has played a critical role in the deterrence system.
00:20:12 And the way that we have played that role is geography and our alliance with the Americans and subsequently with the Western Europeans.
00:20:19 After the Cuban Missile Crisis, when it became clear that nuclear war at that point had been a possibility,
00:20:26 both sides took steps to ensure that each side knew that any use of nuclear weapons would be
00:20:32 mutual suicide, you know, the policy of MAD, mutual assured destruction. And so that the Russians and 0.95
00:20:37 the Soviets and the Americans developed weapon systems that could be launched to destroy the
00:20:45 other side. They weren't about achieving military victory. They were about total destruction of the
00:20:50 major cities and populations in the system it's a bizarre system when you work out its logic
00:20:56 because it means you have to cooperate with both sides to develop these weapon systems but also
00:21:02 develop a warning system so that if the other side ever does attack you you've got enough time
00:21:08 to get your missiles up to kill them and it's that knowledge of mutual destruction that stops
00:21:14 you from ever firing in the first place so you may be hating whatever the soviets are doing or the
00:21:19 soviets may be hating whatever the west is doing but it's not enough to say okay well i'm still
00:21:24 going to launch my missiles knowing i will die also and as part of that of the surveillance
00:21:30 system to assure that we have as much confidence as one can ever have in these issues you needed
00:21:37 to of course have the ability to detect any incoming missiles and the geography the arctic
00:21:43 the geography of canada has meant that we are a critical part of that detection system it starts
00:21:48 with the mid-Canada warning line, it develops into the due line, distant early warning system,
00:21:54 and it morphs into the north warning system, which of course is now being modernized to continue
00:22:00 the deterrence against the Russians. And so Canada is a critical component of it. 0.90
00:22:06 Canada also plays a critical role in the defense of the region by our alliance with the Americans
00:22:13 through the NORAD agreement and so once again it's all out of sight out of mind people don't
00:22:19 want to think about the what nuclear deterrence actually means but Canada is a critical player in
00:22:24 it our working with the Americans remains a critical element and if you are going to deter
00:22:30 the Russians from thinking about the possibilities that we are discussing here you have to ensure 0.99
00:22:35 that they they totally believe you when you say we're going to know anything you do and we can
00:22:41 therefore have the ability to respond within time and we will not suffer a surprise we will not
00:22:47 suffer a defeating surprise attack you may launch a surprise attack you're going down with us and
00:22:52 that that's where canada plays its role i know rob that in the past you have been consulted by the
00:22:59 government of canada on matters such as this if you were to be asked now whether canada is doing
00:23:08 what it needs to be doing in the situation,
00:23:11 and is there more that it should be doing?
00:23:15 What would your advice be?
00:23:17 Well, my advice is that we basically understood what is necessary.
00:23:21 You can find it in both the security and defense statements
00:23:25 of the Harper government.
00:23:26 You can find it within the Trudeau government,
00:23:29 read Strong, Secure, and Engage,
00:23:31 and the recently announced defense update.
00:23:34 All of them point to an understanding
00:23:36 about modernization of NORAD, which is implicitly stating, yes, we get it. We have to play our role
00:23:42 in terms of deterrence of the new weapon systems. And Manchin is made of hypersonics and other
00:23:47 delivery systems. The problem that we've always faced is that starting from the point of Crutchin
00:23:52 on, we haven't paid the piper. In other words, we understand it. The policy position, if you
00:24:00 really read it carefully. If you read the standing committee, which is government-led but includes
00:24:07 the opposition parties, if you read the reports that come out of committee, both on defense and
00:24:11 foreign policy, you'll see we understand it. We get it. The question is, though, what we've avoided
00:24:16 for actually paying what we get. So if I was advising government, it would be we got to pay
00:24:21 for what we say we're going to be doing. Now, there are signs that we are starting to do that.
00:24:27 There are significant indications that since 2022, we've started taking serious about paying for the elements of NORAD modernization, that the wheels are now starting to be oiled because they've become so rusty, one could say, that this is starting to move.
00:24:45 But the problem is, is it in time?
00:24:48 Because what we have to be mostly concerned with is, of course, that our enemies, and
00:24:53 that is the Russians and presumably the Chinese on that, do not see us as sort of a weak link
00:24:59 within the overall detection system.
00:25:02 And equally problematic, we can't be seen as a weak link by our American allies.
00:25:07 Regardless if it's a Democrat or a Republican, they can't be thinking that we are allowing
00:25:13 a kink in terms of the detection system and so therefore to come back i would be saying we've
00:25:19 got to be really putting the full uh body press and it has to be an ongoing effort it can't just
00:25:25 simply be some announcement of a defense minister getting up in front of a an old f-18 saying we've
00:25:31 just spent four billion dollars next subject please this has to be an ongoing rebuilding and
00:25:37 modernization um you know you can say okay well we got to meet two percent two percent in my mind
00:25:43 is a somewhat arbitrary figure that we have picked but what it suggests is that we need to be doing
00:25:49 more we need to have a system that is using the capabilities of 2024 not 1985 because northern
00:25:57 the last time we had a major update was 85 and so that's where we have to be going we have to
00:26:02 to be getting the F-35s up and running. We have to be getting the new river class operational.
00:26:08 We have to be talking summaries. All of this is extensive. All of this is expensive. But it fits
00:26:13 into the ability to assure the enemies that we as Canada are not a weak link. We will respond
00:26:20 accordingly. We're almost out of time, Rob. Let me ask you this one last question. In six months'
00:26:30 time, is the situation going to look much the same? Or does there come a point when it goes
00:26:36 this way or that way? See, the problem with this is the difficulty of understanding at what point
00:26:43 of the exhaustion scale are the Ukrainians and the Russians. There have been repeated suggestions
00:26:49 that the Russian economy is on the teeter of collapse, but we've been seeing this discussion
00:26:53 for some time. We've seen equal discussions that the Ukrainians are literally exhausted, 0.99
00:26:59 both in terms of people and equipment. The problem is we don't know. We don't know what
00:27:05 is happening behind the scenes, and that is always the difficulty of being able to bring
00:27:09 any crystal ball forward. I think that it's going to really depend on what happens when Trump takes
00:27:16 over, and the questions will surround in terms of the degree of support that he's willing to
00:27:22 maintain to the Ukrainians, and whether or not, as some observers have suggested, his claims of
00:27:29 ending the war in a day is basically forcing the Ukrainians to accept Russian terms.
00:27:34 I mean, once again, without knowing what is actually happening as opposed to what people
00:27:39 think is happening, it's incredibly difficult. It could go either way or even worse. It could
00:27:45 just simply continue to exist as this grinding war that sees a slow weapon escalation. And of
00:27:53 course, the joker in the deck is, at what point do the Chinese feel that they can in fact start 0.96
00:27:58 uh following some of this usage of military force to reclaim territories that they believe um that
00:28:06 they um are associated with and that of course means taiwan because a war in the asia pacific
00:28:13 region involving the americans and of course changes the calculation as well so we are just
00:28:19 i mean the crystal ball that i have tells me we're just in an increasingly dangerous environment
00:28:24 with such degrees of uncertainty that things can really get worse really quickly i was hoping you
00:28:32 were going to give us something hopeful rob maybe that's maybe that's not available just now we'll
00:28:37 have you back to talk about this again as the situation matures but for now i just want to
00:28:44 thank you on behalf of western standard viewers for for coming on and sharing the sharing the kind
00:28:50 of information you would be sharing with government if they were to ask you rob thanks very much
00:28:58 thank you angel of the center for military and strategic studies in calgary and for the western
00:29:06 Standard and Nigel Hannaford.