New Culture Forum - May 09, 2022


Can Patriotism Save Us? David Starkey speaks at the NCF Conference

How To March BACK Through The Institutions & Regain Control The New Puritans: How Social Justice Captured the Western World

Episode Stats


Length

50 minutes

Words per minute

132.83

Word count

6,756

Sentence count

404


Transcript

Transcript generated with Whisper (turbo).
00:00:00 Peter, ladies and gentlemen, thank you.
00:00:08 We are at one of those extraordinary moments, I think,
00:00:13 in national, European and world affairs.
00:00:18 My very strong view that the greatest works,
00:00:21 and I'm not actually aiming to produce one in the next half hour,
00:00:25 but it would be nice if I did,
00:00:26 that the greatest works of political thought emerge from moments of crisis.
00:00:33 The equivalent great work of late antiquity is St. Augustine's City of God,
00:00:41 written in response to Allardic the Goths' invasion and capture of Rome in 410.
00:00:49 The achievement of Machiavelli is a direct consequence of the Italian wars
00:00:55 and the disintegration of the Concert of Italy in the early 16th century.
00:01:02 The Hobbes, still by far the most realistic analysis of the fundamental basis of politics in power,
00:01:12 is a response to the crisis of the English Civil War.
00:01:16 And the greatest analysis, full stop, of the nature of human society, is wrung out of Edmund Burke in the last few months of his life in response to what I regard as the fundamental catastrophe of humanity, which is the French Revolution.
00:01:35 I'm being deadly, deadly serious. The French Revolution is the catastrophe, as the state of France now demonstrates.
00:01:46 We are, of course, confronting, which lies much behind what's going on this afternoon,
00:01:57 we are confronting the events in the Ukraine.
00:02:01 And they do and should force us to rethink virtually every assumption of the post-Second World War,
00:02:10 Everything in particular that's set up in 1945 demands rethinking.
00:02:18 And all that is effectively the entire fabric of the so-called rubis,
00:02:24 the rules-based system of international relations.
00:02:27 Everything needs rethinking.
00:02:31 We need to start again.
00:02:34 And we can see, I think already, the very fact of this conference, the idea of patriotism, the West, not therefore nationhood, nationalism, not being really the Emily Thorne, the horror of the Union Jack, the implicit fascism.
00:03:00 You're where? God help me. There's a cross of St. George in front of me. You know, one has to do that and wave garlic.
00:03:09 Suddenly we are forced to rethink, are we not?
00:03:13 Because what we're seeing in the Ukraine is a moment of literally, to steal the title of the film, it is the birth of a nation.
00:03:25 Putin is right. There wasn't a real nation there before.
00:03:28 We're seeing the birth pacts in blood, iron, horror, toxic masculinity.
00:03:38 Zelensky incarnates toxic masculinity.
00:03:44 The recognition that right is meaningless without might.
00:03:52 The fact that there is a gender difference.
00:03:54 men go and fight
00:03:57 and women and children
00:03:59 go to safety
00:04:00 who would have thought it
00:04:03 what shameful traditionalism
00:04:07 right
00:04:09 now that immediately
00:04:12 puts a central question
00:04:14 because of course
00:04:16 the standard rhetoric
00:04:18 of everything
00:04:20 from the EU to the British left
00:04:23 to the self-hatred
00:04:24 of the British and American left, has been the notion that nationhood and patriotism are
00:04:30 fundamentally inadequate and indeed probably wrong, and that what we should be doing instead
00:04:37 is embracing a doctrine of some form of doctrine of universalism. And of course, all of this
00:04:44 achieved its sublime expression in one of the silliest, I think, essays of the human spirit,
00:04:51 Francis Fukuyama's End of History.
00:04:55 Has anybody ever read it?
00:04:56 If you haven't, please do.
00:04:59 The man aspires to be a prophet.
00:05:03 He forecasts the triumph of the liberal, democratic, universal state.
00:05:09 He considers in his essay, which is, thank God, much shorter than the book,
00:05:14 and contains everything of substance in it,
00:05:16 he considers the possible fate of Russia post-1989,
00:05:20 because, of course, the essay is written because of the fall of the Berlin Wall,
00:05:27 of the collapse of Soviet communism,
00:05:29 he considers the possibility that Russia might actually revert to its imperial pattern,
00:05:35 to its former Tsarist pattern, and says, what an absurd idea,
00:05:40 assuming that the world hasn't changed.
00:05:43 He considers the fact that would China revert to the model of an aggressive imperialism
00:05:48 imperialism based on the nationalism of the Han people. What an absurd thought, he says.
00:05:54 When prophets fail in prophecy, they're to be seen what they are as mere charlatans.
00:06:00 Mere, mere charlatans. And this raises the question, therefore.
00:06:05 Patriotism clearly is central, and a sense of nationhood is central, and even Fukuyama,
00:06:13 in his attempted reworking of his ideas has now acknowledged
00:06:18 that the liberal state needs to be grounded
00:06:22 in national identity.
00:06:26 Now this raises one utterly fundamental question.
00:06:29 What is the nature of liberalism?
00:06:33 Is liberalism a product of specific place
00:06:37 and circumstance and culture?
00:06:40 or is it a set of universal values as embraced, for example,
00:06:46 as embodied in, for example, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
00:06:51 the great achievement of the 1945 settlement
00:06:56 along with the creation of the United Nations.
00:06:59 And this, of course, is, I think, the fundamental issue.
00:07:03 It is Burke who, faced with another great moment of crisis, delivers the proper answer.
00:07:13 Because remember, we think of Burke as the prime philosopher of the right, as the prime philosopher of conservatism.
00:07:23 Burke is a lifelong wig.
00:07:27 Burke is a passionate supporter of the American Revolution.
00:07:31 Burke is a fundamental believer in tightly limited monarchy
00:07:37 and a lifelong opponent of George III.
00:07:42 How on earth does he become the founder of modern conservatism?
00:07:48 It is in response to the crisis of the French Revolution.
00:07:53 I'm sure we all know his reflections on the late turmoil in France,
00:08:00 whatever the precise phrase is, is written as an astonishing, I've already mentioned, prophecy.
00:08:06 I've classified and characterized Fukuyama as a false prophet because he fails in prophecy.
00:08:14 What is astonishing about Burke is that he is a genuine prophet. He writes in 1789. He writes
00:08:22 the very beginning of the process. All that's happened is you've had the fall of the Bastille
00:08:27 and the march on Versailles.
00:08:30 You have not had the terror.
00:08:31 You have not had Napoleon.
00:08:33 You have not had the revolutionary armies.
00:08:35 You have not had the aspiration to the conquest of Europe
00:08:39 and the upturning of world order.
00:08:41 None of that.
00:08:42 He forecasts it all and forecasts it precisely.
00:08:48 And what is the centerpiece of Burke's argument?
00:08:52 It is the centerpiece of mine
00:08:53 that the disaster of liberalism is the claim to be founded in universal values.
00:09:02 That there are, and I hope this is now going to be profoundly controversial,
00:09:06 there is no such thing as universal values.
00:09:12 Values are narrowly culturally defined.
00:09:17 Values are rooted in historical experience and they are anchored to place.
00:09:23 and they are not easily detached from place.
00:09:28 Burke understands this completely,
00:09:31 and his great criticism of the French Revolution
00:09:33 is its attempt at universalizing,
00:09:37 at trying to produce models of everything,
00:09:41 from the measurement of time,
00:09:44 to weights and measures,
00:09:46 to currency, to human rights,
00:09:48 to political structures that fit everybody,
00:09:51 based on the assumption that there is a common universal humanity.
00:09:57 Now, this idea is profoundly rooted in us.
00:10:02 I think it's wrong.
00:10:04 I think it's fundamentally wrong.
00:10:09 There is a common humanity in the broadest, broadest possible sense.
00:10:15 But it is one that tells us nothing about political values,
00:10:20 tells us nothing about culture
00:10:23 tells us nothing about language
00:10:25 and Burke recognizes
00:10:27 this. He sees
00:10:29 the attempt of the French
00:10:31 revolution at saying history
00:10:33 is a mistake
00:10:34 that the specificity of history
00:10:37 is a mistake
00:10:39 that what we, you know, the absurdity
00:10:41 that there are 24 hours in the day
00:10:43 how preposterous there should be 10
00:10:45 or that there are 12 weeks in the year
00:10:47 how utterly silly or 67
00:10:49 Literally, the French Revolution puts everything into tens.
00:10:53 How preposterous it is that there are geographical areas
00:10:57 that aren't exactly the same size.
00:11:01 It is this principle, thank God,
00:11:05 very briefly exemplified in Britain by late Tony Blair,
00:11:09 but with still utterly catastrophic consequences.
00:11:12 So what I'm going to posit then is the Burkean position.
00:11:15 Burke, in contrast, says that what society is, is not a contract of fragmented individuals.
00:11:25 Society is a contract that goes across generations.
00:11:29 It is a contract of past, present and future, of the dead, the living and those yet to be born.
00:11:35 And it is culturally, specifically rooted.
00:11:40 it. That's Burke's response to that first great crisis of universalism. And it seems to me that
00:11:48 what we've got to learn is that the attempt at producing universal human values or a single
00:11:54 system of international law is an absurdity. And it leads inevitably to the mess that we're in now
00:12:02 or to the disaster that was produced by the French Revolution.
00:12:07 Now, let us, again, I made the point right at the beginning
00:12:11 about the nature of evidence.
00:12:14 Can I now invite you to look not at the world as we thought it should be
00:12:18 with a single rule-based system of international law and all the rest of it,
00:12:23 the kind of thing that politicians of good looks and high superficiality
00:12:27 like Justin Trudeau perpetually chatter about.
00:12:30 But we need to look at the world as it is.
00:12:33 And I've argued, some of you will have been watching my YouTube channel, I know,
00:12:37 that the world as it is looks astonishingly like the world envisaged by George Orwell in 1984.
00:12:46 That is to say that we have, at the center of the Northern Hemisphere,
00:12:52 we have three great power blocks.
00:12:54 We have Ossinia, which is, again, explicit in 1984, America and the British Empire, fused.
00:13:08 We have Eurasia, which is an expanded Russia.
00:13:13 He assumes it's come to the frontiers of France, which, of course, is exactly what Putin's propagandists are saying it should do at the moment.
00:13:21 And then we have East Asia, which is a greater China.
00:13:26 And then you have the parallelogram of the rest of the world, which is in dispute.
00:13:31 Now, it seems to me that if you look at that, that corresponds pretty identically to the
00:13:37 line-up that has developed in the wake of the Ukraine crisis.
00:13:42 The West is simply Britain, the old Empire, the old Commonwealth, and America.
00:13:51 That's what it is. It's the five I's.
00:13:54 You know, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Britain, and the United States.
00:13:59 The adherence of the European Union to it is highly fragile.
00:14:05 Look at the behavior of Germany.
00:14:07 Germany was, of course, the model state in terms of Fukuyama's prophecy.
00:14:12 That's to say, the universal homogenous state that is purely driven by economic criteria
00:14:18 and it has nothing vulgar to do with foreign policy
00:14:21 or power politics and whatever.
00:14:24 Look at its fundamental moral cowardice.
00:14:29 Look at its incompetence in international relations.
00:14:33 Look at its supine posture.
00:14:35 And above all, look at the betrayal of the notion
00:14:38 that the Germans have genuinely come to terms with their history.
00:14:42 They have not.
00:14:44 They have not.
00:14:46 Right.
00:14:46 So, the West then is what? The West is fundamentally culturally homogenous. It is the offspring of the two British empires.
00:15:01 It's the United States of America, and it is then, remember, the unique feature of the British Empire was that it did not aspire to be universal.
00:15:14 The catastrophe of the Roman Empire, of the French empires, they aspired to universalism.
00:15:20 The British Empire is unique in that it envisages ending itself, not committing suicide, but a form of apotheosis.
00:15:31 Remember the fragmentation of the first empire that results with the rebellion of the United States of America and that successful rebellion is really a continuation of the British Civil War.
00:15:46 That's what it is. It is fundamentally those same disputes. Why is the American Revolution successful? Because it's not a real revolution.
00:15:56 It simply pretends to the universalism of the French.
00:16:01 You have the disaster of, you know,
00:16:03 we hold these truths to be self-evident,
00:16:06 that all men are born free and equal.
00:16:07 Can I point out, there's never been a sillier statement.
00:16:11 That far from being self-evident, it's deranged.
00:16:15 It's even deranged when you apply it to women.
00:16:22 Because how are we born?
00:16:24 we're not born free and equal, we're born wildly different, and we are born utterly, completely,
00:16:30 and absolutely dependent. And we're born not free, but amidst piss and shit, as again said,
00:16:38 this isn't Augustine, it's not me. It's exactly what Augustine says. And what we need to understand
00:16:46 is that the American Revolution was successful in spite of those absurd circumstances. Because
00:16:53 what the American Revolution does is simply incorporate English common law and the existing
00:17:00 structures of English government, which are very, very lightly glossed over with the universalism
00:17:07 of the late Enlightenment. That's all that happens. You just give a little lick of Roman
00:17:11 paint to what is basically a British institution. If you don't believe me, ask why the American
00:17:16 House of Representatives sits on green benches and has got something called a speaker in
00:17:20 charge of it. And even more interestingly, why its administrative officer is called,
00:17:26 Americans can't even pronounce it, the Sergeant at Arms. And if you ask an American why the
00:17:31 Administrative Officer of the House of Representatives is called the Sergeant at Arms,
00:17:35 they will look at you with horror and say, is it? What's that? And it is, of course,
00:17:41 purely because that was the case in England. So the universalism of Rome, the universalism
00:17:50 of France was utterly challenged by Britain. Britain after the loss of the American colonies
00:17:56 because the colonies wanted self-government, which was of course the... Remember, we are not
00:18:02 a historic democracy. This again is a complete myth. Britain has been a democracy for less than
00:18:07 100 years. What we are is a profoundly rooted system of representative and limited and law-based
00:18:15 government. That is what really is important. That's what we are, and it's rooted in our
00:18:21 institutions, and it is this pattern of historical institutions which is fundamentally significant
00:18:27 and makes us what we are, and what we are the immensely fortunate heirs of. And America
00:18:32 incorporates that with the disastrous series of grand universalist claims, which of course
00:18:40 have been exposed with brutality,
00:18:44 with the whole war about race and everything else
00:18:47 which has followed from the 1960s onwards.
00:18:51 The British Empire, after the failure in America,
00:18:53 does something truly astonishing.
00:18:56 With the Durham Report
00:18:58 and the development then of the idea of dominions,
00:19:01 it consciously envisages
00:19:03 that the white Commonwealth and India, remember,
00:19:08 will become independent, self-governing states
00:19:13 on the model of the home country.
00:19:15 This is the absolute opposite of the Roman notion,
00:19:19 the complete, total opposite.
00:19:22 In other words, it is, as it were, an inductive empire
00:19:26 as opposed to the Roman empire of deduction,
00:19:29 which is a single universal model,
00:19:31 which, of course, meets the absolute collapse
00:19:33 between 410 and 465 in the West.
00:19:38 So what I'm wanting to suggest, in fact, is that what went catastrophically wrong is that we forgot that liberty and freedom are not universal.
00:19:50 They're culturally specific.
00:19:53 They don't export very easily, as we've tried with the neoconservative endeavors in Iraq and Afghanistan.
00:20:02 Can you imagine anything sillier than waging a war so that women could wear a miniscope?
00:20:08 I mean, that was actually a specified war aim.
00:20:15 Now, I can well understand why a woman may wish to,
00:20:18 but if you conceive of doing that in a tribal society,
00:20:22 you can see what the problem is.
00:20:25 And then this also raises something else.
00:20:27 Why have some countries been able to adopt to modernity,
00:20:31 either a result of imperial conquest or a result of collision?
00:20:35 Remember, what happens with the Anglo-American world as it emerges from the War of 1812 and in the 19th century is that every country in the world has to come to terms with the economic and social nature of the West and industrialization.
00:20:52 And you do it either by imperial conquest or you do it by self-generated change, like Meiji Japan in the 19th century, or China and South Korea and so on, and South Asia in general in the 20th and 21st centuries.
00:21:10 We need to ask the fundamental questions about why countries are able to do this, some, and, for example, virtually the whole of Africa and most of South America, not.
00:21:21 You therefore have to answer absolutely culturally specific questions,
00:21:26 and they relate above all to the nature of the family
00:21:28 and the primacy of the family and the existence of independent institutions.
00:21:34 The reason for the peculiarity of the Anglo-Saxon world, which is what it is,
00:21:38 is best discussed in the most brilliant book by Alan McFarlane,
00:21:43 which is called The Origins of English Individualism,
00:21:45 and he argues that our great strength is the weakness of our family.
00:21:50 The fact that we have very weak family structures,
00:21:54 everybody goes along, isn't the Italian family lovely?
00:21:58 Or isn't the Irish family lovely?
00:22:00 Yes, it leads directly to the IRA on the one hand
00:22:03 and the mafia on the other.
00:22:10 It's true.
00:22:12 It's true.
00:22:14 We have to say these things.
00:22:17 We have to say them.
00:22:18 So, what I'm wanting to say then is, what has undone the West? Why are we having this conscience? Why are we worried about the very moment of what should have been our triumph? We have been undercut by identity politics. We've been undercut by anti-imperialism. We've been undercut by the whole business of everything.
00:22:39 Remember, I was a pioneer of gay rights, God help me.
00:22:42 Everything from gay rights, trans rights, you know, the whole business, the whole poisonous, toxic business of race.
00:22:50 What went wrong?
00:22:53 What went wrong was the creation of the universal institutions in 1945.
00:23:00 This is what's gone wrong in international relations.
00:23:03 This is what's gone wrong in human rights.
00:23:05 If you look at, and again I've argued this seriously, that Russia is actually winning the war of international opinion.
00:23:15 We lie to ourselves.
00:23:18 If you look at the G20, only 11 of them supported sanctions against Russia.
00:23:24 The other nine, Turkey in NATO, India, former member of the Commonwealth, Argentina, Indonesia.
00:23:34 none of them has supported sanctions. This is because Russia, with its masterful role in the
00:23:42 United Nations, came up with an entirely novel set of doctrines that deliberately displaced
00:23:49 the universalism of the West with an invocation of regional power blocks on the one hand,
00:23:57 But above all, of international patterns of behavior that respected, listen to them, national, cultural, and confessional norms.
00:24:08 In other words, the world as it is, which is why the Russians have done extremely well in all of this.
00:24:14 We mythologize ourselves. The world is not against Russia.
00:24:19 It is just Ossinia plus a few bits and pieces that are against Russia.
00:24:23 And what we're now seeing is the coming together of Eurasia and East Asia, a new alternative world block, complete with its own system of payments because we've expelled Russia from SWIFT between Russia and China.
00:24:38 But it goes beyond that. The Soviet Union and the rest of the, in those days, the powers of Eastern Europe, performed an extraordinarily clever game, turning the doctrine of universal human rights against the West.
00:24:56 and this is very clearly set out
00:25:01 if you actually look at the whole way
00:25:03 in which freedom of speech has been undermined.
00:25:06 It's been undermined
00:25:08 by the doctrines of universal human rights
00:25:12 being turned from the protection
00:25:15 of the individual against the state
00:25:17 to the protection of diverse groups
00:25:20 within the state by overreaching state power.
00:25:24 And have you all noticed the very strange thing that Russia is constantly going on about the Ukraine being Nazi and fascist?
00:25:35 The reason for this is very simple.
00:25:37 The first erosion of the doctrines of freedom of speech,
00:25:41 that remember very ambiguously drafted article 2021 of the Universal Declaration,
00:25:47 were the result of Russia writing into the peace treaties with Austria, with Hungary, and whatever,
00:25:53 that they had to be anti-fascist
00:25:57 and that any assertion of fascism was to be a criminal offence.
00:26:02 You legislate from the very beginning
00:26:05 restriction of freedom of speech.
00:26:09 And then from that point onwards,
00:26:10 you use doctrines of imperialism,
00:26:13 of course, to get the third world on side,
00:26:16 right through the 60s and whatever, the 50s and 60s.
00:26:18 And then in the 60s, you take over with the notion
00:26:21 of minority rights and again the notion that the only thing that can protect minority rights
00:26:28 is the state as against other individuals so the whole way in which the we've got the free speech
00:26:35 union here the origin of the limitation of freedom of speech lies in the overreach of the universal
00:26:41 doctrine of human rights and the creation of course of the united nations machinery to maintain it
00:26:48 So again, I go right back to the beginning. We've got to do something different. We've got to start to invoke consciously that the West is best. We've to lose this sense of shame. We have to look at the astonishing achievement of our history in which opposites are reconciled.
00:27:09 reconciled. We've to stop picking out the slaver and the slave. We've got to stop picking out the
00:27:17 Whig and the Tory. We've got to stop picking out the Royalist and the Republican. We descend from
00:27:22 all of them. We have this astonishing achievement of a polity in which we are the offspring of all
00:27:30 of them. And this attempt at picking out, as it were, the victim and lording them, and the vanquished
00:27:37 and the victor and despising them is a catastrophe.
00:27:41 It destroys the astonishing achievement of the West.
00:27:46 I'll read, to conclude, before a final conclusion,
00:27:49 I'll read what I did when I gave a version of this lecture
00:27:52 a little while ago at one of the evening's,
00:27:55 one of the splendid party evenings
00:27:57 of the National Cultural Forum, New Cultural Forum,
00:28:01 and it's T.S. Eliot's Little Gidding.
00:28:04 If we're to take history seriously,
00:28:05 What I'm suggesting is that history is the numinous basis of the state.
00:28:11 History is the emotional foundation of the state, of the Western state, of Britain and America and Australia, Canada and whatever in particular.
00:28:21 It's striking, of course, that in traditional states, the legislature is invariably built in Gothic architecture.
00:28:27 That suggests that he is embedded, rooted in the historical experience.
00:28:33 And Eliot, more than all of poets, seizes this notion in Little Gidding.
00:28:43 He's talking about the monuments in a country church and of people, not wholly commendable,
00:28:49 of not immediate kin or kindness, but of some peculiar genius, all touched by a common genius,
00:28:58 united in the strife which divided them.
00:29:00 If I think of a king at nightfall, of three men and more on the scaffold, and a few who died forgotten in other places here and abroad, the one who died blind and quiet, why should we celebrate these dead men more than the dying?
00:29:18 It is not to ring the bell backward, nor is it an incantation to summon the spectre of a rose.
00:29:26 We cannot revive old factions. We cannot restore old policies or follow an antique drum.
00:29:32 These men and those who oppose them and those whom they oppose accept the constitution of silence
00:29:38 and are folded into a single party.
00:29:42 Whatever we inherit from the fortunate, we have taken from the defeated.
00:29:46 what they had to leave us, a symbol, a symbol perfected in death, and all shall be well and
00:29:53 all manner of things shall be well by the purification of the motive in the ground of
00:29:59 our beseeching. We need to understand that. We need to understand that insofar as there is a
00:30:08 commitment to those values of liberty and of freedom and of law. It lies in those ancestors,
00:30:18 those ancestors on both sides. You will not find it in China. You will not find it in Russia.
00:30:26 You will not find it in Africa. You will not find it in South America. That does not mean
00:30:33 that a Russian, or a Chinese, or a South American, or an African cannot absorb those values.
00:30:41 But they do it by a process of acculturation, but what I would call becoming bicultural.
00:30:50 And we need to start thinking of that. We need to begin with that sense of patriotism,
00:30:57 of pride but of humility because we did nothing to create it. We're merely the
00:31:05 fortunate inheritors but we will be blamed if we lose it.
00:31:27 Come on, give me an excuse to keep talking.
00:31:36 Here, have we on the mic?
00:31:38 There's one here.
00:31:39 Absolutely.
00:31:40 Thank you, David.
00:31:41 Really stimulating talk, as always.
00:31:44 I just was missing how you think the universalized ideas really took hold of the American Revolution,
00:31:53 if you see them as originally French.
00:31:56 And also, how much stock do you put in, well, what's become known as the Tom Holland thesis of Western universalism being an offspring of Christianity?
00:32:06 Yeah, right.
00:32:08 The Americans got it simply because the things were bloody fashionable.
00:32:12 And it's pure fashion.
00:32:14 You know, Jefferson is a would-be.
00:32:18 We know that what the Americans, if you actually look at the great, and I think the founding fathers, it's a banal statement that they are one of the most extraordinary groups of human beings that have ever existed.
00:32:31 But what they did, they read effectively the works of French Abbey.
00:32:36 The reason that they were so rational about the risks of democracy,
00:32:40 which, of course, was an extraordinary experiment that they were undertaking,
00:32:44 was because the French Abbey had drawn up these vast lists of constitutions
00:32:50 and failures of democratic constitutions, so they were all aware of that.
00:32:54 So they were soaked in French culture, and they were soaked in the culture of the Enlightenment.
00:32:58 And the great problem, of course, is that the English Enlightenment, the English Enlightenment at the end of the 17th century, is a highly specific thing.
00:33:07 This is where all the ideas come from, you know, with Locke and Newton and all the rest of it.
00:33:12 And then when the French take it over in the 18th century, they, of course, can't admit that they've taken it from the English, can they?
00:33:19 So you have to produce these grotesque schemes of the notion of a universal man.
00:33:25 And so I think it really is as simple as that with America.
00:33:30 Now, the universalism of Christianity, well, I think it's a great case of yes, but.
00:33:35 And remember, it's really, it's Paul, isn't it?
00:33:39 With, you know, there is neither Jew nor Greek nor whatever.
00:33:46 But that's equality in the sight of God, not of man.
00:33:52 which is why early Christianity,
00:33:53 indeed, Christianity for most of its history,
00:33:55 is perfectly relaxed about tyranny.
00:33:58 It's perfectly relaxed about slavery,
00:34:01 because it's only in your relationship with God
00:34:03 that this actually applies.
00:34:05 And the shift of that to a series of, as it were,
00:34:10 political statements is normally heretical.
00:34:15 It is the various heretical groups in the Middle Ages.
00:34:19 It is, of course, various peasants and pseudo-peasant revolts in 14th century England, with this, again, the association very often of Lollardy with peasant leveling, Cade and everything else, which you get.
00:34:38 And so I don't see Christianity at all as having that necessary consequence.
00:34:46 I think that what happens is it's Christianity that then elides into the culture, particularly of the Anglo-Saxon world.
00:34:57 If you look at where these ideas are developed,
00:35:00 If you look, for example, where the, particularly the abolitionist movement and the notion of the, you know, the iniquity of slavery, it is purely within the Anglo-Saxon world.
00:35:13 I mean, do we, again, there's been this great fuss in the Caribbean about the fact, you know, and inflicting on not terribly bright members of the royal family the entire, the entire, the entire burden of guilt over slavery.
00:35:25 What I think somebody should do is gently ask them, would they have preferred to have been French?
00:35:36 I mean, colonized by the French.
00:35:43 Shall we look at the experience of the most important French colony, of Saint-Domingue, that we now call Haiti?
00:35:51 Haiti was indeed, the slaves in Haiti were freed for five minutes by the French Revolution.
00:35:59 Then Napoleon seeks to re-impose, and they have their own revolution, with Toussaint L'Ouverture and whatever,
00:36:05 and then there is the attempt at re-imposing by Napoleon slavery.
00:36:10 That is defeated, whereupon the people of Haiti carry out one of the most unspeakable massacres of a white population ever.
00:36:21 You destroy, it's a bit like Ireland with its governing class,
00:36:26 you destroy the basis of the civilization,
00:36:28 admittedly a pretty horrible one.
00:36:32 How then does Haiti finally get its independence from France?
00:36:36 Can anybody tell me?
00:36:38 They pay for it.
00:36:40 They are required to pay a hundred,
00:36:43 this is by the restoration government,
00:36:45 is it 1823 or 1823?
00:36:47 Oh, I'm not doing badly, am I?
00:36:48 They are required to pay 150 million gold francs to buy their freedom from France.
00:36:56 That debt continues to be paid until 1943, when it is held by the Citibank of New York.
00:37:06 That is how you would have been treated if you'd been part of the French Empire and not part of the British Empire.
00:37:12 So whenever we hear them squeals about reparations,
00:37:16 I think they should be told that little story.
00:37:19 And I am happy to write the speech
00:37:20 for the next junior member of the royal family,
00:37:23 who visits.
00:37:33 Can we have Eric and then the gentleman here?
00:37:37 So here.
00:37:38 Yes.
00:37:39 Yeah, hopefully this is working. Thanks for a lovely speech, David. And I agree with a lot of it, but I, as a fellow Anglosphere individual from Canada, I want to sort of maybe take a less sort of sunny view of the sort of Anglo-Saxon society and culture.
00:37:59 because can't we say that essentially wokeness is an Anglo-Saxon cultural invention?
00:38:06 And so what I guess I would argue is that even though there aren't many good things
00:38:10 that come out of that Anglo heritage, there's also bad things that are coming out of that heritage.
00:38:15 And don't we have to hope there is at least some cultural universalism
00:38:20 to allow perhaps other parts of the world to check the wokeness
00:38:24 that is sort of running riot in the Anglosphere?
00:38:27 I don't think woke is Anglo-Saxon.
00:38:29 I think woke is French it's oh bye bye it's French and German look look look
00:38:37 and look and look and look and look and look and look at the people who are
00:38:40 responsible for it there isn't an English name amongst them name and name
00:38:45 any one of that part apart from the business of critical race theory the
00:38:49 entire philosophical foundation is Franco-German is that not true I think
00:38:56 No, no, no, no, come on, things are either true or false.
00:39:00 Give me, give me, give me.
00:39:04 No, I'm being deadly serious.
00:39:07 Now, what I think has happened, again, sorry, that is a very serious position.
00:39:12 What we're seeing is, and this again is a really very interesting question.
00:39:16 I had one of these moments of epiphany when I had what I called my deck chair of history
00:39:23 at Dartmouth College in New Hampshire in the 1980s.
00:39:27 It was called my deck chair because I could only hold it during the summer quarter.
00:39:31 And we had, so it was a deck chair, and we had visiting, we had Dedida, the high priest
00:39:39 of much of this stuff.
00:39:41 And it was called, you lectured in the theatre in the woods, which was this kind of pulpit.
00:39:45 It was obviously modelled on, you know, voice crying in the wilderness, which is the motto of Dartmouth College.
00:39:51 So there was huge clearing in the woodland, and you had this vast pulpit,
00:39:54 and you were supposed, you know, like Jesus or John the Baptist or Martin Luther, to address the multitude.
00:40:00 I have never been as bored in my life.
00:40:02 And he went on for an hour and a half in incomprehensible, high-flowing Franco-English,
00:40:07 with the emphasis, in all the wrong places.
00:40:09 And the whole event turned into a kind of parody of Haydn's farewell symphony.
00:40:14 Little groups udging out at the side.
00:40:16 And I wondered at that point, how can this rubbish have ever been so attractive?
00:40:21 And this is the big question we've got to answer,
00:40:24 and the explanation is the one that I have given you.
00:40:27 There is a direct continuation between the points of Soviet attack
00:40:31 on using the doctrines of universal human rights,
00:40:35 first on imperialism, and then on minority rights.
00:40:38 And it seems to me that all that's happened is that these various people, these various Franco-German thinkers, especially when they're embedded in a fatly paying American chair, pick on these points.
00:40:56 And really, they're supplying no more than effectiveness slogans.
00:41:01 Nobody actually reads this stuff.
00:41:02 But the emotional underpinning of it, and this is the point you should have been making, which goes back to Christianity, is English Puritanism, is American Puritanism.
00:41:12 And so much of the left is really just another peculiarly awful version of Puritanism.
00:41:19 And this is understood completely, of course, by George Orwell.
00:41:22 And again, one of the things that's really striking about this is the extent to which clearly the new left had read Orwell.
00:41:32 this is the terrifying thing
00:41:36 if you actually look
00:41:37 at
00:41:38 some of the key essays
00:41:42 on whatever it is
00:41:43 the one on repressive freedom
00:41:44 the really famous one
00:41:46 he's actually read Orwell
00:41:49 and so he turns
00:41:51 the developments
00:41:53 as it were satirised into Orwell
00:41:55 into actual principles of action
00:41:57 and I think
00:41:59 it is this
00:42:00 counter streak
00:42:02 in Anglo-Saxon culture,
00:42:05 this streak of repression,
00:42:08 this streak of hostility to pleasure,
00:42:10 this streak of self-flagellation,
00:42:13 which has been given a secular form.
00:42:19 Which, again, of course, Puritanism
00:42:21 picks up this strange doctrine of Christianity,
00:42:24 which is equally mad and comes from equally outside the culture.
00:42:28 It's equally incomprehensible
00:42:29 when it's mixed with Greek Gnosticism.
00:42:32 Anyway, that's a rival right, but I think, you see, that is how I would approach the issue.
00:42:39 I think that it is the catastrophe of the universal doctrines of human rights and how they were perverted by...
00:42:47 If you look at... There's a famous essay, and I should have brought it with me because I've forgotten its title,
00:42:54 which provides the legal basis for the limitation of freedom of speech
00:42:58 through the various modifications between the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
00:43:03 and what is the second version in the 1960s,
00:43:07 which is the one that is actually legally binding.
00:43:10 And all the limitations on freedom of speech come from the Soviet bloc.
00:43:17 And they're all cited with acclaim by the human rights lawyers.
00:43:23 It's an extraordinary story, and it needs telling.
00:43:28 This gentleman here, I think that's a final question, I think.
00:43:32 For your talk, I wanted to ask you about,
00:43:35 since you've talked about the Enlightenment and France and Christianity,
00:43:40 it strikes me a lot these days, these years,
00:43:43 that every time I read Descartes' famous dictum,
00:43:46 I think, therefore I am,
00:43:49 it strikes me that it's an inadequate and incomplete description
00:43:53 of what it means to be a human being.
00:43:54 In other words, if you build your whole sort of Christianity
00:43:57 or your philosophy of life on such an inadequate foundation,
00:44:01 your house will just simply collapse one day.
00:44:04 And I wonder if that's why the Western mind
00:44:06 is in such a state these days.
00:44:08 I wonder what you think of that.
00:44:12 I think that's an extraordinarily shrewd observation.
00:44:15 In other words, the standard, you know,
00:44:19 cogito e cosoma, whatever.
00:44:21 And this is precisely, of course, what Burke denies.
00:44:27 Burke denies that politics is fundamentally reasonable.
00:44:32 Politics is not reasonable.
00:44:35 The foundations of human society are not reason.
00:44:40 The foundations of society are emotional.
00:44:44 They are not the product of freedom.
00:44:46 They are the product of dependence.
00:44:48 They are not the product of will.
00:44:50 They are the product of history.
00:44:53 We are bored into a society.
00:44:56 We are born into a language.
00:44:58 We are born into sets of values.
00:45:01 We enter into a dialogue with them.
00:45:03 And again, it's really important that we don't see them.
00:45:07 The traditional position has been, of course, that that is to put yourself in a straitjacket.
00:45:13 That to accept, as it were, the givenness of society is to put yourself in chains.
00:45:19 Again, it's the Rousseau position.
00:45:21 We're born free, but we're everywhere in chains.
00:45:24 the far subtler position
00:45:26 is not only Burke, it's going
00:45:28 back very, very much earlier
00:45:30 right to the foundation of
00:45:32 again the extraordinary cultural
00:45:34 collusion between Anglo-Saxon
00:45:36 culture and that of Latin Europe
00:45:38 particularly in the 14th
00:45:41 century and particularly in the work of
00:45:42 Geoffrey Chaucer. Chaucer
00:45:44 right at the beginning
00:45:45 when he is looking
00:45:48 in the Parliament of Fowles
00:45:50 when he is looking at one of those
00:45:52 extraordinary
00:45:54 pieces of the Roman world
00:45:57 that have come down to him. The dream of
00:45:59 Scipio, which actually looks
00:46:01 at the idealization of the Roman state
00:46:03 and all the rest of it, and he thinks,
00:46:04 God, this is boring. He goes to sleep
00:46:06 and dreams, instead of a dream of parliament
00:46:09 of fowls, all, you know, getting off
00:46:10 and making love to each other. But there's
00:46:12 this wonderful
00:46:14 pair of couplets
00:46:16 in which he addresses the
00:46:18 whole question of the relationship
00:46:20 between old and new.
00:46:22 And this seems to me, we were talking, I was chatting to some people before I came in here,
00:46:28 on what education is about.
00:46:30 This is what education is about.
00:46:32 It's the realisation, it is fundamentally cultural transmission on the one hand,
00:46:37 the essential duty of the teacher is to hand over the cultural inheritance of the past,
00:46:42 but to do it in a way which equips the child to do something new with it.
00:46:48 Old and new are in permanent and fruitful dialogue.
00:46:51 And Chaucer understands, it's just, listen, out of old fields, as men saith, cometh all this new corn from year to year, the cycle of organic growth.
00:47:03 And out of old books, in good faith, cometh all this new science that men leer, that men learn.
00:47:12 Old books are new.
00:47:14 This, again, every great figure has said the same.
00:47:18 Newton. I see further because I stand on the shoulder of giants. It's always, and this notion
00:47:24 that art is all about kicking it away and putting ice cream cones with flies on them on top of
00:47:30 monuments in Trafalgar Square is crass vulgarity. It's absurd, and it shames our city.
00:47:40 The joke is good once when it's done with a urinal, but that was in New York in 1919,
00:47:45 and it's merely, it's a historic
00:47:48 fart and
00:47:49 it is
00:47:52 shameful and stale and is disgusting
00:47:54 but Chaucer
00:47:55 but you see what
00:47:58 Chaucer is doing, what Hegel is
00:47:59 doing, what Burke is
00:48:02 doing, what all the greats
00:48:04 are doing is recognizing
00:48:06 the givenness
00:48:07 recognizing that yes
00:48:12 we have our reason
00:48:12 and our reason is vital
00:48:15 in that process but our reason doesn't begin with itself. It's given things to work with
00:48:23 both insiders and outside. In fact and in the reality of human relations and human culture
00:48:31 and human language. And the disaster of the universalism of 1945, of the universalism of
00:48:38 the French Revolution, of the universalism of the Roman world was to fail to understand that.
00:48:45 and to simply apply a universal, abstract rule of reason,
00:48:53 which is, by definition, procrustean.
00:48:56 And we all know what that means.
00:48:58 If the bed of procrustes, if you didn't fit it,
00:49:02 you were too short, you were stretched to fit it.
00:49:05 If you didn't fit it because you were too long,
00:49:07 bits were cut off.
00:49:08 And that's exactly what the single arbitrary rule of reason means.
00:49:13 It is a torment of human society.
00:49:16 Thank you very much.
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